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Reality monitoring and suggestibility: Children's ability to discriminate among memories from different sources
... For children, providing an accurate account of a witnessed event is cognitively demanding (see Lindsay and Johnson, 1987), requiring efficient cooperation of many cognitive abilities, such as the ability to perceive and comprehend the initial event, to retain representations of the initial perception, to understand questions asked about the event, and to retrieve relevant information. Answering suggestive and specific option-posing questions requires discrimination between memories that were actually perceived and those that are based on imagination (see Lindsay and Johnson, 1987). ...
... For children, providing an accurate account of a witnessed event is cognitively demanding (see Lindsay and Johnson, 1987), requiring efficient cooperation of many cognitive abilities, such as the ability to perceive and comprehend the initial event, to retain representations of the initial perception, to understand questions asked about the event, and to retrieve relevant information. Answering suggestive and specific option-posing questions requires discrimination between memories that were actually perceived and those that are based on imagination (see Lindsay and Johnson, 1987). ...
... According to the reality monitoring approach, accuracy of the memories depend on whether memories are based on information from the first three categories (i.e., perceived information or external sources) or the last category (i.e., imagination or internal sources). Lindsay and Johnson (1987) found that the ability to provide accurate answers to free recall and suggestive questions is related to age, overall cognitive development, and the ability to mentally distinguish different sources of information. To date, studies evaluated the empirical evidence that the ability to provide accurate and detailed information is age-dependent (see e.g., Lamb et al., 2003Lamb et al., , 2018. ...
The aim of this study was to replicate a previous experiment using a different stimulus event. The present study examined the relationship between age, development of conceptual thinking, and responses to free recall, suggestive and specific option-posing questions in children and adults. Sixty-three children (aged 7-14) and 30 adults took part in an experiment in which they first participated in a live staged event, then, a week later, were interviewed about the event and tested using the Word Meaning Structure Test. Age and level of conceptual thinking were positively correlated in children. Compared to age, conceptual thinking ability better predicted children's accurate free recall and inaccurate responses to specific option-posing questions, but not inaccurate responses to suggestive questions.
... Events that are perceptually experienced are expected to include more idiosyncrasy than imagined events (Humpston et al., 2017). This process is thought to be mostly unconscious and automatic, unless a concerted effort is made, such as being cued to reflect on the source of information by an interrogator (Johnson et al., 1993;Lindsay & Johnson, 1987;Lindsay & Johnson, 2000;Morosan et al., 2018). Conversely, pressure experienced during interrogation to remember, or to remember something that may or may not be encoded in the first place, impacts one's ability to identify a source (Johnson et al., 1993). ...
... This is because a child's imagination tends to be more vivid, so imagined events are more likely to have characteristics that are similar to perceived events (Bright-Paul et al., 2008;Johnson, 2005;Johnson et al., 1993;Santtila et al., 1999). If left to their own devices, it is unlikely a child would even consider making a conscious effort to evaluate their source monitoring in a given situation, unless prompted to do so (Ackil & Zargoza, 1995;Lindsay & Johnson 1987). This prompt, of itself can be risky, given the research on suggestibility, particularly in children (Kiat & Belli, 2017;Otgaar, Chan, Calado & La Rooy, 2019;Price et al., 2016) In witness statements, children appear to be less aware of cues regarding source monitoring (Bright-Paul et al., 2008;Santitilla et al., 1999). ...
... This prompt, of itself can be risky, given the research on suggestibility, particularly in children (Kiat & Belli, 2017;Otgaar, Chan, Calado & La Rooy, 2019;Price et al., 2016) In witness statements, children appear to be less aware of cues regarding source monitoring (Bright-Paul et al., 2008;Santitilla et al., 1999). Verbal ability also seems to play a role in source monitoring, with increased verbal skills positively correlating with better source monitoring, particularly between ages 5-8 (Giles et al., 2002;Lindsay & Johnson, 1987;Santtila et al., 1999). Children show an improved ability to engage in source monitoring when asked to consider the source of information (Birght-Paul et al., 2008;Johnson, 2005;Santtila et al., 1999). ...
Forensic Mental Health Practitioner provided by the American Institute for the Advancement of Forensic Study
Abstract
Source monitoring has been identified as one of the most significant contributors to witness memory error (Deason et al., 2017; Johnson, 2006; Johnson, Hastroudi & Lindsay, 1993; Morosan et al., 2018). Within source monitoring, many components play a role in these errors and many ways in which source monitoring interplays with other elements that create error (Loftus, 1979; Johnson et al., 1993; Wells, 2018). Those include a specific type of source monitoring, called reality monitoring, as well as suggestibility, age of the witness, mental state of the witness, and extend to the jurors ability to judge a witness' source monitoring accuracy (Ackil & Zargoza, 1995; Fitzgerald, 2000; Humpston, Linden & Evans, 2017; Johnson, Bush & Mitchell, 1998; Price, Connolly & Gordon, 2016). Professionals working within the criminal justice system should be aware of the possibility of source monitoring errors, and the components that play a part in those errors.
... The third theoretical position on the misinformation effect is the coexistence hypothesis (Belli, 1989;Johnson et al., 1993;Lindsay & Johnson, 1987) in which both the original event and misleading information are proposed to co-exist in memory with the post-event misinformation benefiting from being studied more recently (Morton et al., 1985). In line with its name, the coexistence hypothesis can readily coexist alongside the misinformation acceptance hypothesis and the weaker (but not the strong) variant of the "destructive updating" hypothesis. ...
... It is particularly interesting to consider these findings in the context of the source monitoring framework (Johnson & Raye, 1981;Johnson et al., 1977), coexistence hypothesis (Belli, 1989;Johnson et al., 1993;Lindsay & Johnson, 1987), and theoretical work linking the SMF and misinformation effect susceptibility (Dodhia & Metcalfe, 1999;Hekkanen & McEvoy, 2002;Lindsay & Johnson, 1989a;Zaragoza & Lane, 1994). ...
... In this framework, the primary difference between true and misinformation based memory traces are elevated visual feature strength in true memories as well as elevated semantic and temporal (due to the relative recency of the narrative information) feature strength in misinformation memories. In addition to its evident links to the source monitoring framework, this model can also be viewed from a memory impairment perspective, specifically in light of the coexistence hypothesis (Belli, 1989;Johnson et al., 1993;Lindsay & Johnson, 1987) in which both the original event and misleading information are proposed to co-exist in memory. From this angle, increased preferences for verbal\semantic processes would elevate both the initial encoding strength as well as the likelihood and\or strength of reactivation of verbal\semantic traces during memory retrieval, reducing the likelihood of those visual traces being activated sufficiently enough to produce an endorsement response. ...
The goal of this dissertation is to investigate links between susceptibility to misinformation on the misinformation effect paradigm and individual differences in visual and verbal source monitoring ability. Results from four studies are reported. The first three studies assess links between individual differences in perceptual misinformation endorsement levels and visualization (Word-As-Picture) as well as verbalization (Picture-As-Word) errors on the memory test of a source monitoring task in which a set of objects were initially presented either as pictures or words during study. In Study 1, this picture-word source monitoring task and a misinformation effect paradigm, with a True/False test format, was administered to a sample of 87 participants. In Study 2, the same picture-word source monitoring task and the misinformation effect paradigm, this time with a two-alternative forced-choice test format, was administered to a sample of 177 participants. In Study 3, electroencephalographic (EEG) data was recorded during the testing phases of a picture-word source monitoring task and a misinformation effect paradigm administered to a sample of 19 participants. Across all three studies, verbalization (Picture-As-Word) errors was more strongly linked with misinformation susceptibility than visualization errors (Word-As-Picture). Building on these results, Study 4 assessed the misinformation susceptibility related predictive value of individual differences in visual and verbal processing during the event and narrative study stages of the misinformation effect paradigm. In Study 4, EEG data was recorded during the during the event and narrative study phases of a misinformation effect paradigm administered to a sample of 30 participants. The primary findings from Study 4 indicate that during the event and narrative encoding stages in the misinformation effect, activity in neural regions associated with semantic and verbal processing is more strongly related to misinformation susceptibility relative to activity areas related to visual processing and encoding. Collectively, these results indicate that verbalization based processes may play a stronger role in misinformation susceptibility relative to visualization related processing. Drawing on this observation, an integrative framework highlighting the role of modality related features in a source monitoring perspective of the misinformation effect is proposed.
