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International Conference KNOWLEDGE-BASED ORGANIZATION
Vol. XXIII No 1 2017
TOWED ANTI-TANK GUNS RENAISSANCE OF ALMOST FORGOTTEN
WEAPONS IN UKRAINIAN CONFLICT
Lukáš DYČKA
University of Defence, Brno, The Czech Republic
lukas.dycka@unob.cz
Abstract: Russia’s operations in Ukraine stand in stark contrast to the old Soviet doctrine of
methodical, timetable- and echelon-driven employment of ground forces that sought to outmass the
opposing army. Apart from obvious tactical implications and use of some modern equipment, this
approach has led to reoccurrence of rather forgotten types of military hardware on the battlefield,
most notably the towed anti-tank guns that had profound effect on later stages of the conflict. This
article assess the reasons of their reoccurrence, types of these weapons and ammunition used on both
sides of the conflict and in the last part tactical use of towed anti-tank guns with possible prospect for
the future warfare. Data collection and analysis relied chiefly on media and image analysis both from
Russian and Ukrainian sources.
Keywords: Russia, Ukraine, Towed anti-tank guns
1. Introduction
1. It could be argued that Russia’s
operations in Ukraine (2013–present) as well
as in Georgia in 2008 provide many
interesting insights, but most notably they
illustrate a departure from contemporary
guerrilla and counterinsurgency operations
(dominant of Western armies) and
demonstrate the pendulum swinging back
toward conventional, high-intensity land
warfare.
Firstly, changes to Russian tactics typify the
manner in which Russia now employs its
ground force. Borrowing from the military
theorist Carl von Clausewitz, who stated,
“It is still more important to remember that
almost the only advantage of the attack
rests on its initial surprise,” [1] Russia’s
contemporary operations embody the
characteristic of surprise. Russian
operations in Ukraine, as well as earlier in
Georgia, demonstrate a rapid, decentralized
attack seeking to temporally dislocate the
enemy, triggering the opposing forces’
defeat. Russia’s actions in Ukraine have
revealed several innovations, most notably
the employment of the semi-autonomous
battalion tactical group, and a
reconnaissance-strike model that tightly
couples drones to strike assets, hastening
the speed at which overwhelming firepower
is available to support tactical commanders.
[2] These methods stand in stark contrast to
the old Soviet doctrine of methodical,
timetable- and echelon-driven employment
of ground forces that sought to outmass the
opposing army. Current Russian land
warfare tactics are something that most
armies, including the Czech Armed Forces,
are largely unprepared to address.
Conversely, after achieving limited
objectives , Russian forces in Ukraine
quickly transitioned to the defense using
ground forces, modern drones and air-
defense capabilities to build a tough,
integrated position from which extrication
would be difficult, to be sure. [3] Russia’s
defensive operations do not serve as a
simple shield, but rather, as a shield capable
of also delivering well-directed,
DOI: 10.1515/kbo-2017-0015
© 2017. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.
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concentrated punches on the opposition
army.[4] Russia’s paradoxical use of
offensive operations to set up the defense
might indicate an ascendancy of the defense
as the preferred method of war in
forthcoming conflicts. Apart from obvious
tactical implications and use of some
modern equipment, this approach has
unexpected impact on reoccurrence of
rather long forgotten military hardware on
the battlefield.
Among the most visible and with highest
impact on later phases of Ukrainian conflict
were towed artillery pieces, including anti-
tank cannons. Largely omitted in past
decades, it can be argued that the towed
anti-tank guns played their last important
role during the World War II, but the
maneuver character of the combat gradually
led to the preference of self-propelled anti-
tank guns, also called “tank destroyers”.
Although many armies continued to use the
towed anti-tank cannons, their importance
declined as light recoilless guns and later
the anti-tank guided missiles replaced them.
The only relevant exception was the Soviet
Union, which continued to develop,
produce and use “classic” (i.e. not
recoilless) towed anti-tank guns. Even
today, these guns of 85 and 100 mm caliber
could be surprisingly effective artillery
weapons, as the conflict in eastern Ukraine
has proven.
2. Historical overview – Development of
Soviet Smooth-barreled Cannons in Cold
war Era.
In 1965, the Soviet industry manufactured
the first serial examples of new towed anti-
tank gun, but it officially entered the Soviet
Army service only in 1961 under the name
T-12 or 2A91. It had caliber of 100 mm and
it was created by the construction bureau of
the Yugrin Machinery Plant as a
replacement for previous BS-3 gun of the
same caliber. But there was also a distinct
difference, because the former gun had got
rifled barrel, but the new T-12 had got
smoothbore one. This solution was selected
due to the possibility of achieving higher
pressures (and thus, higher projectile
speeds) and longer endurance. The fact that
smoothbore barrels are more suitable for
HEAT rounds, since the rotation of grenade
from the rifled barrel reduces the efficiency
of the shaped charge, played also role in its
development. The T-12 gun used the
carriage and other features of the 85-mm D-
48 anti-tank gun, the only difference was in
fact the barrel. [5] Both types can be easily
distinguished by their muzzle brakes,
because the brake of D-48 has got a “box”
shape, while the brake of T-12 is cylindrical
with small holes. The T-12 breech is a
vertical block with semi-automatic
function, meaning that it needs to be
opened manually only before the first shot,
but after every following shot, the breech
opens automatically itself. The recoil of the
gun is lowered not only by the muzzle
brake, but also by the hydraulic buffer and
recuperator. In 1971, a new variant was
introduced, officially called MT-12
(sometimes also T-12A) and given the
combat name Rapira (meaning “Rapier”).
