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A farming crisis or a tourism disaster?
An analysis of the foot and mouth disease in the UK
Dr Graham A. Miller
Senior Lecturer
Centre for Tourism
University of Westminster
Tel: +44 20 7911 5000 ext 3054
Fax: +44 20 7911 5171
Email: G.Miller01@wmin.ac.uk
Dr Brent W. Ritchie
School of Service Management
University of Brighton
49 Darley Road
Eastbourne
BN20 7UR
Tel: +44 1273 643 634
Fax: +44 1273 643 619
Email: b.ritchie@bton.ac.uk
and
Tourism Program
University of Canberra
ACT 2601
Australia
1
A farming crisis or a tourism disaster?
An analysis of the foot and mouth disease in the UK
Abstract
As the number of disasters and crises affecting the tourism industry increases, it is
becoming necessary to understand the nature of these disasters and how to manage
and limit the impacts of such incidents. This paper defines crises and disasters before
discussing the area of crisis and disaster management. The paper then applies the foot
and mouth outbreak which occurred in the United Kingdom to the tourism disaster
framework proposed by Faulkner (2001). The paper notes that although the outbreak
fits the basic principles of Faulkner’s (2001) model the size, scope, and subsequent
management of the outbreak over an extended period suggests that although the
model is useful, it has limited usefulness because not all disasters and crises are the
same. Nevertheless, by examining how crises and disasters are managed, lessons for
destinations and organisations may help turn such incidents into positive forces for
change and help to reduce the severity of future disasters.
Keywords: Tourism, Disaster, Crisis, Event, United Kingdom
Introduction
In February 2001, the first case of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) was confirmed in
the UK since an outbreak of the disease in 1967. A total of 2030 cases of the disease
were identified and a total of over 4 million animals were culled during the crisis with
worldwide media broadcasts showing burning carcasses of culled animals. The
English Tourism Council (ETC) have predicted that losses to English tourism in 2001
would be £5bn, while in 2002 and 2003 reductions would total £2.5bn and £1bn
respectively (ETC, 2001a). On January 15th 2002 government officials announced
2
that the disease had finally been defeated after 11 months of battling the outbreak.
Despite the end of the disease, the outbreak has deeply affected the farming and
tourism industry and raised questions concerning government policy toward both the
farming and tourism industry. Although the outbreak was not expected, questions
have been specifically raised concerning the responsiveness and preparedness of the
entire UK tourism industry for the falling numbers that resulted from FMD. Faulkner
(2001) notes there are an increasing number of disasters and crises which affect the
tourism industry, ranging from natural to human influenced disasters. This has been
made most evident since the events of September 11th 2001, which has dramatically
impacted upon the tourism industry illustrating the need to understand and effectively
manage such incidents.
Faulkner (2001) argues that there is a lack of research on disaster phenomena in the
tourism industry, on the impacts of such events on both the industry and specific
organisations, and the responses of the tourism industry to disasters. Yet Lee and
Harrald (1999:184) note that crisis management, disaster recovery, and organisational
continuity are important competencies for managers in both the public and private
sector. This paper aims to address these deficiencies as well as to consider FMD in
the light of the framework for analysing and understanding tourism disasters
developed by Faulkner (2001). More specifically the paper examines the
framework’s applicability to the foot and mouth outbreak at a national level before
examining the response of an individual organisation (the Cheltenham Horseracing
Association) who manage an annual sporting event, the Cheltenham Festival. The
Cheltenham Festival was chosen for analysis because the town of Cheltenham is
indicative of the move towards an economy dominated by tourism in a rural area
3
traditionally dominated by farming. Thus, although Cheltenham and its surrounding
area did not suffer the highest incidence of FMD, the economy of Cheltenham had
come to be highly reliant on the tourism industry (and events in particular) and thus
placed itself in a position vulnerable to disasters.
An examination of the management of the outbreak may provide assistance to other
destinations and organisations in developing crisis management strategies to deal with
unforeseen events such as disasters and crises. First some discussion of crisis
management definitions and crisis management theory is required.
Crisis and Disaster Definitions
A number of authors have attempted to define a crisis to help improve their
understanding of this phenomenon. Pauchant and Mitroff (1992:15) believe that a
crisis is a “disruption that physically affects a system as a whole and threatens its
basic assumptions, its subjective sense of self, its existential core.” Selbst (1978 in
Faulkner 2001:136) defines a crisis as “any action or failure to act that interferes with
an organisation’s ongoing functions, the acceptable attainment of its objectives, its
viability or survival, or that has a detrimental personal effect as perceived by the
majority of its employees, clients or constituents.” Faulkner (2001) considers the
principal distinction between what can be termed a “crisis” and a “disaster” to be the
extent to which the situation is attributable to the organisation itself, or can be
described as originating outside the organisation. Thus, a “crisis” describes a
situation “where the root cause of an event is, to some extent, self-inflicted through
such problems as inept management structures and practices or a failure to adapt to
change”, while a “disaster can be defined as “where an enterprise…is confronted with
4
sudden unpredictable catastrophic changes over which it has little control” (Faulkner
2001:136). This enables the production of a simple matrix (see figure 1).
