Exploring Migration Governance Gaps: The Case of Ugandan Labor Migration to the United Arab Emirates

Abstract

Over the past few decades, Sub-Saharan African labor migration to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries has rarely been examined in existing literature. Despite the massive inflow of migrants to the GCC, many Sub-Saharan African governments have not fully developed consistent institutional and policy frameworks to provide labor protection in the host countries. Drawing from extensive interviews with migrants and policy document analyses, we argue that Ugandan government’s incoherent policies on migration have increased the vulnerability of the migrants in host countries and limited the capacity to optimize migration as a national development strategy.
This paper is divided into six sections. The first section explains the Sub-Saharan African migration to the GCC from the era of slave trade up to current labor migration. The second section contextualizes the patterns of Ugandan migration to the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The third section analyses the Ugandan migration policy framework and institutions while the fourth section examines the Ugandan government’s role in implementing migration policies with a focus on labor protection in the UAE. The fifth section explores migration as a co-responsibility of both Uganda and the GCC countries in addressing labor issues. The final section broadly offers some policy recommendations to increase protection measures for Ugandan and other Sub-Saharan African migrants in the host country

Full text

NO. 02
Tchiapep N. Oliver | Froilan T. Malit, Jr.
Exploring Migraon Governance Gaps:
The Case of Ugandan Labor Migraon to
the UAE

Over the past few decades, Sub-Saharan
African labor migraon to the Gulf
Cooperaon Council (GCC) countries has rarely
been examined in exisng literature.1 Despite
the massive inflow of migrants to the GCC,
many Sub-Saharan African governments have
not fully developed consistent instuonal and
policy frameworks to provide labor protecon
in the host countries. Drawing from extensive
interviews with migrants and policy document
analyses, we argue that Ugandan
government’s incoherent policies on migraon
have increased the vulnerability of the
migrants in host countries and limited the
capacity to opmize migraon as a naonal
development strategy.2
This paper is divided into six secons. The first
secon explains the Sub-Saharan African
migraon to the GCC from the era of slave
trade up to current labor migraon. The
second secon contextualizes the paerns of
Ugandan migraon to the United Arab
Emirates (UAE). The third secon analyses the
Ugandan migraon policy framework and
instuons while the fourth secon examines
the Ugandan government’s role in
implemenng migraon policies with a focus
on labor protecon in the UAE. The fih
secon explores migraon as a
co-responsibility of both Uganda and the GCC
countries in addressing labor issues. The final
secon broadly offers some policy
recommendaons to increase protecon
measures for Ugandan and other Sub-Saharan
African migrants in the host country.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Exploring Migraon
Governance Gaps: The Case of
Ugandan Labor Migraon to
the UAE
Tchiapep N. Oliver | Froilan T. Malit, Jr.
Sub-Saharan African Migraon to the GCC
Current literature acknowledges that Sub-Saharan African migraon to the
GCC countries and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has existed
for several centuries (Murray, 1989). The crical linkage between Africa and
the GCC states can be historically traced to the 8th century, when Arab traders
transported African slaves from the Swahili Coast in Southeast Africa
(present-day coastal Kenya, Mozambique, and Tanzania) and from Eritrea and
Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa across the Indian Ocean to present-day Iraq, Iran,
Kuwait, Somalia, Turkey and other parts of the Middle East and India (Labbi
and Theola, 2004). These African migrants were mostly female slaves traded as
concubines and servants, or male slaves mostly traded as soldiers and laborers
(Segal, 2002). Therefore, the early African labor migraon to the GCC and the
Middle East was primarily driven by slave trade.
1 The GCC countries are an intergovernmental polical and economic union comprised of six-oil rich
countries: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Oman, and Kuwait.
2 Both authors contacted the Ugandan embassy, but officials were unavailable for comments.
Policy Report No. 02 July 2014
UGANDA
Figure 1. African Map showing the Sub-Sharan region (green shades)

