A Novel Subject-Object Model of Consciousness

Abstract

The nature of the subjective aspect of consciousness is elusive and hence, there has been a lot of debate on how to quantify the subjective experience of a human in comparison to other living systems. Here, the primary concern lies with the question of the presence of consciousness in other living systems, and if so, how distinct could the experience be when compared to humans. Firstly, to probe such investigations, our current theories fall short in having an absolute definition for consciousness and whatever we observe and experience as a human brings about our present notion/definition. Failures in capturing the non-deterministic nature of living/biological entities with our reductionist and deterministic models call for a new holistic science and synergistic theories of consciousness. In this regard, present paper tries to propose a novel consc iousness model; Subject-Object Model (SOM), based on the degree of subjectivity/subjectiveness a living species would naturally embrace. It propounds consciousness as a kind of evolutionary trait and thereon claims it as an emergent property resulting from the parsimony of indexing quantities. Accordingly, it conjectures; the development of certain degree and level of complexity in a living system during the process of evolution calls for an emergence of a qualitative property (like consciousness) for better survival and optimal functioning. This provides a scale to estimate the level of consciousness and the extent of subjective experience of life across the wide living spectra.

Full text

NeuroQuantology | March 2017 | Volume 15 | Issue 1 | Page 79-85 | doi: 10.14704/nq.2017.15.1.977
Shashi Kiran Reddy J., A Novel Subject-Object Model of Consciousness
eISSN 1303-5150 www.neuroquantology.com
79
A Novel Subject-Object Model of Consciousness
J. Shashi Kiran Reddy
ABSTRACT
The nature of the subjective aspect of consciousness is elusive and hence, there has been a lot of debate on how
to quantify the subjective experience of a human in comparison to other living systems. Here, the primary
concern lies with the question of the presence of consciousness in other living systems, and if so, how distinct
could the experience be when compared to humans. Firstly, to probe such investigations, our current theories fall
short in having an absolute definition for consciousness and whatever we observe and experience as a human
brings about our present notion/definition. Failures in capturing the non-deterministic nature of
living/biological entities with our reductionist and deterministic models call for a new holistic science and
synergistic theories of consciousness. In this regard, present paper tries to propose a novel consc iousness model;
Subject-Object Model (SOM), based on the degree of subjectivity/subjectiveness a living species would naturally
embrace. It propounds consciousness as a kind of evolutionary trait and thereon claims it as an emergent
property resulting from the parsimony of indexing quantities. Accordingly, it conjectures; the development of
certain degree and level of complexity in a living system during the process of evolution calls for an emergence of
a qualitative property (like consciousness) for better survival and optimal functioning. This provides a scale to
estimate the level of consciousness and the extent of subjective experience of life across the wide living spectra.
Key Words: subjective consciousness, the self, objective consciousness, self-awareness, living systems
DOI Number: 10.14704/nq.2017.15.1.977
NeuroQuantology 2017; 1: 79-85
Introduction
1
When we experience the enigmatic phenomenon
called ‘Life,’ one can be sure of experiencing it
from the subjective standpoint (having the first-
person perspective) and also objectively as a
third-person with the sense of self-awareness.
Experiences resulting from both these
perspectives combine to create a unique
experience of life (Hodgson, 1898; Chalmers,
1996, 2002, 2004; Velmans, 2000, 2009; Zeman,
2005; Leontyev, 2009; Pereira & Reddy, 2016b, c,
e). Even though we take the subjective
experience of life as granted (identifying it as the
1
Corresponding author: J. Shashi Kiran Reddy
Address: Independent Researcher, Bangalore-560064, India
Phone: + 918861568004
e-mail  jumpalreddy@live.com, jumpal_shashi@yahoo.com
Relevant conflicts of interest/financial disclosures: The authors
declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any
commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a
potential conflict of interest.
Received: 30 June 2016; Accepted: 22 September 2016
very nature of a living entity), mechanisms
involved in the construction of such phenomenon
called ‘Self’ looks mysterious and puzzling to
modern science (Cleeremans, 2005; Feinberg and
Keenan, 2005; Greenfield and Collins, 2005;
Grandpierre et al., 2013; Noel et al., 2015; Fabbro
et al., 2015; Feinberg & Mallatt, 2016; Reddy &
Pereira, 2016b, c, e). We are not only short of
understanding the underlying mechanisms that
results in feeling of the sense of self (a grounded
experience), but also not certain about the
location or place in the physical body from where
one perceives the self and surroundings
(Feinberg and Keenan, 2005; Morin, 2011;
Alsmith and Longo, 2014; Noel et al., 2015;
Fabbro et al., 2015). When we probe such
investigations, we usually assume consciousness
to be grounded or rooted in the physical fabric
and hence associate it with constituents of the
body like the brain, looking for localized theories
that could address the concept of self.

