Safety and Security District Baseline Report: Las Anod

Abstract

The district of Las Anod lies at the heart of the disputed region of Sool, between Somaliland and Puntland. It is
predominantly inhabited by various lineages of the Dhulbahante clan group (Darod). As early as the late 19th century,
the area was the setting for an anti-colonial struggle known as the Darawish resistance. In the 1970s and 1980s, Siad
Barre’s divide-and-rule policy revived intra- and inter-clan tensions. In 1991, the region was incorporated into the
new state of Somaliland, but Puntland took over stewardship of the area from 2002 to 2007. Deteriorating security led
allegiances to shift once again, however, and Somaliland regained control of the area in 2007. In 2009, the Sool, Sanaag
and Cayn (SSC) militia was created.
A Crime and Victimization Survey (CVS) was rolled out in Las Anod in February and March 2010, with additional
qualitative information gathered mainly in a series of focus groups in June 2010. Overall, CVS respondents felt that
the security situation had improved over the 12 months preceding the survey. 71 percent of respondent households
declared the district was a little or a lot safer – with women showing more caution in their assessment than men. Despite
those findings, 108 CVS respondents (14% of the sample group) declared to have witnessed an act of crime or violence
against someone outside their own household over the 12 months prior to the survey.
Conflict dynamics were prominent in focus group discussions. In the CVS, 50 percent of respondents claim these never
or almost never happen, but 43 percent of respondents pointed at yearly incidence of community disputes. The reasons
most often cited include conflicts over resources (50%), revenge (20%), and family disputes (19%). Focus groups also
described various types of inter-clan conflicts, including land disputes; conflict over water; compensation disputes
(when a party to a dispute defaults on compensation payment, or violence is used as leverage to gain compensation);
neighbourhood fights; and political tension.

Full text

Safety and security
District baseline report
LAS ANOD

Community Security Approach to Peace-building
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Safety and Security District Baseline Report: Las Anod
Authors
• Yann-CédricQuero,Criminologist,Senioranalyst(Ph.D.candidate,UniversityofMontreal)
• MireilleWidmer,Communitysafetyspecialist(UNDPSomalia)
• ManassehWepundi,Researcher(Saferworld)
• LindseyPeterson,Analyst(UNDPSomaliaandOCVP)
Copyright
PublishedandCopyright©2011bytheObservatoryofConictandViolencePrevention.
Nopartofthisbookmaybereproducedorutilisedinanyformorbyanymeanselectronicormechanical,including
photocopying,recordingorbyanyinformationstorageandretrievedsystemwithoutpermissioninwriting.
FirstEdition(August2011)
FirstPrinting(February2012)
ISBN: 978-9966-1614-3-7
Inquiriesshouldbeaddressedto:
ObservatoryofConictandViolencePrevention(OCVP)
Hargeisa,Somaliland
info@ocvp.org
http://www.ocvp.org

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Acknowledgements
The Somali Observatory of Conict and Violence Prevention wishes to thank the following organizations (in
alphabeticalorder):
Right from the beginning of this project, the Danish Demining Group participated in consultations on the
development of the su rvey tools, pa rticula rly the Crime an d Victimizat ion Survey (CVS). In addit ion, it provided
logisticalandsubstantivesupportforfacilitatingseveralroundsoffocusgroupdiscussions,includingtrainingoflocal
non-governmentalorganization(NGO)partners,andfacilitatingandrecordingtheproceedings,includingtheDistrict
SafetyPlans.ItalsohelpedgatheradditionaldataforthedistrictmappinginBurao,LasAnod,BossasoandGalkayo.
The NGOs Haqsoor (Bu rao), Hornpeace ( Las Anod), SORSO (Bossaso) and K AALO (Galkayo) provided loca l
supportforthe facilitation of thedistrict mappingand sampling, the CVS,and focus group discussions. SOYDEN
and theCentre for Peace and Democracyalso provided mapping informationfrom four Mogadishudistricts and
supportedtheimplementationoftheCVS.
The International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (Montreal, Canada) provided expert feedback on the
developmentoftheCVS.
TheJapan Centre for Conict Preventiontookaleadingroleinthedevelopmentofthesurveytoolsandmethodological
guidance, primarilythe CVS andthe focusgroup questionnaires. It oversawthe sampling of districtsnecessary to
conducttheCVS,participatedinthetrainingofenumerators,setupthedatabase,andoversawdataentryandcleaning.
TheObservatory of Conict and Violence Prevention (OCVP)contributedtothecollectionofadditionalinformation
fromBurao,LasAnod,BossasoandGalkayoforthenalizationoftheCommunity Safety and Security Analysis.
SAACIDcontributedusefulinsightsforthedevelopmentoftheCVS.
Saferworld was involved from the beginning in consultations on the development of the various survey tools,
particularlytheCVS.Ittookaleadingroleincollectingandanalyzinginformationfromthefocusgroupdiscussions,
includingadditionaldesk-basedreviews,fortheproductionoftheinitialCommunit y Safety and Security Analysesfor
Burao,LasAnod,BossasoandGalkayo.ForGalkayoandBurao,Saferworldalsoperformedarststatisticalanalysis
ofthedatafromtheCVS,includingadditionalkeyinformantinterviews.
SOCDAtookaleading roleinthe implementation oftheCVS.Fromthebeginningoftheproject, itparticipated in
thedevelopmentoftheCVS,recruitedandoversawthelocalteamsofenumerators,participatedintheirtrainingand
supervision,aswellascontributedtodataentryandcleaning.
SOYDENtookthe initiativeofconductingfocusgroup discussions in fourMogadishudistricts,providing precious
additionalqualitativeinformationonpatternsofcrimeandviolenceinMogadishu.
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)in Somalia, inparticular,theArmed Violence Reduction
projectwithintheRuleofLawandSecurityProgramme,providedoverallsubstantive,technicalandnancialsupport.

Community Security Approach to Peace-building
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction 11
2. Methodology 12
2.1Districtmapping 12
2.2CrimeandVictimizationSurvey 12
2.3Focusgroupsdiscussions 12
2.4.Keyinformantinterviews 13
2.5Validationprocess 13
3. Mapping of Las Anod District 14
3.1.Historicalbackground 14
3.2.Geographyanddemographics 15
3.3.Resourcesandtheeconomy 16
3.4.Accesstobasicservices 17
3.5.Governance 17
4. Perceptions of insecurity 18
5. Forms of insecurity and violence 20
5.1.Conictdynamics 20
5.1.1.Landdisputes 21
5.1.2.Conictsoverwater 21
5.1.3.Disputesovercompensation 21
5.1.4.Neighbourhoodghts 21
5.1.5.Politicaltension 21
5.2.Homicide 22
5.3.Assaultorphysicalattack 22
5.3.1.Victims 23
5.3.2.Perpetrators 23
5.4.Sexualviolence 24
5.6.Kidnapping 25
5.7.Propertycrimes 25
6. Drivers and risk factors 26
6.1.Socialfactors 26
6.2.Economicfactors 27
6.3.Political/governancefactors 27

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6.4.Firearmsandsecurity-relatedfactors 27
7. Perceived performance of justice and security actors 30
7.1.Comparativeperspectives 30
7.1.1.Generalperception 30
7.1.2.Assault 30
7.1.3.Sexualviolence 31
7.1.4.Propertycrime 31
7.2.Police 31
7.2.1.Mappinginformation 31
7.2.2.Generalperception 31
7.2.3.Response 32
7.3.Courts 33
7.3.1.Mapping 33
7.3.2.Generalperception 33
7.3.3.Response 34
7.4.Eldersandreligiousleaders 34
7.5.Women 35
8. Recommendations 36
8.1.Improvingtheperformanceofsecurityproviders 36
8.2.Improvingprisonconditions 37
8.3.Improvingtheperformanceofjusticeproviders 38
8.4.Improvingdialogueandcommunicationbetweencivilsocietyrepresentativesandauthorities 39
8.5.Promotinggoodgovernance 40
8.6.Promotingyoutheducationandemployment 40
8.7.Improvingcommunitysafetywithregardstourbanplanning 41
8.8.Promotinginter-groupharmonyandpublicawarenessraising 42
8.9.Supportforsurvivorsofviolence 43
AbouttheSomaliObservatoryofConictandViolencePrevention(OCVP) 44

Community Security Approach to Peace-building
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Figures
Figure 1: Number of surveys collected, by subdivision (Freq.) 12
Figure 2: Clan of the head of household (Freq.) 16
Figure 3: Residential status (Freq.%) 16
Figure 4: Occupation of the head of household (Freq. %) 16
Figure 5: Daily spending on food (US$) (Freq. %) 16
Figure 6: Level and type of education of the head of household (Freq. %) 17
Figure 7: Change in perceived safety over the last 12 months (Weighted %) 18
Figure 8: Level of perceived safety walking after dark (Weighted %) 18
Figure 10: Witnessing property crime and assault (Freq.) 19
Figure 11: Frequency of clan or community disputes (Freq. %) 20
Figure 12: Most common reason for clan or community disputes (Freq. %) 20
Figure 13: Victims of homicide, by gender and age (Freq.) 22
Figure 14: Assault or physical attack, by time and place (Freq. %) 22
Figure 16: Severity of injury from assault (Freq. %) 23
Figure 17: Victims of assault, by gender and age (Freq.) 23
Figure 18: Victims of assault, by residential status (Weighted %) 23
Figure 19: Victims of assault, by clan (Weighted %) 23
Figure 21: Victims of sexual violence, by age (Freq.) 24
Figure 22: Sexual violence, by time and place (Freq.) 24
Figure 23: Perpetrators of sexual violence (Freq.) 24
Figure 24: Assault against children (Freq.) 24
Figure 25: Type of property crime (Freq. %) 25
Figure 26: Property crime, by month (Freq. %) 25
Figure 27: Perpetrators of property crime (Freq. %) 25
Figure 28: Trend in availability of rearms (Freq. %) 28
Figure 29: Types of rearms available (Freq. %) 28
Figure 30: Reason for owning a rearm (Freq. %) 28
Figure 31: Perceived threat from remote-controlled or time bombs (Freq. %) 28
Figure 32: Presence of mines and UXOs (Freq. %) 29
Figure 33: Level of trust in public authorities who serve as security providers (Weighted %) 30
Figure 34: Reporting rates, assault (Freq. %) 30
Figure 35: Public authority to whom assault was rst reported (Weighted %) 30

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Figure 36: Reasons for not reporting an assault to public authorities (Weighted %) 30
Figure 37: Reporting rates, sexual violence (Freq. %) 31
Figure 38: Public authority to whom sexual violence was rst reported (Freq.) 31
Figure 39: Reporting rate, property crime (Freq. %) 31
Figure 40: Public authority to whom property crime was rst reported (Freq. %) 31
Figure 41: Levels of trust in the police, by gender (Weighted %) 31
Figure 42: Accessibility of the police in terms of physical distance and ease to locate (Weighted %) 31
Figure 43: Accessibility of the police, by subdivision (Weighted %) 32
Figure 44: Speed of police response (Weighted %) 32
Figure 45: Satisfaction with the police’s response, assault (Weighted %) 32
Figure 46: Satisfaction with the police’s response, property crime (Freq. %) 32
Figure 47: Level of trust in the courts, by gender (Weighted %) 33
Figure 48: Accessibility of courts in terms of physical distance and ease to locate (Weighted %) 33
Figure 49: Accessibility of courts, by subdivision (Weighted %) 33
Figure 50: Speed of court response (Weighted %) 33
Figure 51: Reasons for not turning to the criminal courts (Weighted %) 34
Figure 52: Victim’s satisfaction with the court’s decision, assault (Freq.) 34
Figure 53: Trust toward clan or community elders, by gender (Weighted %) 34
Figure 54: Trust toward religious leaders, by gender (Weighted %) 34
Figure 55 : Reasons for female non-participation in community or townhall meetings,
by gender of respondent (Weighted %) 35

Community Security Approach to Peace-building
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Executive summary
The dis trict of Las A nod lies at the hea rt of the disput ed region of Sool, bet ween Somaliland  and Puntlan d. It is
predominantlyinhabitedbyvariouslineagesoftheDhulbahanteclangroup(Darod).Asearlyasthelate19thcentury,
theareawasthesettingforananti-colonialstruggleknownastheDarawishresistance.Inthe1970sand1980s,Siad
Barr e’sd ivide-and -rule policy r evived intr a- and inter-cla n tensions. I n 1991,th e region was inc orporate d into the
newstateofSomaliland,butPuntlandtookoverstewardshipoftheareafrom2002to2007.Deterioratingsecurityled
allegiancestoshiftonceagain,however,andSomalilandregainedcontroloftheareain2007.In2009,theSool,Sanaag
andCayn(SSC)militiawascreated.
ACrimeand VictimizationSurvey(CVS)was rolled outinLas AnodinFebruaryandMarch2010,withadditional
qualitativeinformationgatheredmainlyinaseriesoffocusgroupsinJune2010.Overall,CVSrespondentsfeltthat
the securitysituationhad improvedoverthe 12 monthspreceding the survey.71percent of respondent households
declaredthedistrictwasalittleoralotsafer–withwomenshowingmorecautionintheirassessmentthanmen.Despite
thosendings,108CVSrespondents(14%ofthesamplegroup)declaredtohavewitnessedanactofcrimeorviolence
againstsomeoneoutsidetheirownhouseholdoverthe12monthspriortothesurvey.
Conictdynamicswereprominentinfocusgroupdiscussions.IntheCVS,50percentofrespondentsclaimthesenever
oralmostneverhappen,but43percentofrespondentspointedatyearlyincidenceofcommunitydisputes.Thereasons
mostoftencitedincludeconictsoverresources(50%),revenge(20%),andfamilydisputes(19%).Focusgroupsalso
descr ibed variou s type s of inter-clan con icts, includ ing land d isputes; con ict over water; comp ensation di sputes
(whenapartytoadisputedefaultsoncompensationpayment,orviolenceisusedasleveragetogaincompensation);
neighbourhoodghts;andpoliticaltension.
TheCVSquantiesthecostofconictthroughthelensofinterpersonalviolence.Seveninstancesofhomicidewere
recorded (1% of sample, 6% of respondents), which focus group participants interpreted as revenge killings and
compensationdisputes.
In addition, 98 instancesofassaultwererecordedbythe CVS (12%ofthe sample).These happened mainly inthe
marketplaceinthemorning,athomeintheafternoon,andinthestreetatnight.Firearms–mainlyassaultries–were
usedin28percentofassaultincidents,whilebluntweaponswereusedinafurther24percent.Bladedweaponswere
usedin22percent.Victimswerepredominantlymale,particularlybetween the agesof15to19years.Womenaged
20-29arealsoatrisk:focusgroupspointedoutthatwomenareatparticularriskofmugging,anddomesticviolence.
Surprisingly,per petrators of assaults weremainly identied asfriendsand neighbours (33%ofcases),followedby
individual criminals (32%),organized armed groups (15%)and family or relatives(11%).Thearmy orpolice were
responsiblefor4percentofassaultcases.
Eighteen cases of sexual violence were reported to the CVS (2% of the sample). All the victims were female,
predominantlyintheagegroup15-19.44percentofincidentshappenedintheafternooninsomewhatisolatedlocations
(eld,bush,orforest)andperpetratorsweremainlyidentiedasindividualcriminals.Womenandyouthfocusgroups
drew particularattentiontotheissueof rapeandsexualviolence.They consideredfemaletraderstobeparticularly
atriskwhencomingandgoingfromthemarket,eitherveryearlyorverylate.Thediscussionsalsonotedthestigma
attachedtorape,andtheproblematicpracticeofmarryingthevictimtotheperpetrator.Whileparticipantsjustiedthis
practiceonthegroundsthatastigmatizedrapevictimwouldnototherwisebeabletomarry,theynotedthatitmight
actuallyencouragesomeyoungmentocommitrapeiftheywouldotherwisenotbeabletoaffordthedowry.
Childrenarealsoatriskofviolence.SeventeencasesofassaultwererecordedbytheCVSwherethevictimwasaged
17or you nger. Focus groups note d issues of child a buse – includi ng sexual abus e – infanticid e and forced labou r.
Recruitment ofchildren andyouth by militia groups wasalso mentioned as aconcernand saidto happen through
KoranicschoolsandMadrassas.
Five cases of kidnapping were recorded in the CVS. Regrettably, no information is available surrounding the
circumstancesoftheseevents,whichaffectedpredominantlyIDPsandminoritiesofethnicBantuorigin.
Relatively frequent are propert y crimes, with 81 instances recorded by the CVS, cor responding to 10 percent of