... The third theoretical position on the misinformation effect is the coexistence hypothesis (Belli, 1989;Johnson et al., 1993;Lindsay & Johnson, 1987) in which both the original event and misleading information are proposed to co-exist in memory with the post-event misinformation benefiting from being studied more recently (Morton et al., 1985). In line with its name, the coexistence hypothesis can readily coexist alongside the misinformation acceptance hypothesis and the weaker (but not the strong) variant of the "destructive updating" hypothesis. ...
... It is particularly interesting to consider these findings in the context of the source monitoring framework (Johnson & Raye, 1981;Johnson et al., 1977), coexistence hypothesis (Belli, 1989;Johnson et al., 1993;Lindsay & Johnson, 1987), and theoretical work linking the SMF and misinformation effect susceptibility (Dodhia & Metcalfe, 1999;Hekkanen & McEvoy, 2002;Lindsay & Johnson, 1989a;Zaragoza & Lane, 1994). ...
... In this framework, the primary difference between true and misinformation based memory traces are elevated visual feature strength in true memories as well as elevated semantic and temporal (due to the relative recency of the narrative information) feature strength in misinformation memories. In addition to its evident links to the source monitoring framework, this model can also be viewed from a memory impairment perspective, specifically in light of the coexistence hypothesis (Belli, 1989;Johnson et al., 1993;Lindsay & Johnson, 1987) in which both the original event and misleading information are proposed to co-exist in memory. From this angle, increased preferences for verbal\semantic processes would elevate both the initial encoding strength as well as the likelihood and\or strength of reactivation of verbal\semantic traces during memory retrieval, reducing the likelihood of those visual traces being activated sufficiently enough to produce an endorsement response. ...
The goal of this dissertation is to investigate links between susceptibility to misinformation on the misinformation effect paradigm and individual differences in visual and verbal source monitoring ability. Results from four studies are reported. The first three studies assess links between individual differences in perceptual misinformation endorsement levels and visualization (Word-As-Picture) as well as verbalization (Picture-As-Word) errors on the memory test of a source monitoring task in which a set of objects were initially presented either as pictures or words during study. In Study 1, this picture-word source monitoring task and a misinformation effect paradigm, with a True/False test format, was administered to a sample of 87 participants. In Study 2, the same picture-word source monitoring task and the misinformation effect paradigm, this time with a two-alternative forced-choice test format, was administered to a sample of 177 participants. In Study 3, electroencephalographic (EEG) data was recorded during the testing phases of a picture-word source monitoring task and a misinformation effect paradigm administered to a sample of 19 participants. Across all three studies, verbalization (Picture-As-Word) errors was more strongly linked with misinformation susceptibility than visualization errors (Word-As-Picture). Building on these results, Study 4 assessed the misinformation susceptibility related predictive value of individual differences in visual and verbal processing during the event and narrative study stages of the misinformation effect paradigm. In Study 4, EEG data was recorded during the during the event and narrative study phases of a misinformation effect paradigm administered to a sample of 30 participants. The primary findings from Study 4 indicate that during the event and narrative encoding stages in the misinformation effect, activity in neural regions associated with semantic and verbal processing is more strongly related to misinformation susceptibility relative to activity areas related to visual processing and encoding. Collectively, these results indicate that verbalization based processes may play a stronger role in misinformation susceptibility relative to visualization related processing. Drawing on this observation, an integrative framework highlighting the role of modality related features in a source monitoring perspective of the misinformation effect is proposed. Advisor: Robert F. Belli
... This research can assist the courts in finding effective remedies for PTP bias. The chapter explores how exposure to PTP is similar to exposure to misinformation in the reversed suggestibility paradigm and that memory for the trial can be affected by misinformation (PTP) presented before the trial (Lindsay & Johnson, 1989;Rantzen & Markham, 1992). The chapter will also review research and theory examining whether memory errors (e.g., source misattributions) and biases of individual jurors are likely to be corrected by jury members during deliberations. ...
... Pretrial Publicity Affects Juror Decision Making and Memory 3 In the reversed suggestibility paradigm the order of presentation of the misinformation and the target event is reversed with the misinformation being presented before the target event. Research using this paradigm has shown that memory performance is also affected by misinformation presented before the to-be-remembered event (Lindsay & Johnson, 1989;Rantzen & Markham, 1992). The reverse suggestibility paradigm creates an experimental situation that is similar to the real world situation of juror exposure to PTP (misinformation) and the trial (to-be-remembered event). ...
Pretrial publicity (PTP) has been found to have a biasing effect on jury decision
making. This chapter explores how research and theory in cognitive psychology has been
used to examine the mechanisms responsible for PTP’s biasing effects on jury decisions.
This research can assist the courts in finding effective remedies for PTP bias. The chapter
explores how exposure to PTP is similar to exposure to misinformation in the reversed
suggestibility paradigm and that memory for the trial can be affected by misinformation
(PTP) presented before the trial (Lindsay & Johnson, 1989; Rantzen & Markham, 1992).
The chapter will also review research and theory examining whether memory errors (e.g.,
source misattributions) and biases of individual jurors are likely to be corrected by jury
members during deliberations. A review of relevant literature is followed by the
presentation of two research studies. The first study explores whether deliberation
reduces the biasing effects of PTP by comparing group (jury) and individual (juror)
decisions using the nominal group method. This study also explores whether jurors who
are exposed to PTP are likely to misattribute information presented only in the PTP to the
trial. The second study explores the effects of both negative (anti-defendant) and positive
(pro-defendant) PTP on juror decision making. Both studies suggests that even if jurors
are instructed not to use information contained in the PTP to make decisions about guilt,
they may be unable or unwilling to do so because of source memory errors and their
perceptions of the defendant and trial attorneys. This research also suggests that jury
deliberations can increase (polarize) juror bias and therefore, cannot be counted on to
remedy the effect of PTP on jury decision making.
... This research can assist the courts in finding effective remedies for PTP bias. The chapter explores how exposure to PTP is similar to exposure to misinformation in the reversed suggestibility paradigm and that memory for the trial can be affected by misinformation (PTP) presented before the trial (Lindsay & Johnson, 1989;Rantzen & Markham, 1992). The chapter will also review research and theory examining whether memory errors (e.g., source misattributions) and biases of individual jurors are likely to be corrected by jury members during deliberations. ...
... In the reversed suggestibility paradigm the order of presentation of the misinformation and the target event is reversed with the misinformation being presented before the target event. Research using this paradigm has shown that memory performance is also affected by misinformation presented before the to-be-remembered event (Lindsay & Johnson, 1989;Rantzen & Markham, 1992). The reverse suggestibility paradigm creates an experimental situation that is similar to the real world situation of juror exposure to PTP (misinformation) and the trial (to-be-remembered event). ...
Pretrial publicity (PTP) has been found to have a biasing effect on jury decision making. This chapter explores how research and theory in cognitive psychology has been used to examine the mechanisms responsible for PTP’s biasing effects on jury decisions. This research can assist the courts in finding effective remedies for PTP bias. This research suggests that jury deliberations can increase (polarize) juror bias and therefore, cannot be counted on to remedy the effect of PTP on jury decision making. This book also reviews research and theory examining whether memory errors (e.g., source misattributions) and biases of individual jurors are likely to be corrected by jury members during deliberations.
... The suitability of the modified test, though, has been questioned. According to source monitoring principles (Lindsay & Johnson, 1987), subjects are usually good at Pohl,Schumacher,& Friedrich: Misinformation effect 3 distinguishing between familiar and new items. Impaired discrimination between original and misleading source will then not be detected by the modified test. ...
... The reported research focussed on the postevent-misinformation effect-as typically found in eyewitness-misinformation studies (see Loftus et al., 1989;Schumacher, 1991)-and on source-monitoring approaches (Lindsay & Johnson, 1987, 1989. The evidence supplied in Experiments 1 and 2 is consistent with the McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) argument stating that the misinformation effect may not be caused by impairment of original memory but rather by demand characteristics of the test procedure used (response bias). ...