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But, few recent studies in experimental
neuropsychology revealed that such a notion of
bodily-self grounded in the physical fabric may
not be true since one can also have the sense of
self (or feeling of self-identification) outside one's
physical body (Blanke & Metzinger, 2009; Blanke,
2012; Ananthaswamy, 2015; Noel et al., 2015).
The concept of ‘Peripersonal Space (PPS)’ could
help us in understanding the non-local roots of
consciousness in the brain. The PPS is an
encapsulating space in the immediate vicinity of
the body; which acts as an interface between the
body and environmental interactions (Blanke &
Metzinger, 2009; Blanke, 2012; Noel et al., 2015;
Serino et al., 2015). Though it is a multi-sensory
representation constructed by the brain, here, the
interesting question would be, how can a
localized compact (physical) structure like brain
construct a dynamic, non-local (and non-
physical) peripersonal space (PPS)? It is
analogous to a magnet (compact but localized)
and its non-local (and non-physical) magnetic
field that envelopes and extends beyond its
physical boundary. Each physical organ in the
body has their own version of PPS called
‘Receptive fields (RFs),’ and PPS associated with
the whole body is just an integrated or global
version constructed from these individual ones
(Duhamel et al., 1998; Blanke, 2012; Serino et al.,
2015). So, even though PPS construct could be
related to the activity of the specific multisensory
neuronal regions in the brain (Blanke &
Metzinger, 2009; Blanke, 2012; Noel et al., 2015),
it’s not a phenomenal construction (of brain
mechanisms alone). It is epiphenomenal resulting
from the integration of respective RFs via
specifically optimized pathways. Similarly,
consciousness could in a way be related to brain
and its activity having respective maps and
correlates, but resulting localized theories
(involving brain alone) may not capture entire
phenomenon or roots of consciousness in its
entirety. This is because consciousness could be
resulting not from the activity of the brain alone
but from certain informational processing and
self-optimal mechanisms that are rooted in the
whole system via defined pathways (Edelman &
Tonon, 2000; Cleeremans, 2005; Greenfield &
Collins, 2005; Tononi, 2005; Grandpierre et al.,
2013; Hankey, 2014, 2015; Webb & Graziano,
2015; Oizumi et al., 2016; Tsuchiya et al., 2016).
Hence, consciousness could be thought of as a
non-local and non-material property resulting
from certain order and structure in the system
with optimal self-reviving, self-organizing and
self-feeding properties. In this sense, it could also
be seen as a higher order property resulting from
certain specific states of matter (Tegmark, 2015).
The model proposed in the present paper tries to
address such issues associated with the theories
of consciousness and accordingly scales the level
of consciousness and subjective experience of a
human compared to other living systems.
Levels of conscious experience: Based on the
degree of Subjectivity/Subjectiveness
The intensity and extent of any conscious
experience of life would depend on the level of
subjectiveness with which one perceives it
(Hodgson, 1898; Chalmers, 1996, 2002, 2004;
Zeman, 2005; Morin, 2006; Boly et al., 2013;
Fabbro et al., 2015; Feinberg & Mallatt, 2016).
Consequently, we come across three different
levels of consciousness based on the degree of
subjectiveness: 1) Objective consciousness 2)
Subjective consciousness, and 3) Subjective self
or the sense of self-awareness. Based on this, one
can model one’s conscious experience to be
resulting from the integration of fragment
experiences associated with the varying nature of
experience at each of these levels (Hodgson,
1898; Velmans, 2000, 2009; Leontyev, 2009;
Morin, 2006, 2011).
Objective consciousness gives the third-
person perceptive of an experience; the sense of
how it would feel like to be an entity having such
experience in first-person. This is where all our
empirical observations and investigations would
point to. Every study aimed at understanding the
nature of consciousness and its physical
correlates would be indirectly addressing this
aspect of consciousness. This is where the
artificial intelligence (AI) systems and few other
biological entities would fit in. Artificially
designed robots and sensors with self-feedback,
informational and other bio-mimicking
properties are made to sense the surroundings
making them objectively aware of the ambient.
But they are always objectively bounded; they
can’t have a subjective experience of how it feels
like to be called as living. This is the basis on
which objective entities differ from
biological/living entities (Trewavas & Baluska,
2011; Shanta, 2015, 2016; Feinberg & Mallatt,
2016; Reddy and Pereira, 2016b, c, e).
The other two aspects of consciousness
are purely personal and subjective. They can
neither be captured nor generalized; this signifies
their unique nature. Subjective consciousness

