Content uploaded by Ndukuyakhe Ndlovu
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Ndukuyakhe Ndlovu on Sep 13, 2018
Content may be subject to copyright.
1 23
Archaeologies
Journal of the World Archaeological
Congress
ISSN 1555-8622
Arch
DOI 10.1007/s11759-017-9302-1
Fragmented Approach to Governance?
Critical Review of the Role Played by
Various Government Departments and
Agencies in the Administration of Heritage
Matters in South Africa
Ndukuyakhe Ndlovu
1 23
Your article is protected by copyright and
all rights are held exclusively by World
Archaeological Congress. This e-offprint is
for personal use only and shall not be self-
archived in electronic repositories. If you wish
to self-archive your article, please use the
accepted manuscript version for posting on
your own website. You may further deposit
the accepted manuscript version in any
repository, provided it is only made publicly
available 12 months after official publication
or later and provided acknowledgement is
given to the original source of publication
and a link is inserted to the published article
on Springer's website. The link must be
accompanied by the following text: "The final
publication is available at link.springer.com”.
Fragmented Approach to
Governance? Critical Review of the
Role Played by Various
Government Departments and
Agencies in the Administration of
Heritage Matters in South Africa
Ndukuyakhe Ndlovu , Department of Anthropology and Archaeology, University
of Pretoria, Pretoria, Hatfield 0083, South Africa
E-mail: ndukuyakhe@googlemail.com
ABSTRACT
________________________________________________________________
South Africa is one of the leading economic powerhouses in the African
continent. With its rising population and the National Development Plan
(NDP) aimed at repositioning South Africa, there is an increasing threat
posed by the need to sustain positive economic growth patterns and thus
create employment opportunities. As a result, various economic
development factors such as mining, manufacturing and retail industries,
and hosting of international sport games are springing around the country,
leading to tensions between the growth and socio-economic development
on the one hand and the environment on the other hand. Any opposition,
on environmental or heritage grounds, against proposed development is
thus seen as a threat to the creation of employment for the destitute
communities. One of the heritage sites that have been exposed to one of
these threats is the Mapungubwe Cultural Landscape (MCL). Of concern in
this paper is the interaction of government departments and agencies in
the administration of applications from various role players in economic
development. Thus, using the Mapungubwe case study, I provide a brief
historical background to the mining operations in the area and identify
various government departments that had a role in the approval of the
mining licence granted to Coal of Africa Limited (CoAL) by the Department
of Minerals and Energy (DME) in 2010. Furthermore, how this application for
the mining licence was dealt with in terms of coordination between the
departments and the steps taken by all stakeholders to resolve the concerns
raised is critically analysed. I conclude by offering a recommendation on a
best practise to address the evident fragmentation in the approval process
within government where heritage matters are affected.
________________________________________________________________
RESEARCH
ARCHAEOLOGIES
2017 World Archaeological Congress
Archaeologies: Journal of the World Archaeological Congress (2017)
DOI 10.1007/s11759-017-9302-1
Author's personal copy
Re
´sume
´:L’Afrique du Sud est une des plus grandes puissances
e
´conomiques du continent africain. Avec une population croissante et un
plan de de
´veloppement national visant le repositionnement de l’Afrique du
Sud, la ne
´cessite
´de pre
´server des mode
`les de croissance e
´conomique
positifs et, par la me
ˆme occasion, de cre
´er des emplois, constitue une
menace grandissante. Conse
´quemment, divers facteurs du de
´veloppement
e
´conomique, dont les secteurs de l’exploitation minie
`re, de la fabrication et
de la vente au de
´tail, l’organisation d’e
´ve
`nements sportifs mondiaux et ainsi
de suite bourgeonnent partout dans le pays, cre
´ant ainsi des tensions entre
la croissance et le de
´veloppement socioe
´conomique d’un co
ˆte
´et
l’environnement de l’autre. Toute opposition, pour des motifs
environnementaux ou patrimoniaux, au de
´veloppement propose
´est ainsi
interpre
´te
´e comme une menace pour la cre
´ation d’emplois destine
´s aux
communaute
´s dans le besoin. Un des sites patrimoniaux ayant e
´te
´expose
´s
a
`une de ces menaces est le Mapungubwe Cultural Landscape (MCL). Le
pre
´sent article se pre
´occupe de l’implication des ministe
`res et organismes
gouvernementaux dans l’administration des demandes de divers acteurs du
de
´veloppement e
´conomique. En utilisant l’e
´tude de cas de Mapungubwe, je
dresse un bref historique des activite
´s minie
`res de la re
´gion et identifie
divers ministe
`res gouvernementaux jouant un ro
ˆle dans l’approbation des
licences minie
`res accorde
´es a
`la Coal of Africal Limited (CoAL) par le
ministe
`re des Mine
´raux et de l’e
´nergie en 2010. Qui plus est, la fac¸on dont
ce processus de demande de licences minie
`res fut ge
´re
´en termes de la
coordination des ministe
`res et des e
´tapes prises par tous les intervenants
pour re
´soudre les proble
`mes souleve
´s est se
´ve
`rement analyse
´e. Je conclus
en recommandant une pratique exemplaire permettant de re
´soudre la
fragmentation e
´vidente du processus d’approbation au sein du
gouvernement lorsqu’il est question de patrimoine.
________________________________________________________________
Resumen: Suda
´frica es una de las potencias lı
´deres del continente africano.
Con su creciente poblacio
´n y el Plan de Desarrollo Nacional dirigido a
reposicionar Suda
´frica, existe una creciente amenaza planteada por la
necesidad de sustentar patrones de crecimiento econo
´mico positivos y crear
de este modo oportunidades de empleo. Como resultado, diversos factores
econo
´micos de desarrollo tales como las industrias de minerı
´a, fabricacio
´ny
minoristas, el patrocinio de juegos deportivos internacionales, etc. esta
´n
apareciendo por todo el paı
´s, llevando a tensiones entre el crecimiento y el
desarrollo socioecono
´mico por una lado, y el medioambiente por otro.
Cualquier oposicio
´n, en base al patrimonio histo
´rico o medioambiental,
contra el desarrollo propuesto es visto como una amenaza para la creacio
´n
de empleo para las comunidades desposeı
´das. Uno de los lugares
patrimonios de la humanidad que se ha visto expuesto a una de estas
N. NDLOVU
Author's personal copy
amenazas es el Paisaje Cultural de Mapungubwe (MCL). Al presente
documento le preocupa la interaccio
´n de los departamentos y agencias
gubernamentales en la administracio
´n de solicitudes de diversos actores en
el desarrollo econo
´mico. De este modo, utilizando el estudio de caso de
Mapungubwe, proporciono unos breves antecedentes histo
´ricos de las
operaciones mineras en el a
´rea e identifico a diversos departamentos
gubernamentales que tuvieron un papel en la aprobacio
´n de la licencia
minera otorgada a Coal of Africa Limited (CoAL) por el Departamento de
Minerales y Energı
´a en 2010. Asimismo, se analiza de manera crı
´tica co
´mo
se trato
´esta solicitud de licencia minera en te
´rminos de coordinacio
´n entre
los departamentos y los pasos dados por todas las partes interesadas para
resolver las preocupaciones planteadas. Concluyo ofreciendo una
recomendacio
´n sobre una mejor pra
´ctica para abordar la evidente
fragmentacio
´n en el proceso de aprobacio
´n dentro del gobierno en
aquellos casos en los que se ven afectados asuntos patrimoniales.
