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Handbook of Immigration & Crime

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ON THE HISTORY OF
IMMIGRATION AND CRIME
Holly Ventura Miller
Introduction
Despite its designation as a “nation of immigrants” or a “melting pot,” rarely has the U.S. been a
welcoming place to newcomers. A considerable misconception in today’s immigration debate is the
belief that anti-immigrant sentiment is new, a product of the times, due to a particular political can-
didate or set of circumstances, or associated with only certain types of immigrants. Rather, hostility
towards immigrants and governmental responses to control immigration are longstanding traditions
in American sociopolitical life. From the Alien and Sedition Acts of the late 18th century to today’s
calls for restrictions on immigrants and refugees, there are numerous instances of legislation conceived
to control immigration or immigrants. This chapter attempts to provide a broad overview of several
interrelated topics by way of a general introduction to the socio-cultural-legal history of immigration
and crime. Specifically, this chapter is designed to provide: 1) a brief history of immigration to the
U.S., 2) an introduction to American nativism vis-à-vis immigration and crime, 3) an overview of
early studies on immigration and crime, and 4) a review of American immigration policy throughout
history with a particular focus on how perceptions of the criminal immigrant shaped these laws.
The perceived criminality of the newly arrived foreign-born was the impetus for early state and
local action in controlling immigration and was critical in getting the federal government involved in
immigration in the 19th century (Bernard, 1980). Each of the major waves of immigration to the U.S.
sparked nativist movements and policies as the native-born sought to distance themselves from new-
comers and firmly establish the dominance of the preceding immigrant groups. Generally speaking,
nativism was sparked by several major concerns including: 1) the foreign-born undercut the wages of
native-born American workers, 2) these new immigrants would not be able to effectively assimilate
into American society, and 3) immigrants would increase various social ills, including crime (Feagin,
1997). Notably, these concerns remain at the forefront of the contemporary immigration debate.
Historically, immigration to the U.S. was driven by many of the same reasons that remain relevant
today. Immigrants often were motivated by religious persecution or economic oppression; some
came as indentured servants and others were transported as part of a criminal sentence (Davie, 1936).
The vast majority of settlers in early Colonial America were English or of English parentage such that
90% of those in the colonies in 1699 shared this Anglican background. The remaining white settlers
at this time included Swedes in Delaware, Germans in Pennsylvania, Dutch in New York, and
Huguenots in New Rochelle (Zelinsky, 1973). The first U.S. Census taken in 1790 showed a popula-
tion of 2.8 million, 1.3 million of whom were of English descent. The 1790 Census also recorded
560,000 Africans, 180,000 Scots, 156,000 Germans, 54,000 Dutch, 44,000 Irish, and 13,000 French.
Holly Ventura Miller
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The first half of the 18th century brought with it mass immigration to the U.S. when nearly
750,000 immigrants arrived in the two decades spanning 1821 and 1840 alone (Hansen & Schlesigner,
1940). Another 1.7 million entered in the next decade, spurred by famine, industrialization, and
political unrest on the European Continent. The Treaty of Guadalup-Hidalgo ended the Mexican-
American War in 1848, extending citizenship to 80,000 Mexicans living in the newly acquired
territories in the Southwest (e.g., Texas, California, Arizona). The California Gold Rush led to a
significant increase in Chinese immigration as well during this decade.
The second half of the 19th century saw a steady increase in immigration with 2.6 million arriving
between 1851–1860, followed by another 2.3 million the succeeding decade (Thompson & Whelpton,
1933/1969). Between 1881–1890, 5.2 million immigrants arrived, 1 million of whom were German.
This second wave of mass immigration saw a corresponding rise in immigration policy and law, as
well as nativist backlash that included the emergence of anti-immigrant political parties (e.g., Know
Nothings party) and anti-Catholic riots in Philadelphia that burned churches and schools. And while
nativists’ hostility was high towards immigration from mainly Catholic nations such as Germany and
Ireland, their ire was provoked even more so by the third wave of mass immigration (1880–1930)
(Billington, 1964; Higham, 1963).
Between 1881–1920, 2 million Eastern European Jews immigrated to the U.S. and in the five
decades preceding World War II, 25 million immigrants arrived in the U.S., mainly from Southern
and Eastern Europe (Taeuber & Taeuber, 1958). These new arrivals substantially altered the
complexion and cultural context of many large American cities and gave rise to the first empirical
assessments of the immigration-crime relationship. Immigration legislation increased dramatically
during this period, as Congress restricted the immigration of various groups including the Chinese,
Japanese, convicts, prostitutes, the mentally ill, indigents, polygamists, and persons with contagious
diseases (Garis & Schibsby, 1928). This period also saw the rise of nativist and related movements,
the most significant of which was the prohibition of alcohol and drugs (see Chapter 2 in this volume).
The Hart-Cuellar Act of 1965 altered immigration significantly as the quota system
1 was abolished
and source nations shifted from Europe to Latin America and Asia. European immigration constituted
the majority of arrivals between 1920 and 1960 (i.e., 60%), by 1975 these numbers shifted, with
Europe sending only 19%, South and Central America 43%, and Asia 34% (Waldinger, 1989).