9
responde nts. The two pre dominant t ypes of prop erty cr imes in th e CVS are stree t theft (47% of cases) and home
burglaries (33%). Property crime seems to follow a seasonal pattern, with a spike between January and March.
Perpetrators are mostly individual criminals (46%), followed by organized armed groups (40%). In focus group
discussions,thesendingswere conrmed:participantsspokeofsemi-organizedgangswithknownmeetingpoints.
Mobilephonetheftissaidtobeanissue,targetingmainlywomenandtheelderly.
Focusgroupsexplored the driversandriskfactorsofinsecurity.Social factorsmentionedinthediscussionsinclude
rstclan1identity,andmorespecically,thesocialhierarchybetweenclansbasedontheirperceivedstrength.Some
tensionsarealsoduetofamilybreakdown,anddifferencesbetweenreligiousschools.Poorurbanplanning,including
forwastedisposal,seemstocatalyzedisputesandviolence.Finally,qatconsumptionwasmentionedasafurtherrisk
factor.Generaleconomicfactorsmentionedincludepovertyandunemployment.Landandwaterdisputesaresaidtobe
sparkedbycompetitionforgoodgrazingareas,illegitimatelandenclosure,andanunclearlegalframework.Obvious
politicalfactorsincludesplitloyaltiesbetweenadministrations,andasenseofmarginalisationofthedistrict.
Besidesthegeneralweaknessofthestatesecurityapparatus,thewideavailabilityandmisuseofrearmswasmentioned
asakey factorcontributingtoinsecurity.Indeed,itwasperceivedas aformofviolenceinitselfbytheyouthfocus
group.Lessthan2percentofhouseholdsrespondedtothequestionwhethertheypossessarearmornot,butanearlier
studybytheDanishDeminingGrouphadfoundanownershiprateof90percentinSoolregion.AccordingtotheCVS
theseareKalashnikov-typeassaultriesin76percentofcases, and pistols orrevolversin23 percentofcases.CVS
respondentsconsidertrendsinrearmpossessiontoberelativelystable.Remote-controlledortimebombsandmines
orunexplodedordnancealsoposeamoderatethreatinthearea.
TheCVSratedtheperceivedperformanceofjusticeandsecurityactors.Overall,eldersandreligiousleadersreceive
muchhighertrustthandothepoliceandjudiciary,whichareratednegatively.When theresultsarebroken downby
gender, however, men and women  show vastly differe nt perception s:wh ile men strong ly mistr ust the inst itutions,
womenappearmuchmoreneutral,withover20pointsdifferencebetweengenders.
The overallassessmentisconrmed bylooking at reporting rates.64 percentofassaultswere reported by victims
–mainlytoelders–withjust5percentofcasesreportedtothepolice,and7percentto the courts.Incidentally,the
dataseemstoindicatethatsomecasesarebroughttocourtwithoutinvolvingthepolice.Themainreasoncitedfornot
reportingassaultisthatthereareothermeanstoresolvethecase.Regardingsexualviolence,anencouraging83percent
ofcasesarereportedbyvictims.However,itisnotablethatnonewerereportedtothepoliceorthecourts.Elders,and
sometimesreligiousleaders,aremainlycalledupontodealwiththesecases.Finally,58percentofpropertycrimeis
reported,including4percenttothepolice,and3percenttothecour ts.Whileeldersremaintherstportofcall,non-
statesecurityprovidersalsoreceiveasignicantshareofpropertycrimereports.
Asnoted,menhaveanoverwhelminglynegativeperceptionofthepolice–thisappliestotrust,accessibility,andspeed
ofresponse.Womenaremoreambivalentintheirperception.However,victimsaregenerallysatisedwiththepolice
whentheydorespondtoassaultandpropertycrimes.Thisparticularlyappliestomen.
Thecourtsareperceived similarlytothepolice.Accessibilityseems tobeamajorobstacletolingcases atcourts.
High fees we re also noted. Never theless, sat isfaction with t he verdict is high  in the case of ass ault. Focus groups
notedthatpoorlyperformingcourtsmayactuallycontributetoconictbyperpetuatingasenseofinjustice.Another
weaknessthatwasnotedistheabsenceofamechanismtoenforcejudgments.
As mentione d above, elders and religiou s leaders are h ighly regarded i n their contr ibution to peace a nd securit y.
Focusgroupsnotedthateldersinparticularcanapprehendsuspectsthateludethepolice.However,focusgroupsalso
acknowledgedthatelderscancontributetoconict,particularlyregardingpoliticaldisputes, compensationdisputes,
andretributiveviolence.
Finally,theroleofwomeninsafetyandsecuritywasaddressedintheCVSbyexploringtheirabilitytoparticipatein
publictown-hallmeetings. 32percent ofrespondenthouseholdsindicatedthatwomenarenotallowedtoparticipate
insuch events. Themain obstaclenotedwas the factthatwomen themselvesmayfeeluncomfortable participating.
Families mayalsopressurewomentofocusonfamilyissuesinstead ofpubliclife.Ontheotherhand, focusgroups
drewattentiontothecontributionofwomentoinsecurity:theyarethemaininstigatorsofneighbourhoodorvillage
violence,andarealsosaidtohelptheirhusbandspurchaserearms.
1Theterm“clan”isusedloosely:inLasAnodthiswillgenerallyrefertosub-clangroupings

11
1. Introduction
Evidence-basedprogrammingandpolicydevelopmentin
theeldsofcommunitysecurity,armedviolencereduction
andpeace-buildingrequireacomprehensiveandaccurate
prior analysisofinsecurity.Measuringthe outcome and
impactofinterventionstodealwithinsecurityis equally
important, both to advance collective understanding
of what works and what does not, and to hold all those
involved accountable. The Somali Community Safety
Framework(SCSF)isalooseconsortiumoforganizations
andlocalandinternational,non-governmentalandUnited
Nations agencies, which collectively aims at building
Somali capacity to mitigate violence and insecurity in
a sustainable manner.2 Committed to evidence-based
programming, participants in the SCSF identied the
collectionandanalysisofsoliddataonsafetyasapriority.
Thevalueaddedofthesedatawouldbegreatlyincreasedif
theycontributedtotheadoptionofcommonindicatorsand
methodologiesfeeding intoa commoninformationpool.
A broad consultation process was therefore undertaken
in2009–2010undertheumbrellaoftheSCSFtodevelop
a Crime and Victi mization Sur vey (CVS) that would be
recognizedbySCSFparticipants.
Somali ownershipofthedata and survey methodologies
must be ensured. Until recently, the little data and
knowledge available on causes and manifestations
of insecurity – whether related to crime or conict –
generallyremainedwithintheorganizationthatcollected
it, and were often lost when project s ended or key staff
moved on. To contribute to local ow nership, the Somali
ObservatoryofConictandViolencePrevention(OCVP)
is under taking th is task on behalf of part icipants in the
SCSF,toensure that a non-partisan academicinstitution
will be the cu stodian of data and in formation on cr ime
andconictintheSomaliregions.By collecting,storing
andsharingtheknowledgeacquired,theOCVPcanhelp
ensurethatinterventionsareguidedbyreliableevidence,
and that thei r impact is measure d and evaluated. It will
also centralize data collection tools and methodologies,
and encourage their widespread use to improve the
comparabilityofthedatacollected.
UNDP Somalia is a founding member of the Somali
OCVP.ThroughitsRuleofLawandSecurityProgramme,
it supporte d the development and implementation of the
CVSinselectedSomalidistrictsbetween2009and2010.
Specically,this householdsurvey was rolledoutin the
districts of Burao, Bossaso, Galkayo and Las Anod,
as well as six Mogadishu districts (Waberi, Shangani,
Hamar Weyne, HamarJabjab,Dharkenley and Wadajir).
Locations were selected in order to cover some of the
majorpopulationcentressothatmorepeoplemightbenet
from the lessons drawn from the survey while at the
sametimeillustratingavarietyofsecuritychallenges.In
particular,the locations surveyed varybetween conict,
post-conictorcrime-related.Theentirerawdata,aswell
as the datacollection tools andmethodologies, form the
initialendowmentoftheOCVPandarepubliclyavailable
forfurtherresearch.
Based onthese data,UNDPSomaliathen supportedthe
drafting,onbehalfoftheOCVP,ofveSafetyandSecurity
District Ba seline Reports, which wi ll also be translated
intoSomali.Theseanalyticalreports are compiled using
a selection of data from the CVS, focus group results,
mapping information, key informant interviews and a
number of secondary sources. Results are validated by
the commu nity and authorities pr ior to publication. The
reportswillbesupplementedeveryyearbybriefupdates
oftrends basedonfocus group discussions and possibly
newqualitativeandquantitativedata.
Thepictureofsafetyandsecuritythatemergedfromthese
baselinereportsthenguidedtheelaborationofappropriate
responses bycommunities, localand state governments.
These recom mendations were elaborated by t he District
SafetyCommittees(DSCs),whichwereestablishedunder
the authority of the District Council in each location,
composedofrepresentativesofyouth, women,theelders
andreligiousleaders,localgovernmentandpolice/justice
ofcials. The suggested interventions are described in
District Safety Plans, which will be integrated into the
District Development Framework and as part of an nual
planning and budgeting cycles. Local and international
agencieswillbenetfromthesetoolstoselect,designand
measure theimpactofensuinginterventionsonthebasis
ofthiscombinationofdataandneedsassessment.
This District Baseline Report is divided into eight
sections. Following this introduction, the research
methodologyisdescribedinsection2.Section3provides
ageneralprole(mapping)ofLasAnoddistrict,including
importanthistoricalbackgroundnotes.Section4looksat
perceptionsofinsecurity,andsection5presentsthemain
security concerns noted in Las Anod. The drivers and
risk factors underlying these problems arethenexplored
in section 6. Section 7 takes a look at the perceived
performanceofjusticeandsecurity actors,includingthe
police,courts,elders,religiousleaders,women,andother
non-state security providers. Finally, section 8 provides
recommendationsextractedfromtheDistrictSafetyPlan
developedinresponsetotheanalysis.
2Seewww.somalipeacebu ilding.orgformoreinformation.

Community Security Approach to Peace-building
12
2. Methodology
ThisSafetyandSecurityDistrictBaselineReportforLas
Anodwaspreparedthroughamethodologythatconsisted
of compiling data and information gathered through
four researchtools: a district mapping exercise, a crime
and victimization sur vey, focus group discussions, and
keyinformantinterviews. Itwascomplementedbydesk
reviews of relevant published and u npublished reports.
More infor mation on the developme nt, content and us e
of the various tools is available in the Monitoring and
AssessmentToolkit.3
2.1 District mapping
ThersttoolusedtogatherdataforthisDistrictBaseline
Report is a mapping of existing formal and informal
resources in the community to cope with insecurity.
Themappingseeksto capture4initialindicationsonthe
composition of the target community, its demographic
prole anddegree ofsocial cohesion (e.g.proportion of
IDPs,clanprole).Historicalbackgroundinformationis
includedtorevealbothtraumaticeventsthatmayunderpin
the vulnerability of the community, and past peace
initiatives that may provide important lessons learned
and inuence perceptions of any new peace initiative.
Existing institutions of justice, security and healthcare
have been surveyed to map out the state’s capacity to
enforcepeace,justiceandsecurity,andprovideassistance
to victims of violence. Finally, capacities for peace
such as civil society initiatives, conict management
mechanisms, and neighbourhood watch schemes have
been mapped out because under certain conditions,
they could  be incorpor ated into prog rammes. K nowing
how information is accessed and/or circulated in the
community can also be useful for future awareness-
raisingactivities.InLasAnod,themappingwascarried
outinDecember2009bylocalNGOpartnerHornpeace.
2.2 Crime and Victimization Survey
The second tool used was a CVS that was developed
in 2009.5 This CVS sought to provide the quantitative
informationnecessarytoestablishanaccuratepictureof
crimeandvictimizationintargetdistricts, and toenable
latertomeasuretheimpactofinter ventions.
The information gathered during the mapping exercise
wasusedtodeterminepossiblegeographicalsubdivisions
where the C VS could be con ducted. Subdivi sions were
chosen after meeting with the local administration,
partner NGOs or community elders to obtain a prole
for drawi ng maps, creating borders and estimating the
numberofhouseholds.Ineachsubdivisiontheresearchers
then identiedstartingpoints which were followedbya
random s ampling of 20 households  from each loca lised
area.
LasAnodishometoapproximately 150,000people.For
the purpose of the study, Las Anod was divided into
40 subdiv isions, of which 27 were chos en for the CVS.
Figure1indicatesthenumberofsurveyscollectedineach
subdivision. Heegan, Wadajir, Ooodagooye, Faraxskule
andDaamicorrespondtoLasAnodtown,whileallother
subdivisionscorrespondtooutlyingr uralareas.
Figure 1: Number of surveys collected, by subdivision
(Freq.)
Ref.B3(n=800)
Sixenumeratorsandoneindicatormonitorwereassigned
forLasAnodDistrict.Allattendedaeldexercisewhich
took place from 16 to 19 October 2009 in Bossaso.
The survey methodology was again revised and the
questionnairewasshortened so itcouldbeconductedin
less than 40 minutes. The CVS wasconductedfrom 10
February 2010 and concluded approximately 12 March
2010withatotalof800surveyscollected.
2.3 Focus groups discussions
The thirdtoolused were focusgroup discussionsmeant
to capture perceptions of the nature of insecurity in
the districts, its causes and risk factors, victims and
perpetrators, and capacities for peace.   A series of
focus groups were convened in the rst week of June
2010 separatelywithwomen,youth,internally displaced
persons(IDPs),elders,religiousleaders,localauthorities
and residents fromrural areas. Thefocus groups began
with asking participants to dene safety, security and
violenceandthentospeakaboutthelevelsandchangesin
security over the preceding twelvemonths. Participants
wereaskedtocompile athoroughlistofallmajortypes
ofviolenceexperiencedaffectingtheareaandtoidentify
theirmainconcerns.Fromthere,theywereledthrougha