Subjects' recollections of earlier encoded (original) information can be distorted by presenting contradictory information prior to the attempt of recalling the original information. This paradigm has supplied a wealth of empirical evidence. In this paper, we present three lines of research: (1) In order to investigate the influence of source confusion on the misinformation effect, we present ModiCHARM, a holographic associative memory model that allows simulation of source confusion and forgetting in misinformation studies. We report two simulations, where ModiCHARM successfully modeled different sets of empirical data; (2) To further test the source-confusion approach, we varied the modality of material presentation in two misinformation experiments. We found only small modality effects, but a different, so far neglected, variable proved its importance: subjects' awareness of contradictions; and (3) Finally, we present an experiment where misinformation effect and hindsight bias were directly compared to each other. Using numerical items as material, we found the same mean distortion in subjects' recollections under both paradigms. Analyzing the data with a multinomial model, though, suggested that only hindsight subjects suffered from genuine recollection blends, while the misinformation effect was based on demand characteristics.
... According to the source misattribution/confusion explanation of the misinformation effect (see Lindsay & Johnson, 1987), source confusion occurs regarding the respective origins of both event and postevent information upon an attempt to remember the event. Research shows that it is more difficult for participants to determine under what circumstances different items were experienced than to discriminate between items that were and were not experienced (Lindsay & Johnson, 1987). ...
... According to the source misattribution/confusion explanation of the misinformation effect (see Lindsay & Johnson, 1987), source confusion occurs regarding the respective origins of both event and postevent information upon an attempt to remember the event. Research shows that it is more difficult for participants to determine under what circumstances different items were experienced than to discriminate between items that were and were not experienced (Lindsay & Johnson, 1987). Given this notion that explains the misinformation as a source confusion error, we can expect that variables that would increase source confusion errors or disrupt source monitoring would also increase suggestibility to the misinformation effect, and variables that would aid source monitoring should decrease vulnerability to misinformation. ...
The aim of the present study was twofold, to attempt to reduce false memories with the experimental manipulation of giving feedback; and to assess factors that potentially increase suggestibility to false memories, such as stress. In Experiment-1 an immediate feedback manipulation was introduced to reduce false memory rates, especially in older adults. A second aim of the experiment was to see if the feedback manipulation would decrease false memory rates in a source monitoring task, rather than a regular yes/no recognition task, as well. Results failed to demonstrate a facilitating effect of the source monitoring test or the feedback manipulation on memory performance. In Experiment-2, the effect of stress on false memory was investigated under the misinformation paradigm. In order to do this, stress was induced in half of the participants using the Trier Social Stress Test (Kirschbaum, Pirke, & Hellhammer, 1993). Older, but not younger, adults showed increased levels of false recall rates under conditions of stress.
... Diese und ähnliche Fragestellungen werden im Rahmen des Realitäts-bzw. Quellenüberwachungsansatzes untersucht (Johnson, 1985(Johnson, , 1988Johnson, Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 1993;Johnson & Raye, 1981;Lindsay & Johnson, 1987, 1989Mitchell & Johnson, 2000). Während die dazu vorgelegten Untersuchungen meist mit relativ einfachen Ereignissen gearbeitet haben, ist es unser Anliegen, diesen Ansatz auf hochkomplexe Ereignisse, nämlich Schilderungen autobiografischer Ereignisse bzw. ...
... Im Rahmen der Theorie zur Realitäts-und Quellenüberwachung (Johnson, 1985(Johnson, , 1988Johnson et al., 1993;Johnson & Raye, 1981;Lindsay & Johnson, 1987, 1989Mitchell & Johnson, 2000) wurde versucht, qualitative Unterschiede ("Erinnerungsqualitäten") zwischen Berichten über Erinnerungen an tatsächlich erlebte versus Erinnerungen an lediglich vorgestellte Ereignisse herauszuarbeiten und diese Unterschiede systematisch zu ordnen. Aus diesen inhaltlichen Analysen von Erinnerungsqualitäten lassen sich letztendlich Kriterien zur Unterscheidung der beiden Arten von Erinnerungen ableiten, die zur Diskrimination verschiedener Arten von intern bzw. ...
Zusammenfassung. Im Zentrum dieser Untersuchung steht die Frage, wodurch wir tatsachlich Erlebtes von lediglich Vorgestelltem, durch Gedanken oder unsere Fantasie Geschaffenem, unterscheiden konnen. Diese und ahnliche Fragestellungen werden im Rahmen des Realitatsuberwachungsansatzes untersucht, allerdings mit relativ einfachen Handlungssequenzen. Ziel dieser Untersuchung war, diesen Ansatz auf komplexere autobiografische Erlebnisse auszudehnen und seine Brauchbarkeit bei der Diskrimination von erlebten vs. erfundenen Erlebnissen zu uberprufen. Wir liesen 100 Studierende, Schuler und Auszubildende innerhalb einer Woche je eine auf einem tatsachlichen, “besonderen“ Erlebnis beruhende und eine frei erfundene Geschichte - in ausbalancierter Reihenfolge - niederschreiben. Im Anschluss daran sollten die Verfasser die Geschichten anhand des Selbstbeurteilungsbogens von Erinnerungsqualitaten (SBEQ) - einer adaptierten Fassung von Johnson, Foley, Suengas und Raye’s (1988) Memory Characteristics Questionnaire - ei...
... One possibility is that answering multiple-choice questions is somewhat similar to answering open-ended questions at least when the source text is not available and when the quality of distractor options are carefully controlled such that test takers need to engage in a careful evaluation of which answer option best matches the contents of the source text according to memory. This hypothesis is based on cognitive psychological research in memory (Lindsay & Johnson, 1987;Zaragoza & Koshmider, 1989, also see Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993, for a discussion of the effect of task format on recognition memory), which suggests that the selection of the correct answer among perceptually and/or conceptually similar multiple-choice options requires the retrieval of high quality representations of the source information (e.g., text content in this context). ...
... The finding that performance on multiple-choice and open-ended questions in the without-text condition is highly correlated is consistent with existing research on memory retrieval and recognition task literature (Lindsay & Johnson, 1987;Zaragoza & Koshmider, 1989, also see Johnson et al., 1993 for a discussion of the effect of task format on recognition memory). This finding indicates that selecting the right answer option from several alternatives, which share a large conceptual and/or perceptual overlap to the correct answer, requires: (a) retrieving the target answer from memory, and (b) rigorously comparing memory of the target with all the answer options along relevant features, as opposed to selecting an answer based on familiarity. ...
This study examines how passage availability and reading comprehension question format (open-ended vs. multiple-choice) influence question answering. In two experiments, college undergraduates read an expository passage and answered open-ended and multiple-choice versions of text-based, local, and global bridging inference questions. Half the participants were allowed to refer to the passage when answering the questions and half were not. Participants' prior domain knowledge relating to the text contents was assessed using multiple-choice and open-ended questions. Correlation-based analyses in the two experiments indicated: (a) a decline in the relationship between prior domain knowledge and comprehension when the passage was available during question answering; and (b) a high correlation between multiple-choice and open-ended question answering performance when the passage was not available for reference. Overall the results indicate that the nature of the reading comprehension assessment is influenced by the specific task with which comprehension is assessed.
... Reality monitoring is a special case of the broader domain of source monitoring-discriminating among memories of various origins (Johnson, 1988;Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). According to Johnson and colleagues (e.g., Hashtroudi, Johnson, & Chrosniak, 1990;Johnson, 1988Johnson, , 1991aJohnson & Foley, 1984;Johnson & Raye, 1981;Lindsay & Johnson, 1987), source monitoring typically is based on various qualitative characteristics of memories, namely records of perceptual details, contextual and affective information, semantic content, and cognitive operations. Cognitive operations refer to the records established at encoding of the cognitive activity involved in perception and reflection (e.g., Johnson, 1983Johnson, , 1991bJohnson & Hirst, 1993). ...