Referred to as the post-1965 cohort, this group is demarcated from older, mainly European
immigrant groups. This trend continued throughout the end of the 20th century altering demographics
Africa
Prior to 2005 3.5
6.2
6.6 40.3 9.1 9.4 25.2 6.1 3.3
30.4 8.0 7.6 38.8 6.7 2.3
26.9 12.8 9.5 37.8 6.9 2.5
2005 to 2007
2008 or later
Asia Europe Caribbean Central America
Latin America and the Caribbean South
America
Other
regions
Figure 1.1 Foreign-Born Population by Period of Entry and World Region of Birth: 2010 (Percent distribution.
Data based on sample. For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and
definitions, see www.census.gov/acs/www/ )
Note: “Other regions” includes Northern America and Oceania.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 American Community Survey.
On the History of Immigration and Crime
7
and substantially increasing the non-white population in the U.S. Today’s immigrant population
includes 40 million foreign-born, less than half of whom are naturalized American citizens (U.S.
Census, 2012). This number consists of 21.2 million immigrants from Latin America, 11.3 million
from Asia, and 4.8 million from Europe. While the foreign-born resided in every state in 2010, the
population is disproportionately concentrated in California, New York, Texas, and Florida (i.e.,
more than half live in these four states). Immigrants today are, on average, younger than native-born
citizens, more likely to be married, less likely to be divorced, and more likely to have children. They
are also more likely to live in poverty.
Figure 1.1 is from the U.S. Census’ American Community Survey in 2010 and shows immigra-
tion trends before and after 2005. Data indicated that the nine largest countries of birth constituted
nearly 60% of the total foreign-born population in 2010 (U.S. Census, 2011). The largest number
by far hailed from Mexico (29.3%), followed by China (5.4%), India (4.5%), and the Philippines
(4.4%). The remaining countries in the top nine included Vietnam (3.1%), El Salvador (3.0%), Korea
(2.8%), Cuba (2.8%), and the Dominican Republic (2.2%).
American Nativism and the Criminal Immigrant
The history of immigration and crime is situated within the larger context of immigration and related
policy in the U.S. Perceptions regarding immigration and crime fall under the broader umbrella of
perceptions regarding newcomers more generally such that perceptions of the criminal immigrant
are merely one manifestation of a larger sociohistorical reality of nativism in the U.S. Nativism is
both general and specific; it can be defined as “intense opposition to an internal minority on the
ground of its foreign (i.e., “un-American”) connections” (Higham, 1988, p. 5). Nativism in the U.S.
has typically resulted in discriminatory legislation and immigration restrictions aimed at controlling
the movement and liberties of a foreign “other” (Bennett, 1988; Jaret, 1999). Various immigrant
groups during different time periods have been viewed as deviant, criminal, immoral, atavistic, and
otherwise unappealing. Generally, nativism can be viewed through the lens of four major themes:
1) certain races are intellectually and culturally inferior, 2) those from racially and culturally inferior
groups face difficulties in assimilating to the larger Anglo-dominated culture, 3) immigrants represent
an economical threat to native-born Americans, and 4) immigration triggers governmental crises
(Feagin, 1997, pp. 13–14). The immigrant as criminal threat is situated within each of these larger
themes.
The first groups to draw the ire of nativist philosophies and policies were the Germans in the
mid-18th century and the French in the late 18th/early 19th centuries (Higham, 1988). Though the
latter was largely a function of internal political strife between John Adams’ Federalists and Thomas
Jefferson’s Democrats, these immigrants were painted as socially problematic, prompting a series of
legislative acts known collectively as the Alien and Sedition Acts (discussed further in the following
section). Nativism took on more significant proportions in response to Irish and Catholic immigration
in the mid-19th century and led to the development of the first specifically anti-immigrant political
party, the Know Nothings. At the heart of this party was rabid anti-Catholicism which in turn
disproportionally affected immigrants from places like Ireland and Germany. Famine and political
strife led to the immigration of millions between 1820 and 1850, mainly Irish and German Catholics.
These Catholic immigrants were disliked for being foreign-born, non-Anglos and because of
Protestant disdain for “popery” (Jaret, 1999).
Nativism in the mid-19th century, while firmly rooted in anti-Catholic bias, also adopted
philosophies of racial superiority (Handlin, 1959). Race in this context was largely used to distinguish
between the white race comprised of those with Northern European backgrounds (i.e., Nordic
races) and those from undesirable groups such as Southern and Eastern Europeans (i.e., Mediterranean
and Alpine races). Those outside of the Nordic race were viewed as racially inferior, prone to socially
Holly Ventura Miller
8
problematic behavior, more likely to engage in crime, and unlikely to successfully assimilate into
American society. Though much of the racism was devoted to typologizing various European
ethnicities, this new form of nativism was also directed towards people of color, most notably
Mexicans in California and Texas whose land had been recently subsumed as new American territories.
Consistent with larger beliefs regarding American Manifest Destiny, nativism saw these groups as
socially and culturally inferior to Anglo-dominated culture that characterized the U.S.