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results in the unique personal experience of the
objective world or surroundings. It gives the taste
of how it feels like to experience it as a first-
person. The moment we try to report or
investigate, it becomes third-person (Hodgson,
1898; Chalmers, 2002, 2004; Velmans, 2000,
2009; Reddy & Pereira, 2016 b, c, e). Most of the
living entities would embrace the life experience
from this part of consciousness. This is the level
of consciousness we usually associate with
different living species like birds, animals etc
(Leontyev, 2009; Boly et al., 2013; Fabbro et al.,
2015; Feinberg & Mallatt, 2013, 2016; Graziano &
Webb, 2016b). The subjective self or the notion of
self-awareness points to the subjective
experience in first-person and spontaneously
being aware of the self or agency to which it is
happening (Hodgson, 1898; Morin, 2006, 2011;
Leontyev, 2009; Fabbro et al., 2015). One’s
experience at any point of time could, in turn, be
related to any of these aspects.
A deeper understanding of consciousness
comes from various neuropsychological
disorders with the altered sense of experience
resulting from conditions that perturb any of
these aspects of consciousness (Feinberg, 1997,
2005b, 2010; Blanke & Metzinger, 2009;
Ananthaswamy, 2015). Perturbations of objective
consciousness correspond to problems like the
spectrum of Autistic disorders and other specially
challenged conditions etc. Synesthesia,
Schizophrenia, Body integration identity disorder
(BIID), Phantom limbs etc are disorders
associated with the subjective aspect of
consciousness. The altered experience of the
subjective self or the aspect of self-awareness
could be noticed in disorders like Doppelganger,
Autoscopic phenomena, Ecstatic epilepsy etc
(Blanke & Metzinger, 2009; Ananthaswamy,
2015). All though these disorders could have
different sourcing mechanisms, it would be
interesting to study various neurobiological,
other physiological mechanisms and conditions
that result in the construction of specific or each
of these aspects of consciousness. In this regard,
it is necessary for present science to develop
various modalities by which one can estimate or
understand the aspect of consciousness certain
living species would naturally embrace. This, in
turn, would have implications for understanding
the fundamental nature and structure of
consciousness and thereby unravels how
evolution involving ecological consciousness
works from this perspective.
Subject-Object Model of Consciousness
Recent advancements in the medical field (mainly
the possibility of organs transplantation) made it
clear that consciousness or the sense of self of an
individual is neither grounded nor rooted in any
specific organ like the heart, liver or in the brain,
etc. Even if that is the case, disorders like BIID,
Phantom limbs show that the sense of
identification of certain body parts (i.e. subjective
experience of the bodily self) could be perturbed
by disrupting respective maps in the brain
(Feinberg, 1997, 2005a, b, 2010; Blanke &
Metzinger, 2009; Blanke, 2012; Ananthaswamy,
2015; Noel et al., 2015). From these conditions,
one can conclude that consciousness and its
subjective aspects are not specifically localized. If
one still argues brain to be the seat of self and
source of consciousness then does that mean a
fetus in mother’s womb is not a living entity, and
can’t be considered as a conscious being until few
initial weeks of its development? Suddenly with
the development of the brain and its constituents
after a certain period of time, it turned conscious?
If few important regions in the brain are
considered to be the source of consciousness,
then are they the first regions developed in the
evolution of a being? Until this point is fetus only
a kind of biosensor or biomechanism responding
to the ambient environment? In this context, how
best do the brain based models of consciousness
explain the cases of Hydranencephaly (Pereira,
2016)?
When we look at how as an individual we
subjectively experience our own-selves, one can
be certain about experiencing one’s own self in
the global/integrated sense (Chalmers, 1996,
2002, 2004; Velmans, 2000, 2009;
Ananthaswamy, 2015; Reddy & Pereira, 2016b, c,
e). We feel/experience our body and its
constituents (as a first-person) with the sense of
identification (thus constructing the bodily self).
In the process, one can notice that we are not
given access to the subjective experience of
functioning of each and every organ or for say
various biological mechanisms occurring under
the sheath of our physical field or body. We only
have global or integrated experience of the self.
We are not consciously monitoring the system of
mechanisms that are necessary for our functional
and living purposes. They are guided and
monitored automatically (using self-feedback
mechanisms) at various functional levels, and
only at the certain level of activity, the sense of
awareness of its presence seem to pop out and
felt. If we look for the reasons why we are not

