Merging and Demerging Education Ministries in Malaysia

Abstract

p>There is little research about the potential effects of large-scale institutional changes. Mergers and demergers of educational ministries provide an example of such changes, with their impact on the detailed workings of the organizational mechanics of education systems. The case study reported here is based on the perceptions of the frontline actors concerned by mergers/demergers, none of whom expressed enthusiasm for the merger. Overall, the Malaysian merger, and the demerger two years later, had little overall effect. The short time of the merger was a factor, as well as the existence of autonomous agencies assuring key functions. </p

Full text

INTERNATIONAL HIGHER EDUCATION
20
gap between the provision of higher education, the require-
ments of industry, and the country’s economic and social
development needs.
Using ASEAN and International Frameworks
Myanmar needs to conform to the requirements of its
membership in ASEAN, and utilize its advantages. Aside
from increasing regional economic integration, ASEAN,
through the ASEAN University Network and SEAMEO
RIHED (Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organiza-
tion/Regional Centre for Higher Education and Develop-
ment), has taken a significant number of higher education
initiatives that should help its member countries’ higher
education systems reach regional and international stan-
dards. These programs include establishing national quali-
fications frameworks, which will be referenced to the ASE-
AN Regional Qualifications Framework by 2018; setting up
the ASEAN Quality Assurance Network; and developing an
ASEAN Credit Transfer System.
These higher education developments at the regional
level do not stand alone. Other bilateral and multilateral
higher education engagements also provide support for
capacity development, infrastructure improvement, and
guidance in international best practices. However, ASEAN
provides a significant and tested framework in line with
its policy of narrowing the developmental gap between its
member countries, a strong regional basis for higher edu-
cation cooperation, and a directive to establish not only the
ASEAN Economic Community, but also the ASEAN Com-
munity, in the near future.
Higher education can be key to supporting the coun-
try’s economic development and democratic transition.
However, legal frameworks must be established and imple-
mented, even if this remains an ongoing process. Support
must be given to higher education institutions, especially
within the proposed institutional autonomy framework,
and universities need to be actively engaged in citizen-
ship education to enhance nation building, reduce internal
conflicts, and support the democratic transition. Finally,
Myanmar’s active engagement in ASEAN higher education
initiatives provides support for capacity building, quality
enhancement, mutual recognition, and, in time, meeting
ASEAN higher education standards. Transparency, inclu-
sion, and good governance remain key factors to improving
Myanmar’s higher education sector.
Merging and Demerging
Education Ministries in
Malaysia
Richard Sack and Omar Jalloun
Richard Sack is a consultant. He was formerly executive secretary of
the Association for the Development of Education in Africa. E-mail:
richardsack@gmail.com. Omar Jalloun is an assistant professor of in-
ternational and comparative education at Taibah University, Madinah,
Saudi Arabia. E-mail: ojalloun@taibahu.edu.sa. The work reported
here is part of a larger study on the merger of education ministries,
commissioned by the UNESCO Regional Center for Quality and Excel-
lence in Education (RCQE) in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
There is little research into the institutional/organiza-
tional underpinnings of education systems. Take, for
example, the frequent phenomenon of mergers and de-
mergers of education ministries. Many countries have sev-
eral ministries of education: one for basic and secondary
education (sometimes even one for each); another for high-
er education; yet another for vocational education. Over
time, these ministries are merged, demerged, and reconfig-
ured with sufficient frequency to provide ample meaning to
the quote “it’s déjà vu all over again” (and again and again).
Even though ministerial mergers and demergers are
fairly common and pose similar challenges to all concerned,
we were surprised to find only one study (in Zimbabwe)
that directly addresses the issue. Studies on the reorganiza-
tion of government structures are plentiful, but they do not
address the particular issues of merger/demerger in educa-
tion. And yet the abilities of education systems to meet ex-
pectations can be cruelly dependent on their organizational
capabilities. In education, in particular, policy usually ends
up being evaluated as implementation, and implementa-
tion is the work of organizational structures at all levels.
Malaysia: A Case Study
In Malaysia, the ministry of higher education (MoHE) was
Number 88: Winter 2017
After 50 years of isolation, neglect, and
underinvestment, Myanmar’s higher
education infrastructure (e.g. buildings,
libraries, and laboratories), curriculum,
research, and teaching capacity require
substantial renovation, investment, and
capacity building.