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
KEY WORDS
Mapungubwe,Mining,CoAL,Save Mapungubwe Coalition,DEA,DWA,
SAHRA
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Introduction
A number of World Heritage Sites around the world are under threat from
a number of factors, particularly from mining and the extraction of oil and
gas. The rising populations around the world create a demand for eco-
nomic demand. As a result, these landscapes that have been inscribed into
the exclusive World Heritage List over the years are now being identified
for other potential uses, which clashes with the ‘‘fossilisation’’ of landscapes
by the virtue of their inscription. In 2011, the IUCN reported that 24% of
37 African natural and mixed World Heritage Sites were under threat
because of commercial mining, oil and gas projects. This was an increase
of 8% from the 16% of sites that were listed as threatened in 2009.
Amongst some of the African WHS facing danger because of mining activi-
ties were: Mount Nimba Strict Nature Reserve (Cote d’Ivoire and Gui-
nea—iron ore mining), Virunga National Park (DRC—oil drilling), Selous
Game Reserve (Tanzania—uranium mining), and the Mana Pools National
Park, Sapi and Chewore Safari Areas (Zimbabwe—heavy mineral Sands
Deposits). The buffer zone boundary of the Selous Game Reserve was rea-
Fragmented Approach to Governance? Critical Review of the Role Played
Author's personal copy
ligned and approved by the World Heritage Committee at its 36th session
held in St. Petersburg, a decision that allowed uranium mining which is
due to begin in 2016.
This mining phenomenon is not only limited to the African landscape
(Cameron and Ro
¨ssler 2013). Instead, sites from Bolivia (extensive mining
activities threatening the survival of the 500-year-old Potosı
´colonial settle-
ment), England (re-mining and development projects around the Cornwall
and West Devon Mining Landscape), Yellowstone National Park (USA—gold
mining), Donana National Park (Spain—collapse of a toxic pool nearby an
inscribed site) and Kakadu National Park (Australia—uranium mining) have
also been subjected to threatening mining activities. Interestingly, none of
the threatened sites have ever been taken off the lists of WHS.
The Mapungubwe Cultural Landscape (MCL) is an area of about
28,168.66 hectares in the north of the Limpopo Province, near the conflu-
ence of the Limpopo and Shashe rivers. It is a landscape characterised by
the presence of three capital cities of archaeological significance (Shroda,
Bambandyanalo and Mapungubwe Hill) and their satellites. The location of
the MCL is a meeting point of three countries: Botswana, Zimbabwe and
South Africa. Since its ‘‘rediscovery’’ on New Year’s Eve in 1932, the land-
scape has been extensively surveyed and excavated over many years mainly
by archaeologists from the universities of Pretoria and Witwatersrand.
Their focus was particularly on the rich Iron Age of this region. Through
these efforts to intensively survey and excavate the landscape, we have
come to know of the complex society that lived in the area and had exten-
sive networks that provided a significant source of wealth. It is the knowl-
edge generated that has given the MCL a place in the international arena
as one of the World Heritage Sites (WHS). The landscape was inscribed on
the list of World Heritage Sites in 2003—meeting criteria i, iii, iv and v of
the 1972 UNESCO Convention. This was in recognition of its value as an
archaeological site that provides significant insight into southern Africa’s
early civilisation.
The significance of the MCL is defined by its interpretation as the local-
ity where a thriving Kingdom lived between the late 11th and early 13th
century. One of the three capital sites within the landscape, the Mapun-
gubwe Hill, has been identified as the first class-based Kingdom in what is
today southern Africa. However, recent findings at Mapela are questioning
the previous interpretations of Mapungubwe and the Zimbabwe culture
(see Chirikure et al. 2014; Huffman 2015), a discussion that falls beyond
the scope of this paper. The class categorisation at Mapungubwe meant
that there was segregation between ‘‘commoners’’ and those of a higher
social stratification. With a population of between 3000 and 5000 people,
the elite lived at the top of Mapungubwe Hill, while the commoners occu-
pied the bottom and the surroundings.
N. NDLOVU
Author's personal copy
One may argue that the inscription to the list of the World Heritage
Sites, informed by its historical significance, has not necessarily given the
site absolute protection. Instead, the outstanding universal value of this
landscape is now threatened by the discovery of rich minerals such as coal
and diamonds as well as the shortage of electricity in South Africa. Mapun-
gubwe is not an exception. For instance, Swaziland withdrew the Ngwenya
Middle Stone Age ochre mines from the UNESCO World Heritage Sites
nomination list in favour of reviving industrial iron ore extraction. In the
Sudan, vast stretches of cultural landscape hosting valuable and less valu-
able heritage are under threat from dam construction (Kleinitz and Naser
2011; Chirikure et al. 2014). To highlight the mining threat to MCL, I
briefly discuss the background to mining in the region.
Background to Mining in the MCL: A Focus on Vele
Colliery
When the MCL was proposed for the WHS and subsequently declared as
such in 2003, there were a number of potential threats identified. These
were development pressures—agricultural activities at three localities: those
upstream of the Park, those within the proposed Park and those down-
stream of the Park; mining (the two mining operations at the Riedel dia-
mond mine and the Venetia Mine); environmental pressures (climate
change, alien vegetation, introduction of large game); natural disasters and
preparedness (flooding and fire); and visitor and tourism pressures (inade-
quate control of visitors), environmental degradation because of the poor
local communities, especially those from Maremani in Zimbabwe, land
restitution and cross-border crime. I will limit my discussion to the devel-
opmental pressures and mining specifically. Most significantly, mining is
not a recent phenomenon in the area. Instead, mining for gold dates back
to the period when the population at Mapungubwe mined for this resource
as per the evidence found, indicating social class amongst the community
members.
When MCL was declared a World Heritage Site in 2003, there were two
mining operations nearby. These were the relatively small diamond mining
operations along the ancient river course of the Limpopo River at the farm
Riedel in the eastern part of the Park and the much larger diamond mining
operation at the Venetia Mine by De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd. The
former, which has since been abandoned, was considered to be less of a
threat to the MCL, while the latter had been subjected to the Environment
Conservation Act of 1989—thus an Environmental Impact Assessment and
Environmental Management Plan were prepared when its operations began
in 1992. A significant concern was raised, however, about the Venetia
Fragmented Approach to Governance? Critical Review of the Role Played
Author's personal copy
Mine. The bright lights of the mine, which are highly visible from many
kilometres away, were considered to have a potentially negative impact on
tourism experiences. Whether this has been the case or not has not been
studied recently and falls beyond the confines of this paper.
Noting the presence of these two mining operations, and the richness of
the Messina area in terms of mineral resources, there was always a possibil-
ity that other valuable mineral resources could be successfully prospected.
