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Policy Brief
June 2014
South Africa’s response to the
Ukrainian crisis
Executive summary
By Elizabeth Sidiropoulos
South Africa did not join in the chorus of condemnation against Russia’s annexation of the
Crimea, instead adopting a position that in part mirrored language used by Russia to explain its
actions, but in other ways reflected key principles of South African foreign policy. Together with
its fellow BRICS members, South Africa opposed the imposition of sanctions and was critical of
suggestions that Russia might be excluded from the G-20 Summit in Australia later in the year.
Non-interference in the internal affairs of states and the inviolability of borders have been cen-
tral organising principles of African affairs since decolonisation. South Africa’s approach must
be understood in the context of a desire to see the balance of forces change to reflect the rise
of emerging powers. The West’s unilateral actions since the end of the cold war have not sat
well with the South African government. Civil society elements aligned to the ruling tripartite
alliance have condemned what they perceive as Western propaganda against Russia and the
West’s involvement in stirring unrest in Maidan Square, Kiev. Furthermore, from a realpolitik
perspective, South Africa accords its alliance with the BRICS states high priority. Yet, as a rela-
tively small country, it is in South Africa’s interests to encourage adherence to a set of global
rules that are respected by all.
African principles of international relations
Although a Western construct, sovereignty was warmly
embraced by newly independent states in Africa and Asia
after the Second World War. When the Organisation of
African Unity (OAU) was established in 1963 it adopted the
principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of
states and the inviolability of the borders that had been
drawn up by Europeans in 1884. These borders had been
drawn with scant regard for realities on the ground, but the
newly independent states thought that the alternative
might be too terrible and messy to contemplate. The OAU’s
successor, the African Union (AU), has maintained the
principle of the inviolability of borders.
Ironically, Europe’s borders have been far more fluid in the
last 100 years than those in Africa, with the most notable
recent examples being the break-up of Yugoslavia,
Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. The successors to
these states – some forged through war, others through
mutual agreement to separate – were recognised by the
international community. Ideally, in a world governed by
a set of international rules, wars should not be the pre-
ferred means for revising borders.
African countries contain multiple ethnic groups speaking
many languages. Many of the current fault lines – such as
in Mali, for example, where the Tuaregs in the north want
a homeland, Azawad – reflect colonial anomalies, and in
most instances the dismantling of existing states or their
partitioning in Africa is likely to open a Pandora’s box.
Better to uphold territorial integrity while pushing for
states that are well-governed, democratic and protect all
who live there, irrespective of race, ethnicity or creed.
South Africa on Crimea
Since 1994 South Africa has also been a strong proponent
of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign
states and, in line with the AU, has adhered to the principle
of the inviolability of borders. Further, it has opposed
regime change imposed on countries by external powers
and encouraged negotiation among warring parties to
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NOREF Policy Brief – June 2014
arrive at a settlement. The case of South Africa’s reaction
to Crimea thus stands in contrast to these two principles.
Many in the West no doubt expected that South Africa’s own
espoused principles of non-intervention in internal affairs,
preference for negotiated settlements over unilateral
actions, and respect for democratic institutions might have
placed it on the side of the West in condemning Russia’s
actions in Crimea.
The Department of International Relations and Cooperation
(DIRCO) issued a statement on Sunday March 2nd 2014
urging “the protagonists in the stand-off to settle the crisis
through dialogue”, consistent with its own foreign policy
that favours and promotes the peaceful resolution of
conflicts. With the exception of the recent deployment in
the Central African Republic, South Africa has deployed
troops only under a United Nations (UN) or regional
organisation mandate. Insisting that parties to conflict sit
together to negotiate a settlement has been its preferred
modus operandi. While the limits of this approach have
sometimes become apparent (the Democratic Republic of
Congo is still not at peace), South Africa seeks to avoid
situations where escalation makes the outcome much
worse – which was essentially the country’s view of the
consequences of NATO’s intervention in Libya.
South Africa also abstained on the UN General Assembly
resolution on the territorial integrity of the Ukraine on
March 27th 2014, after the referendum in Crimea. Russia’s
other BRICS partners did the same. Russia, of course,
voted against the resolution, which was passed with 100
votes in favour. The next day South Africa issued a state-
ment calling on “both the Russian Federation and Ukraine
to engage in dialogue and cooperation in the interest of the
stability of the broader region”. It went on to say
(emphasis added):
South Africa is of the view that the escalation of hostile
language, the imposition of sanctions and counter-
sanctions, the use of threat of force and violent
actions do not contribute to the peaceful resolution of
the situation and the economic stability of Ukraine and
the region.
South Africa encourages the various parties to
strengthen all diplomatic efforts to produce a sustain-
able and peaceful solution, including through appropri-
ate international fora. It is essential that a political path
be supported by a united, cohesive international effort
towards a negotiated political settlement reflective of the
will of the people aimed at establishing a democratic
pluralistic society, in which minorities are protected.
However, by that stage the situation on the ground had
changed dramatically: Crimea had been incorporated into
Russia and eastern Ukraine was in turmoil. A negotiated
political settlement was very far away.
Southern solidarity and Western hypocrisy
Nevertheless, there is also a different narrative at play.