Figure 1: Conceptualising Crises and Disasters
Source: Faulkner (2001)
The implication of whether a situation can be described as a crisis or a disaster is
crucial in designing response options and also the ability to reflect on the situation and
make changes subsequent to the negative events. A crisis implies the need for change
to prevent the situation occurring again, while a disaster requires responses to limit
the impacts should there be a repeat occurrence. However, FMD can be considered as
both a disaster and a crisis depending on the perspective taken. Therefore, while the
precise causes of FMD are a source of much disagreement, factors such as lax import
regulations, a (general, though not exclusive) resistance to vaccination and a
collapsing market are suggested as potential causes that designate FMD as a farming
crisis. Yet, as none of the factors instrumental in the outbreak of FMD could be
influenced by the tourism industry, FMD was a disaster that threatened an industry
worth £52.2bn per year to the UK economy (4% of GDP, the UK’s fifth biggest
industry) and employs 1.7million people. A total of 150,000 jobs were thought to be
In du c e d b y t he a ct io n s o r
in ac tio ns o f t he or ga ni s a ti on
In du c e d b y n at u ra l ph en om en a
o r e xt e r n a l h um a n a ct ion
S c a le or
M a g n it u d e
O f th e e v e n t
C h e r n o b y l
D i sa s t e r sC r i se s
L oc k er b ieE xx on V a ld e z
K ob e E ar t h q ua ke
K at he r in e F lo o d s
(A u s tr a l ia )
S w is s Ca ny on
In c i d e n t
5
directly at risk and 3,000 small rural tourism business faced the threat of failure (ETC,
2001a). The classification of FMD is made more complex by understanding the
diversification in recent years by farmers towards tourism as a way of regulating
farming incomes that have fallen by 75% over the last three years to their lowest
levels since the 1930s (Cook, 1999). Thus, a farmer diversified into tourism can be
both cause and effect, the precipitator of crisis and a victim of disaster. The difficulty
of this position is enunciated in a later section, which explores recovery options from
the disease.
Crisis Management
Lee and Harrald (1999:184) state that “natural disasters can disrupt the supply and
distribution chains for even the best prepared businesses…service businesses are
increasingly vulnerable to electrical, communication and other critical infrastructure
failures.” Kash and Darling (1998:179) agree, and claim that it is no longer a case ‘if’
a business will face a crisis; it is rather a question of ‘when’, ‘what type’ and ‘how
prepared’ the company is to deal with it. Both statements illustrate that although
organisations are able to design pre-crisis strategies to help with crisis management
they are often unable to prevent a crisis from occurring. However, the real challenge
is not to recognise crises, but to recognise them in a timely fashion (Darling et al.,
1996). Authors such as Burnett (1998) and Kash and Darling (1998) note that
decisions undertaken before a crisis occurs will enable more effective management of
the crisis, rather than organisations being managed by the crisis itself. Proactive
planning through the use of strategic planning for crises will help reduce risk, time
wastage, poor resource management and reduce the impacts of those that do arise
(Heath, 1998).
6
Furthermore, Heath (1998:9) noted “the ability of a crisis to cause other crisis
situations is termed the ripple effect because these crises seem to fan outward.” Heath
(1998) believed that effective and well planned crisis management strategies were
needed to prevent or limit the ‘ripple effect’ or chaos associated with crisis incidents.
In other words, crisis management is crucial not only for scoping potential crises but
also for limiting their impacts on other organisations, destinations or specific industry
sectors.
The literature generally has discussed the nature of crises and disasters and/or
discussed crisis management strategies for dealing more effectively with these
instances. According to Coombs (1999) a list can be developed to illustrate possible
types of crises individual organisations may face and the nature of these crises (see
table 1).
7
Table 1: Typology of crises and their characteristics
Type of crises Characteristics
Natural Disasters -When an organisation is damaged as a result of the weather or ‘acts
of God.’ Examples include earthquakes, tornadoes, floods, hurricanes,
and bad storms.
Malevolence -When some outside actor or opponent employs extreme tactics to
express anger toward the organisation or to force the organisation to
change. Examples include product tampering, kidnapping, terrorism
and espionage.
Human Breakdowns -When human error causes disruptions. Examples include industrial
accidents and product recalls.
Challenges -When the organisation is confronted by discontented stakeholders.
The stakeholders challenge the organisation because they believe it is
operating in an appropriate manner and does not meet their
expectations. Examples include boycotts, strikes, lawsuits,
government penalties and protests.
Megadamage -When an accident causes significant environmental damage.
Examples include oil spills and radioactive contamination.
Organisational Misdeeds -When management takes actions it knows will harm or serve to
discredit or disgrace the organisation in some way. Examples include
favouring short-term economic gain over social values, deliberate
deception of stakeholders and illegal acts by management.
Workplace Violence -When an employee or former employee commits violence against
other employees on organisational grounds. Examples include killing
or injuring co-workers.
Rumours -When false information is spread about an organisation or its
products. The false information hurts the organisation’s reputation by
putting the organisation in an unfavourable light. Examples include
rumours linking the organisation to radical groups or stories that their
products are contaminated.
Source: Modified after Coombs (1999:61-62).
Although typologies are useful for beginning to understand the nature of crises, the
very nature of crises makes it difficult to fully understand them. Coombs (1999)
notes, all crises are different and crisis managers need to tailor responses to individual
crises rather than try to plan for every individual situation. Heath (1998:272) agrees
and states that “no crisis has exactly the same form, the same time limitations, the
same demand for resources…or the same temporal, social and economic threats.”
This indicates the difficulty in developing typologies and theories to understand crisis
management and how to prevent or limit the effects of crises. Authors such as Kash
and Darling (1998) believe that although crises management is a requirement for all
8
organisations and that business leaders recognise the concept of crisis management,
many do not undertake productive steps to address crisis situations.
Other crisis management research has focussed on the stages of crises to assist in
understanding crisis phenomenon and assist in proactive and strategic management of
crises (see Richardson, 1994; 1995). Fink (1986) and Roberts (1994) both developed
slightly different models to explain the lifecycle of crises (see table 2). Fink’s (1986)
model suggested a four phase anatomy of a crisis outlined in figure 2, but also noted
that due to the nature of crises ‘chaos’ may be a more accurate depiction of a crisis
from an individual perspective (see figure 3).
