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A Study of Japanese Occupation
in Leyte, Philippines, 1942-1945
by
Satoshi Ara
Historical studies about the Japanese occupation in the
Philippines during World War II often focus on events that
happened in Luzon. These are namely the declaration of
Manila as an Open City, the valorous defense of Bataan, the
dehumanizing Death March of allied defenders followed by
the downfall of Corregidor, the formation of the
collaborationist government led by Jose P. Laurel under
Japanese rule, and later the Liberation of Manila in 1945.
However, there are only limited sources engaged with the
discussion about the events in the rural areas of the
Philippines, particularly in Leyte, during that momentous
event that greatly affected the course of human history in the
previous century (Lear, 1961; Ara, 2008). This study aims to
fill that gap by examining the situation of the island of Leyte,
Philippines during the Second World War.
Harry Benda (1958) argued that the Japanese occupation
of Southeast Asia drastically changed the postwar situation by
creating a discontinuity in the rule of some local elites in
Indonesia. Another scholar by the name of David Steinberg
(1967) supported this “interregnum” theory in his study of
local leaders in the Philippines who collaborated with the
Japanese army. Steinberg suggested that even though the war
retained the oligarchy in some areas, it created changes in the
political leadership of the country due to the treason charges
A Study of Japanese Occupation in Leyte
120
against them that weakened their political influence in the
postwar period.
Contrary to what Benda and Steinberg proposed, Alfred
McCoy (1980) argued that there was no interruption in the
rule of local leaders in the provinces, specifically in Panay
Island, both during and after the war in spite of the Japanese
occupation of various Asian nations. This study of McCoy
challenges the general assumption that local leaders in
Southeast Asia only reacted as either collaborators or part of
the resistance during the Japanese occupation in the Second
World War wherein the local elite who collaborated had their
political downfall in the postwar situation. Other scholars
support this idea of McCoy and suggested that a “dual
collaboration or mock collaboration” of the municipal
officials happened by siding both with the guerillas and the
Japanese authorities making the issue of collaboration more
complex (Setsuho and Jose, 1999)
Following the study of McCoy, the study attempts to
examine his idea by responding to the three questions in
connection with the political attitudes of the local elites in
Leyte who collaborated with the Japanese occupation and/or
with the resistance forces:
1. What was the reaction of the local municipal
officials in Leyte to the Japanese presence?
2. How did they cope with the situation they had to
face?
3. What kind of social environment existed in the
region presumably having impact on the political
conduct of the residents?
The study primarily used the documents from People’s
Court Papers (PCP) archived at the main library of the
University of the Philippines together with some pertinent
A Study of Japanese Occupation in Leyte
121
documents found at the National Institute of Defense Studies
in Japan. These PCPs were the reports of the thorough
investigations done by the Central Intelligence Command
(CIC) in reviewing the cases of collaborators. Due to limited
time and resources for a more intensive field research, the
study focused on the said documents to test the idea of McCoy
in another Visayan province together with some information
from the interviews conducted with Leyte residents in 1995.
The sample to be studied are the conduct of municipal officials
of Leyte from the nine towns of Ormoc, Palompon, Villaba,
Naval (Biliran Island), Abuyog, Dulag, La Paz, Sogod, and
Santa Fe. Although there were more than 30 municipalities in
the island since the Spanish colonial period, the number of
civilian officials tried by People’s Court in 1946 did not reach
more than 15 persons. Although this research might not be
able to provide a generalization on the subject, it is hoped that
there would be a sufficient funding in the future so that a more
comprehensive research could be done about the topic.
An Overview of Leyte in 1942-1945
Leyte caught the eyes of the world when the Americans
defeated the Japanese Fleet in the Battle of Leyte Gulf in
October 1944. It was one of the turning points of the war in
the Pacific Theater resulting in the creation of beachheads in
Palo, a town near the city of Tacloban, Leyte, led by Gen.
Douglas Macarthur together with the cabinet members of the
Philippine Commonwealth led by Sergio Osmeña. The
landing of the Allied forces was aided by achieving contact
with the anti-Japanese forces in the island. Through this
invasion, the Allied forces were able to establish a temporary
capital of the Commonwealth in Tacloban. The city became
the stage for the further advance of troops in the Visayan
Islands towards eventual recapture of the Philippines. This
development in the war later on led to Japanese retreat.
A Study of Japanese Occupation in Leyte
122
Prior to this Allied counter-offensive in 1944, the
Philippines surrendered to the Japanese under the instruction
of Gen. Jonathan Wainright after the defeat of the United
States Armed Forces in the Philippines (USAFIP) in Bataan
Peninsula on 9 April 1942 and the capture of Corregidor
Island on 6 May of the same year. After the momentous
defeat of the Allied forces in defending the country, the
remaining members of the United States Armed Forces in the
Far East (USAFFE) who refused to surrender continued the
struggle against the Japanese.
Strategically, Leyte was a backwater island to the 14th
Imperial Japanese Army. The Japanese military authorities did
not reinforce the island until 1943 because they saw that it
lacked raw materials that would establish a base for their
soldiers. This means that the local resistance forces in Leyte
were able to establish numerically ahead since the official
surrender of the Philippines in April 1942. Nonetheless, the
Japanese Army was still able to garrison the municipalities of
Ormoc and Tacloban as their bases of operations in Leyte
even if the remaining pockets of resistance tactically attacked
these localities until 1944.
Leyte was not initially defended except for the presence
of some Philippine Army cadres and Philippine Constabulary
(PC) units. Together with these small groups of defenders
was the 93rd Infantry of the USAFFE that was activated on 15
December 1941. However, the 93rd Infantry was later
assigned to Mindanao in January 1942. This action reduced
the troops in the island. To make matters worse, the
remaining Leyte Provisional Regiment were not well
equipped and were unprepared to take contingency measures
to mount a defensive position. What remained hopeful for
the Filipinos in their defense was the existence of legitimate
guerilla groups willing to fight together with some bandits
who eventually became part of the resistance forces.