Two studies used a response–signal procedure to explore the time course of source-monitoring judgments about perceived and imagined events. Ss judged whether probe words corresponded to pictures that had previously been seen or imagined or were new. Old–new recognition accuracy grew to significant levels before reality-monitoring accuracy, supporting the notion that source monitoring requires more of or a different type of information than does old–new recognition. Also, source identification accuracy developed more quickly for imagined items than for perceived items. This difference in time-course functions is consistent with the idea that memories for perceived and imagined events differ in the relative amounts of various types of information they include (Johnson & Raye, 1981) and that these different types of information may revive or become available to source attribution mechanisms at different rates or may be differentially salient during reality monitoring.
... It is likely that children who went along with the incriminating interviewer's suggestions later remembered or confused the suggested information with their factual recall. This explanation points to another factor that could have contributed to children's suggestibility: difficulties in source monitoring (see Lindsay & Johnson, 1987). Source monitoring, or reality monitoring, refers to the capacity to discriminate between different sources of one's memories. ...
Fifty-four children (33 girls and 21 boys), 4 to 6 years old, participated in an experiment examining the effects of leading interviews on their interpretations and factual recall of an interaction with a teaching assistant (TA). Children were either familiar or unfamiliar with the TA and were interviewed in either an incriminating or a neutral manner. In comparison with neutral-interview children, incriminating-interview children made more cued-recall errors and endorsed more biased interpretations of the TA's actions. Familiarity with the TA had limited effects on free recall and interpretations of the TA's actions and had no effect on cued recall. Results indicated that 4- to 6-year-olds will produce misleading reports about their interactions with either familiar or unfamiliar adults when they are promoted to do so by an opinionated adult interviewer.
... In summary, the results support the view that exposure to misinformation does not lead subjects to believe they remember seeing the misinformation, nor does it reduce subjects' ability to accurately identify the source of originally seen information. These results are particularly interesting in light of the fact that several researchers have proposed that misinformation effects may be caused in part because subjects confuse the source of the original and misleading information (e.g., Lindsay & Johnson, 1987). The present results provide no evidence of source confusions caused by misleading information. ...
Many studies have demonstrated that subjects exposed to misleading postevent information are likely to report the misinformation with confidence on subsequent tests of memory for the event. The purpose of the present studies was to determine whether subjects exposed to misleading postevent information come to believe they remember seeing the misinformation at the original event. A second question addressed by the present studies is whether exposure to misinformation reduces subjects’ ability to remember the source of items they witnessed at the original event. In two experiments, subjects viewed a slide sequence depicting an event, were subsequently exposed to misleading information or neutral information about selected aspects of the event, and were later tested on their memory for the source of original and misleading details. The results showed that exposure to misinformation did not lead subjects to believe they remembered seeing the misinformation, nor did it reduce subjects’ ability to accurately identify the source of originally seen details. The same pattern of results was obtained whether subjects were tested immediately (Experiment 1) or after a 1-day delay (Experiment 2). Collectively, the results suggest that subjects may report misinformation even if they know they do not remember seeing it.
... Second, some verbal cues are age-specific. For example, it is understood that the verbal lie detection tool Reality Monitoring cannot be used with younger children because they have more difficulty than adults to distinguish fact from fantasy (Lindsay, 2002;Lindsay & Johnson, 1987). ...
Since its introduction into the field of deception detection, the verbal channel has become a rapidly growing area of research. The basic assumption is that liars differ from truth tellers in their verbal behaviour, making it possible to classify them by inspecting their verbal accounts. However, as noted in conferences and in private communication between researchers, the field of verbal lie detection faces several challenges that merit focused attention. Nine researchers and three practitioners with experience in credibility assessments gathered for 3 days of discussion at Bar-Ilan University (Israel) in the first international verbal lie detection workshop, with the mission of promoting solutions for urgent issues in the field. The primary session of the workshop took place the morning of the first day. In this session, each of the participants had up to 10 min to deliver a brief message, using just one slide. Researchers were asked to answer the question: ‘In your view, what is the most urgent, unsolved question/issue in verbal lie detection?’ Similarly, practitioners were asked: ‘As a practitioner, what question/issue do you wish verbal lie detection research would address?’ The issues raised served as the basis for the discussions that were held throughout the workshop. In the current presentation I will present several messages to researchers in the field, designed to deliver the insights, decisions, and conclusions resulting from the workshop discussions.
... Second, some verbal cues are age-specific. For example, it is understood that the verbal lie detection tool Reality Monitoring cannot be used with younger children because they have more difficulty than adults to distinguish fact from fantasy (Lindsay, 2002;Lindsay & Johnson, 1987). ...
... Pierwszym, i być może najważniejszym pytaniem jest to, czy efekt dezinformacji jest zjawiskiem czysto pamięciowym. O ile zdecydowana większość badań (Loftus i Palmer, 1974;Loftus i współpracownicy, 1978;Loftus, 1975Loftus, , 1979Loftus i Loftus, 1980, Bekerian i Bowers, 1983Bowers i Bekerian, 1984;Christiaansen i Ochalek, 1983;Morton, Hammersley i Bekerian, 1985;Metcalfe, 1990;Ayers i Reder, 1998;Lindsay i Johnson, 1987;Zaragoza i Lane, 1994;Loftus, 2005 (Greene i in., 1982). Ponadto badani mają prawo sądzić, że w ramach eksperymentu nic nie jest dziełem przypadku, a tym bardziej błędu. ...
The aim of the presented study was to investigate the influence of misinformation (misleading post-event information) on transaction prices in Smith, Suchanek & Williams experimental asset markets. In a standard experimental market, participants receive an instruction directly stating the probabilities of receiving dividends for owning stocks. In three experiments presented in this paper, participants also received misinformation regarding the chances to receive high or low dividends. Remuneration for investment was also manipulated. Among participants who received remuneration, significant differences between treatments were found. The group receiving homogenous misinformation suggesting high dividends yielded the highest transaction prices; lower prices were found in groups with homogenous misinformation suggesting low dividends, and without misinformation (instruction only). The group in which half of the participants received misinformation suggesting high dividends and the other half did not receive misinformation, yielded the lowest transaction prices. It was also found that participants who received misinformation generated lower profits than participants who did not receive misinformation. The described differences were not found in participants who did not receive remuneration.
Celem pracy było zbadanie wpływu dezinformacji (nieprawidłowej informacji następczej) na ceny transakcyjne akcji na rynkach eksperymentalnych Smitha, Suchanka i Williamsa. Na standardowym rynku eksperymentalnym osoby badane otrzymują instrukcję zawierającą informacje o prawdopodobieństwie wylosowania dywidend, otrzymywanych podczas gry za posiadane przez nich akcje. W trzech przedstawionych eksperymentach oprócz wspomnianej instrukcji wprowadzano dezinformację dotyczącą szans wylosowania wysokich lub niskich dywidend. Manipulowano także otrzymywaną przez uczestników motywacją wykonaniową (wynagrodzeniem zależnym od osiągniętych na rynku zysków). Wśród osób, które otrzymywały wynagrodzenie, stwierdzono istotne różnice w cenach transakcyjnych. Najwyższe ceny zanotowano w warunku, w którym wszyscy badani otrzymywali dezinformację wskazującą na wysokie dywidendy; niżej plasował się warunek z jednolitą dezinformacją o niskiej dywidendzie oraz warunek bez dezinformacji (w którym badani otrzymywali tylko opisaną wcześniej instrukcję); najniższe ceny zanotowano w warunku, w którym połowa badanych otrzymywała dezinformację wskazującą na wysokie dywidendy, połowa nie otrzymywała dezinformacji. Wykazano także, iż osoby zdezinformowane uzyskują niższą stopę zwrotu z inwestycji na rynku eksperymentalnym niż osoby niezdezinformowane. Omawianych różnic nie stwierdzono w warunku bez motywacji.
... Source monitoring errors can lead to the acceptance of misinformation when a person misattributes misinformation as having occurred during the original event (Lindsay & Johnson, 1987, 1989McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985). Research in both children and adults has found that source monitoring reduces suggestibility (Giles, Gopnik, & Heyman, 2002;Zaragoza & Lane, 1994). ...