13
processofdescribingthecauses,location,timeorseason,
victims, perpetrators, means or weapons and levels of
organi zation for each pr iority ty pe of violence. Finally,
theywereaskedtoidentifytheindividualsorinstitutions
thattheytrusted topreventorrespond toviolence.Each
focus gr oup was attended  by 15 to 20 part icipants and
efforts were made to ensure that different gender, age
groupsandresidentsfromdifferentareaswereadequately
represented.Forthemostpart,thiswasachieved.
2.4. Key informant interviews
Security restrictions made it difcult for researchers
to reach Las Anod District for further eld research.
Nevertheless, a number of key informants were
approachedbyUNDP to provideadditionalinformation
forthisreport,bothforthemappingofLasAnodDistrict
andtoshedfurtherlightonthendingsoftheCVS.These
includedlocalauthorities,membersoftheDistrictSafety
Committees,aswellasDhulbahanteclanmembersbased
inHargeisa.
2.5 Validation process
Results from the focus group discussions and further
desk-based reviews were written up by Saferworld in
September 2010. After further editing, staff of UNDP
andtheObservatoryofConictandViolencePrevention
travelled toLas Anod inNovember 2010topresentthe
informationtotheLasAnodDistrictSafetyCommittee.
Somefurtherqualitativeinformationwasreceivedinthe
process.
3The Monitoring andAssessment Toolkit is availableathttp://www.
somalipeacebuilding.org/pb -resources/maa.ht ml
4SeeAn nexAoftheMonitor ingandAssessmentToolkit.
5SeeAn nexBoftheMonitor ingandAssessmentToolkit
6SeeAn nexCoftheMonitor ingandAssessmentToolkit

Community Security Approach to Peace-building
14
3. Mapping of Las Anod District
3.1. Historical background
History,stillvividinthemindsofLasAnodinhabitants,
playsanimportantpartintheongoingstand-offbetween
Puntland and SomalilandoverSoolregion (and Eastern
Sanaag).7 A widely recounted war is the Darawish
resistance, a 21-year anti-colonial struggle beginning
in 1899 that was led by Moh amed Abdullah Hassan, a
spiritualleadercommonlyreferredtoincoloniallanguage
as the “Mad Mullah”.Besides resisting colonialism,the
Mullahpushedforpan-SomaliMuslimbrotherhood,and
assuchisgloriedinSomali history.Hismainterritory
was centred on his fortress at Taleh in Dhulbahante
territory, and Eastern Sanaag in Warsangeli territory.
Whethertheresistancewasactuallyorganizedtothepoint
of forming an embryonic administration covering the
Sool,SanaagandCaynregionsisdebatable,eventhough
todaysomereferbacktothismovementastheDarawish
State. What united the people in this resistance was a
combination of kinship ties, the anti-colonial str uggle,
and religious orientation – the people east of Burao
followingtheSalihiyaschoolofIslam,afundamentalist
IslamicideologycomparedtothemoretolerantQadiriya
school to the west. However, the Darawish were not
unanimouslysupportedbythelocalcommunities,asthey
alsocommittedwidespreadabuseagainstthepopulation.
Mad Mullah was eventually defeated militarily by the
Britishin1920;fromthenonthecolonialadministration
keptanuneasycontrolovertheDhulbahanteterritory.
Several decades later, conicts erupted during thereign
ofSiadBarre,whosedivide-and-rulepoliciesheightened
clan-baseddivisions.SomemembersoftheDhulbahante
andWarsangeliclansjoinedtheghtagainsttheIsaq-led
Somali NationalMovement (SNM) priorto the collapse
of the regime in 1991. The creation of Sool region in
1986 was a fur ther attempt by Siad Barre to win over
the Dhulbahante clan by recognising their territory as
an adminis trative region. As a marginalised a rea, Sool
regionexperiencedtheseinter-grouptensionsasdifferent
communitymemberswerepro-oranti-theBarreregime
(the pro-Bar re Dhulbahante group was led by Ahmed
SulaimanDafe,while the anti-Barregroup wasledby
Garaad Ali Garaad and later Garaad Abdiqani). There
were also Isaq-Dhulbahante hostilities, which only
subsided followinga seriesofpeace initiativesbetween
thetwogroupsin1990and1991.
Afte r 1991, most Dhulbah ante leaders joi ned the peace
conferences among Somaliland clans. This reected a
willtoavoidfurtherclashesbetweentheDhulbahanteand
theIsaq,andtobepartofthenation-widereconciliation.
Initially,thequestionoftheindependenceofSomaliland
from the rest of Somalia was not on the agenda, and
the Dhulba hante, who were al so targeted  in Mogadishu
during the civil war, particularly by members of the
Hawiye clan,feltmuchmore afnitywith communities
intheNorthofthecountrythantheclansthatdominated
theSouth.SoolregionwasincorporatedintoSomaliland
whenitdeclareditsindependencefromSomalia,andthe
Dhulbahantealsoexpectedtoreceiveashareofpowerin
thenewarrangement.
These expectations were not fully met. After 1993,
the Dhulbahante felt they held no political weight in
Somaliland, and t hat the initia l drive for reconcil iation
was lost. When dialogue began in neighbouring
Puntland for similar state-building arrangements, most
Dhulbahante leaders joined this effort. When Puntland
eventuallydeclareditsautonomyin1998,therelationship
betweenSomaliland and the Dhulbahante wasat a low.
Atthatpoint,SoolandEasternSanaagbecamethemain
battlegroundbetweenSomalilandandPuntland.Forfour
years,armedclashesoccurredregularlybetweenthetwo
administrations. In 2002,with Puntlandemerging from
itsowncivilwar,ittookoverLasAnodfromSomaliland
withconsiderablesupportfromlocalinhabitants.
But the hopes of the local communities would again
soonbefrustrated:thePuntland administration invested
little i n Sool region, apa rt from s ending mi litia group s,
and quickly alienated the population, who once again
felt marginalised. Lawlessness reached new peaks:
individualswouldbeshotorknifedinbroaddaylightwith
total impunity.Seriousclashes between Somaliland and
Puntlandforcesalsoeruptedin2004about30kmwestof
LasAnod.9
By September 2007, the Puntland administration had
nearly collapsed, and the Puntland army was spread
thinlyas it haddeployed forces inMogadishu.Ethiopia
was pushing for a takeover of Sool region by the
Somaliland administration.8 Local communities were
disenchanted with the Puntland administration, and
hopedthatSomalilandauthoritieswouldbringbackmuch
needed law andorder to the region.Whatensued was a
popularuprisingthatquicklyledtotherelativelypeaceful
departureofPuntlandmilitiaswhiletheSomalilandarmy
movedintotheregion.However,althoughtherewereonly
about 20 bat tle-related deat hs in these clash es, roughly

15
half the population in Las Anod was displaced. The
diasporaseemstohaveplayedamajorroleinthemassive
displacement: strong opposition to Somaliland among
the Dhulbahante diaspora leditto use thedisplacement
asapoliticaltoolagainsttheSomalilandadministration.
DisplacementwouldbringabadnametotheSomaliland
administration, and the diaspora therefore pressured
their relatives in theregion toleave,using thethreat of
withholdingremittancesasleverage.Upto7,000families
ed to nearby districts (such as Hudun, Taleh,Bocama,
Buhodle) and pa rts of Punt land (Garowe and Bossaso).
Nevertheless,in October2007 Somaliland hadregained
controlofLasAnodwithsomelocalsupport,andthenew
frontlinehadmoved50kmeastofLasAnod.
InLasAnodthechangeinlawandorderwassignicant.
Afterthe displaced population returned to LasAnodin
December 2007, local police and communities started
toworkcloselytoendcriminality,and randomviolence
stopped. The police conscated not only rearms, but
evenknives;weaponswerenolongerseeninthestreets.
Sadly, however, this period of stability did not last.
In 2008, electoral campaigning ahead of presidential
elections in Somaliland shifted the focus away from
Soolregion,wherenoneofthethreeleadingSomaliland
politicalpartieshadmuchhopetogainsignicantvotes.
As the authorities turned their focus away from the
region, insecurity increased. Bomb attacks – road-side
bombswereanewphenomenoninthearea–andkillings
cost the lives of at least ten high-ranking Somaliland
ofcials i n Las Anod bet ween November 2009 a nd the
endof2010.Insecurityunderminedthelocalpopulation’s
supportforSomaliland.
Meanwhile,after 2007,onemember of the Dhulbahante
clan, a disgruntled presidential candidate in Puntland,
allied with a small group of elders to found the Sool
SanaagandCayn(SSC)“UnityandSalvationAuthority”
– both a militia and a government-in-waiting. Its
professed objectivewastoghtforthere-establishment
of a Darawish state, but i n reality the g roup was little
more tha n a name on paper, and enjoyed no sympathy
among the wider Dhulbahante com munity. It was only
joined by individuals who had been marginalised in
society,includingcriminals and returning diaspora who
failed to re-integrate into their families, and who saw
the SSC as an income-generating scheme. The SSC’s
professed object ives cert ainly appea led to the dias pora,
who suppor ted it nancially. Its creation was ofcially
announcedinSeptember2009inNairobi.10
InNovember2010,however,justtendaysafteradelegation
from the Somaliland government fullled an electoral
promise by meeting with the SSC, ghting erupted in
Kalshale between one member of the Dhu lbahante and
onememberoftheHabarJeclo.Somaliland troopswere
sent to the area. The move was perceived to be more
advantageoustotheHabarJeclo,andsincetheSSCwas
theonlygroupopenlyghtingtheSomalilandarmy,the
Dhulbaha nte clan rallied behind the militia g roup. The
authoritiesthen invitedamemberoftheSSCmilitia for
talks, providing the group withapoliticalplatform that
fur therincreaseditsreach.
3.2. Geography and demographics
Las Anod is one of Somali land’s six major cities. It is
the capital of Sool region, which lies on Somaliland’s
(contested)easternborder,butalsogivesitsname tothe
local government district within which it is located.11
Sool is an a rid and droug ht-prone region, wit h only 50
hectaresofrain-fed landunder cultivation, compared to
9,800hectaresinthewestofthecountry.12
Map 1: Map of Somalia
Source:UnitedNationsAdministrativeMap,2011
Population estimates for the district are imprecise,
ranging from 120,000 to 250,000.13 What is certain,
however, is that the area grew rapidly after the 1991
civilwar,mushroomingtoperhaps ten timesitspre-war
populationintheinterveningperiod.
SoolregionispredominantlyinhabitedbytheDhulbahante
clan, but thisisfurther sub-dividedintothe Muhamoud
Garaad and Farah Garaad lineages (locally referred to
as clans). Other D hulbahante li neages have collectively
formed an alliance called the Baha Nugaleed in order
to count er the inuence of the Muha moud Garaad a nd
FarahGaraadlineages.Non-Dhulbahanteinhabitantsare
referredtoas“foreigners”.
Based on the CVS, each household comprises a mean
of 8.8 people: 4.8 males, 4.1 females. T hese include an
averageof4.2youth under15per household(2.3males,
1.9 female). The majority of respondents identied as
membersoftheDarod clan (92.5%),with all otherclans
accountingforlessthan3.0percenteach(Figure2).

Community Security Approach to Peace-building
16
Figure 2: Clan of the head of household (Freq.)
Ref.RP9(n=798)
83.9 percent of respondent households declared to be
permanent residents, 12.8 percent were IDPs and 3.3
percentrefugees(Figure3).
Figure 3: Residential status (Freq.%)
Ref.RP10(n=799)
According to focus group discussions, crime hotspots
withinLasAnodincludeTuulo-Qoday,Daami,Samaley,
Geedoqarsay andFarxaskule. Inhabitantsofthese areas
are all poor and, apart from Tuulo-Qoday, are host to
internally displaced persons (IDPs) of various origins.
DaamiisreportedtohostIDPsaswellasaminorityclan
calledtheGabooye.SamaleyhostsIDPsfromoutsidethe
region. Similarly,Geedoqarsay hostsIDPswhoescaped
drought in southern Somalia, but also poor indigenous
families. Farxaskule also hosts communities who ee
thedrought.Therewasstrongconsensusacrossallfocus
group discussions that IDPs and host communities in
Las Anodhavecordial relations strengthenedby shared
religiousandculturalvalues.Overcrowding,povertyand
poorlightingwerecitedinfocusgroupsasthedriversfor
crimeintheseareas.
Diagram 2: Map of Las Anod
3.3. Resources and the economy
The private sector accounts for the bulk of economic
activit y in Las A nod, as in So maliland more ge nerally.
Along with shing in coastal areas and cropproduction
in areas with higher rainfall, electricity generation,
telecommunications, water supply and waste disposal
areallsignicantcontributorstoSomaliland’seconomy.
The lat ter sectors a re all represent ed in Las Anod, but
the city is heavily dependent on the livestock industr y
(the district and its surrounds are rich in livestock);
telecommunicationsalsomakesasignicantcontribution,
accounting for 40 percent of municipal tax revenues,
accordingtoonesource.14
33.3percentofrespondentsofLasAnodDistrictdeclared
themselvesunemployed(Figure4).Thelargestproportion
of employed respondents (27.2%) works as labourers.
The secondmost commonform of employment (13.8%)
istrade orbusiness,andthethirdmostcommon(11.9%)
pastoralists.Othersignicantportionsarefarmers(7.3%)
andgovernmentworkers(3.8%).
Figure 4: Occupation of the head of household (Freq. %)
Ref.RP11(n=799)
Noinformationisavailableonincomelevelsbecausemost
respondents could not answer this question. However,
roughly halfof respondents (47.2%)spendbetweenUS$
0.00toUS$9.99onfooddaily.Thereare also scattered
pockets of households who spend a signicant amount
more—13.8 percent of households spend on average
US$16.00toUS$17.99;9.8percentofhouseholdsspend
US$24.00to25.00;and7.6percentofhouseholdsspend
betweenUS$32.00toUSD$33.99(Figure5).
Figure 5: Daily spending on food (US$) (Freq. %)
Ref.RP13,n=672

17
3.4. Access to basic services
Data on basic services in Las Anod is scarce. As a
whole, Somaliland scores poorly on most development
indicators. The state budget goes primarily towards
maintaining the security sector (taking up an estimate
50%ofthebudget)andcivilservice,leavinganestimated
7 perce nt for development.15A v ibrant civil s ociety has
emerged alongside the private sector to provide many
social services. The CVS infers some information on
basicservicesthroughindicatorsoneducation.
AccesstoeducationisverylimitedinSomaliland(agross
enrolmentrate of48% forboysand 32% for girls).The
CVS reveals that 44.8 percent of heads of households
surveyedinLasAnoddistricthadreceivednoeducation.
30.2percentwereinformally educated and25.0percent
wereformallyeducated(Figure6).
Figure 6: Level and type of education of the head of
household (Freq. %)

