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A Wider Atlantic: Further integration of the Wider Middle East and Russia in the framework of Euro-Atlantic Structures

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Based on the talk given by the author at the conference '15 Atlantic Years in Central and Eastern Europe. The Atlantic Community in the 21st Century: The Power of Values and the Value of Power,' Sofia, 4-5 April 2006. Published by the Streit Council, USA.
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16 ————————— Freedom & Union ————————— Summer 2006
T
he aim of this brief comment is not so much to
make predictions for the future but rather share some
thoughts and hopefully provoke discussion about the
ongoing process of change and development brought
about by the forces of globalization in the last fif-
teen-twenty years. While the evolution and transfor-
mation of the Euro-Atlantic structures during this pe-
riod is well known, the prospects for the possible in-
tegration of Russia and the Greater Middle East
(GME) in both EU and NATO are something new
that ought to be examined seriously, and then in the
right time frame. Indeed, what seems and is impossi-
ble today may be quite possible -- even inevitable --
tomorrow.
A starting point for any such analysis would be the
experience of the democratic transformation of CEE.
In a few words, this lesson is that no CEE nation re-
grets its Euro-Atlantic choice, what is regretted is the
delays in choice and reforms. An early start brings
early results, better wellbeing and lower social price;
delays and hesitant reforms result in lost time and
paying the high price twice.
Right now one can see the different stages of this
process of Euro-Atlantic integration in the case of
various CEE countries. Most of them are already in
NATO and EU, which, by the way, seemed quite im-
possible yesterday. The Western Balkans are already
scheduled for NATO, and Turkey for EU; that is de-
cided in principle but the relevant countries are not
yet ready, and the process would take several more
years. Countries like Ukraine and Georgia are at
fairly initial stages, their membership is obviously
impossible today but we may already safely presume
that it will be quite inevitable tomorrow.
One of the main challenges facing NATO today is
the globalization of threats, which entails globaliza-
tion of the Alliance responsibilities. Naturally, 26 na-
tions cannot simply assume the role of global police-
man. That would be neither desirable nor possible.
Nevertheless, the 26 increasingly undertake missions
in countries like Afghanistan that are remote yet key
for the world security. There is a growing demand
for NATO services; first, because no comparable se-
curity alliance exists or may be expected to appear;
and secondly, because today’s peace enforcement
and peace keeping missions are as a rule multina-
tional, and NATO possesses unique expertise and
mechanisms, making the Alliance the best tool for
planning, implementing and leading such multina-
tional missions. Therefore, it comes as no surprise
that NATO involvement and partnership is increas-
ingly sought in Africa (Darfur) and the Middle East
(Gulf countries, training mission in Iraq, possible
post-conflict peace keeping in Palestine). One
should never forget the lesson of Rwanda, where
there was nobody to intervene and stop the genocide,
or the lesson of Bosnia, where the delayed interven-
tion made it possible for a full scale civil war to de-
velop resulting in tens of thousands more people
killed and hundreds of thousands displaced.
At the same time, the fact is that the 26 have insuf-
ficient military capability to back such global respon-
sibilities, despite the progress in national defense
By Lyubomir Ivanov
sector reforms, and in NATO transformation.
Whether it’s a NATO coalition or EU mission, it
still draws from the same pool, the combined mili-
tary capabilities of the 26. This deficit is coupled
with the deficit of political credibility to act on be-
half of the international community; indeed, it is de-
sirable to have the participation and support of more
than 26 nations, preferably mandated by the UN Se-
curity Council. This political deficit is further exac-
erbated by shrinking public support, eroded by vig-
orous anti-globalist and anti-American propaganda,
and hardly opposed by national or Allied public di-
plomacy effort.
This discrepancy between existing needs and
available means is dealt with, at least partially, by
way of ongoing NATO enlargement and develop-
ment of partnerships that help expand
the joint capabilities. Let us remem-
ber that even early European missions
of the Alliance, such as Bosnia and
Kosovo, benefited from troop contri-
butions by Russia, Ukraine, other PfP
partners, even countries from Latin
America, Africa and the Middle East.
On the agenda is the development of
PfP-like partnerships in the South
Mediterranean and the Greater Mid-
dle East, building upon the NATO
Mediterranean dialogue, Istanbul Co-
operation Initiative, Gulf Cooperation
Council partnership, and even the es-
tablishment of global partnerships
with Japan, South Korea, Australia
and New Zealand.
While NATO has no decision or declared intention
at this stage of inviting any such global partners to
join the Alliance, partnerships could naturally pave
the way to membership, especially having in mind
that countries like Japan or Australia could easily
meet the membership criteria, certainly in much less
time than CEE has needed.
