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VARIOUS DEVELOPMENT OF COUNTERPART ASSISTANCE IN POST-DISASTER RECONSTRUCTION: -A study on Wenchuan Earthquake, Yushu Earthquake and Lushan Earthquake-

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The purpose of this study is to analyze the various development of counterpart assistance (CA) in the post-disaster reconstructions of Wenchuan, Yushu and Lushan Earthquake, by analyzing the decision making, reconstruction organizational structure and funding. We found that: throughout the time span of the three earthquakes, various forms of CA were adjusted to fit in the specific disaster affected situations. It was concluded as various development, which also deduced the important points for CA, which are the rational decision making by governments, the suitable implementation pattern, the moderate involving process of CA providers, the applicable scope of CA projects and amount of CA fund, the thorough fund supervision, and the realization of autonomy of local governments.
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VARIOUS DEVELOPMENT OF COUNTERPART ASSISTANCE IN POST-DISASTER
RECONSTRUCTION
-A study on Wenchuan Earthquake, Yushu Earthquake and Lushan Earthquake-
⅏ᐖ᚟⯆࡟࠾ࡅࡿᑐཱྀᨭ᥼ࡢᒎ㛤࡟㛵ࡍࡿ◊✲
࢙࢘ࣥᕝᆅ㟈࣭⋢ᶞᆅ㟈࣭ⰱᒣᆅ㟈ࡢ᚟⯆஦ᴗࢆᑐ㇟࡜ࡋ࡚
Jiaoru XI
*
, Yasuaki ONODA
**
, Haruka TSUKUDA
***
㑾ⓟዴ ᑠ㔝⏣Ὀ󰩣 ఢᝆ
The purpose of this study is to analyze the various development of counterpart assistance (CA) in the post-disaster
reconstructions of Wenchuan, Yushu and Lushan Earthquake, by analyzing the decision making, reconstruction
organizational structure and funding. We found that: throughout the time span of the three earthquakes, various
forms of CA were adjusted to À t in the speciÀ c disaster affected situations. It was concluded as various development,
which also deduced the important points for CA, which are the rational decision making by governments, the suitable
implementation pattern, the moderate involving process of CA providers, the applicable scope of CA projects and amount
of CA fund, the thorough fund supervision, and the realization of autonomy of local governments.
Keywords: Wenchuan Earthquake, Yushu Earthquake, Lushan Earthquake, post-disaster reconstruction,
counterpart assistance, various development
࢙࢘ࣥᕝᆅ㟈 ⋢ᶞᆅ㟈 ⰱᒣᆅ㟈 ⅏ᐖ᚟⯆ ᑐཱྀᨭ᥼ࡢᒎ㛤
1. Research introduction
1.1 Background
The 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake (Wenchuan E.) was the most
devastating earthquake occurred in China in recent years.
However, its post-disaster reconstruction (PDR) was near À nished
within merely three years. It became a consensus that the
implementation of counterpart assistance (CA) was one of the
most important reasons that brought such astonishing efÀ ciency,
which raised great global attention.
CA of PDR in China, means that, under the mandate of the
central government, the non-disaster affected areas offer
assistance to the disaster affected area in a pairing system.
Started from the Wenchuan E., CA was proved to be effective,
and has made major impacts on following PDRs. After the 2011
Great East Japan Earthquake, inspired by the CA of Wenchuan
E., Science Council of Japan and Union of Kansai Government
proposed to promote horizontal cooperation between local
governments, and implemented the Japanese version of CA. As
an effective method to guarantee reconstructive enforcement and
efÀ ciency, CA became an important topic when issues of PDR are
concerned.
The earthquakes over Ms. 6.0 occurred in China since Wenchuan
E. were shown in Table 1. Wenchuan E., the 2010 Yushu
Earthquake (Yushu E.) and the 2013 Lushan Earthquake (Lushan
E.) were the three earthquakes with Ms. over 7.0, death tolls of
over 100 people, and CA implemented during PDR.
1.2 Existing research
Xu (2013)1) proposed that CA of Wenchuan E. was an innovative
PDR assistance method, which could guarantee reconstruction
efficiency when encountered with tough reconstructive
tasks. However, Wang (2010)2 ) pointed out that in spite of
the advantages, there are also number of problems, such as
ambiguous legislations, insufÀ cient fund supervision, and so on.
When the three-year CA period of Wenchuan E. finished, Liu
(2010)3) and Zheng (2011)4) believed that there was a trend in
turning temporary emergency CA into long-term counterpart
coordination. Zhou (2011)5) pointed out that after Wenchuan E.,
CA was also implemented in Yushu E., and briefly introduced
ᮾ໭኱ᏛᕤᏛ◊✲⛉㒔ᕷ࣭ᘓ⠏Ꮫᑓᨷࠉ༤ኈᚋᮇㄢ⛬࣭ಟኈ ᘓ⠏Ꮫ
ᮾ໭኱ᏛᕤᏛ◊✲⛉㒔ᕷ࣭ᘓ⠏Ꮫᑓᨷࠉᩍᤵ࣭༤ኈ ᕤᏛ
ᮾ໭኱ᏛᕤᏛ◊✲⛉㒔ᕷ࣭ᘓ⠏Ꮫᑓᨷࠉຓᩍ࣭༤ኈ ᕤᏛ
*Graduate Student, Dept. of Architecture and Building Science, Grad.
School of Eng., Tohoku Univ., Mr. Archi.
**Prof., Dept. of Architecture and Building Science, Grad. School of Eng.,
Tohoku Univ., Dr. Eng.
***Assist. Prof., Dept. of Architecture and Building Science, Grad. School of
Eng., Tohoku Univ., Dr. Eng.





JiaoruXI, YasuakiONODA**andHarukaTSUKUDA**
󲫿󰘿












【カテゴリーⅠ】
1291
basic information is shown in Table 3-left. Its disaster-affected
areas were ranked based on their level of severity*4). Its Extreme
Area reached 10 counties, Serious Area reached 41 counties, and
Common Area reached 186 counties.
3.2 Basic information of Yushu E.
Yushu E. occurred on April 14th 2010. The disaster affected
situation is shown in Table 3-middle. Its Extreme Area reached
one town; Serious Area reached four villages; and Common
Area reached 22 villages. The disaster affected area belongs to
Tibentan area, with severe nature condition*5), and was one of the
least developed areas in China.
2. Data source
Existing research about CA has mainly focused on Wenchuan
E., but lacked precise and detailed analysis in earthquakes after
Wenchuan E. The comprehensive understanding of CA could
not be À gured out. So we collected the scattered and fragmented
data from many official sources from government and existing
research. We then re-organized those data carefully into the
structure that rationalized on the basic of the interpretation
getting from the interviews to the key persons. The main content
of the interviews is shown in Table 2.