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123
Map of Leyte Island in 1939
Source: Census of the Philippines V. 5, Commission of the Census
Commonwealth of the Philippines, 1941.
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124
According to Elmer Lear (1961), the formation of the
guerilla troops of Leyte including the unsurrendered former
USAFFE soldiers after the fall of Bataan and Corregidor
could be observed in October to December 1942. This
remark was based on the report of the Japanese-sponsored
Acting Governor of Leyte Pastor Salazar, a former member
of the Provincial Board, who stated in December 1942 that
ubiquitous guerilla groups numbering around 1,500 from
different towns under the command of Col. Cornell refused
to accept the surrender order from Gen. Sharp in Mindanao
(Hartendorp, 1967). Despite the presence of such number led
by a USAFFE colonel, the resistance did not have a common
principle and action resulting in the disunity of the guerilla
movement reflected in the conflict between Lt. Blas Miranda
and Col. Ruperto Kangleon of Western Leyte. Thus, the
Japanese-sponsored officials perceived these groups as
opportunistic “bandits” competing to gain political influence
and economic benefits from the civilian inhabitants.
Since the arrival of the Nagano detachment forces in
May 1942, the task was to organize the provincial
government through the Japanese military administration by
ordering Governor Bernardo Torres of Tacloban together
with the municipal mayors to establish the Leyte Special
Force that consisted of surrendered USAFFE members.
However, the newly created appeasement group reached only
188 members, first assigned to Col. Juan Causing and later led
by Arturo Reyes in 1943, was not properly trained and
equipped enough to perform their duties in maintaining peace
and order. This formation of the local police was done
pursuant to the creation of the Bureau Constabulary (BC)
that replaced the PC after the fall of the Philippines to
Japanese control. In order to have a firmer grip on the towns,
collaborators from the provincial and municipal levels
conducted propaganda campaigns to influence the local
residents regarding the importance of Japanese occupation
A Study of Japanese Occupation in Leyte
125
policy. This campaign became intense during the “reinvasion”
of the Japanese in October 1943 in order to annihilate the
“bandits”.
Leyte was first be occupied by the Matsunaga
detachment forces (May 1942 to October 1942) and later on
by the Omori Unit (October 1942 to October 1943). Both
military units were not capable of eliminating the large-scale
guerilla resistance that they had to confront due to lack of
troops. Moreover, the 14th Japanese Army delegated the task
of pacification to the Japanese-sponsored government
officials who were mostly recently elected in 1941. It was only
in September or October 1943 when the 16th Division of the
Japanese Army conducted an intensive offensive military
operation entitled Leyte-Samar To Tobatsu Shukusei Yoryo (The
Outline of Mopping-Up Operation and Disciplinary Action
in Leyte and Samar Island).
Hence, two general situations were happening during
the Japanese occupation of Leyte. The first was the existence
of two governments: the resistance-administered government
and the one controlled by Japanese collaborators; and the
second situation was that the Japanese Army did not take
drastic action in curbing the guerillas since the time they
invaded the island in May 1942 to October 1943.
From this point onwards, the study will now present a
series of cases from the nine municipalities of Leyte showing
the behavior of key officials who collaborated with the
Japanese forces in the towns they occupied.
The Case of Ormoc
If there is one municipality of Leyte that was exceptional
in its efforts to eliminate the guerilla through its Japanese-
sponsored government that would be Ormoc. This was due
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126
to the presence of organized citizens who were willing to
fight the guerillas.
Capt. Abe gave Hermosilla a freehand in administering
Ormoc and the Jinkeidan (Home Guard). However,
Hermosilla was still contacting Miranda’s group by giving
them some technical information. This made the Japanese
skeptical about the loyalty of the mayor when the prominent
Tan family reported him and Vicente Tomada, the liaison
officer of Miranda, to the Japanese military officials. This
report of Tan resulted in the arrest of Hermosilla and
Tomada by Lt. Hirayama. However, he was later freed thanks
to Capt. Abe who claimed that he ordered the mayor to
continue his communication with the resistance forces.
Hermosilla’s attitude is interesting to stress here because
he was able to communicate freely and give instructions to
both the guerillas and his own organized Jinkeidan (Home
Guard). Moreover, he was described as an ambitious mayor
who gained political influence in Ormoc by ordering the
assassination, through the help of Miranda’s group, of his
political enemies namely: Atty. Cayetano Mañago, Fortunato
Abellana, Pedro Alejo, and Procopio Gaguit. Hermosilla’s
conflict was not only limited to personalities living in the
poblacion. He also denounced the cult of a fanatical religious
leader named Mariano “Bongoton” Laurel, who was very
influential among the masses.
Hermosilla was forced to resign from office sometime in
November or December 1943 because of hypertension. His
office was delegated to Jose Codilla, which was later given to
Potenciano Larrazabal, a guerilla member, when the
Americans took control of the country in May 1945. The CIC
arrested Hermosilla due to crimes he committed during the
war. Despite his reputation as a political opportunist who
ordered the killings of his enemies, no one testified against
him. This is an indication that he was still politically
A Study of Japanese Occupation in Leyte
127
influential for being a hacendero in the municipality even if he
was no longer active in local politics after the war. The
Larazzabal family became the dominant political dynasty in
the post-war period for three decades. Together with them is
the politically powerful Codilla family. Until in the present
times, the Codilla “political dynasty” seems to reign through
the person of Mayor Eric Codilla.
In March 1972, the local elites “forgave” the
collaboration activities of Catalino Hermosilla. This was
realized when the Ormoc City Council named him as a local
“hero” and at the same time naming a new municipal
circumferential road as ‘Catalino Hermosilla Drive’.
