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Electoral Dynamics in
Indonesia
Electoral Dynamics in
Indonesia
Money Politics, Patronage and Clientelism at the Grassroots
Edited by
Edward Aspinall and Mada Sukmajati
I/$r
NUS PRE55
SINGAPORE
o 2016 Edward Aspinall and Mada Sukmajati
Published by:
NUS Press
National University of Singapore
AS3-01-02, 3 Arts Link
Singapore 117569
Far (65) 6774-A652
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ISBN 978-981 -4722-04-9 (Paper)
AII rights reserved. This book, or Parts thereof, may not be reproduced in
any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying,
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invented, without written permission from the Publisher.
National Library Board, Singapore Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
Names: Aspinall, Edward, editor. I Sukmajati, Mada, 1976- editor. I NUS Press,
publisher.
Title: Electoral dynamics in Indonesia: money politics, Patronage and clientelism
at the grassroots / edited by Edward Aspinall and Mada Sukmajati.
Description: Singapore: NUS Press, National University of Singapore, [2016]
Identifiers: OCN 928277967 | ISBN 978-981-4722-04-9 (paperback)
Subjects: LCSH: Elections--Indonesia. I Political campaigns--Indonesia. I
Indonesia--Politics and government.
Classification: LCC 1Q778 I DDC 324.959804--dc23
Cover image: Voting day in |akarta, 2OL4 (Photograph by Eduardo Ramirez).
Tlpeset by: International Typesetters Pte Ltd
Printed by: Markono Print Media Pte Ltd
Contents
Li* oi ],IaPs, Tables and Figures viii
-1"-kno*'ledgements ix
G,i-.i-'-.ar;' and Abbreviations xii
CurrencS' Conversion Table xix
1. patronage and clientelism in Indonesian Electoral Politics 1
Ed*,ard Aspinall and Mada Sukmaiati
l- Bireuen, Aceh: The Aftermath of Post-conflict Politics and 39
the Decline of Partai Aceh
Rizkika Lhena Darwin
-i. Bener Meriah, Aceh: Money Politics and Ethnicity in a 54
New Electoral District
Teuku Muhammad lafar Sulaiman
+. Iledan, North Sumatra: Between Ethnic Politics and 70
Money Politics
Ahmad Taufan Damanik
5. Bangka Belitung: Patronage and Identity Politics in a Plural 87
Society
Ibrahim
6. Musi Banl'uasin, South Sumatra: Nine Steps to Victory 102
Alamsyah
7. Palembang, South Sumatra: Aspiration Funds and 12o
Pork Barrel Politics
Muhammad Mahsun
10.
8. Banten: Islamic Parties, Networks and Patronage
Gandung Ismanta and ldris Thaha
g. Tangerang, Banten: Women Candidates in the Shadow of
Men
Argoposo Cahyo Nugroho
Central and South |akarta: Social Welfare and Constituency
Service in the MetroPolis
Sita W. Dewi, S.L. Harianto and Olivia D. Purba
Bekasi, West ]ava: From Patronage to Interest Group Politics?
Amalinda Savirani
Bandung, West |ava: Silaturahmi, Personalist Networks and
Patronage Politics
Caroline Paskarina
Cirebon, West |ava: Where Materialism Defeats Personalism
Marzuki Wahid
Pati, Central Java: Targets, Techniques and Meanings of
Vote Buying
Noor Rohman
Blora, Central |ava: Local Brokers and Vote Bupng
Zusiana Elly Triantini
East |ava: New Clientelism and the Fading of Aliran Politics
Rubaidi
Madiun, East |ava: Brokers in Territorial, Social Network
and Vote-buying Strategies
Ahmad Zainul Hamdi
t54
167
184
t37
217
11.
t2.
13.
14.
15.
16.