Ref.RP14,RP15,RP16(n=778)
Out of those wh o were formally e ducated, 45.9 percent
had completed secondary or high school; another 30.9
percentattendedandcompletedintermediateschool;and
15.5percentwenton to completea university orcollege
degree.7.7percentonlycompletedprimaryschool.
75.4 percent of those who were informally educated
attended a form of religious schooling. 22.9 percent
received li fe skills edu cation or liter acy classes, a nd an
additional1.7percentdeclaredtheyobtainedaneducation
throughmeansnotspeciedbytheCVS.
3.5. Governance
Las Anod is one of 42 districts spread across six
Somaliland regions. Decentralisation means that each
districthasresponsibilityforservicedelivery.Devolution
ofnanceandadministrationremainsaworkinprogress,
however: capacities for local revenue generation are
generallyveryweak,andskillsareoftenlacking among
front-line staff. This is partly responsible for the poor
qualit y of service delivery.16 In addition, no mayors or
districtcouncilsofSoolregionareelected:thisistheonly
Somalilandregionwherelocalgovernmentelections are
not tak ing place. Inst ead, candid ates are recom mended
bythelocalGovernor,andappointedbythePresident.
The district sits on territory claimed by bot h Puntland
and Somaliland, which accounts for the presence of
both administrations’ military forces on either side of
a contested boundary. Somaliland currently controls
threeadministrativeregions along itswesternboundar y
that ar e disputed by Pu ntland: Sool, Sana ag and Cayn.
The basis  for Somali land’s clai m on the regions is t hat
they sat within the territory of British Somaliland in
the colonia l period and t hat Somaliland i nherite d these
borders  during its  rst brief per iod of independenc e in
the 1960s. Puntland givesanidentity-based justication
for its claim , since most of the region s’i nhabitant s are
membersofsub-groupsoftheDarodsuper-clanstructure,
whichisdominantinPuntland.
7 Somali society is an oral cultu re, where historical k nowledge is
passed down generation s in spectacularly detailed accounts. Many
clan elders are walking encyclopedia, able to recou nt their clan’s
historyforgenerations.Thesehistoricalnoteswerereconst itutedfrom
the ac counts of se veral key in forman ts, includ ing but not l imited t o
member softheDhulbahanteclan.
8EthiopiawasconcernedaboutmilitantIslamistswhowereinltrating
thenorththroughLasAnod ,and bythe refugegiventoghtersofthe
OgadenNationalLiberat ionFront(ONLF)
9Unsur prisingly, the extentofthis localsuppor t is a hotly contested
issue – s ome sources a ssert tha t local suppor t for the take -over by
Somal iland was co nsiderable , while othe rs claim th at this t ake-over
ledtociv ilun rest.
10SeealsoUnitedNations,ReportoftheMonitoringGrouponSomalia
andEritreapursuanttoSecurityCouncilresolut ion1916(2010),18July
2011,p.26
11LasAnodalsogivesitsnametheadministrat ivedistrictitissituated
within.ThisisoneofsevenwithinSoolregion.
12UN/WorldBank,op.cit.,p.8.
13T he lower esti mate was provided by UN DPSomalia’s Community
Mappingexercise in early2010;the higher esti mate fromReliefweb,
‘LasAnodtownu rbanv ulnerabilityupdate7July2003’,Reliefweb.
14http://en.wik ipedia.org/wiki/Las-Anod.
15Ibid.,p.4 -5andp.11.
16Ibid.,p.10.

Community Security Approach to Peace-building
18
4. Perceptions of insecurity
Feelingsorperceptionsofinsecurityoftendeterminehow
people regulate theirbehaviour. Theyare,therefore,the
mainlinkbetweensecurityanddevelopment.
When debating and dening insecurity, focus group
respondents listed both direct violent threats (such as
armed conict and crime) and indirect or structural
forms of violence (pover ty, hunger, wate r scarcity, and
so on, all pointing to feelings of marginalisation). For
example,onefemalerespondentdenedviolenceas:“IfI
gosomewhereandIseesomethingIcannotstand,suchas
hunger…then thatis violence.” But participantslargely
consideredthedistrictsaferthaninthepastbecauseofthe
lullinarmedconictbetweenPuntlandandSomaliland.
Anotherbenchmark thatwas usedto gaugethe level of
securitywas the electioncampaign ofearly2010, which
was overwhelmingly peaceful, marking a real change
compared to previous years when it was apparently
impossibleforpoliticianstocampaigninthearea.Those
participantswhofelttheareawaslesssafetendedtocite
the unpredictability oftheSSC militia, who exploded a
series  ofb ombs in the di strict ea rly in 2010. But a bove
all,feelingsofinsecurityseemtobefedbyaperception
oftheweaknessoftheSomalilandadministrationinthe
regionandthat itcannotguaranteethe state’s monopoly
ofthecoerciveapparatus.
TheCVSrevealsthatinhabitantsofLasAnodperceivea
changetowardsrelativesafety.70.8percentofrespondents
declaredthattheircommunityhasbecomeatleastalittle
safer to a lot s afer, with women sl ightly more ca utious
thanmenintheirassessment(Figure7).
Figure 7: Change in perceived safety over the last 12
months (Weighted %)

Ref.PV1(n=788),Female(n=498),Male(n=288)
Similarly, 71.0 percent of CVS respondents declared
that walking aloneatnight is rather to verysafe.When
disaggregatedbygender,mentendtofeelmorecondent
thanwomen(Figure8).
Figure 8: Level of perceived safety walking after dark
(Weighted %)
Ref.PV2(n=777),Female(n=509),Male(n=288)
To evaluate the impact of insecurity, the CVS asked
respondentswhatactivitiestheyavoidduetoinsecurity.
Between10.0and21.0 percent of respondentssaid they
avoidactivitieslikefetchingfoodorwater,goingto the
market place, etc.Keepinglivestockor propertyoutside
wasseenasveryunsafe,withupto61.9percentofwomen
and 45.6 percent of men avoiding this activity due to
insecurity(Figure9).
Figure 9: Activities avoided due to perceived insecurity
(Weighted %)
Ref. PV3 (n=793), PV4 (n=795), PV5 (n=788), PV6 (n=794), PV7
(n=793)
Perceptions of security are also be inuenced by
witne ssing crime. A t otal 108 CVS respondent s (13.5%
ofthe sampleand respondents) declared they witnessed
a cri me or violence agains t someone outside thei r own
household over the12months priorto the survey.Most
respondents declared having witnessed both property
crimesandassault(Figure10).

19
Figure 10: Witnessing property crime and assault (Freq.)

Ref.WV2(n=103),WV3(n=106)

Community Security Approach to Peace-building
20
5. Forms of insecurity and violence
A criminological typology of violence includes standard crimes such as homicide, assault, sexual violence, or
propertycrime.However,intheSomalicontext,someindividualcrimesarenotviewedasdistinctevents,butrather
as components of broader conict dynamics and inter-group violence. The table belowshowsthe priority givento
differentsafetyissues(sometimesbroadlydened)17identiedbyeachfocusgroup:
Table 1: Priority of dierent types of violence by focus groups
Women Youth IDPs Elders and
Religious Groups
Local Authorities Villagers/ Rural
areas
1 Land conict Political conict Land disputes Under-
development
Land disputes, esp.
as new settlements
arise on former
grazing land
Land disputes
2 Youth violence Gun possession Outstanding
compensation
Political conict Poverty Clan-based
conicts
3 Neighbourhood
ghts (triggered
by ghts among
children)
Joblessness Rape Land conict Rape (sometimes)
4 Rape Crime/theft Mobile phone
theft (mostly
targeting women)
Unemployment Water/wells conict
5 Mobile phone
theft (mainly
targeting women)
Business conicts Inter-clan raids Inter-clan conicts Road accidents
6 Violence against
women esp. rape
Road safety Human rights
violations by the
militar y (esp. rape
& theft)
The following section wi ll begin with a d iscussion of differ ent types of i nter-group violence mentioned by focus
groups,beforepresentingthequantitativedatacollectedonindividualcrimes.
5.1. Conict dynamics
Asnoted above, intergroupviolencewill oftenmanifest
itselfas formsof interpersonal crimessuchas homicide
andassault,andisthereforedifculttocategorisewithin
theCVS.49.2percentofrespondentsclaimedthatdisputes
onlyoccurneveroralmostnever(Figure11).
Figure 11: Frequency of clan or community disputes (Freq. %)
Ref.CD1(n=728)
When they do occur, clan disputes in Las Anod are
most often triggered by conicts over resources (i.e.
land or water) (49.1%). Other prominent triggers cited
wererevenge (20.2%)and family disputes(18.4%).Less
frequent declared triggers were disputes as a result of
other crimes (theft, robbery,rape, etc)(8.3%);power or
culturalstruggle(2.8%);orothertriggersnotspeciedin
theCVS(1.2%)(Figure12).
Figure 12: Most common reason for clan or community
disputes (Freq. %)
Ref.CD3(n=326)

21
In the case of inter-clan conicts, armed clan groups
(militias) are pitted against one another. Conict most
frequentlyeruptsoverwaterresources,landandpasture.
But clan mi litias have also t aken sides in  the terr itorial
disputebetweenSomalilandandPuntland.Thefollowing
sectionswilltakeacloserlookatlanddisputes,disputes
overwater,compensationdisputes,neighbourhoodghts,
andpoliticaltensions.
5.1.1. Land disputes
Based on t he tradition s of pastoralism , land in the La s
Anod area has long been communally owned, with
different grazing zones controlled and accessed by
specic clans. Violence is often seasonal, with groups
seeking to control pasture-rich areas during the rainy
seasonandwatersourcesduringperiodsofdrought.This
ispartlyduetoterritorialinterestsandeffortstoincrease
power and cont rol, but genuine need also tr iggers clan
conict.
InsomepartsofSomaliland,landisnowbeingenclosedas
partofthecommercialisationofthe livestockindustry.18
A contravention of xeer law, this tends to increase
competitionamongpastoralistsfortheremainingpasture
andgrazingland.
Theseproblemshavenotgenerallyoccurredinurbanareas,
butanewdynamic is apparentlynowemergingbecause
ofurbanization,with individualsand groups seeking to
control land for settlement and urban development. In
focus groups, it was widely felt that urban centres are
expandingontowhatwaspreviouslycommunitygrazing
land. From this perspective, unchecked urban growth
endangerspastoralists’livelihoods.
5.1.2. Conicts over water
Las Anod often experiences drought and suffers water
scarcity.Giventhepremiumplacedonwater,clangroups
thencompetetoaccessandcontrolwaterpoints.Disputes
mayarise andleadtoviolence,especiallywhena group
seeksexclusivecontrolofawatersource.Atothertimes,
the disputeis about whoselivestock isgivenpriority in
dri nking wat er from a par ticular sou rce. This can t ake
clanorintra-clan(lineage-based)dimensions.
There is also arural-urbandimensiontowaterdisputes.
While relatively well watered, Las Anod is not self-
sufcient in water. The municipality now uses water
trucks to fetch water from reservoirs and other water
sourcesinruralareastosupplytownresidents.Thisfeeds
grievances amongrural people,who needthe water for
theirlivestockanddailyconsumption.
5.1.3. Disputes over compensation
Inter-clan conict in Las Anod is often said to start
when an offense is committed through the system of
compensatory payment (diya).19 According to focus
group respondentsthere are two ways inwhich conict
results from compensation agreements. First, where
the per petrator a nd kin fail to compensat e the victim’s
family,theresultisinter-clantensionthatmaydegenerate
intoviolence (pitting the perpetrator’sand victim’s kin).
Second,oneofthemembersoftheperpetrator’skinmay
default on their contribution towards the reparation,
whichcansparkintra-clandisputesleadingtointra-clan
violence.
5.1.4. Neighbourhood ghts
In the same vein, although on a smaller scale,
neighbourhood ghts are often triggered by disputes
between (pre-teenage) children during playtime before
drawingintheirmothers.Fightsalsobreakoutoverwaste
management, when women in a neighbourhood argue
overlittering.Inter-groupviolencecanresultiftheghts
are protracted and pull in the families’ men. A strong
clanidentitythatpervadessociety makesthisescalation
possible,sothatevenargumentsbetweenchildrencanbe
interpretedasclansuperiorityand/orinferiorityconicts.
Furthermore,neighbourhoodstendtobeoccupiedonclan
lines , and where chi ldren from  various neighb ourhoods
playtogetherandhavedisagreements,thisdrawsinwomen
from multiple neighbourhoods.Focus groups noted that
women are t he main per petrator s ofn eighbourhood (or
village)violence,whichmostlyhappensduringtheday.
5.1.5. Political tension
The two a dmin istration s are cur rently at peac e, but the
borderdisputeremainsamajorsourceoftensionbetween
them. The competing administrations have troops
amass ed at the border, some of whom were  accused of
human rights violations by focus groups. The border
disputeiscomplicatedbythepresenceoftheSool-Sanaag-
Caynabo(SSC)militia.Althoughthemilitiaisbelievedto
consistofasmallbandofghters,theymaintainanactive
presenceinareasjustoutsideLasAnod,suchasBuuhodle
(aregionalcapitalofthenewCaynregion),Buulo-Wadar
(between Las Anod and Garowe) and Widh Widh (the
lasttwoareasareconsideredtheirstrongestbases.)They
arenotcurrentlyinvolvedwithopenviolence:“nomanis
goingtodestroyhisownland”,saidamemberoftheLas
AnodDistrictSafetyCommittee.However,thepopulation
fears renewed displacement should the political conict
reignite.


Community Security Approach to Peace-building
22
Though small in number, the SSC militia has been
relatively successful at outwitting its state opponents
and appe ars to move with relative ease in the area. Its
motivationsarenotentirelyclear,however.Someaccounts
hold that the SSC wants an i ndependent Sool re public;
others that it seeks union with Puntland (the Puntland
administrationreceivescriticismforsupportingtheSSC).
An alte rnative expla nation is that t he militia sp rung up
because its leaders were disgruntled at missing out on
political p ositions in both P untland and Som aliland. In
any case, the militia enjoys clan support, including
nancialsupport.Clanmilitiasarealsoreportedtotake
sidesintheterritorialdispute.
5.2 Homicide
HomicidewasinvestigatedintheCVSasassaultleading
to death. Seven instances of homicide were reported
(5.6% of res pondents, 0.9% of the sample). Six vict ims
were male andonefemale, ranging from11to 54 years
old(Figure13).
Figure 13: Victims of homicide, by gender and age (Freq.)