Coal is one of the mineral resources that have been found in the MCL
area. According to the EMC report (2013: 6), ‘‘Coal is vital for economic
development. It is important for electrical generation and a vital input into
steel production. Over the past 30 years coal has been the indispensable
driver of economic and social development, and around 40% of the
world’s electricity is produced using coal. Coal will have a major role in
meeting the future energy needs and the demand for coal and its vital role
in the world’s energy system is set to continue, as strong competitive forces
continue to drive coal market prices. South Africa is one country that has
potential of the world’s largest coal mine exploration. The quality of coal
produced from coal mines in South Africa is the best in the world.’’
The application by CoAL to mine coal reserves near the core area of
MCL was thus not unexpected. The Department of Minerals and Energy,
which issues prospecting and mining licences in South Africa, received an
application for a new order mining right from CoAL on the 6th of
November 2008. This new mining application for coking coal and two
types of middling products (‘‘c’’ grade coal and power station coal) was
accepted on the 27th of November 2008—with the department having
12 months to finalise this application as per the stipulating in the Mineral
and Petroleum Resources Development Act, 2002 (Act 28 of 2002). The
area identified for mining is located approximately 48 km from Musina,
the nearest town to the south-east in the Vhembe District Municipality, on
the northern border of South Africa and Zimbabwe on the Limpopo River.
The eastern boundary of the MCL is situated approximately 7 km to the
west of the mining area and 35 km from the Mapungubwe Hill, the core
of the WHS to the west.
CoAL proposed that the first phase of the project be an open-cast min-
ing on the east and west pits for a period of five (5) years, while the sec-
ond phase would include underground mining on the east and west areas
for a period of twenty-four (24) years, thus bringing the total life of the
whole mining project to an estimated 29 years. According to CoAL’s Chief
Engineer of the mining operations, the decision by the company to ‘‘mine
underground near the Limpopo River in the north-west is to protect the
large commercial citrus farms in that area, which would be destroyed by
open cast mining…they see no economic interest in what they called the
‘dry bush land’ over the rest of the site, they are choosing to undertake
N. NDLOVU
Author's personal copy
opencast mining in those areas’’ (UNESCO/ICOMOS mission report 2012:
39–40). The area is estimated to contain approximately 721 Mt of coal. In
its original plans, CoAL intended to build a power station at the colliery
and considered rail link between Musina and the mining plant to transport
coal directly from the mining source to various destinations. The latter was
considered more destructive to environment and thus abandoned. Follow-
ing months of disagreements over the mining licence given to CoAL, which
I discuss in detail below, it was alleged that the Chinese were unhappy with
the quality of the coal produced (http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/mining/
2013/10/27/coal-seals-bee-deal-to-push-its-projects, accessed on 13 March
2016). I now review the management of the mining right application made
by CoAL to the Department of Minerals and Energy. The aim of this
review is to highlight the fragmentation in the management of mining
applications in general, but with specific reference to this application by
CoAL.
A number of government departments and their agencies were involved,
directly and indirectly, in the review of this application. Amongst these
were the Department of Minerals and Energy (DME, approving depart-
ment); Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA, approval of environ-
mental authorisations), Department of Arts and Culture (DAC,
commenting department—through its agency—the South African Heritage
Resources Agency) and the Department of Water Affairs (DWA, approval
of the water licence).
Department of Mineral Resources
Following public consultation, as defined in the Mineral and Petroleum
Resources Development Act, 2002, the DME granted an unconditional new
order mining right to CoAL on the 02nd of February 2010 and approved
its Environmental Management Programme (EMP) just over a month later,
on the 19th of March 2010. These approvals enabled CoAL to conduct
mining activities on the Farms Overvlakte 125 MS (Portion 3, 4, 5, 6, 13,
Remainder), Bergen Op Zoom 124 MS, Semple 155 MS and Voorspoed
836 MS—the extent of which is 8663 ha. Based on these approvals, and
without having secured a water licence and environmental authorisations,
CoAL began with their mining operations. This was in direct contravention
of NEMA. On the 05th August 2010, and in terms of Section 31 of
National Environmental Management Act, 1998 (Act 107 of 1998), the
DEA issued a Compliance Notice against these mining activities that con-
travened environmental legislation. Amongst the contraventions, CoAL
removed vegetation, constructed roads, a sludge dam and installed a water
pipeline network and constructed an above-ground storage of dangerous
Fragmented Approach to Governance? Critical Review of the Role Played
Author's personal copy
goods. According to Section 24F of the National Environmental Manage-
ment Act, it is an offence to commence an EIA-listed activity without an
environmental authorisation and such action is, upon conviction, liable to a
fine not exceeding R5 million or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding
10 years or to both such fine and such imprisonment. After the issuing of this
Compliance Notice, CoAL was required to submit applications for rectification
in terms of Section 24G of National Environmental Management Act in
respect of listed activities that commenced without any environmental
approval. Subsequently, all mining operations were ceased on the 06 August
2010. CoAL thus lodged a first application for the rectification of unlawful
commencement of activities in terms of Section 24G of NEMA (listed activi-
ties 1 (m), 12, 15 and 16b of GN R.386 and listed activities 2 and 6 of GN R.
387) on the 03rd of September 2010. A second application for the rectification
of unlawful commencement of activities, also in terms of Section 24G of
NEMA, was lodged on the 04th of January 2011. The company successfully
received environmental authorisations on the 5th of July 2011 (for the first
application) and 31st of October 2011 (for the second application).
Department of Water and Sanitation
In terms of the National Water Act, 1998 (Act 36 of 1998), CoAL was
granted a five-year Integrated Water Use License (IWUL) for Phase 1
(open-cast mining). The Department of Water Affairs (DWA, now Depart-
ment of Water and Sanitation) approved this licence on the 29th of March
2011. However, this licence was suspended by the Minister of DWA a few
months later, in July 2011, following an appeal that had been lodged
against the mining company. The Minister, however, reinstated the licence
after rejecting the appeal against the issuing of the water licence. The
amended Integrated Water Use License (IWUL) was issued on the 18th of
July 2011, thus lifting the previous suspension. The amended integrated
Water Use License was granted on 18 July 2011.
South African Heritage Resources Agency (SAHRA)
The SAHRA, in the letter dated the 16th of July 2009, expressed two con-
cerns regarding the then proposed mining to the east of the Mapungubwe
National Park, (i) mentioning that it could have negative impact to the
WHS it defined as an icon representing African renaissance and (ii)
expressed concern against the industrialisation of the surroundings of the
WHS. The latter was informed by knowledge that other than the mining
operations then proposed by the CoAL, Universal Coal (which owns the
Bernice coking coal project) and Anglo Coal had also begun prospecting
N. NDLOVU
Author's personal copy
for coal on farms along the WHS and a consortium of business people
were considering a plan to construct a power station (Mulilo) alongside
the then proposed mine operations by CoAL (http://www.news24.com/
SouthAfrica/News/Mine-could-destroy-Mapungubwe-20100511—accessed on
11 March 2016). To fully assess the impact of the mining operations on her-
itage, SAHRA decided that a thorough Heritage Impact Assessment (HIA)
was required. This HIA was heavily criticised, mainly because it was deemed
to be an Archaeological Impact Assessment (AIA) rather than an HIA. Even
as an AIA, this impact assessment still had limitations. While I acknowledge
these concerns, I have previously argued (see Ndlovu 2014)thatmany
impact assessment reports in South Africa claim to be fully assessing the
heritage impact when this is not the case, yet, similar complaints from the
archaeological community are not raised. Nevertheless, it is critical to note
that CoAL had enlisted the services of a heritage specialist to undertake the
HIA as per the requirement of SAHRA. The quality of the product falls
beyond the remit of CoAL.
