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Indian
Journalism
in
a
New
Era
Changes,
Challenges,
and
Perspectives
Edited
by
Shakuntala
Rao
OXFORD
UNIVERSITY
PRESS
OXFORD
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CHAPTER
SEVEN
The
Media
Are
Biased
Exploring
Online
Right-
Wing
Responses
to
Mainstream
News
in
India
KALYANI
CHADHA
AND
PRASHANTH
BHAT
India
’
s
national
election
of
2014
was
significant
for
bringing
to
power
the
Hindu
nationalist
BJP
in
a
decisive
victory
that
ended
decades
of
coalition
rule
in
the
country.
From
a
media
standpoint,
this
election
was
also
notable
for
the
extensive
coverage
given
to
the
successful
party
and
its
leader
Narendra
Modi.
According
to
an
analysis
con
ducted
by
the
non-partisan
CMS
Media
Lab,
Mr
Modi
and
the
BJP
got
close
to
40
per
cent
of
all
prime-time
television
coverage
in
the
run-up
to
the
election,
significantly
more
than
any
other
politician
or
political
group
(CMS
Media
Lab
2014:
1).
Some
media
observers
even
commented
on
what
they
perceived
to
be
the
overt
support
of
Mr
Modi
by
sections
of
the
national
media
(Guha
Thakurta
2014).
But
despite
the
recent
favourable
coverage,
members
of
the
Indian
political
right
as
represented
by
the
BJP
and
its
ideological
allies
’
116
Kalyani
Chadha
and
Prashanth
Bhat
have
long
taken
the
position
that
the
country
’
s
so-called
‘
left-liberal
’
and
‘
pseudo-secular
’
,
mainstream
media
—
particularly
the
national
press
which
plays
a
crucial
agenda-setting
role
—
is
opposed
to
the
right
(Sonwalkar
2006).
The
tensions
between
the
political
right
and
mainstream
Indian
media
can
be
traced
back
to
the
late
1980s,
when
the
BJP,
acting
in
concert
with
other
Hindu
nationalist
groups,
launched
the
Hindutva
or
‘
Hinduness
’
,
campaign,
an
ideological
effort
aimed
at
redefining
India
as
a
‘
Hindu
’
nation
(Davis
2005).
Integral
to
the
campaign
was
the
proposed
construction
of
a
temple
in
the
northern
city
of
Ayodhya,
at
a
spot
which
devout
Hindus
identified
as
the
birthplace
of
their
god,
Rama.
As
this
spot
was
occupied
by
a
fifteenth-century
mosque,
the
demand
for
a
temple
resulted
in
a
dispute,
which
eventually
culminated
in
the
destruc
tion
of
the
mosque
by
so-called
‘
volunteers
’
from
Hindu
nationalist
organizations
in
December
1992
(Guha
2012).
This
was
followed
by
violent
riots
in
several
north
Indian
cities.
Not
surprisingly,
these
events,
which
marked
a
watershed
in
the
Hindu
nationalist
move
ment,
generated
considerable
media
coverage.
Interestingly,
although
some
commentators
criticized
the
‘
general
culpability
of
the
Indian
media
in
adopting
a
celebratory
attitude
towards
the
Hindu
Right
’
s
Ram
Janmabhumi
movement
’
(Ram
2012:
20),
right-wing
groups
argued
that
national
media
outlets
which
were
intent
on
‘
minority
appeasement
were
biased
against
the
majority
and
its
authentic
claims
(Prasad
2002).
While
right-wing
outrage
against
mainstream
national
media
continued
to
simmer,
it
surfaced
on
a
country-wide
scale
in
1999,
in
response
to
what
the
BJP
and
others
perceived
to
be
a
one-sided
media
coverage
of
the
murder
of
an
Australian
missionary
and
his
two
young
sons
by
activists
of
the
Bajrang
Dal,
a
Hindu
activist
organization.
As
one
commentator
put
it:
The
beating
up
of
conversion-resisting
tribals;
desecrations
of
Hindu
idols;
a
forced
exodus
of
non-Christians
...
None
of
which
items
were/
are
investigated
or
debated
or
published
by
the
‘
mainstream
’
media.
Instead,
theres
only
more
of
the
uneven
coverage:
Inconvenient
details
are
systematically
ignored;
there
is
no
retraction
of
bogus
‘
news
’
;
and
there
’
s
the
hard
sell
of
an
angelic
Christendom
suffering
under
a
barbaric
Hindutva.
At
the
editorial
level,
this
kind
of
consensus
can
only
be
an
engineered
one.
(Bhosle
1999)
The
Media
Are
Biased
117
Similarly,
in
2001,
a
sting
operation
conducted
by
the
news
weekly
Tehelka,
showing
the
BJP
president
Mr
Bangaru
Laxman
accepting
a
bribe
from
a
fake
arms
dealer
in
return
for
awarding
him
a
defense
contract,
riled
both
BJP
leaders
and
members
of
Hindu
nationalist
organizations
who
condemned
mainstream
media
coverage
as
a
political
hit
job
by
a
partisan
media
(Chaudhury
2002).
However,
the
perception
of
a
‘
left-liberal
media
bias
’
among
right-wing
circles
was
perhaps
most
effectively
reinforced
by
mainstream
media
cover
age
of
the
riots
that
took
place
in
Gujarat
in
2002,
a
state
governed
at
the
time
by
India
’
s
current
prime
minister,
Narendra
Modi.
These
riots
in
which
about
a
thousand
people,
mostly
Muslim,
were
killed,
constituted
the
first
large-scale
communaP
riots
following
the
launch
of
24-hour
television
news
channels
in
the
country,
and
for
the
first
time
in
Indian
history,
violence
was
carried
‘
live
’
,
on
television.
In
the
coverage
that
ensued,
the
national
press
actively
questioned
the
state
government
’
s
failure
to
contain
the
riots,
and
some
suggested
that
the
Modi
administration
had
in
fact
been
complicit
in
the
violence
(Ram
2012)
and
even
sought
his
apology
(
Newsl8.com
2013).
Predictably,
such
coverage
invited
charges
of
biased
reporting
from
the
BJP
and
other
right-wing
groups
who
accused
the
national
media,
notably
the
English-language
press,
of
‘
distorting
’
the
issue
and
demonizing
Hindu
organizations
and
their
supporters
’
(Hinduism
Today
2002).
Right-wing
activists
were
notably
incensed
by
editorials
that
called
on
Narendra
Modi
to
apologize
for
his
governments
failures,
argu
ing
that
such
demands
were
not
only
unfair
given
that
non-BJP
chief
ministers
were
never
asked
to
apologize
for
communal
clashes
in
their
states,
but
also
revealed
the
national
medias
deep-seated
anti-BJP/
anti-Hindu
stance.