3. Basic information of the three earthquakes
3.1 Basic information of Wenchuan E.
Wenchuan E. occurred on May 12th 2008. It was the first
devastating earthquake since Tangshan E. 32 years ago. The
Table 2 Main contents of the interviews in Shanghai
Date Name Position Reason for interview
Interviews in Dujiangyan and Chongqing, research report and audio records
provided by the author’s lab
2012
12/20
Mr. A Deputy Director of
Planning Bureau of Du-
jiangyan City
as the deputy director of planning bureau of Dujiangyan,
he participated in the full process of:
PDR work of Dujiangyan City.
2012
12/23
Mr. B A.Pro. of Department
of Urban Planning,
Chongqing University
as an urban planner, he participated in:
reconstruction planning of Xiaojin County in Wenchuan
E.
2012
12/25
Mr. C Pro. of Department
of Urban Planning,
Chongqing University
as an urban planner, he participated in:
reconstruction planning of Xiaojin County in Wenchuan
E.
Telephone interview
2013
10/07
Mr. D Member of CAUPD*2) as an urban planer, he participated in:
reconstruction planning of Jiegu Town of Yushu County.
Interviews in Shanghai
2015
01/06
Mr. E A.Pro. of Department
of Architecture, Tongji
University;
Member of TJAD
as the contact person on behalf of TUPDI and TJAD*3)
and an architect, he participated in the full process of:
1) reconstruction planning, architecture design,
and construction acceptance of Dujiangyan City in
Wenchuan E.;
2) reconstruction planning, architecture design, and
construction acceptance of Baoxing County in Lushan E.
2015
01/07
Mr. F Pro. of Department of
Architecture, Tongji
University;
Member of TJAD
as an architect, he participated in:
1) architecture design of two projects of Dujiangyan
City, one project of Beichuan County in Wenchuan E.;
2) architecture design of one project of Baoxing County
in Lushan E.
2015
01/08
Ms. G Pro. of Department of
Architecture, Tongji
University
she had suf¿ cient research experience in China, Japan,
Canada and England, especially in the topic of Urban
and Housing Development
2015
01/10
Mr. H Pro. of Department of
Urban Planning, Tongji
University;
Member of TUPDI
1) as an urban planner, he participated in Temporary
resettlement plan in Chengdu area in Wenchuan E.;
2) his research direction is Urban Security and
Comprehensive Disaster Prevention Plan
Table 1 Earthquakes over Ms 6.0 of China since Wenchuan E.*1)
Time Earthquake Name Ms. Death toll
2008/05 Wenchuan Earthquake in Sichuan Province 8.0 69,227
2008/08 Zhongba Earthquake in Tibet Autonomous Region 6.8 0
2008/08 Panzhihua Earthquake in Sichuan Province 6.1 38
2008/09 Zhongba Earthquake in Tibet Autonomous Region 6.0 0
2008/10
Kizilsu Kirghiz Earthquake in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region
6.8 0
2008/10 Damxung Earthquake in Tibet Autonomous Region 6.6 9
2008/11 Haixi Earthquake in Qinghai Province 6.3 0
2009/07 YaoAn Earthquake in Yunnan Province 6.3 1
2009/07 Nyima Earthquake in Tibet Autonomous Region 6.0 0
2009/08 Haixi Earthquake in Qinghai Province 6.6 0
2010/03 Nyainrong Earthquake in Tibet Autonomous Region 6.1 0
2010/04 Yushu Earthquake in Qinghai Province 7.3 2,968
2012/06 Xinyuan Earthquake in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region 6.6 0
2012/08 Yutian Earthquake in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region 6.3 0
2013/04 Lushan Earthquake in Sichuan Province 7.0 196
2013/07 Min Earthquake in Gansu Province 6.7 95
2013/08 Zuogong Earthquake in Tibet Autonomous Region 6.1 0
2014/02 Yutian Earthquake in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region 7.3 0
2014/05 Yingjiang Earthquake in Yunnan Province 6.1 0
2014/08 Ludian Earthquake in Yunnan Province 6.5 617
2014/10 Jinggu Earthquake in Yunnan Province 6.6 5
2014/11 Kangding Earthquake in Sichuan Province 6.3 0
1292
1293
its basic information. In other words, Chinese researchers were
aware of the implementation of CA after Wenchuan E., but there
was no in-depth study on the implementation of CA of Yushu E.
and Lushan E.
Among the researchers from Japan, Miyairi (2011)6), Gen (2012)7)
and Otani (2014)8) pointed out that, the CA of Wenchuan E.,
provided a good example of horizontal assistance in PDR, but its
existence was based on the centralized political system of China,
as it was ordered in a top-down approach. The difference in
economic strengths between counterpart providers and receivers
was another premise; Iizuka (2013)9) further put forward that,
because of the particular preconditions mentioned above, Japan
could not simply imitate the Wenchuan pattern, but rather tried
to create its own version of CA, mainly by staff dispatching in the
PDR of 311 Great East Japan Earthquake. In other words, the
knowledge of the Japanese researchers about the CA of China
mainly came from Wenchuan E. However, after Wenchuan E.,
new information was not appended.
1.3 Research purpose
This study focuses on the various development of CA in PDR of
Wenchuan, Yushu and Lushan E. "Various development" means
that, during the time span of the three earthquakes, various
forms of CA were adjusted to Àt in the speciÀc disaster affected
situations. Decision making of CA, reconstruction organizational
structure and funding were selected as the indicators for an in-
depth analysis. The reasons of choosing these indicators are as
follow: First, decision making in CA revealed the implementation
foundation of CA, and how the guidelines of CA were formulated.
Secondly, organizational structure, which means the relationship
between multiple reconstruction stakeholders, was crucial to
understanding how CA was operated speciÀcally. Thirdly, funding
was also an important indicator in PDR. Once the organizational
structure get clearly mapped out, it was possible to analyze how
the funds Á owed between these organizations.
4.1 Decision making of CA after Wenchuan E.
The severe situation of Wenchuan E. was paid high attention
by the central government. The central government formulated
guidelines of CA in one regulation and one scheme, mandating the
inter-provincial pattern of CA (Table 4), that 18 provinces outside
of the disaster-affected area would counterpart assist 18 counties
in Extreme Area and Serious Area of Sichuan Province*15). It was
the À rst time that CA was implemented in PDR. The list of names
is shown in Table 5.
In the selection of provision-county pairings*16), the central
government considered the high magnitude of the destruction
Table 4 Decision making of CA after the three earthquakes
Extreme Area Serious Area Common Area three/two/one administrative
hierarchie(s) in difference
3.3 Basic information of Lushan E.
Lushan E. occurred on April 20th 2013. The disaster affected
situation is shown in Table 3-right. Its Extremely Area reached
one county; Serious Area reached five counties and six villages;
and Common Area reached 15 counties. Most of the disaster
affected area was also struck by Wenchuan E. Lushan E. also
occurred at the time when local fiscal revenue increase rates
generally slowed down*6).
4. Decision making of CA after the three earthquakes
No matter the CA of Wenchuan, Yushu or Lushan E., the existing
foundation is the centralized political system of China*7). Decision
making is ordered in a top-down approach. After the disaster
occurrence, the decision making of CA is divided into two phases
according to different leading forces, to formulate guidelines of
CA, as shown in Table 4.