Ref.AA11_Rx A12_R(n=7)
All the victims were members of the Darod clan; six
werepermanentresidents;one was an IDP.Threeofthe
incidentsoccurredinthestreet,whileoneeachhappened
inthehome,intheeld/bush/forest,andinanotherlocation
not speci ed in the CVS. Th ree homicides occu rred at
night, two in the afternoon, and one in the morning.
While the CVS provides no further detail as to the
circumstancesofthesedeaths,thefocusgroupsdiscussed
the tr iggers that m ay set off cycles of revenge kill ings,
whichintimemayescalatetobloodfeuds.Itwasnotedthat
retributiveviolence–orderedbyelderswhentheycannot
resolveaconictorfailtosecurecompensation–should
be distinguished from revenge killings, perpetuated
by aggrieved family or clan members to avenge an ill
(e.g. committing rape, killing etc.).20 These are mainly
perpetrated by young and middle-aged men, and the
weapon of choice is mostly a rearm (Kalashnikov-
typeassaultries).Youngmenweresaidbyfocusgroup
participants tobe mobilisedto conductrevengekillings
as part of inter-clan conict often through incitement
bywomen andwith the blessing ofelders. Killingscan
occurinbothurbanandruralareas.Revengekillingsare
culturally embedded, andmostfocusgroup respondents
felttheyarebestaddressedbyelders.
5.3. Assault or physical attack
98 CVS respondents declared to have been victim of
assault orphysicalattackduring the 12monthsprior to
the su rvey (12. 3% of t he sample and respon dents). O ut
ofthose,68declared tohave beenvictim once,25 were
attackedtwice,andvewereattackedthreeormoretimes.
Assaults occur at any time of day or night, with 30.6
percentinthemorning,35.7percentintheafternoon,and
33.7percentatnight.Themostcommonplaceforvictims
to suffer assault was the marketplace in the morning
(15.3%),followedbythestreet during the night(12.2%),
andthehomeintheafternoon(11.2%).Themarketinthe
afternoon andthe street in theafternoon arealso prone
to assault with 8.2 percent and 7.1 percent of assault
respectively(Figure14).
Figure 14: Assault or physical attack, by time and place
(Freq. %)

Ref.AA5(n=98)
77ofthe98assaultvictimsdeclaredtohavebeenassaulted
withaweapon.Theweaponsreportedtohavebeenused
duringthecourseofassaultorattackweremostlyrearms
(27.8%)with18.4percentbeingeitheraKalashnikov-type
assaultrieoranautomaticrie,8.2percenteitherapistol
orarevolverand1percenteitherahuntingrieorshotgun.
Bluntweapons were usedin23.7percentofassault, and
bladed weapons in 21.6 percent of cases (Figure 15).
Figure 15: Weapons used during assault (Freq. %)

Ref.AA6(n=98)

23
46.6 percent of victims suffered light injury, another
24.6 percent incurred a medium injur y and needed
medicalassistance,andanadditional9.3percentrequired
hospitalization(Figure16).
Figure 16: Severity of injury from assault (Freq. %)

19.5
46.6
24.6
9.3
Ref.AA13_R(n=118,homicideexcluded)
5.3.1. Victims
Therewereassaultvictimsreportedfromtheagesof0to
over50years. When disaggregated by gender,theCVS
data shows that men areathigherrisk thanwomen and
remain suscept ible to becoming v ictim of assault for a
longerperiod.Thepeakagefor attacksagainstmenwas
betweenthe ages 15 to 19 years,which amounted to 21
ofthetotal 77 attacks. Toa much lesserdegree, women
appearto bemostvulnerabletoattackbetweentheages
of15and29.Twentythreeofthetotal36attacksoccurred
againstwomenfromthisagegroup(Figure17).
Figure 17: Victims of assault, by gender and age (Freq.)

Ref.AA12_R1byAA11_R(n=113),male(n=77)andfemale(n=36)
IDPsandrefugees,althougharelativelysmallproportion
of Las Ano d households (12.8% and 3.3% respectively,
see Figur e 3), exp erience hig her levels of victimi zation
thanpermanentresidents(Figure18).
Figure 18: Victims of assault, by residential status
(Weighted %)
Ref.AA1xRP10(n=796)
This i s also reected i n the clan dist ribution of assault
victims,whichreveals thatone intwoDigil-Mirieand
one in three Bantu or Dir have been assaulted, while
theproportionamongtheDarod only reachesonein ten
(Figure19).
Figure 19: Victims of assault, by clan (Weighted %)

Ref.AA1xRP10(n=795)
Focus group respondent s felt that women a re the main
victimsofanumberofcrimesandformsofviolence,most
obviously rape (see below, section 5.4), female genital
mutilation,various formsofdomesticviolence,andalso
muggings. Focus groups reported levels of domestic
violence as high,sayingtheygenerallyinvolvedattacks
byhusbandsagainsttheirwives,butsome expressedthe
view that with women’s increasing economic strength,
men have also become victims of spousal violence
(though, on a lower scale). Other problems, including
familyneglectandbreakdownanddenialofeducationto
women,werealsoraised.
5.3.2. Perpetrators
WithintheCVStheperpetratorsofassaultwereidentied
asmainlyfriendsorneighbours(32.6%),thesecondlargest
propor tion of perpet rators were ide ntied as ind ividual
criminals (31.6%), thereafter followed members of
organizedarmedgroups(14.7%),andfamilymembersor
relatives(10.5%).Lesssignicantamountswereidentied
as clan groups (5.3%), members of the government
army orpolice force(4.2%), and foreign troops21 (1.1%)
(Figure20).Furthermore,vevictimsofassaultsaidthe
perpetratorwasunder theinuenceof drugs or alcohol.
Figure 20: Perpetrator of assault or physical attack (Freq. %)

Ref.AA7(n=95)
Focus groups identied young men as the group most
commonly responsible for different acts of violence,
including rapes, muggings, burglaries and revenge
killings.Unemployment,qatuseandlowliteracyaresaid
tonegativelyinuencethisbehaviour.

Community Security Approach to Peace-building
24
5.4. Sexual violence
Womenareatparticularriskofsexualviolence.Eighteen
households declared to have a member who suffered
sexualviolence.Victimswerereportedbetweentheages
10to29years,withthemajorityofincidentsoccurringto
womenbetweentheagesof15and19(Figure21).Allof
thevictimswerefemale;inoneofthesecasesthevictim
wastherespondentherself.
Figure 21: Victims of sexual violence, by age (Freq.)
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35% 32.6%
31.6%
14.7%
10.5%
5.3% 4.2%
1.1%

Ref.S5_R(n=12)
Eight ofthe 18incidentsofsexual violenceoccurred in
a eld, bush, of fore st, often in t he aftern oon. Overall,
theafter noonwasthetimewhenmostincidentsoccurred,
withatotalofnineoutof18incidents(Figure22).
Figure 22: Sexual violence, by time and place (Freq.)

Ref.SV6andSV7(n=18)
Eightperpetratorswereidentiedasindividualcriminals
unknowntothehouseholdmembers,fourwerefamilyor
relatives,fourwerefriendsorneighbours,andthelasttwo
wereidentiedrespectivelyasamemberofanorganized
armedgroup,andamemberofaclangroup(Figure23).
Figure 23: Perpetrators of sexual violence (Freq.)

Ref.SV10(n=18)
Asnoted,violenceagainstwomenwasakeyconcernfor
femalefocusgroup participants,withrape and domestic
violence top ping the list. Rega rding rape, focu s groups
saidthat female traders(ofwhomthereare asignicant
number)areexposedwhentheyheadtothemarketearly
andreturnhomelate.Inruralareas,womenweresaidto
be more vulnerable during thedryseasonas theywalk
long distances sea rching for water and rewood in the
day.Theyarealsoatriskduringtheculturaldancesand
traditionalnight-timefestivitiesofthedryseason.
Oneoftheprimaryconcernsoffocusgrouprespondents
about rape was that where an unmarried female is
targeted,sheisforcedbyelderstomarrytheperpetrator.
Therapesurvivorwillbestigmatizedinthecommunity
andamongherfamily,andherchancesofgettingmarried
diminish,sothatmarriagetotheperpetratorisoftenthe
preferredsolution,evenifthesemarriageswillgenerally
notlast.Focusgroupparticipantswerealsokeentostress
thatrapecanactasanintra-orinter-conicttriggerwhere
the perpetrator and survivor belong to different clans.
5.5. Violence against children
Ofthereportedassaultcases,25occurredagainstvictims
18years oryounger,accountingfor28.4percent oftotal
assaultvictims(Figure24).
Figure 24: Assault against children (Freq.)

Ref.AA12(n=25)
Likewise,  as shown in Figur e 21, of the decla red cases
of sexual v iolence, eight oc curred aga inst childre n and
youthaged19yearsoryounger.
Focus group discussions recognized child abuse or
violationsofchildren’srightsindifferentforms.Themost
common a buse cited was child l abour. Examples given
werechildrenservingasportersatconstr uctionsitesand
aswaiters/waitressesinhotelsforaround12hoursaday.
Adoption as s ervants ( by rich famil ies from poor o nes)
was alsosaid to occur. In what may amount to slavery,
itwouldappear thatthe children havelittlesayontheir
termsofserviceandareoftenoverworked.Abandonment
of children by divorced parents, particularly following
cessation of payments by fathers, was also discussed,
aswassexualabuse(thoughttoberare),useofcorporal
punishmentagainstchildreneitherathomeorschool,and
infanticide,whichcanoccurwhenwomenbearchildren
outofwedlockandcommitthecrimetoavoidostracism.
Apolice ofcer respondent inone focus group cited10
cases ofchild abuseandinfanticideinLasAnod within
theyearprecedingthediscussions.

25
Focus group participants also drew attention to the
problem of forced re cruitme nt of children a nd youth in
LasAnod.TheysaidthisoftenhappensthroughKoranic
schoolsandMadrassas,whereyouthareapproachedand
indoctrinated by their teachers. Misinterpretationofthe
Koranplaysakeyrole,asdoesparents’ignoranceofthe
content of the teachings dispensed to their children in
theschools where theyhavebeenenrolled.“Wenance
the rec ruitment  ofou r childre n/youth,” said one female
DistrictSafetyCommitteemember,referringtotheschool
feesthathavetobepaid.Teachersprovideguidance,but
alsologisticalandnancialsupport.
5.6. Kidnapping
The CVS recorded ve incidents of kidnapping which
occurred tosomeone within therespondent households.
Ademographicanalysis ofthecasesrevealsthattargets
werepredominantlyIDPsandhouseholdsofBantuethnic
origin. No fur ther details surrounding these events
are available so that they cannot be linked to human
trafckingorforcedrecruitment.
5.7. Property crimes
81respondentsdeclared tohavebeenvictim ofproperty
crimeoverthe12monthspriortothesurvey,accounting
for 10.2 percent of respondents. Out of these victims,
65.4percent declaredto have beenvictimized once;the
remaining34.6percentwerevictimizedtwoorthreetimes.
The greater portion of these crimes was street theft
(46.8%).Thesecondlargestportionwashomeburglaries
(32.9%).Lesscommonoccurrencesweretheftofcropsor
livestock(10.1%);waterorland(7.6%);orotherproper ty
notspeciedthroughtheCVS.
Figure 25: Type of property crime (Freq. %)

Ref.PC3(n=79)
There were morereportedcrimesagainst propertyin the
beginningmonthsoftheyear,particularlyJanuary(16.3%),
February(16.3%),and March(20.4%). Thereafter,a steep
dropinreportedcrimesoccuredwithlowlevelsofvariation
(2.0%to6.1%)throughouttherestoftheyear,exceptaslight
risefromJulytoSeptember(6.1%to8.2%)(Figure26).
Figure 26: Property crime, by month (Freq. %)

Ref.PC4(n=49)
Perpet rators of crimes again st property were identied
most frequently as individual criminals (45.7%), or as
members of organized armed groups (40.0%). Less
commonperpetratorswerethoughttobefriendsorfamily
members(8.6%),clangroups(4.3%),orgovernmentarmy
orpolice(1.4%)(Figure27).
Figure 27: Perpetrators of property crime (Freq. %)
40%
8.6%
11.4%
4.3%
45.7%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
Ref.PC6(n=70)
Focus groups conrmed that two types of theft, both
burglary and muggings (aka street theft) are  major
concernsinthetown.Burglariesaremostlysaidtooccur
atnightandearlyinthemor ningandareoftenperpetrated
by young men. Violence is often used or threatened,
and crude weapons are commonly used (e.g. Somali
swords,sticksorclubs).Severalfocusgroupparticipants
claimed to know the common meeting points for the
semi-organized gangs who commit these crimes, with
Tuulo Qodah most frequentlymentioned.In thecase of
muggings,youngmaleperpetratorsmainlytargetwomen
andthe elderly.Mobile phonetheftisthemost common
motive.Muggingsaremostcommonintheevenings(up
to8pm),targetingwomenontheirwayhomefromselling
waresandotherwork.
17Itemsinitalicsarenotconsideredformsofinsecurityandviolencefor
thepu rposeofthisbaselinereportanda rethereforeaddressedfurt her
inthediscussionofdriversandriskfactors.Roadsafety/roadaccidents
willnotbediscussedhereastheydonotrefertointerpersonalviolence.
18UN/WorldBank,op.cit.,p.7.
19UndertheSomalicu stomarylegalsystem(xeer),victimsofdifferent
crimes (e.g. killings, maiming, etc.) are to be compen sated by the
perpetrator with a determined number of livestock. The costofsuch
reparations is borne communally by the per petrator’s kin, and the
commu nityagreesonhowmucheachmembershouldraise.
20Compensationdisputesareaddressedinsection5.1.3
21It should be notedthatt heDhulbahante tend to refer to indiv iduals
fromotherclansas“foreigners”,sothat thisquali cationlikelyrefers
toSomalilandtroops