This is the first reported study of children's use of two metacognitive strategies, recollection rejection and diagnostic monitoring, to reject misinformation. Recollection rejection involves the retrieval of details that disqualify an event, whereas diagnostic monitoring involves the failure to retrieve expected details. First (n = 56, age 7 years) and third graders (n = 52, age 9 years) witnessed a staged classroom interaction involving common and bizarre accidents, were presented with misinformation about the source of these events, and took a memory test. Both age groups used recollection rejection, but third graders were more effective. There was little evidence that diagnostic monitoring influenced responses for bizarre events, potentially because these events were not sufficiently bizarre in the context of the stereotype induction.
... Studies have reliably indicated very poor performance on source memory in children under the age of 5 years (O' Neill and Gopnik, 1991, Gopnik and Graff, 1988, Wimmer et al., 1988, Whitcombe and Robinson, 2000, Taylor et al., 1994, Drummey and Newcombe, 2002 However, models of source memory suggest that that qualitative differences in the experience of remembering information acquired from different sources are used to differentiate between these memories and determine their source (Johnson et al., 1993, Lindsay andJohnson, 1987). Thus this monitoring requires not only the re-experience of the event(s), but also the ability to distinguish between multiple representations. ...
Episodic Cognition (or “Mental Time Travel”) is the ability to mentally re-experience events from our personal past and imagine potential events from our personal future. This capacity is fundamental to our lives and has been argued to be uniquely human. The aim of this thesis is to use behavioural tasks developed in comparative cognition to integrate both the literature on different research subjects (animals, children, adults, patients) but also from different theoretical perspectives, with the hope of facilitating communication and comparison between these fields.
The backbone of the thesis is the behavioural tasks themselves, along with their origins in theory. Specifically, the “What-Where-When”, “Unexpected Question” and “Free Recall” episodic memory tasks and the “Bischof-Köhler” test of episodic foresight. Each of these tasks stems from different theoretical approaches to defining episodic cognition. Whilst extensively studied, these four tasks have never been undertaken by the same subjects and have never been directly compared. It is thus unclear whether these different theoretical perspectives converge on a single “episodic cognition” system, or a variety of overlapping processes. This thesis explores these issues by presenting these tasks to previously untested animal (the Eurasian Jay), developing children (aged 3-6), and a sample of human adults (Cambridge Undergraduates). Finally, these findings are applied in the assessment of episodic cognition in a population that is thought to have mild hippocampal damage – the overweight and obese.
It was predicted that if all these putative tests of episodic cognition were tapping into the same underlying ability, then they should be passed by the same animal species, develop at the same time in children, correlate in human adults and be impaired in those with damage to the relevant brain areas. These predictions were, to some degree, confirmed. While the novel animal model could not be tested on all paradigms, the jays performed well on Bischof-Köhler future planning test. However, the results of the What-Where-When memory test were equivocal. There was a relatively low degree of correlation between performance on all the tasks in human children, along with a suggestion that each had a distinct developmental trajectory. The study of human adults revealed that while performance on all the tasks were related to one another, this relationship was often nonlinear, suggesting the contribution of several different psychological processes. Finally, it was found that both memory and performance on the Bischof-Köhler future planning task were altered in individuals who are overweight. A potentially surprising theme throughout the results is that performance on the Bischof-Köhler tasks is in fact negatively related to performance on memory tests, and improves in patients thought to have mild hippocampal damage.
It is concluded that there may be a significant degree of overlap in the processes tapped by different putative tests of episodic memory, but that they can not be considered to be equivalent. Furthermore, it is suggested that episodic cognition is a fundamentally ineffective system with which to predict future motivational states, because it is biased by current feelings.
... Les jeunes enfants présenteraient également des difficultés à distinguer les informations réelles des informations erronées ou imaginées (problème de " reality monitoring " : cf. Jones & McGraw, 1987 ;Lindsay & Johnson, 1987 ;Wakefield & Underwager, 1988 ;Yarmey, 1990). ...
... Indeed , people sometimes mistake memories of reflective episodes for memories of perceptual experiences (Johnson & Raye , 1981). Such failures in " real ity monitoring" are a special case of failures in source monitoring (Johnson , 1988;Lindsay & Johnson, 1987). ...
The standard temporal order of events used in studies of eyewitness suggestibility was reversed: Misled subjects were given verbal suggestions about a visual scene before witnessing it. As in the standard procedure, the subjects were later tested on memory of the visual scene. A suggestibility effect was obtained with this reversed procedure, even though the verbal information could not “update” the target memory because no memory of the visual scene existed when the misleading suggestions were given.
... The cognitive process normally referred to as source monitoring reflects the ability of the individual to attribute the origin of memories [40], including the context of individual memories such as those involving personal knowledge and beliefs [41]. Research into the nature of and changes in accuracy in source monitoring normally differentiate among three types of source monitoring, reality monitoring, eternal monitoring (ESM), and internal monitoring (ISM) [40][41][42][43][44][45]. Internal source monitoring involves the ability to distinguish between memories for internally generated events (e.g., "Last week, did I actually call her a 'drama queen' or did I only think it?"). ...
Children (n = 85) between the ages of 6 and 16 were administered two tests of source monitoring proficiency, one an external source test and the second an internal source test. In addition, the children were assessed using the Children's Category Test (CCT), the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Third Edition (WISC-III), and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST). The primary interest was to compare the source monitoring and cognitive processes of children in foster care with a diagnosed conduct disorder and children in foster care without a psychiatric diagnosis. In addition, a group consisting of children living with their parents was included for comparative purposes. For the primary analyses, the dependent variables consisted of raw ISM and ESM scores, full-scale IQ, measures of working memory and processing speed, and the total and perseverative error measures of the WCST. First, because age differences were expected, a MANOVA was used with the age of the subject grouped into three categories of 6 to 8-, 9 to 12-, and 13 to 16-year olds. Following the verification of age differences on the dependent measures, a MANCOVA was used to examine the influence of abuse/neglect by comparing individuals in foster care, with and without a psychiatric diagnosis. Therefore, the study comprised three groups: (1) a group of children living at home with the parents and serving as a comparison group, (2) a control group consisting of children living in foster care but with no psychiatric diagnosis, and (3) a group of children living in foster care with a diagnosed conduct disorder. Age, as a continuous variable, served as the covariate. ISM scores revealed that both of the control groups differed from the foster care / conduct disorder group, with scores in the foster care control group comparable to that of the intact family comparison group. The intact family comparison group had significantly higher FS-IQ scores than either foster care group. In addition, FS-IQ scores in the foster care control group were intermediate between that of the intact family comparison and conduct disorder groups. Children in the intact family comparison group made significantly fewer total errors and perseverative errors than either foster care group. However, the number of perseverative errors for the two foster care groups was comparable. Keywords: Conduct Disorder, Memory, Executive Function, Foster-Care Language: en
... According to the source monitoring model, event memories are attributed to particular sources in one's past experience by means of decision processes performed (often without awareness) during remembering (see, e.g., Hashtroudi, Johnson, & Chrosniak, 1989;Johnson, 1988;Lindsay & Johnson, 1987;Lindsay, Johnson, & Kwon, 1990). The term source refers to a variety of attributes that, collectively, specify the conditions under which an event memory was acquired (e.g., its spatial and temporal context, medium, modality, etc.) . ...
This study demonstrates a manipulation that has opposite effects on old/new recognition and source monitoring. Deep processing of target items improved performance on an old/new recognition test in which subjects were to discriminate between targets and new distractors, but it impaired performance on a source monitoring test in which subjects were to discriminate between targets and distractors that had also been deeply processed during the experimental session. We argue that the relationship between old/new recognition and source monitoring varies with the specifics of the situation. The aspects of memories that support recognition judgments are not necessarily the same as those that support source monitoring judgments, and memory performance is the joint product of what is stored in memory and how memory is tested.
... In future work, researchers could more pointedly probe children's reports of the presence of a scene to better characterize the form of their memories. Similarly, an entire literature documents younger children's difficulties with reality and source monitoring (Table 1, property 6; for a review, see Lindsay & Johnson, 1987). Event memory may help explain children's memory errors in terms of whether memories are remembered as real or imagined. ...