Among immigrant groups, Italian Catholics were particularly vilified vis-à-vis criminality (see, for
example, Bingham, 1908). Nativists viewed Italians as “inferior and degraded,” unable to effectively
assimilate, and responsible for the destruction of the nation’s moral fiber. Media accounts described
Southern Europeans as inferiors that lived immoral lives centered on alcohol consumption while
similar derogatory depictions were leveled at Jews in the early 20th century, describing them as
immoral and unscrupulous in business (Jaret, 1999). Even agents of the criminal justice system
weighed in on the criminality of Italians and Jews in public forums. Tiedore A. Bingham, the then-
Chief of the NYPD, wrote in 1908: “The crimes committed by the Russian Hebrews are generally
those against property. They are burglars, firebugs, pickpockets, and highway robbers . . . but . . .
pickpocketing is the one to which they seem to take most naturally” (p. 384). Bingham described the
manner in which Jews work in concert with Italians to commit crimes in tandem and noted “the
Italian malefactor is by far the greater menace to law and order,” while also alleging that both groups
were “engaged in the slave trade in New York” (p. 390). Bingham’s treatise, published in the
North American Review , also described concerns with Chinese, Eastern European, and Armenian
immigrants.
Ultimately, nativism carried with it significant implications for American political, social, and
economic life (Higham, 1988; Jaret, 1999; Perea, 1997). Political elites turned their attention to the
immigration “problem” and established organizations such as the Immigration Restriction League,
working doggedly to curtail immigration. Both the American Protective Association and the
Ku Klux Klan worked aggressively against immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe as well
as from Asia. Anti-immigrant hysteria reached a peak in the 1920s when many aliens were prohibited
from certain jobs or professions such as medicine, law, and engineering (Jaret, 1999). Decades of
anti-immigrant sentiment resulted in a number of restrictive pieces of legislation between 1870 and
1920, culminating in the Immigration Act of 1924, which established quota systems specifically
designed to reduce and restrict the number of immigrants hailing from “inferior” races. Most notably,
Asians and Southern and Eastern Europeans were targeted to ensure fewer immigrants arrived from
these nations by setting quota numbers consistent with numbers in the U.S. Census from three
decades prior (Bernard, 1980).
Early Studies of Immigration and Crime
Early empirical assessments of the immigration-crime link tended to differ based upon data availabil-
ity, quality, and analysis. In an early 20th-century analysis using state-level data from New York,
Hourwich (1912) reported that the state’s recent crime rate increase “coincided with the lowest ebb
of immigration, while the high tide of immigration was contemporaneous with a decrease in crime”
(p. 479). The study concluded that an increase in the foreign-born population was accompanied by
a corresponding decrease in the crime rate. Sutherland (1927) was an early critic of data reliability
with respect to the immigration and crime question but found that immigrants had a considerably
higher commitment (i.e., incarceration) rate compared to native-born whites. However, he
also reported lower commitment rates for New York City and New York State after allowing for
the adult male population, an early reminder of the importance of confounding variables in the
immigration-crime relationship. The Wickersham Commission (1936) examined the immigration
and crime question and concluded that the foreign-born were significantly less likely to commit
On the History of Immigration and Crime
9
crime overall compared to the native-born, but that the rates were closer for crimes of violence
and personal gain. The Commission also reported that arrest, conviction, and incarceration rates
were similarly lower for the foreign-born. Glueck and Glueck (1930) found that the native-born
were significantly over-represented in their study of 500 parolees such that 79% of ex-prisoners were
native-born compared to just 54.1% in the general population.
Sutherland (1927) also considered immigration and crime relative to nativity and described differ-
ent crime patterns across ethnic groups. He reported that Italians were committed to prison for major
offenses at a rate three times that of the Irish, although they were only two-thirds as likely to be sent
to jails or workhouses. Wickersham Commission (1936) similarly found differences between nation-
alities in terms of types of offenses committed. Sutherland’s analysis produced three general conclu-
sions: 1) the native-born had significantly higher rates of incarceration for crimes of personal gain
(i.e., robbery, larceny, burglary), 2) rates for crimes of personal violence were about the same for the
native and foreign-born, and 3) a larger portion of foreign-born crimes were crimes of violence.
Ross (1937) considered the immigration and crime link as a function of social class and urban envi-
ronment, concluding:
Thus the crime of the native-born sons of foreign-born parentage may be a result not of
cultural maladjustment as is usually held, but of their position in a poverty class, a class
which breeds criminals with equal facility from all its constituents be they of native or
foreign parentage.
(p. 207)
Moehling and Piehl (2009) revisited the prison Census data used by the Dillingham and Wickersham
Commissions but incorporated other Census data (e.g., mortality, demographics) to examine the
prevalence of incarceration between the native and foreign-born. Their analysis, unlike earlier
empirical work, provided specific, nuanced findings that allowed for critical germane variables such
as race and age. Using data from 1904, 1923, and 1930, findings indicated that in 1904, both native
and foreign-born exhibited a distinct age-crime curve with the peak for foreign-born males higher
and earlier than that of the native-born. Results also indicated that these rates converged by age 30.
Data from 1923 revealed that the foreign-born were incarcerated at a higher rate at younger ages,
but at a lower rate at older ages. By 1930, Congress passed legislation restricting immigration, which
led to an aging of the foreign-born population reflected in their lower rates of incarceration during
the third observed timeframe.