As
they
put
it,
‘
they
[media]
only
listen
to
Muslims
and
ignore
Hindus
’
(Patel
et
al.
2002).
In
2012,
Modi
was
finally
cleared
of
involvement
in
the
2002
riots
by
the
Supreme
Court
of
India.
His
acquittal
gave
further
credence
to
the
perception
of
liberal
media
bias
among
BJP
supporters
and
right-wing
activists,
who
asserted
that
the
highest
courts
judgment
showed
that
the
mainstream
press
had
been
unfair
to
Modi
all
along.
Commenting
on
the
impact
of
the
coverage,
conservative
commenta
tor
Minhaz
Merchant
stated:
‘
Some
columnists
were
so
obsessively
and
often
viciously
anti-Modi
that
they
achieved
three
unintended
objectives:
one,
they
eroded
their
own
credibility;
two
they
generated
118
Kalyani
Chadha
and
Prashanth
Bhat
unexpected
support
for
Modi
among
readers
who
felt
he
was
being
unfairly
maligned;
and
three,
they
caused
widespread
revulsion
in
the
public
for
mainstream
media
’
(Merchant
2015).
Indeed,
a
pervasive
feeling
within
right-wing
circles
seemed
to
be
that
an
entire
constellation
of
powers
with
a
negative
intent
’
,
with
a
galaxy
of
sepoys,
especially
in
media
and
academia
’
,
was
‘
arrayed
against
them
(Srinivasan
2016).
But
unlike
media
scholars
and
observers
who
have
criticized
the
increasingly
‘
commercialized
and
corporatized
’
nature
of
the
Indian
news
media
(Rao
and
Mudgal
2015)
which
has
resulted
in
negative
implications
for
journalism,
including
growing
sensationalism
(Thussu
2007),
a
failure
to
focus
on
substan
tive
issues
(Mudgal
2011),
as
well
as
the
growing
influence
of
political
and
business
interests
over
news
(Chadha
and
Koliska
2016),
what
sets
the
right-wing
s
attack
on
mainstream
media
apart
is
its
emphasis
on
what
it
considers
the
‘
anti-Hindu
bias
’
of
the
latter.
And
although
this
sense
of
grievance
is
by
no
means
new,
it
found
an
especially
potent
avenue
for
expression
due
to
changes
in
India
’
s
technological
landscape
(Vaidya
2016).
Thus,
whereas
until
this
point,
the
Hindu
right
had
mainly
sought
to
counter
what
they
perceived
to
be
the
anti-Hindu
and
anti-BJP
tenor
of
mainstream
media
narratives
through
publications
such
as
the
pro-BJP
paper
the
Pioneer,
or
the
RSS
mouthpiece
the
Organizer,
they
could
now
take
advantage
of
the
tremendous
surge
in
internet
use
in
India
as
well
as
the
growth
of
online
media
platforms.
Indeed,
just
as
the
medium
of
state
television-
through
its
broadcasting
of
the
Hindu
epic
the
Ramayana
—
contributed
to
the
rise
of
Hindutva-related
ideologies
in
the
1980s
(Rajagopal
2001),
the
combination
of
enhanced
connectivity
and
new
virtual
spaces
enabled
right-wing
intellectuals
and
activists
to
establish
a
variety
of
websites
and
news
and
commentary
portals
that
are
characterized
by
an
oppositional
stance
vis-a-vis
mainstream
media.
The
earliest
and
initially
most
influential
exemplar
of
such
websites
was
NitiCentral.com
.
Established
in
August
2012
‘
to
challenge
the
mainstream
media
by
providing
an
alternate.
Right
of
Center,
perspective
’
,
this
site
was
shut
down
in
2015.
Since
then,
the
task
of
opposing
mainstream
news
narratives
has
been
taken
on
by
other
right-leaning
news
and
commentary
websites.
In
this
chapter,
we
explore
the
dis
course
ofSwarajyamag.com
,
Oplndia.com
,
and
Indiafacts.org
—
three
right-wing
online
news
portals
that
are
exemplars
of
the
varied
types
The
Media
Are
Biased
119
of
sites
that
have
gained
a
growing
following
among
the
so-called
‘
Internet
Hindus
’
,
and
that
contain
‘
a
new
kind
of
ideology-centric
journalism
’
(Khan
2015)
aimed
at
challenging
and
countering
main
stream
news
accounts.
In
doing
so,
we
aim
to
provide
empirical
insight
into
a
crucial
component
of
the
country
’
s
emergent
conservative
counter
sphere,
which
offers
an
institutionalized
‘
communicative
environment
for
right-wing
thinkers
(Schmidt
2008).
We
begin
by
offering
a
brief
description
of
these
sites,
followed
by
a
discussion
of
their
media-related
discourse,
and
conclude
by
reflecting
on
their
role
in
the
emergence
of
an
increasingly
visible
conservative
Hindu
counter-sphere
that
appears
to
be
inspired
by
the
‘
conservative
counter-sphere
in
the
United
States
(Major
2012).
Defining
itself
as
the
‘
big
tent
for
right
of
center
discourse
’
,
Swarajya
(meaning
freedom)
states
that
it
believes
in
‘
celebrating
and
promot
ing
India
’
s
cultural
heritage
’
,
‘
secularism
which
does
not
pander,
and
supporting
the
‘
integrity
of
India
’
.
The
news
portal
which
was
launched
in
September
2014
evolved
out
of
a
print
weekly
founded
in
1956,
which
promoted
quintessentially
conservative
values
such
as
indi
vidual
liberty,
limited
government,
and
free-market
economics
that
represented
a
stark
contrast
to
the
socialist
ethos
that
characterized
India
at
the
time.
While
the
magazine
shut
down
following
the
death
of
its
founders
in
1980,
the
owners
of
a
right-wing
website,
www.
centreright.in,
purchased
the
rights
to
its
name
and
relaunched
it
as
an
online
news
portal
in
2014.^
Despite
its
relatively
recent
provenance,
Swarajyamag.com
currently
enjoys
the
most
traffic
among
similar
right-wing
news
portals
in
India,
with
an
estimated
751,136
unique
visitors
every
month.
It
also
has
496,007
likes
on
Facebook
and
over
42,000
followers
on
Twitter
as
of
June
2017.
But
while
the
portal
bills
itself
as
an
independent
voice,
its
content
—
which
is
provided
by
a
combination
of
professional
staff
and
independent
contributors
—
makes
its
political
affiliation
and
ideology
unambiguous.