Community Security Approach to Peace-building
26
6. Drivers and risk factors
Focusgroupdiscussionsshedfurtherlightonthecausesand
riskfactorsofinsecurity,whetherconict-orcrime-related.
Where  possible, data f rom the CVS serves t o illustra te
particular elements mentionedduring thesediscussions.
6.1. Social factors
Theuseofclanidentitytomobilisepeopleforcompetition
ordominationofothersisafundamentaldriverofconict
in the area. In-group and out-group perceptions are
framedaroundone’sbelongingtoagivenclan,sub-clan,
lineageorfamily,withcommunitymembersrecollecting
their ancestr y as far back as thirty or even more
generations. Although the mai n Dhulbahante sub -clans
in Las Anod – the Muhamoud Garaad, Farah Garaad
and Baha Nugaleed – ultimately have one forefather
(together with the Warsangeli and Majeerteen clans in
Sanaag and Puntland respectively), they are conscious
ofthe factthat they are distinguished bytheir different
patriarchs.Proximatetoclanidentityisanaccompanying
social hierarchythatleads groupstolabelthemselves as
themajorityandothersasminorities,basedonperceived
(numerical) strength. In focus groups, this dimension
was noted a s a key factor th at enables the mobil ization
ofclansforwar.By invokingnarratives andpoemsthat
celebrate an identity group’s legacy as the majority or
victoriousgroup,clanmembersareboundbytheneedto
defendtheirgroup’shonour.
Clan identity escalates violence because many forms of
crime,abuseorbadconductcanmobilizeopposingclanor
sub-clangroupsforviolence.Includedinthislistarerape,
revengekillings,violenceagainstwomen,neighbourhood
ghtsandevenanexchangeofinsults.Thisisexacerbated
by delayed dispute resolution efforts. All focus groups
agreed that most disputes escalate to wider violence
because of slow responses to emerging conicts. They
pointed t o the need to cap acitate commu nity membe rs,
tra ditional and rel igious elders, as well a s the police in
conictearlywarningandearlyresponse.Breakdownsor
stalematesinresolutioneffortscanheightenconictand
lead to outbreaksofviolence.In thecase of stalemates,
elders are sometimes tempted to organize retributive
violenceasleverage.
Itshouldbeemphasizedthatindiscussingidentity-based
violenceinLasAnod,communityrepresentativesinfocus
groupstendedtoblurgroupidentities.Theyinsteadopted
to descr ibe conicts in regional terms (i.e. as between
residentsofHawdandNugaal).InhabitantsoftheHawd
plateau arepredominantlythe FarahGaraad, but italso
has the Ba ha Nugaleed line ages.22 Nugaal val ley (from
where the current Vice President of Puntland hails), is
mainly inhabit ed by the Mohamoud Gar aad group, but
alsohas membersoftheBahaNugaleed lineages. Thus,
itemergesthattheMohamoudGaraadandFarahGaraad
groups have a competitive and sometimes conicting
relationship,withtheBahaNugaleedstrivingtocounter
the two while protecting the alliance’s political and
socioeconomicinterests.
While community members in Las Anod pride
themselves on their shared religious values, the
appearance of different religious schools was said to
also contribute to tensions (focus group respondents
talke d of tensions bet ween Su, Sali hiya, and Qa diriya
schools). Although not a major conict determinant,
these tensions were cited as a community concern.
It should be noted that inter-sect differences are
not clan-based, but revolve around ideology. Such
differencesdonot cur rentlyhaveviolentmanifestations.
Poor urba n planning d uring rapid p opulation grow th is
another contributing fac tor, both to conict and crime.
As discussed earlier, settlements are now emerging on
former communa l land. Within t he town, many live in
low-cost residential areas that were poorly const ructed
andbadlyplanned,ifatall.Examplesoftheproblemsthat
ariseincluderesidentsdemarcatingtheircompoundswith
stones that also block roads and cont ribute to disputes
between motorists and community members, and poor
sanitationandlitteringthattriggersneighbourhoodghts.
Asmentioned above, focusgroupparticipants saidlocal
quarrelsoverwastedisposaloftentriggerwiderviolence
withinresidentialareas.Thelocalauthority’slackofwaste
managementcapacityhasmeantthatresidentsbattlewith
sanitation and hygiene problems, as waste is disposed
around residential areas. This sparks squabbles over
litte ring. Wh ile these qu arrels st art at an i nter-persona l
level, they can escalate to an inter-clan dimension by
drawinginmoreandmoreneighboursinthedisputeover
responsibilityforthewaste.Becausesettlementpatternsin
neighbourhoodsaremostlyclan-based,suchviolencecan
spreadeasilythroughthemobilisationofclanmembersin
residentialareas.Inthissense,evensmallscaledisputes
havethepotentialtoescalatetobiggercrises.
Qatconsumptionwaswidelycitedasacontributingfactor
toviolenceagainstwomen(beatingsandrape),muggings,
and burglaries. According to the CVS, 6.6 percent of
households who experienced assault believed that the
perpetratorwasundertheinuenceofdrugs,alcoholorqat.
Cultural norms supporting the marginalisation of

27
womenarealsoachallenge.Thiscan,for example,lead
to family breakdown through divorce and husbands
reneging on their responsibilities. This contributes to
challengesofchildrightsviolations(denialofeducation,
childlabour,etc.)andgeneralneglect offamilies.Focus
groupparticipantsalsoidentiedthepracticeofplanned
marriage as contributing to highdivorce rates, as many
incompatible matches are apparently made by parents.
Somefocusgrouprespondentsblamedpolygamy(where
itisstillpracticed)ascontributingtofamilyneglect,asit
leadsmentoneglectsomewivesandchildrenoverothers.
6.2. Economic factors
Poverty and unemployment were identied by focus
groupparticipantsas therootofmany problemsranging
from domestic violence to muggings, burglaries and
revengekillings.Problemssuchasfamilyneglect,where
husbands who have divorced their wives default on
alimonyandchildsupportpayments,werealsoattributed
tolowincomes.
High levels of economic stress and unemployment are
particularly felt among men. Without jobs for men,
and with urbanisation, women have rapidly risen as
breadwinnersfortheirfamilies.Risingfemaleeconomic
poweragainstthebackdropofmassmaleunemployment
haschallengedconceptsofmasculinity,therebyfuelling
domestic violence and other forms of violence against
women.Asalready noted,unemployment wasalsocited
as a factor contributing to rape: as many young men
cannotaffordhighdowrypayments, they secureabride
by raping her as she is generally forced to marry the
perpetratortoresolvethecase.
As discussed earlier, in rural areas clan groups often
enter into negotiation or competition for water,pasture,
grazing land. Disputes are morelikely toariseat times
ofstress-inducedvulnerability(e.g.during droughtsand
dryseasons)orincaseswherenewpracticessuchasland
enclosureincreasedcompetitionoverscarceresourcesin
contraventionoftraditionallaw.
Unfortunately there is no clear and consistent legal
frameworktodealwithlandandpropertyinSomaliland.
Instead,thereisamixtureofdifferentnormsandpractices
in customary,Islamicandstatutory law.Inconsistencies
arise because while customary law regulates pasture,
grazing land, forests and water, its simple provisions
reect a com munal owner ship perspec tive. Islamic law
allowsforcommercialtransactionsover investmentsbut
not over landitself. Secular law(dating from the Barre
era) allows leasi ng of land to indiv iduals but mai ntains
complete state ownership. Unfortunately in all three
systems women’s rights are signicantly more limited
thanmen’s.23
6.3. Political/governance factors
Focus group discussions revealed a deep sense of
margi nalizat ion from the re st of Somaliland b ecause of
highpoverty,lowliteracyandalackofsocialamenities.
Many focus group respondents depicted Somaliland’s
capital, Hargeisa, asprivileged given itsrelative strides
indevelopment.Onefocusgrouprespondent’sdenition
ofsafetycapturedthisperfectly.Toher,safetyconsisted
of: “…health, water, airports, telecommunication
infrastructure, cars, equal rights… Safety is realised
when there is sufcient development in a society as
achievedinHargeisa.”
Itis worth noting,however,that while theremay be an
objective basis for the belief in Las Anod’s peripheral
existence and economic marginalization (focus group
respondents talked of being left out by international
agencies, a lack of job opportunities and a lack of
electricity), it is the perception and shared narrative
aroundthisthatmattersmostfromaconictperspective.
It would appear that being the minority group in
Somaliland, some Dhulbahante see marginalizationasa
naturalconsequenceofthestate’sdominationbytheIsaq.
This sense of marginalization reinforces split loyalties
towards the two regional administrations (Somaliland
andPuntland)amongcommunitymembersinthedistrict,
afactthatwasalsocitedascontributingtoviolence.
TheterritorialdisputebetweenSomalilandandPuntland
canbeinterpretedinvariousways.Itcan,forexample,be
seenasanoverduedecolonisationissue;an expansionist
clash between clan groups or political elitesengaged in
state -building; or t he misuse of clan ident ity in purs uit
ofpoliticalpower.Thedisputehascertainlyemphasized
identity-basedrivalriesamonggroupsfororagainstunion
with Puntland.For instance,itisestimated thatsupport
foreitheradministrationissplit byhalfamongtheBaha
Nugaleed,that a majority ofthe MohamoudGaraadare
eithersuppor tiveofPuntlandoraseparateadministration
andthatmostoftheFarahGaraadareforSomaliland.
Competing ideologies on Somalia’s future are also in
play,withgroupssplitbetweensupportforoneSomalia,
belonging to Puntland ortoSomaliland.Someevenirt
withtheideaofan independent Sool.This disputedates
backtotheDarawish-eradividebetweenthosefavouring
pan-Somali statehood and those with federalist and/
or separ atist views on st ate-build ing. Puntla nd tends to
favour a un ied (federal) Somalia , while Somalila nd is
stridentinassertingitsownsovereignty.
6.4. Firearms and security-related factors
Focusgroupparticipantsfeltthattheweaknessofthestate
securityinstitutions,specicallythepolice,isadriverof
insecurity.TheSomalilandpolicepresence in Las Anod

Community Security Approach to Peace-building
28
isapparentlyinadequate,particularlyinruralareaswhere
there arenopolicedeployments at all.Thegovernment,
therefore, cannotmonopolizetheuseofforce acrossthe
territory,creatingopportunitiesfornon-stategroupsofa
criminalorpoliticalnature.24
High rates of rearmpossession among civilians partly
reectthisfact.IntheCVS,only1.5percentofhouseholds
agreedtorespondtothequestionwhethertheypossessa
rea rm or not, rend ering the r esults unu sable. In ter ms
oftrends, however,39.2percentofrespondents declared
that rearms had become less available over the 12
months prior to the survey; 38.8 percent declared that
availabilityhasstayedrelativelystable;andtheremaining
22.0 percent declared that rearms have become more
available(Figure28).
Figure 28: Trend in availability of rearms (Freq. %)

Ref.WE1(n=760)
The types of weaponsowned byrespondenthouseholds
were mostly Kalashnikov-type assault ries (76.0%).
Pistolsorrevolverswerethenext mostprominenttypes,
accounting for 23.3 percent. Additionally,huntingries
andshotgunsaccountedfor0.8percentofarmsavailable
(Figure29).
Figure 29: Types of rearms available (Freq. %)

Ref.WE3_ R(n=129)
The most common reason for owning a rearm was
declaredtobeforprotection(61.8%).Toalesserdegree,
respondents also claimed that rearms were necessary
for work (19.8%), pa rt of tra dition (14.4%), and hunt ing
(3.8%)(Figure30).
Figure 30: Reason for owning a rearm (Freq. %)

Ref.WE4(n=131)
Based on an earlierstudy on smallarms possessionand
communitysafetyinSomaliland,smallarms possession
is by far highest in Sool region, with 89.5 percent of
households believed to own guns.25 This is similar to
the hig hest estimat ion of arms pr evalence in Las A nod
givenbyfocusgroups.Twointerestingobser vationscan
be made. First, that the estimations of gun ownership
among pastoralists (camel herders) were much higher
(indeedfocusgroupparticipantswereoftheviewthatall
herdershaveguns,witheachfamilyhavingoneortwo).
Secondly,IDPsclaimedthattheirgroupdoesnotpossess
anyrearmsbecausetheycannotaffordthem.26
Focus group discussions conrmed that while rearms
are prevalent in society, the most frequent violent
incident s in the Las A nod area – bu rglarie s, muggings ,
rapes,andneighbourhood/villageviolence–areactually
committedwithcrudeweapons(e.g.swords,sticks,clubs
or knives), basically wh atever is to hand. It is a p olice
policyintheregiontodisarmanyonepubliclywieldinga
weapon,includingcrudeweapons.
Whilealsopresent, explosives arenot deemedtoposea
signicantthreat.However,mostrespondentsreporteda
perceived threat fromremote-controlledor timebombs,
where52.2percentdeclaredtherewasatleastalowthreat
and23.3percentdeclaredtheretobeahighthreat(Figure31).
Figure 31: Perceived threat from remote-controlled or time
bombs (Freq. %)

Ref.WE7(n=790)
Similarly, a signicant proportion of respondents

29
believedinanapparentthreatfromthepresenceofmines
and unexploded ordnances (UXOs) with 59.8 percent
whodeclaredtherewasalowthreatandanadditional9.7
percentwhodeclaredtherewasahighthreat(Figure32).
Figure 32: Presence of mines and UXOs (Freq. %)


Ref.WE8(n=742)
22Thefou nderoftheSSCmil itiaisalsobelievedtobef romthisarea.
23UN/ WorldBank ,op.cit.,p.9.
24Seesection7onPerceivedper formanceofjusticeandsecurityactors
formoreinformationont hispoi nt
25 ‘Commu nity Safety and Small A rms i n Somaliland’, Danish
DeminingG roup,2007.
2627.1%oftheIDPsrespondentdeclaredowni ngarearm(n=96).

Community Security Approach to Peace-building
30
7. Perceived performance of justice and security actors
Both the CVS and focusgroup discussions exploredthe
perceived p erforma nce of the various  public authoritie s
that should respondtoinsecurity(i.e.thepolice,courts,
religious leaders, and the clan or community elders).
The following section will rst present a comparative
perspectiveoftheperformanceofthesedifferentactors,
includingbytypeofcrime.Eachactoristhenconsidered
separatelyinfurtherdetail,includingadiscussionoftherole
ofwomen,youth,andothernon-statesecurityproviders.
7.1. Comparative perspectives
7.1.1. General perception
TheCVSexaminedthelevelofgeneraltrustaffordedto
clan/communityelders, religiousleaders,the police and
thecourts,byaskingrespondentstostateforeachwhether
their trustwasvery high, fairly high, fairlylow or very
low.InLasAnod,mosttrustappears tobevestedinthe
clanorcommunityelders,whowereaccreditedwith24.7
percent of t rust, followed by the religious leaders who
wereaccreditedwith23.8percentoftrust.Thepoliceand
thecourts on the contraryare in thenegativewith -11.6
percentand-11.8percentoftrustrespectively.Particularly
strikinginLasAnod District, however,ishowmenand
women differ in their perceptions of state institutions,
withwomenawardingsignicantlyhigherlevelsoftrust
topoliceandcourtsthanmalerespondents(Figure33).
Figure 33: Level of trust in public authorities who serve as
security providers (Weighted %)

Ref.AR1_R(n=790),AR4(n=790),AR7_R(n=788),andAR10_R(n=773)
7.1.2. Assault
Of the 98 cases of assault declared, 6 4.3 percent were
disclosedtothepublic,whichcanincludeelders,religious
leaders,police,etc.5.1percentwerereportedspecically
topoliceand7.1percentreceivedacourtjudgment(Figure
34).Astheproportionofcasesreachingacourtverdictis
higherthanthosereportedtothepolice,itseemsthatsome
victimswenttocourt withoutrstturningto thepolice.
Figure 34: Reporting rates, assault (Freq. %)

Ref.AA1(n=98),AA34(n=63),AA39(n=5),AA42(n=7)
Men and women make similar decisions regarding
whichauthoritiestheyrst report assaultto(Figure 35).
Intere stingly, despite the h igh level of trust t hey enjoy,
fewcasesareactuallyreportedtoreligiousleaders.
Figure 35: Public authority to whom assault was rst
reported (Weighted %)
Ref.AA36(n=63)
Ofthe reasons not toreportgiven by women,10out of
the11cases(90.9%)declaredthattherewereothermeans
toresolvethe issue,andonevictim(9.1%)declared that
shedidnotreportbecausesomeoneelsehadreportedthe
incident.Whilemostvictimsalsoinvokeothermeansto
resolvetheissue,mensignalawiderrangeofobstaclesto
publicreportingofassaultcases(Figure36).
Figure 36: Reasons for not reporting an assault to public
authorities (Weighted %)
Ref.AA35(n=35)

31
7.1.3. Sexual violence
A signicant 15 out of 18 or 83.3 percent of cases of
sexual violencewere disclosedtothe public. Strikingly,
however,nonewerereportedeithertothepolice,ortothe
courts(Figure37).Overallnumbersaretoolow,however,
toinferreliabletrendsfromthisindicator.
Figure 37: Reporting rates, sexual violence (Freq. %)
Ref.SV1(n=18),SV11(n=15),SV16(n=15),SV19(n=18)
Thi rteen cases (86.7% of the reported cases) were rst
repor ted to com munity elde rs, and two v ictims (13.3%)
reportedtoreligiousleaders(Figure38).
Figure 38: Public authority to whom sexual violence was
rst reported (Freq.)