The 1930 data, however, were somewhat confounded in that “foreign-born” was generally meant
to denote foreign-born white (i.e., from Europe) and not those hailing from Mexico or Asian nations
such as China and Japan. Moehling and Piehl (2009), however, remedy this by operationalizing
foreign-born as foreign-born white plus all other races, and in doing so, the foreign-born incarcera-
tion rate is increased by 30%. Although this narrowed the gap between the native and foreign-born,
it altered the sign of the difference only for the 18-year-old cohort. Their analysis of nation of origin
(i.e., Germany, Ireland, Italy) indicated that at least some of the link between this variable
and incarceration rate was partially attributable to differences in age distribution. Russians were
committed for major offenses at a rate higher than English, German, or Irish, but close to the predicted
rate given their age distribution. Immigrants from Scandinavia (i.e., Norway and Sweden) were
incarcerated at a rate half of that expected given the age distribution. The Irish had rates that exceeded
those of predicted rates, especially for minor offenses. Italians had a commitment rate twice that of the
Irish and three times as much as the Germans. While part of this can be explained by age, these immi-
grants were disproportionately incarcerated for more serious offenses. Finally, this analysis also showed
that commitment rates were significantly correlated with average wages, literacy rates, and English
proficiency, also convoluting the link between nationality and crime.
Holly Ventura Miller
10
American Immigration Policy: A Historical Overview
The perception and fear that immigrants may disrupt the social order dates back to the Colonial era,
as first illustrated by the cases of Virginia and Maryland in the 1660s and 1670s (Hansen & Schlesinger,
1940). After the English Parliament approved the transportation of convicted felons to the Chesapeake
Bay area, both colonies passed exclusionary laws in an effort to prevent such practices. Despite their
efforts, Parliament overruled the restrictions and the policy of transportation continued well into the
18th century. Between 1717 and 1783, Britain sent 50,000 convicts to the American colonies,
representing nearly 10% of total immigration during that period. This early tangle between national
and local interests would foreshadow the often-tenuous relationship between the federal government
and the states when dealing with immigration policy.
Early Efforts
Immigration policy was one of the many grievances American colonists levied at the British Crown
in 1775 and was subsequently debated at the Constitutional Convention in 1787 (Bernard, 1980).
Between 1790 and 1798, Congress passed five pieces of legislation referred to as the Alien and
Sedition Acts, which, among other objectives, sought to create uniform policies for immigration,
including establishing a rule of naturalization and a two-year residency requirement for aliens who
were “free white persons” of “good moral character.” The following acts were blatantly more
political, but affected immigration policy nonetheless. The Naturalization Act extended residency
requirements for citizenship from 2 to 14 years and the Alien Friends Act (1798) allowed the
President to imprison or deport aliens considered “dangerous to the peace and safety of the United
States.” The Alien Enemies Act (1798) authorized the President to detain or deport male citizens of
a hostile nation during times of war and was invoked a century and half later against Japanese
Americans during World War II.
In 1819, Congress passed legislation requiring shipmasters to deliver manifests enumerating all
immigrants on board; the Secretary of State was required to then report these numbers to Congress
annually (Bennett, 1963). However, as first established during the Colonial Period, immigration
largely remained the purview of the States. Between 1820 and 1860, for example, states with large
ports including Massachusetts, Maryland, New York, and Pennsylvania, all passed laws to reduce the
costs associated with immigration (Bernard, 1980). New York passed inspection and welfare laws
requiring shipmasters to report the name, occupation, birthplace, age, and physical condition of each
passenger. Those with potential for becoming wards of the state could then be deported on the basis
of these reports. Other cities used the fees collected from ships to maintain marine hospitals or deliver
social services to immigrants. New York’s laws were challenged in City of New York v. Miln (1837)
and affirmed by the Supreme Court who held that the state was within its legitimate rights to
exercise police powers within its borders:
We think it as competent for a State to provide precautionary measures against the moral
pestilence of paupers, vagabonds, and possibly convicts, as it is to guard against the physical
pestilence which may arise from unsound or infectious articles imported, or from a ship, the
crew of which may be laboring under an infectious disease.
The ethnic make-up of the U.S. began to shift in the mid-19th century from mainly Caucasians
from Western and Northern Europe to include Latinos and Asians in the Southwest and West
(Dinnerstein & Reimers, 1975). The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo ended the Mexican-American
War and extended citizenship to approximately 80,000 Mexicans living in Texas, California, and
what was now the new American Southwest. The California Gold Rush in the 1840s spawned
On the History of Immigration and Crime
11
Chinese immigration, while Catholic immigration also rose from Ireland and Germany during the
first half of the 19th century, prompting the emergence of nativist movements and other social
disruptions. In July 1844, for example, nativists in Philadelphia burned Catholic churches and schools
resulting in 20 deaths. The following decade saw the rise of the Know Nothings Party, which was
mainly concerned with Catholic immigration from Ireland and Germany. Organization membership
was restricted to Protestant men concerned with purifying American society and politics (Billington,
1964; Higham, 1988). Inherent to their view was the belief that Catholic immigrants had a certain
degenerative nature about them such that their very presence would result in greater social ills, chief
among them crime.
The 1860s marked a shift in immigration policy with new legislation designed to target classes of
immigrants from specific locations, most notably China (Handlin, 1959; Konvitz, 1946/1965). The
push for anti-Chinese immigration policies originated in California in the 1950s, when both the
governor and the state assembly advocated for restrictive measures designed to inhibit the flow of
immigrants from China. State courts declared the Chinese ineligible for naturalization on the grounds
that they were not the “free whites” stipulated by federal law. In 1870, California passed a state law
prohibiting the landing of any Mongolian, Japanese, or Chinese female who could not provide
evidence of voluntary emigration and decent moral character. In an effort to curb contract labor, this
law was then extended to males as well.