Articles
with
headlines
such
as
Why
They
(Left-Liberals)
Don
’
t
Want
Modi
to
Succeed
’
,
and
‘
Radical
Islamists
Are
Now
Looking
to
Destroy
Tamil
Nadu
’
s
Dargahs
’
,'*
give
away
the
site
’
s
ideological
moorings
(see
also
www.Swarajyamag.com
2015).
Not
only
does
its
executive
editorial
board
include
several
well-known
right-wing
intellectuals,
but
many
prominent
members
of
the
BJP
and
the
Modi
government
also
contribute
to
the
website,
which
contains
120
Kalyani
Chadha
and
Prashanth
Bhat
articles
on
topics
such
as
‘
countering
media
propaganda
against
Modi
and
mainstream
medias
liberal
bias
’
.
Like
Swarajyamag.com
,
Oplndia.com
was
launched
in
December
2014
by
a
right-leaning
academic,
and
focuses
exclusively
on
criticism
of
so-called
‘
liberal
media.
The
site
highlights
what
it
perceives
to
be
biased
reporting
by
both
national
and
international
English-language
press,
both
of
which
it
deems
anti-Hindu
and
anti-India.
Stating
that
‘
In
India,
politics
and
journalism
attract
some
of
the
worst
brains,
thanks
to
the
system
that
has
evolved
over
time
’
,
Oplndia.com
represents
itself
as
an
attempt
to
break
free
of
this
system
’
by
supporting
‘
libertarian
politics
and
journalism
that
is
free
from
the
burden
of
liberal
bias
and
political
correctness
’
.
The
website
has
522,460
monthly
visitors
and
is
regularly
followed
by
over
41,000
readers
on
Twitter
and
108,000
people
on
Facebook.
In
addition
to
articles
and
rebuttals
to
the
con
tent
published
in
mainstream
news
outlets,
Oplndia.com
also
invites
its
readers
to
contribute
articles
and
opinion
pieces.
With
a
self-proclaimed
aim
of
countering
the
so-called
propaganda
against
Hinduism,
a
group
of
Indologists
started
Indiafacts.org
,
a
website
dedicated
to
the
discussion
of
Hindu
philosophy,
politics,
and
media-related
topics.
The
site
is
less
popular
than
both
Swarajya
and
Opindia,
but,
like
them,
caters
to
right-wing
audiences.
Containing
the
tagline
Truth
be
told,
the
site
‘
aims
to
provide
a
counter
to
the
mainstream
media
narrative
about
India,
writings
by
right-leaning
historians,
academics,
and
commentators
on
topics
such
as
the
‘
distor
tion
and
appropriation
of
Indian
identity
’
,
the
growing
threat
posed
by
radical
Islam
and
evangelical
Christianity,
as
well
as
religiously
moti
vated
attacks
on
Hindus
in
India
and
abroad,
enumerated
through
its
monthly
Hindu
Persecution
digest.
ANALYSING
ONLINE
RIGHT-WING
MEDIA-RELATED
DISCOURSE
Mirroring
conservative
commentary
in
the
United
States
with
its
attacks
on
the
so-called
‘
liberal
’
and
‘
elite
’
media,
the
general
con
tention
of
the
right-wing
online
outlets
that
we
examined
vis-a-vis
national
media
outlets
is
that
the
latter
are
dominated
by
‘
left-liberal
’
journalists
who
are
inclined
to
‘
distort,
inflame
and
promote
a
line
of
propaganda
(Mukherji
2015).
According
to
these
sites,
claims
to
independence
notwithstanding,
the
national
press
are
actually
closely
lite
Media
Are
Biased
121
allied
with
political
parties
such
as
the
Aam
Aadmi
Party
(AAP),
which
emerged
in
the
wake
of
the
anti-corruption
movement
of
2012,
and
the
erstwhile
ruling
Congress.
As
one
commentator
reflecting
on
media
coverage
of
the
parliamentary
elections
in
Delhi
of
May
2014
and
the
victory
of
the
AAP
leader
put
it:
1
have
always
had
a
sense
at
the
back
of
my
mind
that
the
MSM
brigade
is
too
deeply
invested
in
the
Kejriwal
phenomenon
and
would
try
to
reinvent
him
at
some
point
of
time.
The
present
Delhi
election
became
a
God-sent
opportunity
for
almost
the
entire
media
universe....
TV
stu
dios
were
virtually
converted
into
AAP
campaign
offices
for
the
last
one
month
wherein
2-3
supposedly
'neutral
’
commentators
of
the
likes
of
Aarti
Jeraths,
Dibangs
and
Manini
Chatterjees
would
sit
and
pontificate
on
the
virtues
of
AAP
even
while
deriding
the
ruling
party.
(Patil
2015a)
Another
noted
that
‘
there
is
a
concerted
effort
on
the
part
of
the
Congress
to
project
the
current
NDA
government
as
UPA-3,
and
the
media
is
playing
by
its
script
’
(Dasgupta
2015).
Indeed,
writers
on
these
sites
regularly
made
the
claim
that
mainstream
news
outlets
had
to
all
intents
and
purposes
been
co-opted
by
the
political
estab
lishment
as
represented
by
the
Congress
party
and
that
they
tailored
their
coverage
accordingly.
Reflecting
this
position,
a
piece
on
Oplndia.com
stated:
If
not
for
anything
else,
the
ten
year
UPA
rule
provided
innumerable
opportunities
to
journalists
to
permanently
establish
their
credentials,
lhere
were
so
many
flabbergasting
stories
of
misuse
of
power
and
cor
ruption
coming
out
from
Delhi,
that
our
journalists
should
have
been
fretting
over
the
agony
of
choice.
But
none
of
the
so
called
top
journalists
broke
the
2G
scam,
Coalgate,
Adarsh,
CWG
scam
or
any
of
the
count
less
gifts
from
UPA.
The
corruption
was
instead
uncovered
by
NGOs,
individual
MPs,
private
citizens
and
the
CAG.
Even
more
criminal
was
the
lack
of
proper
investigative
follow-ups
to
these
breaking
stories....
Such
lack
of
curiosity
would
have
been
mysterious
if
not
for
the
timely
release
of
the
Radia
tapes
which
did
a
splendid
job
of
encapsulating
how
compromised
and
beholden
the
Indian
media
is
to
those
very
powers
it
is
supposed
to
keep
a
watch
on.
(
Oplndia.com
2015)
In
addition
to
characterizing
mainstream
media
outlets
as
corrupt
—
sometimes
referring
to
them
as
‘
presstitutes
’
—
right-wing
news
outlets
122
Kalyani
Chadha
and
Prashanth
Bhat
also
routinely
deride
‘
left-liberal
’
journalists
for
their
dissemination
of
an
‘
anti-Indian
narrative
’
,
particularly
through
their
coverage
of
Kashmir.
