Available via license: CC BY 4.0
Content may be subject to copyright.
INDEPENDENT JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT & PRODUCTION (IJM&P)
http://www.ijmp.jor.br v. 8, n. 2, April - June 2017
ISSN: 2236-269X
DOI: 10.14807/ijmp.v8i2.580
[http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/]
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States License
474
STRATEGIC MISTAKES (AVOIDABLE): THE TOPICALITY OF
MICHEL PORTER’S GENERIC STRATEGIES
Leandro A. Viltard
Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina,
Universidad de Palermo, Buenos Aires,
Universidad Argentina de la Empresa (UADE), Buenos Aires,
Universidad de San Isidro, Argentina.
Universidad del Pacífico, Ecuador
E-mail: lviltard@yahoo.com.ar
Submission: 29/11/2016
Revision: 09/12/2016
Accept: 19/12/2016
ABSTRACT
This article explores the topicality of Porter’s generic strategies,
assessing about their applicability on two specific automotive industry
projects: The Smart and the New Beetle.
After performing a documentation analysis on these two projects, it
was concluded that both of them may be considered avoidable
strategic mistakes as they show the risks of higher differentiation that
is not being paid by the customer, no matter how if it is about
recognized brands or icon products. Hazards and risks, like big
losses and negative margins, are applicable to every firm.
This is a qualitative investigation with a not experimental and
transversal research design.
Keywords: Strategy; Generic; Mistake; Competitiveness; Value;
Smart; New Beetle; Michel Porter’s generic strategies; Competitive
Advantage; Operational Effectiveness
[http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/]
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States License
475
INDEPENDENT JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT & PRODUCTION (IJM&P)
http://www.ijmp.jor.br v. 8, n. 2, April - June 2017
ISSN: 2236-269X
DOI: 10.14807/ijmp.v8i2.580
1. INTRODUCTION
Competitive Advantage (CA), strategy and Operational Effectiveness (OE)
have been an academic and empirical discussion for years. Professor Michael Porter
proposed fundamental management theories on these subjects and, during a long
period, critics have been posed on his work. Mekic and Mekic (2014) suggest that:
• In accordance with Speed (1989), the Five Competitive Forces are arbitrary
and there is not shown how to operationalize any analysis based on these
forces.
• CA is best practices for a company (WELCH, 2005), but also CA can derive
from external or internal forces like resources and environment, basis for CA,
too (BARNEY, 1991).
• Operational Effectiveness (OE) refers to doing the same things in better ways
than others do, not to strategy (BACHMANN, 2002). Strategy relates to
combining activities; that is why managers may lose the whole picture of the
company thinking on core competencies, critical resources and key success
factors (KIPPENBERGER, 1997).
• Generic strategies (cost leadership, differentiation and focus) seem to be a
parameter of choice for every firm; however, this choice is bounded by the
size of the firm, industry and competitive analysis, and access to resources.
As a result, small companies should only compete through focus strategy
whereas bigger firms may choose cost leadership and differentiation
(WRIGHT, 1987).
In addition, Dawes (1996) suggests that the generic strategy schema do not fit
with what happens in reality and that they are not a route to superior
profitability. Datta (2009) argues that cost leadership theory rests well with a
heavy initial investment in state-of-the-art equipment, which is impossible for
small firms when they are not clear about its CA. The author insists that cost
leadership needs a high market share, which is unachievable at the
beginning of a business.
• Although not relying solely on Porter’s work, it should be considered because
it could be the basis when deciding on strategy and CA (RECKLIES, 2011).
[http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/]
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States License
476
INDEPENDENT JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT & PRODUCTION (IJM&P)
http://www.ijmp.jor.br v. 8, n. 2, April - June 2017
ISSN: 2236-269X
DOI: 10.14807/ijmp.v8i2.580
Moreover, that strategy, OE and generic strategies are relevant factors to
understand and prevent from strategic mistakes that derive into losses and
negative margins in every firm.
1.1. Objective of this investigation
To explore the topicality of Porter’s generic strategies, assessing about their
applicability on two specific automotive projects: the Smart and the New Beetle,
proposing actions to improve strategic decisions and implementations.
1.2. Design: Methodology and analysis
This is a qualitative study, which explores and describes information of
relevant authors and specialists gathered in the period Jul. 2016 - Nov. 2016.
The investigation design is not experimental and, among them, transversal as
it is referred at a precise moment in time.
The analysis unit included the study of strategy, OE and generic strategies.
Important secondary sources were used to complete this review.
This study was performed in Buenos Aires, Argentina.
1.3. Research limitations/clarifications
The information included in this analysis is the one that was judged to be
needed in order to support -in a reasonable way- the basis of this investigation.
As this study is based on bibliographical review, it was not used an empirical
analysis.
Conclusions are based on what is exposed in this study and -as a qualitative
research-results shown cannot be generalized; however, they may be useful for
management decisions.
1.4. Findings
A deeper understanding on strategy, CA, OE and generic strategies should be
put in place in every organization, no matter its size and location. The specific
organization and skills needed are directly connected with a proper implementation
of that understanding.
There were taken two projects as examples: the Smart and the New Beetle,
which are shown as avoidable strategic mistakes due to a higher differentiation that
was applied to these products and it, finally, was not paid by the customer.
[http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/]
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States License
477
INDEPENDENT JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT & PRODUCTION (IJM&P)
http://www.ijmp.jor.br v. 8, n. 2, April - June 2017
ISSN: 2236-269X
DOI: 10.14807/ijmp.v8i2.580
Recognized brand or icon products do not guarantee success in the business arena;
big losses and negative margins are applicable to every company.
Leadership is about strategy and management is about OE. In order to have
sustainable growth, the leader’s job refers to:
• Focus on their present and future industries and select the right one/s to
compete.
• Establish an adequate set of distinctive activities.
• Develop the next practices needed to go forward.
• Be open and flexible, and look for nonconformity, uncharted territories,
development through learning, helping others, inclusion, transparency, and
loyalty.