The Case of Palompon
Palompon is located at the west coast of Leyte Island.
This town together with the municipalities of Albuera,
Merida, Villaba, and the Japanese garrisoned town of Ormoc
were under the influence of Blas Miranda’s guerilla forces in
the first half of the Japanese occupation. Alfredo Parilla,
elected mayor in 1940, administered the municipality of
Palompon. Unlike in the previous case, he eagerly helped
Miranda’s guerillas by giving them food supplies and
important information about Japanese activities in the area.
However, similar to what happened to most of the municipal
leaders, he was forced to collaborate with the Japanese forces
and was instructed to supply them of their necessities
especially when its reinforcements from the 16th Division
came in October 1943. Through this “reinvasion,” Capt.
Sasaki, the commander of the 20th Infantry Regiment assigned
to garrison Palompon, intensified the campaign to reduce
guerilla capability. In response to this action of the officer,
Deogracias Astorga, then commanding officer, 3rd Batallion
of 5th Infrantry, Western Leyte Guerilla Warfare Forces
(WLGWF), wrote to Parilla that he must negotiate with the
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128
Japanese in order to protect the townspeople. The Japanese
in Palompon applied the same strategy as what Capt. Abe did
in Ormoc, which is to allow the guerillas to surrender without
being hurt. According to Pedro Brocoy, the vice-mayor at
that time, Parilla helped the guerillas who surrendered by
issuing a “Release Paper” identifying them as non-guerillas.
In the later part of their campaign in Leyte, the Japanese
intensified their offensive because they discovered that their
appeasement strategy was not very effective in inducing the
resistance forces to surrender. By December 1943, Miranda’s
group was already weakening in Western Leyte due to the
Japanese “reinvasion” wherein Maj. Marcos Soliman, the
chief of staff of Miranda, was captured in Camotes Island. It
was reported in the documents researched that Mayor Parilla
instructed Maj. Soliman to surrender to him so that the
Japanese led by the “benevolent” Capt. Sasaki would not hurt
him. Due to this situation, Maj. Nazareno, a commander of
Kangleon’s guerilla forces, was able to take the upper hand in
taking tactical positions in Western Leyte. Numbering up to
5,000 resistance fighters, they acted as the blocking force
against the Japanese who were coming from the eastern
shores of the island (Baclagon, 1966).
Mayor Parilla was not in tune with the events that
happened after 1943 due to the new guerilla leader in
Palompon even though it can be evidently seen that he was
sincerely helping the resistance movement. According to the
PCP documents, Anastacio Orais testified against him that
the mayor cooperated with Japanese soldiers by being with
them in their anti-guerilla operations in the municipality
resulting in the death of townspeople. Interestingly, Orais was
a relative of the mayor who supplied lumber for municipal
infrastructure projects but was not paid by the official. This
conflict between the mayor and Orais resulted in the beating
and imprisonment of the latter together with his wife. It can
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129
be seen here that Mayor Parilla unjustly used his authority to
solve his family feud with Orais. Controversially, the mayor
contacted the Japanese commander in Ormoc without the
instructions of any guerilla group that Lt. Ismael Pastor, a
guerilla under Maj. Nazareno’s command, was leaving
Palompon after giving them some food and technical
information. This unexpected action became an issue to
guerillas on whether or not the mayor was a full-pledge
Japanese collaborator. This problem was only resolved when
Mayor Parilla had the opportunity to talk to Maj. Nazareno
on 20 August 1944 telling him that he wrote a message for
the Japanese but did not send it to the commander stationed
in Ormoc. The mayor’s intention was to protect the residents
by making a necessary report in case the Japanese would ask
him to produce information about the guerillas.
Satisfied with the explanation of the mayor, Maj.
Nazareno wrote to the CIC in favor of Parilla that the mayor
collaborated with the Japanese not as an instrument of
oppression but as a “brake” to their atrocities by lessening the
suffering of the residents on 14 February 1944. Interestingly,
an affidavit from Inocencio Lubiano dating 18 April 1945
stated that Maj. Nazareno told him that the said guerilla
commander pitied Mayor Parilla because he was convinced by
the mayor’s words concerning the letter written to the
Japanese. If not because of his explanation, he would have
likely to face the same fate of Mayor Frederico Boholst of
Merida who was killed by Maj. Nazareno because of his acts
of collaboration.
After the Japanese occupation of Leyte, Mayor Parilla
was imprisoned at the Tacloban stockade similar to what
happened to Mayor Hermosilla of Ormoc. He was charged
with the crime of treason in the People’s Court but later on
was released after being cleared of all charges. After the war,
Alfredo Parilla ran in the elections for mayoralty of
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130
Palompon in 1947 where he successfully regained his political
power after a landslide victory.
The Case of Villaba
Adjacent to Palompon is the municipality of Villaba
located at the northwestern coast of Leyte. It has a local
asphalt mine in Barrio Balite managed by the American Frank
Wilson and its Filipino superintendent Elias Laude. During
the Japanese occupation, it was forced to suspend its
operations causing the two managers to join the guerilla
movement led by Lt. Higino Cabiling.
Prior to the war, Bartolome Gamas held with a firm grip
the political office of the mayor for almost a decade since
1931 until Vicente Veloso, the political opponent of Gamas,
was elected the chief executive of the municipality in 1940.
Mayor Veloso won due to the strong support of his relative,
ex-Senator Jose Ma. Veloso. With this outcome, the mayor
had considerable political influence in the island especially
when the Japanese arrived in 1942. Ex-Senator Veloso, who
was a collaborator himself, influenced the said municipal
official to cooperate with the Japanese.
Initially, the mayor attempted to organize a guerilla unit
to defend the municipality against enemy incursion. However,
such attempt did not materialize because he changed his
stance after attending a conference in Tacloban sponsored by
the Japanese in May 1942 according to Fermin Tumamak, the
barrio teniente of Balite, in his interview by the CIC in 1945.