Aer the abolion of slave-trade in the MENA region by the mid-19th century, the trade relaonships between
Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East intensified, triggering regional migraons, parcularly to the GCC region
(Fofack, 2009). The GCC countries’ increasing producon of oil and hydrocarbon product exports greatly influenced
their economic development, making them aracve to internaonal migraon. Between 1994 and 2004, apart from
Kenya and Djibou, trade was nearly non-existent between Sub-Saharan African countries and the GCC or other Arab
states in North Africa. Economic growth and trade eventually flourished between the MENA region and Sub-Saharan
African countries in the mid-2000s. For example, the GCC-Africa two-way trade increased from US $2.8 billion in 1990
to US $6.8 billion in 2000, and more recently up to US $25.7 billion in 2008. Due to the global economic downturn in
2008, trade fell to US $18.1 billion. Bilateral trade had thus grown by more than 170 % between 2000 and 2009, which
enabled several Sub-Saharan African countries (South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Zambia)
to become top 50 trading partners of the GCC countries (Sager, 2010; Dudley, 2013). This regional trade growth on
imports and exports of petroleum and non-petroleum products has not only contributed to these countries’ economic
development, but also triggered growing labor migraon.
Furthermore, the oil discovery beginning in the 1930s had dramac social, polical, and economic impacts in the GCC
region, increasing demand for foreign labor, including those from Africa. Inially, only foreign workers from Arab
states were imported given their cultural, linguisc, and religious similaries (Kapiszewski, 2006). However, as
domesc economic growth expanded, the need for workers rapidly increased—parcularly in the construcon and
domesc work sector – thus requiring more importaon of foreign labor from Asia. At the same me, many local and
expatriate employers increasingly preferred Asian workers to Arabs due to their docility and affordability. But with
growing unemployment and conflicts in various Sub-Saharan African countries, labor migraon to the GCC became a
‘safety valve’ although compeon existed with other South Asian and South-East Asian migrant workers in
predominantly low-skilled labor markets (Lucas, 2013; Ghosh, 2013; Sloan, 2013). The UAE, for example, has seen a
massive inflow of Sub-Saharan African labor migrants occupying the low skilled labor market sector of the country.
One concrete example is the increasing recruitment of Kenyans, Nigerians, and Ugandans to work in various
low-skilled jobs, including security and cleaning services in the UAE. The recent African labor migraon flows to the
GCC has posed crical challenges to Sub-Saharan African governments (including Uganda) on how to protect the labor
rights of their migrants in the host countries.
The Context of Ugandan Labor Migraon to the UAE
Ugandan labor migraon has always been an integral part of the country’s economic development historically codified
in its legal regulaons. At the naonal level, the Ugandan constuon recognizes in Arcle 20 that fundamental rights
and freedoms are inherent and not granted by the State. In parcular, Arcle 29 (2) (b) states that every cizen shall
have the right to leave and return to Uganda, and (c) that every Ugandan has the right to a passport or other travel
document. While the Ugandan government does not explicitly prohibit labor migraon, the country’s polical history
highlights the ambivalent relaonship between the state and cizens, whereby migraon is used as a tool to maximize
economic and naonal development.
Three labor migraon waves have been idenfied: the first wave occurred during the dictatorship era of President Ida
Amin from 1971-1979, where at least 80,000 Ugandans of South Asian descent were expelled from the country. The
second wave took place approximately between 1980 and 1986, when thousands of Ugandan refugees were exiled
due to growing armed conflict and polical instabilies. The recent third wave started in the early 1990s when
globalizaon forces generated push and pull factors on labor mobility (Orozco, 2008). Key push factors include
populaon growth, unemployment, and lack of sustainable employment while the primary pull factor is the high
demand for foreign labor in the country of desnaon.
During the late 1990s and early 2000s, large emigraon flows of Ugandans to the West (i.e. US, Canada, and Europe)
for employment and study increased, where high-skilled migrants (i.e. doctors and nurses) were lured by good
salaries, beer living condions and educaonal oppurtunies in the West (Mulumba & Olema, 2009). Yet with recent
immigraon restricons in the West, many Ugandans have alternavely been migrang to the Middle East, including
the UAE. Figure1 shows the Ugandan Bureau of Stascs’ data on migraon of Ugandan residents to the UAE between
2007 and 2009.
Internaonal Associaon Internaonal Gulf Organizaon
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POLICY REPORT
3
Figure 2 shows that the migraon of Ugandan residents to the UAE increased from 10,760 in 2007 to 12,098 in 2008.
This parcular figure decreased to 9,908 during the 2009 global recession but available evidence suggests that close
proximity with the GCC countries and the increasing presence of recruitment agencies in Uganda generally smulate
migraon. There is no accurate data on Ugandan labor migraon to the UAE, but an esmated 3,000 Ugandans are
reported to be occupying the low- and semi-skilled sectors of the labor market (e.g. cleaners, security guards, waiters,
sales persons etc.) and other related service-based industries and sex work. Ugandan labor migraon to the GCC and
the MENA regions has increasingly become an important ingredient of naonal economic development discourse,
parcularly in the role of remiances. The Bank of Uganda reported that Ugandan migrants in the diaspora
transferred US$ 109 million in 1995/1996, which rose up to US$ 685 million (about 1.2 trillion Ugandan shillings) in
2004/2005 (Mulumba & Olema, 2009). Remiances in fact connued to grow to US$ 910 million in 2012, a 14%
increase which influenced the Ugandan government to declare labor migraon “a noble trade”. The government
report also noted that 5.6% of the total amount of remiances came from the MENA region. However, this excludes
unofficial channels (i.e. channels unknown to the Ugandan government) which are likely to increase as Ugandan labor
migraon to the MENA region expands over me.
Due to the growing Ugandan labor migraon to the GCC countries, policy and instuonal capacity building is vital to
maximizing economic benefits. By extending more protecon to its cizens abroad, especially in the Middle East, the
Ugandan government would effecvely help increase remiance inflow and smulate the naonal economy.
Number of Migrants
Year
15000
10000
5000
02007 2008 2009
Figure 2. Uganda Resident Migraon to the UAE from 2007 - 2009
Figure 3. Sources of Remiances by Ugandan Migrants (2012)
21%
26%
43%
5%
5%
Africa
Europe
North America
Middle East
Australasia

