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North Korea, Nuclear Testing, Non-Proliferation, Missile Defense. Editorial, INESAP Information Bulletin 02
Abstract and Figures
INESAP Information Bulletin, Issue No. 2, July 1994
• Jürgen Scheffran: Editorial
• Rebecca Johnson: Nuclear Testing and Non-Proliferation: Linkages and Risks
• David Albright: North Korean Plutonium Production
• Peter Hayes: Swinging Pendulum in Korea
• Kumao Kaneko: Japan's peace commitment deters nuclear armament
• Paul Podvig, George Lewis: U.S. Proposal Threatens ABM Treaty
• Wolfgang Liebert: Open Letter concerning the German HEU Reactor
• Jo Husbands: Managemant and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, Excerpts from NAS report
• Colin Archer: Activities of the International Coalition for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
• INESAP-News & Non-Proliferation-News
• Selected Publications, Dates, Join INES & INESAP
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Editorial: Jürgen Scheffran
During the past two months, the high-stakes gambling over North Korea's nuclear program reached a climax, appearing to bring Northeast Asia close to the brink of war. As we go to press, however, the slide to war appears to have halted, due to Jimmy Carter's June diplomatic initiative.
Two articles in this issue focus on the tense situation on the Korean peninsula: David Albright discloses what is known (and what is not known) about North Korea's plutonium program, and Peter Hayes analyzes the politics of the crisis. Closely related is a contribution from Kumao Kaneko, who critically discusses Japan's nuclear ambitions and relates his personal experiences in influencing that debate.
The perception of threat created by emerging nuclear powers like North Korea provides a strong incentive for some countries to develop military counter-measures for protection. In the United States, programs to develop new ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems - the successors to SDI – are central to "counterproliferation" initiatives. The political relevance of BMD has been demonstrated by the Patriot system, which despite its failure in the 1991 Gulf war has been deployed in South Korea, provoking strong opposition from the North. The article by Paul Podvig and George Lewis argues that advanced tactical BMD systems under development
threaten the ABM Treaty, and may endanger the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as well.
Another complex of topics relates to the NPT, a possible Comprehensive Test Ban (CTBT) and the proposed fissile material cut-off. Rebecca Johnson points to the linkage between the NPT extension and the CTBT negotiations in the Conference on Disarrnament (CD). Jo Husbands summarizes the results of a recent study by the National Academy of Sciences on options for the disposing of excess weapons plutonium. The use of Highly-Enriched Uranium (HEU) in a research reactor near Munich is currently being hotly debated in Germany, and Wolfgang Liebert provides a translation of an open letter opposing this plan which he wrote
together with other German physicists. The debate on the open letter was published in a one-page article in "Nature", which is partly quoted.
This issue concludes with news and descriptions of some projects around the world working against the spread of nuclear weapons. The INESAP Information Bulletin will be most useful if it is not "centrally planned", but involves creative input from all those who form the network. I urge you to use the journal to spread word of your activities and of your point of view on critical non-proliferation issues within the INESAP community.
Finally, I would like to welcome two new members to the Editorial Board: Shen Dingli, Center for American Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai, China; and Pervez Hoodbhoy, Department of Physics at Quaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad, Pakistan. Their participation on the Editorial Board is an important step toward better inclusion of perspectives from the South.
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Many of the Patriot‐Scud engagements during the 1991 Gulf War were recorded on video by news media camera crews. These videos are a unique and important source of information on Patriot's performance that has been completely ignored by the US Army in performing its assessments of Patriot's performance. The videos show many examples of Patriots missing their Scud targets, as well as a few examples of Patriots hitting Scuds but failing to destroy the Scud warhead. The videos also contain information about the nature of the Scud targets, and also about other important occurrences, such as Patriots diving into the ground. The videos we have been able to obtain contain no unambiguous evidence that Patriot destroyed even one Scud warhead. Rather, they contain substantial evidence that Patriot's success rate was very low, and provide a record of Patriot performance that clearly is inconsistent with the US Army's current claim that Patriot destroyed 52 percent of the Scud warheads that it engaged.
In this paper, we analyze the North Korean missile program based on publicly available information and a technical understanding of missile systems. In particular, we present models for the 1,000 kilometer‐range Nodong missile and a 1,300 kilometer‐range variant, both based on Scud technology. These models are single‐stage missiles with four clustered Scud‐engines and would have a circular error probable (CEP) of two to four kilometers or larger. We conclude that a 1,000 kilometer‐range missile with a one tonne payload could be built using Scud technology. Moreover, it appears feasible to extend the range to roughly 1,300 kilometers (with the same payload) if the missile body can be constructed out of high‐strength aluminum rather than steel, although it is unclear whether North Korea has such a capability. If both missiles are based on Scud technology, their existence would not imply a breakthrough in North Korean missile technology. These missiles would then represent essentially the longest‐range missiles achievable without technically difficult steps such as multi‐staging, suggesting that future range increases may occur more slowly than past increases, depending on the level of technical assistance North Korea can acquire. We look briefly at what ranges could be achieved using a two‐stage model with Scud engines and the difficulties a missile such as the Nodong would present to endo‐atmospheric missile defenses.
South Africa's Secret Nuclear Weapons
- David Albright
David Albright, South Africa's Secret Nuclear Weapons, "ISIS Report", May 1994
Developing the UN Register of Conventional Arms, University ofBmdford: Bradford Arms Register Studies
- Wuif
Wuif(Eds.), Developing the UN Register of
Conventional Arms, University ofBmdford:
Bradford Arms Register Studies, No.4, 1994
Nonproliferation Regimes: Policies to Control the Spread ofNuc\ear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons and Missiles Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service Issue Brief
- Z Davis
Z. Davis, Nonproliferation Regimes: Policies
to Control the Spread ofNuc\ear, Chemical,
and Biological Weapons and Missiles Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service
Issue Brief, Revised February 18, 1993.
International Missile Trade and the Two Koreas, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Working Paper No. I
- P Hayes
P. Hayes, International Missile Trade and the
Two Koreas, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Working Paper No. I, March
1993
North Korea MayBe Developing Ability to Build Nuclear Weapons
- Johnj
- Fialka
See for example: JohnJ. Fialka, "North Korea MayBe
Developing Ability to Build Nuclear Weapons", The Wall
StreetJoumal, 19 July 1989, p. Al6
Selected Publications:
EffectivenessofPatriot During the 1991 Gulf War
EffectivenessofPatriot During the 1991 Gulf
War, Science and Global Security, 1993, VoL
4 (I)
Non-Proliferation by Military Means? -North Korea and the Strategy of Counterproliferation
- J Scheffran
- P Schdfor
- M Kalinowski
J. Scheffran, P. Schdfor, M. Kalinowski, Non-Proliferation by Military Means? -North Korea and the Strategy of Counterproliferation
(in German), Bl!ltterftlrdeutsche und intemationale Politik, July 1994