For the reason why he did not organize the resistance forces,
the researcher had the opportunity to interview the former
mayor at his residence in Villaba back in June 1995 where he
stated that, “It was the best choice in order to save the
residents from the brutality of the Japanese and the guerilla
groups.” With this kind of situation faced by the mayor, he
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131
became the link of the Japanese forces to the people and at
the same time tried to influence Felix Pamanian, a guerilla in
northwestern Leyte, to surrender by promising him to
become an inspector of the BC. The resistance leader ignored
the offer.
Based on these findings, it is more likely that the two
scenarios influenced the decision of Mayor Veloso to
collaborate – his affinity with the Veloso-Salazar faction in
provincial politics and the appeasement campaign of the
Japanese not to harm guerillas who will surrender to them as
an act of “benevolent policy”. Due to this situation, Mayor
Veloso attempted to convince guerilla fighters in the
mountains to surrender. The mayor’s active effort of his
collaboration can be clearly seen when he sent Pedro
Viagedor, his chief of police, to Bonaparte K. Omega. Omega
was a USAFFE member who fought the Japanese in
Corregidor and recently returned to his hometown in Villaba
in June 1942 from Manila. The mayor demanded Omega to
surrender but he did not follow the instruction of the local
official. Omega, together with his family, escaped to Cebu but
soon returned to Villaba after hearing a wrong information
that the Japanese killed Mayor Veloso. Upon his return to
Villaba, he learned that the town was already under the
control of the guerilla leader Felix Paminian.
The guerillas interrupted Mayor Veloso’s administration
of Villaba and was replaced by Vice-Mayor Eusebio Gaviola.
This event forced most of the collaborators to flee for
Tacloban. However, municipal officials known to be
cooperating with the Japanese were able to return soon
during the “reinvasion” of the Japanese in which a “mopping-
up” operation led by Capt. Kamai was conducted against the
guerillas in the area sometime in December 1943. The police
took Omega’s father and was interrogated by the Japanese
about the whereabouts of his son. This situation forced
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132
Bonaparte to submit to the authorities in January 1944 but
was released after one day of imprisonment in order to let
him tell the other guerillas that they will not be harmed upon
surrendering their arms.
During those times, the harsh Japanese policy against
the guerillas focused on the “hunting” for Frank Wilson. In
order to have a lead of the American national, Mayor Veloso
brought Juan Ybañez to the police. Ybañez was linked to
Frank Wilson on two counts. He was employed in the asphalt
mining company and his daughter, Geraldine, was the wife of
the American. Moreover, since the situation was already
worsening at that time due to the advancement of Maj. Jose
Nazareno’s guerillas in 1944, Mayor Veloso organized the
Neighborhood Guards and Neighborhood Association to
deal with the peace and order. The mayor also exacted
residential taxes and confiscated the food supply of residents
for the Japanese.
To deal with the activities of the mayor, Maj. Nazareno
had a secret meeting with him in October 1944. He warned
Veloso to cease his collaboration with the Japanese. After the
Japanese left Leyte, the fearsome major revealed to the CIC
that he could have killed Mayor Veloso, who was taken into
custody of the officer, similar to what happened to other
collaborators if he had not procured food for the guerillas
and because the official had a very large family.
Thus, in the case of Villaba, Mayor Vicente Veloso
actively collaborated with the Japanese in compliance with the
decision of the Veloso-Salazar faction. At the same time ex-
Senator Jose Ma. Veloso, his relative, supported him against
his political enemy, Bartolome Gamas, in the mayoralty
election of 1940 as an act of utang na loob (debt of gratitude).
Since Veloso was temporarily interned during the war,
Eusebio Gaviola returned as the mayor of Villaba in 1945. In
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133
the mayoralty election of 1947, Fermin Tumamak became the
new elected chief executive of the town.
The Case of Naval, Biliran Island
Naval, Biliran is a municipality separate from the island
of Leyte and administered by Mayor Isais Ikain who was
elected in December 1940. His political rival Restituto
Copuaco, who migrated from Dulag, Leyte, was eager to
challenge the influence of the Mate, Enage and Ikain political
factions already settled in the island.
When the Japanese occupied Leyte, Mayor Ikain joined
the guerillas resulting in the vacancy of the public office.
Acting Governor Pastor Salazar of Leyte instructed Restituto
Copuaco to report to the Japanese-sponsored Tacloban
Assembly where he was appointed as the mayor of Naval.
In his return to Biliran, Mayor Copuaco declared that he
is the “Chief Ruler, Judge and overlord of the entire island.”
Being a municipal leader, he actively complied with the
appeasement directive of the Japanese Army by implementing
harsh policies against the guerillas of Felix Pamanian. The
cedula (residential tax) also sprang up during his term and tried
to break the influence of dominant political clans in the island
by ordering his men to confiscate their foodstuffs like what
he did to Judge Pedro Jerez Mate.
Being in conflict with the settled political dynasties in
Biliran, Mayor Copuaco had difficulty challenging their power
because most of these people sided with the guerillas as what
the elected mayor did. The conflict between the local elites
who joined the resistance and the collaborationist mayor
reached its peak when Copuaco sent five policemen to a
dance party in nearby Barrio Catmon attended by the former
mayor of Biliran Alberto Enage and Capt. Antonio Jerez, a
member of the guerillas. This action of the mayor catalyzed
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134
greater problems in securing his power because Pamanian’s
guerilla group arrested one of his friends, Nuncio Limpiado.
Mayor Copuaco reported to Gov. Salazar and the Japanese
administration that the barrio was guerilla-infiltrated. For this
reason, the Japanese raided Catmon on 28 August 1942 but
the local residents were warned ahead of time. Japanese
planes were sent to bomb Catmon but bombed instead Barrio
Busali.
