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Liberal democracy as the end of history: Western theories versus Eastern Asian realities
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A growing number of political scientists have recently advocated the theses that democracy has emerged as a universal value and that it is also becoming the universally preferred system of government. Do most people in East Asia prefer democracy to nondemocratic systems, as advocates of these Western theses claim? Do they embrace liberal democracy as the most preferred system as they become socioeconomically modernized and culturally liberalized? To address these questions, we first propose a typology of privately concealed political system preferences as a new conceptual tool in order to ascertain their types and subtypes without using the word “democracy”. By means of this typology, we analyze the third wave of the Asian Barometer Survey conducted in 12 democratic and nondemocratic countries. The analysis reveals that a hybrid system, not liberal democracy, is the most preferred system even among the culturally liberalized and socioeconomically modernized segments of the East Asian population. Our results show that the increasingly popular theses of universal and liberal democratization serve merely in East Asia as prodemocracy rhetoric, not as theoretically meaningful propositions.
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... A general starting point for discussion is whether the democratic transitions in Asia could at all be interpreted in the same theoretical framework as democratic transitions in other parts of the world (Cotton, 1997;Shin, Kim, 2016). In the 1990s, research on democratic consolidation was already raising serious questions around East Asian Third Wave democracies, using various arguments which mostly still remain relevant today. ...
... In Central and Eastern Europe, the tradition of the planned economy, the need to rebuild the market economy after communism, the opportunities for European networking, extended welfare services and the tradition of interwar developments can be identified (Dawisha, Parrot, 1997); and in Asia, integration into the world economy, the successes of economic development under authoritarian rule, the challenge of the poorly dealt with authoritarian past, civilian-military relations, and the relationship between ancient Asian culture and religion and Western-based global human rights values and concepts are the main lines of differentiation (Diamond, Plattner, 1998;McAllister, 2016;Croissant, 2004). Shin (2008Shin ( , 2016, Fukuyama (2012) and others established a network of analytical aspects for the interpretation of problems and achievements of new democracies in East and South East Asia, relating to the Third Wave and subsequent consolidation: ...
... On the global scene, China was an emerging actor, and the US supported democratization and consolidation processes in the region, not with the same intensity and engagement in each and every country, but according to the regional interests of their foreign policy. Democratic consolidation in Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, which are considered to be stable, free and liberal democracies in the region, is partly due to the US presence and support based on security concerns in these countries, with powerful enemies on the other side (Diamond, 1997;Shin, Kim, 2016;McAllister, 2016;Croissant, 2017). ...
Different starting points, similar processes and different outcomes can be identified when comparing East Central Europe and East and South Asia. The two regions face similar global challenges, follow regional patterns of democratization and face crises. In communist times, East Central Europe was economically marginalized in the world economy, while some parts of Asia integrated well in the global economy under authoritarian rule. Europeanization and a favorable external environment encouraged the former communist countries to opt for the Western-style rule of law and democracy. Different external factors helped the Third Wave democracies in Asia, especially South Korea and Taiwan, which benefited from the support of the United States and other global economic, military and cultural partnerships to develop their human rights culture and democracy while facing their totalitarian counterparts, namely the People’s Republic of China and North Korea. The very different positions Taiwan and Hungary have in their respective regions follow from the different capacities of their transformation management since 1988-1989. Taiwan preserved its leading role and stable democracy despite the threat to its sovereignty from the People’s Republic of China. Hungary never had such an influential and problematic neighbor and was ensured security and welfare partnership by the European Union, which Taiwan lacked. While Taiwan was less secure, economic and social conditions were more favorable for democratization than those in Hungary. Hungary, in turn, held a leading position in democratization processes in the period of post-communist transition which was lost during the crisis and conflicts of the last decade (after 2006 and especially since 2010). Despite the fact that liberalization prepared the way for peaceful transition in both countries and resulted in similar processes of democratic consolidation in the 1990s, Hungary joined the ‘loser’ group in its region, whereas Taiwan is among the top ‘winning’ countries in its region. Taiwan at the moment is starting comprehensive reform processes toward enhanced democracy, civil rights and the rule of law, and Hungarian development is criticized by many external and internal analysts as straying from the path of European-style consolidated democracies towards illiberal trends and hybridization. Western global concepts of democratization may help to identify similarities and differences, and compare stronger and weaker factors in the democratic transitions in Asia and Europe within the Third Wave democracies.
... al., 2004;Fuchs, Guidorossi, and Svensson 1995;Pippa 1999). People's understanding of democracy includes how they understand both democratic ideals and democratic practices, and it contains related beliefs, information, and knowledge derived from people's day-to-day political practice (Shin and Kim 2017). ...