249
t7. 279
Contents
South Kalimantan: Islamic Party Candidates Who Refuse
to Buy the Vote
Altmad Muhajir
North Sulawesi: Clan, Church and State
Nono S.A. Sumampouw
Southeast Sulawesi: Money Politics in Indonesia's Nickel Belt
Eve Warburton
East Nusa Tenggara: Patronage Politics, Clientelism and the
Hijacking of Social Trust
ktdi Rohi
ZL North )ayapura, Papua: Bupng the Voters and Buying the
Administrators
Ridwan
23- Papua's Central Highlands: t1rre Noken System, Brokers
and Fraud
Cillian Nolan
NWiography
C.ontributors
tu
321
34t
2t- 363
4t6
431
433
List of MaPs, Tables and Figures
MAPS
Indonesia
Aceh and Medan
Bangka Belitung and South Sumatra
Banten, |akarta and Bekasi
West |ava
Central and East |ava
South Kalimantan
Sulawesi
East Nusa Tenggara
Papua
TABLES
2.1 Bireuen District Parliament Seats' 2009 and 2014
6.1 Musi Banyuasin III, Elected Representatives' 2009
an,d ZOtq
11.1 Bekasi District DPRD, Party Representation' 2009
and 2014
11.2 Bekasi District, Votes for FSPMI Candidates' 2014
13.1 Election Results, Cirebon I,2OO9 and 2014
19.1 Legislative Candidates Elected to GMIM BIPRA
Positions, 2014
FIGURES
1.1 Typical Success Team Structure for a DPRD II
Candidate
l7.l Typical Success Team Structures in Madiun District
xx
38
86
t36
202
z3z
298
320
362
382
3l
42
105
t87
198
221
33L
vlll
283
q
v)
d
oo
o
te
x
bo
6l
FE
d
a
hapter
Belitung: Patronage and ldentitY
tics in a Plural SocietY
Ibrahim
province of Bangka Belitung, a group of islands to the east of
rtra, hosts a heterogeneous and dynamic society' A long history of
rce with, and maritime connections to, other parts of Indonesia
Southeast Asia has produced a community that prides itself on
openness and ethnic pluralism. Since the beginning of the reform
iod, after a brief flurry of mobilisation that led to the formation of
province two years after the fatl of Suharto, the province has been
ely politically stable. Ethnic pluralism, for example, has not given
to ,riol"rr.", and though there has been intra-elite rivalry (much
d it focused on the political economy of tin mining), it has rarely led
r significant social tension.
in the 2014 legislative elections, programmatic politics featured
hle in the campaigning of candidates running for seats in the national,
povincial and district parliaments in Bangka Belitung. Instead, as in
-mny parts of Indonesia, candidates concentrated on building personal
lEccess teams and winning voters over with patronage. This chapter
samines these patterns of political mobilisation by focusing on three
aspects of electoral dynamics. After a brief background section, the
&apter analyses, fi.rst, the varieties of patronage politics that candidates
agaged in. This section notes that, although most candidates denied
88 Ibrahim
involvement in money politics, in fact patronage was central to most of
their strategies, and they demonstrated great creativity in devising ne\r-
forms of gifts and means of delivery. Second, the chapter investigates the
campaign structures used by candidates, noting a basic division between
casual and unstructured methods used by poorly resourced candidates
and more elaborate and effective structures built by wealthier candidates.
Third, the chapter examines patterns of identity-based networking by the
candidates. Here, we face something of a puzzle: though Bangka Belitung
society is remarkably open and ethnically tolerant, candidates often relied
on narrow identity appeals and networks when reaching out to voters.
BACKGROUND: LOCAT POLITICS IN A
MULTI-ETHNIC SOCIETY
Bangka Belitung was established as a province relatively recently, when
it was split from South Sumatra in 2000.1 Consisting of an archipelago
of some 256 islands to the east of southern Sumatra, the province is
dominated by the two large islands which give it its name. About 70
per cent of the population live in the four districts and one urban
municipality that make up Bangka island; most of the remainder reside
in the two districts of Belitung.