According to the testimony of Capt. Jerez to the CIC,
Busali was attacked instead of Catmon because he believed
that the Japanese made a mistake in finding their target due to
similarities of landmarks present in both barrios. The then
Mayor Alberto Enage also told the CIC that two Japanese
officers met with him sometime in early July or August 1942
to talk about the presence of guerillas in Barrio Busali and
Burabod after it was reported by Mayor Copuaco in
Tacloban. The army officers showed him a marked map of
the two barrios. Whether the Japanese planes intentionally
bombed the barrio or not, the key concern that can be noted
then was that Mayor Copuaco, with the help of the Japanese,
was active in eliminating the rival political factions allied with
the guerillas.
After the disturbance in Catmon and the bombing of
Busali, Simeon Ikain in Naval formed the guerilla
organization, which was successful in taking control of Biliran
Island in September 1942. By that time, Isais Ikain returned
as the mayor of the town while Restituto Copuaco evacuated
to Bantayan Island, Cebu. Capt. Jerez’s troops, however,
captured and warned him never to collaborate again with the
enemy. However, during the Japanese “reinvasion” of Biliran
in December 1943, he was able to return to his post as the
chief executive of Naval. Mayor Copuaco’s hold to power
was disturbed again when the Americans arrived in October
1944 where the newly appointed Leyte Governor Ruperto
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135
Kangleon gave the post of the municipal mayor to Isais Ikain.
The CIC arrested and charged Restituto Copuaco with
treason sometime after May 1945. Although he was able to
post bail of 30,000 pesos to gain his temporary freedom, he
died three years after his arrest on 24 April 1948 at Naval.
The Solicitor General of the Department of Justice in Manila
recommended the dismissal of his case. Thus, the
collaborationist mayor died without succeeding in eliminating
the political influence of the dominant families in Biliran.
Even if the Japanese forces were already there, the presence
of strong guerilla forces led by Pamanian and Ikain foiled his
ambition.
The Case of Abuyog
After discussing the four municipalities in the western
coast of Leyte, the study will now show the collaboration
activities in the eastern part of the island starting with the
municipality of Abuyog. During the war, this town was under
the resistance movement led by Capt. Glicerio Erfe and Col.
Ruperto Kangleon. The incumbent Mayor Pedro Gallego,
elected in 1940, together with the chief of police, Catalino
Landia, organized the Volunteer Guard (VG) that became
part of Erfe’s 2nd Guerilla Brigade in October 1942.
Similar to what happened to other municipal officials of
Leyte who were left to hold office during the Japanese
occupation, the elected Vice-Mayor Eleuterio Caña was asked
to report to Tacloban and was appointed by the Japanese to
be the mayor of Abuyog. Ricardo Collantes, the rival of
Gallego during the election of 1940 who won for three
consecutive terms since 1931, was appointed the vice-mayor
and at the same time municipal treasurer. They were in power
during the first half of the Japanese activity in Leyte until the
guerillas successfully took Abuyog in October 1942. The two
collaborators were forced to flee to Tacloban where they
A Study of Japanese Occupation in Leyte
136
became part of the Provincial Finance office. According to
the CIC reports of Caña, Collantes worked hard for the
Japanese so that they could occupy Abuyog again, which
eventually happened in November 1943. In November 1944,
Japanese warplanes dropped propaganda leaflets signed by
Jose Veloso and Eleuterio Caña showing that the
collaborators of the town were in tandem with the
collaborationist Veloso-Salazar faction of the province. Since
the return of Caña and Collantes, the situation became worse
because of their corrupt political maneuverings. Felipe Verra,
a former councilor, stated that the “Big Three” of the town,
Eleuterio Caña, Ricardo Collantes, and Juan Canavella, the
acting police chief, were so corrupt that it relentlessly purged
the Gallego party by working with the Japanese to burn the
three barrios of Tarragona, Palala, and Mahaplag because
Collantes lost by a wide margin in those areas in the last
election. Moreover, the CIC reported that Collantes was
collecting taxes even if it was not his work and confiscated
palay and corn sometime in June to August 1944 so that they
would be able to supply the Japanese. To make matters
worse, he also imposed high residential taxes on the people.
The CIC arrested Collantes on 27 November 1944. CIC
investigation collected pertinent information about the
collaboration conduct of Collantes and the other Japanese
appointees. Verra reported that even if Caña was the
appointed mayor of the town, he still consulted Collantes,
who had more experience being a mayor. CIC sources also
stated that Collantes had anti-American sentiments even
before the war wherein he denounced the American
occupation and openly made pro-Japanese speeches.
The Japanese-sponsored mayor of Abuyog, Eleuterio
Caña, was sentenced to 15-year imprisonment in 1948.
Interestingly for Ricardo Collantes, the winds of change blew
in his favor. Pedro Gallego, Catalino Landia together with
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137
other witnesses and victims were expected to testify against
Collantes were no longer interested in pursuing the case
resulting in a reinvestigation of the suspect in December
1947. To have a firmer grasp of the issue, an interview
conducted by the author in June 1995 with the old generation
residents of Dulag gave the impression that Collantes was still
influential in Dulag-Abuyog area even after the war. Although
Gallego returned as mayor of Abuyog in 1945, followed by
Landia in 1946, the two were thinking of bringing
reconciliation and healing the wounds that the war brought to
their town. The political situation at that time dictated the
importance of the people to support the guerilla commander
Ruperto Kangleon in his bid for governorship of Leyte
against the Veloso-Salazar faction, to which Collantes was
adhering. Eventually, Catalino Landia became influential in
eastern Leyte and was elected its governor in 1949.
The Case of Dulag
The discussion concerning the municipality of Dulag
focuses on the role of the municipal treasurer Balbino
Lagunsad due to the scanty historical information collected
regarding Mayor Nicolas Bautista’s acts of collaboration.