South Africa regards its membership of the BRICS as a
significant diplomatic coup, considering it as grouping with
a Southern identity that brings together major emerging
powers from Eurasia, Africa and Latin America, despite the
fact that Russia is not a member of the global South. It
would be more correct to describe the BRICS as a counter-
poise to the West (largely represented by the U.S. and
Europe). In this context South Africa, like the other BRICS,
has preferred to disassociate itself from the West’s “neo-
imperialist” agenda – it has been highly critical of U.S.
unilateralism in the past, especially in Iraq. The country
was also opposed to the way in which NATO (and the Arab
League) interpreted UN Security Council Resolution 1973
on Libya as supporting “regime change”, arguing that the
fallout from this intervention is now plaguing Mali and the
Sahel region. While still a member of the UN Security
Council in 2011-12 and concerned to avoid a Libya-style
embroilment, South Africa opposed the stronger measures
the West wanted to take against Syria. After the overthrow
of Egyptian president Muhammad Mursi in July 2013, South
Africa and other African countries were critical of the
West’s equivocation on whether this constituted an uncon-
stitutional change of government, seeing it as Western
hypocrisy regarding democracy and constitutional govern-
ment.
South Africa’s commitment to constitutional democracy
and the manner of its transition in the early 1990s had
created an impression among most Western states that the
“Rainbow Nation” shared their values, world view and
approaches. However, over the years South Africa has
aimed to self-identify with Africa and the global South, thus
revealing underlying tensions. This has often meant that it
has steered away from publicly criticising fellow African
states and other developing countries. It has also been
opposed to sanctions, seeing them as counterproductive.
Its position on Ukraine should be seen in this light, ironic
though this might be.
The debate in South Africa
At the global level, South Africa has chafed against the
actions of the P-3 (the U.S., France and Britain). It has been
uncomfortable with U.S. and European Union (EU) political
conditionalities and the “democracy promotion” agenda in
Africa and elsewhere. Although the statements by DIRCO
on Ukraine have not been polemic, it is in the realm of civil
society that some of the perceptions referred to above
become more apparent.
The public debate on Ukraine has been mixed, although it
is important to emphasise that such debates about places
far away occur among a small section of the population.
Many of the mainstream media have tended to adopt
a harsh critique of Russia’s actions in Ukraine. However,
elements of civil society historically aligned with the
progressive and anti-apartheid movement in South Africa
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NOREF Policy Brief – June 2014
have traditionally opposed Western “imperialism”, both
political and economic. Thus, commentators from these
formations have taken the Russian line, using similar
terminology in describing what happened in Kiev’s Maidan
Square, Crimea and eastern Ukraine. This includes
characterising the interim government in Kiev as fascist
and as a junta. They have emphasised that the West’s
insidious support for the Maidan protesters was the first
breach of the non-intervention principle. Some among
these civil society movements have highlighted that the
support for democracy provided by the U.S. over the last
several years in fact constituted an attempt to remove
those opposed to Ukraine’s attempts to join the EU
(and possibly NATO). They have also been critical of the
Western media outlets’ reportage on the crisis and the
South African media’s reliance on these outlets, bemoaning
the fact that the latter ignore Russia Today, preferring
Western propaganda.
It is not the purpose of this brief to interrogate the specifics
of the stand-off between Ukraine and Russia. Supporters of
Russia will argue that the West’s indiscretions were such
that Russia’s response (and that of its supporters in
Ukraine) was justified; opponents will say that Russia’s
response was disproportionate and that it is up to
Ukrainians to determine their future orientation. What is
clear, however, is that the process by which Crimea was
annexed has set in motion a potential precedent that may
boomerang on multi-ethnic states like Russia. What would
Russia’s response be if Chechens decided to hold a
referendum in the manner in which the Crimean one was
conducted in an attempt to exercise their right to self-
determination?
Clearly, the South African government, in determining its
response, had to consider a number of issues. Although
relations between the new South Africa and the Russian
Federation were neither side’s priority after 1994, this
changed after South Africa joined the BRICS. South Africa’s
careful response was aimed at not upsetting its fellow
BRICS member. However, South Africa should have been
more forthright in condemning the role played by Russia
though its clear military involvement (albeit not officially
confirmed) and the unilateral changes to the borders of
a sovereign state in the manner in which it was done. South
Africa’s credibility as an advocate of certain values and
processes is eroded by adopting equivocal positions; after
all, the country’s soft power lies in building legitimate and
accountable processes for resolving conflicts.
Where are we headed?
The implications of the Ukrainian crisis will be far-reach-
ing. The annexation of Crimea has overturned the post-cold
war order in Europe in a way that Russia’s occupation
(but not annexation) of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008
did not – although that was the first shot across the bows
of the old order. For Europe and the U.S., the message
should be clear: Russia will not countenance any further
“incursions” into states that have formed part of its “near
abroad” and which it sees as providing a buffer against
NATO. Russia is much more willing to play for high stakes
in its near abroad than Europe or the U.S. If Russia’s
approach is coupled with China’s much more strident
actions in the seas around it, then the much-touted
multipolar world may well be more unstable as the major
powers vie for regional dominance and enhanced national
security. The ability of the UN Security Council to play
a crucial role in conflict resolution may be limited further
to those wars where great powers have no direct interest
– which in some ways would be reminiscent of the cold war
period. For a small country like South Africa, which empha-
sises the importance of creating a rules-based global
order, the multipolar period is likely to be a more problem-
atic one to navigate, making it difficult for the country to
contribute towards crafting global frameworks that are
applicable to all and protect smaller states from the strong.
Elizabeth Sidiropoulos is the chief executive of the South African
Institute of International Affairs.
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