Wenchuan E.10) Yushu E.11) Lushan E.12)
Time 2008/05/12 2010/04/14 2013/04/20
Ms. 8.0 7.1 7.0
Max intensity 11 degree 9 plus degree 9 degree
Death toll 69,227 persons 2,698 persons 196 persons
Affected
population
40 million 0.247 million 2.184 million
Direct eco-
nomic loss
845.1 billion RMB 44 billion RMB 85.17 billion RMB
Collapsed
housing
7,967,000 buildings almost all the adobe wood
architecture in Yushu
County
56,000 buildings
Damaged
housing
24,543,000 buildings reached 80% of Extremely
& Seriously Affected Area
1,468,900 buildings
Image of
disaster-
affected area
Affected
district
Extremely Seriously Area:
10 counties (cities);
Seriously Affected Area:
41 counties (cities, districts);
Common Affected Area:
186 counties (cities, districts)
Extremely Seriously Area:
1 town;
Seriously Affected Area:
4 villages (towns);
Common Affected Area:
22 villages (towns)
Extremely Seriously Area:
1 county;
Seriously Affected Area:
5 counties (districtes) & 6
villages (towns)
Common Affected Area:
15 counties (districts)
Table 3 Basic information of Wenchuan, Yushu and Lushan E.
Extremely seriously
Seriously affected
Common affected
Table 7 List of counterpart assistance of Lushan E.
Intra-pattern Intra-pattern
Provider Receiver
(City government) (County government)
Provider Receiver
(City government) (County government)
Deyang City Lushan County Panzhihua City Mingshan District
Luzhou City Baoxing County Zigong City Yingjing County
Nanchong City Tianquan County Mianyang City Yucheng District
Time Leading force Governmental function after disaster Case of Wenchuan Earthquake Case of Yushu Earthquake Case of Lushan Earthquake
Phase 1 Central
Government
(the State Council)
The central
government
dispatches staffs
from its ministries
and commissions
to establish the
leader group, which
directly leads and
formulates guidelines
for disaster relief and
reconstruction work.
Guidelines about CA 2008/06/08
“the Regulation
of Wenchuan E.”*8)
2008/06/18
“the CA Scheme of
Wenchuan E.”*8)
(2010/05/25)
“the Guiding Opin-
ion of Yushu E.”*9)
(2010/06/22)
“the CA Scheme
of Yushu E.”*9)
(2013/07/06)
“the Master planning of Lushan E.”*10)
Factors start CA ż × ż × ż
CA pattern ׿ I nter-pattern ׿
Inter- & intra- pattern
ż Intra-pattern
CA period ׿ 3 years ż 3 years ׿ 3 years
CA providers
and receivers
׿ 18 provinces vs.
18 counties
׿
2 provinces & 4 en-
terprises, of inter-part
×
assistant task ׿ fund & imple-
mentation
׿ implementation,
of inter-part
×
fund amount ׿ 1% × × ×
CA projects × × × ż of inter-part ×
Phase 2 Local
Governments
(level of province,
city, county.etc.)
The local governments
implement the concrete
reconstruction work,
formulate guidelines
in a further step, on the
basic of the guidelines
set up by the central
government.
Guidelines about CA
(respectively in 2008)
"the Framework Agreement between A
and B"*11)
(2010/06/22)
"the Framework Agreement between A and
B*12)" of intra-part
(2013/07/19)
“the CA Scheme of
Lushan E.”*13)
(respectively in 2013)
"the Framework
Agreement between
A and B"
*14)
Factors CA pattern × × × ×
CA period × × × ×
CA providers
and receivers
׿ 3 cities vs. 3 towns, of intra-part ż 6 cities vs. 6
counties
×
Assistant task ׿ implementation, of intra-part ż fund & imple-
mentation
×
Fund amount × × ż 5‰ ×
CA projects ż ż of intra-part ׿
* As the intra-part of Yushu E. only concerned with Common Area, it was not focused on to be analyzed.
3 2 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
Table 6 List of counterpart assistance of Yushu E.
Inter-pattern Intra-pattern
Provider Receiver
(Province govern.) (Town/Village govern.)
(State-owned Enterprise)
(Town/Village govern.)
Provider Receiver
(City government) (Town government)
Beijing City Jiegu Town,
Longbao Town
Xining City Sahuteng Town
Liaoning Province Batang Village Haixi Municipality Jiajiboge Town
Enterprise a Jiegu Town (north),
Anchong Village
Haidong City Chengwen Town
Enterprise b Jiegu Town (east),
Zhongda Village
Enterprise c Jiegu Town (south)
Enterprise d Jiegu Town (west)
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
Table 5 List of counterpart assistance of Wenchuan E.
Inter-pattern Inter-pattern
Provider Receiver
(Province govern.) (County govern.)
Provider Receiver
(Province govern.) (County govern.)
Shandong Province Beichuan County Fujian Province Pengzhou City
Guangdong Province Wenchuan County Shanxi Province Mao County
Zhejiang Province Qingchuan County Hunan Province Li County
Jiangsu Province Mianzhu City Jilin Province Heishui County
Beijing City Shifang City Anhui Province Songpan County
Shanghai City Dujiangyan City Jiangxi Province Xiaojin County
Hebei Province Pingwu County Hubei Province Hanyuan County
Liaoning Province An County Chongqing City Chongzhou City
Henan Province Jiangyou City
Heilongjiang Province
Jiange County
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
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1293
5. Counterpart assistance re ected in organizational structure
Chapter 5 raised up specific cases, by analyzing their
organizational structures to explain how the concrete
implementation methods of CA were decided by the local
governments of providers and receivers.
5.1 Organizational structure of Wenchuan E.
Case of Dujiangyan City (county level) was taken, which
belonged to Extreme Area, and its partner Shanghai City (SH)
is the most developed area of China. This pairing showcases the
ideology behind CA.
Following the instructions of central government, Headquarter
of Shanghai City (HSD) was established on behalf of SH
Government. As shown in Fig. 1, HSD participated in the full
process of CA projects, including decision-making, planning,
construction and supervision. As the administrative hierarchy of
SH is two-level higher than Dujiangyan, SH City took the leading
force in decision making, resulting in strong administrative
enforcement. Therefore, although the CA projects were decided
during the negotiation meeting by both sides of providers and
receivers’ governments and written into Framework Agreement
(Table 4), they were actually decided by SH City. The HSD took
direct leadership of its own units, such as the planning institute
(TUPDI), architecture design institutes, construction companies,
and supervision sections. The CA projects covered almost all of
the key physical projects in infrastructure, housing, and public
facility reconstruction. Social infrastructure recovery (such as
education, medical care, and ecology) was also supported by
dispatching technical staffs.
On the other hand, the effective administrative enforcement also
meant strong interference from the providers. It caused difÀ culties
with the autonomy of local governments during PRD. For
example, CA projects had the tendency to show off achievements
of the CA providers, but turned out not to be accordant with local
demands*19).