1.5. Originality and value
As, success stories abound in business literature, it is hard to find mistakes
because they are not easily recognized and sometimes hidden. However, it is
demonstrated that admitting a mistake is better when somebody wants to learn.
As a result, this study may help executives and entrepreneurs when taking
important strategic decisions in their companies.
2. THE IMPORTANCE OF STRATEGY AND OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE (OE)
Strategy, organization and performance are key issues while considering
company results. White (1986) states that:
• It is needed a fit between the internal organization and the strategy of a firm.
An inappropriate internal organization may cause to perform less than full
potential.
• There is a distinction between corporate strategy (where to compete, in which
industries and geographic areas) and business strategy (how to compete
within a given industry). Nevertheless, at business or corporate levels, the
strategy-organization-performance problematic exists.
• In multi-business companies, business unit strategy can be influenced by key
personnel choice, and by the internal and external business unit organization.
[http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/]
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States License
478
INDEPENDENT JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT & PRODUCTION (IJM&P)
http://www.ijmp.jor.br v. 8, n. 2, April - June 2017
ISSN: 2236-269X
DOI: 10.14807/ijmp.v8i2.580
• Cost strategies efforts are directed to reducing costs. That´s the reason why,
they are connected to concepts like higher ROI while giving lower autonomy
and higher responsibilities sharing.
• Differentiation efforts are directed to creating perceived uniqueness amongst
customers. In this case, strategy requires of strong functional coordination
unified under the business unit manager.
In addition, Porter (1996) states that:
• Flexibility, outsourcing, benchmarking/best practices and positioning are not
differentiators anymore. Copying others is a path to “mutually destructive
competition” and to temporary CA.
• Sustainable profitability is almost impossible, as there is confusion between
operational effectiveness and strategy. Tools and techniques like change
management, outsourcing, total quality management and the like are helping
operational improvements, but not sustainable profitability.
• Superior performance needs from Operational Effectiveness (OE) and
strategy, but they work differently. Outperforming rivals implies to charge
greater prices and to have greater efficiencies through lowering unit average
costs. As there are many activities required to carry out the different tasks
that are needed in a company (sell, produce, create products, and distribute,
for example), costs advantages come from being more efficient than
competitors are and differentiation arises from the choice of activities and
how they are performed. As a result, “activities are the basic units of
competitive advantage”. OE is doing better than rivals, it is about inputs and
outputs, and efficiency is its key word; it is about moving the productivity
frontier (new ways of managing, capital investment or new personnel). On the
contrary, strategic positioning means doing different activities than rivals or in
different ways.
• Constant improvement on OE is necessary but not enough when considering
extended period; best practices imitation is its worst enemy as generic
solutions diffuse the fastest and managers let OE supplant strategy. The
result is a pressure on costs and prices, compromising long term
sustainability. In other terms, homogeneity and imitation are the basis of
[http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/]
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States License
479
INDEPENDENT JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT & PRODUCTION (IJM&P)
http://www.ijmp.jor.br v. 8, n. 2, April - June 2017
ISSN: 2236-269X
DOI: 10.14807/ijmp.v8i2.580
diminishing returns for incumbents, and managers are supplanting strategy
by OE, which is the basis of performance.
• On the other hand, competitive strategy is about being different, choosing a
different set of activities than competitors. In this way, the essence of strategy
is in the activities that are chosen. As a result, strategy is “the creation of a
unique and valuable position, involving a different set of activities” (p. 68) to
be chosen, and it is needed a trade-off among them. Activities cannot be
separated from the whole and position comes from positions built on systems
of activities. That is why, trade-offs are the essence of strategy and imply
choosing what not to do.
• While OE is about achieving excellence in individual activities, strategy is
connected with combining those activities. Organizational structure,
processes and systems must be strategy-specific as strategy is seen as an
activity system. As a consequence, cost-cutting and restructuring are not
strategies, are distractions to growth.
• Leadership is not about orchestrating operational improvements and making
deals. The core of a general management position is strategy; it is about
defining a unique position, making trade-offs and fit among activities; it is
about deciding what to do and what not to do.
• OE improvement is part of management job, but it is not strategy. It is
connected with best practices and continual improvement.
• Finally, OE and strategy are part of two different agendas.
Out from what it was said, to turn firms into leaders is more than
benchmarking other companies. Prahalad (2010) is convinced that benchmarking
has a role in leadership catching up with competitors but it does not turn companies
into leaders. It is needed to spot big opportunities and next practices in order to
become winners.
He understands that next practices (not best practices) are about imagining
the future as Apple’s Steve Jobs and Tata Motors’s Ratan Tata do/did. So, to identify
the big opportunities that may arise he proposes questions, as:
• Is the problem widely recognized and affects other industries?
[http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/]
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States License
480
INDEPENDENT JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT & PRODUCTION (IJM&P)
http://www.ijmp.jor.br v. 8, n. 2, April - June 2017
ISSN: 2236-269X
DOI: 10.14807/ijmp.v8i2.580
• Does it need radical innovations and can change the industry economics?
• Tackling this issue, will give a fresh competitive advantage and will create a
big opportunity?
He proposes that inclusive development is an example as smart companies
had come up with low priced products as a $ 2,000 car, a $ 100 laptop, a $ 30
cataract surgery procedure and $ 0,002 cell phone call per minute. In fact, for 2015
he predicted that 5 billion people all over the world would be using cell phones.
Consequently, giants like Unilever and P&G think that -for 2020- 50% of their
worldwide revenues will come from poor people in the developing world.
Additionally, due to the connection between inclusive development and
sustainability, (more than 4 billion micro consumers and micro producers will place
an unsustainable stress on the earth in the future), sustainability is another big
challenge.
Prahalad (2010) cites that Drucker once said that opportunities are “visible,
but not seen”. That is why inclusive development is seen as a Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR) not as a path to growth. He ends up saying that sustainability is
not a problem but an opportunity to innovate. Imagination is the principal constraint
to discovering mega-.opportunities, not resources.
Likewise, Prahalad (2010) remarks important characteristics of managerial
responsibilities, as follows:
- Nonconformity and the value to entering into uncharted territories.
