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Opinión
Drugs, gangs and vigilantes: how to
tackle the new breeds of Mexican
armed violence
I
At the end of 2007 Mexico joined the list of Latin Ameri-
can countries that, despite being formal and relatively sta-
ble democracies, have experienced epidemic levels of lethal
violence that either match or surpass the number of deaths
associated with civil war and traditional political conict1.
Like Mexico is experiencing today, Colombia, Brazil,
Venezuela and the countries of the northern triangle of Cen-
tral America (Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador) have
witnessed the emergence and consolidation of criminal net-
works that have profoundly weakened citizens’ security and
the state’s capacity to uphold the rule of law.
The results have included expressions of violence neither
rooted in traditional armed conicts nor driven by objectives
that could be qualied as political in any conventional way (Ad-
ams, 2014: 1; Davis, 2010: 399-400)2. Instead, they involve the
participation of armed non-state actors, whose use of violence
is generally motivated by the pursuit of prot, the need to ac-
1 The country’s homicide rate increased by more than 58% in 2008,
and went from eight homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 2007 to
24 per 100,000 in 2011 (Shirk et al., 2014). In 2011 more than
16,600 deaths were ofcially attributed to the actions of criminal
organizations, a number that surpasses by far the 1,000 casualty
threshold used to dene a “civil war” (Schedler, 2014: 6-7).
2 A conventional denition of political violence includes only those
acts whose aim is to uphold or subvert a given political system,
ideology or movement (cf. Bourgois, 2001: 8).
Estudios Internacionales 181 (2015) • Universidad de Chile
quire territorial control over trafcking and distribution routes,
or the simple imperative to neutralize competing organizations.
Like other countries across the region, Mexico attempted
to contain and counteract the presence of criminal organi-
zations, particularly drug-trafcking organizations (DTOs),
through a security strategy that privileged the use of repres-
sive and militarized measures. Announced at the end of 2006
by Mexico’s former president, Felipe Calderón (in power
2006-12), as an imminent all-out war against organized
crime that the Mexican state had to undertake, this strategy
also had several negative and unexpected consequences for
the country’s insecurity. Among these were a steady increase
in lethal and non-lethal forms of violence, including kidnap-
pings, extortion, extra-judicial killings and forced disap-
pearances; an escalation in human rights violations by mili-
tary and police personnel; and the fragmentation of DTOs,
together with the emergence of smaller and more volatile
criminal organizations (Guerrero, 2012). This has triggered
the emergence of self-defense forces that, while claiming to
defend the security of their communities, have pursued the
strategy of taking justice into their own hands (Afura-Heim
& Espach, 2013). Although Mexico’s current president, En-
rique Peña Nieto, has promised to revise the country’ securi-
ty strategy and move towards a more holistic approach that
would prioritize protecting local communities, safeguard-
ing the rights of victims and reducing the impact of violent
crimes, evidence as to the effects of these changes has been
mixed (Felbab-Brown, 2014). Furthermore, the recent disap-
pearance and apparent mass killing of 43 students in Iguala,
a city located in the Mexican state of Guerrero, has exposed
the central role corruption and impunity play in explaining
the country’s current levels of violence3.
As a result there is a pressing need to consider alternative
3 On September 26th 2014, 43 student protesters went missing in the
city of Iguala. According to recent investigations the students were
kidnapped by a group of municipal police ofcers under the man-
date of the then-mayor of the city, José Luis Abarca, and his wife,
María de los Ángeles Pineda. The police ofcers then turned the
students over to the criminal organization Guerreros Unidos, which
may have massacred them and burnt their bodies.
• O P I N I Ó N •
ways to confront the challenges posed by non-conventional
forms of armed violence in Mexico. This report will argue
that acknowledging the plural, dynamic, and hybrid character
of non-conventional violence is central to the design and im-
plementation of integral, sustainable, and effective responses.