5.2 Organizational structure of Yushu E.
Case of Jiegu Town was taken. As the only town of Extreme Area
and where the Government of Yushu County located, Jiegu Town
received CA from Beijing, and four state-owned enterprises.
Following the instructions of central government, all the
providers established CA Headquarter in Yushu County. But
this time, as shown in Fig. 2, the CA providers withdrew from
decision-making, planning, and supervision, focusing mainly
on construction. As mentioned above, the CA projects was
decided directly by the central government. After the decision
making of central government, Qinghai Province was able to
partially keep the autonomy in actual implementation. As a
Tibetan agglomeration, Jiegu Town did not undergo thorough
Land Reform. There was 83.9% of private land ownership,
which made the feedback of individuals necessary. Qinghai
Province committed CAUPD*2), not only with planning, but also
coordinating feedback from inhabitants, and providing technical
consultant for the cooperation with construction sections when
the incapacity of local government appeared. The CA projects
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in disaster affected areas and enormous PDR tasks, by pairing
each county with CA providers (province) two administrative
hierarchies highe r, to mak e sure economic advant age an d
administrative enforcement to provide effective assistance.
4.2 Decision making of CA after Yushu E.
Considering its sensitive ethnic issue and serious nature
con ditions, Yushu E. was also paid high attention to b y the
central government. The central government formulated one
guiding opinion and one scheme, mandating the combination of
inter- and intra-provincial pattern of CA (Table 4). Of the inter-
provincial pattern of CA, Beijing City (provincial level), Liaoning
Province and four state-owned enterprises*17) counterpart assisted
one county in Extreme Area, three vill ages and one town in
Serious Area. The administrative powers of Beijing and Liaoning
(province), were three hierarchies higher than their receivers
(town/ village). But b ecause the c oncrete CA pr ojects were
previously decided by the central government (Table 4), and CA
providers withdrew from the decision making of CA projects, the
administrative enforcement was not as strong as Wenchuan E.
This will be further analyzed in Chapter 5. Of the intra-provincial
pattern, province government was authorized to make decisions.
Framew ork agreeme nts were sig ned under the mandate of
Qinghai Province, regulated that three cities counterpart assisted
three towns in Common Area, there were two administrative
hierarchies in difference. The list of names is shown in Table 6.
The selection was mainly based on former assistant experience
before the disaster and the incapacity of local governments*18).
4.3 Decision making of CA after Lushan E.
Right after the disaster, the General Secretary of the CPC (the
leader of the Central Committee of the CPC*7 )) instructed that,
local government should be authorized as the leading force in
PDR, to search for innova tive and more sustainable way to
implement PDR. Central government embodied this instruction
into the master planning, and mandated the intra-provincial
pattern of CA (Table 4). Later on, Sichuan Province formulated
one scheme, mandated six cities of its own to counterpart assist
six counties in Extreme and Serious Area (Table 4). The list of
names is shown in Table 7. There was only one administrative
level in difference.
This decision making indicated the intention of the central
government to strengthen the autonomy of local governments in
PDR. Another reason for the central government granting more
autonomy to local governments, is during this time, the overall
governmental fiscal revenue increase rates slowed down, and
the central government wanted to avoid putting more burden on
potential external CA providers.
work as integration
act on
relationship
organizaiton
organization
organization
work
Fig. 1 Organizational structure of Wenchuan Earthquake (Case: Dujiangyan City)
Central Government
Reconstruction Organizations
Reconstruction works
Headquarter of
Shanghai City
Government of
Dujiangyan City
co-operate
implement units of Shanghai
local implementation
units
Army and police force
Planning Bureau of
local government
audit section
of the state
audit section
of Shanghai
Government of
Sichuan Province
Government
of Chengdu City
reconstruction planning
non-counterpart
assistant projects
Other Stakeholder
state
level
province
level
county
level
planning
institute
implementation
section
lead
lead
lead
lead
lead
lead
lead
lead
lead
lead
lead
army & police
transport
supervise
implement
formulate
implement
supervision
section
city
level
authority of
decision making
counterpart assistant projects
Social:
ecology, education,
medical care
Counterpart Assistant Provider
Counterpart Assistance Receiver
Physical: (most of the key projects)
infrastructure, housing,
facility, industry
audit section
of local
government
TUPDI*3)
Fig. 2 Organizational structure of Yushu Earthquake (Case: Jiegu Town)
authority of
decision making
implement units
of Beijing City
4 state-owned
enterprises
10 construction committee
Inhabitants
local implementation
units
Army and police force
reconstruction planning
lead
lead
lead
lead
lead
lead
lead
lead
lead
lead
transport
commit
implement
implement
supervise
implement
formulate
community
state
level
province
level
county
level
town
level
community
level
individual
level
planning
institute
implementation
section
army & police
supervision
section
city
level
audit section of
local government
audit section
of the state
Reconstruction Organizations Counterpart assistant provider
Government of Yushu City
Government of Jiegu Town
Planning Bureau of
local government
Government of
Qinghai Province
Government of Yushu Municipal
Reconstruction Works
Counterpart assistance receiverOther Stakeholder
lead
integrate
planning/
feedback
Headquarter of
Liaoning Province,
Beijing City
Central Government
counterpart assistant projects
Physical: (most of the key projects)
infrastructure, housing,
facility, industry
Social:
ecology, education,
medical care
non-counterpart
assistant projects
CAUPD*2)
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covered almost all the key physical projects of infrastructure,
housing and public facilities, while social infrastructure recovery
was supported by staff dispatching.
5.3 Organizational structure of Lushan E.
Case of Baoxing County was selected to be analyzed, though only
a Serious Area, because it was one of the six cities that followed
indiscriminative assistance orders from Sichuan Province. It
was also because the interviewees participated in both the PDR
of Baoxing County after Lushan E., and the PDR of Dujiangyan
City after Wenchuan E. So it is easier to get a more objective view
between the two earthquakes.
Following the instructions of the central government,
Headquarter of Luzhou City was established in Baoxing County.
As shown in Fig. 3, Sichuan Province took the leadership role in
PDR, even the commanding powers of army and police force were
shifted temporarily from the Central Government to Sichuan
Province. Sichuan Province, Ya'an City, and Baoxing County
took charge of the PDR work level-by-level. TUPDI and TJAD
were also committed by local governments after Yushu E., but
only managed their own work. The role of integrating different
stakeholders returned to local governments. People criticized the
local government on its incapacity when confronted complicated
cases. The CA provider mainly provided fund and technical staffs
to support its receiver. Which projects should be committed as CA
projects was decided during the negotiation meeting by both sides
of governments, and written into Framework Agreement (Table
4). The CA projects of Luzhou City included four key physical
projects, and social infrastructure recovery was supported by
dispatching technical staffs.
The CA enforcement was the weakest among the three, but on
the other hand, the local governments had greater autonomy.