- Displaying a commitment to learning and developing yourself in order to help
others.
- Help others displaying their full potential investing on them.
- Good leaders are inclusive, so relate with the unfortunate.
- Develop fair and transparent processes and take a look at how results are
achieved. You will be judged by what you do and how well you do it, not for
what you said you wanted to do.
- Remark loyalty to the organization, profession, community, society and family,
as anything can be achieved without family’s support.
[http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/]
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States License
481
INDEPENDENT JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT & PRODUCTION (IJM&P)
http://www.ijmp.jor.br v. 8, n. 2, April - June 2017
ISSN: 2236-269X
DOI: 10.14807/ijmp.v8i2.580
- Leadership is about self-awareness, modesty, humility and humanity it is
requested to be aware of the poor and disabled, accepting human
weaknesses.
Big opportunities are about to come and leaders must set the right strategy
and organization to transform them into sustainable and inclusive growth. OE is a
need, but not all what is needed. To select the right industry to compete, the right set
of activity system and the right next practices are a must. Openness and flexibility
are an imperative for growth.
In the following Table 1 it is shown a summary of what it was said in this
section:
Table 1: Strategy and Operational Excellence
•Full potential of afirm comes f rom aproper fit betw een the internal organization and the
strategy.
•It must be distinguished between corporate strategy and business strategy.
•Cost strategies are related to c osts reductions, ROI and efficiencies .Differentiation strategies
to build aperceived uniqueness among customers.
•Strategy is apath to sustainable profitability, not OE.It is about doing different activities or in
different ways.
•OE is about inputs and outputs, and doing better than competitors.It is needed for superior
performance.
•Activities are the basis for competitive advantage.And differentiation arises from choosing
them and how they are performed.
•Leaders hip is about strategy, spotting new o pportunities and next practic es. Its key concepts
are:defining aunique position, making trade-offs and fit among activities, and decide what to
do and what not to do.
•Management is about OE.
•Inclusive d evelopment should be seen as apath to growth, not as aCSR.As big firms are
predicting for next years huge p ercentages of revenues c oming from poor people, it should be
seen as abig opportunity example to chase.
•Key words for business peopl e:nonconformity, uncharted territories, learning, development,
help others, inclusion, fairness, transparency, loyalty, new leadership.
3. UNDERSTANDING GENERIC STRATEGIES
It is hard to win playing the same game others do. That is why the competitive
arena is about playing a different game that the leader plays as the leader is who
designed the rules and have the resources to defend them.
[http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/]
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States License
482
INDEPENDENT JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT & PRODUCTION (IJM&P)
http://www.ijmp.jor.br v. 8, n. 2, April - June 2017
ISSN: 2236-269X
DOI: 10.14807/ijmp.v8i2.580
Throughout history, in different markets and industrial sectors, there were
companies that changed the rules and have control in their industries, others who
influence and others that neither one nor the other. The difference among them is to
have a clear strategy and to change the rules of the game0F
1.
Moreover, to think about competitive strategy is to work on what the company
should seem in the future, and to think that operational strategy is emphasize
operational efficiency and effectiveness. Both are needed, but OE is not enough to
sustainable growth as it was said before.
In this sense, Porter (2008) proposes three generic strategies:
• Cost leadership (no frills): it relates to gaining CA through lowest costs of
production, removing costs from every link of the value chain. The product
can be priced at a competitive parity and profit per product is lower if it is
compared with differentiation generic strategy. That is the reason why it
requires high market share in order to achieve revenue targets.
Key concepts under this strategy are: scale (big volume and efficient capacity
utilization), cost reduction/minimization, integration, quick learning and control.
There is a point in which it must be done a differentiation sacrifice and no
more features must be added to the product/service.
The risks that may be faced are: being trapped on high investments, to ignore
differentiation basis and/or to be exposed a cost reductions that are
implementable by other competitors. As an example, General Motors and
Wal-Mart are firms that target price-sensible customers.
To be successful with this generic strategy it is needed to have access to
technologies that will bring costs down, to be very efficient in logistic and/or
consistently be in the position to cut costs below those of other competitors.
• Differentiation (creating uniquely desirable products and services): it
relates to the creation of differentiated/more attractive products for different
segments, charging customers with premium prices. Profit per product is
1 In this sense, Harvard Professor Clayton Christensen developed the disruptive innovation
theory which states that new entrants may put out of play industry’s incumbents. But this subject is not
going to be analyzed as it exceeds the scope of this investigation. For more information, see
Christensen’s book: The Innovator’s Dilemma (1997), Harvard Business School Publishing, USA:
Boston.
[http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/]
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States License
483
INDEPENDENT JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT & PRODUCTION (IJM&P)
http://www.ijmp.jor.br v. 8, n. 2, April - June 2017
ISSN: 2236-269X
DOI: 10.14807/ijmp.v8i2.580
higher in comparison to cost leadership generic strategy, but market share is
smaller. This generic strategy includes quality and certainly is costly. How to
do this depends on industry characteristics but it may include: features,
durability, functionality, brand image, support, and the like.
Key concepts under this strategy are: to be unique, brand loyalty, less price
sensibility and exclusivity.
Its risks imply high cost of differentiation, no need for differentiation and
imitative products. Examples: Mercedes Benz, Audi or BMW.
To be successful with this generic strategy implies to nurture R&D, innovation,
ability to deliver high-quality products/services, and to build an effective sales
and marketing to make the market understand the benefits offered.
• Focus or niche segment (offering a specialized service in a niche
market): it is related to focusing on a narrow and defined market segment. It
means that it will be developed a uniquely low cost or well-specified
product/service, generally with a strong brand loyalty among their customers.
After deciding a focus strategy, it is requested to decide if it is going to be
pursued cost leadership or differentiation, as focus in not normally enough on
its own. It is necessary to offer something extra in the selected niche. Porsche
is a case: their customers appreciate the CA created especially for that niche.
Risks are connected with situations like the niche may not grow or disappear.