By the term “plural”, this report refers to the manifold actors
and groups that characterize Mexico’s ever more fragmented
and volatile insecurity context, and which call for the adop-
tion of differentiated and context-specic policies. The term
“dynamic” illustrates the capacity of non-conventional armed
actors, such as DTOs, gangs, and other criminal networks, to
adapt and transform their activities, modes of organization,
and geographical scope relatively quickly. The term “hybrid”
points to the fact that non-conventional armed violence may
involve the participation of both state actors (including public
ofcials, and police and military personnel) and members of
local communities. Recognizing the hybridity of non-conven-
tional violence illuminates the limits of those security policies
designed in terms of an “us versus them” logic, in which state
institutions and communities are regarded as incorruptible
and impenetrable, while non-conventional armed actors are
regarded as deviant elements or actors that lie on the margins
of the country’s institutional and social fabric.
T
Three main actors are behind Mexico’s current state of
insecurity and violence: DTOs, street gangs and self-defense
forces. While their interests and modes of organization dif-
fer, the connections between the illicit markets driving their
activities and the political and social forces legitimizing their
presence suggest that these actors operate as part of a con-
tinuum rather than in isolation.
For instance, evidence suggests that self-defense forces are
at present partially funded by DTOs and are thus becom-
ing a threat to the very communities they claimed to protect
(CCSPJP, 2013). For their part, street gangs have developed a
closer relationship with DTOs and have become instrumen-
tal in ensuring the trans-shipment of drugs and their distri-
Estudios Internacionales 181 (2015) • Universidad de Chile
bution in the U.S. market. Moreover, many DTOs have diver-
sied their activities, incorporating other violent crimes such
as robbery, kidnapping, extortion and human trafcking. In
so doing they have coerced, if not displaced, more autono-
mous and localized criminal cells that used to control these
criminal markets. For the purposes of our discussion I will
describe these actors separately in an effort to differentiate
their relations with local communities and state authorities.
The rst part of this report will examine the three above-
mentioned actors –DTOs, street gangs and self-defense
forces– by looking at their aims, levels of organization, and
connections with communities and state actors. The short-
comings of the past and present strategies that the Mexican
government has adopted towards them and potential ways
these might be remedied will also be highlighted. A second
and nal section will present ve core elements that an al-
ternative approach to non-conventional armed violence in
Mexico should incorporate.
D-
DTOs have played a prominent role in Mexico’s recent es-
calation of violence, as well as in the emergence of more vis-
ible and spectacular forms of violence. According to recent
estimations, organized-crime-style killings represent between
30% and 50% of the total number of intentional homicides
in Mexico (Shirk et al., 2014: 24). Although the presence of
DTOs in Mexico can be traced back to the beginning of the
20th century (Astorga, 2005), the role of DTOs as one of
the country’s main drivers of violence is a more recent devel-
opment. As argued by Snyder and Durán-Martínez (2009),
illicit markets do not necessarily generate greater levels of
violence, particularly when political elites are willing and
able to offer state-sponsored protection deals to criminal
organizations4. Until the 1990s and again at the beginning
of the 2000s, Mexican DTOs benetted precisely from such
4 Snyder and Durán-Martínez (2009: 254) dene a state-sponsored
protection racket as “informal institutions through which public
ofcials refrain from enforcing the law or, alternatively, enforce it
• O P I N I Ó N •
protection rackets, thus privileging the use of bribery over
violence in their transactions.
However, the relationship between DTOs and political
elites fundamentally changed as a result of both, the coun-
try’s process of democratization and the regional consolida-
tion of Mexican DTOs, which emerged as the main suppliers
of drugs to the U.S. market (Astorga & Shirk, 2010: 33).
As a result DTOs increasingly turned to violence as a pre-
ferred means of securing dominance over their competitors.
Moreover, as DTOs gained the upper hand in their relation-
ship with political elites, they began to use violence against
public ofcials who did not comply or who did not deliver
the expected protection.
The security policies promoted by former president Felipe
Calderón against DTOs further intensied levels of violence.