NeuroQuantology | March 2017 | Volume 15 | Issue 1 | Page 79-85 | doi: 10.14704/nq.2017.15.1.977
Shashi Kiran Reddy J., A Novel Subject-Object Model of Consciousness
eISSN 1303-5150 www.neuroquantology.com
82
given access to such experiences at these lower
functional levels, we could understand better the
nature and structure of consciousness.
To explain such phenomenon, one could
come across two possibilities on the occurrence
of consciousness. One relates the extent of
conscious experience to our sensitivity levels and
the other quotes the possibility of the emergence
of consciousness only at certain level of activity
(an epiphenomenal argument). The later
possibility argues consciousness and its
subjective aspect (or experience of the sense of
self) to be epiphenomenal in nature and hence
would arise only at a certain level of functioning
of the system. This leads us to think of
consciousness not as a localized phenomenon
associated with specific parts of the brain or body
but as a global construct resulting from certain
functional order and level of activity. This is
inherently communicated and encoded in specific
pathways following which consciousness at a
subjective level pops up (Edelman & Tonon,
2000; Cleeremans, 2005; Greenfield & Collins,
2005; Tononi, 2005; Feinberg & Mallatt, 2013;
Grandpierre et al., 2013; Webb & Graziano, 2015,
2016b; Reddy & Pereira, 2016d). To explain this
possibility in detail a novel Subject-Object Model
(SOM) of consciousness is developed (see Fig.1).
The scale for this model is based on the ‘degree of
subjectivity’ a living entity would naturally
embrace. Since, one’s experience results from the
combination of both objective and subjective
aspects of consciousness, this model tries to scale
different life forms/living systems based on these
aspects. Finally, it quotes how different a human
experience (as a subject) could probably be in
comparison to other living experiences (in
agreement with Leontyev, 2009; Boly et al., 2013;
Fabbro et al., 2015; Graziano & Webb, 2016b).
Following this, we would have life forms with
various degrees of subjectivity and objectiveness.
The present model hypothesizes
consciousness to be the reflexive property that
emerges from the biological/living system
exhibiting parsimony of various indexing
quantities (Edelman & Tonon, 2000; Cleeremans,
2005; Tononi, 2005; Janzen, 2008; Peters, 2013;
Hankey, 2014, 2015; Tegmark, 2015; Webb &
Graziano, 2015; Oizumi et al., 2016; Reddy &
Pereira, 2016d, e). Accordingly, the extent of
subjective experience one develops would
depend on factors like the degrees of freedom in
various informational systems, orderliness in
complex pathways (resulting in varying entropy),
self-feeding and other self-sustaining
mechanisms and global communication network
etc (Edelman & Tonon, 2000; Cleeremans, 2005;
Greenfield & Collins, 2005; Tononi, 2005; Hankey,
2014, 2015; Webb & Graziano, 2015; Oizumi et
al., 2016; Tsuchiya et al., 2016). All these factors
depend on morphological and other biological
faculties that a living entity adapts during its
evolution, which in turn depends on functional,
ecological and environmental aspects
(Cleeremans, 2005; Leontyev, 2009; Boly et al.,
2013; Fabbro et al., 2015; Feinberg, 2013, 2016;
Webb & Graziano, 2015, 2016a, b; Reddy &
Pereira, 2016 b, c, d, e). For example, with
increased morphological or biological complexity
one requires maximum optimization of functional
pathways, quickest feeding and informational
systems with a wide communication network for
better functioning. This optimal and survival
necessity calls for an emergence of the subjective
aspect of consciousness. Greater the subjectivity,
greater is the index for the heightened level of
functioning of any such complex biological entity.
This theory explains why different living species
with varying complexity both morphologically
and functionally should have different levels and
degree of subjectivity. Hence justifies why lower
forms of life have a low degree of subjectiveness
and subtler experiences of life.