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Internaonal Associaon Internaonal Gulf Organizaon
Ugandan Migraon Framework: Policies and Instuons
Over the years, the Ugandan migraon policy framework has shied focus between emigraon and immigraon
policies (Mulumba & Olema, 2009). The Ugandan government has restricted emigraon of its high-skilled populaons
to prevent brain drain by imposing foreign exchange restricons and obligatory travel clearances (IOM, 2013).
However, in the 1990s, due to the increased civil unrest in neighbouring African countries, Uganda received a huge
influx of refugees, which prompted the government to focus on immigraon policy to protect refugees and other
internally displaced persons (IDPs). Eventually by the early 2000s, the Ugandan government switched focus to engage
more with its diaspora in naonal development (Mulumba & Olema, 2009). These parcular policy developments
demonstrate the shiing and oen conflicng policy priories of the Ugandan government as well as the lack of
coherent long-term regulaon of internaonal labor migraon.
Despite these parcular constraints in the frameworks, the government has increasingly exerted efforts to close
exisng policy gaps. The President of Uganda in 2007, for example, issued a direcve to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MOFA) to develop strategies to strengthen its capacity to manage Uganda’s diaspora. With support from the UNDP,
the MOFA draed a diaspora policy. The following tables summarize various naonal policies and instuons that
govern Ugandan labor migraon.
Source: Internaonal Organizaon for Migraon (IOM) (2013)
Table 1: Exisng Ugandan Government’s Policy Framework on Migraon
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

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POLICY REPORT
Table 2: ExisngInstuonal Framework on Migraon
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Source: IOM (2013)
These parcular policy addions have guided the current instuonal and policy framework of the Ugandan
government in managing its labor migraon globally.
Policy Strengths
As more Ugandans seek employment via recruitment agencies for jobs in the West and Middle East, the government
responded by establishing the External Employment Unit (EEU), a government body of the Ministry of Gender, Labor,
and Social Development (see Table 2) to license and regulate these agencies. Their primary role was to educate the
job-seekers about the opportunies in the labor market outside of Uganda. An inherent benefit of labor migraon
policy is that it effecvely organizes and regulates labor migraon, while at the same me reducing the high
unemployment problems in Uganda. Approximately 62% of Ugandan youths are unemployed, most of whom are
college graduates (Andrew, 2013). Thus, increasing the awareness of available employment abroad through these
government instuons can help reduce unemployment problems.
Another posive benefit of the stated policies and instuonal frameworks is that they opmize economic
contribuon of the diaspora to the country’s development. For example, the overall objecve of the Naonal Diaspora
Policy (NDP), as noted in Table 1, is to facilitate the safe and reliable remiance of funds to increase Ugandan migrants
full parcipaon in naonal development. When migrant cizens transfer funds back home to their families, the
money is invested in small businesses, educaon, and other health-care related needs. However, our qualitave
studies suggest that Ugandan diaspora groups are oen faced with many constraints such as lengthy documentaon
procedures and security of their businesses. Implemenng the NDP policy framework certainly creates a conducive
environment for investments by the Ugandan diaspora.