Anchored in a three-pronged strategy –the use of militarized
operations, the imprisonment and elimination of DTOs’
main leaders or kingpins, and the seizure of drugs– Calde-
rón’s policies directly contributed to rising levels of violence
both within and across these organizations. DTOs increased
their arsenals of weaponry; directed attacks against public
ofcials, journalists and civil society activists; and diversi-
ed their illicit activities by turning to kidnapping, extortion,
human trafcking, and gas and oil theft (Magaloni et al.,
2011). Furthermore, the imprisonment and killing of several
DTOs’ most inuential kingpins led to the fragmentation
and atomization of these organizations and to the subse-
quent emergence of smaller and more independent criminal
cells (Felbab-Brown, 2014: 16). Moreover, the presence of
these organizations became more widespread, as did the geo-
graphic distribution of intentional homicides (Shirk et al.,
2014: 26). Lastly, many DTOs started to promote the forced
recruitment of members in order to make up for manpower
losses. Mexican children and youth from marginalized ar-
eas, as well as Central American immigrants in transit to the
U.S., have been particularly affected by this new develop-
ment (Meyer, 2010).
Although President Peña Nieto has tried to demarcate
selectively against the rivals of a criminal organization, in exchange
for a share of the prots generated by the organization”.
Estudios Internacionales 181 (2015) • Universidad de Chile
his security strategy from that of the previous government,
in practice his most important strategies resemble those of
Calderón’s government. These include the arrest of inuen-
tial drug lords, such as Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán, and
the deployment of federal and military forces in towns that
had fallen under DTO control. Moreover, although levels of
lethal violence decreased by 12.5% in 2013, falling from 22
to 19 homicides per 100,000 (INEGI, 2014), violent crimes
such as extortion and kidnapping have actually increased
since last year, while DTOs’ use of violence has continued to
feature ever more brutal and spectacular forms of expression
(ENVIPE-INEGI, 2014: 7).
Furthermore, corruption and impunity have remained
at the heart of Mexico’s security crisis, as demonstrated by
the various cases implicating state governors, mayors, police
ofcers and military personnel in illicit activities. As such,
DTOs’ actions have had a clear impact on the political sta-
bility of the country. Among other things, DTOs have con-
tributed to undermining the transparency and legitimacy of
state institutions by controlling electoral processes, penetrat-
ing the security and justice systems at more than one level,
and creating a climate of fear and insecurity that has helped
weaken support for procedural justice and the rule of law
(Schedler, 2014).
Although the use of violence by DTOs has become more
widespread, there are still considerable differences between
the types of tactics employed by these criminal organizations.
For instance, two of the most inuential DTOs in Mexico to-
day –the Sinaloa cartel and the Zetas– differ signicantly in
terms of their strategies and operations. The Sinaloa cartel
favors corruption over violence, and is characterized by a
relatively stable hierarchy and membership. It is known for
its capacity to bribe high-level ofcials, including politicians
and police personnel, as well as for using more “discreet”
forms of violence, such as forced disappearances (Radden
Keefe, 2012). In addition to developing strong ties with po-
litical and economic elites, the Sinaloa cartel often operates
with the acquiescence of local communities who regard its
leaders as social benefactors and patrons (Hernández, 2013:
3-6). Furthermore, its main criminal activity continues to be
• O P I N I Ó N •
the production and trans-shipment of drugs.
In contrast, the Zetas are known for their conspicuous
and highly publicized methods of violence. Created by former
members of the Mexican army special forces, the Zetas oper-
ate as a loose network of criminal cells that have developed
an extractive and highly diversied criminal model (Dudley,
2012b). They have managed to exert control over more lo-
calized criminal organizations involved in human, sexual
and drug trafcking, and operate in the Mexican states of
Tamaulipas, Veracruz, and Chiapas, and along the borders
and in the inner cities of Guatemala, Honduras and El Salva-
dor. Evidence shows that the absorption of independent and
local criminal groups by regional DTOs –a process known as
“cartelization”– might led to the weakening of local forms of
social control exercised over these organizations and to the
adoption of more predatory and violent behaviors (Mendoza
Rockwell, 2012).
Understanding DTOs’ various modes of organization is
central to thinking about more effective ways to reduce the
harm and violence that these organizations generate. For in-
stance, whereas DTOs that privilege bribery might be per-
suaded more easily to stop using violence, those that regard
violence as a fundamental means to retain their dominion
can hardly be expected to change their tactics.