For example, during rural housing reconstruction, inhabitants
were encouraged to get involved by the local governments. “Self-
construction committees” were established by election. They
could negotiate the price of reconstruction material, supervise
construction process, feedback advises and handle disputes within
neighborhoods*20).
6. Counterpart assistance re ected in funding
6.1 Funding in Wenchuan E.
As shown in Fig. 4, the total amount of reconstruction budget
for Wenchuan E. was 865.80 billion RMB, and governmental
budget (budget from central government, Sichuan Province and
18 counterpart assistance provinces) provided the majority of
the non-repayable grants. According to the Scheme of Wenchuan
E., each CA province was mandated to provide no less than 1%
of its fiscal revenue of the previous year to its partner county
as reconstruction fund, and would continue for three years. In
total, the budget from CA was predicted to be 78.0 billion RMB.
However, as shown in Fig. 7-left, the eventual figure, 84.90
billion RMB was more than the prediction. It took on 9.8% of the
whole budget, and made great contributions to the funding. The
Fig. 3 Organizational structure of Lushan Earthquake (Case: Baoxing County)
community
community
level
individual
level
Government of
Sichuan Province
Government of Ya’an City
Government of
Baoxing County
lead
lead
lead
leadelection
feedback
local implementation
units
Army and police force
reconstruction planning
temporary lead
co-commit
co-lead
transport
support
supervise
implement
formulate
state
level
province
level
county
level
planning
institute
implementation
section
army & police
supervision
section
city
level
audit section
of local
government
audit section
of the state
Central Government
Reconstruction Organizations
Planning Bureau of
local government
Reconstruction Works
Other Stakeholder
lead
Headquarter of
Luzhou City
lead
authority of
decision making
counterpart assistant projects
Phisical: (4 projects)
infrastructure,
housing, facility
Social:
ecology, education,
medical care
non-counterpart
assistant projects
self-construction committee
Inhabitants
Counterpart Assistant Provider
Counterpart Assistance Receiver
TUPDI*3)
TJAD*3)
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1297
much less than Wenchuan E.
In Yushu E., all the funds were collected by the Central
Government, and appropriated to the Government of Qinghai
Province, who then redistributed the fund level-by-level and
eventually into different projects. According to the audit result
published by the National Audit OfÀ ce21), in the PDR of Wenchuan
E., there were 36 projects out of the 1404 audit targets committed
illegal usage of funding, totaling the amount of 0.19 billion
RMB. Such adjustment of funding distribution after Yushu E.
showed the consideration of the central government to avoid the
ineffective fund supervision, when CA providers were in charge
of project management and fund distribution, and also involved
in fund supervision in Wenchuan E. Furthermore, principle
of "breakeven investment & small profits" was proposed by
the central government to reduce the economic burden for CA
providers. Therefore, compared to funding, the support from CA
providers in construction was more crucial. Although they only
provided 3.9% of the total reconstruction fund, CA providers
actually completed the investment of construction projects with
the amount of 18.79 billion RMB, making up 59.4% of the total
budget. It made great contribution to PDR work.
6.3 Funding in Lushan E.
As shown in Fig. 6, the total amount of reconstruction budget for
Lushan E. was 87.2 billion, and government funding also took on
the major part. According to the Scheme of Lushan E., each CA
cities was mandated to provide assistance for three years, and
the general amount would arrive 5‰ of the its À scal revenue of
2012. The CA of Lushan E. was from intra-provincial support,
so the funding was also counted as a part of "Budget from
Sichuan Province", and was not listed separately as CA fund.
Fig. 4 Reconstruction budget for Wenchuan E.19) unit: billion RMB
Fig. 5 Reconstruction budget for Yushu E.20) unit: billion RMB
Fig. 6 Reconstruction budget for Lushan E.22) unit: billion RMB
budget
from Sichuan Province
budget from 18 counter-
part assistant provinces others
(including loan from bank,
social donation and other social capital)
budget from
central government
220.30
(41.20)
78.00 526.30
0.00 100.00 200.00 300.00 400.00 500.00 600.00 700.00 800.00 900.00
A. Total amount 865.80
others
(including loan from bank,
social donation and other social capital)
(20.65)
(2.00) (9.00)
budget from
central government
budget from
Qinghai Province
B. Total amount 31.65
0.00 100.00 200.00 300.00 400.00 500.00 600.00 700.00 800.00 900.00
budget from
Sichuan Province
0.00 100.00 200.00 300.00 400.00 500.00 600.00 700.00 800.00 900.00
(46.00)
(10.00)
budget from
central government
others
(including loan from bank,
social donation and other social capital)
(31.20)
C. Total amount 87.20
Fig. 7 Funding & Construction completed by counterpart assistance of Wenchuan, Yushu and Lushan E.
Provider Fund-
ing
Investment
completed
Provider Fund-
ing
Investment
completed
Beijing P. 1.12 1.12 Enterprise d - 2.60
Liaoning P. 0.05 0.50 Xining C. 0.02 1.12
Enterprise a - 4.38 Haixi M. 0.02 0.99
Enterprise b - 3.50 Haidong C. 0.01 0.98
Enterprise c - 2.60
I: Total amount of fund invested=1.22;
II: Total amount of project completed=18.79
I/B=1.22/31.65=3.9%; II/B=18.79/31.65=59.4%
Providers Fund-
ing
Investment
completed
providers Fund-
ing
Investment
completed
Deyang C. 0.06 0.06 Panzhihua C. 0.03 0.03
Luzhou C. 0.05 0.05 Zigong C. 0.03 0.03
Nanchong C. 0.06 0.06 Mianyang C. 0.06 0.06
I: Total amount of fund invested=0.29;
II: Total amount of project completed=0.29
I/C=0.29/87.20=0.3%; II/C=0.29/87.20=0.3%
Provider Fund-
ing
Provider Fund-
ing
Provider Fund-
ing
Shangdong P. 12.00 Hebei P. 2.80 Jilin P. 1.30
Shanghai C. 8.25 Liaoning P. 4.00 Anhui P. 2.13
Guangdong P. 11.20 Henan P. 3.00 Jiangxi P. 1.30
Zhejiang P. 8.50 Fujian P. 3.38 Hubei P. 2.12
Jiangsu P. 11.28 Shanxi P. 1.69 Chongqing P. 1.70
Beijing C. 7.00 Hunan P. 2.01 Heilongjiang P. 1.24
I: Total amount of fund invested=84.90
I/A=84.90/865.80=9.8%
fund movementrelated organization project cooperated as major
implementor of projects
provide
invest
Central Government
Shanghai City
design institute
construction
company
Sichuan Province
Chengdu City
Dujiangyan City
Counterpart Assistant Projects
I
I
appropriate
provide
invest
re-distribute
re-distribute
Central Government
design institute
Qinghai Province Beijing City
Liaoning Province
4 central enterprises
other construction
company
Yushu Manicipality
Yushu County
Counterpart Assistant Projects
II
I
re-distribute
invest
provide
Counterpart Assistant Projects
Central Government
design institute
Sichuan Province
Yaan City
Baoxing County
Luzhou City
construction
company
I
II
re-distribute
re-distribute
re-distribute
Wenchuan Earthquake Yushu Earthquake Lushan Earthquake
Funding & Investment completed by counterpart assistance*21), unit: billion RMB; P.=Province, C.=City, M.=Municipality
Fund movement between relative organizations
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fund was distributed by its providers, and went directly into CA
projects.