An event memory is a mental construction of a scene recalled as a single occurrence. It therefore requires the hippocampus and ventral visual stream needed for all scene construction. The construction need not come with a sense of reliving or be made by a participant in the event, and it can be a summary of occurrences from more than one encoding. The mental construction, or physical rendering, of any scene must be done from a specific location and time; this introduces a "self" located in space and time, which is a necessary, but need not be a sufficient, condition for a sense of reliving. We base our theory on scene construction rather than reliving because this allows the integration of many literatures and because there is more accumulated knowledge about scene construction's phenomenology, behavior, and neural basis. Event memory differs from episodic memory in that it does not conflate the independent dimensions of whether or not a memory is relived, is about the self, is recalled voluntarily, or is based on a single encoding with whether it is recalled as a single occurrence of a scene. Thus, we argue that event memory provides a clearer contrast to semantic memory, which also can be about the self, be recalled voluntarily, and be from a unique encoding; allows for a more comprehensive dimensional account of the structure of explicit memory; and better accounts for laboratory and real-world behavioral and neural results, including those from neuropsychology and neuroimaging, than does episodic memory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved).
... In contrast, details that vary across occurrences remain in memory, but the associations between specific details and the occurrence in which they were present weakens, and this is especially true for children (Powell, Roberts, Ceci, & Hembrooke, 1999;see Roberts, 2002, for a review). That is, when recalling a memory for which a script has been developed, children retrieve overall categories (e.g., "whenever mum goes"), and they have strong memories for the different alternatives (e.g., "at work," "at the neighbors," "at the shops") associated with the categories (Roberts, 2002), but struggle in tying the alternatives to specific times (Lindsay & Johnson, 1987). Interviewing, therefore, needs to be supportive in helping children to reconstruct these connections. ...
For just over two decades, researchers have been conducting empirical studies devoted to understanding children’s memory for, and ability to describe, individual occurrences of events they have experienced repeatedly. This knowledge is critical because children making allegations of repeated abuse are required to provide details particular to an individual incident in many jurisdictions internationally. Much of this work has thus far been conducted in rigorously controlled analog settings, and empirical study of their generalizability to the context of field interviews is urgently needed. We outline in detail the empirical and theoretical foundations that underlie a set of specific suggestions that practitioners might consider when assisting children to report as much information as possible about individual occurrences of repeated abuse. Our recommendations cover both presubstantive (i.e., “practice”) and substantive phases of the interview. The particular challenges involved with describing individual incidents of repeated events are discussed, followed by evidence-based guidelines aimed at overcoming these difficulties. We highlight research that has included comparisons between lab and field data, and draw attention to areas of understanding that require further validation in forensic interviews. The inaugural guidelines we present are not meant as a replacement to existing best practice interviews, but to serve as more detailed procedures in cases of repeated allegations.
... Todos ellos han llegado a la conclusión de que los sujetos tienen grandes problemas a la hora de decidir si el detalle sugerido ha sido visto o procede de otras fuentes, como por ejemplo de la narración del suceso o las preguntas que le realizó el investigador. Lindsay y Johnson (1987 Johnson ( , 1989), en otros experimentos en los que también pedían juicios sobre el origen de sus memorias reales y sugeridas encontraron que los sujetos confundían su origen, y argumentan que sería debido a que son poco críticos a la hora de realizar estos juicios. De esta forma, una interesante explicación al efecto de la información post-suceso engañosa proviene de los estudios sobre la distinción del origen de los recuerdos, en el marco del modelo de Control de la Realidad propuesto por Johnson y Raye (1981). ...
El objetivo principal del presente estudio consistió en analizar las características diferenciales entre los recuerdos procedentes de una fuente real y los procedentes de una fuente sugerida. De esta forma, se analizaron las características cualitativas y cuantitativas que podrían distinguir el origen de los recuerdos. Los sujetos presenciaron un accidente de tráfico, posteriormente se sugirió la existencia de una señal de tráfico y se manipuló el verbo con el que se describía el suceso. Los resultados mostraron efectos sobre las velocidades estimadas de los vehículos implicados en el suceso y sobre la calidad de los relatos proporcionados por los sujetos. Las diferencias halladas en las características de los relatos reales y sugeridos implican un paso más en la comprensión del efecto y aportan datos interesantes para la discriminación de ambos tipos de relatos. The aim of this study was to examine the features that differ from real to suggested memories. In this way, qualitative and quantitative features were analysed in order to discriminate the source of the memories. Subjects viewed a film about a traffic crash, then a traffic sign was suggested and the verbal word, which describes de traffic crash, was manipulated. Results showed that estimated velocities of the cars involved in the event and the qualities of the memory descriptions were affected. The differences between real and suggested statements suppose an advance to understand post-event effect and contribute with interesting data to discriminate between both types of statements.
... Source monitoring has since come to be regarded as one of the basic explanatory factors for the misinformation effect (e. g., Belli, Lindsay, Gales, & McCarthy, 1994;Cohen & Faulkner, 1989;Lindsay, 1990;Lindsay & Johnson, 1989;Payne, Toglia, & Anastasi, 1994;Zaragoza & Lane, 1994). Source monitoring is the mechanism that makes it possible to distinguish between material com- ing from an external source (e. g., something seen) and material coming from an internal source (e. g., something imagined). ...
Two lines of research that have revealed the existence of memory distortions are reviewed. Both began at the beginning of this century and continue through today. One is a coherent research tradition aimed at investigating suggestion-dependent memory distortions produced by clinical and social psychological manipulations; the other consists of a series of unrelated studies on naturally occurring memory distortions. These latter studies are aimed at establishing some of the basic processes underlying the functioning of normal human memory and have not previously been considered together as part of the literature on memory errors.
... Whereas most of the controversy in this area has revolved around the memory impairment issue, Marcia Johnson and I (Johnson & Lindsay, 1986;Lindsay & Johnson, 1987,1989a, 1989b; see also Schooler, Gerhard, &Loftus, 1986, andJohnson &Suengas, 1989) have focused on the question of whether or not misled subjects sometimes genuinely believe they saw suggested details. Regardless of whether or not suggestions impair ability to remember event details, the question of whether or not subjects misremember suggested details as things they saw in the event is an interesting and important one. ...
The hypothesis that misleading suggestions can impair recollection was supported in a study inspired by L. L. Jacoby and C. M. Kelley's (unpublished manuscript) "logic of opposition" and D. S. Lindsay and M. K. Johnson's (see record
1989-38908-001) hypotheses about source memory. Tendency to report suggested details was set in opposition to ability to remember their source by telling Ss not to report anything from the narrative. Conditions were manipulated so that in the high- but not the low-discriminability condition it was easy to remember the suggestions and their source. At test, Ss were told (truthfully) that any information in the narrative relevant to the questions was wrong. Suggested details were more often reported on misled than control items in the low- but not the high-discriminability condition, yet suggestions impaired accurate recall of event details in both conditions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Este libro presenta el instrumento “CAPALIST: Protocolo de Valoración de Capacidades para Testificar”. El CAPALIST supone una herramienta para la evaluación por parte del psicólogo/especialista policial de las capacidades de personas especialmente vulnerables, como personas con discapacidad intelectual, menores en periodos iniciales de desarrollo (tres a seis años de edad), personas de edad avanzada o personas con algún trastorno mental, víctimas/testigos vulnerables de delitos. El protocolo es una ayuda al inicio de la exploración, que dé paso a una entrevista posterior fiable, valida y precisa, sobre los hechos ocurridos para facilitar el abordaje de los hechos a investigar en las entrevistas.
En el libro se introducen las necesidades de evaluación de las capacidades para testificar en el contexto de la Psicología jurídica y sus campos de intervención. Se abordan las características del testimonio en las personas especialmente vulnerables arriba mencionadas (primera infancia, discapacidad intelectual, mayores y trastorno mental). Se hace especial hincapié en las capacidades cognitivas relevantes en el testimonio, objeto de evaluación con el procedimiento y contextualizadas en el sistema de memoria, el paso del tiempo, el olvido y los efectos de la recuperación. Por último, se presentan las investigaciones realizadas para validar el instrumento y se concluye sobre las posibilidades de trabajo futuro con la herramienta CAPALIST.