The Zetas exemplify the latter, the Sinaloa cartel the
former. As a matter of fact, analysts have suggested that
Mexico’s former president Calderón decided at the end of
his presidency to direct most of the government’s militarized
operations against those DTOs that, like the Zetas, were seen
as responsible for producing the disturbing expressions of
crime in the country (Felbab-Brown, 2013:7). However, this
strategy –known as “focused deterrence”– generated mixed
results at best. Although it facilitated the arrest of some of
the Zetas’ main leaders, the organization’s highly dynamic,
decentralized, and uid nature enabled its ongoing reproduc-
tion through newer and increasingly fragmented cells.
For many observers, the Zetas’ modus operandi repre-
sents the future of Mexican DTOs: dynamic, predatory, frag-
mented and detached from the communities where they op-
erate. If this tendency is conrmed, a strategy of focused
Estudios Internacionales 181 (2015) • Universidad de Chile
deterrence might not be the most effective means to prevent
the expansion of these organizations. In point of fact, it
might accelerate their fragmentation and even trigger their
territorial expansion, because organizations may splinter
and seek to “transplant” their activities into different lo-
calities (Garay Salamanca & Salcedo-Albarán, 2012: 305).
In addition, the strategy of focused deterrence, at least in
the Mexican case, left untouched the challenge of state
capture, with the consequence that networks of corruption
linking DTOs and public ofcials persisted and deepened.
The hybrid nature of non-conventional violence in Mexico
demands anti-corruption efforts to be at the crux of any se-
curity strategy aimed at producing sustainable and positive
results. These efforts need to start at the level of the police
force, whose use of criminal violence has been identied
as one of the main sources of citizens’ fear and insecurity
(Magaloni et al., 2011). Furthermore, given that DTOs are
increasingly using extortion and kidnapping against com-
mon citizens, any effective policy must move from its em-
phasis on attacking DTOs by militarized strategies to one
of protecting vulnerable areas through the strategic deploy-
ment of local police forces, the strengthening of police in-
vestigation capacities and the development of effective re-
porting mechanisms.
S
Street gangs have undergone fundamental changes in
Mexico over the past ve to seven years. In 2006 a subre-
gional study comparing the presence and dynamics of gangs
in Mexico, Central America, and the U.S. concluded that in
Mexico gangs were considerably less violent, less organized
and possessed weaker ties with organized crime when com-
pared to their counterparts in Guatemala, Honduras, and El
Salvador (Barnes, 2006).
Other comparative and national studies reached similar
conclusions, characterising Mexican gangs as groups formed
mostly by young men from marginalized areas, whose crimi-
nal activities were limited to minor robberies and selling
• O P I N I Ó N •
drugs at the local level (Perea, 2008; Santamaría, 2007).
Their use of violence, these studies argued, remained at rela-
tively low levels due to the social bonds that kept gang mem-
bers connected to the communities where they operated.
Today, street gangs’ modus operandi has changed signi-
cantly. While smaller and more localized gangs continue to
exist in Mexico’s central and southern states, the country’s
northern states have seen the emergence and consolidation
of gangs characterized by greater levels of violence, deep-
er connections to organized crime and a more hierarchi-
cal structure with established transnational ties to the U.S.
(Cawley, 2014). Salient among these gangs are Barrio Azteca,
Mexicles and Mexican Maa; many of the members of each
of these originate from among Mexican nationals incarcer-
ated in the Texan and Californian prison systems.
With a strong presence in cities such as Monterrey, Ciu-
dad Juárez and Tijuana, these gangs gained a foothold on
Mexican territory as a result of massive deportations carried
out by the U.S. government during the 1990s and 2000s.