The Anti-Coolie Act of 1862 discouraged Chinese immigration and instituted special taxes for
those who hired Chinese workers. Immigration continued to increase, however, and in 1864
Congress passed a bill establishing a federal Bureau of Immigration to address its regulation. Also in
1864, the Republican Party embraced a stronger role for the federal government in establishing
immigration policy. These efforts were largely successful with Congress passing the Naturalization
Act of 1870, which provided citizenship rights to whites and blacks, although Asians were still
banned from becoming citizens. In 1875, Congress authorized the First Exclusionary Act (1875),
which banned prostitutes, convicts, and Chinese workers (coolies) from entering the U.S.
A Supreme Court case in 1875 would significantly change the direction of immigration policy
henceforth. In Henderson v. Mayor of New York City , the Court found that all existing state laws
regarding immigration were unconstitutional on the grounds that they usurped the federal govern-
ment’s power to regulate foreign commerce. This reversed the earlier Miln decision and placed
responsibility for immigration policy in the hands of the federal government. In the decade following
the decision, Congress enacted a series of statutes bringing immigration under direct federal control
and allowing the government to prevent the immigration of any class of alien deemed undesirable.
Responses to Mass Immigration in the 19th Century
Mass immigration in the 19th century brought about what is referred to as the Era of Regulation
(1882–1916), encompassing a series of restrictive immigration laws and policies (Abbott, 1969;
Bernard, 1980). With the Supreme Court’s Henderson decision and petitions from the states to create
stricter immigration policies, the federal government began to develop the bureaucratic mechanisms
necessary to administer national immigration policy. In 1882, Congress passed the first federal effort
at comprehensive immigration reform with the Immigration Act or the Chinese Exclusion Act
(1882). In an effort to circumvent an existing trade treaty with China, Congress curtailed Chinese
immigration for a period of ten years. Ex-convicts, lunatics, idiots, and those unable to care for
themselves were also excluded under this legislation. Congress followed this legislation with bills in
1885 (The Foran Act, 1885) that prohibited the recruitment of unskilled labor and in 1888 that
ordered the deportation of alien contract laborers within one year of entry. In 1891, the U.S. Office
of Immigration was established while Congress restricted the entry of paupers, polygamists, the
insane, and persons with contagious diseases.
Holly Ventura Miller
12
The Era of Regulation coincided with the third wave of immigration to the U.S. (1880–1930).
During this time, 25 million immigrants arrived, mostly from Southern and Eastern Europe. Approx-
imately 2% were sent back for a variety of reasons including health problems, being an unskilled
laborer, criminal history, or insanity. Those arriving in the third wave of immigration were often
referred to as the “new immigrants” and were viewed with varying levels of suspicion and trepidation
by both the native-born and those from earlier immigrant groups (e.g., Irish, German). Between
1891 and 1929, Congress passed a number of laws aimed at limiting the number of immigrants who
qualified for admission. In 1903, epileptics, professional beggars, and anarchists were excluded,
followed by imbeciles, the feeble-minded, tuberculars, persons with physical or mental defects, and
persons under the age of 16 without parents in 1907 (Bennett, 1963; Gastil, 1975; Zelinsky, 1973).
Asian groups continued to be targeted during this timeframe. As Western congressmen succeeded
in having the Chinese Exclusion Act renewed indefinitely, immigrants from Japan began arriving in
numbers equal to those of the Chinese. In response, businessmen and civic leaders organized the
Japanese and Korean Exclusion League of San Francisco, a movement that spread quickly throughout
the region. The movement was quashed, however, after the Gentlemen’s Agreement between the
U.S. and Japan wherein the latter voluntarily agreed to restrict immigration while the former agreed
to stop segregating Japanese students in San Francisco schools (Handlin, 1959; Konvitz, 1946/1965).
The Dillingham Commission
Concerns about the new immigrants were not, however, limited only to those Asian groups. Immi-
grants from Southern and Eastern Europe were still suspected of having inferior constitutions and
potential sources of various social ills. In 1910, Congress appointed a commission led by Senator
William P. Dillingham (i.e., the Dillingham Commission) to investigate the extent and impact of
immigration, which resulted in the publication of a 42-volume report. While the first edition ( Jenks
& Lauck, 1911) concluded that the proportion of foreign-born committing recorded offenses was
smaller than that of the native-born overall, immigrants were more likely to be represented in
offenses of “personal violence” and against “public policy” (i.e., described as mainly violations of city
ordinances, for example peddling without a license).
Data collected from New York State for the report documented the types of crimes for which
various ethnic groups were convicted. Among Italians, 39.3% of convictions were for violence,
while 18.6% of convictions for those hailing from Austria-Hungary were for violent crimes.
Convictions among the Irish included 16.5% for violence compared to 11.7% of convictions of the
native-born. The report also identified those groups most involved in “gainful offenses”: Italians and
extortion, Canadians and forgery and fraud, Russians with larceny and receiving stolen property,
Poles and robbery (Jenks & Lauck, 1917, pp. 55–56). The report notes: “the Italians seem to show a
peculiarly bad eminence, leading in homicide . . . in abduction . . . in assault . . . and in crimes against
public health and safety” (p. 56). In the end, however, the report concludes “that on the whole, in
spite of the inclination apparently shown by certain nationalities to commit certain classes of crimes,
it is impossible to show whether or not the totality of crime has been increased by immigration”
(p. 59). The report concludes with suggestions for reducing the number of criminal immigrants
including requesting police and penal records from foreign nations and a “confidential force” abroad
to watch for criminal and immoral persons intending to enter the country.