Thus,
in
contrast
to
media
observers
who
have
criticized
Indian
media
coverage
as
‘
overwhelmingly
in
favor
of
the
Indian
government
and
armed
forces
’
(Khalid
2016),
writers
on
the
sites
we
analysed
routinely
make
the
case
that
mainstream
media
in
fact
pro
vide
support
to
the
separatist
cause
through
coverage
that
emphasizes
the
‘
killing
of
innocent
Kashmiris
’
,
while
ignoring
the
deaths
of
security
personnel
as
well
as
the
‘
ethnic
cleansing
’
of
Kashmiri
Hindus
from
the
state
(Simha
2016)
and
advocating
for
talks
with
both
Kashmiri
leaders
as
well
as
Pakistan
(R.
Sharma
2016;
Simha
2016),
In
fact,
one
writer
for
Indiafacts.org
went
so
far
as
to
state
that
‘
on
the
Kashmir
issue,
even
the
Pakistani
media
does
not
attack
India
as
much
as
left
liberal
journalists
(Simha
2016),
while
a
Swarajya
commentator
held
the
media
responsible
for
weakening
the
position
of
the
Indian
government
(Jagannathan
2017).
Another
popular
and
widely
circulated
line
of
critique
in
the
dis
cursive
attack
mounted
by
right-wing
news
and
commentary
sites
vis-a-vis
mainstream
news
outlets
is
that
the
latter
are
deeply
‘
biased
’
against
Hindus
and
Hinduism.
This
bias,
they
contend,
is
evident
in
the
mainstream
press
s
negative
’
coverage
of
Hindu
faith
and
culture
wherein
elite
journalists
and
media
commentators
are
quick
to
deride
Hinduism
and
represent
its
believers
as
‘
regressive
’
,
while
avoiding
any
criticism
of
minority
faiths
(Manini
2015).
Underscoring
this
point,
an
editorial
on
Oplndia.com
asserted
that
‘
We
find
that
in
the
news
media,
including
that
of
India
itself,
anti-Hindu
attitudes
are
common.
Hindus
are
spoken
of
in
negative
way
that
is
not
done
relative
to
religious
groups
whose
behavior
has
been
more
violent,
exclusive
or
oppressive.
Anti-Hindu
statements
appear
to
be
acceptable
to
everyone
and
no
one
questions
them
very
much
’
(
IndiaFacts.com
2015).
Some
contributors
go
so
far
as
to
assert
that
even
though
they
make
up
the
majority
of
India
’
s
population,
Hindus
are
representationally
challenged
by
the
biased
’
national
media.
In
this
vein
a
right-wing
commentator
wrote:
Christianity,
Islam
and
Judaism
have
numerous
news
stations,
media
outlets,
and
media
analysts
both
in
countries
where
they
are
in
a
majority
and
in
those
where
they
are
minorities.
Unfortunately,
Hindus
do
not
have
much
comparable
in
the
mass
media,
even
in
Bharat,
’
which
The
Media
Are
Biased
123
puts
them
at
a
severe
disadvantage
in
this
information
era....
Bharat
’
s
media
is
dominated
by
leftist
groups,
including
well
known
member!,
of
Bharat
’
s
communist
parties,
who
have
formed
an
extensive
network
with
anti-Hindu
groups.
(Frawley
2016)
Moreover,
contributors
on
these
sites
also
claim
that
mainstream
news
media
outlets
espouse
a
type
of
‘
pseudo-secularism
that
favours
the
rights
of
minorities
and
is
inimical
to
the
Hindu
majority.
In
this
context,
one
commentator
wrote:
‘
India
’
s
media
portrays
Hindus
as
a
privileged
majority,
as
if
the
laws
benefitted
them
unfairly.
It
pro
motes
anti-Hindu
attitudes,
and
encourages
government
and
judicial
interference
in
Hindu
affairs.
And
when
Hindus
complain
about
the
brazen
discrimination
against
them,
the
media
accuses
Hindus
of
being
intolerant
’
(Frawley
2016).
Apart
from
disseminating
what
one
Indiafacts
writer
terms
the
‘
chronic
hate
Hindu
narrative
’
(Manini
2015),
writers
on
these
sites
frequently
argue
that
national
media
outlets
display
active
partisanship
in
their
‘
favourable
’
treatment
of
minorities,
exemplified
in
their
reluc
tance
to
use
the
term
‘
Islamic
’
terror
and
their
attempts
to
humanize
Muslim
terrorists
’
(Sarkar
2014)
while
displaying
little
hesitation
in
condemning
Hindu
nationalist
organizations
as
extremist,
or
even
‘
fascist
’
,
with
a
view
to
discrediting
them
(Frawley
2015).
Indeed,
this
trend,
many
right-wing
commentators
asserted,
was
evident
in
the
writings
of
many
‘
leftist
’
mainstream
news
columnists
who
portrayed
Yakub
Memon
one
of
the
masterminds
in
the
1993
Islamic
terror
attack
on
Mumbai
as
innocent
’
and
questioned
the
decision
to
execute
him
(
Oplndia.com
2016).
Writers
also
frequently
emphasize
that
the
national
media
has
been
deliberately
‘
apathetic
to
the
religious
persecution
of
Hindus
worldwide.
Emphasizing
this
point,
a
Swarajya
contributor
wrote:
Indian
media
has
done
a
‘
commendable
job
in
covering
international
events,
be
it
Arab
spring,
Tahrir
square,
Gaza
conflicts
to
beatification
of
saints
at
Vatican.
The
only
blind
spot
has
been
the
plight,
or
rather
the
disappearance,
of
Hindus
worldwide,
including
in
Indias
own
backyard.
This
is
quite
inexplicable
given
that
other
events
in
these
regions,
elec
tions
and
terror
attacks
in
Pakistan,
have
been
generously
covered....
The
apathy
of
Indian
media
about
Hindu
victims
of
persecution
has
not
been
induced
by
the
lack
of
resources.
(Sarkar
2014)
124
Kalyani
Chadha
and
Prashanth
Bhat
Others
accuse
the
‘
liberal
’
mainstream
press
of
failing
to
acknowl
edge
what
they
perceive
to
be
the
growing
threat
to
the
Hindu
com
munity
posed
by
other
religions.