According to CoAL, the fact that mining activities were mentioned in
the Mapungubwe Management Plan submitted for the nomination of the
site as the WHS, reflected the possibility for heritage and mining to coexist.
This view was criticised by those opposed to mining operations. For
instance, the Association of Southern African Professional Archaeologists
(ASAPA) argued that ‘‘Mapungubwe is both a place of archaeological and
historical significance and a powerful national symbol: the Order of
Mapungubwe is one of South Africa’s highest honours. The sustainability
of the MCL as a successful World Heritage Site within an industrial land-
scape is, however, questionable.’’ The concern by ASAPA against the indus-
trialisation of the surroundings of the WHS echoed the similar complaint
raised by SAHRA. In the recent past, such concerns have been confirmed:
the entire area north of the Soutpansberg, including Mapungubwe, has
been identified for the mining of coal and the construction of power sta-
tions. Considering the lack of coordination between government depart-
ments and agencies, this should yet again be a significant concern.
While there had not been any opposition against the prospecting licence
obtained by CoAL, the same did not happen with their successful applica-
tion for a mining right. Instead, opposition to the Vele Colliery began to
gain momentum in the middle of 2009 when the Mapungubwe Action
Group (MAG) was formed. The MAG was composed of local stakeholders
such as game lodge owners, farmers and indigenous communities, all uni-
ted to protect the WHS and its immediate surroundings. Soon, and largely
through the efforts of the late Nick Hiltermann, the threat against Mapun-
gubwe landscape was brought to the attention of the Endangered Wildlife
Trust, a number of other environmental and archaeological organisations,
and conservationists.
Fragmented Approach to Governance? Critical Review of the Role Played
Author's personal copy
A number of these organisations (the Mapungubwe Action Group, the
Endangered Wildlife Trust, the Association of Southern African Profes-
sional Archaeologists, Peace Parks Foundation, World Wide Fund for Nat-
ure South Africa, BirdLife South Africa and the Wilderness Foundation
South Africa) came together to establish the Save Mapungubwe Coalition.
This coalition subsequently filed an appeal on the 13th of May 2010 and
an interdict on the 3rd of August 2010 against the mine’s various authori-
sations. This appeal followed that of the ASAPA that had been lodged in
March 2010 against the granting of the mining permit because such deci-
sion failed to consider the impact on the cultural and natural environment.
The interdict launched on the 3rd of August 2010 against CoAL and the
Minister of Mineral Resources was led pro-bono on behalf of the Save
Mapungubwe Coalition by the Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS) of
the University of the Witwatersrand. The CALS, based at the School of
Law at the University of the Witwatersrand, was established in 1978 as a
civil society organisation whose primary objective was at one stage to chal-
lenge apartheid laws through research and education. This civil organisa-
tion, whose mandate has expanded to include public interest litigation,
promotes human rights. By launching the appeal and interdict, the ‘‘Coali-
tion campaign sought to hold both the company, and government to their
obligations under environmental law (CALS, p: 46).’’ In a broader sense,
failure to defend the social, environmental and cultural aspects impacted as
a result of the Vele Colliery ‘‘could have opened the floodgates to the
excessive and unsustainable proliferation of mining activity in the province
(CALS p: 46).’’ Besides concerns raised by SAHRA and the Save Mapun-
gubwe Coalition, the Department of Environmental Affairs had also raised
strong concerns about the colliery particularly because no environmental
authorisations had been applied for, meaning that environmental impacts
would not have been properly assessed. Considering the international sig-
nificance of MCL and its inscription as a WHS, UNESCO got involved to
establish how we could move forward without compromising the signifi-
cance of the site. I now critically review the role played by UNESCO in
resolving the crisis stage.
The Role of the World Heritage Committee
At its 34th Session held in Brasilia in 2010, the World Heritage Committee
was alerted the controversy surrounding the granting of the mining permit
to CoAL. Subsequently, the WHC called for a joint World Heritage Cen-
tre/ICOMOS reactive monitoring mission to visit South Africa. This reac-
tive joint mission took place between the 13th and 17th of November
2010. Amongst other activities, the UNESCO/ICOMOS mission conducted
N. NDLOVU
Author's personal copy
an aerial survey (over the core area of the World Heritage Site, the Vele
Colliery, the buffer zone area and the Venetia mine), a tour to a number
of sites within the colliery—and studied maps and plans pertaining to the
Vele Colliery mining, meetings with a wide and representative range of
stakeholders. The report expressed a number of concerns. I focus on two
such concerns, namely (i) the reform of the legal framework on mining (in
order to ensure that applications for mineral prospecting and mining
respect the Outstanding Universal Value of the World Heritage property
and its setting) and the (ii) finalisation of the buffer zone. The buffer zone
gazetted by South Africa in 2009, under the South African World Heritage
Act of 1999, was not matching the buffer zone envisioned in the nomina-
tion dossier of 2003. The nomination dossier did not clearly provide a buf-
fer zone; instead, an area of around 100,000 ha that could potentially serve
as a buffer zone (inclusive of Venetia-Limpopo Nature Reserve, Vhembe
Nature Reserve and Limpopo Valley Game Reserve) was identified. It thus
seems that the World Heritage Committee did not approve the buffer zone
when the site was inscribed in 2003. As a result, by 2010 when this
UNESCO/ICOMOS visited South Africa, there was no buffer zone on the
east side of the WHS—thus meaning a ‘‘free zone’’ between the world her-
itage property and the Vele Colliery. Amongst the recommendations made,
the State Party had to provide a revised Heritage Impact Assessment to
UNESCO, and South Africa committed to doing so. This revised assess-
ment had its Terms of Reference drafted from the ICOMOS Guidance on
Heritage Impact Assessments for Cultural World Heritage.
During its 35th session held in Paris in 2011, where the report of the
first mission was considered, it was decided that another joint WHC/ICO-
MOS reactive monitoring must be undertaken. This mission was initially
planned for 20–25 November 2011 but was postponed following a request
from ICOMOS for more time to review the revised HIA prior to the mis-
sion. Terms of Reference for the second UNESCO/ICOMOS mission were
almost similar to those of the first mission.
Later in the same year and prior to the second UNESCO/ICOMOS mis-
sion, the Save Mapungubwe Coalition—which had used internal depart-
mental appeals by individual coalition members and litigation—decided to
revise its strategy in October 2011. The decision to suspend litigation and
begin negotiations was taken on the 20th of October 2011. This change in
approach was informed by three main factors: (i) government departments
had offered a water licence and environmental authorisations thus indicat-
ing that irregularities by CoAL had now been addressed; (ii) the construc-
tion of the mine was nearing completion and this meant that the prospects
of a successful legal challenge had dissipated; and (iii) litigation was
becoming a financial burden to Save Mapungubwe Coalition members.