Figure 2: What One Crisis Cycle May Look Like
Source: Fink (1986)
9
Figure 3: What Crisis Cycles Often Look or Feel Like to the Individual
Source: Fink (1986)
From the work of Fink (1986) and Roberts (1994) Faulkner (2001) developed the first
tourism specific disaster management framework and subsequently applied this
framework to the Katherine Floods in Australia (see Faulkner & Vikulov, 2001).
Table 2 outlines the basis to the framework that Faulkner (2001) developed which
will be applied, later in this paper, to the FMD in the UK and the response of the
tourism industry and the Chelteham Horseracing Association.
10
Table 2: The crisis and disaster lifecycle
Faulkner’s (2001) stages Fink’s (1986) stages Robert’s (1994) stages
1. Pre-event Pre-event: where action can
be taken to prevent disasters
(e.g. growth management
planning or plans aimed at
mitigating the effects of
potential disasters)
2. Prodromal Prodromal stage: when it
becomes apparent that the
crisis is inevitable
3. Emergency Acute stage: the point of no
return when the crisis has
hit and damage limitation is
the main objective
Emergency phase: when the
effects of the disaster has
been felt and action has to
be taken to rescue people
and property
4. Intermediate Intermediate phase: when
the short-term needs of the
people must be dealt with –
restoring utilities and
essential services. The
objective at this point being
to restore the community to
normality as quickly as
possible
5. Long term (recovery) Chronic stage: clean-up,
post-mortem, self-analysis
and healing
Long-term phase:
continuation of the previous
phase, but items that could
not be addressed quickly are
attended to at this point
(repair of damaged
infrastructure, correcting
environmental problems,
counselling victims,
reinvestment strategies,
debriefings to provide input
to revisions of disaster
strategies)
6. Resolution Resolution: routine restored
or new improved state
Source: After Faulkner (2001:140).
Although understanding the type of crisis and the stages of a crisis are important,
understanding how to manage crises is critical. Heath (1998) identified two major
approaches concerning the management of crises: the traditional crisis management
approach and the risk management approach. The traditional crisis management
approach involves no initial (pre-crisis) planning or management as the approach
begins when the crisis starts (see figure 4). The approach of the risk management
approach is to respond to the crisis and manage the impacts effectively and efficiently.
11
The evaluation, risk assessment and crisis planning does not occur until after the crisis
event (post-crisis) and the findings are then kept for future reference.
Figure 4: A Traditional Approach to a Crisis
Source: Heath (1998).
The risk management approach follows on from the traditional crisis management
approach as it starts where the other finishes and is concerned with assessing and
managing risk before a crisis begins (pre-crisis). It is then in the position to
implement appropriate response and recovery plans as the crisis emerges (see figure
5). Again, similar to the first approach, learning and feedback are crucial
requirements for the development of future crisis management planning.
Figure 5: A Risk Management Approach to a Crisis
Source: Heath (1998).
Crisis risk assessments.
Response and recovery
planning.
Crisis situation.
Response and recovery
plans implemented.
Feedback – learning from
experience, risk identification,
planning & preparedness for
future crises
Crisis event/outbreak Response onset and
impact management
Learning – the identification
of risks, planning &
preparedness for future crises
12
With the previous crisis management and tourism disaster management theory in
mind, the authors undertook research to examine the FMD in the UK and assess the
response of both the tourism industry generally, and the response of an organisation,
the Cheltenham Horseracing Association. Secondary research was undertaken by
examining newspaper articles throughout the duration of the foot and mouth outbreak.
However, particular emphasis was placed on the analysis of ‘broadsheet’ newspapers
from the beginning of the outbreak in February 2001 until September 2001 when the
number of outbreaks was reduced to a very small number. Analysis was undertaken
through examining the content of messages within the newspaper articles and the
reporting angle of the newspaper media. The four main broadsheet newspapers cross
the political spectrum, and thus the authors were vigilant for political bias being
introduced into the research. Other secondary documents such as British Tourist
Authority briefing papers and media releases by the tourism industry and English
Tourism Council were also examined and analysed looking for themes and recurrent
issues.
Primary research was carried out through a semi-structured in depth interview format
with the Managing Director of the Cheltenham Horseracing Association (Edward
Gillespie). The interview with Gillespie lasted over 2 hours and was tape recorded and
transcribed. The data gathered from both the secondary and primary collection stages
was analysed and an attempt was made to place key themes and issues within
Faulkner’s (2001) tourism disaster management framework.
13
By examining the responses of the tourism industry and critically evaluating the FMD
insights may be gained to assist with future crisis management in the UK and
overseas. Furthermore, the paper will consider FMD in the light of the framework for
analysing tourism disasters developed by Faulkner (2001) and critique the
applicability of this framework for understanding the FMD. However, first
background on the Cheltenham Horseracing Association is presented to set the
context for subsequent sections of the paper.
Cheltenham and the Cheltenham Horseracing Association
Cheltenham is the principle town within the county of Gloucestershire, which is a
rural county with a population of less than 500,000 but within easy access of the
major cities of Birmingham and Cardiff, and all the permanent attractions consistent
with the second city of England and the capital of Wales. Cheltenham has therefore
sought to develop a plethora of festivals to promote tourism. These festivals include
the International Festival of Music, the Festival of Literature, Jazz Festival, Cricket
Festival and an arts festival. In 1999, over six million visitors were attracted to
Cheltenham, contributing £220 million to the town’s economy and helping to support
over 6,000 jobs (Cheltenham Borough Council 2002). For the county of
Gloucestershire as a whole, 27 million visitors were recorded, contributing
£500million and supporting a direct workforce of 18,612, the fourth largest employer
in the county and responsible for one in ten jobs in Gloucestershire (Gloucestershire
Tourism 2002). Visitors to Cheltenham therefore generate nearly half the tourism
revenue for the county and the Cheltenham Festival is the largest single contributor to
tourism in Cheltenham, demonstrating the prominent role that the three-day Festival
has in the local economy.