Ref.SV13(n=15)
7.1.4. Property crime
Ofthe81casesofpropertycrimerecordedbytheCVS,47
(58%)weredisclosedtothepublic.Reportingratestothe
policeonlyamountto3.7percent,with2.5percentofproperty
cri me eventually re aching a cou rt decision (Figu re 39).
Figure 39: Reporting rate, property crime (Freq. %)

Ref.PC1(n=81),PC8(n=47),PC13(n=3),PC16(n=2)
Of the 47 cases disclosed to the public, 72.3 percent
of victim s reported  rst to the com munity elders,  12.8
percentrepor tedtonon-statepolice,12.8percentreported
to the gover nment police and a n additional 2.1 perc ent
reporteddirectlytoreligiousleaders(Figure40).
Figure 40: Public authority to whom property crime was
rst reported (Freq. %)

Ref.PC10(n=47)
7.2. Police
7.2.1. Mapping information
ThedistrictofLasAnodhasthreepolicestationsintown,
withatotalof137ofcers.27
7.2.2. General perception
Aspreviouslymentioned,eldersandreligiousleadersare
tr usted much more th an state in stitutions of pol ice and
judiciary,even accounting fordifferences of perception
betweengenders(Figure33).Thesedifferencesbetween
gendersare,however,signicantwhenitcomestothepolice.
Lookingmorecloselyattrustinthepolice,itappearsthat
while men haveanoverwhelmingly negativeperception
of them, women are more ambivalent. 23.8 percent of
womendeclaredveryhightrustinthepolice(Figure41).
Figure 41: Levels of trust in the police, by gender (Weighted %)

Ref.AR7(n=787)
Similarly, CVS respondents declared the police to be
less accessible in terms of physical distance and ease
to locate, w here a mean of 60.0 perce nt of respondents
(mainly male) declared that the police are relatively to
veryinaccessible(Figure42).
Figure 42: Accessibility of the police in terms of physical
distance and ease to locate (Weighted %)


Ref.AR8(n=790)

Community Security Approach to Peace-building
32
Differences appear obviously between subdivisions
withinthedistrict,withruralareasfarlesssatisedwith
policeaccessibility(Figure43).
Figure 43: Accessibility of the police, by subdivision
(Weighted %)

AR10_RxB5(n=790)
The promptness of the police response was negatively
viewed where 67.5 percent of re spondents de clared that
police response was very to relatively slow and 32.5
percent declared that the police responded relatively
to very rapidly (Figure 44). Again, women were more
positivethanmenregardingtheirperceptionofthespeed
of police resp onse, 27.4 percent of women s aid that the
policerespondedrelativelyrapidly.
Figure 44: Speed of police response (Weighted %)

Ref.AR9(n=776)
From focus group discussions, it would seem that the
policeareappreciatedbutalsoviewedascorrupt,poorly
equipped,underpaidandpoorlytrained.Althoughfocus
groupparticipantssaidthatthepolicecanbeaneffective
deterrent to crime and insecurity where they are fully
present, and that there are community-based policing
committeesoperatingincollaborationwiththepolice,they
alsopointedout thattheirnumbersaretoosmall.These
weakn esses under mine their  law enforcement f unction,
andtheyare,therefore,unabletomaintainlawandorder
effectively.Aswiththecourts,thisappearstocreatetwo
problems: failu re to provide an effe ctive deterrent, and
perceivedbias(mainlythroughcorruptibility).
7.2.3. Response
Althoughviewedwithsomescepticism,thepolicedelivered
amorepositivedegreeofsatisfactiontovictimsofassault.
Outof17assaultvictims,ameanof58.8percentreportedto
berathertoverysatisedwiththepoliceresponse(Figure
45).Satisfactionratesarehigheramongmenthanwomen,
whichissurprisingconsideringoveralllevelsoftrust.
Figure 45: Satisfaction with the police’s response, assault
(Weighted %)

Ref.AA40xAA11_R(n=17)
Twovictimsofassaultreportedreasonsforbeingunsatised:
one victi m said the police took too long to respond to
the cr ime; the other s aid the police did not t ake action.
Apartfrom victimsofassault, therewere three victims
ofpropertycrimeswhosaidtheywerenotsatisedwith
the police response (Figure 46). Two victims said the
policetooktoomuchtimetorespondafterthecrimewas
reportedtothem,andonevictimsaidthatthepolicetook
toolongtomake initialcontact.Notethatthe genderof
thevictimisnotrelevantinthecaseofpropertycrime.
Figure 46: Satisfaction with the police’s response,
property crime (Freq. %)

Ref.PC14(n=9)

33
Noneofthecasesofsexualviolencewerereportedtothe
governmentpolice.
7.3. Courts
7.3.1. Mapping
LasAnodhasadistrictcourt,aregionalcourtandacourt
ofappeal,all housedin one building. According toone
keyinformant,stafngisshortateachlevelofthecourts
andthereisashortageofspace.Therestofthestatejustice
systemisalsostruggling.Forexample,thereisoneprison
in Las Anod without separate facilities for women or
juveniles. Rehabilitat ion of of fenders cur rently consists
ofabasicliteracyandreligiouseducationprogramme.28
7.3.2. General perception
As already mentioned (Figure 33), the courts were the
least trusted of all public authority gures. The CVS
revealsthatwhenthecourtsareisolated, 61.8percent of
respondentsdeclarerelativelytovery lowtrustand38.2
percent declare relatively to very high trust. Overall,
however, women tend to view the courts largely more
favourablythanmen(Figure47).
Figure 47: Level of trust in the courts, by gender (Weighted %)

Ref.AR10xRP1(n=773)
Similarly, more respondents perceive the courts to be
relatively to very inaccessible (58.6%) over those who
declaredthemtoberelativelytoveryaccessible.Women
again tended to be more satised than men with the
accessibilityofcourts(Figure48).
Figure 48: Accessibility of courts in terms of physical
distance and ease to locate (Weighted %)

Ref.AR11(n=781)
Signicantdifferencescanbeseenhereaswellbetween
subdivisionswithinthedistrict,withhouseholdsinurban
areasmoresatisedthanthoseinr uralareas(Figure49).
Figure 49: Accessibility of courts, by subdivision (Weighted %)

Ref.AR11_Rx B5(n=781)
Furthermore, the courts are also perceived to respond
slowlyto cases,with68.9percentofrespondentssaying
thecourtsrespondrelativelytoveryslowly(Figure50).
Figure 50: Speed of court response (Weighted %)

Ref.AR12(n=770)
Avarietyofreasonsweregivenfornotreportingacrime
to a cour t. The most decla red reason is t hat the cour ts
are too far or not accessible (23.4%). Other reasons
includedthatthejudgment wasnotfair(18.5%);thefees
aretooexpensive(18.5%);thematterwouldtaketoolong
(14.4%);fearofcorruptionorbribery(14.4%);andlastly,
victimssaidthecourtwouldnottakeaction(Figure51).

Community Security Approach to Peace-building
34
Figure 51: Reasons for not turning to the criminal courts
(Weighted %)
 
Ref.AR14(n=222)
Thefocusgroupsconsideredcourtstobeinefcientgiven
that they are not as expedient as elders in dispensing
justice. “It seems like courts are a business place”,
observed one elder, with another estimating that 80
percentofcourtjudgmentsareunfair.Whilefocusgroup
respondentstendedtoappreciatethecourts’importance,
their perception of them as cor rupt and inefcient left
themtoconcludethattheyactuallycontributetoconict
andviolence,throughreinforcingasenseofinjusticeand
failingtoactasadeterrenttooffenders.Concreteelements
that discredited the courts include the high number of
unresolved cases, and the absence of a mechanism to
followuponenforcementofcourtdecisionsbythepolice
orothers.Theperceptionisthatjudgmentswillberendered
in favour of the party who has paid the most money.
7.3.3. Response
There were seven verdicts reached through a criminal
court in response to assault cases. One victim (14.3%)
reported to be rather satised and six victims (85.7%)
verysatised(Figure52).
Figure 52: Victim’s satisfaction with the court’s decision,
assault (Freq.)

Ref.AA43(n=7)
Nocase of sexualviolence reached a court verdict.Out
ofthetotal81propertycrimes,onlytwocasesreacheda
verdictthroughacriminalcourt.ThereisnoCVSdataon
howsatisedthevictimswere.
7.4. Elders and religious leaders
Traditionaleldersareseenasprotectorsoftraditionand
the community’s identity andhonour. As such,they are
attheapexoftheSomalixeersystem,wheretheyresolve
manydisputes,including violence againstwomen,inter-
clanconict,revengekillings,compensationdisputesand
evenpoliticalconicts(eldershavebeen knowntopass
resolutionsinsupportoforagainsteitheradministration
in the Sool region border dispute). One focus group
estimatedthat 70-80percent ofdisputesareresolvedby
elders, w ith a small nu mber handled  by court s. Indeed,
the youth respondents pointed out t hat elders can even
apprehend suspects hidden by their clans in places
where the p olice can not. Only forms  of i nsecurit y that
are criminal in nature and exhibit no signicant clan
aspect(e.g.muggingsandburglary)arethesolepreserve
of the police and courts. Across the board, the focus
groups’ ass essment of elders’ role in disput e resolution
wasoverwhelminglypositive.Itseemstoindicatethatin
Las An od they provide swif t, accessible just ice for the
majority – even though the question whether solutions
always comply wit h human right s and gender equ ity is
leftunanswered.
The CVS conrms that trust in elders and religious
leadersisbothhigh, particularlyamongmen(Figure53
andFigure54).
Figure 53: Trust toward clan or community elders, by
gender (Weighted %)

Ref.AR1xRP1(n=789)
Figure 54: Trust toward religious leaders, by gender
(Weighted %)

Ref.AR4xR P1(n=732)

35
Interestingly, while victims overwhelmingly turn to
elders rst when reporting crime, religious leaders are
muchlessfrequentlyapproachedinsuchcases(seeFigure
35,Figure38andFigure40).
Accordingtofocusgroups,however,eldersalsocontribute
toconictinseveralways.First,theyareconsideredthe
protectorsofclanidentity,andintheirroleasgate-keepers
oftheiridentitygroup,theyaresometimessaidtopermit
young people to participate in conicts they consider
just. It is noteworthy that Sool’s elders are the leading
voicesarticulatingsupport for Somaliland, Puntland,or
auniedSomalia.Tothisextent,allrelevantactorsinthe
borderdispute(Somaliland,PuntlandandtheSSCmilitia)
seekthesupportofelders.Secondly,itwasalsoreported
that when elders fail to secure compensation from a
perpetratororcannotresolveaconict, in angerand as
leverage, theyresortto ordering retributiveviolence. In
theelders’case,theuseofretributiveviolencetocoerce
compliancetotheirdecisions canbecounterproductive,
asfamilyorclanmemberscaninterpretthisasanaffront
on their  identity gr oup as opposed t o looking at it as a
compensation dispute. Third, elders were said to be
subjecttopoliticalmanipulation,wheretheysuccumbto
politicians’localschemes.This oftenresults individing
clansandinstigatingviolencebetweenclansforpolitical
advantage.
7.5. Women
Theintegrationofwomen’svoicesinpublicdiscussionsis
oneofthemainconcernsofwomen’sempowerment.68.4
percent ofCVSrespondentsdeclaredthatnorestrictions
preventwomenfromparticipatingincommunityortown-
hall mee tings. Wh ile a majority, thi s leaves a relatively
highproportionof31.6percentofrespondenthouseholds
whodeclaredthatwomenarenotallowedtoparticipatein
publicmeetings.
Among the reasons cited as obstacles to par ticipation,
self-censorshipseemsto playaprominentrole:themost
common reasongivenfornon-participationwasbecause
the femalehousehold members feel uncomfortable with
participating(29.7%).Interestingly,womencitetheirown
lackofcondence much more thandomen.Thesecond
mostcommonreason given was thatthefamilyfelt that
thewomanshouldfocusonfamilyissuesinstead(28.4%).
The next largest proportion of respondents declared
that the male household members dislike the visibility
of female decision making (23.3%). Respondents also
declared  that women were supp ressed by the husb and’s
jealousy orlack of trustin thewoman’sloyalty(18.1%)
(Figure55).
Figure 55 : Reasons for female non-participation
in community or townhall meetings, by gender of
respondent (Weighted %)

Ref.RP19xR P1(n=232)
Although women are often considered a marginalized
group, th rough focus group discussions they were also
identiedassignicantinstigatorsofneighbourhood(or
village) violence. Focus groups said women contribute
to crime and violence by nancing the armament of
their husbandsandspyingon rivalgroups.Whileit was
admittedthatmenwouldnotaskfortheirwives’opinion
on gun ownership and use (prior to purchasing one),
womenadmittedthattheywouldhelpfundtheirhusbands’
purchaseofrearmsduetofeelingsofinsecurity.Women
were also said to mobilize their husbands, sons and
other young men to join con icts through propaga nda,
narrativesofpastwarsandinjustices,songsandpoems.
27MappingofLasA nodDistrict,Hornpeace,December2009
28MappingofLasA nodDistrict,Hornpeace,December2009

Community Security Approach to Peace-building
36
8. Recommendations
ThefollowingrecommendationsareextractedfromtheLasAnodDistrictSafetyPlan.Thiswasdevelopedinseveral
steps.AworkshopwasheldattheendofJuly2010with70individualswhohadparticipatedintheJune2010focusgroup
discussionsinLasAnod.TheworkshopwasfacilitatedbySaferworld,theDanishDeminingGroupandHor npeace.
Participantsvalidatedthedraftcommunitysafetydiagnosis,prioritizedsecurityconcerns,andbrainstormedsolutions
totheissuesidentied.ItshouldbenotedthatquantitativedatafromtheCrimeandVictimizationSurveywasnotyet
available at the time.The District SafetyCommittee thenadopted theDistrictSafety Plan thatwasproduced.This
shouldberevisedannuallytoformpar toftheDistrictCouncil’sannualworkplan.Externalsupportisrequiredforits
fullimplementation.
8.1. Improving the performance of security providers
Vision Intervention and ac tivities for implementing the intervention
Local council
and community
contribution
External
support
needed
Have a well trained
and equipped police in
Las Anod that is highly
responsive to crimes
and threats
1) Intervention for police capacity building. Activities:
a) Recruit XX female ocers and train them
Mobilization of
police
Finances
b) Establish t he police investigation department/unit and train XX
ocers as detectives
c) Deploy more police ocers to Wadnah, Samalay, Yogori-Cadhotey
and Daarhac Marayakanka
d) Improve police ocers’ terms of service (including remuneration)
2) Intervention for improving the equipment and infrastructure of the
police: Ac tivities:
e) Construct Police stations in Wadnah, Samalay, Yogori-Cadhotey
and Daarhac Marayakank
Labour (for
construc tion)
Land
f) Construct police posts in hotspots (Tuulo-Qodah, Samalay, Daami,
Farxaskule, Geedoqarsay etc)
g) Rehabilitate the central police station
h) Equip the regional police headquarters with oce equipment
(chairs, desks, computers, printers)
i) Improve the police transport and communication infrastructure
(at least two vehicles per police station, and have communication
equipment)
Have a secure Sool
region based on a
seamless partnership
between the Las Anod
Police and community
members
3) Intervention for improving cooperation between police and
community. Activities:
a) Create a dialogue forum for Community Based Policing
Committees (CBP), District Safet y Committee (DSC) and the police
Mobilization of
community
Representation of
Police
CBP, DSC
Traditional and
religious leaders
Mobilisation
Establishment
of dialogue and
public forums
Establishment of
sub-committees
Training
exper tise
b) Train members of CBP, DSC and police on CBP, networking,
peace building and sustaining locally owned communit y safety
interventions
c) Create a quarterly public forum as a feedback mechanism
discussing security developments
d) Establish sub- committees for dierent residential areas, IDP camps
and rural villages
Militar y forces
stationed around
Las Anod that do not
abuse the population
e) Local authorities maintain a dialogue with military forces stationed
in the area to prevent and report abuse of the population