... However, most of the global public, especially in authoritarian and postauthoritarian countries, either do not understand or misunderstand the characteristics of liberal democracy. In many countries, democracy is only an attractive political symbol, whereas the actual political system of the country is still authoritarian (Shin and Kim 2017). Even though the original meaning of democracy is 'the rule of the people', the people are deprived of the right to define democracy themselves. ...
Different methods of measurement for survey research have been developed to explore how the public understands democracy. In the existing research on the democratic understanding of the Chinese people, closed-ended questions are often used to measure this understanding. However, the results obtained can only prove whether the democratic understanding of the Chinese people deviates from or is close to liberal democracy. This article applied grounded theory to classify respondents’ answers to an open-ended question. Unlike previous research findings, this article’s findings showed that even Chinese people’s democratic understanding has certain procedural or substantive elements. However, this understanding consists of only emphasizing their rights and interests under the Communist Party of China-led system rather than being more inclined toward liberal democracy. Additionally, the higher effective response rates for closed-ended questions suggested that Chinese people need a higher level of political knowledge and engagement in public affairs to form their own understanding of democracy when answering an open-ended question. We argue that although closed-ended questions are more convenient for statistical analysis, open-ended questions with the classification method developed in this study can paint a more accurate picture of respondents’ understanding of democracy in China.
... These values include support for horizontal accountability and other checks on executive power, political and social pluralism, civic association, and equal participation. Surveys show that popular majorities across 11 East and Southeast Asian countries, including rich countries, prefer non-democratic and hybrid forms of political regime, while only a small minority endorse liberal values (Chu et al. 2008;Shin and Kim 2017;. ...
... The ABS's assessment of authoritarian and democratic values asks questions about support for principles that underlie successful democracies such as equality, liberty, separation of powers, freedom to associate, and pluralism, while eschewing the word "democracy," which elicits almost unanimous support around the world and therefore offers little guide to variation in attitudes (Chu et al. 2008;Shin and Kim 2017). The measurement asks respondents whether they agree or disagree with a set of statements that includes "If the government is constantly checked (i.e., monitored and supervised) by the legislature, it cannot possibly accomplish great things," "Harmony of the community will be disrupted if people organize lots of groups," and "The government should decide whether certain ideas should be allowed to be discussed in society." ...
Myanmar’s introduction of competitive elections after decades of military rule raised expectations for progress in economic and social development, including in the area of women’s rights. In this paper, we draw on data from two national surveys, interviews, and existing qualitative studies to explore public opinion on women’s rights and gender equality. Do Burmese people support gender equality? How are their views on gender related to other aspects of political culture, such as traditional values and views toward authoritarianism and democracy? Our objective is to gain better understanding of the opportunities and obstacles to egalitarian social change and democratic consolidation. Our analysis of survey data reveals that attitudes toward gender roles are conservative, traditional and anti-democratic beliefs are widespread, and these views are strongly associated. Our findings imply that tendencies in public opinion provide a resource for Burmese nationalist groups and politicians and an obstacle to activists seeking greater alignment with global norms on gender equality.
... Contrary to what is expected from this thesis of human emancipation, most Koreans refuse to embrace liberal democracy even when they are endowed with the same resources as those in the West (Shin and Kim 2017). Instead, they remain in favor of a paternalistic autocracy that keeps them deferential and submissive to political leaders instead of being active and critical of them, as shown above in Table 1. ...
... social legacies especially of Confucian culture that are deeply embedded in the Korean experience (S.Kim 2014;Shin 2012;Shin and Kim 2017). 4 Specifically, its political norms of paternalistic government encourage leaders to play an autocratic or commanding role and their subordinates to play a deferential or submissive role(Bell and Li 2013; Shi 2014). ...
Why did liberal democracy backslide in Korea, a highly globalized and well-developed country, contrary to what is expected from neo-modernization and other prominent theories of democratization in the West? To explore this question, I propose a cultural theory of democratic deconsolidation, and test it with the Asian Barometer Korean surveys conducted over the period 2011-15. The analysis of these surveys indicates that socioeconomic development under the sponsorship of the state and big businesses has failed to "emancipate" both ordinary citizens and political leaders from the Confucian legacies of political paternalism and social harmony. Moreover, it has failed to instill them with "the bourgeois impulse" to become a free and equal being. As the habits of their hearts and minds, these legacies powerfully motivate both groups to reembrace or condone the resurgence of autocratic political practices. Empirically, therefore, the deconsolidation of liberal democracy in this highly modernized country and the prevalence of affinity for paternalistic autocracy among its people directly challenge the Western theories that link socioeconomic modernization to human emancipation and liberal democratization.