Furthermore, while the previous migraon regulaons primarily focused on restricng emigraon of highly skilled
professionals, they to a large extent failed to adequately address irregular emigraon of low-skilled Ugandans who
oen end up being exploited (Papademetriou & Somerville, 2014). Therefore, Uganda is now developing policies
(Table 1 and 2) that emphasize the legal migraon of its cizens. The monitoring of Ugandan migraon flows does not
only address issues of the emigraon of low skilled workers but also help build an efficient migraon database. The
proposed legislave framework will help develop migraon policies and engage the Ugandan diaspora in host
countries.
Policy Limitaons
The Ugandan labor migraon policies, however, have also their own shortcomings. The first limitaon is that the
policies do not emphasize the labor protecon of Ugandan migrants in the host countries. The protecon of rights of
a country’s cizens abroad has a long-term effect on their contribuon to their home countries. It has been well
proven that migrang from low-income to high-income countries brings great benefit to immigrants, their families,
and their communies through remiances (Ruhs, 2010). In addion, evidence suggests that more immigrant rights
in the host country could lead to beer their salaries and contribuons to their families and home communies.
In contrast, the fewer rights an immigrant has, the more likely he is to face vulnerable working condions and low
wages in the host country (Julia & Douglas, 1999). Ugandan migraon policies have not addressed these concerns as
desnaon countries lack implementaon policy to enforce migrants‘ labor rights, parcularly those low-skilled labor
workers. Most labor-receiving countries in the West provide comprehensive rights to immigrant workers (i.e. path to
cizenship), while others such as the GCC countries (including the UAE) provide minimal rights to their temporary
migrants (Fargues, 2011). The Kafala system of employment in the GCC oen restricts labor migrants’ ability to switch
employment due to their contractual agreement with employers, which directly limits their capacity to earn beer
wages and remit to their home countries. Thus, lack of protecon policies for migrant workers abroad could to a large
extent hinder naonal economic development.
Another limitaon of the Ugandan policies and instuonal frameworks on migraon is that it shis the responsibility
on protecng migrant workers’ rights from the government to recruitment companies. Uganda’s Vision 2040 policy,
for instance emphasizes that the government must provide legal assistance to their labor migrants by signing
“cooperaon agreements” (or Memorandum of Understanding, MOU) with the host country governments. Yet the
External Employment Unit (EEU) of the Ministry of Gender, Labor, and Social Development (see Table 2) is mandated
to “license and regulate recruitment companies who are intended to protect the rights of migrant workers abroad.”
Granng recruitment agencies the legal responsibility to protect the rights of migrants (i.e. contractual violaons)
crically poses challenges, given their lack of full legal and instuonal capacity to negoate for and protect labor
rights, thereby leaving the laborers vulnerable to the host country’s legal system. This shortcoming in legal protecon
negavely affects migrant workers’ contribuon to naonal development.
The policy and instuonal frameworks also fail to capitalize on the potenal gains of “social remiances” (including
the transfer of values, norms, knowledge, or skills),” which has always been beneficial for both sending and receiving
countries (Dvzimbo, 2003). The economies and infrastructural development of migrant-receiving countries such as the
GCC countries have grown due to the imported skills from labor migrant workers; on the other hand, labor-sending
countries like Uganda have benefited from the financial investment of their migrant workers. The Ugandan NDP policy
(Table 1) omits to menon that, if properly managed, the return of Ugandan emigrants could lead to further
development through skill transfers. Thus, failing to define efficient strategies and programmes to fully harness the
skills of Ugandan migrant returnees limits the government’s capacity to maximize “social remiances” as a naonal
development strategy. As a result, Ugandan workers transfer their knowledge and skills beer in the host GCC
countries than when they return to their home country, thus not contribung to their country’s economic growth and
development.
6
Internaonal Associaon Internaonal Gulf Organizaon