Easily accessible by sea from Sumatra, |akarta, Malaysia and
elsewhere in island Southeast Asia, these islands have long been centres
of maritime commerce. Bangka and Belitung have also been among
Southeast Asia's major centres of tin mining since the 18th century. This
long commercial history has produced waves of migration and trade in
the islands. As a result, local society is not only highly heterogeneous but
also relatively open and dynamic. The population of 1.3 million is about
82 per cent Muslim, and about 50 per cent Malay, including various
local Malay subgroups with distinctive adat (customs) and dialects, but
with very fluid boundaries, assimilating freely with more recent Malar-
1 Minako Sakai, "Resisting the Mainland: The Formation of the Province of the
Bangka-Belitung (Babel)'l in Autonomy and Disintegration in Indonesla, ed. Damien
Kingsbury and Harry Aveling (London: RoutledgeCurzon,2003), pp. 189-200.
Bangka Belitung
migrants from other parts of Sumatra.2 The Chinese are the second-
largest group, and constitute, according to the 2010 census, 8 per cent
of ihe population. However, many local experts believe the true figure is
higher, with many persons of chinese descent-especially in villages-
de"scribing themselves as Malays to census enumerators, meaning the real
number might be 20-25 per cent, making Bangka Belitung a province
with one of the largest populations of chinese Indonesians. The chinese
population have a strongly peranakan or indigenised culture, which
Las developed since the beginnings of Chinese settlement in the 16th
century.3 The remainder of the population are migrants from other parts
of Indonesia, drawn by tin mining and other industries: |avanese, Bugis,
Butonese, Bataks and virtually all of Indonesia's significant ethnic groups
can be found in the islands. Interethnic relations in daily life tend to be
iluid and relaxed, with much interaction and intermixing; however, each
significant ethnic group also has its own ethnic association (paguyuban)
tbr organising community activities.
Despite ihe prorrince being known for its tin mining, this industry
only employs a minority of the workforce, with large numbers employed
in sectors such as rubber, pepper and palm oil production, and fisheries.
rhough mining issues, such as conflicts between national and regional
,.g,rlltior* o, ih" role of illegal mining, tend to be prominent in direct
elections of local government leaders (who have significant powers over
hcensing), they are much less prominent in the legislative elections.
: Ibrahim et al., "Pakaian Adat, Rumah Adat, dan upacara Adat Melayu di Provinsi
Kepulauan Bangka Belitung" [Traditional Dress, Traditional Houses and Malay
Traditional ceremonies in Bangka Belitung Province], A report of joint research
projectwithDisbudparBangkaBelitungProvince,2013,unpublished;Ibrahim,
lBisrris, Kekuasaan, dan Identitas: Studi terhadap Politik Identitas Etnis Tionghoa
di Bangka Belitung Pasca orde Baru" [Business, Power and Identity: A Study of
the post-New Order Identity Politics of the chinese in Bangka Belitungl, PhD
diss., Gadj ah Mada University, Yogyakarta, 2ol4'
: Arrthony Reid, "Chinese on the Mining Frontier in Southeast Asia", in Chinese
Circulations, Capital, Commodities, and Networks in Southeast Asia, ed. Eric
Tagliacozzo and wen-chin chang (Durham, NC: Duke university Press, 2011),
p. 23; Mary F. Somers Heidhues, "company Island: A Note on the History of
Belitung", Indonesia 5l (I99L):2.
89
90 Ibrahim
Politically, the islands are broadly representative of national trends.