As it was mentioned above and considering that focus or niche segment
generic strategy is finally a differentiation or cost strategy for a specific
segment, for the purpose of this study it will be generalized that there are two
generic strategies: cost leadership and differentiation.
In addition, Porter (2008) suggests that:
• It is not convenient to be positioned in the middle of these generic strategies
as the company: a) doesn’t achieve any generic strategy, having difficulties to
generate profits, and b) there is uncertainty and lack of clarity. A clear
example is the automotive company Fiat/Chrysler; historically, both firms had
problems delivering positive results.
[http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/]
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States License
484
INDEPENDENT JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT & PRODUCTION (IJM&P)
http://www.ijmp.jor.br v. 8, n. 2, April - June 2017
ISSN: 2236-269X
DOI: 10.14807/ijmp.v8i2.580
• It is not possible to choose both strategies at a time as cost leaderships needs
an internal focus on processes and differentiation an outward highly creative
approach. In order to choose wisely a generic strategy it is essential to
consider organization’s competencies, strengths and weaknesses, as per the
following steps:
1- SWOT analysis, to understand where success and risks are.
2- Five competitive forces analysis, to know the nature of the industry you
are in.
3- Compare 1 and 2, and ask yourself if it could be reduced or managed
the supplier and customer power, and the threat of substitution or new
entry, and finally if it could be built an uncontested place in the market.
4- Generic strategy selection will give you the best and strongest set of
options.
It is essential to take into consideration that, when selecting a generic
strategy, it will be very difficult to change it in the near future as it implies a whole
organizational context to be developed (abilities and skills, among others).
Complementing what Porter says, Dess and Davis (1984) demonstrates the
“viability and usefulness of categorizing firms within an industry into strategic groups
on the basis of their intended strategies” or Porter’s generic strategies. They suggest
that:
• Strategies differ among firms and better strategies make a difference in
performance results.
• There are groups of firms in the same industry with similar strategies, like
home appliances, chemical process and consumer goods which differ along
dimensions rather than size and market share.
• Each generic strategy represents a group of strategy groups in which a firm
may want to compete in. To be “stuck in the middle” implies low profitability as
the firm will not take advantage of any generic strategy. As a consequence,
these three groups (two, as per our purpose) serve to explain profitability and
performance of firms within an industry.
[http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/]
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States License
485
INDEPENDENT JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT & PRODUCTION (IJM&P)
http://www.ijmp.jor.br v. 8, n. 2, April - June 2017
ISSN: 2236-269X
DOI: 10.14807/ijmp.v8i2.580
Finally, Porter indicates that each generic strategy is connected with different
organizational skills, and strategy influences any industrial sector.
The following Table 2 shows the basic elements of generic strategies
suggested before:
Table 2: Generic strategies
Cost Leadership
Differentiation
It is about Lower production costs–No frills.
Making differentiation sacrifices.
Differentiated/more attractive
products creation.
Includes quality and is costly.
Price
Competitive parity
Premium
Profit per product
Less
Higher
Market share
High
Small
Key concepts
Scale.
Cost reduction/minimization.
Integration.
Quick learning.
Control.
To be unique.
Brand loyalty.
Less price sensibility.
Exclusivity.
Risks
High investments.
Ignore differentiation basis.
Imitable cost reductions.
High cost of differentiation.
No need for differentiation.
Imitative products.
Company emphasis /
skills and abilities
Efficiency and effectiveness R&D and innovation.
Examples General Motors / Wal-Mart.
Mercedes Benz, Audi or
BMW.
To be successful
means
Access to technologies that will bring
costs down.
Cost and logistic efficiencies.
R&D focus + Innovation.
Ability to deliver high-quality
products/services.
To build an effective sales and
marketing.
As it was shown in this section, to have a solid strategic view it is needed to
understand the basic principles of Porter’s generic strategies, its benefits and how it
should be selected.
A generic strategy influences present and future performance of a firm and
impacts on the industrial sector in which competes.
To decide one of these generic strategies implies a specific set of skills and
abilities to be developed, and a specific organization to be put in place.
A middle position involves harsh risks like low profitability, uncertainty and
lack of clarity. There is not a company in the world which can stand them.
[http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/]
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States License
486
INDEPENDENT JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT & PRODUCTION (IJM&P)
http://www.ijmp.jor.br v. 8, n. 2, April - June 2017
ISSN: 2236-269X
DOI: 10.14807/ijmp.v8i2.580
4. THE SMART PROJECT
At the beginning, every project is a big interrogation mark and the Smart was
not an exception. The initial ideas of Daimler Chrysler’s (DC)1F2 executives were not
met on this project, and they collided with what experts of the industry said. Let’s
review some of the positive and negative opinions that were found in our
investigation.
“Positive” opinions
There are not a lot of specialists who have positive opinions on the Smart,
although there were found positive points of view but with some reservations. For
instance, Keuning (2007) states that:
• Smart is a kind of a revolution with a lot of skepticism around, and the
breakeven may come in many years. It was launched in Oct., 1998 with an
initial hope of 120,000 units to be sold in the first year but rapidly revised to
80,000 units. In the half-year to June 2000, 54,000 cars were sold but the first
estimate of 3 to 4 years of breakeven is history.
• The initial argument to launch this project was that it would bring down the fuel
consumption figures for Daimler helping the giant S-class to be on the road
and not cannibalizing actual products.
• Wealthy families would use two cars: an S-class for longer trips and a Smart
to get into the city. As a consequence, two Daimler cars would be bought by
the same family.
• There were two inconveniences:
1. The elk test for A-class retarded the development of the Smart, increasing
costs further.
2. Over-emphasis on fun: targeting young people and offering crazy colors. In
addition, it was marketed like a toy, not being taken seriously. That is why it
took more than a year to become acceptable for the streets of Munich and
Berlin.
2 At the moment the Smart was launched (1998), Chrysler was part of Daimler-Benz. From
2014 on, Chrysler is controlled by Fiat S. p. A. after their merger. The new holding is Fiat Chyster
Automobiles (FCA) with headquarters in London.