In
this
regard,
a
Swarajya
writer
claimed:
Newspapers
have
not,
over
the
decades,
ever
used
the
phrase
onslaught
of
Christianity
”
,
which
is
actually
a
more
accu
rate
description
of
what
is
happening
through
the
proselytization
efforts
of
aggressive
evangelical
missionaries
funded
by
the
West
’
(Venkataraman
2015).
In
a
similar
vein,
another
contributor
lamented
the
failure
of
secular
media
to
recognize
the
phenomenon
of
‘
love
jihad
’
,
whereby
Hindu
women
were
being
persuaded
to
marry
Muslim
men
and
convert
to
Islam
(Kapoor
2014).
Meanwhile,
many
other
commentators
deplored
the
national
media
’
s
failure
to
highlight
what
they
termed
‘
religious
’
demographic
changes
in
India
(Dikgaj
et
al.
2016;
Bajaj
2016).
Reflecting
this
view,
a
commentator
on
Oplndia.com
noted:
In
India,
see
how
the
demography
of
the
country
is
being
systemati
cally
changed.
North
East
India,
Kerala,
Tamil
Nadu,
Andhra
Pradesh,
Telangana
&
many
tribal
&
rural
areas
are
falling
to
massive,
systematic,
and
organized
Christian
conversations
supported
by
fake
NGOs
and
evangelical
missionaries
’
networks.
States
like
Kashmir,
West
Bengal,
Bihar,
UP,
and
many
other
parts
of
India
are
radically
Islamized....
This
is
further
supported
by
complete
silence
from
our
‘
secular
’
media.
(Intolerantindian
2016)
However,
perhaps
the
most
persistent
and
recurring
critiques
directed
at
the
mainstream
press
in
the
articles
that
we
examined,
was
that
these
outlets
engage
in
‘
selective
outrage
’
,
resulting
in
‘
hysteria
over
majoritarian
communalism/intolerance
and
a
blind
eye
towards
or
muted
criticism
of
minority
communalism/intolerance
’
(Seetha
2015).
This,
numerous
writers
have
argued,
results
in
biased
coverage,
whereby
acts
of
violence
committed
by
Hindus
against
other
com
munities
receive
disproportionate
’
media
attention
whereas
attacks
targeting
Hindus
evoke
little
response
from
national
media
outlets.
As
evidence,
commentators
offered
examples
of
cases
that
in
their
view
revealed
the
medias
so-called
double-standards
’
.
One
such
issue
was
coverage
of
the
2016
unrest
in
West
Bengal.
Discussing
the
incident,
a
Swarajya
journalist
argued
that
mainstream
accounts
which
sought
The
Media
Are
Biased
125
to
explain
the
mobs
violence
as
a
response
to
a
Hindu
leader
’
s
alleg
edly
inflammatory
remarks
not
only
misrepresented
the
situation,
but
also
downplayed
the
incident
because
the
mob
belonged
to
a
minority
community.
Condemning
mainstream
coverage,
she
said,
‘
In
Maida,
the
administration
continues
to
enable
the
rioters
with
soft-action
and
political
posturing
to
deflect
blame.
Many
sections
of
the
media
continue
to
aid
and
abet
this.
For
instance,
a
senior
journalist,
who
failed
in
his
duty
to
report,
accused
others
of
fanning
communal
flames
when
they
carried
the
story.
The
underlying
message
was
to
downplay
the
events
’
(Barooah
2016).
Another
example
of
the
so-called
anti-Hindu
bias
cited
by
Swarajya
writers
was
the
murder
of
a
Hindu
boy
by
three
Muslim
youths,
in
what
the
website
identified
as
a
religiously
motivated
attack.
Reacting
to
the
incident,
a
commentator
wrote;
Indian
media
had
extensively
covered
the
murder
of
a
Muslim
techie
by
Hindu
goons
in
Pune
but
barely
mentioned
brutal
killings
of
an
RSS
pracharak
in
Kerala
and
a
BJP
secretary
in
Tamil
Nadu
or
the
rape
of
a
9
year-old
Hindu
girl
by
a
Muslim.
Your
life
is
worth
an
awful
lot
if
you
happen
to
be
a
Muslim,
and
you
are
a
victim
of
violence
at
the
hands
of
Hindus
—
like
it
happened
in
Dadri^....
When
one
Mohammad
Ikhlaq
died
in
a
hate
crime
at
the
hands
of
a
few
Hindus,
a
whole
nation
was
declared
intolerant
but
when
Sawan
Rathod
was
brutally,
cruelly
mur
dered
because
he
was
a
Hindu,
it
is
made
out
to
be
just
a
law
and
order
crime!
If
you
are
just
a
poor,
uneducated
Hindu
kid
of
16,
burnt
alive
by
Muslims,
your
life
is
not
worth
the
amount
of
petrol
used
to
turn
you
into
a
human
torch!
(Vaidya
2016)
More
recently,
right-wing
news
sites
mounted
a
similar
attack
on
mainstream
news
media
for
their
coverage
of
recent
riots
in
West
Bengal,
on
the
grounds
that
they
ignored
violence
by
Muslims
(Ghosh
2017;
Jagannathan
2017).
In
this
context,
a
writer
for
Opindia
claimed:
It
is
clear
that
Hindu
lives
don
’
t
matter
to
the
‘
secular-liberal
’
media.
Not
a
word
for
the
man
who
was
killed.
Contrast
that
to
copious
tears
they
shed
when
a
victim
is
Muslim....
In
sifting
through
all
the
reports
about
the
subsequent
violence,
I
am
yet
to
come
across
one
intellectual
taking
issue
with
the
fact
that
the
West
Bengal
police
is
126
Kalyarti
Chadha
and
Prashanth
Bhat
taking
action
against
the
victim
(a
minor
no
less!)
instead
of
going
out
and
containing
the
rioters....
Instead,
I
have
seen
media
report
ing
on
the
original
FB
post
calling
it
anything
from
‘
objectionable
’
to
blasphemous
’
...
neither
can
I
find
anyone
willing
to
meet
with
the
family
of
Kartik
Ghosh
and
report
on
the
tragedy
they
have
faced.
It
is
as
if
Kartik
Ghosh
’
s
life
was
less
real.
No
one
wants
to
ask
who
is
responsible
for
the
loss
of
Kartik
Ghosh
’
s
life.
Meanwhile,
the
death
of
Junaid
Khan
is
being
blamed
collectively
on
the
1
billion
Hindus
of
this
country.
(Ghosh
2017)
The
perception
of
Hindu
victimization
—
reflected
in
coverage
that
is
believed
to
favour
minorities
while
ignoring
threats
to
the
majority
—
thus
constitutes
an
important
component
of
media-related
discourse
on
these
sites,
where
arguably,
it
serves
to
consolidate
a
sense
of
collective
identity
among
disaffected
sections
of
India
’
s
dominant
faith
group.