Due to its small population, the province elects only three members
of the national DPR. In both 2009 and 2014 these three came from
each of the largest nationalist parties: pDI-p, Golkar and partai
Demokrat, respectively. Other medium-sized parties such as
Gerindra, PKS, PPP and PKB are all represented in Bangka Beritung's
provincial and district parliaments. one distinctive feature of the
province's political scene has been the relative strength of the small
Islamist party, Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB, crescent Star party)
which had eight seats in the provincial parliament in 2004, three in
2009 (almost as many as the big three of pDI-p, Golkar and partai
Demokrat), but fell to just 1 out of 45 in 2014. pBB's locar strength
did not reflect particularly strong Islamist politics, but the influence
of its former leader, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, a Belitung native who
held several national ministerial posts betwe en 1999 and 2007. As his
political star faded (his last senior national post was as Minister of the
State Secretariat, which ended in 2007), so too did the local fortunes
of PBB.a
FROM POT PLANTS TO WATER REFILLS:
MODIFICATIONS OF MONEY POLITICS
My research on the 2014 elections in Bangka Belitung incorporated
candidates for district, provincial and national legislatures. Almost every
candidate and success team member I interviewed claimed that they
did not engage in "money politics". Most of them condemned money
n Along with Yusril, a prominent local politician who has made a mark on national
politics is Basuki rjahaja Purnama, commonly known as Ahok, who had been
elected (as the running mate of ]oko widodo, Jokowi) as deputy governor of |akarta
in2012, then governor in November 2014. Ahok, who is Chinese, was formerly the
bupati of East Belitung, the runner up in the 2007 Bangka Belitung gubernatorial
race, and a Golkar national legislator. However, his impact on the legislative race
in Bangka Belitung was limited. unlike yusril, a founder and consistent supporter
of PBB, Ahokt career has been marked by shifts between parties.
Bangka Belitung
as reprehensible and unhealthy. In this regard, they followed
political discourse which tends to interpret money politics
as the direct exchange of cash for votes, and as both illegal
immoral. But this did not mean that they rejected patronage politics,
broadly. In this respect, Kohar (not his real name-I am
pseudonyms for most informants in this chapter), a PBB candidate
the East Belitung DPRD, was tyPical:
As for money politics, I'm opposed. I wont use it because our people
are smart already. They will take the money, but they wort't necessarily
vote for us. I prefer holding meetings where I can explain my ideas
and the programme I will carry out. I have already held about 27
such meetings in almost all the villages in my electoral district. The
attendance varies, from about 20 to 70 people. I give them assistance
in accordance with their needs-for instance, sporting equipment for
youths, shirts or headscarves-but not money. I've even sponsored a
special festival in a fishing village.s
Darwan, a PPP candidate in the Pangkal Pinang city DPRD, had
e similar attitude. Not only was he spending a lot on his success team,
h also distributed unusual gifts to women voters: seedlings of pucuk
rcrah (a red-leaved decorative plant) and palms. He believed that these
me not only unique but also well-targeted gifts, because many women
louseholders were fond of using such plants in their front yards. Another
crndidate, an incumbent in South Bangka, also distributed seedlings-
tut this time rubber trees intended for productive use. Neither candidate
rcgarded such gift-gMng as money politics,
Almost all candidates, no matter how vehemently they condemned
trrcney politics, distributed goods in this way. There was even a local
frrge a connection between the giver and recipient. Some of the goods
crndidates distributed were standardised: many, for example, handed out
headscarves, women's prayer robes (mukena), sarung and batik shirts-
standard gifts when approaching religious groups or when trying to
build an image as a caring person. It also helped that such goods can
casily be bought in bulk in |ava and shipped cheaply to the province,
9l
; Confidential interview 8 Apr. 2014.
92 Ibrahim
and that they are usefur to practically an recipients. some candidates
also distributed staple foods, typically rice, to voters. The tlpicar method
here was for the candidate or his/her success team to strike a dear
with the RT (subneighbourhood) head and then distribute an agreed
amount (for instance, 5 kg of rice per househord) in the neighbourhood
immediately before the election.