... People centrism can take very different forms, but, as my findings demonstrate, we should move away from defining populism by its most infamous outcomes (tyranny of the majority and homogenization of pluralistic society) to recenter 'the people' in populism. As Shin and Kim state, it is unlikely that elitist representative democracy is the 'end of history' (Shin and Kim 2017) for South Korea. Instead, we can anticipate an ongoing process of power shifts within the governmental system. ...
The study of populist attitudes has become increasingly relevant over the past decade, and researchers have struggled to find a model to study these political attitudes more accurately. In this paper, I investigate a strong tendency toward inclusive populist democracy in South Korea that seems to stray from the common black and white thinking associated with populism elsewhere. I find that this profile in Korea is most common among undergraduate educated individuals who are likely to protest and believe that South Korea does not run on meritocracy. I also find that there is virtually no difference in the level of populist attitudes in those who believed the Moon administration was successful in rooting out corruption compared with those who did not. My findings suggest that theories of the causes and consequences of populism, especially around the assumption that it rises from the uneducated masses and must bifurcate society, should be reexamined.
... Consistent with my view about the lack of appetite among voters for Chee's liberal-democratic vision, Shin and Kim (2017: 133) analysed the third wave of the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS), conducted in 12 democratic and nondemocratic countries, and concluded that 'a hybrid system, not liberal democracy, is the most preferred system even among the culturally liberalized and socioeconomically modernized segments of the East Asian population' (East Asia here includes Singapore). Only 20% of Singaporeans agreed with all three concepts of democracy: by the people, of the people and for the people (Shin and Kim, 2017). This translates to the SDP's hardcore support. ...
Singapore’s political struggles of the 1950s and 1960s, between a Chinese-educated, working-class left wing and a middle-class, English-educated faction, have not been completely eradicated but continue to cast a shadow over modern political developments. The moderate, English-educated faction achieved an important victory when it took over control of the People’s Action Party (PAP) in the early 1960s. However, the surprise ascendancy of the Workers’ Party (WP), under Low Thia Khiang, has seen a long-marginalized section of the Chinese-educated galvanize around a district, Hougang and Aljunied, and a Teochew-speaking charismatic but low-key individual in Mr Low. The WP’s ability to develop an enduring ‘brand’ over the 2006–2013 period surprised many commentators. By 2013 it had become Singapore’s second-strongest political force.
... Nathan's traditional social values correspond quite well with the noted Confucian legacies. 7. Similarly, in their examination of democratic support among East Asians, Shin and Kim (2017) have found that a majority of East Asians implicitly prefer a hybrid regime over liberal democracy. This still holds true in societies like Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, wherein citizens have sufficient exposure to and experience of democratic politics. ...
East Asia has been defined as the cultural sphere characterized by the lasting influence of Confucianism on its political and socioeconomic lives. Academic interest in the political culture of East Asia has been mainly shaped by the great diversity in this region’s economic and political landscapes. The systematic differences between Confucianism and its Western philosophical counterparts in prescribing how to organize societies and manage state-society relationships are central to understanding the uniqueness of this region’s political culture. The features of East Asian political culture cast some significant influence over the dynamics of political practice and development in the region, including but not limited to how East Asians assess their political regimes, conceptualize democracy, and participate in politics. Increasing access to high-quality regional barometer surveys, as well as expanding global survey projects, has empowered students of comparative politics to more effectively examine the political culture of East Asia and test the so-called “Asian values thesis” in a much broader context. Yet, among academics, there is a lack of agreement on what constitutes East Asia. This, along with discrepancies between empirical instruments and corresponding theoretical constructs and insufficient research designs tailored to various versions of the “Asian values thesis”, has prevented more fruitful dialogues among scholars. Considering such issues in future research could contribute to more effective accumulation of knowledge and yield a more nuanced and dynamic understanding of the political culture of East Asia.
Until recently, many political scientists had believed that the stability of democracy is assured once certain threshold conditions – prosperity, democratic legitimacy, the development of a robust civil society – were attained. Democracy would then be consolidated, and remain stable. In this article we show that levels of support for
democratic governance are not stable over time, even among high-income democracies, and have declined in recent years. In contrast to theories of democratic consolidation, we suggest that just as democracy can come to be “the only game in town” through processes of democratic deepening and the broad-based acceptance of democratic institutions, so too a process of democratic deconsolidation can take place as citizens sour on democratic institutions, become more open to authoritarian alternatives, and vote for anti-system parties. Public opinion measures of democratic deconsolidation are strongly associated
with subsequent declines in the actual extent of democratic governance and predict not only recent democratic backsliding in transitional democracies, such as Venezuela or Russia, but also anticipated the downgrades in Freedom House scores occurring across a range of western democracies since 2016.