When we assess the place of Russia vis-a-vis
NATO, that country obviously has the capabilities
for a substantial and valuable contribution to
NATO-led missions. This has already been demon-
strated in Bosnia and Kosovo. Russia also has the
advantage of an institutionalized partnership by way
of the NATO-Russia Council. That framework
could be enhanced but nevertheless falls short of
membership, as it does not provide Russia with a
say in NATO’s decision making. Russian member-
ship in NATO is presently out of the question. It is
certainly unrealistic today. The idea of some Rus-
sian analysts that the Alliance missed an opportunity
to invite Russia in the 1990s is based on a serious
lack of understanding of the nature of NATO and its
enlargement process. Such an invitation was quite
impossible as Russia was not ready for NATO
membership in the 1990s. Russia is not ready today
either, and it is an axiom that no country may join
the Alliance unless it meets NATO standards. Fur-
thermore, unlike Ukraine or Georgia, Russia has not
even decided to join NATO. However, I expect
such a decision on the Russian side sooner rather
than later, and the progress of Ukraine on the road
to NATO would have a major im-
pact on the evolution of Russia’s in-
tentions. After that, it would be a
matter of having the relevant re-
forms done and criteria met, relying
of course on the Alliance guidance
and support.
The more diverse region of GME is
likely to follow several individual
models of democratic transforma-
tion and integration with NATO,
very much like the diversity of
CEE, where certain countries started
as producers of security from the
very beginning, while others under-
went the whole road of a country in
military conflict becoming the ob-
ject of an Allied mission and internationally sup-
ported nation building, and eventually joining
NATO. There is no doubt, however, that like in the
case of CEE, NATO and NATO integration is to
play a crucial role in both national and regional de-
mocratic development.
In the epoch of globalization, the logic of EU-style
integration apparently dictates that each country
should seek participation in some similar project of
regional integration. Speaking of Russia and the
GME, it is quite obvious that for geographical, his-
torical and economic reasons, their natural integra-
tion partners would be the other republics of the for-
mer Soviet Union, the East European countries, and
the South European countries in the first place, and
the rest of the West European countries in the sec-
Dr. Ivanov (right) meets with
Jabar Manda, Deputy
Minister of Defense of Iraqi
Kurdistan.
Atlantic Club of Bulgaria
18 ————————— Freedom & Union ————————— Summer 2006
ond place. And immediately the problem is that most of these potential
integration partners are already in the EU or on their way to join. So
the question is, where will Russia and the GME integrate?
It is unrealistic for Russia or the GME to form their own integration
centers separately from EU, as they lack the necessary human, political
and economic potential for that. Having no partners left for such pro-
jects either, both Russia and the GME face no alternative but to join the
EU itself. This idea might seem bizarre and grossly unrealistic; indeed,
the EU accession is a much more sophisticated process, much more dif-
ficult to achieve than NATO membership. It is also true that presently
there is very little enthusiasm in EU to think about further enlargements
after Turkey and Ukraine. Still, most of what is reality today seemed
equally unrealistic fifteen years ago, and the pace of world change, if any-
thing, is accelerating. After all, if Turkey could progress towards EU ac-
cession, why not Morocco or Russia? Does anyone believe that the natural
permanent border of EU might be that between Kiev and Moscow?
While the NATO enlargement process goes in parallel with (and gen-
erally preceding and facilitating) EU enlargement in Eurasia and poten-
tially Africa, in other world regions it would probably have to have
other economic and political integration companions. In Latin America
for instance, the Atlantic integration of countries like Mexico or Chile
may benefit from their US-sponsored NAFTA/AFTA integration.
Dr. Lyubomir Ivanov is Chairman and CEO of the Atlantic Club of
Bulgaria and a member of the Streit Council Advisory Board. An expert
in international affairs, he is a former member of the Bulgarian
parliament and adviser to the Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs.
He is a member of numerous international organizations and the
author of several books and articles.
We ask your support in order to establish a Kurdistan Atlantic Club to support your cause and principles in Kurdistan,
Iraq and the Middle East. For that reason, we will present an official application to the Atlantic Clubs Society through the
Bulgarian Atlantic Club.
Jabar Y. Manda
Deputy Minister of Defense of Iraqi Kurdistan
April 4, 2006, Sofia, Bulgaria,
On occasion of the celebration of the 15th anniversary of the organized Atlantic movement in Central and Eastern Europe.
“Most of
what is
reality today
seemed
equally
unrealistic
fifteen years
ago,
and the pace
of world
change, if
anything, is
accelerating.
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