[http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/]
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States License
487
INDEPENDENT JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT & PRODUCTION (IJM&P)
http://www.ijmp.jor.br v. 8, n. 2, April - June 2017
ISSN: 2236-269X
DOI: 10.14807/ijmp.v8i2.580
• This car is successful in cities like Rome (as Italians are used to small cars)
and countries like Switzerland (for its link with Swatch Group, as Nicholas
Hayek, its chairman, who in the early 1990s joined Daimler with the idea of
bringing a watch manufacturer to the car industry).
Negative opinions
Negative opinions are found not only from specialists but from the executives
of DC. The article “Smart is a disaster – Mercedes boss” (2005) states that E.
Cordes, the Head of the Mercedes Car Group, described that the Smart brand was a
“disaster” but still has a future. Targets were not met and Cordes predicts that it
would break even in 2007. Although Chief Executive J. Schrempp ruled it out to
closure, he is convinced that “adds sympathy to the Group and helps to achieve
voluntary emission targets”.
Additionally, Flint (2005) says that Smart had no sense from day one as they
forgot what a car is about. He suggests that every auto company (like Toyota,
Honda, BMW and Porsche) makes mistakes and that some cars make no sense. For
instance: the 1997 GM’s electric car (two-seater with 40 to 80 miles of autonomy),
the 2002 Ford Blackwood (a pick-up that couldn’t pick up anything and lacked four-
wheel drive). He insists that a car is valuable because of its versatility: carries a lot
for huge distances in every condition, if not it doesn’t sell.
His personal view is that, as Smart is a partnership with Swatch watch
(Switzerland) and Volkswagen rejected the project, it has different mistakes:
• A car is not conceived to be parked in crowded cities, it is bought for mobility.
Parking is not a reason for existence.
• It is only for two people, and a couple cannot carry a baby or a friend. Lienert
(2005) adds that smaller cars in America are not welcome as they are full of
capacity and parking is easy, unless someone lives in New York or San
Francisco. In addition, they are small for a medium American person and for
American roads.
• The fuel-stingy engine makes it slow not making it friendly-driven in any
distance. The American traffic is not for this car.
[http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/]
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States License
488
INDEPENDENT JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT & PRODUCTION (IJM&P)
http://www.ijmp.jor.br v. 8, n. 2, April - June 2017
ISSN: 2236-269X
DOI: 10.14807/ijmp.v8i2.580
• The car body could be taken apart to match it with a dress, but nobody would
do that in his/her right mind.
• Smart needed to sell 200,000 units a year to breakeven but, at the most, they
have not surpassed 100,000 a year.
• In the first four years, the Smart lost $3 billion, which are compromising
DaimlerChrysler results as, in accordance with Lienert (2005), needs
resources to fix premium cars.
• For the price of the Smart, Europeans could buy a more competent car like
VW Polo with four seats and can go anywhere.
To add some more information to what Flint says on more competent cars
found in different markets, it was made a price comparison in USA and Argentina on
different models and brands which suggests that, in both countries, more
comfortable/competent cars could be bought for what a Smart is priced. In addition,
in USA the Smart is priced between $15,000 and $21,0002F
3, and in Argentina prices
varies from $22,300 to $26,4003F
4.In addition, Davies (2013) says that he has a lot of
fun zipping around Manhattan and Brooklyn but he will not buy one. He points out
some positive points in its favor: it is targeted for people who are prone to new and
interesting designs (ex.: Millenials, environmentalists, and city dwellers) and it is built
for urban driving with great visibility. Parking and driving it is an excellent experience.
However, also, he points out the negative: the automated manual transmission which
offers a “jerky shifting of a poorly driven manual” and that being knocked by the wind
it offers an unpleasant sensation.
Finally, Flint argues that quitting would be admitting a mistake, and executives
hate to do that. In addition, the plant was built in France as a symbol of German-
French cooperation, and dismissing French people would be politically
embarrassing. DC leaders forgot that a car is much more than parking and cute as
they must be able to do more things of what they are supposed to do.
3 From http://www.autoguide.com/new-cars/smart/, and
http://www.thecarconnection.com/quickquotes/smart_fortwo_2016?wide, retrieved 11/23/2016.
4 From http://autoblog.com.ar/2016/01/12/lanzamiento-smart-fortwo-y-forfour-2016/, retrieved
11/23/2016.
[http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/]
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States License
489
INDEPENDENT JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT & PRODUCTION (IJM&P)
http://www.ijmp.jor.br v. 8, n. 2, April - June 2017
ISSN: 2236-269X
DOI: 10.14807/ijmp.v8i2.580
The impacts of this project
Chronic losses, additional costs incurred and negative margins are the
fundamental impacts of this project. In addition, some Institutions and specialists are
recommending closing this project.
In addition, different specialists are against the way this project has been
carried on and advert that what is being done is not enough, as follows:
• The “Smart division has been a chronic loss maker since its birth in 1998 and
promises of break-even have never been fulfilled”.
With 2004 financial results, DC disclosed a 500 million Euros loss in the year.
Morgan Stanley investment bank estimates that each unit sold gives DC 4,000
Euros loss and a 35% of negative margin.
In addition, the ForFour and the ForMore had been the source of many
problems for the brand, and Smart is a huge problem DC has to deal with.
Dismissing people is not enough, plants should be closed (WINTON, 2015).
• Tran (2005) insists that DC would spend €1.2bn on Smart revamp after years
of losses with this brand. The large costs of this project were impacting the
firm’s earnings forecast for 2005 and obliged to recall 1.3 million Mercedes-
Benz vehicles worldwide. Significant earnings increase for 2007 (€600
million), reductions in the workforce and to discontinue production of its
roadster and SmartSUV were planned in order to restructure the Smart
business model. Credit Suisse First Boston was skeptical on these moves as
the announcement on Smart is not aggressive enough to deal with DC
problems.
Moreover, Morgan Stanley bank advises that it is necessary to close this
project. The article “Mercedes advised to close Smart” states that this bank
urged DC to dump the £1.9bn cost incurred in closing Smart following BMW,
whose share price went up after it jettisoned Rover in 2000. E. Cordes,
Mercedes Benz boss, said that they “will present Smart anew”.