Immigration Legislation in the 20th Century: The Era of Restriction
Massive successive waves of immigration eventually resulted in the tightening of restrictions on who
could enter and also ushered in the era of immigration quotas (Bennett, 1963; Bernard, 1950, 1965,
1980). The Immigration Act of 1917 was the first in a series of statutes that sought to establish a federal
On the History of Immigration and Crime
13
immigration policy wholly based on a rank order of eligibility that favored national groups thought most
likely to assimilate. The 1917 legislation also introduced a literacy test the result of which banned virtu-
ally all Asian immigrants from entry to the U.S. Proponents of the literacy test had long argued that the
illiteracy of many immigrants made them unlikely to assimilate and thus more costly to the U.S.
Despite these restrictions, the number of immigrants arriving from Southern and Eastern Europe
remained high, as literacy levels had increased significantly in these nations over the prior decade. So
in 1921, the Quota Act (1921) set an annual immigration ceiling of 350,000 with a new nationality
quota. Under this statute, each nationality groups’ admissions were set to 3% of each group’s repre-
sentation in the 1910 Census. As a result, immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe fell sharply
thereby achieving the legislation’s primary goals. The National Origins Act of 1924 further reduced
the annual immigration ceiling to 150,000 and the quota was again revised to 2% of each nationality’s
representation in the 1890 Census. This reduced the number of immigrants from Southern and
Eastern Europe further as their numbers were significantly fewer in 1890 than they were in 1910.
These nationality-based quota immigration policies remained in effect until 1965.
Large-scale geopolitical events leading up to and encompassing World War II and its aftermath
largely characterized immigration policy in the second quarter of the 20th century (Bernard, 1980).
Immigration to the U.S. decreased during the Great Depression and during the events preceding
World War II and large portions of most quotas went unfilled. High unemployment led then
President Hoover to strictly apply the clause excluding immigrants likely to become public charges,
which prevented all but the wealthy from obtaining visas. This also impacted the number of refugees
fleeing fascism in Europe that could be admitted.
The Smith Act (1941) gave immigration officials the ability to refuse visas to applicants who might
endanger public safety and allowed the President to deport any alien if in the best interests of the U.S.
Alliances during World War II prompted the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act, though all other
Asian groups remained banned. World War II created millions of European refugees seeking asylum
and led to a series of legislative and executive orders. In 1945, President Truman issued an executive
order calling for the admission of 40,000 displaced persons, and the following year Congress passed
the War Brides Act, which admitted 120,000 alien wives and children of American service members.
The Displaced Persons Act of 1948 admitted more than 220,000 over a two-year period with prior-
ity given to applicants from the Baltics. Due to the qualification dates included in the bill, Jews and
Catholics were largely excluded. The revised Displaced Persons Act of 1950 liberalized admission,
removed the technicalities that discriminated against Jews and Catholics, and set a quota ceiling of
415,000. The Refugee Relief Act of 1953 admitted 205,000 refugees as non-quota immigrants.
The Internal Security Act (1950) again intersected immigration policy with national security
needs, and required the exclusion or deportation of all aliens who had been communists or belonged
to front organizations. In 1952, Congress passed, Truman vetoed, and Congress overrode the veto
for the McCarran-Walter Act (1952), which consolidated all previous efforts at immigration regulation.
This legislation retained and revised the nationality quota system (Northern and Western Europe
received 85% of total annual quota) though tighter restrictions were placed on the colonies of these
European countries, mainly to restrict the flow of black immigrants from the British West Indies.
The Act removed the restrictions on Asian immigration and retained and enlarged the non-quota
class (e.g., immediate relative of citizens, permanent resident aliens).
Operation Wetback , an Eisenhower Administration policy, represents a particularly dark period in
American immigration history. While the McCarran-Walter Act removed restrictions on naturaliza-
tion so that being white was no longer a prerequisite for citizenship, other tactics were employed to
restrict the number of non-white American citizens. In an appalling abuse of executive power, the
Director of Immigration and Naturalization Services, Joseph Swing, instituted the Operation Wet-
back policy to reduce the number of Mexican laborers within the U.S., utilizing mass detention and
deportations. The program was implemented in response to the concerns and lobbying from a wide
Holly Ventura Miller
14
range of stakeholders including farmers, business leaders, and the Mexican government, who felt too
many temporary workers had flooded into the U.S. thereby creating pressure on both native-born
Americans and the Mexican economy. Enforcement of the policy resulted in the deportation of
more than a million individuals, several hundred of whom were actually American citizens of
Mexican descent (Mitchell, 2012).
The Era of Liberalization, 1965–1986
By the late 1950s, pressure developed on Congress to revise the national immigration policy, in
particular the nationality quota system (Bernard, 1980). Consequently, Congress passed the
Hart-Cuellar Act of 1965, reforming federal immigration policy by abolishing both the national
quota system and the designation of the Asia-Pacific Triangle. The annual immigration ceiling was
raised to 290,000, split between the Western (120,000) and Eastern (170,000) hemispheres of which
no country could use more than 20,000. Applications were accepted on a first come, first serve basis,
although non-quota admissions were retained. This legislation significantly impacted the kind of
immigrants allowed visas, as countries whose quota allocations had previously placed them at a
disadvantage (e.g., China, Portugal, India, Greece) were now able to immigrate in greater numbers.