6.2 Funding in Yushu E.
As shown in Fig. 5, the total amount of reconstruction budget for
Yushu E. was 31.65 billion RMB, and government funding took on
the major part of total funding. Different from Wenchuan E., the
CA of Yushu E. was from both inter- and intra-provincial support,
so part of its funding was from the "Others" category, and part
from the "Budget from Qinghai Province", therefore, it was not
listed separately. As shown in Fig. 7-middle, the fund provided
by CA was 1.22 billion RMB, making up 3.9% of the total budget,
In Lushan E., when local governments had already experienced
Wenchuan E., and the level of severity was not as high as
Wenchuan E., the central government decided to strengthen the
role of local governments in PDR. Therefore, the local province
government was authorized as leading force, and the cities within
the province were selected as CA providers.
(2) Organizational structure of stakeholders
In Wenchuan E., CA providers participated in the full process
of decision making, planning, construction and supervision. CA
projects covered almost all of the key physical projects. Since
the administrative power is two hierarchies higher than their
receivers, CA providers took the leading force in decision making,
essentially decided the CA projects (Fig. 1). But it caused difÀ culty
for the autonomy of the local governments*19).
In Yushu E., CA providers only focused on the process of
construction. Although the administrative power of the inter-
governmental providers is three hierarchies higher than their
receivers, because they withdrew from the decision making
process, the province government was able to partially keep its
autonomy in concrete implementation, such as a third party
was committed for integration of the cooperation of the various
stakeholders (Fig. 2, CAUPD was committed by Government
of Qinghai Province). CA projects were decided by the central
government, and covered almost all of the key physical projects.
In Lushan E., CA providers mainly provided fund and technical
staffs to support its receiver. CA projects covered a number of the
key physical projects. Since the local province government became
the leading force, autonomy of local governments was easier to be
ensured to realize localization. (Fig. 3)
(3) Funding
In Wenchuan E., CA fund made great contribution to PDR (Fig. 4).
But as the CA providers not only funded, but also managed fund
distribution and also got involved in supervision, the supervision
was not effective enough, and illegal use of funding occurred. (Fig.
1, Fig. 7-left)
In Yushu E., the contribution of CA providers in construction was
much more crucial than funding (Fig. 5). As the fund was collected
by the central government, then appropriated to local province
government to distribute, and then supervised by both the central
government and local governments, the supervision power was
strengthened. (Fig. 2, Fig. 7-middle)
In Lushan E., CA fund took less proportion than Wenchuan and
Yushu E. (Fig. 6), and was both collected and distributed by local
province government. The province government also delegated
the project approval authority to some cities and counties to
implement full process supervision. The supervision of local
governments was further strengthened. (Fig. 3, Fig. 7-right)
(4) Characteristics of implementation
ձIn Wenchuan E., the two administrative hierarchies in
difference really provided economic strength and enforcement
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As shown in Fig. 7-right, the CA fund was 0.29 billion. Because
this time the Government of Sichuan Province was in charge of
the PDR, the fund was both collected and distributed by it. In
order to strengthen the supervision on funding, Sichuan Province
delegated the project approval authority to cities and counties to
implement process supervision*22). Local governments assigned
the projects to CA providers with the same amount of money that
the providers provided, 0.29 billion RMB, which was 0.3% of the
whole reconstruction budget.
7. Conclusions: Various development of CA
(1) Decision making of CA implementation
ձ Decision maker of guidelines of CA
In Wench uan E., the cent ral government decided the inter-
provincial pattern of CA, and selected the CA providers and
receivers. (Table 4)
In Yushu E., the central government decided the combination of
inter-provincial and intra-provincial pattern of CA, and selected
the CA providers and receivers of the inter-provincial patternpart.
The province government selected the CA providers and receivers
of the intra-part. (Table 4)
In Lushan E., the central government decided the intra-provincial
pattern of CA. The province selected the CA provide rs and
receivers. (Table 4)
ղ Administrative hierarchies in difference
In Wenchuan E., there were two administrative hierarchies in
difference between providers (province) and receivers (county).
(Table 5, Fig. 9)
In Yushu E ., of t he inte r- provi nc ia l pat te rn , the re w ere
three adminis trative hierar chies in difference betwee n the
governmental providers (province) and receivers (county/village);
of the intra-provincial pattern, there were two administrative
hierarchies in difference between providers (city) and receivers
(town/village). (Table 6, Fig. 9)
In Lushan E., there was one administrative level in difference
between providers (city) and receivers (county). (Table 7, Fig. 9)
ճ Decision making rationales
In Wenchuan E., because the level of severity was high and PDR
task was enormous, the priority of PDR was to guarantee the
advancement of PDR work and enforcement of administrative
orders. Therefore, the provinces, who had the capacity in both
funding and execution were selected as CA providers.
In Yushu E., bec ause of the sensit ive ethnic issue, the CA
providers should have the capacity of communicating with local
governments and also disaster affected population. Therefore,
the provinces as the former assistant providers were selected as
CA providers. Also because of the harsh natural condition, there
was incapacity of local governments especially in construction
technology. So, the four state-owned enterprises specialized in
infrastructure construction were selected.
(5) Consideration
Our analyses of these three cases of CA also deduced the
important points for CA, the rational decision making by
governments (the central and local governments), the suitable
implementation pattern (inter-, intra-province or both), the
moderate involving process of CA providers (decision making,
planning, construction and supervision), the applicable scope of
CA projects (physical projects, social infrastructure projects, and
the proportion) and amount of CA fund (affordable for providers
and effective for receivers), the thorough fund supervision, and
the realization of autonomy of local governments.
Supplementary notes
*1) The list of earthquakes was based on the information from "China
Seismic Information", advanced-searched as "Ms6.0, from 2008/05 to
2015/06"; the death toll was based on the news published by the related
governments.
*2) CAUPD stands for China Academy of Urban Planning & Design
Institute.
*3) TUPDI stands for "Shanghai Tongji Urban Planning & Design
Institute". TJAD stands for "Tongji Architectural Design (Group) Co.,
Ltd".
*4) Disaster-affected areas are ranked into "Extremely Seriously Affected
Area" (abbr. as Extreme Area), "Seriously Affected Area" (abbr. as
Serious Area) and "Common Affected Area" (abbr. as Common Area)
according to different severity levels. The division standard was based
on “The Report of Wenchuan Earthquake Hazard Assessment” published
on 2008/07/22, based on the statistics of death toll, affected population,
collapsed housing, damaged housing, direct economic loss and so on.
It was formulated by the assessment group composed by professionals
from Expert Commission of China National Commission for Disaster
Reduction and National Disaster Reduction Center of China, under
the organization of Ministry of Civil Affairs, National Development
and Reform Commission, China Seismological Bureau, etc. The same
procedure was taken after Yushu and Lushan E.