The performance has not changed, but the
gun used new carriage with higher
endurance, as it was needed for towing by
MT-LB armored tractors (while the original
T-12 was usually towed by trucks). Their
wheels can easily distinguish both variants,
since the wheel disc of the T-12 has six
screws, while the MT-12 wheel disc
(identical to ZIS-150 truck disc) has eight
screws.
2.1. Ammunition types and special
variants
The main device for aiming of the MT-12
in good visibility is the OP4MU-40U
optical sight, while in the night, the crews
use the APN-6-40 sight, also known as
“Brusinka” (Russian for “Cranberry”). But
the gun can be equipped also with other
types of night sights, such as the 1PN35,
1PN53 or APN-7. [6] The MT-12 gun is
also able of indirect fire, thus, it is equipped
with S71-40 mechanical artillery sight, PG-
1M panoramic telescope and K-1 collimator
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sight. Coincidently this feature plays
significant role in Ukrainian conflict. The
default ammunition stock is twenty rounds,
including ten solid armor-piercing rounds
(BPS), six HEAT shaped-charge rounds
(KS) and four high-explosive grenades
(OFS) against “soft” targets (their
specifications are found in the table).
Besides the main MT-12 variants, there
were also smaller amounts of two special
models, equipped with additional sensors.
The MT-12K (2A29K) gun has got a laser
device for guidance of the anti-tank guided
missiles (in Russian, called “PTUR”) of the
9K116 Kastet (“Knuckle”) system. Its
9M117 missile is launched with a special
round and is guided semi-automatically
with laser-beam-driving method. Its range
is about 4000 m and it is able to penetrate
reactive protection and layered armor equal
to 550 mm RHA.[7] For comparison, the
“classic” armor-piercing grenades of MT-
12 can penetrate armor of about 215 mm
RHA (the armor of M60 and Leopard 1
tanks) at 1000 m. The second special
version of the gun is known as MT-12R
(2A29R) and is equipped with a small
radar, called 1A31 Ruta (“Rue”) and
developed for the detection and aiming of
targets at distances up to 3500 m. Both
variants were introduced in the service in
1981 and were not exported outside of the
USSR, while the basic MT-12 was
massively sold to the Warsaw Pact and
Third World countries. The Russian Army
actively uses about 520 guns [8] (and about
two thousands are stored) and several
hundreds can be found in arsenals of at least
fourteen other countries of the world.
3. Use of Towed Anti-tank Guns in the
Donbass Conflict
Before the outbreak of the conflict in
eastern Ukraine, the Ukrainian army
possessed slightly over five hundreds of the
T-12, MT-12 and MT-12R cannons (but
probably no “rocket” MT-12K guns).
Usage of towed anti-tank guns by the
Ukrainian army against the pro-Russian
separatists in Donbass was at first
documented in their original role, and it
was soon proven that, while morally
obsolete, these 100-mm cannons could still
be efficient weapons. While they could not
penetrate the frontal armour of modern main
battle tanks, it is worth mentioning that
“modern” tanks are very rare in the eastern
Ukraine conflict. The most common type is
the T-64 tank, whose front armour can be
penetrated by 100-mm rounds at smaller
distances. And this type of ammunition is in
any case wholly adequate for penetrating side
armor of T-64 tank and it can in any case
easily destroy all lighter armored vehicles
used on the Donbass battlefield. The main
drawback of the MT-12 gut is its limited
mobility, for which it is only of limited use in
maneuvering combat – consequently in this
type of operations 100-mm cannons suffered
greatest losses mostly due to mechanical
breakdowns and counter-battery fire by the
Russian military. [9]
The largest maneuver tank battles took
place in the summer 2014 and the initial
results of the Ukrainian army against the
separatists were satisfactory, but after the
regular Russian army units joined the
conflict, the situation changed. In the
September 2014, the Ukrainian army
suffered the fatal defeat near Ilovaysk and
the frontline was stabilized. Up until this
point, towed guns were rarely seen, because
maneuverable warfare preventeted their
wider employment. But after defeat near
Ilovaysk the frontline became more static
and this class of weapons appeared on both
sides of the front in larger numbers. In the
combat from the September 2014 to
February of 2015, towed artillery played
significant role. The MT-12 guns were
often seen during the battle of Debaltseve in
the January 2015, this time on both sides,
because the separatists captured several
pieces (or were supplied with them by
Russia).[10] The city formed a salient into
Russian- and separatist-controlled territory,
which offered Russia an enticing
opportunity to shore up its front lines. On
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January 14, 2015, Russian and separatist
forces attacked, aiming to collapse the
shoulders of the salient and cut off the
Ukrainians in the city—a pincer movement
reminiscent of the Battle of the Bulge. Once
isolated, Russian forces launched massive
salvos of rocket and artillery fire at
Ukrainian forces. The Ukrainian army had
to abandon its positions and in the February
2015, the new ceasefire agreement (also
known as “Minsk II”) was negotiated.