The Context of the Ugandan Government in the UAE
The incoherent nature of the Ugandan government’s policy and instuonal frameworks in the home country -
parcularly labor protecon to migrants in the diaspora - directly limits the capacies of its foreign diplomac
instuons such as embassies and consulates abroad.
The limited instuonal and legal capacity of the Ugandan embassy in the UAE demonstrates this problem. Of the 54
Sub-Saharan African countries, the government of Uganda is one of the 30 African countries that have established a
diplomac mission in the UAE2. With the growth of Ugandan labor migraon to the UAE and the GCC, the Ugandan
government has increasingly developed emigraon policies to engage its diasporas abroad. However, the lack of
coherency in the Ugandan government’s migraon policies and instuonal framework, has greatly constrain their
consulates and diplomac missions to protect migrants. For example, the UAE-based Ugandan embassy states that its
objecve is to “develop a business understanding of the UAE and to manage the cross-cultural insights that support a
problem-solving team, which aspires to deliver an efficient service” (Consular Services, 2013) Its three primary
services include cerficaon of documents/tesmonials, noficaon of next of kin in case of accidents, illness, or
death, and visa issuance. While these parcular core services support Ugandan labor migrants, the embassy has no
specific labor grievance mechanisms to provide legal assistance to maltreated or abused migrant workers, a crical
issue that serves to deepen tension between the Ugandan labor diasporas and the government.
Based on our extensive interviews with migrants, the following crical labor issues have been idenfied including legal
redress, limited memorandum of understanding on migraon, exploitaon from recruitment agencies and improper
disseminaon of informaon on labor market. =
2 African countries with diplomac missions (embassy and or consulate) in the UAE include: Angola, Algeria, Benin, Chad, Comoros, Djibou, Egypt,
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Libya, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, Niger, South Africa,
Senegal, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.
7
POLICY REPORT

8
Internaonal Associaon Internaonal Gulf Organizaon
Legal Redress
The UAE-based Ugandan embassy’s lack of legal assistance results in migrant workers being subjected to the UAE‘s
Kafala Sponsorship System, a legal system that binds each migrant worker to a parcular sponsor/job, thereby
restricng his mobility (Babar 2013). Infact, some companies exploit this parcular system by confiscang labor
migrants’ passports and this act violates the Ugandan government’s policy3. James4 , a Ugandan security guard in the
UAE laments, “When I arrived to the UAE, the company I was supposed to work for, took away my passport from me.
My manager told me the passports will be taken to the immigraon for the residence permit. Aer a few weeks, my
colleagues and Irequested our passports, but we were told that our passport would be given to us only aer we
finished our contract with the company or pay AED 3,500 before we collect our passports” (James, male, 28). Another
Ugandan janitor in the UAE Andrew, adds, “In addion to keeping my passport, my company asked me to sign a
document stang that I grant them the right to keep my passport or else I wouldn’t be given the job. Holding my
passport is not included in my contract, so I knew it was illegal for them to keep my travelling documents. But I gave
them it because I needed the job as I spent a lot to come to the UAE” (Andrew, male, 24).
Given these parcular cases, our interviews confirmed that the vast majority of semi- and low-skilled Ugandan
migrant workers — parcularly newcomers — largely face labor rights violaon, including delayed/non-payment of
wages, overcrowded accommodaons, passport confiscaon, physical abuse, and immediate deportaon for minor
faults. Due to lack of legal redress, Clement, a Ugandan cleaner highlights, “We were promised good comfortable
accommodaons, but when we arrived, 8 of us were put in one room. The toilets are very dirty and unhygienic. When
we complained to the management of the company, we were told we came to Dubai to work and not to live
comfortable lives which I find ridiculous.”
While some Ugandan labor migrants have aempted to file complaints, they oen lose in the UAE courts due to lack
of financial resources and inability to communicate in Arabic. The Ugandan embassy in Abu Dhabi explicitly states it
has no capacity to provide legal assistance, court intervenon, or addional services to Ugandan naonals in custody,
employment, and hospitals . The weak abily of the Ugandan embassy to provide legal assistance to Ugandan
migrants in the UAE reflects the government’s lile priority in addressing labor rights protecon in the host country.
Furthermore, the embassy is also under-staffed and specifically lacks a labor department that would oversee migrant
labourers’ issues in the UAE. Despite the growing Ugandan labor migraon, the Ugandan government has not yet
adequately resolved labor grievances against offending UAE companies or sponsors. Thus, low-skilled Ugandan labor
migrants are vulnerable to labor exploitaon and impacng on their capacity to contribute to the naonal
development of Uganda.
3 Informaon obtained from the “Important Notes” found in Ugandan Passport.
4 For the purpose of this qualitave study, we altered the parcipants’ original names to maintain and protect confidenality and privacy.
Source : SAFE ACCESS NOW