While Europe had comprised the bulk of immigration between 1920 and 1960 (i.e., 60%), by 1975
these proportions had shifted dramatically, with Europe sending only 19%, South and Central
America 43%, and Asia 34% (Waldinger, 1989).
Refugees were again addressed in 1980 when Congress authorized the Refugee Act (1980),
which entitled refugees as a distinct class separate from other immigrants. The new law defined
refugees as those who flee a country because of persecution “on account of race, religion, nationality,
or political opinion.” The President, in consultation with Congress, is authorized to establish an
annual refugee ceiling and allowed to admit any group of refugees in an emergency.
The most significant piece of immigration legislation of the late 20th century was passed by
Congress and signed into law by President Reagan in 1986 (Perea, 1997). The Immigration Reform
and Control Act (1986) revised the annual immigration ceiling to 540,000 and offered amnesty to
those illegal immigrants able to prove continuous residence in the U.S. since 1982, with no criminal
record, and provide proof of registration with the Selective Service (i.e., the draft). Provided an
applicant was granted legal status, they were disqualified from receiving all forms of public welfare
assistance for five years (although this did not apply to Cuban or Haitian immigrants). The Immigration
Act of 1990 raised the annual ceiling to 700,000, offered 10,000 permanent resident visas to
immigrants willing to invest substantially in the U.S., and amended the McCarran-Walter Act so that
admittance could not be denied based on beliefs, statements, or associations.
Concern about illegal immigration increased during the 1980s and 1990s, when estimates put the
number of undocumented immigrants at about 8 million. In an effort to curb illegal immigration,
mainly from Latin America, Congress voted to double the Border Patrol to 10,000 agents over five
years and mandated the construction of fences along the most heavily trafficked areas of the
U.S.-Mexico border. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
signed by President Bill Clinton also instituted a 10-year ban for those entering the country illegally
and staying for more than a year.
Immigration Legislation in the 21st Century: 9/11,
the DREAM ACT, and Beyond
The events of September 11, 2001 once again drew attention to the nation’s immigration policies.
Five of the 19 hijackers on 9/11 had also committed violations of immigration policy, as did many
of the terrorists involved in the earlier World Trade Center bombing in 1993 and the African
On the History of Immigration and Crime
15
embassies’ bombing in 1998. Consequently, immigration and national security concerns coalesced
again as they had following World War II. The PATRIOT Act (2001) was passed immediately
following 9/11 and broadened the terrorism grounds for excluding aliens from entering the U.S. and
increased monitoring of foreign students. The following year (2002), Congress established the new
Department of Homeland Security, to where nearly all of the functions of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) were transferred from the U.S. Department of Justice. INS was then
restructured to become three new agencies, Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. The Enhanced Border
Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 was also passed that same year and implemented new
procedures for the review of visa applicants and required that travel and entry documents be
machine-readable, tamper-resistant, and include biometric identifiers. The REAL ID Act of 2005
required states to obtain proof of citizenship or legal immigration status before issuing a driver’s
license, and to make licenses resistant to fraud or tampering. This legislation also expanded terrorism-
related grounds for inadmissibility and deportation. Congress enacted the Secure Fence Act of 2006
after the Senate failed to adopt comprehensive immigration reform legislation that had passed the
House of Representatives and was supported by the Bush Administration. This legislation called for
the building of an additional 850 miles of fencing along the U.S.-Mexico border, authorized more
lighting, vehicle barriers, and border checkpoints, and required advanced technology (e.g., sensors,
cameras, drones) be employed to deter illegal border crossings (Ewing, 2012).
While comprehensive immigration reform has remained elusive for the better part of three
decades, both Congress and various administrations have voiced support for addressing the plight of
childhood arrivals, i.e., those brought to the U.S. illegally by their parents. This group has received
the most, if only, political sympathy of all undocumented immigrants, and numerous legislators from
across the political spectrum have attempted to move bills through the House and Senate since 2001.
Towards this end, Richard Durbin (D-IL) and Orrin Hatch (R-UT) first introduced the DREAM
Act (Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors) in the Senate with bipartisan support in
2001, which was similar to a bill introduced in the House by Luis Gutierrez (D-IL) earlier that year.
This legislation granted childhood arrivals a path to temporary and, ultimately, permanent residency
status provided they could meet the requirements set forth in the bill (i.e., under 16 at arrival, not
have entered the U.S. on a non-immigrant visa, provide proof of residence in the U.S. for at least
five consecutive years, registered with Selective Service (males only), be between 12 and 35, have
graduated from an American high school, obtained a GED, or been admitted to an institution of
higher education, and be of good moral character). The Act has been reintroduced in various forms
since then including in 2008 as an amendment to a defense authorization bill. The bill was reintro-
duced in somewhat altered forms in 2009, 2010, and 2011. The DREAM Act passed the House in
2010 though it did not garner the 60 votes necessary for cloture in the Senate.