Evidence suggests that these gangs have created alliances
with the Sinaloa cartel, the Juárez cartel, the Gulf cartel and
the Zetas. They work as DTOs’ sicarios or hired assassins, as
well as distributors or intermediaries for the trans-shipment
of drugs to the U.S. market (Jones, 2013: 97). Their role has
become more instrumental to these businesses as DTOs have
transitioned into more fragmented organizations that depend
on subcontractors or temporary alliances with other crimi-
nal groups. However, it should be noted here that, contrary
to what some newspapers have suggested, none of these alli-
ances involves the Central American gangs known as maras.
In fact, according to various studies, the viability of an alli-
ance between Mexican DTOs and maras is at best question-
able. Among other things, this is due to the more local char-
acter of maras’s criminal activities, which involve extortion,
robbery and the local distribution of drugs (Dudley, 2012a;
Santamaría, 2013). Nonetheless, Mexican DTOs have indeed
built alliances with other Central American criminal organi-
zations, such as groups of transportistas, or transporters –
i.e. groups that facilitate DTOs’ trans-shipment of drugs and
offer access to local markets to distribute and sell drugs (Ga-
Estudios Internacionales 181 (2015) • Universidad de Chile
ray Salamanca & Salcedo-Albarán, 2012: 305).
The transition of Mexico’s street gangs towards more
hierarchical and violent organizations with established con-
nections with DTOs has clear consequences for the types of
policies that can be implemented to prevent or control them.
Given that they operate as transnational organizations and
DTOs’ subcontractors with little or no attachment to local
communities, these gangs lack the type of social or commu-
nity controls that more traditional gangs observed. Moreo-
ver, driven as they are by more predatory criminal interests,
their use of violence cannot be prevented through the type of
social interventions that have proved effective in the case of
more localized juvenile gangs (Jones, 2013: 98-99).
Nevertheless, other policies could be implemented. For in-
stance, the 2012 truce between the two most powerful maras
in El Salvador, which was mediated by the government and
led to a signicant decrease in homicides, might offer some
important lessons for Mexico’s equally violent and well-or-
ganized gangs. If gang members from Barrio Azteca, Mex-
icles and Mexican Maa continue to owe their allegiance
mostly to their gang leadership, then it might be possible for
the government to negotiate a halt to violence in exchange
for improvements in the living conditions of gang members
in Mexican prisons. However, as in El Salvador’s case, the ef-
fectiveness of this initiative would depend on the capacity of
the gang leadership to implement the truce and discipline its
members; this discipline might have been weakened by these
gangs’ commitments to DTOs. Moreover, in order for such
a truce to work in Mexico there should be sufcient checks
and balances to ensure that the negotiations do not feed cor-
ruption or create further incentives for state capture.
A less controversial intervention would involve focusing
on protecting children and youth in Mexico’s border and
northern cities from being recruited by these gangs and by
DTOs themselves. Evidence from programs working directly
with at-risk youth in Mexico, but also in countries like Brazil,
Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua, demonstrate that ef-
fective interventions are based on an integral approach to ju-
venile violence (Muggah & Aguirre, 2013), i.e. an approach
that is able to highlight the connections linking intra-family
• O P I N I Ó N •
violence, violence at school, and the dynamics of social and
economic exclusion affecting this particular group.
S-
Over the last ve years self-defense forces have emerged
in at least ten out of Mexico’s 32 states. Organized as a reac-
tion to increasing levels of violence and crime generated by
DTOs in their communities, these groups, comprising mostly
young and adult men, have decided to arm themselves and
take matters into their own hands. Although DTOs’ presence
in these communities is not new, the use of violence in com-
munities and against unarmed civilians, and DTOs’ incursion
into criminal activities beyond the cultivation and smuggling
of drugs are more recent trends. Guerrero and Michoacán,
for instance, two of the Mexican states where self-defense
forces have developed a stronger presence, have for decades
been home to various DTOs. However, it was only when
DTOs became more predatory, and started to diversify their
activities by kidnapping and extorting small farmers and
their families, that members of the community decided to
organize groups of vigilantes or self-defense forces (Asfura-
Heim & Espach, 2013).