21
INTERNATIONAL HIGHER EDUCATION
created in 2004 in order to promote significant growth in
higher education, which is what happened: enrollments
grew by 54 percent and the gross enrollment ratio increased
from 28 percent to 37 percent between 2005 and 2012.
Malaysian universities are autonomous for budgetary and
most academic matters, but overall enrollments and the
level of staff salaries are outside of locus of full university
autonomy.
The ministry of education (MoE) and the MoHE were
merged in 2013. The reasons provided included: spurring
the transformation of education to be on par with interna-
tional standards by 2020; progress toward one administra-
tive roof for the whole system; harmonization of education
strategic plans; improved strategic management of the
education system. Two years later, in 2015, the single min-
istry was again divided into its two previous components,
the MoE and the MoHE. This was justified by claiming that
separation would allow the MoHE to better focus on em-
powering higher education in order to meet the rising de-
mands of its institutions. According to senior staff at both
ministries, the 2013 merger and the 2015 demerger were
politically motivated and unexpected—all interviewed stat-
ed that both decisions took them by surprise.
The merger lasted for only two years and its effects were
minimal. Three factors account for this: (i) the important
functions of accreditation and examinations supervision
are performed by autonomous agencies and, thereby, are
insulated from ministerial institutional changes; (ii) uni-
versity autonomy, which insulates the universities from po-
litically motivated vicissitudes; and, of course (iii) the short
duration of the merger—if it had lasted longer, the effects
would have been greater and a subsequent demerger more
difficult. Nonetheless, efforts were made toward consolida-
tion of the two ministries, especially during the second year
after the announcement of the merger.
The Merger as Seen by Ministerial Staff
Notwithstanding the unexpectedly short duration of the
merger, staff of the two former ministries gave serious
thought to its implementation and to potential benefits and
costs. Staff from the former MoE perceived the benefits as
follows: facilitation of information-sharing, resulting from
improved ease of obtaining advice from university faculty
and researchers; economies of scale in human resource
management; and sharing of infrastructure. On the other
hand, MoE staff saw several potential problems associated
with the merger: the renegotiation of some international
agreements to include higher education; the difficulty of
budget planning; confusion resulting from the (presum-
ably short-term) duplication of human resources, account-
ing, and legal departments during the merger period; and
loss of exclusive focus on K-12 education.
For the MoHE, the merger provided one major ad-
vantage—coincidental and unintended, according to all
interviewed—which was that it greatly enhanced the for-
mulation of its ten-year strategic plan (Malaysia Education
Blueprint 2015-2025). The short merger period facilitated this
by allowing for: improved access to information; a better
understanding of the complexities of the basic education
system as a whole; a broader ownership of the higher edu-
cation Blueprint; the identification of overlapping activities,
such as technical and vocational education and training;
and the definition of key performance indicators.
On the downside, according to MoHE staff, decision
chains lengthened and the merged ministry was perceived
as too big and difficult to manage. There were too many
meetings, leading to greater stress. Most importantly, the
budget for higher education declined under the merger.
The merger also highlighted the very different institu-
tional cultures of the two ministries. For example, decision-
making processes in the MoHE were more flexible and in-
formal than those of the MoE; information and decisions in
the MoHE tended to circulate more as soft copies, whereas
the MoE used hard copies; and MoHE staff were often on
secondment from other (usually university) positions and/
or on limited-term contracts, meaning that there was more
staff turnover in the MoHE than in the MoE.
Conclusion
Both the 2013 merger and the subsequent 2015 demerger
were politically motivated and came as a surprise to all
frontline actors in the ministries. Little organizational
change occurred during the two years of the merger period,
with the first year mostly spent on getting to know new ar-
eas, procedures, and staff, and the second year on work-
ing toward implementation. In the event, all agree that the
merger did not change much; however, if it had continued
for a longer period, reversal would have been difficult and
painful. Also, there was broad agreement that management
was smoother and more efficient before the merger, and
improved again after the demerger.
Number 88: Winter 2017
Even though ministerial mergers and
demergers are fairly common and pose
similar challenges to all concerned, we
were surprised to find only one study
(in Zimbabwe) that directly addresses
the issue.