After more than 10 years of Congressional gridlock, President Barack Obama sidestepped the
legislative process and issued a policy memorandum through the Department of Homeland Security
“Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals” or DACA. DACA authorized undocumented immigrants
brought to the U.S. as children (under age 16) to obtain a work permit and defer deportation for a
renewable period of two years. Pew Research Center (Passel & Lopez, 2012) estimated that up to
1.7 million individuals would qualify for DACA and as of this writing, approximately 850,000 people
have applied and been approved under this policy. As covered extensively in the media (Bennett &
Memoli, 2017; Price, 2016; Reyes, 2017; Schmidt & Holley, 2017), the future of DACA recipients
remained in limbo under the new administration, with contradictory statements made by the
President and his Cabinet fueling anxiety among Dreamers. Several instances of detention and
deportation of DACA recipients (Hawkins, 2017; Schmidt, 2017) only heightened the confusion
and fear surrounding the policy though for now it seemingly remains intact. In June 2017, the
Department of Homeland Security announced officially that it would not make changes to DACA
Holly Ventura Miller
16
while at the same time rescinding its parallel DAPA policy for the undocumented parents of native-
born American children.
Discussion
Perceptions of the criminal alien have fueled immigration policy, nativist movements, and contemporary
political debate. The criminal immigrant construct is situated within larger nativist themes such as the
intellectual and cultural inferiority of certain groups, assimilation problems, and economic threats
(Feagin, 1997). A wide range of ethnicities and nationalities have been targeted by restrictive immigra-
tion policies and nativist sentiments including French, Germans, Irish, Chinese, Japanese, Italians, and
Jews, among others. Today, most of the ire of nativism is directed towards Latinos, Muslims, and,
relatedly, refugees, all of whom are considered suspect in terms of criminality, albeit for different reasons.
It is important to recognize current political sentiment within this sociohistorical context. The
concerns voiced today are presented within discussions of national security, drug control policy, and
general law and order—virtually identical to the arguments voiced in previous eras. The current
President did not introduce a new topic to the political discourse, rather he dredged up underlying
concerns about the generalized other; Islamic fundamentalists are today’s version of communists, just
as Mexico’s “bad hombres” can be interpreted as the new Black Hand. In that perceptions are pro-
cessed as reality and consequently influence public policy, it is imperative for scholars to infuse
empirical evidence into the debate ensuring that facts emerge through the din of nativist drumbeats.
The history of immigration policy, and particularly legislation, is shockingly discriminatory and
often outright racist. Perhaps most concerning, however, is that these ideas still hold sway among a
significant proportion of the American population. The new administration’s executive order suspend-
ing immigration and travel from certain majority Muslim nations, though still awaiting a possible
Supreme Court hearing at this writing,
2 are wholly consistent with prior statutory laws and nativist
sentiments against certain groups and classes of aliens. In this view, Muslims from certain nations are
viewed as threats to national security, probable perpetrators of terrorist acts, and as such, justifiable
targets for exclusion. In this case, those from six specific nations (Libya, Syria, Sudan, Somalia, Yemen,
and Iran) are seen as having greater potential for committing crimes related to terrorism. There is little
systematic evidence, however, beyond anecdotal case studies that support the notion of a statistically
significant relationship between immigration from these six nations and increases in terrorism.
The yet to be articulated policy on the nation’s estimated 11 million undocumented immigrants—
who will be targeted, how will the process be executed, and what will happen to DAPA recipients—
remains at the forefront of public policy concerns. The President seemingly has supported a range of
oftentimes conflicting ideas from revoking DACA, to affirming DACA, to bringing back Operation
Wetback, to devising a system to deport and then let the “good ones” back into the country. It is
unclear, though unlikely, if Congress will be able to pass comprehensive immigration legislation and,
if passed, whether or not the President would sign such a bill. Immigration reform has seemingly
fallen on the list of both legislative and administrative priorities to make room for healthcare reform,
tax cuts, and increases in military spending. Nevertheless, immigration policy remains an area in
desperate need of thoughtful attention and careful address, ideally informed and shaped by sound
empirical evidence.
Notes
1 The immigration quota system established quotas for different ethnic groups based on representation in
previous censuses. This system, established by Congress through legislation, is discussed in greater detail in a
forthcoming section of the chapter.
2 At the time of this writing, the 4th and 9th Circuit Appeals Courts had both recently upheld the injunction
against the travel ban although for different legal reasons.
On the History of Immigration and Crime
17
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Hall .
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... While many urban residents outside of the border region may equate increased immigrant presence with dangerous neighborhoods (Castañeda 2012), this perception may indeed be unfounded as research has continuously shown that when the number of immigrants increases in a neighborhood, crime decreases (Miller and Peguero 2018). As long as fears about immigration have been around, empirical research has questioned and challenged this link (Hourwich 1912). ...
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There has been a considerable amount of research examining the potential connection between immigration and the risk for victimization. The results generated from this body of research have produced somewhat mixed results, with some research showing an association and other research failing to detect an association. The current study sought to add to this existing knowledge base by examining the potential association between being an immigrant and being victimized during adolescence and adulthood. To do so, the authors analyzed data drawn from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health. Analyses of these data revealed that being an immigrant was unrelated to 11 measures of victimization, including repeat victimization, drawn from four waves of data. There were no results indicating that immigration and victimization were associated. We conclude by discussing the limitations of the study and avenues for additional research addressing the association between immigration and victimization.
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