14
During the winter season, 10,000 of the 250,000 attendees to races stay overnight in
Gloucestershire, while for the Festival, 10,000 of the 60,000 daily customers and staff
remain overnight, making available accommodation extremely difficult to find during
the Festival. A fully booked accommodation stock for the 3-day Festival would
contribute around £1.5million to the Cheltenham economy, gate receipts are equal to
approximately £4.5million and a conservative estimate of spending at £75 per person
per visit would give a total direct contribution to the local economy of over
£17million. No formal attempt has been made to measure the benefits enjoyed by the
town or the county as a result of the Festival, although it is felt that the expansion of
the November meetings and the addition of Sunday racing to the schedule has
encouraged racegoers to stay overnight and further explore the county.
The main activity of the Cheltenham Horseracing Association is the hosting of an
annual horseracing festival called the Cheltenham Festival. The Festival is second
only in the UK to the Grand National in the national hunt racing calendar, and lists
itself as one of the top ten sporting events in the UK. The racecourse, in a rural part
of the west of England, contains the biggest corporate entertainment area for any
British sporting event. The Festival has been organised in its current format since
1948 and today is held over three days in March and comprises twenty races with
prize money of over £1m. The largest race is the Gold Cup, which takes place on the
final day of the Festival and attracts prize money of £290,000. Each day of the
Festival draws capacity crowds of 50,000 – with the day of the Gold Cup being sold
out several months in advance. In 2000, Cheltenham was named the racecourse of the
year for the seventh time in eight years by the Racegoers Club.
15
Cheltenham employs 50 staff on a permanent basis, but this number will increase to
over 1000 on a normal race day and in excess of 5000 per day for the Festival.
Figures show Cheltenham racecourse has a turnover of £12m, which includes £11.5m
from racing and £0.5m from non-racing events. Of the £11.5m from racing, £9m
(75% of total turnover) is derived from the 3 day festival in March. From all racing
throughout the year, approximately £6m (over 50% of total turnover) comes from the
cost of admission to the races. Such ratios signal high reliance on racing for income,
high reliance on the Festival for racing income, high reliance on admissions during
the Festival and ultimately high reliance on corporate customers (where hospitality is
included in the admission prices) during the Festival. The vast majority of these
tickets are advanced sales. Media revenues contribute around £1m to turnover (1.3m
viewers are recorded as watching the Gold Cup live on TV) and the 6500 members
are worth about £1.2m through their membership fees. Corporate hospitality and the
hire of boxes also add a further £1.2m to the racing turnover.
The outbreak of FMD in February 2001 led to an original intention to proceed with
the Festival, as there were no confirmed cases near the racecourse. Yet the need to
comply with guidelines issued by the racing industry’s board of control about FMD
meant rescheduling the Festival to take the place of a smaller meeting planned for
April. The veterinary advice received by Cheltenham was that the Festival would
pose no greater risk than a Premiership football match, none of which were cancelled.
This advice was strongly contested by the local farming community, who were
vocally opposed to the original intended position to continue with the Festival, instead
wanting to limit as far as possible the number of people visiting the area and therein
16
increasing the risk of spreading the disease (Gillespie 2001). The nature of the Hunt
racing season meant that dates not conflicting with other courses were scarce and that
the ground would not be suitable for hunt racing once into May. In operational terms,
May also carries a heavier number of other sporting fixtures and so reduces the
availability of the required plant, equipment and staff.
A further issue was the importance of the Irish racers and horses, the Irish government
stated that 30 days must elapse after the final outbreak of the disease in the UK before
racing could resume in Ireland. Races in Ireland form an important element of the
preparation for the Festival and thus FMD served to further disjoint the season.
However a subsequent confirmation of the disease at a farm close to the racecourse
meant the abandonment of racing in April and the possibility of simply postponing the
Festival to a later date. The Festival was thus cancelled for 2001.
Tourism Disaster Management Framework
Faulkner’s (2001) uses models by Fink (1986) and Roberts (1994) to identify six
phases in the process of a tourism disaster. Each phase will be considered in turn to
analyse FMD and its effects on the tourism industry and the Cheltenham Horseracing
Association and the Cheltenham Festival.
Pre-event stage
This period represents a time when action can be taken to prevent or mitigate the
effects of the potential disaster. In 1967 there was an outbreak of FMD in the UK,
which led to the cancellation of the Grand National, the largest, richest and most
17
prestigious race of the national hunt season. However, the effect of thirty four years
on the industry seems to have removed the benefit of experience and been replaced by
a belief that a repetition of the disaster was too unlikely to prepare for. The
Northumberland report into the 1967 outbreak made many conclusions that were
overlooked in 2001, but the rural environment was very different then to the context
of the most recent outbreak of the disease. One of the largest differences is a
declining agricultural production and a downturn in agricultural activities, which has
not only impacted upon the local economy of countries but society in general.
Furthermore, rural or regional areas have been the regions most vulnerable to this type
of agricultural decline and restructuring. As a response to a downturn in agricultural
activities in rural regions the government have been promoting new economic
activities, including tourism. Thus, despite the previous outbreak of the disease, the
growth of tourism and its increasing dominance in rural economies has transformed
the impacts that could be expected from FMD, making FMD almost a new disaster.