Limited Memorandum of Understanding on Migraon
Over the past decade, many labor sending countries have used various legal instruments like the MOUs
(Memorandum of Understanding) to protect migrant’s labor rights. Unlike Uganda, some Asian countries like the
Philippines and India have signed MOUs with the UAE government, seng a minimum wage and standardized labor
contracts for domesc workers (Malit Jr. & Safa, 2014). The Pakistani embassy, in parcular, has also set a minimum
wage of not less than AED 800 for its labor migrants in the UAE5 . The Ethiopian embassy further increased labor
protecon for their domesc workers by imposing a minimum wage of AED 1, 200 and demanding for beer working
condions (Pree K., 2013).
However, while the Ugandan government has forged a strong bilateral agreement with the UAE in trade and business,
it has not focused on labor migraon issues between the two countries. The Ugandan Ambassador to the UAE, H.E
Mrs. Irene Florence Persis Wekiya, previously met with the Ruler of Dubai in August 2013 to discuss their mutual
naonal interests (including trade, tourism, and investments in infrastructural projects, power generaon, roads,
railways, waterways, ports, food security oil, and gas). However, labor migraon issues have not been discussed
despite its increasing relevance in the UAE. The Ugandan Prime Minister Rt. Hon Amama Mbabazi has also engaged
with the Abu Dhabi government officials this past April 2013 to explore and expand exisng avenues of trade and
economic cooperaon between both countries, excluding labor migraon. Furthermore, the Prime Minister’s recent
visit to the Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry this May 2014 strongly focused on strengthening Uganda’s
bilateral business relaonships with the UAE—again, not labor migraon related issues. The lack of emphasis on
addressing labor issues during these official state visits indicates the low priority of Uganda to address labor migraon
issues in the UAE towards the economic and naonal development of the sending country.
Accordingly, many Ugandan migrants in the UAE exert public pressure to address their on-going labor concerns. In
2012, a group of Ugandan labor migrants appealed to the Ugandan Parliament by MPs Bey Nambooze (of Mukono
municipality) and Hussein Kyanjo (of Makindye West municipality) for the alleged neglect of Ugandans by embassy
officials in the UAE. The migrants claimed that the Ugandan embassy did not establish good working relaons with
Dubai and failed to extend labor assistance to its naonals in the UAE. The former Ugandan Ambassador, Prof
Semakula Kiwanuka, denied the allegaons saying, “The embassy had so far helped to provide 165 Ugandans with
emergency travel documents aer they were deported or had lost their travel documents. My staff has worked
relessly to visit Ugandans detained for various offenses in detenon camps, jails, or hospitals” (Bwambale, 2012). In
his statement, the ambassador failed to menon the embassy’s efforts to protect the labor rights of these vulnerable
Ugandans in detenon camps and jails. The absence of MOUs that strive to address labor issues of its migrants in the
UAE reflects of the incoherent policies and instuonal frameworks of the Ugandan government. Thus, Ugandan
migrant workers are vulnerable in the labor migraon process, which limits the government’s capacity to opmize on
migraon as a tool for naonal development.
9
POLICY REPORT
5 Informaon obtained from official documents of the Pakistan Consulate in the UAE
Source : TRADE AND EXPORT ME