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Shashi Kiran Reddy J., A Novel Subject-Object Model of Consciousness
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Figure 1. Subject-Object Model (SOM) of Consciousness.
In the present context, a careful
observation reveals that either during
malfunctioning or rupture of functional organs or
in the case of devastation, we are usually given
access to subjectively experience certain subtle
mechanisms which are in general inconspicuous
while in normal working conditions. Also, we are
designed with specific bio-faculties that filter out
subjective experience below certain sensitivity
level. This is the reason why we usually don’t feel
the pumping of the heart, blood flow and other
dynamics etc. The functional pathways, in
general, developed an advanced feeding
mechanism and hence any malfunctioning would
be immediately communicated with the
increased intensity in localized subjective feeling
usually associated with that organ. These
pathways would involve maps respective to each
and every important functional organ in the body.
At the time of malfunction, it activates emergency
feedback system that would take alternate
pathways to support functioning. After certain
duration, even these emergency pathways would
rupture and tends to collapse completely with a
discontinuity in the pathway network. Since
consciousness emerged as a signature of a
specific order in pathway systems, the moment
these are destroyed the physical organ/body
can’t keep up with its natural mechanisms and
thereby loses it capability to hold or support
consciousness. This results in a devastating
condition of the specific organ/body and finally
death. This could be the reason why
malfunctioning/rupture of any specific organ
could result in death. Here one could notice that
the subjective aspect emerges as a property
resulting from the parsimony of indexing
quantities following certain constructal laws
(Edelman & Tonon, 2000; Cleeremans, 2005;
Greenfield & Collins, 2005; Tononi, 2005; Hankey,
2014, 2015; Webb & Graziano, 2015; Oizumi et
al., 2016; Tsuchiya et al., 2016). In this regard,
subjectivity is just another qualitatively emerged
property seeding reflexive awareness which is
needed for the better and proper functioning of
the biological system.
The other possibility supports a layered
structure of consciousness (scaled by the level of
sensitivity) with functional interaction/
communication happening via subtle
mechanisms that are below our sensitivity levels.
Just like a sensor is made to detect or sense
within a specific range, we humans might also be
designed to access only certain levels of
sensitivity subjectively. Maybe those functional

NeuroQuantology | March 2017 | Volume 15 | Issue 1 | Page 79-85 | doi: 10.14704/nq.2017.15.1.977
Shashi Kiran Reddy J., A Novel Subject-Object Model of Consciousness
eISSN 1303-5150 www.neuroquantology.com
84
mechanisms that occur below this level of
sensitivity would not confront any subjective
experience. This is very similar to the case of our
sensory perception of reality (Reddy & Pereira,
2016a, b, c, e). We are in general limited in
perception by the capabilities of different sensory
faculties (thereby limiting our subjective
experience of life). Therefore, any experience
falling outside these limits won’t confront any
subjective experience at our level of awareness.
In the process of evolution, each biological/living
species has adopted various sensory faculties
with different levels and degrees of sensitivity.
Hence, no two species could perceive reality, in
the same way, i.e. the extent and level of
subjective experience vary from species to
species. Similarly, each species could have
adopted a different degree of subjectivity/the
sense of self-awareness (or feeling of the sense of
self) depending on various other factors. Just as
limitations in the sensory capabilities limit us to
the extent of perception of reality and outside
world, similar analogs could decide the degree of
self-awareness as well. This explains how
humans and other living entities differ in the
extent of subjective experience and degree of
self-awareness. Various complex mechanisms
and other morphological parameters that
biological entities adapt in the process of
evolution decide its place on the ‘degree of
subjectivity/self-awareness’ scale.
Following this, a life form with zero
degrees of subjectivity would be called as an
object, say for example stones, rocks, and other
material objects etc. These are categorized as the
lowest in the scale corresponding to life forms
devoid of both the objective and subjective
aspects of consciousness. Life forms in the order
of ascending degree of subjectivity include plant
kingdom, fungi, various microbial systems,
animals and humans respectively (see Fig.1). This
way animals would have more degree of
subjectivity (making them feel more alive) than
lower life forms and these, in turn, are succeeded
by humans that occupy next position in the
evolutionary step. Accordingly, along with
varying complexity in morphological and other
biological parameters, each specimen/individual
entity across wide living spectra also develops a
selective degree of subjectivity (or levels of
consciousness).
Both the above possibilities converge to
the unique structural layout of consciousness and
helps in scaling life forms/living systems either
based on the degree of subjectivity or the level of
sensitivity. Though at the surface they look very
distinct, coupled model would base the life forms
in a single parameter. This basis could be claimed
to serve as the complete model for consciousness
even though necessary indexing parameters and
other central networking pathways are to be
studied in detail.
Result
The model developed in the present paper
provides a scale to estimate the level of
consciousness and the extent of subjective
experience of life across the wide living spectra. It
scales different living species or life forms based
on the degree of subjectivity/subjectiveness. It
proposes that after the development of a certain
degree of complexity in the biological system, the
emergence of qualitative aspects which includes
varying levels of consciousness is crucial for its
survival. Accordingly, in the process of evolution,
each species developed different degrees and
levels of complexity associated with biological
faculties for functional purposes. This requires
respective levels of consciousness and subjective
aspect resulting in the unique experience of life.
Even though if consciousness is considered to be
phenomenal and primary trait, embracing the
various aspects associated with it decides the
intensity and extent of subjective experience of
life.
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