The recency of the growth in the number of tourism businesses and the ascendancy of
the tourism industry in rural economies may provide some explanation for the lack of
preparedness.
Fink (1986) believes that all businesses are “on the edge of chaos” and as such should
be prepared for uncertainty in order to achieve a greater sense of control. However,
the effect of being struck by a disaster is that events are definitionally beyond the
control of the organisation, or destination. This may produce a fatalism that as events
are external to the organisation there is little that can be done to prevent them and in
fact often little is done. According to Kash and Darling (1998:183) “refusing to
acknowledge a crisis situation is the worst course of action to take.” While refusing
18
to acknowledge incidents may be akin to the ostrich sticking its head in the sand, the
cost of insuring against remote events provides a further incentive to simply hope for
events not to repeat themselves. Cheltenham racecourse was insured for financial loss
incurred by the cancellation of the Festival, and so exhibited a rare sense of
cautiousness. However, the UK has approximately 120,000 tourism business, 77% of
which have a turnover of less than £250,000 per annum (ETC, 2001a). The small size
of the individual businesses in a fragmented industry meant that for many of these
smaller businesses, the losses caused by FMD were uninsured and the lessons from
1967 unlearnt.
Prodromal
This phase refers to when it is apparent that a disaster is imminent, but has not yet
struck. For natural disasters, this period of time may be very short and give little
opportunity for preparation. For a crisis, the incentive to try to contain the situation
may result in a period of denial that a problem exists. This can be a psychological
denial, where those responsible refuse to acknowledge the risk even to themselves or
a more calculated denial, where the problem is denied to the outside world in an
attempt to preserve markets, esteem or resources. However, for both crises and
disasters there needs to be a ”triggering event” that marks the beginning of this
prodromal stage.
For FMD the triggering event was the first suspected, and then subsequently
confirmed case of the disease (the process of confirmation can take between 24 and
48 hours), yet although the implications of one case of FMD are serious, reports of the
disease did not appear in the media until the number had increased significantly and
19
some days had passed. Thus, unlike for a catastrophic event like a flood, earthquake,
explosion, or acts of terrorism, the potential for denial of the existence of a problem
was greater, as the full extent of the problem was not discovered, and indeed had not
yet occurred.
The advantage of this extended Prodromal phase was the increased time available to
develop a strategy to limit the spread and impact of the disease. Here the distinction
between the aims of the farming community and the tourism industry is revealed. The
initial reports of the disease focused on the implications for farmers, how this would
threaten the price of UK meat products and the likely reaction of destination markets.
As is typical of any national event there was a large amount of disagreement as to
what the “correct” course of action should be. Within the farming community there
was also disagreement as to whether vaccination or the policy of culling would be the
most beneficial. However, the National Farmers Union (NFU) opposed the
vaccination of healthy livestock as any such action would destroy the market value of
the animals, although it would prevent the spread of the disease. Given the limited
choices, the NFU instead favoured burning infected cattle and limiting the movement
of animals and people throughout rural areas.
For the tourism industry, none of its infrastructure had been threatened or damaged,
FMD is generally not contagious to humans and the disease causes no impact on the
visual landscape. Yet the policy of slaughtering and then burning infected and
suspected animals damaged the essential intangible quality that is the appeal and
image of a destination. Thus, the disaster for the tourism industry was not the disease
itself, but the actions taken to eradicate the farming crisis and the media images
20
associated with these actions. There was also a perception, particularly from the North
American market, according to ETC and BTA briefing reports, that the whole of the
UK was effectively closed due to this disease and that it was contagious to humans.
This is perhaps a good example of the ‘ripple effect’ (Heath, 1998) which can
exacerbate the magnitude of crises through ineffective crisis management. Managing
the public perception during a crisis situation is critical. As Heath (1998:26) notes
“crisis management is as much about dealing with human perceptions about the crisis
and the management of a crisis as it is about physically resolving the crisis situation.”
However, difficulties arise in managing the media as it is unlikely that there will be a
time delay between the start of any crisis and media coverage (Ashcroft, 1997). Both
Burnett (1998) and Marra (1998) note that effective crisis communication strategies
are required as part of a strategic approach to dealing with crisis situations. Marra
(1998:461) notes that poor communication strategies can often make the crisis worse
as a deluge of questions is often asked from a wide range of stakeholders including
reporters, employees, stockholders, government officials and public residents.
Faulkner (2001: 142) argues, “the effectiveness with which the tourism industry in a
disaster area handles a crisis, and the degree to which it is prepared for it, has a
bearing on how quickly services are restored to normal”. The tourism industry, like
all other industries was not prepared for FMD, yet the ability of the industry to be
prepared in a way that can protect its industry is determined by the relative power of
the tourism industry compared to other industries, such as the farming industry. The
NFU is a strong and well-organised lobbying body, while the fragmented nature of the
21
tourism industry found difficulty in speaking with one voice that could be heard
(Cotton, 2001).
A 26% growth in tourism revenue occurred over the year to 2001 with tourism
contributing 7% of the workforce in rural areas, compared with a 21% decline in
agricultural revenue contributing only 1.5% of the workforce (ETC, 2001b). Tourism
can be seen to be one of the key drivers of the British economy and supports around
1.7 million jobs, with 1 in 5 of all new jobs created in the tourist industry (Star UK
Statistics, 2001). Yet FMD was a farming disease that threatens the very resources of
the tourism industry. The long prodromal stage of the disaster and the lack of
previous planning ensured that this debate was held during the disaster and served to
create tensions between elements of all areas of the UK.