Because of this section, Smart was not conceived for what a car is about to
be: versatility and friendly driven for long-distances. More competent cars are
[http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/]
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States License
490
INDEPENDENT JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT & PRODUCTION (IJM&P)
http://www.ijmp.jor.br v. 8, n. 2, April - June 2017
ISSN: 2236-269X
DOI: 10.14807/ijmp.v8i2.580
offered in the market and may be that is the reason why break even hasn’t
come yet. In other words, it was followed a differentiation strategy and
positioned in a higher target market for a car that is not price competitive for
what it is. As huge losses and negative margins are the fundamental impacts
seen, the peril of this project is that it may compromise Daimler as a whole.
5. THE NEW BEETLE PROJECT
Sass (2013) and other publications4F
5 say that the old Beetle was born in
1930s. It is a record with +21 million produced and bestselling car of the 1950
decade with 40% market share, remaining unchanged during 58 years and in
production for 65 years (1938 to 2003).
Dhabhar (2016) remembers that the Beetle was created by Ferdinand
Porsche during Hitler’s period with a subsidized plan (SASS, 2013), and was called
the “People’s car”, helping a lot to motor the world.
McGinn (1998) suggests that it is not an easy job to create a modern version
of a fable. After nineteen years that VW took the old Bug off the market in USA, it
remained as the bestselling car in history and an icon for collectors. The author
insists, “For a car designer, this was the equivalent of repainting the Mona Lisa”. Five
years were needed to be designed, having 80% of its parts in common with VW´s
Golf. It is stated that for elder people it can stir up emotions but after the design
work, sales must happen.
Out of the study of different authors Dhabhar (2016), Sass (2013) and Lal
(2005) it is possible to have an additional understanding on specific issues of both
cars, the classic and the new Beetle:
• In the 1950s, the Beetle was a success in India but in 2008 with an “exorbitant
price tag”, it had few buyers. Its price is “absolutely ridiculous” and its price
point is “absolutely far from the people’s car”. It is more a “fashion accessory”
than a “mode of transport”. The original Beetle was inexpensive, but never
cheap.
5 20 facts about the VW Beetle, from http://www.thefactsite.com/2016/07/volkswagen-beetle-
facts.html, retrieved 11/21/2016.
[http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/]
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States License
491
INDEPENDENT JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT & PRODUCTION (IJM&P)
http://www.ijmp.jor.br v. 8, n. 2, April - June 2017
ISSN: 2236-269X
DOI: 10.14807/ijmp.v8i2.580
• Its shape and low price rapidly attracted new generations of Americans. For
many, it was their first car. A memorable advertising said it all: “Buy low. Sell
high”. By 1970, the Beetle’s sales peaked at +400,000 units and it became an
American icon.
• In the period 1970-1993, the New Beetle sales declined from 500,000 units to
50,000 in USA. However, in the period 1993-1997 sales rebounded to an
annual 29% growth thanks to targeting a younger new generation.
• The appreciation of the Deutsche mark against the dollar (1970s), the drop in
oil prices (1982) and the declining popularity of hatchbacks contributed to the
declining in its sales. In 1979, VW was impeded to comply with environmental
legislation stopping selling cars in USA. Finally, and with a huge Japanese
competition, in mid-1980s and for the first time since 1958, VW sales were dip
below 100,000 units.
• More than 10 years after the last Beetle was sold in USA, VW designers
begun to design a New Beetle, based in four concepts: honest, simple,
reliable, and original, with up-to-date German engineering and superior driving
performance. By 1993, the concept car was finished and presented in the
1994 Auto Show in Detroit.
• The first step was the design process and the second one was directed to
define the target market. In order to comply with this task, they begun to talk
with potential customers, knowing that most of the old ones had personal
histories, memories, and affection with the old Beetle, but the new ones had
no emotional connection with the car. As a result, it was thought for the small-
car segment, changing its positioning behind drivability. Its price range was
$17,000-$18,000, more than the average price of competitors ($15,200).
• It was very important to assess the right selling proposition. That is why it was
needed to position The Beetle into the right segment and not as “a toy” but as
a “real, drivable car”.
• In 1994, VW prepared a relaunch in the USA market trying to modify the
perception of poor quality and reliability of its products. In 1995 and 1996 and
thanks to a new ad campaign, sales increased in each year 29% and by 1997,
sales increased 178% in comparison to 1993 sales.
[http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/]
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States License
492
INDEPENDENT JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT & PRODUCTION (IJM&P)
http://www.ijmp.jor.br v. 8, n. 2, April - June 2017
ISSN: 2236-269X
DOI: 10.14807/ijmp.v8i2.580
• Jim Mateja (Chicago Tribune of 02/13/1994) said that VW must came up with
a new, small and inexpensive car as the old Beetle, giving the opportunity to
have what many people couldn’t. However, the New Beetle -made on the VW
Golf platform- was larger, more spacious, had a better engine and nice shape,
and offered front and side airbags.
• Although the Classic Beetle has the outright charm to call the attention of any
and every person, the New Beetle is prettier, larger and more comfortable,
and incorporated the Porsche inspired spoiler. Both cars are solid and of good
quality.
Both cars are shown in the following image:
Figure 1: The Classic and the New Beetle
Source: Dhabhar (2016)
Moreover, in the article “The whim’s duel: Mini Cooper versus New Beetle”
(2012) it is compared esthetic, mechanic and comfort of both cars. It states that Mini
Cooper wins in sportsmanship and the New Beetle in comfort, but both are treated
as a whim. However, in this sense Mini Cooper wins.
Finally, it says that the New Beetle would end production in 2018 after 20
years and two generations (this news is about to be confirmed), as traditional cars
are not selling as utility-like vehicles are and VW needs to open production capacity.
In addition, it has never good sales, and during the first quarter, 2016 VW delivered
5,700 Beetles in USA, representing a 42% decline over previous year (GANZ, 2016).