Following negotiations with CoAL, a Memorandum of Understanding
Fragmented Approach to Governance? Critical Review of the Role Played
Author's personal copy
(MoU) was reached in November 2011, publicly announced on the 24th of
November 2011 (CALS 2015). This MoU set the frame for negotiations
and the 31st of January 2012 was the deadline to reach a Memorandum of
Agreement (MoA).
The joint UNESCO/ICOMOS mission visited South Africa between the
17th and 21st of January 2012 (Mketeni 2012). Members of this mis-
sion—Lazare Eloundou (World Heritage Centre) and Dag Avango (ICO-
MOS)—had to consider a number of aspects: (i) the revised Heritage
Impact Assessment (HIA) submitted to UNESCO by the Department of
Environmental Affairs on 25 November 2011, (ii) the potential impact of
the proposed large-scale coal mining to the east of the property, (iii) pro-
gress with the delimitation of a buffer zone to the east of the property and
(iv) the overall state of conservation of the property. The mission noted in
its report that neighbouring communities—Tshivhula Royal Family,
Leshiba Royal Family, Machete Royall Family, Vhangona cultural move-
ment—complained that the mining company failed to consult with them
accordingly and in particular failed to give them a stake of ownership.
Interestingly, Venetia mine—which will be opening an underground pit
extending the life of the diamond mine until 2042—is fully owned by the
De Beers Consolidated Mines, with no stake by local communities. There
is no evidence that these local communities have claimed a stake. The
Machete representative importantly noted that the revised HIA fails to con-
sider that the ‘‘Vele colliery is located in a zone where anti-apartheid fight-
ers struggled with the South African army during the 1960s and 1970s.
During those years, Umkhonto We Sizwe (Spear of the nation), the mili-
tary forces of the ANC, attacked the military forces of the apartheid state
from bases across the border in Zimbabwe and Botswana…these liberation
fighters died and were buried among other places in the Vele mining area
(UNESCO 2012).’’ My analysis of this omission in the HIA is that it had
no significant bearing on whether the mine could be allowed to proceed or
not.
The mission recommended that the 2009 buffer zone should be formally
increased to incorporate the 7 km stretch east of the property so as to
include the whole area envisaged at the time of inscription and noted that
this stood in opposition to the HIA’s recommendation to even reduce the
current national buffer zone. This second mission expressed concerns that
(i) communities had not been appropriately consulted, and (ii) there were
inconsistencies with the revised Heritage Impact Assessment. For instance,
according to the mission the revised HIA did not adequately follow the
methodology recommended in the ICOMOS Guidance on Heritage Impact
Assessment even though such is claimed. The mission further noted that
while South Africa was supposed to submit this revised buffer zone to the
World Heritage Committee as a necessary step in the Retrospective State-
N. NDLOVU
Author's personal copy
ment of OUV, this was never done. Arguing against the gazetted buffer
zone of 2009 and the recommendation in the revised HIA to reduce the
2009 buffer zone, the mission recommended an increase of this conserva-
tion area to incorporate the seven kilometre stretch east of the property.
The question of why it took many years for the buffer zone to be well
defined after the inscription of the MCL was never addressed by the mis-
sion. This would have been an opportunity for UNESCO/ICOMOS to take
joint responsibility for the lack thereof of certainly as to the confines of the
buffer zone. It was not just the UNESCO/ICOMOS mission critical of this
revised HIA, ASAPA was too and provided a detailed analysis that laid the
ground for their dissatisfaction.
As mentioned earlier, this second mission and the consideration of its
report by the World Heritage Committee was during a period where the
Save Mapungubwe Coalition and CoAL had reached an agreement. How-
ever, by the middle of 2012, the Memorandum of Agreement (MoA) ended
because according to the Save Mapungubwe Coalition, CoAL had failed on
a number of fronts: (i) construction of a dam against authorisation, (ii) an
inability to disclose other significant information (ie detailed impacts on
water courses that were not covered by the water licence and not disclosed
to the Coalition), (iii) concerns raised by the Department of Environmen-
tal Affairs and (iv) failure to meet deadlines that had been agreed to (CALS
2015). CoAL was formally notified in September 2012 that the Save
Mapungubwe Coalition was withdrawing from the MoU. While the MoA
with CoAL was not successful, the Save Mapungubwe Coalition was
granted full membership of the Vele Colliery Environmental Management
Committee (EMC) at the meeting held on the 31st of October 2012. The
EMC had been established to ensure compliance with relevant legislation.
It came into existence following the Memorandum of Agreement (MoA)
was entered into between the CoAL and the Department of Environmental
Affairs—bringing the former to comply with the conditions of the MoA
which included full compliance with all relevant legislation and develop-
ment of biodiversity offsets. It is expected that the biodiversity offsets
agreement, which was signed on the 27th of September 2013, will amongst
others enable MCL to establish projects to manage archaeological sites and
develop key infrastructure within the Park.
The unprecedented decision to grant the Coalition with membership of
the EMC allowed a civil society (for the first time) to have a seat at the
governing table. Through its active participation in the Vele Colliery Envi-
ronmental Management Committee (EMC), Coalition members have,
therefore, had a platform to continue holding the CoAL for the successful
implementation of legislative authorisations even after the failure of the
agreement signed with the mining company (CALS 2015).
Fragmented Approach to Governance? Critical Review of the Role Played
Author's personal copy
Up to this far, I have briefly considered the history of mining in the
Mapungubwe surroundings and, in particular, recent mining activities by
CoAL. I further identified the relevant government departments in the
administration of mining application by CoAL as well as the role UNESCO
played in resoling concerns raised against the then proposed mining. Inter-
estingly, UNESCO/ICOMOS mission failed to take responsibility for the
troubles that ensued as it failed to ensure that there was a buffer zone for
the MCL at the inscription stage. In the next section, I shall critically
review the roles of the government departments and their agencies and
UNESCO in the following section. The intention of this review is to high-
light the fragmented nature in the management of heritage and environ-
ment in South Africa. I conduct the review by assessing the management
of the mining application by CoAL from prospecting stage to mining. I
begin by focusing on the relationship between DMR and DEA in terms of
managing environmental authorisations for mining applications. I then
focus on the NHRA in terms of who has the authority for the heritage
functions in relation to the Vele Colliery. I conclude this review by criti-
cally focusing on the role played by UNESCO in the trouble that ensued
following the application for mining right by CoAL. This review will lay
the foundation for the recommendations on how to address this fragmen-
tation.
Conflict Between DMR and DEA Legislation
According to the litigation affidavit by the Coalition, the Director General
of Department of Minerals Resources (DMR) should not have, given the
sensitivity of the area, approved the proposed mining until getting the sat-
isfaction that all comments received at the application stage have been pos-
itively addressed by CoAL. This view is informed by Section 39(4)(b)(ii) of
the Minerals Act which stipulates that the Minister (or the one with the
delegated responsibility) is obliged to consider comments from other State
Departments before making a final decision. Section 40 stipulates how that
consultation should be facilitated—stating that the Head of Department of
the relevant government department consulted must provide written com-
ments within 60 days of being requested for such.