Typical of the division is the position statement released by the British Tourist
Authority (BTA) amidst the disaster, stating, “tourism has a responsibility to support
farmers and help eradicate foot and mouth disease, but its primary concern is to
safeguard the long term interests of the tourism industry, especially the small and
medium sized businesses who are most affected by the outbreak and are characteristic
of rural tourism” (BTA, 2001). While the prodromal stage of FMD was longer than
for other disasters and allowed more time for considering responses, there is little
doubt that organisations will be afforded sufficient time to think widely and to take
any steps other than those that affect their primary responsibilities. However, the
primary responsibilities of the NFU are to farmers and in the absence of a pre-
determined disaster management plan, the NFU were able to influence government
policy in a way that favoured farmers, to the detriment of the tourism industry. Thus,
22
the policy of slaughter, incineration and denied access continued while the policy of
vaccination was continually proposed and subsequently rejected.
Thus, one can question in a disaster like FMD, where different sections of society are
affected differently, then whose disaster is it, and who should the response measures
be aimed at aiding? Holder (1992) cites contention among the public and private
sector in their respective roles in the tourism industry and argues that the partnership
can be typified allegorically by provision of the locomotive by the private sector,
while the public sector should be held responsible for laying the rails on which the
train proceeds. Holder continues that if the track is correctly laid and the points well
managed then the train will proceed at speed and in safety, yet he concludes that
“unfortunately there are cases where governments have been neglecting the care of
the rails, while showing an unnatural fascination for occupying the driver’s seat of the
train” (pp160). However, to continue the analogy, the FMD express often appeared to
be without a driver and when any direction was provided it was for the benefit of a
small number of passengers only.
The Cheltenham Festival typifies the conflict between farming and tourism during
this stage of the disease. The rural location of the Festival meant that its origins lay in
the development of the countryside through farming, and despite changes to the
Festival, had been regarded as a manifestation of the lives of those from the
countryside. The decision by the managing director at Cheltenham to continue with
the Festival against farming advice was seen as a sign of disloyalty, preferring to ally
the Festival instead with the tourism and leisure industries. Faulkner (2001:139)
encapsulates this division, “Community responses to disasters, both during the
23
emergency and afterwards in the recovery period, involve many different
organisations. In this situation, it is not uncommon for competition and rivalry among
these organisations to become a major impediment to both co-ordination and the
ability of organisations to respond effectively”. The need for a united approach to the
resolution of a disaster is almost an axiom, yet the length of the prodromal period of
the FMD disaster served instead to widen and create divisions rather than the pressure
of limited time creating the opportunity to work together and overcome institutional
or sectoral barriers.
Emergency
Faulkner & Vikulov (2001) demonstrate the effect on the Australian town of
Katherine once the flood struck on the night of the 25th January 1998. The emergency
stage of the disaster lasted until the rain stopped and river levels began to reduce,
which occurred within 24 hours. However, for FMD, the long prodromal period
merged with an emergency period that could be measured in months and where the
effects were not ubiquitous when the disease did strike. One implication of the
different timeframe is the role of the media throughout the disease. Rather than
reporting on a single catastrophic event, and then turning to the clean-up operation
and implications, the media was able to play an investigative role as the size of the
problem gradually became revealed and the response from other countries was also
demonstrated. Harr (1994 cited in Faulkner, 2001) explains that 20% of emergency
staff’s time can be spent in supplying the message and controlling and limiting the
damage done by media reporting of the event. For FMD, the story topped news
programmes and newspapers for months, yet in addition to time spent providing the
media with information, the media undoubtedly influenced the way the disaster was
24
managed, as every step could be scrutinised and presented to the public before
decisions were taken.
A further consequence of the drawn out emergency stage of FMD was the
encroaching deadline for the government to announce a general election. The
government held a strong lead over political rivals in the polls and had made little
secret of its desire to face a spring election. However, the images of burning cows
saturating news coverage meant an early election was impossible unless the disease
could be eradicated without risking the rural vote that was heavily influenced by the
farmers. Yet, the crisis/disaster conflict reflects the multi-sectoral nature of industry
in rural areas, and there was disagreement over how the emergency stage should be
handled. In addition, some rural regions remained unaffected throughout and so
varied in their beliefs as to what should be done to contain the disease. In addition,
there remained a suspicion throughout FMD that, in an increasingly urbanised Britain,
this was a rural problem, following on from Bovine Spongiform Ecephalopathy
(BSE)1, debates over fox-hunting and the right to roam legislation. Such sentiments
expressed via the media further demonstrated the split FMD was causing as to how to
manage a current and continuing emergency.
Intermediate
The intermediate phase is the point where the short-term needs of people have been
addressed and the main focus of activity is to restore services and the community to
normal. However, “normal” may not be defined as the pre-disaster position, as this
may be neither possible, nor desirable. There were no tourism resources damaged by
1 BSE is more commonly known as “mad cow disease” and is linked with the fatal form of the
human disease Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD)
25
FMD to be repaired and the blackened image of the UK could not be repaired until the
disease had been defeated, despite many areas of the UK having never been affected
by the disease. Thus, the nature of the disaster meant that there was no “turning
point” when a town was re-opened, or a building restored or re-built, instead areas of
the country gradually tried to persuade visitors that it was safe to visit, while other
areas of the UK continued to suffer with new outbreaks of the disease. Such a
scenario led to calls from some sectors of the tourism industry to proceed with
advertising campaigns encouraging visitors to the countryside, while for others, such
confidence-building campaigns were mis-placed until the problem had universally
been removed.