*5) Most of the disaster-affected area was Tibetan agglomerations with
97.7% Tibetan in population. Meanwhile, located in the alpine region,
with an average elevation of 4100m, its construction period can only last
6 months per year, from April to October.
*6) As reported by People’s Daily on May 6th 2013, the national fiscal
revenue was 3203.4 billion RMB, increased 6.9% from last quarter, fell
back 7.8% from the same period of last year, which was lower than the
predicted budget increase rate of 8%.
*7) Fig. 9 is shown as below.
*8) "the Regulation of Wenchuan E." stands for ࠓựᕝᆅ㟈⅏ᚋ᜚ኞ㔜ᘓ᮲
౛ࠔ and "the CA Scheme of Wenchuan E." stands for ࠓựᕝᆅ㟈⅏ᚋ
᜚ኞ㔜ᘓᑐཱྀᨭ᥼᪉᱌ࠔ.
*9) "the Announcement of Yushu E." stands for ࠓᅜົ㝔㛵ன೴ዲ⋢ᶞᆅ㟈
⅏ᚋ᜚ኞ㔜ᘓᕤసⓗᣦᑟពぢࠔ, and "the CA Scheme of Yushu E." stands
for ࠓ⋢ᶞᆅ㟈⅏ᚋ᜚ኞ㔜ᘓᑐཱྀ᥼ᘓᕤస᪉᱌ࠔ
*10) "the Master Planning of Lushan E." stands for ࠓⰱᒣᆅ㟈⅏ᚋ᜚ኞ㔜ᘓ
⥲యつ๸ࠔ
*11)A and B of "the Framework Agreement between A and B" stands for
each pair of the CA providers (18 provinces) and receivers (18 counties)
Fig. 9 Centralized political system of China
Fig. 8 The Completion rate two and three years after the occurrence of
Wenchuan, Yushu and Lushan E.
The data of Fig. 8, which shows the completion rates two and three
years after the three disasters*23), was provided by the central and local
governments, and used as supporting evidences to show the different PDR
implementations under the impact of CA.
0.0%
20.0%
40.0%
60.0%
80.0%
100.0%
3 years after Wenchuan E.
2 years after Wenchuan E.
100.0%
73.0%
94.9%
63.0%
40.0%
100.0%
100.0%
99.8%
99.0%
98.3%
12.4%
3 years after Yushu E.
2 years after Yushu E. 2 years after Lushan E.
94.3%
78.2% 74.5%
(the 3rd year hasn’t come)
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1299
power, and making sure of the reconstruction efficiency (Fig. 1,
Fig. 9). It could be seen that the completion rate of general PDR
projects of Wenchuan E.*23) was the highest, although its level of
severity was high and PDR task was enormous.
ղ Since rural housing reconstruction was not so complicated
(mainly low-rise and collective land ownership*24)), authority
was transferred to the people affected by the disaster relatively
quickly after technical guidance and fund support was provided.
It could explained, that the rural housing reconstructions of the
three earthquakes*23), as one important item of CA projects, were
all nearly À nished after two years.
ճ
In the PDR of Lushan E., the local governments took the role
to integrate different stakeholders (Fig. 3, Fig. 7-right), which
was different from the situation of Wenchuan E., that smooth
cooperation was assured as both the design institutes and the
construction companies were from CA providers (Fig. 1, Fig.
7-left). It was also different from the situation of Yushu E., in
that the construction companies had enough experience, and
the planning institute played an important role in the work of
integration different stakeholders’ values (Fig. 2, Fig. 7-middle).
When confronted with complicated projects of Lushan E., the
inc apac ity of loc al gov ernm ents app eare d. Hen ce the urb an
housing reconstruction of Lushan E. after two years*23) was slower
than Wenchuan and Yushu E.
model for post-disaster recovery and reconstruction: 2008 Wenchuan
earthquake as a case, Disaster prevention and management, Vol. 22(1).
pp. 75-93, 2013.
2) ⋤✛ ⴷቻ  ᡃᅜ⅐ྡྷᆅ᪉ᨻᗓᑐཱྀᨭ᥼ᶍᘧึ᥈௨ྛ┬ᕷ᥼ᘓựᕝᆅ
㟈⅐༊Ⅽ౛ ᙜ௦ୡ⏺୚♫఍୺൤ pp. 131-136, 2010 (1).
3) ี㕲  ㄽᑐཱྀᨭ᥼㛗ᩀᮘไⓗᘓ❧௨ựᕝᆅ㟈⅐ྡྷ㔜ᘓᑐཱྀᨭ᥼ᶍᘧ₇ኚ
Ⅽどゅ す༡Ẹ᪘኱ᏛᏛሗ ேᩥ♫⛉∧  pp. 98-101, 2010 (1).
4)㒯󰩴ຬ  ௕ᑐཱྀྜస฿༊ᇦྜస ྡྷ᥼ᘓ󰪍௦ᆅ᪉ྜసⓗᛂ↛㌿ኚ ⌮ㄽ
୚ᨵ㠉 pp. 144-146, 2011 (5).
5) ࿘ᘓ೧  ᑐཱྀᨭ᥼⋢ᶞ⅐༊ἲไ໬ⓗᛮ⪃  ᰘ㎹ᮌᘙⓎ◊✲ , pp. 44-46,
2011 (2).
6) ᐑධ⯆୍ ᅄᕝ኱㟈⅏ࡢ⅏ᐖീࡢᐇయ࡜᚟⯆ᨻ⟇ࡢ⌮ᛕ࡜⌧ᐇ  ❧࿨㤋
⤒῭Ꮫ , pp. 99-127, 2010.
7) ཝᡂ⏨  ୰ᅜ࡟࠾ࡅࡿᅜᐙ୺ᑟࡢࢥ࣮ࢹ࢕ࢿ࣮ࢩࣙࣥ࡜ 2008 ᖺᅄᕝ኱ᆅ
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8) ኱㇂㡰Ꮚ  ᅄᕝ኱ᆅ㟈࡟࠾ࡅࡿ୰ᅜ♫఍ࡢ᚟⯆ᑐ⟇ࡢ≉ᚩ࡜ㄢ㢟 ≉㞟
኱つᶍ⅏ᐖ࡜♫఍ಖ㞀 ᾏእ♫఍ಖ㞀◊✲ , Vol. 187, pp. 4-19, 2014.
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࡜ྲྀࡾ⤌ࡳ ⰱ᭩ᡣ 
10) ୰⳹ேẸඹ࿴ᅜ୰ኸேẸᨻᗓ ᅜົ㝔යன༳Ⓨựᕝᆅ㟈⅏ᚋ᜚ኞ㔜
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13) ᚎ⋪ᖹ 㒃󰩴ᮽ ựᕝ≉኱ᆅ㟈⅐ྡྷᑐཱྀ᥼ᘓ⣔⤫ᕤ⛬ⓗ⥲ྜ㞟ᡂᶍᘧ 
⣔⤫ᕤ⛬⌮ㄽ୚ᐇ㊶ pp. 1-13, 2008(10).