Some candidates avoided these gifts, however, thinking they were
too commonplace. Thus, like Darwan above, some devoted much thought
to making their gifts distinctive and memorable. In pangkal pinang, for
example, one PPP candidate, Hera, cooperated with a drinking water
depot to provide free refilrs of the 20-litre water tanks peopre use in
dispensers in their homes. when his customers came in to ask for
the refills, the depot manager would provide them the water for free,
tell them Hera was paylng for it, and ask them to vote for him. The
manager kept a tally and regurarry billed Hera, who was pleased with
the arrangement as being an originar idea, though he admitted there
was no way of ensuring that those who got the water actua[y voted
for him. He was also concerned that quite a few customers were taking
advantage of the arrangement to ask for Aqua brand refiils, which were
four times more expensive than the standard water tanks.6
Some candidates paid for major events invorving community service
on a much larger scale. Rudianto Tjen, a pDI_p DpR candidate, for
example, brought in teams of quarified doctors to provide free hearth
checks and treatment in many kampung; he then paid for half_page
advertorials in local newspapers to report on these events (such
advertorials alone cost between Rp s and 7 mi[ion). The goar was
to build a "brand" as a man of action who was concerned for the
poor. Sam, a PKS candidate for the South Bangka D'RD, paid for
mass circumcisions, using the opportunity to promote his candidacy
and his party to the assembred masses. Det, the incumbent speaker of
one of Bangka's DpRDs, did the same, arso sponsoring free concerts
by local bands.
It was also relatively common for candidates, especially strong
ones, to invest their funds in club goods: donations to ftrnd community
6 Interview 19 Mar.2014.
l
l
93
Bangka Belitung
fofrastructure or construction projects. Bud, a Bangka district DPRD
oendidate, explained how he spent Rp 5 million on a small jetty for
fSers in one community; Anto, a West Bangka district PBB candidate,
ms negotiating with a youth group in his constituency on how much
I would cost for him to create a football field in their village-he
cstimated it would be about Rp 5 million.T Meanwhile, Cik, an RT
lead and campaign worker supporting three Golkar candidates, boasted
d how he had succeeded in bringing in three packets of assistance
fu his neighbourhood from these candidates: two were for fixing the
&ains; one was for widening an intersection. In return, Cik organised
a meeting for these candidates and personally encouraged residents to
ffe for them.8
Another common technique was to invite community members
D attend a meeting, and then provide them with generous "transport
roney" as the meeting ended. A multi-level marketing agent dealing
fo high-quality clothing related how one candidate-with the help of
relative who occupied a senior position in the marketing network-
pnlled together a large meeting of about 300 persons. After talking
*out running for the election, the candidate gave Rp 100,000 to each
lnrticipant, which they used to join up as members of the multi-level
network, each acquiring a fine shirt as a result.
Despite candidates'protestations, cash payments were in fact critical
D much of the 2014 campaigning. Numerous terms were used to
such payments to supporters, and sometimes, to ordinary
rs-uang makan (food money), uang transport (transport money),
rg pulsa (mobile telephone voucher money), uang lelah (money to
nsate someone for performing a task-"tired money"), uang saksi
money) and the like. The timing and structure of payments
success team members varied widely: some members were paid
y throughout the campaign, some only once near voting day,
were paid according to how much work they did, some were
during the campugn, but then given a bonus if their candidate
and so on.
C-onfdential interview 28 Apn 2014.
C-onfidential interview, 15 Mar. 2014.
94 tbrahim
And many candidates did engage in conventional vote buying. It
is difficult to ascertain how widespread this phenomenon was, though
it was clearly more widespread among district-level candidates than
among provincial or national ones. For example, Darwan, the PPP
candidate in Pangkal Pinang mentioned above, admitted that he needed
to make cash payrnents of Rp 50,000 each to voters. I was present
when he negotiated with provincial and national candidates from the
same party about cost-sharing for this purpose, with these candidates
pooling their vote-buying money and hoping that doing so would
increase their individual votes.e Such financial deals between candidates
were not unusual. Some parties also organised deals whereby victorious
candidates would compensate losing candidates from the same party
and constituency whose personal votes had helped them win (thus in
the Bangka DPRD, the PPP, according to one candidate, set the price
at Rp 40,000 per vote, to be paid within two years of the victorious
candidate taking office).
Overall, we are left with an impression of the candidates' innovative
and creative adaptations of patronage politics to local circumstances.
Candidates used a wide variety of social networks and community
activities-from religious meetings through to medical consultations
and community development projects-to make themselves materially
useful to constituents.