In principle, self-defense forces differ signicantly from
DTOs and street gangs inasmuch as their use of violence is
driven by an interest in defending their communities rather
than pursuing economic gain. However, the lack of transpar-
ency regarding these groups’ sources of funding and recent
accusations about their potential collaboration with DTOs
have raised fundamental questions about self-defense forces’
underlying motivations.5 Accusations of this kind abound, as
do testimonies from members of these communities claiming
that, as self-defense forces grow in numbers and weaponry,
they are themselves becoming a threat to their communities.
These allegations are not to be taken lightly. After all, self-de-
5 For instance, a self-defense group created in a small town in Mi-
choacán to counteract the presence of the Knights Templar was
allegedly linked to the Jalisco cartel, a rival criminal organization
(Cawley, 2013).
Estudios Internacionales 181 (2015) • Universidad de Chile
fense forces have proven capable of ghting powerful DTOs
and ousting some of these organizations’ criminal cells, dem-
onstrating an effective and well-organized use of force that
in many ways surpasses the capacity of local police. Given
that communities do not have the means –institutional or
otherwise– to hold these groups accountable6, and given that
many continue to operate in a grey zone between legality
and illegality, it is plausible to think that these groups may
at some point turn against locals. In this sense, as in the case
of DTOs and street gangs, experience indicates that the more
detached a non-conventional armed group is from the com-
munity where it operates the greater the chances are that it
becomes threatening or adopts more predatory behavior.
Mexican authorities have attempted to control self-de-
fense forces by legalizing and integrating them into the state
structure. Announced in May 2014, this initiative promoted
the provision of arms and uniforms to some of these groups,
as well as their assimilation into a new rural police force
that would ght DTOs hand in hand with the armed forces.
By institutionalizing their existence and promoting their col-
laboration with Mexican security forces, the government
sought to stop the proliferation of these groups and prevent
their further penetration by criminal interests. However, not
all of these self-defense forces have been willing to collabo-
rate with the government. This stance follows from their dis-
trust of state authorities and a prevailing view that holds the
government responsible for the country’s spiral of violence.
Moreover, the institutionalization of self-defense forces has
so far not translated into concrete mechanisms that would
enable communities to gain control over these groups. In
other words, it has increased their collaboration with police
or military personnel, while it has not brought them closer
to their communities. In addition, the government has not
yet presented a plan for the eventual demobilization and
disarmament of these groups, nor has it claried what their
functions will be once the objective of ousting DTOs’ crimi-
6 These groups’ lack of accountability contrasts with other experien-
ces of so-called vigilantes that have existed in indigenous commu-
nities in Mexico for many years, such as the ronda comunitaria of
Cherán in Michoacán.
• O P I N I Ó N •
nal cells has been achieved. A more desirable approach to
self-defense forces would entail establishing a clear timeline
to demobilize them, making them groups accountable to the
communities they claim to protect, and taking concrete steps
to create an increasingly professional and effective local po-
lice force to prevent the spread of vigilantism in the country.
Up until now self-defense forces have neither embraced
a political ideology nor presented any political demands to
the state beyond their demand for public safety. Their main
goal continues to be –at least in principle– to protect their
communities and expel so-called drug trafckers. However,
the recent disappearance and probable mass killing of train-
ee teachers in Iguala, Guerrero, has served as a catalyst to
mobilize various social and political forces that are willing
to join self-defense forces or create new ones. Besides the
teachers’ unions and the student movement, members of the
guerrilla group Ejército Popular Revolucionario (EPR) have
blamed the government for the students’ disappearance.
The EPR has called for the organization of “justice bri-
gades” and for the creation of armed units to ght the Mexi-
can “narco-state” (Olmos, 2014). This development could
jeopardize the state’s current arrangement with self-defense
forces. It could also radicalize these groups and distance
them even further from their initial commitment to ensuring
their communities’ public safety. Most importantly, it could
contribute to the transformation of self-defense forces into a
more conventional form of insurgency.