While responding to a parliamentary questioned asked by a Democratic
Alliance Parliamentary representative (question by Mr M Swart to the Min-
ister of Minerals and Energy), the DME confirmed its responsibility to
consult with the relevant stakeholders in their decision-making processes.
In that written reply, the department stated that: Section 40(1) of the Min-
erals and Petroleum Resources Development Act, requires that the Minister of
Minerals and Energy ‘‘consult with any State Department which administers
N. NDLOVU
Author's personal copy
any law relating to matters affecting the environment.’’ Since the adjudica-
tion of this application, which was only lodged on the 6th of November 2009,
has not been concluded yet, the Department is in the process of consulting
with the Department of Economic Development and Tourism, the Department
of Water Affairs, the Department of Agriculture and SAHRA. DEAT has sub-
mitted its comments on the Scoping Report. The Environmental Management
Programme is expected to be submitted by 26 May 2009. The expectation,
therefore, would have been that DMR would not issue the mining right
licence unless satisfied that all South African legislation have been appro-
priately addressed by CoAL. This, however, did not happen. The DMR
decision to approve was informed by the revised EMP submitted by
CoAL—which had still been objected to by DEA. This revised EMP had
failed to address comments and objections received from interested parties,
other government departments, organs of state, etc. When CoAL began its
mining operations without the water licence, it announced on the Tuesday
12th of March 2011, through its consultation company Brunswick, that
‘‘the Department of Mining gave CoAL ‘unconditional’ approval to start
building its Vele coal mine. Therefore, CoAL does not believe it is acting
illegally. The company is doing the preparation work while waiting for the
approval of the water licence.’’
One of the potential reasons why the DMR may have a poor record in
implementing Section 39 of the Minerals Act is that this legislation does
give the Mineral Resources Minister the power to implement environmen-
tal authority—thus requiring companies to develop environmental manage-
ment programmes and rehabilitate mining sites. As a result, the DMR has
‘‘traditionally adopted the stance that the obtaining of a mining right or
permit (collectively referred to hereafter as ‘mining right’) trumped the
need for any other authorisation required by any other law’’ (Naidoo
and Truter 2014;http://www.werksmans.com/legal-briefs-view/struggle-
achieve-cooperative-governance-continues/, accessed on 12 March 2016).
This was, thus, in contrast to the expectations by DEA that mining compa-
nies had to comply with other licensing requirements such as the issuance
of water use licences, approvals pertaining to heritage resources, atmo-
spheric licences and waste licences in addition to environmental authorisa-
tions. In other words, both DMR and DEA had environmental powers,
meaning that mining companies must submit their applications to both, a
process that delays mining applications.
The South African National Parliament initiated discussions between the
two departments, which successfully led to the agreement that the environ-
mental regulation of mining would be managed by the DEA under
NEMA—thus replacing the ‘‘inferior system of environmental regulation of
mining under the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act,
2002 (MPRDA). The environmental regulation of mining would therefore
Fragmented Approach to Governance? Critical Review of the Role Played
Author's personal copy
be the same as it is for all other industries—a simple and self-evident
proposition.’’ (http://cer.org.za/news/as-new-environmental-laws-for-mines-
start-coming-into-effect-confusion-reigns, accessed 12 March 2016). Fol-
lowing this agreement for a ‘‘One Environmental System,’’ the two depart-
ments promulgated the NEMA Amendment Act 62 of 2008 (NEMAA
2008) and the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Amendment
Act 49 of 2008 (MPRDAA 2008). In the meantime, and to manage the
transition to DEA having the full mandate to implement NEMA in min-
ing-related applications, an 18-month transitional period for the environ-
mental function to transfer from the MPRDA to NEMA was incorporated
into the agreement. This meant that the DMR would serve as an environ-
mental authority for mining operations until the end of the 18-month per-
iod—at the point which the MPRDAA 2008 would commence, and
environmental management for all DMR applications getting transferred to
NEMA. According to Tracy Humble, the Associate Professor of Law at the
University of the Witwatersrand, while the proposed changes provided an
improvement in the coordination of mining applications, there was
another concern that ‘‘The legislation is also largely in favour of the busi-
ness community, but provides fewer opportunities for public engagement,
and the right to appeal decisions is significantly curtailed.’’ (http://www.
miningweekly.com/article/impending-enviro-legislation-to-settle-turf-war-
between-dmr-dea-2014-09-04, accessed on 12 March 2016). Unfortunately,
the stand-off between the two departments is yet to be resolved because of
the confusion created by the many amendments.
The lack of cooperation between the two departments has not only been
limited to disagreements over which governance structure has power to
approve environmental authorisations. However, the recent delay by the
DEA to declare the revised buffer zone is a classic example of a stand-off
between the two departments. The DEA Minister has been waiting for a
long time now to have the DMR Minister offer comments on the new buf-
fer zone. Back in 2014, the spokesperson for the then DEA Minister, Son-
jica Ratau, once said that the DEA Minister ‘‘is ‘struggling’ to make time
in her ‘busy schedule’ to speak to Shabangu (DMR Minister) about her
disapproval of CoAL’s plans and alleged transgressions of all environmental
laws.’’ While this could be interpreted as failure by the DEA Minister to
deliver on her mandate, it could also serve as an indication of the strained
relationship between the departments. The stand-off between the two
departments is not helpful at all. When Jeremy Michaels, then spokesper-
son for the DMR, was asked for a response, he failed to do so after
repeated attempts to contact him. It is noticeable how less vocal the
department has been, while the challenge against the mining right it issued
to CoAL was wrangling over the years.
N. NDLOVU
Author's personal copy
Now that I have highlighted the tensions between the DMR and DEA in
the review of mining-related applications, I wish to shift my attention to
the implementation of heritage legislation in similar applications. This will
further highlight more challenges within the governance structure of the
South African government.
Implementation of Heritage Legislation
Prior to 1999, South African heritage legislation was largely untransformed
and had been in operation since the National Monuments Act was passed
in 1969. The National Heritage Resources Act (NHRA) of 1999 was thus
heralded as a new and transformed legislation. One of the major differ-
ences from its predecessor is that the NHRA promoted a three-tier
approach in managing heritage resources in South Africa: national, provin-
cial and local levels (Deacon 1997: 3; Deacon and Deacon 1999; Kotze and
van Rensburg 2002; Ndlovu 2011a,b,2014; Scheermeyer 2005). This
approach mirrors the structure of government in the country and repre-
sented a deviation from how heritage was managed under the National
Monuments Act (no. 28 of 1969). The main aim of the three-tier system is
to decentralise the management of cultural resources, thus fostering the
participation of communities. The South African Heritage Resources
Agency (SAHRA) is the national authority tasked with the management of
Grade I heritage resources, Grade II heritage resources are the responsibil-
ity of Provincial Heritage Resources Authorities (PHRAs), while local
municipalities have the mandate over sites of local significance and those
that have not been graded. This is where the confusion begins.