[http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/]
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States License
493
INDEPENDENT JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT & PRODUCTION (IJM&P)
http://www.ijmp.jor.br v. 8, n. 2, April - June 2017
ISSN: 2236-269X
DOI: 10.14807/ijmp.v8i2.580
Price comparison
In USA, the New Beatle is priced in a range of $20,000-$26,000 and in
Argentina it is approx. $ 28,000 for the hard top5F
6. It is presented as “stylish,
extravagant, and cool” and the Cabriolet version as “dynamic, sporty, and confident”
with “an unusual denim-like finish”6F
7.
It is fully equipped with features like six-speed automatic transmission, 2.5 liter
five-cylinder and Electronic Stabilization Program (ESP), for safe driving under most
conditions7F
8.
The article “Apuntes del lanzamiento del Volkswagen The Beetle” (2014) says
that in Argentina the sales expectations for 2014 were (only) 500 units. In 2016, it
was priced approx. $28,000/30,000 for a hard top8F
9 (a VW Vento costs approx.
26,000/31,0009F
10) and in USA $20,000/26,00010F
11.
Because of this paragraph, it is noted that in time, the New Beetle changed its
positioning from an “inexpensive car”, to a “toy” and to a “real and drivable car”, but
simplicity, smallness and inexpensiveness were not maintained as in the classic
Bug.
In addition, it was infused with German engineering and superiority in many
areas of the product, made on the Golf platform. As a result, the “people’s car” was
not for everyone, changing the original generic strategy (leadership in cost) to a
differentiation strategy.
In addition, the target market and the selling proposition were thought after its
design was completed, not before. Consequently, VW had not thought on what was
needed in the market but on what they could produce.
Finally, prices are high in comparison to other cars offered in the market.
6 From http://autos.mercadolibre.com.ar/volkswagen/the-beetle/, retrieved 11/16/2016.
7 From http://www.beetle.com/int/en/home, recovered 11/16/2016.
8 From http://www.conduciendo.com/vw-new-beetle-final-edition-2209, retrieved 11/16/2016.
9 From http://autos.mercadolibre.com.ar/volkswagen/the-beetle/, retrieved 11/23/2016.
10 From http://volkswagen.carone.com.ar/vento/?gclid=CPTn7NiNqNACFQIJkQod644FaA,
retrieved 11/23/2016.
11 From http://www.vw.com/models/beetle/section/safety/, retrieved 11/23/2016.
[http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/]
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States License
494
INDEPENDENT JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT & PRODUCTION (IJM&P)
http://www.ijmp.jor.br v. 8, n. 2, April - June 2017
ISSN: 2236-269X
DOI: 10.14807/ijmp.v8i2.580
6. CONCLUSIONS
Sustainable growth comes from a proper fit between strategy (a sufficient
condition) and Operational Effectiveness (OE, a necessary condition, but not
sufficient). While strategies is a path to sustainable profitability, selecting a different
set of activities or do them in a different way, OE is about inputs and outputs and in
doing better than competitors. In this sense, inclusive development should be seen
as a big opportunity for growth.
Leadership is about strategy and management is about OE. That is why,
leaders must focus on the present and future of their industries, selecting the right
one to compete, an adequate set of activities and the next practices needed to go
forward.
To be open and flexible is an imperative for sustainable growth. That is why
leaders characteristics relate to nonconformity, look for uncharted territories,
development through learning, helping others, inclusion, transparency, and loyalty.
To have a solid strategic perspective implies the understanding of the basic
principles of Porter’s generic strategies, its benefits and how it should be selected.
As a result, it is important to understand generic strategies, as follows:
• Cost leadership implies cost reductions (no frills), efficiencies and ROI. There
are needed differentiation sacrifices, if apply.
As price is in competitive parity, the profit per product is low and the market
share should be high.
Its key concepts are: scale, cost reduction/minimization, integration, quick
learning and control.
Key company emphasis should be on efficiency and effectiveness.
• Differentiation relates to building a perceived uniqueness and attractiveness
on products/services, and higher quality.
As premium prices should be established, the profit per product is high and
the market share is low.
Its key concepts are: uniqueness, brand loyalty, less price sensibility and
exclusivity.
[http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/]
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States License
495
INDEPENDENT JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT & PRODUCTION (IJM&P)
http://www.ijmp.jor.br v. 8, n. 2, April - June 2017
ISSN: 2236-269X
DOI: 10.14807/ijmp.v8i2.580
Key company emphasis should be on R&D and innovation.
• A middle position among one of these generic strategies involves harsh risks
like low profitability, uncertainty and lack of clarity.
• Each generic strategy needs to develop a different set of organizational skills
and a specific organization to be put in place, influencing the industrial sector
in which the firm competes.
Taking into consideration what it was said before, the Smart and the New
Beetle could be considered avoidable strategic mistakes, as per the following
reasons:
• The Smart was not conceived for what it is expected from a car: versatility and
friendly driven for long-distances; other better offers are found in the market.
For the segment in which it competes, high differentiation and huge price
premiums are not recognized because of customers’ price sensibility.
Moreover, it is possible that the Mercedes Benz’s customer would not like to
pay what is supposed for one of its products having the Smart (a cheaper
product) as part of Mercedes’ product line, giving an additional argument for
which the Smart may compromise Daimler as a whole.
• The New Beetle (more seen as a toy than as a drivable car) changed the
positioning of the old Beetle (simplicity, smallness and inexpensiveness), and
its original generic strategy (from leadership in costs to differentiation). Being
priced very high for what the classic Beetle was, it seems a car “not-for-
everyone” and not a “people’s car”.
For what it was said before, it is not said that a generic strategy is impossible
to be changed. The fact is that pretending to sell a product just because it
was an icon and not considering the minimum strategic basis may be a fault.
New generations “forget” history and look for actual results.
In addition, as the target market and the selling proposition were thought after
completing the product design, VW seemed doing as in Ford’s times: selling
what is produced and not thinking on customer’s desire or on what he/she
could be delighted. To replicate icon products is not a synonym of excellent
future sales and breakeven point achievement.