A -
M:
Mexico’s current levels of violence are underpinned by
the presence of highly dynamic armed groups that have ex-
perienced a major process of expansion and fragmentation
over the last decade. DTOs in particular have splintered into
smaller criminal cells and are now subcontracting street
gangs and coercing children, young people, and immigrants
into their ranks. Although DTOs and street gangs are mostly
driven by an interest in proting from illicit and criminal ac-
Estudios Internacionales 181 (2015) • Universidad de Chile
tivities, self-defense forces are being galvanized and becom-
ing politicized as citizens’ discontent over the state’s incapac-
ity to deliver security and justice continues to rise. Moreover,
the hybrid character of these groups, which involves the
direct participation or collaboration of public ofcials and
security personnel, raises important questions regarding the
political underpinnings of non-conventional armed violence.
In particular, it calls into question the idea that non-conven-
tional armed groups are to be considered completely exter-
nal to Mexico’s institutional and political structures.
Non-conventional armed actors have become more de-
tached from the communities in which they operate. DTOs
and street gangs, for instance, have transitioned to more uid
and fragmented organizations that operate through transna-
tional criminal networks. Self-defense forces continue to act
on behalf of given communities, yet they seem increasingly
inclined to collaborate with DTOs, in spite of their formal
incorporation into rural police units. The distancing of non-
conventional armed actors from local communities weakens
the latter’s capacity to hold these actors accountable, and
enables the emergence of more violent forms of behavior
within and against these communities.
Meanwhile, the war on drugs, with its emphasis on re-
pression and its focus on dismantling and destroying DTOs,
has contributed to the fragmentation and geographical dif-
fusion of these criminal organizations. It has also added to
the diversication of these organizations’ criminal activities
and their adoption of ever more violent means to secure their
prots. Furthermore, the war on drugs has done little to rem-
edy the institutional roots of drug-related violence, i.e. cor-
ruption and the criminal co-option of public ofcials.
Today, DTOs continue to be the main actors behind the
high levels of violence in the country. Street gangs have, how-
ever, become more instrumental for DTOs and self-defense
forces are experiencing rapid expansion. The potential or ac-
tual conation of self-defense forces and DTOs, on the one
hand, and the radicalization or politicization of self-defense
forces, on the other, may lead to a deepening of Mexico’s
insecurity crisis and initiate a new spiral of insurgent and
criminal violence.
• O P I N I Ó N •
In light of this complex and volatile scenario, the following
ve policy recommendations seek to provide an alternative
framework to non-conventional armed violence in Mexico.
(1) The state should recognize the hybrid character of
non-conventional armed violence and prioritize the
ght against corruption.
The rst step to tackle non-conventional armed violence
in Mexico is to recognize that it is not limited to non-state
actors. The inuence attained by DTOs cannot be fully un-
derstood without taking into account the ongoing collabo-
ration and participation of public ofcials and security per-
sonnel in criminal activities, including extortion, kidnapping
and extrajudicial killings. The war on drug’s original sin was
to attempt to counteract DTOs as if they were purely exter-
nal to the state structure. They are not. Particularly at the
municipal and state levels DTOs have managed to co-opt
decision-making processes and inltrate police and military
personnel. The emergence of self-defense forces is itself a re-
sult of the deterioration of security institutions and of citi-
zens’ distrust in the state’s capacity and willingness to pro-
tect citizens. One of President Peña Nieto’s original promises
was to launch a National Commission against Corruption.
Almost two years have passed since he was inaugurated, but
the initiative is still under revision by the Mexican Congress.
It is critical to fast-track this initiative and adopt other con-
crete measures to ght corruption, both within the police
and military forces, and in political and electoral processes
throughout the country.
(2) The state should focus on the protection of
affected communities, not on dismantling criminal
organizations.
In the last ten years Mexican governments have consist-
ently made the ght against DTOs the cornerstone of secu-
rity policy. The focus on repression and the elimination of
DTOs’ kingpins has only contributed to their further prolif-
Estudios Internacionales 181 (2015) • Universidad de Chile
eration and geographical diffusion. Given the failure of these
past policies, and the plural and dynamic nature of these or-
ganizations, the focus should decisively shift from attacking
DTOs to protecting local communities. President Peña Nieto
has certainly included this shift as a central goal of his new
security strategy, but so far no concrete initiative or program
has been developed to achieve this.