14) ୰⳹ேẸඹ࿴ᅜ୰ኸேẸᨻᗓ  Ⓨᒎᨵ㠉ጤす㒊㛤Ⓨྖ๪ྖ㛗㈝ᚿᴿㄯ
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15) ୰ᅜ⥥➉ ựᕝᆅ㟈୩࿘ᖺᅄᕝ⥥➉Ꮥᚫ㙠ኚ㌟⸽ᕞỈ⾤>@
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17)
୰ᅜẼ㇟ᒁ  ᅄᕝ┬ᒣὥᆅ㟈⅐ᐖ㜵἞ẻ㇟ಖ㞀ᕤ⛬ᘓタ⣖ᐇ
[2013/07/10],
http://www.cma.gov.cn/2011xwzx/2011xgzdt/201307/t20130710_219047.
html, accessed on 2015/10/02
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http://ya.newssc.org/system/20141104/001527240.html, accessed on
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 ಶ⅏ᚋ᜚ኞ㔜ᘓ㡯┠㊦㋑ᑂィཬᑂィㄪᰝ⤖ᯝ [2011/06/17], http://
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㎰ᮧ⤒῭ pp. 75, 2014 (8).
23)ᅄᕝ┬ᑂィᗇ ୍ሙ⁻ுⓗ㊦㋑ᑂィ๰᪂⤌ྜᣙᅄᕝⰱᒣᆅ㟈୩࿘ᖺ㸪
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of Wenchuan E., for example, the Framework Agreement between
Shanghai City and Dujiangyan City.
*12) A and B of "the Framework Agreement between A and B" stands for
each pair of the CA providers (3 cities) and receivers (3 towns) of intra-
part of Yushu E.
*13) "the CA Scheme of Lushan E." stands forࠓⰱᒣᙉⅯᆅ㟈⅏ᚋ᜚ኞ㔜ᘓ
┬ෆᑐཱྀ᥼ᘓᕤస᪉᱌ࠔ.
*14) A and B of "the Framework Agreement between A and B" stands for
each pair of the CA providers (6 cities) and receivers (6 counties) of
Lushan E.
*15) Besides Sichuan Province, counterpart assistance of Wenchuan E. also
included Guangdong Province counterpart assisted Gansu Province, and
Tianjin City counterpart assisted Shaanxi Province. The reason that
Sichuan Province was the only province analyzed in this study is that its
PDR was given priority among all disaster-affected areas.
*16) Although the selection standard was not described in the guidelines of
CA, rules could be seen that economical big provinces were prioritized to
counterpart assist the counties with the most serious disaster affected
situation. For example, Guangdong Province (its GDP ranked the À rst
in 2007) was selected to assist Wenchuan County, where the epicenter
located, and Shandong Province (its GDP ranked the second in 2007) was
selected to assist Beichuan County, which was the only county needed to
be reconstructed off-site, and so on13).
*17) They are China State Construction Engineering Corporation, China
Railway Group Limited, China Railway Construction Corporation and
Sinohydro Group Ltd.
*18) Liaoning was selected because it engaged into “East-West
Partnerships for Poverty Alleviation” program to Qinghai Province
since 1996. Beijing was selected because it engaged into the assistance
work to Yushu Municipality since 200814). Meantime, as the disaster
affected area could not implement reconstruction work independently,
especially in the infrastructure reconstruction where technical support is
necessary. Therefore, the four state-owned enterprises which specialized
in infrastructure construction were selected.
*19) Mianzhu City was counterpart assisted by Jiangsu Province. A
shopping street with Jiangsu Style was reconstructed in Xiaode Town15),
and housing with Jiangsu Style was reconstructed in Qingping Village16),
where all the buildings have a small river running in front of the main
entrance. However, as Mianzhu City is a rainstorm and flood-prone
city17), it is not reasonable to construct buildings too close to river.
*20) When rural housing reconstruction finished, the "self-construction
committee" was transformed into "self-management committee" to
manage daily issue in normal time18), which was a further step for
development of rural community.
*21) The data were based on the news published by related governments
and units. For instance, the data of Shanghai City in Wenchuan E.
was from "Audit Bureau of Shanghai (2011/05)"; the data of the four
enterprises in Yushu E. was from "State-owned Assets Supervision and
Administration Commission of the State Council (2011/11)" and "Power
China (part of Sinohydro Group Ltd.) (2012/03)"; the data of Deyang City
in Lushan E. was from "Deyang Daily (2015/07)". The access date was
until 2015/10/10.
*22) Cities and counties were regulated to present the funding usage
reports monthly and annually, and were follow-up audited by the audit
groups dispatched by Sichuan Province23).
*23) Fig. 8 is shown as above. Data of Wenchuan E. was provided by "
୰⳹ேẸඹ࿴ᅜ୰ኸேẸᨻᗓ (2010/05/12)" and " ᅜᐙⓎᒎ࿴ᨵ㠉ጤဨ
(2011/05/10)". Data of Yushu E. was provided by " ୰⳹ேẸඹ࿴ᅜ
ᅜົ㝔᪂⪺㎨බᐊ (2012/04/12)" and " ୰⳹ேẸඹ࿴ᅜᅜົ㝔᪂⪺㎨බ
(2012/12/03)". Data of Lushan E. was provided by " 㞞ᏳᕷேẸᨻᗓ
(2015/04/15". The access date was until 2015/10/10.
*24) Rural inhabitants essentially had the right to manage their land,
including farmland and homestead.
References
1) Xu J, Lu Y. A comparative study on the national counterpart aid
1300
1301
... Under a strong state government, reconstruction instructions are communicated top-down, from the state to the provincial, municipal, and county or town governments of the affected areas [4][5][6]. Under this mechanism, external governments from non-affected areas could be mandated to help, with resources nationwide being allocated quickly to support the reconstruction of the affected areas, which would be challenging to achieve if this was being done by the affected regional government alone [7,8]. However, many studies have also questioned the possible negative effects of the Chinese top-down reconstruction approach. ...
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for example, the Framework Agreement between Shanghai City and Dujiangyan City
  • E Of Wenchuan
of Wenchuan E., for example, the Framework Agreement between Shanghai City and Dujiangyan City.
the Framework Agreement between A and B" stands for each pair of the CA providers (3 cities) and receivers (3 towns) of intra
  • B Of
*12) A and B of "the Framework Agreement between A and B" stands for each pair of the CA providers (3 cities) and receivers (3 towns) of intrapart of Yushu E.
stands for *14) A and B of "the Framework Agreement between A and B" stands for each pair of the CA providers (6 cities) and receivers (6 counties) of Lushan E
  • E Ca Scheme Of Lushan
*13) "the CA Scheme of Lushan E." stands for *14) A and B of "the Framework Agreement between A and B" stands for each pair of the CA providers (6 cities) and receivers (6 counties) of Lushan E.