INTERNATIONAL HIGHER EDUCATION
22
We found no clear, unambiguous support for the merg-
er. One benefit that surprised senior staff working on higher
education was that the merger facilitated the formulation of
the higher education ten-year strategic plan. However, now
that the Blueprint has been completed and adopted, those
concerned find that separation is preferable for implemen-
tation and focus.
The potential institutional instability resulting from
the merger (or, for that matter, from any reorganization of
government structures) was mitigated by the existence of
autonomous agencies performing major functions, as well
as by the fact that the universities are autonomous.
Perhaps the most surprising finding of our work is the
near-total absence of any systematic analysis of the frequent
phenomenon of ministerial mergers and demergers in the
sector of education. Does this lack of interest constitute a
recognition that mergers/demergers are of little conse-
quence, or, rather, does it point to a general lack of concern
for the institutional, organizational, and managerial dimen-
sions of the sector? The latter would be highly worrisome
given the developmental, social, financial, and political im-
portance of the education sector.
Christian Higher Education’s
Place within Private Higher
Education
Daniel Levy
Daniel Levy is distinguished professor, Department of Educational Ad-
ministration and Policy Studies, State University of New York at Al-
bany, US. E-mail: dlevy@albany.edu.
PROPHE (Program for Research on Private Higher Edu-
cation) has a regular column in IHE and occasionally a
Special Focus topic with multiple articles. This issue’s topic
is Christian Higher Education.
As many IHE articles over recent years testify, private
higher education (PHE) has grown immensely worldwide.
Although most of the articles have dealt with PHE rather
generically, others have focused on some particular type of
PHE. This Special Focus section highlights Christian high-
er education (CHE). The section’s geographical coverage is
broad, as both this introductory piece and Glanzer’s piece
are global in scope, and Carpenter’s is regional (Africa).
CHE in this Special Focus refers mostly to contempo-
rary growth, international settings, and Protestant as well
as Catholic institutions. (Orthodox Christianity has not
much joined the move into higher education.) Although the
Special Focus pieces find variation within CHE (by region,
country, and institution), they also identify enough defining
CHE realities to make CHE a viable category for analysis.
To open the Special Focus section, this introductory
piece places CHE within the context of PHE. More specifi-
cally, it indicates how CHE is a type of “identity” PHE. By
far the most common form of identity presence in higher
education is religious, though ethnic and women’s colleges
also have a presence. In the nineteenth, and late into the
twentieth century, the growing religious type was often
Catholic. But the Protestant component of the contempo-
rary CHE surge augments the pluralist nature of the reli-
gious proliferation. (Some echo is heard on the growth of
Islamic colleges and universities, though these are often
public as well as private and, in any case, are beyond the
scope of this Special Focus.)
The coherence of the CHE category manifests itself in
two vital elements at the forefront of each of this Special
Focus’s articles: growth and challenges.
Growth
Like other identity institutions, CHE institutions emerge to
foster the interests of a group. There is a strong promotion-
al side, but also often a defensive side, as a secularizing so-
ciety and higher education system threaten (intentionally or
not) the religious presence in higher education. Even a ma-
jority among the general population may find itself only a
small minority force in a country’s public higher education
sector. The religious motivation for growth may be rather
narrow, or broadened to include social missions such as
serving the poor. Alongside distinctly religious motivations,
however, religious higher education institutions sometimes
grow from dynamics found also in PHE’s nonidentity sec-
tors. From their outset, most religious institutions declare
academic missions as well. Over time, CHE institutions
seek to build enrollment for the tuition it brings, while
governments push them to help expand higher education
access. On the other hand, some academically and socially
privileged CHE institutions grow as students escape the po-
litical and other problems that plague the public sector in
many countries. Thus, in CHE as in identity institutions
generally, growth comes from a combination of distinctive
group causes and nondistinctive causes, seen elsewhere in
PHE.
“Academic drift,” that common higher education re-
ality in which institutions ascend in their level (including
ascension upward into higher education), plays itself out
in vivid form in CHE. Seminaries or other institutions
training religious leaders and concentrating on theology,
become universities offering nonreligious fields alongside
religious ones. The motivation may be to reach out to soci-
Number 88: Winter 2017