Located at the eastern coast of Leyte, this municipality had
also been under the influence of Pedro Gallego and Catalino
Landia group organized in Abuyog but was later transferred
under the control of Col. Antonio Cinco during the Japanese
“reinvasion” of 1943.
During the mayoralty election in December 1940,
Nicolas Bautista won as the local chief executive of the town
who remained in his office as the Japanese-sponsored mayor
when the occupying forces arrived. However, the Japanese
did not have the confidence to retain Mayor Bautista resulting
in the appointment of Eleuterio Caing in April 1944.
A Study of Japanese Occupation in Leyte
138
Focusing on the role of the municipal treasurer Balbino
Lagunsad, he was reported to the CIC as a cruel Japanese
collaborator who strictly implemented the rules by
confiscating the lands of the local residents who were unable
to pay their taxes. This cruel action caused the resentment of
the people against their municipal treasurer. As a staunch
Japanese supporter, he also caused the arrest and death of
Pablo Mondala by Japanese soldiers in October 1942 and of
Col. Gerardo Serrano and Isidro Kaydayo who were caught
helping the guerillas in 1943. When the pacification campaign
against the guerillas became intense since the Japanese
“reinvasion,” many residents aiding the guerillas were
apprehended including the close relatives of the collaborating
municipal officials. An example of this case happened when
the Kempeitai arrested Sabina de Paz y Lagunsad, the sister
of Balbino. She was taken to Capt. Adachi, Cpl. Sino (a
Japanese teacher in Dulag), and an unidentified Filipino
civilian where she was interrogated and tortured. She
discovered from the letter shown to her the signatures of
Dominador, her nephew and the dentist son of Balbino
Lagunsad, who reported her to the authorities.
When the Americans returned to the Philippines, the
CIC arrested Balbino Lagunsad. He was charged with treason
and other criminal charges not covered by President Manual
A. Roxas’ amnesty proclamation. The CIC investigation later
discovered that Sabina accused Balbino for her arrest because
he made Dominador his fall guy, the real suspect for telling
the enemy regarding her role in aiding the guerillas and who
was killed during the US bombing of the town in October
1944. Due to lack of evidence and the death of the culprit,
the Solicitor General of the Department of Justice Manila
dismissed the case against Balbino on 8 February 1950.
After the war, the former elected Mayor Nicolas Bautista
took over the office from Eleuterio Caing. Bautista was able
A Study of Japanese Occupation in Leyte
139
to win again the local elections in 1947. Although both were
Japanese collaborators, they still held political influence in the
postwar situation of the town. This became possible due to
the lack of guerilla forces controlling Dulag because Gallego
and Landia groups focused more on the defense of Abuyog
and Sogod.
The Case of La Paz
The municipality of La Paz is located in the interior part
of Leyte between Dulag and Abuyog under the influence of
guerilla groups led by Capt. Erfe and Col. Antonio Cinco.
Prior to the war, two factions dominated the local politics of
La Paz. Bernardo Austero, who was elected mayor in the
early 1930s, led the first group while the Pablo Molon headed
the other. However, the political landscape changed in the
elections of 1938 when Francisco Malate challenged
Austero’s dominance in local politics and won under the
party of Molon. Molon himself succeeded Malate in the
December 1940 elections resulting into Austero’s disdain
against their rival political party.
Upon the arrival of the occupying forces in Leyte, Atty.
Pedro Palana, presumably belonging to Molon’s party, was
appointed as mayor of the town while Pablo Molon was given
the position of vice-mayor. With this kind of situation
confronting the Austero party, they fled to the mountains to
join the resistance movement led by Capt. Erfe. Thus, the
Austero party joined the guerillas while most of the Molon
group collaborated through their Japanese-sponsored
positions in the government.
Mayor Palana’s administration was interrupted when the
forces of Capt. Erfe succeeded capturing La Paz around
October 1942. They installed Miguel Malate as the mayor of
the town (an exceptional case of having a political enemy of
A Study of Japanese Occupation in Leyte
140
Austero joining the guerillas). However, during the
November 1943 Japanese “reinvasion,” Maj. Namba of the
3rd Company of the 20th Infantry Regiment did a “mopping-
up” operation, hand in hand with their intensive propaganda
campaign, against the guerillas. The situation became worse
when the main force of 16th Division of the Japanese Army
arrived in Tacloban led by Gen. Makino in April 1944 in
order to prepare Leyte for the landing of US forces. Palana’s
return to office also marked the resurgence of atrocities such
as the coercion of residents to become part of the District
and Neighborhood Association (DANAS).
The Philippine Executive created these Neighborhood
Associations in 1942 through Executive Order No. 77 to
ensure the peace and order situation of the people, which was
in favor of the occupation forces (De Viana, 2003). This was
done through the organization of the localities to small
districts consisting of 10 families where provincial and
municipal officials directly supervised these areas. Together
with the task of organizing the people, it was also assigned to
procure food for the Japanese soldiers through Prime
Foodstuffs Association (PRIMFA). Japanese collaborators
corruptly benefited through this food supplying mechanism
because they were able to collect rice and corn that they did
not own and sell it in order to gain profit at the expense of
the people. According to the CIC investigation, Mayor Palana
took two-thirds of the food supply from PRIMFA and gave it
to the Japanese while leaving the rest to the people who will
no longer be able to dispense aid to the guerillas.
If the situation in the town center of La Paz was filled
with atrocities, the guerillas too were also doing undue
violence against their comrades in arms such as in the case of
Sgt. Tomas Caindoy when he denounced Maj. Donato
Baquiano to the mayor and Capt. Naraoka resulting to the
guerilla’s public execution in 16 February 1944. It can be
A Study of Japanese Occupation in Leyte
141
presumed that the situation reached this level because Mayor
Palana had a personal grudge against the major. Another
criminal offense of Palana was also committed in April 1944
when the Japanese executed Lt. Fortunato Luja because of
the mayor’s lack of action.