37
Vision Inter vention and activities for implementing the intervention
Local council
and community
contribution
External
support
needed
To have an ecient
prison system
that eec tively
rehabilitates adult
and young inmates
(male and female)
1) Intervention for: reform and expansion
a) Construc t a bigger secure prison outside Las Anod town that has
separate male and female inmates’ facilities29
Labour
Building
materials
Land
Finances
b) Construc t well-fenced female-inmates’ prison
c) Construct juvenile prison outside the town
2) Intervention for: vocational education and inmates’ rehabilitation
a) Develop vocational training department in the prison
Advocacy and
awareness raising
Finances
Exper tise
b) Equip the vocational training department with necessary tools and
implements
3) Intervention for: stang
a) Train custodial ocers on human rights and humane treatment of
inmates
b Train and equip police and prison force on children’s rights and child
protection
c) Recruit female custodial ocers
8.2. Improving prison conditions

Community Security Approach to Peace-building
38
Vision Intervention and ac tivities for implementing the intervention
Local council
and community
contribution
External
support
needed
Have a well established,
equipped and respected
judiciar y
1) Intervention for training. Activities:
a) Train judges, their assistants and law yers to ensure capacity to
dispense justice
Land
Building
materials
Human resource
(skilled and
unskilled)
Finances
Trainers
(Exper tise)
b) Build capacity of prosecutors on professional prosecution
c) Build capacity of court clerks
2) Intervention for expansion of the courts. Ac tivities:
a) Construc t court buildings for two of the three divisions of courts
– court of appeal, regional court and district court (including
attorney general’s oce)
b) Rehabilitate current court building to house one of the three
courts
3) Intervention for oce equipment. Activities:
a) Computers
b) Printers and photocopiers
c) Vehicles for the judges and prison
4) Intervention for stang. Activities:
a) Hire XX more judges
b) Hire XX prosecutors
c) Design better remuneration for court ocials
5) Interventions for public perceptions. Activities:
a) Organize meeting between justice ocials and community to
discuss shortcomings of the courts and develop a plan to address
these
b) Develop a mechanism to follow up court case and verdicts
c) Develop supervision mechanism of court process
Prevent conicts related
to diya payment issues
6) Intervention to set up an insurance mechanism against defaulting of
payment. Activities:
a) Invite clan representatives, justice ocials and local authorities to
discuss possible solutions
Respec tive areas of
responsibility between
statutory courts, shari’ah
courts and elders (xheer)
well dened
7) Intervention to prevent conicts of competencies between justice
providers. Activities:
a) Dialogue between court ocials, religious leaders and elders to
discuss respective competenc y
b) In particular, determine types of crime/conict that must be the
exclusive preserve of statutory courts
8.3. Improving the performance of justice providers

39
8.4. Improving dialogue and communication between civil society representatives and
authorities
Vision Intervention and activities for implementing the
intervention
Local council
and community
contribution
External support needed
Peace building
centre that the
community takes
ownership of and in
which they carry out
their activities
1) Intervention for establishment of a Resource Centre for
Peace (RCP). Activities:
a) Construct RCP on designated land based on
approved plan
Labour
Building
materials
Finances
b) Supply for oce equipment (computers, printers,
public address systems for the hall etc)
Human resource Exper tise on organizational
development
Finances
c) Organize management system of the centre
(manager, secretary and guards)
d) Develop RCP business plan for sustainability of the
centre
2) Intervention for partnership bet ween elders and
administration. Activities:
a) Institute monthly consultative meetings between
administration ocials (governor, judges, mayor,
police commissioner etc) and elders
b) Develop framework of cooperation between the
local administration and elders to govern formal
and traditional enforcement of law and order
3) Intervention for capacity building of traditional/
religious leaders, DSC, & CBP: Activities:
a) Train DSC, CBP and traditional/ religious leaders on
conict transformation, community-based policing
& organizational development
b) Mentor/accompany DSC, CBP, and traditional/
religious leaders in peace building, CBP and
organizational development
c) Sensitize elders on their role and responsibilities to
restrain violence and conict
Conicts are
resolved peacefully
d) Training of rst responders (community members,
police, local authorities) in conict mediation and
transformation
e) Open discussions and forums on conict resolution
in the wider public, especially for women in poor
neighbourhoods
f) Explore avenues to restrain clan militias
Civil society
contributes to safet y
and security
g) Dialogue among civil society groups, including
women and youth groups, to identify respective
strengths and allocate responsibilities for violence
prevention and conict resolution at dierent levels
(interpersonal, neighbourhood, clan, etc.)
h) Strengthen capacity of women’s groups

Community Security Approach to Peace-building
40
8.5. Promoting good governance
8.6. Promoting youth education and employment
Vision Intervention and ac tivities for implementing the intervention
Local council
and community
contribution
External
support
needed
A strong
administration
founded
on people’s
participation and
involvement based
on principles of
good governance
1) Intervention for civic education. Activities:
a) Educate community on citizens’ rights and responsibilities and
governance (government, democracy, elections, leadership and
citizens’ participation)
Finances
Somaliland
government
Regional
administration
b) Advocate for inclusive government at national, regional and local
levels
c) Strengthen electoral politics to ensure leaders who have the people’s
condence
d) Invite national authorities to participate in public dialogue
Political dierences
are resolved
democratically and
peacefully
2) Intervention for mediation of political conict. Activities:
a) Monitor activities and maintain dialogue with the SSC militia
b) Promote reconciliation among the dierent clans on the future of Las
Anod and inter-clan divisions
Vision Intervention and activities for implementing the intervention
Local council
and community
contribution
External
support
needed
An enlightened
local youth
empowered with
knowledge and
skills to improve Las
Anod’s economy
1) Intervention for vocational training. Activities:
a) Construct vocational training institute/school
Labour (for
construc tion and
teaching)
Land
Finances
b) Develop vocational programmes that are relevant and sustainable,
particularly for male youth at risk
2) Intervention for support to children from poor families. Activities:
a) Bursaries to support children’s education
DSC’s education
of families on
child protection
Advocacy
Finances
b) Negotiate with private schools (e.g. Koranic schools) to reduce tuition
fees for children from poor families
c) Develop a school and family-based child protection program that
shields children away from Islamic militants and other political
anarchists

41
8.7. Improving community safety with regards to urban planning
Vision Intervention and activities for implementing the intervention
Local council
and community
contribution
External
support
needed
A city with equitable
access to water
sources and supply
for people and
livestock
1) Intervention for water infrastruc ture. Activities:
a) Locate soft and hard water sources and develop infrastructure to
harvest them
Building
materials
Location of
water sources
Finances
Technical
exper tise
b) Connect piped water to neighbourhoods in Las Anod
c) Develop water storage facilities (water reservoirs, water pans, water
tanks etc) for arid areas
d) Develop a water treatment program in all water sources
e) Engage relevant ministry on water management and protection of
water catchments
f) Draw up a plan for equitable and transparent allocation of existing
water supply, in consultation with villages
A secure city with
well lit streets and
neighbourhoods
2) Intervention for lighting infrastructure. Activities:
a) Develop street lights for beautication and security
Locally available
materials
Human
resources
Mobilisation of
relevant actors
Finances
Technical
exper tise
b) Enhance safety of electrical poles and power lines
c) Develop a maintenance schedule for power lines (especially during
rainy season)
d) Install light masts in neighbourhoods (especially Farxaskule, Daami,
Samalay, Gedoqarsay and Tuulo-Qodah)
e) Develop collaboration among government, electrical companies,
business community and humanitarian agencies to implement
lighting projects
Improved security
in hotspots
of violence,
particularly for
women
3) Intervention for improving security in hotspots of violence. Ac tivities:
a) Establish a Mobile Rapid Response Police Unit for quick response to
securit y incidents
b) Install public information boxes to gather incident reports on security
dynamics in hotspots (Tuulo- Qodah, Samalay, Daami, Farxaskule,
Geedoqarsay etc)
c) Improve housing standards in Samalay, Daami, Farxaskule,
Geedoqarsay etc
d) Conduct Women’s Safety Audit in and around the market area
Suppress
neighbourhood
ghts related to
garbage disposal
4) Intervention for reducing the risk of conicts related to garbage
disposal. Activities:
a) Develop dumpsite for garbage disposal
b) Establish garbage collection points in town and neighbourhoods,
c) Acquire garbage disposal vehicles
d) Involve women at neighbourhood level in agreeing on garbage
disposal procedures
Suppress conicts
related to land
management
5) Intervention for improving the land management system. Activities:
a) Create a forum to discuss grazing rights
b) Agree on a prohibition of land enclosure
c) Review system of management of communal land to avoid conict
d) Involve local authorities in allocation of land and determination of
land use (pastoralist/agricultural or residential)
e) Establish a consistent legal framework to handle land and property
Provide youth with
access to peaceful
recreational
activities
6) Intervention for improving recreational facilities in poor
neighbourhoods (eg. play grounds)

Community Security Approach to Peace-building
42
Vision Intervention and activities for implementing the intervention Local council and
community resources
External
support
needed
A united and devout
Muslim community
living harmoniously
1) Intervention for inter-sect harmony. Activities:
a) Establish an inter-sect council of Sheikhs
Mobilisation of
leaders
Building materials
Funds raised through
the mosques
Finances
b) Organize regular forums on inter-religious dialogue at the RCP
2) Intervention for lobbying and sensitization. Activities:
a) Holding sermons on morality by Muslim scholars and respected
Sheikhs (targeting public, police, judiciary and prison)
Sheikhs
Muslim scholars
Carpets for mosques
Public address
systems
Technical
facilitation
The public
understands and
supports the rule
of law
3) Intervention for training and awareness raising
a) Public education dialogue forums on peacebeuilding and conict
resolution
An educated public
that is security-
conscious and aware
of dangers of drug
use
1) Intervention for awareness raising Activities:
a) Establish thematic awareness raising coordination committees,
including women’s
Mobilisation of
members
Speakers on topical
issues
IEC messages
Technical
facilitation
Finances
b) Public education dialogue forums and campaigns the dangers of
qat use
c) Information, Education and Communication materials on peace,
dangers of qat use (e.g. billboards, t-shirts etc)
The public is
conscious of the
dangers of weapons
carrying and storage
d) Develop administration-community cooperation on
disarmament
e) Learn from Burao’s experience with disarmament (invite speaker
from Burao to discuss this issue)
f) Support eorts to curtail the carrying of crude weapons
g) Conduct public awareness raising on the dangers of small arms
A peaceful
community free
from rape and other
forms of insecurity
and founded on
strong family
values and lasting
marriages
1) Intervention for reducing the cost of marriage. Activities:
a) Sheikhs’ sermons encouraging families to ease marriage process
by reviewing cultural requirements e.g. bride price
Opinion leaders
(religious and
traditional)
Technical
advise
b) Encourage couples to make dowry (payable to wife) more
aordable (to reduce cases of men defaulting on such payments
to wives in the event of divorce)
c) Encourage and arrange group weddings to lower attendant costs
2) Intervention for restoring family values, unity and well-being.
Activities:
a) Roll out public education programme on family and duties and
responsibilities of family members
Religious and
traditional leaders
Land
Human resource
(skilled and unskilled)
Finances
Technical
advise
b) Design and execute family-targeted livelihood development
activities (based on activities on employment creation)
c) Execute women empowerment programs designed as family-
strengthening strategies
d) Develop economic assistance programs for vulnerable families
e) Construct orphanage and children’s home for abandoned and
street children and youth
3) End impunity for perpetrators of sexual violence
a)Ensure that perpetrators of rape and sexual violence are held
accountable
The public
understands and
is suppor tive of
women’s rights
f) Awareness raising against domestic violence
g) Discussion on the social status of women, changing gender roles
(including economic roles) and norms protecting women from
violence
The culture of peace
is strengthened
h) Review songs and narrative that fuel clan competition and/or
promote songs and narrative that promote peaceful coexistence,
including by engaging poets and lyric writers to promote peace
messages (through Geediga Nabada)
i) Prevention of violence by and among male youth
j) Sensitize women on their inuence and responsibility for peaceful
coexistence
8.8. Promoting inter-group harmony and public awareness raising

43
8.9. Support for survivors of violence
Vision Intervention and activities for implementing the
intervention
Local council and community
resources
External
support
needed
A distric t with
ecient health care
and support for
survivors of violence
Rehabilitate Las Anod General Hospital and extend it Land
Human resources (skilled and
unskilled) Building Materials
Hire and train doctors
Provide psychosocial and trauma care
29T hereason for relocation isbecausecu rrently,jailbreakat temptsendangermembers ofthe public as some are victims ofstray bul lets when
custodialofcersshootatescapinginmates.Itwasproposedthatifanewprisonisconstr ucted,thecur rentprem isesbeconvertedintoarecreation
centre.

Community Security Approach to Peace-building
44
About the Somali Observatory of Conict and Violence Prevention (OCVP)
TheSomaliOCVP–referredtoasHomboroinSomali–gathersdataandinformationonpatternsofcriminalsocial
andpoliticalviolenceintheregion,supportinganalysisthatcanbeusefultoallSomalis.HomboroistheSomaliname
forthe bottlenose dolphin, an animalcelebrated intraditional songsforits interventionin protecting andrescuing
humanbeings.TheOCVPpursuesasimilarhumansecurityobjective.
The OCVP is cur rently accumulating quantitative and qualitative data on insecurit y and violence in the Somali
regions,whichareavailableforfurtheruse.TheOCVPdataandanalyticalrepor tscanhelppractitionersensurethat
interventionsareguidedbyup-to-dateinformationandevidence.TheOCVPisalsosettingupasafetyand security
monitoringsystemtoformthecornerstoneofaSomaliEarlyWarningandResponseNetwork(EWARN).Beyonddata
collection andanalysis, theOCVP willdraw on the elds of conictmanagement—traditional andcontemporary
—tosupportpractitionersandpolicymakerswith guidancenotes, aninteractivediscussionforumandtraining.By
collecting,storingandsharingtheknowledgeacquiredintheeldofcrimeandviolencereduction,itaimsatbecoming
acentreofexcellenceforconictandviolenceprevention.
Forfurtherinformation:
TheDirector
ObservatoryofConictandViolencePrevention(OCVP)
Hargeisa,Somaliland
info@ocvp.org
http://www.ocvp.org