MOBILISING FOR VICTORY: UNSTRUCTURED AND
STRUCTURED SUCCESS TEAMS
In Bangka Belitung, as was elsewhere in Indonesia, most candidates
formed individual success teams to run their campaigns and to
connect them to voters. But these teams varied widely in their levels
of organisation. There were two basic patterns. In the first, candidates
relied on rather casual methods and generally unstructured teams,
drawing in only a few people from their personal and family networks.
Almost every candidate was able to rally at least a handful of associates
'g Field observations, 2l Mar.2014.
Bangka Belitung
to accompany them to campaign meetings without payment. Some
such people would support a candidate because of personal friendship;
others might have an organisational connection of some sort. candidates
of this type tended to be inexperienced first-timers. Lacking the
resources to build large teams, they instead often professed confidence in
their individual campaigning skills and ability to personally "say hello'
(as some put it) to as many voters as possible. A few candidates with
limited resources tried to marshal them for purposes they thought
would be effective: a Hanura candidate in East Belitung spent his money
on hiring a "Sales Promotion Girl" (SPG, a widely used Indonesian
term for young, generally attractive and fashionably dressed women
employed to promote products) to accompany him on his house-to-
house visits.lo
Such candidates, lacking the financial resources to build teams
that stretched beyond their immediate personal networks, also tended
to share another characteristic: their political support tended to be
concentrated in only one geographic and/or social setting, which they
usually described as their basis (base). Thus, Tri, a PAN candidate in the
Bangka district DPRD, explained that his success team was truly solid
only in a few RT around his home. Sri, a Golkar candidate in pangkal
Pinang, admitted she was strong only in her own subdistrict, and that
she lacked network connections to campaign elsewhere.
One problem for such candidates was that there were almost always
rival candidates competing for the same base, so that friendship networks
could rarely deliver victory. Their lack of money also meant that they
tended to be unable to pay for polling booth witnesses to ensure their
votes were not stolen. Add this to their inability to expand beyond
their narrow base, and it should not surprise us that such candidates
were rarely victorious.
The second pattern, favoured by better-funded and more experienced
candidates (especially incumbents), involved the formation of more
structured success teams. The key here was the creation of hierarchical
structures which tried to ensure that team members were present in at
least the most important regions in the electoral district:
95
i Confidential interview, 8 Apr. 2014.
96 lbrahim
I have a success team that consists of 20 people at the electoral
district level. I recruited them way back, when I was beginning the
nomination process. Then I have also formed success team branches,
each consisting offour people, in each village. These are the ones who
have the job of carrying out socialisation and countering negative
issues about me. As for the costs, I cover them. We know if you want
to win, youve got to spend money on winning.tl
This candidate, who was standing for PBB for a seat in the East
Belitung DPRD, claimed that his team remained "solid" until voting
day, with no members defecting to other candidates.
It was generally expensive to run a well-structured success team.
Langit, the head of a Gerindra DPR candidate's success team, explained
that he had built a team consisting of three layers: Alpha Team consisted
of the strategic and conceptual planners, most of whom came from
|akarta, like their candidate; Bravo Team consisted of locals who
concentrated on networking; and Gamma Team's job was monitoring
what the other two teams were doing. The total cost of running these
teams was about Rp 50 million per month, with expenditure lasting
for several months.
Though there was a big gap between the better-organised and
funded candidates and those who lacked the capacity to build strong
success teams, most candidates shared one thing in common: they
concentrated their efforts on their personal campaigns, rather than
on party efforts. In fact, as a result of the open-list PR system, most
candidates saw their strongest competitors as being rivals from within
their own parties. Most viewed competition with candidates from other
parties as much less significant, because they believed that each party
more or less had its own constituency and it could be predicted how
many seats it would win in a particular electoral district. What was less
predictable was which individual candidate would win. This situation
could lead to candidates from different parties-both at different levels
and sometimes even competing in the same constituency-supporting
each other's campaigns. Thus, in the Mentok-Simpang Teritip electoral
district in West Bangka, three candidates, representing PBB, PDI-P and
rr Interview, Kohar, 8 Apr.2014.
Bangka Belitung 97
respectively, often got together to exchange experiences and urge
other on in their contests against-as they saw it-their respective
rivals.