NEGATIVE
COVERAGE
OF
THE
BJP
GOVERNMENT
AND
ITS
LEADER
In
addition
to
stories
highlighting
media
neglect
of
Hindu
concerns,
another
significant
focus
of
stories
on
right-wing
news
portals
cen
tred
on
what
contributors
identified
as
the
national
media
’
s
‘
biased
’
coverage
of
the
ruling
BJP
government
and
its
leader.
Prime
Minister
Narendra
Modi.
Contributors
to
these
sites
routinely
claim
that
the
Congress
party,
which
had
dominated
India
for
most
of
its
post
independence
history,
had
co-opted
a
large
section
of
the
national
media
to
vilify
Modi
and
his
supporters.
As
one
writer
put
it,
‘
The
English-language
media
is
the
vehicle
through
which
double
stan
dards
in
India
are
propagated.
The
simple
reality
is
the
English
press
is
out
to
get
Modi
at
every
opportunity
’
(Bhalla
2015).
For
instance,
on
the
Swarajyamag.com
site,
numerous
articles
argued
often
using
virtually
identical
language
—
that
the
national
press
s
claims
to
independence
notwithstanding,
it
was
backed
by
big
corporates
as
well
as
‘
left-liberal
parties
such
as
the
Congress
’
.
In
the
words
of
a
Swarajya
writer,
‘
The
fascism
emerging
from
India
s
newsrooms
is
backed
by
big
businesses
and
the
nation
’
s
dynasty.
Corporates
and
dynastic
centers
of
power
pose
a
threat
to
The
Media
Are
Biased
127
democracies
in
every
country.
Indian
media
houses
are
ideologically
configured
’
(Ahmad
2015).
This,
they
asserted,
resulted
in
unfairly
partisan
and
negative
coverage
of
the
present
government
and
its
policies.
Commenting
on
this,
a
contributor
to
Oplndia.com
stated:
There
are
numerous
other
examples
of
political
ownership
and
connec
tions
in
media.
This
insidious
and
incestuous
relationship
exists
with
the
main
objective
of
distorting
public
opinion
and
manipulating
issues
to
suit
the
agenda
of
a
political
party.
Since
it
is
done
under
the
guise
of
neutrality,
there
is
a
large
element
of
deceit
inbuilt
into
this
kind
of
mechanism
of
providing
news.
(Bhandari
2015)
Writers
also
asserted
that
the
long-standing
relationship
between
national
journalists
(including
those
employed
by
the
public
broad
caster
Doordarshan)
and
the
Congress
party
which
was
the
source
of
all
favors
’
(Patil
2015b)
led
the
national
media
to
disseminate
‘
nega
tive
’
stories
aimed
at
downplaying
the
BJP
governments
successes
and
portraying
the
BJP
as
no
different
from
the
Congress
government
that
it
succeeded
(Dasgupta
2015).
Elaborating
on
this,
an
Indiafacts
writer
commented:
There
is
no
shortage
of
good
stories
coming
out
of
India.
Of
course
if
you
are
outside
the
country
you
will
hear
absolutely
nothing
of
this
for
the
simple
reason
that
this
will
show
Prime
Minister
Narendra
Modi
in
good
light....
Let
’
s
face
it,
no
matter
what
Modi
does,
no
mat
ter
what
he
achieves,
no
matter
how
he
transforms
this
nation,
senior
editors,
(pseudo)
intellectuals,
(pseudo)
seculars,
(pseudo)
liberals,
writers,
artists
and
(un)
Civil
Society
will
continue
to
attack
him
24x7.
(Rajguru
2016)
Similarly,
a
Swarajya
journalist
opined.
The
Modi
government
has
significant
achievements
under
its
belt,
especially
on
the
economic
front.
And
yet,
barring
the
business
press,
the
impression
conveyed
by
most
publications
and
news
channels
is
that
of
a
clueless
gov
ernment,
which
is
efficient
only
in
pursuing
a
communal
agenda
(Seetha
2015).
Similarly,
a
commentator
on
Oplndia.com
attacked
the
English-
language
press
for
not
giving
the
Modi
government
credit
for
various
128
Kalyani
Chadha
and
Prashanth
Bhat
policy
initiatives
and
instead
presenting
them
as
‘
repackaged
’
versions
of
earlier
programmes.
As
he
put
it:
Some
are
claiming
that
the
‘
National
Girl
Child
Day
’
of
UPA
was
renamed
to
‘
Beti
Bachao
Beti
Padhao
’
program
of
the
NDA.
This
is
even
more
specious
comparison
than
the
insurance
schemes
—
to
compare
the
celebration
of
a
day
to
a
mass
campaign
program
like
Beti
Bachao
Beti
Padhao!
However,
this
is
not
result
of
some
lack
of
understanding.
There
is
a
clear
agenda.
To
make
these
lazy
accusations
multiple
times
so
that
people
start
believing
that
they
are
true.
An
influential
part
of
the
media
is
complicit
in
fanning
this
narrative.
(Kumar
2017)
Aside
from
their
general
resentment
at
what
they
deemed
to
be
the
national
medias
unjustifiably
negative
stance
towards
India
’
s
right
wing
government,
writers
also
voiced
outrage
at
the
fact
that
not
only
did
mainstream
media
outlets
dismiss
popular
initiatives
like
Yoga
Day
that
were
enthusiastically
received
across
the
country
but
covered
with
the
same
bout
of
sneering
elitism
and
cynicism
that
had
accompanied
earlier
events
of
the
Modi
government
’
(Shankar
2015),
but,
more
importantly,
failed
to
give
Prime
Minister
Modi
credit
for
any
positive
policy
changes.
In
this
context,
a
Swarajya
contributor
wondered
..
whether
the
elimination
of
the
idea
of
corruption
which
had
become
synonymous
with
governance
under
the
UPA,
the
time
bound
elec
trification
of
all
of
Indias
villages,
unprecedented
focus
on
agriculture
through
crop
insurance.
Direct
Benefit
Transfer
(DBT)
preventing
sub
sidy
leakages
and
the
planned
massive
infrastructure
and
development
from
road
to
rail
occurred
in
some
other
continent.
Reading
or
viewing
exclusively
that
form
of
old
media
which
elevates
(often
spurious)
news
of
‘
Hindu(tva)
’
intolerance
as
front
page
headlines,
while
often
almost
censoring
the
tectonic
developmental
initiatives,
does
provide
such
an
impression
though.