The ETC was given £3.8m to promote tourism to a domestic audience in April 2001,
which was spent on specific market campaigns, coupled with developing websites to
inform potential visitors of where was safe to visit. The ETC calculated that this
financial aid generated 766,000 additional visits and produced a return on investment
of £27 for each £1 spent (ETC, 2001a). In May, a further £12m was given to the BTA
for international marketing, while no further finance was available for the ETC and
the domestic market (ETC, 2001a). Some industry representatives questioned the
speed of the marketing finance and suggested that it was far too little too late (Cotton,
2001).
For the Festival, the opportunity to re-stage the event at a later date in the year had
disappeared, and there was little intermediate action that could be taken to repair the
damage of the disease. Indeed, the main intermediate steps were providing refunds to
26
customers who had booked tickets in advance and trying to re-claim deposits lodged
with suppliers for the cancelled Festival.
Long-term (Recovery)
This phase is a continuation of the intermediate phase and saw Cheltenham move to
repair bridges with main customer groups, suppliers and other stakeholders after the
cancellation of the Festival. Around 5000 customers from Ireland attend the Festival
each year, as well as a large number who live in England, giving the Festival its
famed Irish feel. However, Managing Director Edward Gillespie said “…the Irish
were pretty upset with us in February and March when we originally said we were
going ahead with the Festival and the Irish were not able to come, they got very upset
with us. It was like us going ahead with a party, but our chief guest couldn’t come.
They got very upset with us”. The number of cancellations has led one of the main
airlines serving the route from Ireland to institute a policy requiring full-payment 10
weeks in advance of travel, while many of the hotels in Cheltenham town had refused
to return deposits, creating much ill-feeling. This coupled with a general rise in the
stature of hunt racing in Ireland and a strengthening of the British pound left the
vaulted position of the Festival in a vulnerable position to a challenge from a rival
Irish racecourse. The long term recovery of the festival is contingent upon relations
with the principal customer group being repaired and the Irish being willing to travel
back to Cheltenham.
Resolution
The final phase of a disaster is the return to routine, or movement to an improved
position based on reflection. Klein (2000) uses the introduction of the first company
27
safety laws as a result of a fire that killed workers in the Triangle Shirtwaist company
in New York in 1911 to illustrate the benefit that can accrue from disaster. Similar to
crisis management approaches discussed previously, Faulkner (2001), referring to
educational theory, describes this as the potential from the events for single loop, or
double loop learning. Kolb’s (1984) framework identified how the process of an
experience leads to reflection that produces a proposed solution, which is ultimately
tested and so leads to a new experience and a new round of solutions (illustrated in
figure 6). Double loop learning requires a paradigmatic shift as a result of the
experience and so emergent knowledge is produced and ultimately new understanding
is derived (figure 7). The distinction between a crisis and a disaster means that those
who precipitate a crisis are better placed to reflect on mistakes that caused the
problems and institute a paradigmatic shift in thinking. Conversely, and as evidenced
by history, those who suffer the effects of a disaster react to events and are contained
to single loop actions, if not single loop thinking, unless a larger body can enforce the
necessary changes to prevent the events repeating themselves.
Figure 6: Single Loop Learning
Source: Kolb (1984)
Experience
Generalise
Reflect
Test
28
Figure 7 Double Loop Learning.
Source: Kolb (1984)
To this end, the larger body forcing change has been the national government and the
principal change has been the creation of a new government ministry, the Department
for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) from the ashes of the old
Ministry for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. This move illustrates two central
themes to this paper well. Firstly, it is indicative of the relative power of the farming
industry and the tourism industry that the department for tourism does not sit within
this newly formed ministry, but instead remains within the Department for Culture,
Media and Sport (DCMS). While secondly, the move demonstrates a lack of
understanding by the government about the tourism industry. The much heralded
claim of the Labour government has been to produce “joined-up government”, yet the
exclusion of the representatives of the tourism industry from the new ministry for
rural affairs can do little to promote tourism’s influence over future disaster
preparations, or more positively, over the continued changes taking place to the
economic and social fabric of rural areas, of which tourism is a major contributor.
Experience
Generalise
Reflect
Test
Paradigm shift
Emergent Knowing
New Understanding
29
The government also introduced plans for a crisis management unit within the
national government staffed by 100 civil servants which will report to the prime
minister through the cabinet secretary. The unit has been tasked with ‘scanning the
horizon’ to provide an early warning system of looming disasters. Once a crisis
develops, the unit will ensure that government departments co-ordinate their
responses more effectively both within government and in communicating to the
outside world. However, the appointment of a press officer to run the unit suggests
that the government is perhaps more concerned with managing crisis communication
to the general public.
Yet, as a result of FMD, the tourism industry has benefited from a heightened profile
and a wider recognition of its contribution to the economy as a whole and specifically
to the rural economy. To try to capitalise on this elevation, the tourism industry has
formed a Tourism Alliance “to enable the tourism industry to speak with a united,
cohesive voice” (Travelmole, 2001a), headed by the Director-General of the
Confederation of British Industry (CBI). Such a chair can do much to ensure tourism
does not become excluded, or sidelined from the planning for, or management of
future disasters. However, if power does not shift to the tourism industry, then any
preparations become a cosmetic exercise and the notion of disaster planning and
management in tourism becomes devalued.
For Cheltenham, FMD has meant a valuable revision of its relation with its customers
and stakeholders. The disaster has forced a recognition that there had been some
complacency with regard to the value of customers from Ireland and a determination
30
not to take them for granted in the future. Similarly, the 6500 members of
Cheltenham were not entitled to a refund on their membership because of the
cancellation of one particular racing meet during the year, even though the Festival
represents the main attraction of membership. This caused great upset amongst some
members and the managing director concedes the problems arose in describing a
policy that was not well stated originally and “…if you haven’t had a reverse in 55
years, you get out of the habit of how to handle it”. However, as a result of the
disaster “…we will better state it (the policy) so that people know at the point of
engagement what the deal is…it is a very good example of how we have taken them
for granted and therefore we haven’t managed it well and so we now have a whole
new re-design of how we are going to engage with our members” (Gillespie, 2001).