However, a contrasting situation happened to Francisco
Militante, the vice-mayor of Molon prior to the war, who
later became a Japanese-sponsored treasurer. Militante used
to be helping the guerillas before the Japanese caught him
during their intensive military offensive in 1943. In order to
save his life, Mayor Palana made him a Japanese-sponsored
municipal official. Even if Militante was already serving the
Japanese, he was still contacting the guerillas and became a
witness against the actions of Palana especially on the case of
Maj. Baquiano in the CIC. Thus, it can be observed here that
there were internal political struggles not only in the town
center but also in the mountains.
A few months after the Americans returned, Pablo
Molon and his family left Barrio Nagasu for Barrio Luneta
and was never heard again in 1944. Francisco Militante was
found dead floating in a certain river of La Paz in 1946. It
could be presumed that these happened as part of the long-
term plan of Austero’s party. Mayor Pedro Palana, who was
charged with treason, was temporarily released through bail in
October 1945. Unfortunately, the researcher was not able to
find out the verdict given to Palana in the PCP documents
but it is more likely that Palana was found guilty due to his
collaboration and the public execution of Maj. Baquiano and
Lt. Luja.
The Case of Sogod
Sogod is a municipality located at the southern coast of
Leyte Island that was hardly accessed through land due to the
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142
lack of roads resulting in the scanty presence of Japanese
forces in the area. The situation made the guerillas more
organized compared to other municipalities in Leyte which
were led by the former USAFFE members Lt. Sergio Nuqui
and Capt. Francisco, both under the leadership of Col.
Kangleon.
Prior to the war, Severino Macasocol won the elections
of December 1940 against his political rival Cadio, an ex-
USAFFE member. The bitter rivalry between the two that
continued after the elections brought tragic events in the
political situation of Sogod. It was reported that Mayor
Macasocol, as well as Vice-Mayor Pablo Magliate, were
murdered around June 1942. These murders were presumably
ordered by Cadio. According to Lear (1961), since that event
happened, Sogod no longer had chief local officials to
administer the welfare of the townspeople. To solve this
problem, prominent citizens assembled and nominated the
former chief of police Hospicio Labata to assume the
mayoral office.
According to Malitbog Mayor Ramon Vano, the people
of Sogod passed a resolution requesting the Japanese garrison
in his municipality to appoint Hospicio Labata as mayor and
Victorino Mercado as vice-mayor after consulting Lt. Nuqui.
This is a strange case of having both the guerillas and the
occupying forces agreeing on the appointment of a mayor. In
August 1942, Nuqui’s group successfully expelled the
Japanese out of Sogod giving them the full support of the
civilians. This situation gave the guerillas the opportunity to
gather in November 1942 in Inopacan convened by the
American officer Chester Peter, which led to a bloody
encounter between the troops of Blas Miranda and Ruperto
Kangleon due to their personal grudges. The northern and
southern guerilla forces attempted to convene another
unification talk in January 1943 led by Alejandro Balderian.
A Study of Japanese Occupation in Leyte
143
This event officially made Kangleon the Military Advisor for
these groups.
On 8 December 1943, the Japanese were able to
reoccupy Sogod after their “reinvasion” of Leyte. Instead of
appointing Labata, they chose Mercado to be the mayor of
the town. The reason behind this action is unknown but it
can be assumed that the Japanese knew Labata’s connection
with the guerillas. According to Lear’s (1961) interview of Lt.
Lapulapu Mondragon, a former guerilla, Mercado and Labata
were taken to Tacloban on 9 January 1944 through a
motorboat carrying the mayors of southern Leyte where the
Japanese-sponsored provincial Governor, Bernardo Torres
and Acting Governor Pastor Salazar persuaded Labata to
whole-heartedly cooperate and implement Japanese policies.
Due to their persuasion, Labata fully cooperated with
the Japanese and performed his duties to their favor to pacify
the townspeople. After the war, CIC investigations pointed
out in their interview with Geronimo Ruiz, a district
councilor of Sogod, that Labata was indeed a rascal who only
finished third or fourth grade education. Being an unschooled
man, he was seen to be an abusive official even during the
time when he was appointed as chief of police but was
eventually discharged due to bribery. Example of his
evildoing during the Japanese occupation was the
assassination of Mayor Mercado who made contact with the
guerillas. CIC documents stated that Labata killed the mayor
by the order of the Japanese in Sogod. Labata gained again
the post of mayor but he had numerous enemies in Sogod
who attempted to kill him due to his cruelty such as ordering
the public execution of Volunteer Guards in June 1944. He
also confiscated the fishes of residents and sold these to the
Japanese so that they will not be able to aid the guerillas.
At the end of the war, Mayor Hospicio Labata was
charged with 16 counts of treason and was sentenced to life
A Study of Japanese Occupation in Leyte
144
imprisonment. He appealed to the court. After a careful
review of the case, Labata was acquitted because of the lack
of two witnesses to prove whether he really ordered the arrest
of guerillas that led to their execution. In May 1945, the
guerilla organizer Francisco Villamor was appointed as the
post war mayor of the town because of his popularity in
fighting Labata’s collaboration.
The Case of Santa Fe
The last case of Japanese collaboration that this study
will discuss is Barrio Santa Fe, which was part of the
municipality of Palo during the American colonial rule and
located at the northern part of Leyte Island. This area was
under the control of Alejandro Balderian who unified the
guerilla groups of Pabilona and Pamanian in December 1942.
After uniting the two forces, he established a Politico-Military
government by making Carrigara their capital. Balderian
became its governor and was able to gather local elites and
professionals to volunteer serving the resistance movement
that was strong enough to counter the Japanese in the
northern Leyte. A concrete manifestation of this guerilla
strength happened when the Japanese attacked the Alang-
Alang area in August 1943 while Santa Fe was
administratively separated from the resistance-controlled
municipality of Palo under the leadership Generoso Alvarado,
the guerilla mayor of Palo. This led to the decision of the
Japanese to create a separate town from Palo since Santa Fe
was already under their jurisdiction.