(Basu
2016)
Emphasizing
that
the
national
media
were
only
interested
in
‘
sensa
tionalizing
’
and
‘
distorting
’
news
(Saraswat
2017;
Vaidya
2017),
several
right-wing
commentators
protested
that
mainstream
media
routinely
attacked
Hindu
organizations,
often
‘
fabricating
’
stories
that
made
them
appear
in
a
negative
light
(Neelankandan
2015).
Emphasizing
this
point,
an
Indiafacts
contributor
asserted,
‘
The
media
is
clearly
Tlte
Media
Are
Biased
129
being
used
against
the
RSS
and
affiliated
Hindu
organizations.
Rather
than
being
the
fourth
estate
of
civil
society,
India
’
s
media
is
more
like
a
bludgeon.
It
decides
what
is
relevant
to
its
pre-scripted
scenario
and
cherrypicks
information
to
fit
into
its
pre-ordained
script.
This
propaganda
is
then
disseminated
and
imposed
upon
the
public
’
(Parker
2015).
Meanwhile,
other
writers
emphasized
that
although
the
prime
minister
had
done
nothing
that
threatened
secular
values,
he
was
nevertheless
painted
as
an
‘
extremist
’
(Basu
2016;
K.
Sharma
2016).
Underlining
this
point,
a
staffer
for
the
website
wrote,
‘
The
end
of
this
year
will
mark
the
halfway
point
of
the
Modi
government.
The
Prime
Minister
has
not
said
or
done
anything
so
far
that
has
threatened
to
disrupt
communal
harmony.
While
it
is
entirely
acceptable
to
criticize
the
Prime
Minister
in
a
democracy,
such
media
criticism
has
to
be
grounded
in
fact
rather
than
bias
’
(Basu
2016;
K.
Sharma
2016).
However,
right
wing
contributors
’
greatest
ire
was
reserved
for
what
they
termed
the
creation
of
a
‘
false
narrative
’
of
rising
intoler
ance
and
Muslim
persecution
by
the
mainstream
media
(Vidyasagar
2015;
Vyas
2015;
Rajguru
2017).
In
this
vein,
a
writer
on
the
Opindia
site
commented:
If
you
read
and
watch
Indian
media,
and
more
importantly
believe
all
the
things
they
say,
you
certainly
think
that
since
2014,
India
has
been
a
different
place
altogether.
Suddenly,
Indian
people
have
become
intol
erant.
Majoritarian
rule
has
dawned
so
religious
minorities
(especially
Muslims)
are
horrified.
Fringe
elements
on
the
right
have
been
empow
ered
by
this
‘
sympathizing
’
government
and
they
started
pursuing
their
agenda
brazenly....
(LiberalRight
2017)
Meanwhile,
writers
also
expressed
anger
at
what
they
considered
to
be
the
national
press
’
s
tendency
to
hold
Mr
Modi
personally
respon
sible
for
this
development.
Underscoring
this
observation,
Swarajyas
editorial
director
said,
‘
It
is
important
to
keep
in-built
biases
in
mind
when
discussing
the
heavily
lopsided
coverage
of
“
growing
intoler
ance
”
in
the
country,
a
phrase
invented
to
nail
all
the
blame
for
it
at
Narendra
Modi
’
s
door.
It
is
worthwhile
remembering
that
for
55
of
the
68
years
since
Independence,
it
is
the
Congress
party
that
has
been
in
power
’
(Jagannathan
2015b).
130
Kalyani
Chadha
and
Prashanth
Bhat
Indeed,
many
writers
contended
that
the
mainstream
media
not
only
‘
manufactured
’
controversies
related
to
cow
vigilantism
or
lynchings,
but
also
that
they
chose
to
cover
violence
only
when
vic
tims
were
members
of
marginalized
groups.
As
one
writer
on
Opindia
put
it,
‘
It
has
been
more
than
3
nauseating
months
since
media
started
running
a
vicious
Rising
Intolerance
campaign
based
on
cherry
picked
incidents
to
paint
Hindu/upper
caste
as
intolerant
lot
and
blame
NDA
government
for
this.
Dadri
incident
became
the
face
of
the
campaign
and
Kalburgi/Pansare/Dabholkar
murders
played
the
supporting
roles
’
(Shaitaan
Khopdi
2015).
Similarly,
another
commentator
on
Swarajya.com
wrote:
What
is
also
undeniable
is
that
the
outrage
against
lynching
or
mob
vio
lence
is
highly
selective,
to
put
it
kindly.
The
same
liberals
standing
with
#NotInMyName
placards
have
been
silent
on
the
murders
of
Rashtriya
Swayamsevak
Sangh
(RSS)
workers
in
Kerala....
You
can
’
t
blame
the
Khattar
government
in
Haryana
for
Junaid
’
s
murder
and
remain
con
spicuously
silent
over
Pinarayi
Vijayan
’
s
lawless
Kerala.
For
the
same
reason,
it
is
perfectly
legitimate
to
question
the
media
’
s
silence
on
the
appalling
situation
under
the
previous.
Congress-led
government
at
the
centre.
(Didolkar
2017)
While
yet
another
commented:
This
Intolerance
debate
sprung
from
the
Dadri
incident,
where
a
Muslim
man
was
killed
by
Hindu
men
of
his
own
village,
for
allegedly
slaugh
tering
and
eating
cow
meat.
This
act
is
despicable
and
requires
condem
nation.
But,
bracketing
the
whole
of
Hindus,
800
million
of
them,
for
the
crime
done
by
50
Hindus,
does
it
sounds
sane?
Not
to
mention,
the
Moodbidri
incident,
where
a
Hindu
man
was
killed
by
Muslim
Men,
for
preventing
cow
slaughter,
can
we
extend
the
bracket
there
too?
If
whole
of
Hindus
should
be
ashamed
and
declared
Intolerant
for
the
crime
of
a
very
few
Hindus,
can
we
extend
the
same
to
other
religions?
(Manithan
2015)
In
fact,
many
writers
contended
that
the
so-called
‘
intolerance
’
issue
was
a
‘
hoax
’
(Vyas
2015),
propagated
by
the
mainstream
media
(Bijapurkar
2017;
Saraswat
2017).
Hie
Media
Are
Biased
131
CONSERVATIVE
ALTERNATIVES
TO
MAINSTREAM
NATIONAL
MEDIA
In
response
to
such
perceived
misrepresentations
of
right-wing
positions
by
mainstream
media,
many
contributors
to
these
sites
emphasized
the
necessity
of
creating
alternatives
for
the
expression
of
right-wing
ideas
and
voices
(Manini
2015;
Ghosh
2017).