TY POLITICS IN A PLURAL CONTEXT
noted above, one characteristic of Bangka Belitung society is its
pluralism, tolerance and egalitarianism, a product of its maritime
and of centuries of trade, migration and other interaction
the outside world. Amongst the province's Malays, the boundaries
ing the various subgroups are fluid, and there is significant
tion between Malay and other migrants. The Chinese are also
Lthly assimilated, typical of the peranakan cultures of island Southeast
ia The Chinese-language phrase, tong ngin fan ngin tjing jong (which
mghly means the Chinese and the natives are equal) is a widely known
ad accepted term for depicting interethnic relations in the province.
.trordingly, ethnic violence in the province is relatively rare: for example,
tere was no anti-Chinese rioting during the transition to democracy
J 1998, and relations are harmonious in daily life.
Despite this background, it was striking that many candidates made
ihtity politics central to their strategies. Religion and ethnicity, in
prticulaa were often seen as convenient tools of mobilisation. Tri,
fu example, was a PAN candidate in the Bangka DPRD who openly
&cribed making ethnic sentiment central to his campaign. Of favanese
descent, he also lived in an urban precinct-called Kampung Jawa-
rLose population had previously voted for non-|avanese candidates from
&where. He drew almost all the local RT heads into his success team.
ft team coordinator explained that the |avanese residents were now
ready to vote for one of their own:
In every election we have always supported others, who get elected
but then make no meaningful contribution back to us. Now there is
a son of this place, born here, and part of our ethnic group, and we
think he is smart, so we are going to support him. We dont need
money, we need him to be elected and then he'll be able to do a lot
for us. We have been regularly building support for him, and now we
are sure that the masses in Kampung ]awa will be solidly in favour of
98 Ibrahim
him. With more than 2,000 voters we are convinced we,ll be able to
ensure he becomes a council member.r2
In the final event, Tri was not elected, missing out by a mere 50
votes. Anto, a PBB candidate for the West Bangka DpRD, explained
that he was mostly relying on fellow members of the fering-Malay
subethnicity, learning from his experiences as a DpD candidate in 2009,
when he discovered that it was mostly co-ethnics who voted for him
(he ultimately failed to be elected in 2014, too).13 Rah, a success team
member of a PKB candidate running for the provincial DPRD, explained
that he was mostly targeting regions with significant populations of Bugis,
given his candidate's ethnicity. Amongst other methods, he sponsored
friendly football matches among local Bugis youth groups.ra overall,
almost all candidates used identity appeals in order to first try to ensure
that their vote would be solid "internally", that is, within their own
ethnic group. Even so, this was usually done in a quiet manner, by
using informal campaigning techniques and within social contexts and
spaces that were identified with the ethnic group in question-such as
the paguyuban or ethnic associations.
There were also some distinctive ethnic voting patterns. For example,
it has been apparent over several election cycles that members of the
ethnic chinese community tend to support the pDI-p. As mentioned,
the PBB vote has been concentrated in Belitung because of yusril Ihza
Mahendra's role. Bugis voters, meanwhile, tend to be attracted to Golkar,
in part because many prominent national leaders of the party, such as
|usuf Kalla and Nurdin Halid, are from that group.
Of course, candidates did not rely only on ethnic networks; they
also used those based on other identity categories, such as religion.
Many candidates, especially those from the Islamic parties, used
Muslim organisations and networks. Hera, a ppp provincial candidate
who was a teacher at a Quranic school for children, for example,
had easy access to majelis taklim (religious study groups) and similar
networks, and frequently appeared at religious events such as the
12 Confidential interview, 4 Apr. 2014.
13 Confidential interview, 18 Apr. 2014.
la Confidential interview, 20 Mar. 2014.
Bangka Belitung
recitations carried out to pray for the deceased, known as
or yasinan, typically distributing religiously tinged 'tontact tools"
as headscarves, prayer robes or prayer mats. Pasca, a Demokrat
ldate, targeted the Christian vote, emphasising church symbols in
newspaper advertisements and other campaign activities.