The Japanese appointed Carlos Martinez as the mayor of
the newly formed local government of Santa Fe. Initially
when the war began in the Philippines, the Japanese-
sponsored mayor was an active member of the USAFFE who
supported the guerillas from June 1942 to July or August
1943. However, the situation changed when the Japanese
A Study of Japanese Occupation in Leyte
145
officially appointed Martinez through Acting Governor
Pastor Salazar in Tacloban. Moreover, Martinez had a close
relationship with Gen. Kawazoe, the Chief of Staff of the 16th
Division of the Japanese Army, who gave him good graces in
his term as mayor. Due to Martinez’s strong ties with the
occupying forces, he was well supported economically and
politically by his patrons, which could be due to his active
participation in coercing or pacifying the guerillas. This was
clearly seen when he persuaded a guerilla named Carlos
Sydiangco, a member of Pabilona’s group, in a sabungan
(cockpit) to turn his support to the Japanese. However, the
guerilla refused the mayor’s offer resulting in the arrest of
Sydiangco together with his son, Vicente, and his friend Capt.
Centino. After a few days of confinement, they were released
on parole but were able to escape after almost a month of
being repressed to farm for food or go out of Santa Fe.
Moreover, the mayor got in conflict with Sgt. Antonio
Puto, the chief of the BC, who also was given a share of
profit in the cockpit operation. Mayor Martinez abused his
position as chief local executive in order to gain more profits
by attempting to become the full owner of the said municipal
enterprise; this was done through his strong ties with the
Japanese. Thus, Mayor Carlos Martinez acted as an
opportunist by siding with the guerillas in the first phase of
the war but later becoming a Japanese collaborator after being
offered with a position that gave him economic and political
benefits.
After the war, CIC arrested Martinez and was charged
with the crime of treason in January 1946.
A Study of Japanese Occupation in Leyte
146
Concluding Remarks on the Collaboration done by
Local Elites in Leyte
It can be seen from the different cases presented
concerning the behavior of local elites during the Japanese
occupation of Leyte that their actions cannot be simply
dichotomized as collaborators or members of the guerilla
movement due to the complex political dynamics
encountered by Filipino officials in the municipal level. Most
of the collaborators were caught in the political intricacies of
the Japanese and higher powers causing them to immediately
side with those who were more influential in order to save
their lives and their vested interests.
Following the research of Elmer Lear in the 1950s, the
political situation of Leyte before and during the war was not
comparatively different because of the conservative social
forces present in the province. This political phenomenon
can be seen in the dominance of the landowning oligarchy in
influencing the daily matters of individuals since the local
residents were tied as tenants to the land. Unlike in Central
Luzon where organized peasants challenged the influence of
the oligarchy through land reform, farmers in Leyte were not
educated enough to form an organization to challenge the
status quo. Thus, the common motivation of local
representatives was to preserve their position in the society
through public office.
Moreover, the local political unit of barangay in the
Philippines, which evolved to a pueblo (municipality), was
utilized during the Spanish colonial times to enforce colonial
policy coming from a centralized form of government. When
the Americans came to colonize the Philippines, they adapted
this political structure as the initial form of political
organization but introduced civil service to make the
government functional in promoting the welfare of the
A Study of Japanese Occupation in Leyte
147
people. According to M. Ladd Thomas (1969), the Filipinos
accepted the American ideals of civil service but did not
recognize it as a way of providing mutual protection between
the government and its citizens. The local elites used their
education and wealth to become public officials for their own
benefit. This means that the system had the tendency to
concentrate political power in the hands of the few especially
during the Japanese occupation when the military officials
gave some degree of liberty to the collaborators in
implementing their pacification policy.
In addition to this, it is still unclear how Governor
Bernardo Torres and Acting Governor Pastor Salazar
persuaded or forced the municipal officials to collaborate
with the Japanese in the Tacloban convention. What is clear
so far is that at the beginning of the Japanese invasion of the
Philippines, the local leaders were divided in choosing which
side they should go. It may seem that the role of these two
mongering groups during the war are clear but what remains
problematic is that there is no single uniform set of
explanations that can be applied to the local elites on why
they pursued the path of being a collaborator or a guerilla.
It is also important to take note the continuity of the
provincial oligarchy in Leyte because most of the Japanese-
sponsored officials were acquitted in the crime of treason
they faced in courts after the war and thus blurring the issues
of collaboration. This can be seen in the presidential election
of Sergio Osmeña and Manuel Roxas in April 1946. The
Veloso-Salazar faction supported Roxas, who was a
collaborator during the war, while former USAFFE members,
who immediately became municipal executives after the
Americans successfully cleared the Japanese in Leyte,
campaigned for Osmeña. When Roxas won the presidential
elections, he proclaimed amnesty to collaborators except for
those who committed grave crimes during the war. This
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148
proclamation greatly benefited the former Japanese-
sponsored officials by letting them retain their vast political
influence in the province. Alfred McCoy states that problems
of political consolidation in postwar democracy are not
products of World War II but rather issues shaped by the
synthesis of Spanish and American colonial local government
reforms. Grant Goodman (1988) supports this idea of McCoy
that the Commonwealth sustained during the war was not an
interregnum but was a continuum of Philippine politics.
The political situation of Leyte during World War II was
so complex in order to provide an adequate conclusion that
will support the thesis of McCoy. Nonetheless, it is still
definitely relevant to be used for further studies.
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Hermosilla, Catalino 146-10 MCF no. Un 30
Labata, Hospicio 169-3 MCF no. Un 34
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Martinez, Carlos 192-5 MCF no. Un 37
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151