In
this
vein,
in
an
article
titled
‘
Why
the
BJP
Needs
Its
Own
Fox
News
’
,
a
right-wing
activist
stated;
The
Indian
media
like
other
left-liberal
institutions
has
gone
unchal
lenged
for
a
long
time.
Starting
with
the
state-owned
media,
the
chan
nels
have
promoted
leftist
and
now
far-left
oriented
narratives
stifling
any
other
alternative
viewpoints.
Today
we
are
in
a
situation
where
the
‘
Right
’
seems
to
have
a
space
only
on
social
media
or
big
tents
like
this
publication.
It
’
s
important
that
mainstream
media,
especially
English
news
channels
also
create
viable
space
for
the
right....
What
the
Right
and
the
BJP
need
is
a
proper
‘
Right
of
Center
’
mainstream
English
news
channel
like
Fox
News.
(Sethumadhavrao
2016)
While
the
editorial
director
of
Swarajyas
editorial
team
wrote,
‘
Social
media
may
currently
be
dominated
by
right-wing
voices,
but
this
is
largely
because
these
voices
were
—
and
still
are
—
stifled
in
old
media.
One
should
not
be
surprised
if
anonymous
voices
on
Twitter
are
often
the
same
newsroom
guys
whose
views
are
blackballed
by
authoritarian
editors
with
their
monochromatic
views
on
issues
(Jagannathan
2015a).
Consequently,
many
writers
argued
that
it
was
imperative
for
Indian
conservatives
to
‘
engage
’
with
the
wider
Indian
public
via
the
development
of
conservative
media
sources
(Prasanna
2014).
Not
surprisingly,
writers
exhorted
right-wing
intellectuals,
journalists,
and
activists
to
reach
out
to
ordinary
citizens
who
are
‘
fatigued
and
jaded
’
by
mainstream
media
and
have
‘
little
time
or
sympathy
for
the
kind
of
fraud
that
masquerades
as
political
discourse
in
the
country,
especially
in
the
English
language
press
and
media,
on
the
grounds
that
they
were
likely
to
be
receptive
to
alternative
sources
of
informa
tion
(Ramnath
2015).
Such
outreach,
they
argued,
not
only
includes
presenting
right-wing
perspectives
on
traditional
media
outlets
when
ever
possible,
but
the
active
institutionalization
of
alternative
spaces
where
conservatives
can
develop
counter-narratives
and
discursively
132
Kalyani
Chadha
and
Prashanth
Bhat
contest
the
dominant
media
news
frames
and
discourse.
As
one
writer
put
it,
Thanks
to
the
advent
of
social
media,
we
are
now
seeing
more
active
participation
from
the
masses
in
the
electoral
process,
more
informed
conversation
on
issues
which
matter
to
the
public,
a
challenge
and
a
counterpoint
to
the
narrative
of
the
old
media....
But
the
while
those
who
are
of
a
right-of-center
persuasion
have
made
a
dent
in
the
outer
circle
of
power
(electoral
politics),
they
lack
the
knowhow
to
penetrate
the
inner
circles
of
power....
India
’
s
right-wing,
which
is
a
very
large
umbrella,
needs
to
add
institutionalized
intellectual
heft
online
to
build
on
its
current
popular
appeal
among
the
masses.
(Abhishek
2016)
*
*
*
Arguably,
right-wing
sites
such
as
Swarajya.com
,
Indiafacts.org
,
and
Oplndia.com
are
crucial
building
blocks
of
this
effort
to
establish
a
right-wing
ecosystem.
Consequently,
even
though
some
scholars
dismiss
the
emergence
of
right-wing
online
discourse
as
character
ized
by
‘
rage,
profanity
and
bigotry
’
(Kesavan
2015),
we
suggest
that
these
sites
are
coming
to
constitute
a
parallel
discursive
arena
where
conservative
activists
are
not
only
able
to
articulate
their
core
principles,
but
can
also
define
their
own
identity,
highlight
perceived
misrepresentations,
and
develop
oppositional
discourses
challenging
what
they
consider
to
be
a
biased
mainstream
media
narrative.
And
although
such
activities
have
generally
been
associated
with
subaltern
groups,
who
have
developed
such
arenas
in
response
to
the
politics
of
stratified
societies
whose
deliberative
practices
tend
to
exclude
marginalized
groups
(Fraser
1990),
these
tactics
have
increasingly
been
appropriated
by
conservative
groups
who
are
not
discernibly
subordinate,
but
nevertheless
define
themselves
as
such.
Major
(2012)
makes
this
observation
with
regard
to
the
conservative
movement
in
the
United
States,
and
we
similarly
make
the
case
that
while
there
is
little
to
suggest
that
members
of
the
Hindu
right
are
subject
to
social
and
political
marginalization,
they
nevertheless
perceive
themselves
as
excluded
from
the
public
discourse.
Right-wing
news
and
com
mentary
sites
thus
offer
them
the
opportunity
to
‘
mimic
’
,
in
the
words
of
Major,
the
actions
of
subaltern
groups
and,
in
doing
so,
contrib
ute
to
the
establishment
of
a
Hindu
‘
counter-sphere
’
—
a
discursive
Ihe
Media
Are
Biased
133
alternative
to
the
mainstream
public
sphere
that
serves
to
articulate
a
rhetorical
assault
against
mainstream
news
media.
And
although
the
impact
of
these
sites
is
currently
largely
limited
to
an
urban,
English-
speaking
elite,
this
situation
is
likely
to
change
with
the
rapid
increase
in
the
number
of
internet
users.
In
other
words,
the
emergence
of
this
counter-sphere
potentially
has
significant
implications,
and
further
research
is
required
to
examine
how
this
development
affects
both
the
workings
of
the
mainstream
press
as
well
as
audience
perceptions
of
media
bias
in
the
Indian
context.
NOTES
1.
These
include
a
variety
of
Hindu
nationalist
organizations,
such
as
the
Rashtriya
Swayamsevak
Sangh,
the
Bajrang
Dal,
and
the
Vishwa
Hindu
Parishad.
2.
Communal
riots
in
the
Indian
context
refer
to
clashes
between
the
Hindu
and
Muslim
communities.
3.
The
website
also
has
a
monthly
print
magazine.
4.
Dargahs
are
Sufi
shrines.
5.
The
term
‘
Bharat
’
is
used
in
classical
Sanskrit
texts
to
refer
to
India.
6.
The
Rashtriya
Swayamsevak
Sangh
(RSS)
is
Indias
leading
Hindu
nationalist
organization,
and
the
term
pracharak
refers
to
the
organiza
tion
’
s
workers.
7.
Referring
to
a
case
where
a
Muslim
was
lynched
by
a
Hindu
mob.
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