Two of the heritage sites within the MCL and accompanying cultural
artefacts were proclaimed as National Monuments and National Cultural
Treasure, respectively, under the NMA: K2 was declared on the 9th of
September 1983 in Government Gazette Notice No. 1936, Mapungubwe
Hill and the adjacent southern terrace were declared on the 17th of August
1984 in Government Gazette Notice No. 1756, and the collection of cul-
tural artefacts associated with the settlements at Mapungubwe and K2 were
declared a National Cultural Treasure on 10 October 1997 in Government
Gazette Notice No. 1306 (Nomination Dossier: 40). When the NMA was
repealed on 1 April 2000 and replaced by the National Heritage Resources
Act (Act No. 25 of 1999), all previously declared National Monuments
automatically became Provincial Heritage Sites. Their management, there-
fore, was no longer a national but a provincial competency.
In the case of Limpopo Province, where the MCL is located, the provin-
cial heritage authority established under Section 23 of the NHRA is the
Limpopo Provincial Heritage Resources Authority (LIHRA). At the time of
Fragmented Approach to Governance? Critical Review of the Role Played
Author's personal copy
application by CoAL, LIHRA did not have the competency to administer
over such applications, a status that has not changed to date. Normal
expectation would be that in the event where LIHRA is not able to fulfil
its mandate, SAHRA should take over it functions. However, this cannot
be so unless there is an agency agreement between LIHRA and SAHRA in
which the functions of the former are handed to the latter. There was no
such agreement in place when Vele Colliery applied for the mining right.
This application also came at a time where LIHRA had all but ceased to
exist, with its Council not having been appointed by the MEC to replace
the one that had finished its terms in office. The current LIHRA Council
was only appointed towards the end of 2015. An agency agreement
between LIHRA and SAHRA was only signed in mid-2016. It can be
argued, therefore, that when SAHRA took over LIHRA’s functions, this
was an illegal move. Nevertheless, and as mentioned earlier, SAHRA had
expressed concern with regard to the possible industrialisation of the MCL
and asked CoAL to conduct a Heritage Impact Assessment. The first HIA
of 2009 was conducted by R & R Cultural Resource Consultants and the
subsequent revised HIA undertaken by Siyathembana Trading 923 (Pty)
Ltd in 2012. As mentioned earlier, the revised HIA was carried out follow-
ing the intervention by the UNESCO/ICOMOS mission. Both these HIAs
were reviewed by SAHRA. Considering the ongoing threat of mining on
heritage resources in Limpopo Province, SAHRA has made it one of its
major priorities to strengthen LIHRA. The aim is to ensure that the insti-
tution can be capacitated to protect heritage resources in the province as
per the National Heritage Resources Act.
Discussion
I would argue that the inscription of the MCL on the World Heritage Site
list, which is meant to protect the integrity and authenticity of the site for
future generations, did not provide the necessary framework within which
this could happen. Thus, this shortcoming allowed for the approval of coal
mining not too far from the MCL. What was the role of UNESCO in this
failure to provide necessary framework for the protection of this WHS? In
aiming to understand the role of UNESCO in the whole Vele Colliery
debacle, a number of questions come to the fore: Why did UNESCO not
ensure that the buffer zone is clearly delineated? Did they fail in their
duties to promote effective management of WHS? It would also seem that
the archaeological community went into a ‘‘lull’’ between 2003 when the
site was inscribed and 2010 when it got threatened by the mine. Had this
not been the case, archaeologists would have raised concerns about the
N. NDLOVU
Author's personal copy
buffer zone for the eastern portion of the World Heritage Site. The buffer
zone is one of the most vital tools in managing World Heritage Sites.
At the time of nomination as a WHS in 2003, ICOMOS had not recom-
mend Mapungubwe for inscription. Meskell (2011,2012,2014) has elo-
quently discussed the diplomatic pressure the World Heritage Committee
always finds itself under. For instance, when ICOMOS rejected the nomi-
nation of Mapungubwe, South Africa was a member of the World Heritage
Committee. It was serving together with Russia and India who were later
on going to be BRICS partners. What we are seeing, therefore, are ‘‘signs
of increased politicisation of the World Heritage processes, a backlash
against eurocentrism, and reduced respect for expertise generally and the
authority of the Advisory Bodies in particular’’ (Buckley 2014: 43; see also
M’Bow, as quoted by Cameron and Ro
¨ssler 2011: 48, 2013).
Conflicting Views on the Listing of Mapungubwe
At the time of the nomination as the WHS, MCL was known as the
Vhembe Dongola National Park and was managed in terms of the National
Environmental Management Protected Areas Act (no. 57 of 2003). Accord-
ing to the nomination dossier, the site is made up of a core area of
28,168.66 ha (the Vhembe Dongola National Park), with a buffer zone
made up of three properties (Venetia Limpopo Nature Reserve, Vhembe
Nature Reserve and the Limpopo Valley Game Reserve). Altogether,
Vhembe Dongola National Park and these three properties total 100,000
hectares and not a buffer zone of 100,000 ha as stated in the ICOMOS
evaluation report. South Africa later argued that this buffer zone was never
going to serve any of the UNESCO purposes for such a protective area
because the country had included all the properties whose owners showed
a positive desire to be included in the WHS buffer. There is a valid point
to this argument. Significantly, no maps are provided either in the nomi-
nation dossier or in the ICOMOS reports. South Africa has argued that
while ICOMOS had recommended that the nomination be deferred, its
evaluation report did not clearly stipulate the lack of a clear buffer zone as
one of the issues to be addressed, while the site is deferred. I wish to differ
with this view. The first reason provided by the evaluation report is that
an updated Management Plan must be provided by South Africa. A thor-
oughly considered Management Plan has to address the issue of buffer
zone so there was no need to single out the buffer zone in the evaluation
report. The second reason referred to the need to finalise contractual dis-
cussions with owners of the three nature reserves (Venetia Limpopo Nature
Reserve, Vhembe Nature Reserve and the Limpopo Valley Game Reserve).
Acknowledging that these were to form the buffer zone in the nomination
Fragmented Approach to Governance? Critical Review of the Role Played
Author's personal copy
dossier, it is quite clear therefore that the finalisation of these negotiations
would have been a direct response to satisfying the need for the buffer
zone. South Africa is the only country that has proclaimed the 1972 World
Heritage legislation within its own legal system—by promulgating the
World Heritage Convention Act (no. 49 of 1999). This legislation requires
that any property inscribed on the World Heritage List should be nation-
ally proclaimed as a World Heritage Site. South Africa took six years to
address this legal requirement, eventually proclaiming the aforementioned
properties of the buffer zone, on the 30th of January 2009, together with
the core area as a World Heritage Site—with the eastern boundary of the
MCL being the Farm Riedel 48 MS. By now, CoAL had successfully pros-
pected for coal and applied for the mining right on the 06th of November
2008, about 2 months before the proclamation of the buffer zone. The
mining area was now clearly outside the buffer zone and therefore could
be approved without much trouble. It was eventually approved just over a
year later, and this led to a number of appeals and a court interdict as dis-
cussed earlier.