Similarly, the cancellation of the Festival meant local hoteliers, restaurateurs and
others dependent on the 3 day meet were forced to re-evaluate their relationship with
the racecourse. There is evidence that suppliers have profited from FMD by being
refunded after the decision to cancel, and then not passing this refund on to those who
would supply the suppliers. Such practices have led to a revision of relationships and
a tightening of the procedures for engagement with suppliers.
Conclusion: A Critique of the Disaster Framework
FMD was a very different type of disaster from the Katherine floods, to which
Faulkner & Vikulov (2001) apply the Faulkner (2001) disaster management
framework. FMD was a disaster with broad temporal and spatial boundaries, while
the Katherine floods were very concentrated in both time and space. Conversely, the
tourism industry of Katherine, despite high and low seasons, is continuous and
31
occupies an area sufficient to accommodate 11,000 residents whereas the Cheltenham
Festival occurs over three days in March and is contained within an area the size of a
racecourse. Further, FMD was a complex disaster as the prodromal, emergency and
recovery stages were all happening simultaneously for large periods of time, not just
for different locations, but for different industrial sectors of the same location, and in
some cases within the same organisation. As a result, the optimistic aim of reflection
producing healing never materialised, instead deep divisions within the countryside
have emerged, and worsened relations between urban and rural areas. Thus, while
Faulkner’s (2001) model does serve to identify stages to the disaster, they are not as
clearly discernable as for the Katherine floods. This may be due to the evolving
nature of the disaster or the role of the media, but may also be as a result of its
application to an organisation rather than a discrete destination.
Faulkner (2001:136) suggests that “the increased volume of global tourism activity
has combined with the attractiveness of high-risk exotic destinations to expose
tourists to greater levels of risk”. Yet, the Cheltenham Festival occupies just three
days in the annual sporting calendar and takes place in a delightful, yet far from
exotic, rural area to the west of England. The rarity of such an event being impacted
upon by a disaster meant that pre-disaster planning was almost non-existent and later
found to be unhelpful. Subsequent stages of the disaster were influenced largely by
the power position of the tourism industry vis-a-vis the farming industry and meant
that the prodromal, emergency and recovery stages were concerned with responding
to the disaster that became the farming industry’s suggestions of how to react to the
FMD crisis, which in turn led to a tourism disaster. Little proactive strategies
32
planning were made in relation to a tourism disaster in the UK and managers had to
deal with the crisis in the best way they could.
Thus, the framework can be seen as an analytical tool of what happened, but would
have limited value in enabling event managers to steer a pre-determined course
through such an unlikely, yet catastrophic event. However, the case of FMD has
illustrated how a crisis from one industry (farming) can impact upon another
(tourism), and how this can be exacerbated through the ‘ripple effect’ and a lack of
crisis management planning and preparation. The nature of the tourism industry
dictates that the industry should be better prepared for dealing with crises, disasters
and fluctuations of demand. Yet in the case of the UK and FMD this preparation was
not evident, and so the disaster was not dealt with as effectively or efficiently as it
should have been. It is hoped that this paper has contributed in some way to providing
lessons for tourism destination managers and organisations through the case of the
FMD in the UK.
Postscript
A survey of domestic tourism in the UK showed that as a result of FMD spending for
the first 6 months of 2001 had declined by 6%, when compared with the first 6
months of 2000. This had produced losses of £1.4billion from January to June 2001
(Travelmole, 2002), yet during this period larger towns and cities saw an increased
level of businesses from domestic tourism as they were perceived to be safer places to
visit. Domestic tourism in the UK contributes £4 out of every £5 earned through
tourism, equalling £2billion more revenue earned through five times as many trips as
made by overseas visitors. However, international visitors were also keen to remain
33
in urban areas, denying the countryside its share of the £12.5billion international
visitors spend in the UK (BTA, 2001).
The events of September 11th 2001 in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania had a
severe impact on tourism in the UK. Figures for air traffic from the North Atlantic
show a 31.3% decline for October and 26% decline for November (Travelmole,
2001a), the same large cities and towns that had benefited from FMD when perceived
as safer places to visit, now faced a significant decline in visitors as they were seen as
potential targets from terrorism. The increased risk of overseas travel resulted in
evidence of people switching to holidays in the UK rather than travel overseas.
Research conducted by the ETC in October 2001 revealed 15% of respondents had
cancelled their trip, either domestic or international, 25% had postponed, 48% decided
not to make any plans until the situation was more clear, yet 19% of those contacted
had switched to holidaying in the UK rather than abroad (Travelmole, 2001b). The
main beneficiaries of this decision were rural destinations, which were once again
perceived to be safe areas to holiday.
Within the course of 8 months the rural tourism industry had suffered huge losses
from FMD and then benefited from growth as domestic tourism increased and
diverted to the countryside. Such a course of events illustrates the vulnerability of the
tourism industry to disasters, but demonstrates the potential for positive change to
emerge. However, the extent of negative or positive impact is largely beyond the
control of the tourism industry. Both FMD and the terrorism on September 11th 2001
could not have been influenced by the tourism industry, only responded to, while both
events were entirely unpredictable. Despite the valuable attempts of Faulkner (2001)
to introduce the topic of disaster management to tourism, the case of FMD and
34
September 11th 2001 perhaps accounts for the lack of preparedness amongst the
industry and literature covering adequate responses to disasters.
35
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