Asking unanticipated questions in investigative interviews can elicit differences in the verbal behaviour of truth-tellers and liars: When faced with unanticipated questions, liars give less detailed and consistent responses than truth-tellers. Do such differences in verbal behaviour lead to an improvement in the accuracy of interviewers’ veracity judgements? Two empirical studies evaluated the efficacy of the unanticipated questions technique. Experiment 1 compared two types of unanticipated questions (questions regarding the planning of a task and questions regarding the specific spatial and temporal details associated with the task), assessing the veracity judgements of interviewers and verbal content of interviewees’ responses. Experiment 2 assessed veracity judgements of independent observers. Overall, the results provide little support for the technique. For interviewers, unanticipated questions failed to improve veracity judgement accuracy above chance. Reality monitoring analysis revealed qualitatively distinct information in the responses to the two unanticipated question types, though little distinction between the responses of truth-tellers and liars. Accuracy for observers was greater when judging transcripts of unanticipated questions, and this effect was stronger for spatial and temporal questions than planning questions. The benefits of unanticipated questioning appear limited to post-interview situations. Furthermore, the type of unanticipated question affects both the type of information gathered and the ability to detect deceit.
Este manual nace con la vocación de facilitar la obtención y valoración de la prueba testifical a policías, fiscales, abogados, jueces y psicólogos forenses que intervienen en las investigaciones criminales, y por extensión, a todos aquellos que realicen actividades investigativas similares a las del proceso penal (periodistas, historiadores...). También puede ser una buena lectura para los alumnos de grados y posgrados relacionados con la psicología criminalista y la criminología interesados en acercarse a las técnicas de investigación criminal y al proceso penal. Sin ser un manual específico sobre pericias de credibilidad, se profundiza lo más posible en los fundamentos de esta tarea, dejando negro sobre blanco lo que se sabe al respecto, desmitificando conceptos que quizá se han instalado en la práctica profesional sin suficiente apoyo empírico, y proponiendo líneas de futuro para mejorar esas prácticas.
Sin renunciar a la justificación científica de cuanto se afirma, en el libro se pone el foco en lo más práctico, proporcionando hasta donde se puede guías y sugerencias de intervención, de cómo hacer las cosas para conseguir los mejores testimonios posibles, tanto de los testigos y víctimas como de los inculpados en la creencia de que de ese modo se podrán adoptar mejores decisiones, más acertadas, incluso más justas.
The purpose of this research was to determine the role of recollection rejection in the rejection of misinformation. In Experiment 1, we examined the use of recollection rejection to reject contradictory and additive misinformation. We measured recollection rejection by comparing misinformation acceptance rates, graphing confidence-accuracy data using phantom receiver operating characteristic curves, examining high confidence rejections of misinformation, and examining self-report responses. These measures converged on the finding that participants used recollection rejection to reject both types of misinformation but used recollection rejection more on contradictory misinformation. In Experiment 2, we manipulated the delay between the event and misinformation and between misinformation and test. The length of both of these delays affected misinformation acceptance. Participants were more likely to use recollection rejection to reject contradictory misinformation after a short delay before encountering misinformation. Overall these findings indicate that people can spontaneously induce recollection rejection to reject misinformation and prevent false memories. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
This study demonstrates a manipulation that has opposite effects on old/new recognition and source monitoring. Deep processing of target items improved performance on an old/new recognition test in which subjects were to discriminate between targets and new distractors, but it impaired performance on a source monitoring test in which subjects were to discriminate between targets and distractors that had also been deeply processed during the experimental session. We argue that the relationship between old/new recognition and source monitoring varies with the specifics of the situation. The aspects of memories that support recognition judgments are not necessarily the same as those that support source monitoring judgments, and memory performance is the joint product of what is stored in memory and how memory is tested.
When people encounter misleading information after they view an event, their recollection of the event is often affected (see Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978; Bekerian & Bowers, 1983; for examples). We refer to the change in report arising from postevent misinformation as the misinformation effect. In thinking about the impact of misinformation, it is useful to distinguish between a memory report (or what people claim to remember), and a memory trace (or what memory information is stored in the brain). Because the memory traces themselves are, obviously, never directly accessible to researchers, we must rely on memory reports to give us clues about the nature of the underlying trace.
Three main trends of research on suggestion and suggestibility have prevailed over time: suggestion in connection with hypnosis, suggestion as a feature of personality, and suggestion as a psychosocial phenomenon. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss very selectively these lines of research. Selectivity is imperative not only because of the multitude of studies but also because there have already been frequent reports on them in recent years. This is particularly true of investigations of the effects of suggestion with respect to hypnotic phenomena or social influence. Consequently, those fields will be discussed here only as they relate to controversies of significance to the whole domain of suggestion. Fundamental aspects of suggestion and suggestibility are still relatively unexplored. This applies above all to suggestibility, which has been studied — independently of hypnosis and specific questions of social influence — for almost 100 years.
When research on suggestion first began, the serious endeavor of most authors was to propose definitions, e.g. Baudouin (1924), Bernheim (1891; 1911), Janet (1919), and McDougall (1908), to name only a few of the well-known scientists (for reviews, see Allport, 1985; Chertok, 1984; Larède, 1980; Stokvis & Pflanz, 1961; Stukat, 1958).
A central issue in the study of children’s long-term retention is an understanding of children’s susceptibility to memory failures. It has long been recognized that an important cause of memory failures is interference caused by new learning. Recently, interest in memory failures caused by subsequent learning has been revived in the context of studies on suggestibility and eyewitness memory. These studies have shown that, for subjects of all ages, exposure to misinformation (i.e., false information presented as truth) after viewing an event can lead to profound decrements in performance on later tests of memory for the originally seen event.
The suggestibility of the child witness has been a concern of the American judicial system since the turn of the century. At that time, a number of studies (e.g., Binet, 1900; Marple, 1933; Pear & Wyatt, 1914; Stern, 1910; Varendonck, 1911; Whipple, 1909, 1911, 1912) were reported indicating that young children were quite susceptible to suggestive or leading questions. For example, Whipple (1909) wrote that “the one factor that more than any other is responsible for the poor reports of children is their suggestibility, especially in the years before puberty” (p. 162). Much of this early research, however, was methodologically flawed (Goodman, 1984a). Only recently has there been a resurgence of research on this topic. These newer studies have produced conflicting results as young children are not always more likely to succumb to suggestion than are older children or adults. Such complexities have raised questions about the nature and bases of the suggestibility of children’s memory (as well as adults’ suggestibility). Therefore, the major goals of this chapter are (a) to briefly review research on children’s suggestibility, (b) to describe social and cognitive factors that influence children’s susceptibility to suggestion, and (c) to address the theoretical significance of these factors.
The purpose of the present study was to examine whether the suggestibility effects might be obtained for fifth and second graders. After subjects were shown a series of events, subjects on misleading condition were asked to fill out questionnaires that contained false information concerning the event, while subjects on control condition were asked to fill out questionnaires not containing false information. Then the subjects were given either a recognition test or a source monitoring test. Results of the experiment showed that the number of witness responses for the misleading items was significantly greater on misleading conditions than the one on control conditions, but for the other items the differences between them were not significant. The results also showed that the number of conflict responses was significantly greater than that of rewriting responses on the recognition test but not on the source monitoring test. These results suggested that children's suggestibility was not only due to their integrated memory representation, but also to their inability to discriminate between memories of original and misleading information.
Múltiples aproximaciones y modelos han tratado de explicar el funcionamiento de la memoria humana. En esta obra se habla tanto de lo cognitivo como de lo neurocientífico, y en cada capítulo los autores van contando diferentes aproximaciones a múltiples problemas relacionados con los procesos de memoria, aproximaciones tanto descriptivas como funcionales. Cuentan desde la topografía de las distintas áreas cerebrales o zonas que se estimulan al realizar tareas conductuales de memoria, hasta la explicación que tratan de darnos los investigadores que se han acercado a diseccionar estos problemas desde la psicología experimental o clínica. Es una obra excepcionalmente completa sobre la memoria. Su extensión permite abordar los distintos ámbitos desde los que considerar y estudiar la memoria, con una exposición atractiva, aunque no exenta de complejidad y conocimientos técnicos.