[http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/]
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States License
496
INDEPENDENT JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT & PRODUCTION (IJM&P)
http://www.ijmp.jor.br v. 8, n. 2, April - June 2017
ISSN: 2236-269X
DOI: 10.14807/ijmp.v8i2.580
Professor Porter while talking about strategy and generic strategies warns
hazards and risks. The Smart and the New Beetle show the risks of higher
differentiation that is not being paid by the customer, no matter how if it is about
recognized brands or icon products. Losses and negative margins are applicable to
every firm.
REFERENCES
Apuntes del lanzamiento del Volkswagen The Beetle (05/16/2014), from
http://autoblog.com.ar/2014/05/16/apuntes-del-lanzamiento-del-volkswagen-the-
beetle/, retrieved 11/21/2016.
ÁLVAREZ PERALTA, D. H.; VILTARD, L. A. (2016) Herramientas estratégicas
para la Pequeña y Mediana Empresa (PYME). El caso de las empresas de Quito,
Ecuador. B. S. Lab., Italia: Avellino.
ÁLVAREZ PERALTA, D. H.; VILTARD, L. A. (2015) Strategic Analysis Tools
Application at SMEs in Ecuador, Independent Journal of Management &
Production, v. 6, n. 4.
ÁLVAREZ PERALTA, D. H.; VILTARD, L. A. (2015) Simple Strategic Analysis Tools
at SMEs in Ecuador, Independent Journal of Management & Production, v. 6, n.
2.
COPPING, R. A. (2014) Volkswagen Beatle, Shire Publications Ltd., from
www.shirebooksco.uk, retrieved 11/19/2016.
DAVIES, A. (2013) I won’t buy a Smart car until the price tag hits $13.000 –
Here´s why, from http://www.businessinsider.com/should-you-buy-a-smart-car-
2013-4, retrieved 11/13/2016.
DESS, G. G.; DAVIS, P. S. (1984) Porter’s (1980) generic strategies as determinants
of strategic group membership and organizational performance, Academy of
Management Journal, v. 27, n. 3, p. 467-488.
DHABBAR, C. (2016) 2016 Beetle versus 1963 Beetle: The modern versus classic
Volkswagen shootout, from https://www.zigwheels.com/reviews-
advice/shootouts/2016-beetle-vs-1963-beetle-the-modern-vs-classic-volkswagen-
shootout/24717/, retrieved 11/20/2016.
FLINT, J. (02/14/2005) Not so Smart, from
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2005/0214/128.html, retrieved 11/13/2016.
GANZ, A. (04/15/2016) VW Beetle to get the axe after 2018, from
http://www.motorauthority.com/news/1103445_vw-beetle-to-get-the-axe-after-2018,
retrieved 11/19/2016.
KEUNING, D. (2007) Management: a European perspective, Routledge, Taylor &
Francis Group, Noorthhoff Uitgevers: The Netherlands.
LAL, R. (09/25/2005) The New Beetle, Harvard Business School, Boston: USA.
LIENERT, D. (2005) Daimler's dumb decisions. Forbes, New York: USA.
[http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/]
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States License
497
INDEPENDENT JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT & PRODUCTION (IJM&P)
http://www.ijmp.jor.br v. 8, n. 2, April - June 2017
ISSN: 2236-269X
DOI: 10.14807/ijmp.v8i2.580
MEKIC´, E.; MEKIC´, E. (2014) Supports and critics con Porter’s competitive
strategy and competitive advantage, ResearchGate, from
file:///C:/Users/.%C2%B4%C2%BF/Downloads/icesos%20mo%208%20final%20(1).
pdf, retrieved 11/26/2016.
MCGINN, D. (1998) New legs for a bug, Newsweek, from
https://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-20117743.html, retrieved 11/19/2016.
Mercedes advised to close Smart (w/d) from http://www.autocar.co.uk/car-
news/industry/mercedes-advised-close-smart, retrieved 11/13/2016.
PORTER, M. E. (2008) Competitive advantage: creating and sustaining superior
performance, Simon and Shuster, New York: USA.
PORTER, M. E. (1996) What is strategy?, Harvard Business Review, Boston: USA.
PRAHALAD, C. K. (s/f) Remembering C. K. Prahalad, the management guru
(26/4/2010), from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=100V0iaHFcQ, retrieved
10/30/2016.
PRAHALAD, C. K. (2010) Best practices get you only so far, Harvard Business
Review, Boston: USA.
PRAHALAD, C. K. (2010) The responsible manager, Harvard Business Review,
Boston: USA.
Smart factory with networked value chain (08/03/2016), from http://www.hf-
mixinggroup.com/en/news/blog/mixing-highlights/smart-factory-with-networked-
value-chain/, retrieved 11/13/2016.
SASS, R. (01/25/2013) Secrets of the original Volkswagen Beetle, from
http://www.foxnews.com/leisure/2013/01/27/secrets-volkswagen-beetle/, retrieved
11/21/2016.
Smart is a disaster – Mercedes boss (2005), from http://www.am-
online.com/news/2005/3/4/-smart-is-a-disaster-mercedes-boss/8242/, retrieved
11/13/2016.
The whims’ duel: Mini Cooper versus New Beetle (2012), from
http://www.bolsamania.com/kmph/el-duelo-del-capricho-mini-cooper-vs-new-beetle/,
retrieved 11/19/2016.
TRAN, M. (4/1/2005) Daimler to spend €1.2bn on Smart revamp, The Guardian,
UK.
20 Facts about the VW Beetle (w/d), from
http://www.thefactsite.com/2016/07/volkswagen-beetle-facts.html, retrieved
11/21/2016.
WHITE, R. D. (1986) Generic business strategies, organizational context and
performance: an empirical investigation, Strategic Management Journal, v. 7, n. 3,
p. 217.
WINTON, N. (04/01/2015) Smart reaction: DaimlerChrysler’s Smart action
feeble, say bankers, from http://www.just-auto.com/news/daimlerchryslers-smart-
action-feeble-say-bankers_id73025.aspx, retrieved 11/13/2016.