The protection of local communities needs to go beyond
the intermittent presence of the military in areas considered
to be under the control of DTOs. It must involve the imple-
mentation of sustainable and long-term projects, and should
be focused on the recovery of public spaces, the restitution of
citizens’ trust, and the creation of real economic opportuni-
ties for young people. This has to be done at the local level,
and through the creation of strategic alliances with business
owners, civil society organizations, schools, and community
leaders.
(3) The state should work at the local level, followed
by a strategy of geographic sequencing that starts with
the most affected areas and recognizes each area’s
particular needs.
Although Mexico’s geographic distribution of violence
has become more widespread, it is still possible to iden-
tify those municipalities where levels of insecurity demand
immediate attention. In order to be effective, the Mexican
government needs to allocate its resources selectively and
strategically by intervening rst in those cities or munici-
palities that face higher levels of violence (Felbab-Brown,
2013; Guerrero, 2012). In Mexico’s current context these
localities are concentrated in the central and south-western
states of Michoacán, Guerrero and Estado de México, and
in the northern states of Chihuahua, Sinaloa, Baja California
Norte and Tamaulipas. In Michoacán and Guerrero violence
is driven mostly by DTOs, but also by self-defense forces,
as well as by social unrest and insurgent groups such as the
EPR, while in the northern states of Chihuahua and Baja
California violence is driven by the collusion of DTOs and
street gangs. Each of these localities demands different inter-
• O P I N I Ó N •
ventions, depending on the set of armed actors that operate
in each of them, but also on the strength of civil society or-
ganizations and the levels of state capture. In places where
civil society organizations are stronger, the government can
build local alliances and work with prevention or rehabilita-
tion programs already in place. If certain branches of the
local government have been co-opted by DTOs, then the
central government needs to oversee the functioning of local
institutions and try to rebuild the legitimacy of and citizens’
trust in local institutions, while remaining in collaboration
and dialogue with local communities.
(4) The state should prevent the forced recruitment of
children, youth and immigrants by organized crime.
Specic programs can be promoted to protect children
and young men from being forcibly recruited by DTOs. Af-
terschool programs can be important, particularly in con-
texts where children are left alone for long periods.
Interventions should focus on prevention and rehabili-
tation, and should recognize the connections among intra-
family violence, juvenile violence and violence at school. In
the case of immigrants, it is urgent to create a safety corridor
that includes the formation of more shelters for immigrants
and promotes collaboration among the Mexican authorities,
civil society organizations, churches, and the consulates of
Central American countries in Mexico. Mexican authorities
should also facilitate the reporting of extortion and other
crimes affecting immigrants, and guarantee the safety and
human rights of immigrants.
(5) The state should promote a culture of legality in
both state institutions and local communities.
This report has insisted on the hybrid character of non-
conventional armed violence in Mexico. DTOs have operated
in Mexican towns and communities for many decades. Before
these organizations became violent and predatory, local com-
munities were in many ways complicit with the presence of
DTOs, either by turning a blind eye to their illicit activities
Estudios Internacionales 181 (2015) • Universidad de Chile
or by receiving economic benets from them. Local business-
es and local politicians in particular benetted from DTOs,
thereby blurring the lines between licit and illicit activities.
Those participating in self-defense forces have openly ad-
mitted that they did not perceive the presence of DTOs as a
problem, at least until these organizations started to exercise
violence against them. On the other hand, the networks of
complicity and corruption between public ofcials and DTOs
have been part of Mexico’s political landscape for many dec-
ades. In both cases so-called criminal actors were able to de-
velop their inuence through the passive and active complicity
of both local communities and state institutions. Promoting a
culture of legality is certainly not an easy task, and can only be
realized through long-term programs that re-establish citizens’
trust in state institutions and raise awareness about the costs
that illegality and criminality have in terms of citizens’ security
and well-being. It is, nonetheless, a necessary task if citizens
and policymakers are to address the social and political roots
of non-conventional armed violence in Mexico.
Gema Santamaría
Profesora Visitante
Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies
Universidad de California
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