10
Internaonal Associaon Internaonal Gulf Organizaon
Exploitaon from Recruitment Agencies
The Ugandan government lack of monitoring capacity on recruitmnet agencies usually makes migrant workers
vulnurable. In 2005, the government passed the Rules and Regulaons Governing the Recruitment and Employment
of Ugandan Migrant Workers Abroad, Regulaons No. 62 (popularly known in Uganda as “Nkuba Kyeyo”) (ILO, 2005).
These regulaons control the recruitment of Ugandan workers for foreign labor market by the Ministry of Gender,
Labor, and Social Development through the External Employment Unit (EEU), the lead agency responsible for
implemenng and enforcing the migraon laws. Since the creaon of this government unit, there has been a
structured paern in the migraon of Ugandan labor migrants as such the EEU has licensed ten recruitment agencies
that assist interested cizens in securing employment in other countries. Recruitment agency follows the following
procedues, for example to ensure that migrant workers are provided orientaon on recruitment and terms and
condions of work; guarantee that contracts of employment align with standard employment contracts and other
laws, regulaons, and collecve bargaining agreements; ensure that migrant workers examine their contracts before
they sign them and receive copies; guarantee compliance with labor and social legislaon of Uganda, of the country
of employment, and internaonal labor bodies such as the ILO. These state mandated requirements reflects the
government’s interest to protect migrant workers.
However, despite these available instuonal policies and mechanisms, many Ugandan migrants sll face exploitaon
in the process. Our in-depth interviews reveal that Ugandan labor migrants were charged exorbitantly high travelling
fees by these recruitment agencies prior to securing employment in the UAE.
Benjamin, a Ugandan waiter highlights, “We were promised good jobs with good salaries by the recruitment agencies.
But we were asked to pay US$ 2000 (about five million Ugandan shillings) for the visa, flight cket, and medical
check-ups. We paid 50% of the fees before our visas were processed and the rest when the visa was out. I borrowed
some money from the bank as I did not have the full amount. When we arrived to the UAE, our company told us they
paid for our visas and ckets. So we realized the recruitment agency in Uganda duped us. But we could do nothing”
(Benjamin, male, 25). This form of exploitaon can only be curbed by stricter enforcement of regulaons and constant
monitoring of recruitment agencies which can help to improve labor protecon for migrants. Furthermore, Ugandan
labor migrants have also become systemacally vicmized by ongoing fraudulent acvity commied by various
recruitment agencies and companies in the UAE. For example, some UAE-based recruitment agencies excessively
charged jobseekers between AED 300 to 600 to secure employment; however, none of them got a job (Al Jandaly,
2012). Francis, a Ugandan salesperson who came to the UAE with a tourist visa before geng a job, notes, “I went to
a recruitment company who asked me to pay AED 300 and they will get me a sales job. I gave them the money, but
aer a month, they didn’t offer me any job and I searched and got a job on my own” (Francis, male, 32). These
unscrupulous recruitment pracces in Uganda and in the UAE directly violate both local and internaonal labor laws,
yet the Ugandan government has scarcely priorized labor migraon protecon both at home and in the host country.
Source : CAREER SPARK

POLICY REPORT
Improper Disseminaon of Informaon on Labor Market
Improper disseminaon of informaon on foreign job opportunies has greatly led to labor market vulnerabilies for
Ugandan migrants in the host country. For instance, the lack of adequate pre-departure and post-arrival training
programs are almost non-existent, where in some cases recruitment agencies in Uganda provide such informaon
rather than the UAE-based Ugandan embassy. However, the informaon disseminated by these agencies is oen
misleading, far from the reality in the host country. These parcular challenges in informaon disseminaon range
from high visa fees in their home countries to being exploited by employers in the UAE. About 70% of our respondants
noted that the UAE-based Ugandan embassy should have provided basic informaon about the UAE labor market and
living condions prior to travel, a mechanism that could have decreased labor exploitaon. For example, Kinsley,
another Ugandan cleaner, notes, “All the informaon I got was from the recruitment agencies in Uganda. I believed all
the promises they made to me. They told me I could earn up to 2.5 million Ugandan Shillings (US$ 978 or AED 3,500).
But when I reached Dubai that was not the case. I earn just AED 8000 (556,463 Ugandan Shillings or US$ 2,178). I have
to eat, take care of myself, send some money back home to pay off my debts from my aunty, and I have nothing le to
save for emergencies. Those recruitment agencies in Uganda are very deceiul” (Kinsley, male, 30). man Ugandan
labor migrants should have avoided the exploitave pracces of recruitment agencies have they being properly
informed on the labor market and living condions in the UAE by the Ugandan embassy.
The minimal flow of informaon has appeared to deskill Ugandan migrants. Like most Sub-Saharan labor migrants,
Ugandans mostly occupy very low-skilled employment despite high educaonal qualificaons or occupaonal
“deskilling” (Malit, Jr. & Oliver, 2003). Frederick, another Ugandan cleaner in the UAE, highlights, “I am a bachelor’s
degree holder but I am a cleaner now. It is not fair. They do not take into consideraon my educaonal background
before giving me a job. It makes me feel as if I just wasted all these years in college” (Frederick, male, 30). The failure
of Ugandan migrants to find employment commensurate to their level of educaon or training is partly due to the lack
of public awareness from the embassy. As a result, more migrant workers become segmented into low wages and
hence remit less money to their home country. This greatly hinders the Ugandan government’s iniave to harness
the potenals of its emigrant workers in naonal development. These parcular factors, as well as the
non-recognion of their credenals, social and racial prejudices at their place of work, and disorganized social
network instuons are evidence of lack of proper informaon and thus jeopardize Ugandan labor migrants’ posion
within the UAE labor market and their ability to contribute to their home country.
11
Source : WHOSWHO