Citizens in authoritarian regimes understand the concept of democracy under the influence of the state's manipulation and individual agency. This study examines Chinese citizens’ perception of three types of government – people relationships – government (1) of the people; (2) by the people; and (3) for the people – without directly using the term ‘democracy’. Citizens’ perceptions of these three principles of democracy can predict the level of their support for democracy, identifying variations among Chinese ‘democrats’. The principle of government by the people is most popular among the Chinese public. Citizens who understand democracy based on government of the people are dissatisfied with the country's level of democracy and criticize authoritarian politics. Public understanding of democracy based on government for the people has an anti-democratic orientation, and is compatible with support for authoritarian rule. This study unveils variations in the Chinese public's understanding of democracy and its impact on politics.
This study explores how and why the citizenries of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan engage in deconsolidating the liberal democratic system in which they live. For this exploration, the study conceptualizes democratic deconsolidation as a two-phase psychological movement and analyses it as the realignment of system affiliation. The analysis of the Asian Barometer Survey recently conducted in these countries reveals that pluralities of their citizenries are psychologically disposed to realign themselves with a hybrid or autocratic system. It also reveals that democratic learning and socioeconomic modernization, two significant influences on democratic consolidation, do little to keep East Asians from joining in the deconsolidation movement. These findings suggest that the deconsolidation of democracy not be equated with a reversal of its consolidation.
This chapter discusses the distinction between democratic and undemocratic states, noting that it is not only about whether there are elections: it is about whether or not it there is the rule of law. When both conditions are met, elections are free and fair and the government is accountable to the electorate. When laws can be bent or broken, unfair elections represent the will of governors more than that of the governed. The chapter first defines democratic states and outlines the characteristics of a democratic state before assessing the state of states today. It then considers three kinds of undemocratic states, namely: constitutional oligarchy, plebiscitarian autocracy, and unaccountable autocracy. It also examines how democratization has more often come about by trial and error rather than through gradual evolution and concludes by analysing the dynamics of democratic and undemocratic states.
The rise of China, along with problems of governance in democratic countries, has reinvigorated the theory of political meritocracy. But what is the theory of political meritocracy and how can it set standards for evaluating political progress (and regress)? Can meritocracy be reconciled with democracy and if so, how? What is the history of political meritocracy and what can it teach us today? How is political meritocracy practiced in contemporary societies – in China, Singapore, and elsewhere – and what are its advantages and disadvantages in terms of producing just outcomes and contributing to good governance? To help answer these questions, this volume gathers a series of commissioned research papers from an interdisciplinary group of leading philosophers, historians, and social scientists. The result is the first book in decades to examine the rise (or revival) of political meritocracy and what it will mean for political developments in China and the rest of the world. Despite its limitations, meritocracy has contributed much to human flourishing in East Asia and beyond and will continue to do so in the future. This book is essential reading for those who wish to further the debate and perhaps even help to implement desirable forms of political change.
From the beginning, political culture research has argued that, to persist, democracies need a supportive public (Almond and Verba 1963, Chapter 12). Recent evidence, however, indicates a change in the nature of democratic political culture. While support for democracy as a principle is widespread, many citizens have become less satisfied with the way democracy performs (Klingemann 1999; Dalton 2004). Norris (1999, 2010) characterizes this discrepancy as the rise of the “critical citizen.” This term implies a positive message: Critical citizens improve the quality of the democratic process.2 This chapter shows whether this optimistic perspective is empirically justified in Europe. The possible combination of principled support for democracy with dissatisfaction about its performance has been anticipated by Easton (1965; 1975), who called for an analytical distinction between support for a political regime and support for its specific institutions and the authorities running them. Crossnational evidence shows that contemporary citizens do indeed make this distinction (Klingemann 1999; Dalton 1999). People who support democracy as a form of government can either be satisfied or dissatisfied with the design of political institutions and the performance of the political actors of their country. This finding may surprise skeptics who are cynical about the political sophistication of citizens, yet it speaks to the increasing cognitive mobilization and rising levels of expectation among modern mass publics (Inglehart 1970; 1990; Inkeles 1975; Gouldner 1979; Klingemann and Fuchs 1995; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Welzel 2013).
This book re-evaluates Almond, Verba, and Pye's original ideas about the shape of a civic culture that supports democracy. Marshaling a massive amount of cross-national, longitudinal public opinion data from the World Values Survey Association, the authors demonstrate multiple manifestations of a deep shift in the mass attitudes and behaviors that undergird democracy. The chapters in this book show that in dozens of countries around the world, citizens have turned away from allegiance toward a decidedly 'assertive' posture to politics: they have become more distrustful of electoral politics, institutions, and representatives and are more ready to confront elites with demands from below. Most importantly, societies that have advanced the most in the transition from an allegiant to an assertive model of citizenship are better-performing democracies - in terms of both accountable and effective governance.