While it is still in power, the situation in
eastern Ukraine remains risky and
dangerous.
3.1. Re-emergence of the 85-mm guns
At the same time with the “Minsk II”
negotiations, the media also published
several pieces of news about efforts of
Ukrainian army to strengthen its artillery
capabilities [11]. The Ukrainians decided to
re-activate certain types of weapons, which
were stored in the reserve storage and
belong, in fact, to the “museum” category,
since they were developed in the beginning
of the Cold War.[12] However,
employment of older artillery pieces on the
battlefield was dictated (more than anything
else) by terrible losses Ukrainian army
suffered during the war. Comparing the
2013 and 2016 editions of the Military
Balance shows that between 2013 and 2016
Ukraine has lost 29% of its tanks, 56% of
its armored personnel vehicles, 66% of its
infantry fighting vehicles and 44% of its
artillery. This included 56% of its self-
propelled artillery and a whopping 80% of
its light artillery. [12] Thus activated
weapons included the 152-mm D-20 (52-P-
546) howitzers, which were introduced in
1955, and two types of towed cannons of 85
mm caliber that were designed by the
famous F. F. Petrov from the Ural
Machinery Plant. The first one is the D-44
(52-P-367) divisional gun, introduced into
service in 1946. Its design was also the
basis for the second type, the already
mentioned D-48 (52-P-372) anti-tank
cannon, which entered service seven years
later (and its carriage was later used for the
T-12 cannon). The D-44 and D-48 guns
possess rifled barrels with the length of 55
or 74 calibers, respectively. Their breech is
again the vertical block and the range of
ammunition includes solid armor-piercing,
HEAT and high-explosive grenades. The 85-
mm armor-piercing round could penetrate
armor of 185 mm RHA at the distance of
1000 m. It is still surprisingly efficient against
older vehicles, and moreover, these guns are
also capable of indirect fire; the full range of
the D-48 is about 19 km. Reports from the
battlefield indicate, that with ceasfire
measures in place, indirect fire became “daily
bread” for this class of weapons, since larger
caliber guns were withdrawn from the
frontline. [14]
While these guns are morally absolutely
obsolete, their firepower simply cannot be
ignored. And they also have one very
special feature, which could be even the
decisive factor for the Ukrainian army. The
“Minsk II” agreement determined the
distance of 50 km from the frontline to be
cleared of “heavy artillery”, i.e. weapons of
100-mm caliber or higher. But the 85-mm
guns logically don’t fall under this
regulations, thus, they could be placed in
the nearest distance of the line. This could
be taken as a warning that the situation is
very tense, and as the recent events in the
Ukraine demonstrated that a “hot” conflict
can erupt in every moment. And in that
case, the towed anti-tank guns can be seen
in combat again.
4. Conclusions
The battlefields in Eastern Ukraine
represent part of a new era of warfare, or so
we are regularly told. Analysts, pundits, and
military leaders point to cyber warfare,
hybrid warfare, and the gray zone. But look
away from these shiny new concepts for a
moment, and it becomes clear the Russian–
Ukrainian war’s conventional character is
far from new. In fact, it looks a lot like the
last century’s World Wars. While the new
aspects of this war have generated
discussion within the defense industry as to
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the evolving character of war, an
acknowledgement of the conflict’s
conventional character is largely missing
from the discourse. This case could be
ideally illustrated on towed anti-tank
artillery used in the conflict. Of course,
self-propelled artillery is much more
effective in terms of active defence
operations. But towed anti-artillery, with all
its slowness, requires little attention in
terms of the material and technical support.
Moreover its ability to be used in indirect
fire makes them weapon ideally suited for
prolonged positional warfare that dominates
last two years of Ukrainian conflict.
Acknowledgements
The work presented in this paper has been
supported by the Ministry of Defence of the
Czech Republic (Research Project
“STRATAL” No. 907930101023).
Special thanks also goes to Mr. Lukáš
Visingr for his constant and unwavering
support during writing this article.
References
[1] Fox, Amos C., Russian Hybrid Warfare and the Re-emergence of Conventional
Armored Warfare: Implications for the U.S. Army’s Armored Force, 2015. Available
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Russia16.pdf
[2] Fox, Amos C., The Russian–Ukrainian War: Understanding the Dust Clouds on the
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[3] Krushelnycky, Askold., Preparing for Trench Warfare in Ukraine, The Intercept, 2015,
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[5] Širokorad, A. B., Энциклопедия отечественной артиллерии, Charvest, Minsk,
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[6] http://www.russianarms.ru/forum/index.php?topic=860.0
[7] http://www.russianarms.ru/forum/index.php?topic=860.0
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[12] Kmitits, A., Artillery in Ukraine: observations from the line of battle, Belarus Security
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