Uganda and UAE: Are Labor Migraon Policies a Co-Responsibility?
Internaonal migraon and development has always posive impacts on the economic and naonal development of
the sending countries’s economies through the remiances, skills, and experse of migrant workers (United Naons,
2013). Yet this has not been the case of Ugandan migrants in the UAE largely due to the complex divergence of state
interests and priories on migraon policies of both countries. Uganda, for instance, mainly priorizes trade,
business, and investment relaonships with the UAE and the GCC, rather than focusing on labor protecon issues of
their cizens in the host country. Furthermore, the incoherent nature of Ugandan policy and instuonal framework
on migraon--mainly on protecng migrants’ labor rights in the UAE or the GCC--highlights the weak priority of the
government in guaranteeing labor rights.
On the other hand, the UAE and other GCC countries have also strong economic interests in extending investment
opportunies to Uganda and Sub-Saharan Africa and control labor migrants’ mobility under the Kafala System of
Sponsorship. While ongoing policy efforts have been introduced to protect labor migrants‘ rights, the UAE’s lack of
strong policy implemenon on its labor policies significantly undermine migrants’ labor rights and welfare. Because
of this exisng legal framework, combined with the Ugandan government’s weak financial and instuonal capacies,
the Ugandan government has inevitably failed to maximize the potenal benefits of labor migraon in the UAE/GCC.
Therefore, maximizing the potenal benefits of migraon in naonal development should be a shared responsibility
between desnaon and origin countries. An efficient and sustainable mul-stakeholder or bilateral dialogues on
labor migraon issues (i.e. Abu Dhabi Dialogue) are critcally imperave to secure labor migrants‘ rights and protecon
in the long run.
12
Internaonal Associaon Internaonal Gulf Organizaon
Source : EMIRATES 24 7

POLICY REPORT
13
Conclusions
This iaIGO policy report has broadly examined Sub-Saharan African labor migraon to the GCC with a specific focus on
the Ugandan government’s labor migraon instuons and policies. While the Ugandan government has exerted
various regulatory efforts to manage labor migraon, lile emphasis is placed on developing strong labor protecon
for their cizens, parcularly in the GCC countries. This has not only generated labor market vulnerabilies (i.e. mainly
from recruitment agencies), but also negavely impacted their overall capacity to protect their cizens abroad and
opmize remiances. Other crical issues, including illegal emigraon and human trafficking, along with the lack of
accurate data in the Gulf Cooperaon Council countries, have further undermined their capacity to protect their
cizens in the GCC. The limited presence of the Ugandan government in the UAE has addionally generated labor
market concerns (i.e. asymmetric informaon and deskilling). These difficules should spur the Ugandan government
to provide accurate informaon to migrants, strengthen its legal capacity to protect the labor rights of migrants and
to engage more comprehensively with the UAE government by signing MOUs guaranteeing considerable labor
protecon of its migrants in the host country. This will not only further reduce labor market vulnerabilies, but also
facilitate deeper, long-term engagement with the Ugandan diaspora as a crical factor in naonal development.
Source : UAE INTERACT

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Policy Recommendaons
14
Internaonal Associaon Internaonal Gulf Organizaon

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16
POLICY REPORT

We would like to extend our gratude for the inial comments provided by Marcos Medina, DPhil Candidate at
University of Oxford, and Diana Chen, University of Conneccut.
First published in 2014 by
Internaonal Associaon – Internaonal Gulf Organizaon
Dubai, United Arab Emirates
© Internaonal Associaon – Internaonal Gulf Organizaon 2014
All rights reserved. This publicaon is copyright, but may be reproduced for educaonal and policymaking purposes,
but not for resale.
For any other inquiries, please contact info@igogcc.org.
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