Could it be possible, therefore, that South Africa was not finalising the
buffer zone and providing maps because the country already had knowl-
edge about mining rights applications in the east of the WHS? There is a
big possibility that such an understanding had already existed. Further-
more, is it a coincidence that CoAL applied for their prospecting licence in
2008 and subsequently a mining right licence the following year, which is
the same year (2009) South Africa finalised a buffer zone?
Conclusion
The review of the manner in which governance structures managed the
application by the CoAL clearly highlights the fragmentation in the general
management of mining applications. I further illustrated that the agree-
ment between DEA and DMR has failed to address the problems identified.
I am of the view that the better solution in facilitating developmental-
linked applications of whatever kind is for the departments of DMR,
DWA, DEA, DAC to be collapsed into one governance structure and be
renamed as the Planning Department. Besides improving the efficiency of
decision-making, it would assist government to ensure that decision-mak-
ing within the framework of the envisaged One Environmental System
becomes a reality. At an international level, had the UNESCO World Her-
itage Committee ensured that the buffer zone was successfully provided at
inscriptions, thus accepting ICOMOS’s recommendation for deferment of
the nomination, we could not have had the legal wrangling that followed
the approval of the mining right by CoAL. UNESCO later sent two mis-
N. NDLOVU
Author's personal copy
sions to assess the impact of large-scale coal mining in the area, a problem
that could not have arisen in the first place had the professional views of
the advisory body been considered.
Reflecting on the advice by the Endangered Wildlife Trust—privileging
‘‘development,’’ (which benefit a few over the short term), over conserva-
tion led to Gauteng facing the acid mine drainage crisis. According to
Endangered Wildlife Trust, we thus cannot afford similar errors. Consider-
ing that the jobs that were promised by CoAL have not materialised, should
this advice be ringing in our ears, prompting us to be against this and other
similar mines? At its application stage, Limpopo stated that it shall employ
826 permanent employees resulting in an impact on the direct livelihood of
approximately 1495 people. However, only 342 people were employed when
the mine began retrenching. There were approximately 49 people still
employed at the end of the retrenchment process. Who has been the biggest
loser? The communities that never attained the promised jobs? CoAL that
has faced mounting legal and financial challenges because of its mining
activities? And who has been the greatest benefactor? The communities
whose ‘‘heritage’’ has been saved? The Save Mapungubwe Coalition that
was a pillar stone in the battle against mining activities failing to adhere to
environmental and water authorisations? I intentionally do not provide
answers to these questions, but leave them to readers for their views.
Acknowledgements
This research was supported through funding from the Research Develop-
ment Fund of the University of Pretoria. This paper has benefited from
discussions with Pascall Taruvinga, Innocent Pikirayi, Webber Ndoro and
Ashton Sinamai. I take responsibility for the manner in which the ideas are
presented and acknowledge that they may not fully agree with other state-
ments made.
Compliance with Ethical Standards
Conflict of interest The authors declare that they have no conflict
of interest.
References
Buckley, KI
2014. The World Heritage Convention at 40: Challenges for the Work of ICO-
MOS. Historic Environment 26(2):38–52.
Fragmented Approach to Governance? Critical Review of the Role Played
Author's personal copy
CALS
2015. The Mapungubwe Story: A Campaign for Change. https://www.wits.ac.za/
media/wits-university/faculties-and-schools/commerce-law-and-management/
research-entities/cals/documents/Mapungubwe%20Report%20Updated%
2019%20March%202015.pdf Accessed 29 August 2016.
Cameron, C, and M Ro
¨ssler
2011. Voices of the Pioneers: UNESCO’s World Heritage Convention 1972–
2000. Journal of Cultural Heritage Management and Sustainable Develop-
ment 1(1):42–54.
2013. Many Voices, One Vision: The Early Years of the World Heritage Conven-
tion. Ashgate Publishing Limited, Surrey.
Chirikure, A, M Manyanga, AM Pollard, F Bandama, G Mahachi, and I Pikirayi
2014. Zimbabwe Culture Before Mapungubwe: New Evidence from Mapela Hill,
South–Western Zimbabwe. PLOS ONE 9(10):e111224.
Deacon, J
1997. South Africa’s New Heritage Legislation. World Archaeological Congress
Newsletter 5(1):3.
Deacon, HJ, and J Deacon
1999. Human Beginnings in South Africa: Uncovering the Secrets of the Stone Age.
David Philip Publishers, Johannesburg and Cape Town.
Huffman, T
2015. Mapela, Mapungubwe and the Origins of States in Southern Africa. South
African Archaeological Bulletin 50(70):15–27.
Kleinitz, C, and C Naser
2011. The Loss of Innocence: Political and Ethical Dimensions of the Merowe
Dam Archaeological Salvage Project at the Fourth Nile Cataract (Sudan).
Conservation and Management of Archaeological Sites 13:253–280.
Kotze, L. J., and L. J. van Rensburg
2002. Legislative protection of cultural resources: a South African perspective.
Paper presented at the 8th annual qualitative methods conference: ‘Some-
thing for nothing’, 1 May—30 September 2002.
Meskell, LM
2011. From Paris to Pontdrift: UNESCO Meetings, Mapungubwe and Mining.
South African Archaeological Bulletin 66:149–156.
2012. The Rush to Inscribe: Reflections on the 35th Session of the World Her-
itage Committee, UNESCO Paris, 2011. Journal of Field Archaeology
37:145–151.
N. NDLOVU
Author's personal copy
2014. States of Conservation: Protection, Politics and Pacting within UNESCO’s
World Heritage Committee. Anthropological Quarterly 87(1):217–244.
Mketeni, F
2012. Introductory Remarks. Official Opening of the Second Joint ICOMOS–
UNESCO Mapungubwe Reactive Meeting. Jan 18–19. Dongola Ranch,
South Africa.
Naido, S, and J Truter
2014. The Struggle to Achieve Cooperative Governance Continues. https://www.
werksmans.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Mining-Regulation-August-2014.
pdf. Accessed 23 February 2017.
Ndlovu, N
2011. Legislation as an Instrument in Heritage Management—is it Effective?.
Conservation and Management of Archaeological Sites 13:31–57.
2011. Management Versus Preservation: Archaeological Heritage Management
in a Transforming South Africa. Conservation and Management of Archae-
ological Sites 13(2–3):123–133.
2014. Contract Archaeology in South Africa: Some Ethical Concerns. Azania:
Archaeological Research in Africa 49(2):203–217.
Scheermeyer, C
2005. A Changing and Challenging Landscape: Heritage Resources Management
in South Africa. South African Archaeological Bulletin 60(182):121–123.
UNESCO
2012. Report to World Heritage Committee Report, 36th Session. Saint Peters-
burg, Russian Federation. 24 June—6 July 2012. Item 7 of the Provisional
Agenda: State of Conservation of Properties Inscribed on the World Her-
itage List and/or on the List of World Heritage in Danger.
Fragmented Approach to Governance? Critical Review of the Role Played
Author's personal copy