Kinder als Zeugen vor Gericht sind weltweit in den Blickpunkt der Öffentlichkeit und der psycho-logischen Forschung gerückt. Rechtliche Fragen be-fassen sich mit der Zuverlässigkeit und der Glaub-würdigkeit von Aussagen sowie der Notwendig-keit, Kinder vor sekundärer Traumatisierung durch Gerichte zu schützen. Der Schwerpunkt die-ser Arbeit liegt auf den kognitiven und sozialen Determinanten von Aussagen, wobei entwick-lungsbedingten Altersunterschieden, den Fragen der Suggestibilität von Kindern, der Verwendung anatomischer Puppen bei der Befragung sowie dem Wissen über das Gerichtswesen besondere Beach-tung geschenkt werden. Verschiedene Methoden zur Verbesserung von Aussagen sowie kindgerechte Befragungsmethoden werden beleuchtet. Schlüsselwörter. Zeugenaussagen von Kindern, sexuel-ler Mißbrauch, Altersunterschiede, Suggestibilität, Vernehmungstechniken, Verbesserung von Aussa-gen, kognitives Interview, anatomische Puppen, Glaubwürdigkeit, Realitätsüberwachung, sekundäre Traumatisierung Anschrift der Verfasser: SiegfriedL Sporer, Ph. D., FB06 Psychologie der Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen, Otto-Behaghel-Str. 10F, D-35394 Gießen. 1 Volbert und Pieters (1996) haben vor kurzem in dieser Zeitschrift eine ausführliche Zusammenfassung über die suggestive Beeinflussung von Kinderaussagen vorgelegt, die uns bei der ursprünglichen Erstellung des Manuskripts nicht zur Verfügung stand. Die Schlußfolgerungen dieser Autoren decken sich großenteils mit unseren Ausführun-gen, wobei wir jedoch auch auf die positive Beeinflußbar-keit von Aussagen im besonderen eingehen. Wir sind Dipl.-Psych. Katharina E. Müller sowie einem/r anonymen Gutachter(in) für die konstruktiv-kritischen Hinweise dankbar. Die Literaturrecherchen wurden durch eine Sachbeihilfe der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft an den Erstautor (Sp 262/3-1) unterstützt.
Uno de los principales fenómenos que ha estudiado la psicología del testimonio tiene que ver con las transformaciones que ocurren en la memoria del testigo cuando éste, una vez observado el suceso o delito, entra en contacto con otras informaciones sobre el suceso. El fenómeno de «creación de nuevas memorias» (Loftus y Hoffman, 1989) o de «distorsiones sinceras de la realidad» (Loftus, Korf y Schooler, 1988) ha recibido una considerable atención experimental durante los últimos años, así como un importante debatí acerca d los mecanismos psicológicos que pueden explicar este fenómeno. El presente artículo revisa las principales evidencias experimentales que apoyan las diferentes explicaciones alternativas al efecto de la información posterior al suceso.
Reality Monitoring refers to the decision processes involved in discriminating perceptual memories from those which are self-generated. The present studies compare the effects of spontaneous, implicit imagery generation and controlled, explicit imagery generation on the reality monitoring decisions of children and adults. Subjects (6 year olds, 9 year olds, and adults) were shown pictures and words, and they were asked each object's function or they were asked to create an image of each object. When later deciding whether each object was presented as a picture or a word, subjects were more likely to claim a word was presented as a picture than the converse, especially in the Function condition (Experiment 1). This confusion effect was evident for simple and complex perceptual materials and extended across three age groups (Experiments 1 and 2). The results indicate that the absence of developmental differences in reality monitoring previously reported is not due simply to the type of imagery involved, and that the representational processes of children and adults are more alike than is commonly believed.
The goals of the research presented in this article were to: a) examine changes in pre-schoolers' ability to distinguish among memories of performed, pretended, and imagined episodes, and b) use source monitoring as a tool for inferring the nature of preschoolers' conceptualizations of pretense. The participants, 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds, performed, pretended, and imagined performing actions. After a short delay, they identified the origin of their memories in a 3-alternative, forced-choice procedure. Results showed significant improvements between ages 3 and 4 in the ability to distinguish: a) performed actions from imagined actions, and b) performed actions from pretended actions. However, 4- and 5- year-olds confused memories of pretended and imagined actions. These results were replicated in a second experiment with 3- and 4-year-olds, using a simpler 2-alternative, forced-choice format. The findings suggest that, by age 4, children represent both pretense and imagination in memory according to cognitive operation features associated with generating a fictional mental state. Thus, 4-year-olds may recognize that constructing a mental, alternative reality is an important part of pretense.
Much attention has recently been paid to false-memory effects in children and adults. Attention initially focused on the effects themselves. Most observers now agree that false-memory effects are robust and replicable, although they are subject to constraints (e.g., Lindsay 1990; Reyna & Titcomb 1997; Zaragoza & Lane 1994; Zaragoza, Lane, Ackil & Chambers 1997). Using noncoercive procedures, it is possible to induce people to falsely remember witnessing events that they never experienced (e.g., that they saw a yield sign, rather than a stop sign; Loftus 1979; Loftus, Miller & Burns 1978). Currently, researchers are beginning to examine the origins of such effects: How are false memories created, and what can be done to minimize them? It has become apparent that the key questions of prediction and prevention must be addressed through theory development, i.e., by deepening our understanding of false-memory phenomena. In this article, we explore contemporary explanations for false-memory effects in children and adults, including constructivism, source monitoring, and fuzzy-trace theory. Our discussion is divided into four sections. In the first section, we briefly review the assumptions underlying different theoretical approaches. In the second section, various false-memory effects are described, and their interactions with age, delay, and type of questioning. Laboratory demonstrations of false memories are supplemented by real-life examples from clinical medicine. Then, we examine how each of these effects is explained from different theoretical perspectives. Finally, we take stock of the available evidence favoring different explanations for false-memory effects, and discuss the implications of that evidence for subsequent theorizing and for improving memory performance.
In eyewitness testimony experiments examining the effect of misinformation on subjects' memory of a target event, the misinformation is not usually attributed to a particular person. Under these circumstances the misinformation effect may occur because subjects attribute the misleading information to the experimenter and become susceptible to demand and social influence factors. In contrast, the source monitoring hypothesis claims that subjects are misled when they fail to remember the source of the misinformation. When a reversed eyewitness design (Lindsay & Johnson, 1989) was used, the subjects were equally misled, whether the misinformation was unattributed, whether it was attributed to the experimenter or whether it was attributed to an experimental subject. The results of this experiment support the source monitoring hypothesis.
The results of a recent study by Lorsbach, Melendez and Carroll‐Maher (1991) suggest that children with learning disabilities may possess a general deficit in remembering the source of their verbal memories. The purpose of the present study was to examine further whether children with learning disabilities possess a general deficit in source monitoring and whether such a deficit is independent of performance on a recognition memory task. Children with learning disabilities and nondisabled children were presented with a series of incomplete sentences once or twice in either a listen‐listen (external source monitoring) condition or a think‐listen (reality monitoring) condition. Following the presentation of the study‐list, subjects were presented with the terminal nouns of the preceding sentences and asked to make old/new recognition judgments, as well as source attributions. Although children with learning disabilities were deficient in both forms of source monitoring, they did not differ from nondisabled children in their recognition performance. The results suggest that children with learning disabilities possess a general deficit in verbal source monitoring.
Considerable research has demonstrated that people can produce sincere but inaccurate recollections by unwittingly assimilating the misleading suggestions of others. Although the boundary conditions that mediate the influence of misinformation have been intensively investigated, considerable debate continues regarding how misleading suggestions influence memory. Additional research has investigated ways to distinguish real from suggested memories. Typically people have great difficulty determining whether or not a memory is real. However, researchers have identified a number of attributes of memory descriptions that can sometimes be diagnostic, e.g., real memory descriptions tend to include more sensory characteristics. A recent exploratory study examined a new potential technique for discriminating real from suggested memories: negative feedback. We explored the hypothesis that subjects would be less reluctant to believe they were incorrect when recalling a suggested memory compared to a real memory. Surprisingly, we found no support for this hypothesis. Subjects often adamantly defended their suggested memories, illustrating the magnitude to which these “unreal” recollections are sincerely adopted.
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