Perhaps the most ubiquitous social identity drawn upon by
however, was place of origin and domicile. Almost all
ates stressed their local roots when interacting with constituents.
ising that they came from the same locale as voters was not
J a way for candidates to encourage voters to identify with them
also raised the issue of where candidates would direct patronage
iould they be elected. Sam, a PKS candidate for the South Bangka
IIPRD, always told voters in his village to vote for him because if he
rcn they would then be able to access government decision-making
ad so ensure that they obtained their fair share of projects and other
Lenefits. As he put it: "Vote for people from your own kampung, why
Gross over to some other village? If you choose a candidate from the
*eme kampung, it will be much easier to present your aspirations
directly''1s Many voters-such as those in Kampung |awa mentioned
$ove-felt, rightly or wrongly, that their particular community was
neglected by the government. Electing a local was seen as a way to
remedy such neglect.
What this reliance on identity appeals points to is partly that
cendidates were keen to use whatever social networks they could access
in order to build connections with voters and invoke emotional bonds
rith them. Thus, as well as ethnic, religious and regional ties, candidates
r*ro had access to women's organisations would use them (as one female
Golkar candidate put it: "In every meeting, I appeal to the women for
them to vote for a woman") whereas those who worked in a particular
social organisation would likewise make use of that network.
Overall, the prominence of identity networks and appeals in the
election was thus a reflection of the clientelistic nature of politics in
Bangka Belitung. It did not point to wider salience of ethnic and other
identity cleavages in political and social life. To be sure, there was
l
99
:' Confidential interview 16 Man 2014.
100 Ibrahim
something anomalous about the utilisation of identity networks in thc
province, given the pride that most locals take in their communityL
openness and heterogeneity. And perhaps, too, the reliance on identity
points to the underdeveloped nature of democracy here, given th*
identity politics is often a sign of the underdevelopment of more
programmatic appeals.l6 Yet what occurred in Bangka Belitung was d
most a "soft" form of ethnic mobilisation in which 'tontestants for
political office mobilize ethnic symbols in order to garner support brtr
do not claim to be pursuing dominance or primacy for their own
group at the expense of others".l7 In short, though identity politics
was common, it was not necessarily conJlictual. It also rarely involved
substantive discussion of policy or programmatic issues, and was indeed
a means for candidates who lacked the competence to engage with such
issues to avoid doing so.
CONCLUSION
Bangka Belitung is not only a socially heterogeneous province; it is
also one without a history of bitter political cleavages or contestation.
In this context, legislative candidates felt they had to offer more than
just party affiliation or a party programme to voters. As we have
seen in this chapter, they often did so by providing patronage-in
highly varied forms-to voters, and by building personal success teams
to connect them with their constituents. It is in this context that
the prominence of identity politics witnessed in the 2014 legislative
election starts to make sense. At one level, there was something artificial
about the proliferation of ethnic and other forms of identity politics,
given Bangka Belitungt famous openness and interethnic tolerance.
16 Purwo Santoso, "Merajut Kohesi Nasional: Etno Nasionalisme dan Otonomi Daerah
dalam Proses Demokratisasi" [Knitting National Cohesion: Ethnonationalism and
Regional Autonomy under Democratisation], ]urnal llmu Sosial dan llmu Politik
a, 3 Q00t):265-88.
t' Edward Aspinall, "Democratization and Ethnic Politics in Indonesia: Nine Theses",
Iournal of East Asian Studies ll,2 (2Al): 292.
Bangka Belitung t0t
becomes clear. It is not simply that candidates needed to
their personal connections with voters, with a common id,entity
being a simple way to do this. It is also that they needed
ods to convince voters that, if elected, they would take special
of their interests. candidates who highlighted regional, ethnic,
rer, when we remember the context of patronage and personalised
s in which such identity mobilisation occurred, the logic of the
s or other identity ties were typically making the promise_
y or implicitly-that they would keep certain voters in mind
delivering future benefits. in Bangka Belitung, patronage and
y politics thus go hand in hand.
