Chapter

Liberalization: The First Transformation

Authors:
To read the full-text of this research, you can request a copy directly from the author.

Abstract

The Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century and the Napoleonic Wars were catalysts for an unprecedented upheaval in how and why international trade was conducted and for the diplomacy that would make its expansion possible. This first significant transformation in trade diplomacy meant that, for the first time, diplomats would negotiate about trade for its own sake, rather than using trade as an instrument of war. The process by which trade diplomacy increasingly became distinct from other diplomatic issues and became driven by its own policy imperatives could only get underway in earnest once demand for imports and incentives to export goods and services (and for the funds to pay for them) reached certain threshold levels. The late eighteenth and early nineteenth century economic arguments of Adam Smith and David Ricardo for liberalization of international trade and the political arguments of Alexander Hamilton and Friedrich List in favour of protection of the industrial sectors of developing countries all presuppose the necessity of state actors to take trade policy decisions, which itself was a radically new assumption. Scholars and private businesses began to cast governments of states as critical protagonists in much-needed trade-specific diplomacy for the first time: to negotiate trade and tariff treaties, to implement the treaties fairly by collecting duty revenue, to resolve disputes over international trade as and when they arose.

No full-text available

Request Full-text Paper PDF

To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the author.

ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any citations for this publication.
Article
Full-text available
Although the theory of hegemonic stability has attracted an impressive array of adherents, current formulations leave many conceptual issues unresolved. Existing formulations also fail to draw from the theory any implications concerning the process by which a hegemonic state creates and maintains a regime. As an example, Great Britain is generally agreed to have been hegemonic in the nineteenth century, but Britain's behavior was generally inconsistent with that implied by a theory of hegemonic stability. I advance an alternative set of explanations for changes in international tariff levels based on the notion of a “political business cycle.”
Book
The Rise of Free Trade Imperialism seeks to uncover some of the intellectual origins of the imperialism of the classic period, the sources from which later theories of imperialism were constructed, and the character of the ideology which underlay the dismantling of the old colonial system and the construction of the Victorian Pax Britannica. The author discusses the development and diffusion of a number of the central arguments of the 'science' of political economy, from the standpoint of a historian rather than an economist, which were crucial not only to the construction of theories of capitalist imperialism, but also served as a spur both to efforts at colonization, and to establishing a British Workshop of the World.
Article
The textbook theory of tariffs, and their converse, the movement to freer trade, has more elements than we need for the nineteenth century, but also lacks some. In the usual comparative statics, a tariff may be said to have ten effects: on price, trade, production (the protective effect), consumption, revenue, terms of trade, internal income distribution, monopoly, employment and the balance of payments.
Article
Much has been written about the history of the Cobden-Chevalier treaty, partly because of the eminence of the persons involved in its negotiations and partly because of its significance in Anglo-French relations. By far the most detailed and up-to-date account is that of A. L. Dunham. Besides this valuable contribution to the history of the treaty, accounts of it can be found in nearly all the biographies and personal reminiscences of British statesmen of that period. In addition a large number of articles and monographs have been devoted to it on both sides of the Channel. All these accounts usually contain three main points concerning the origin of the treaty. The first of these is that by the close of 1859 the state of Britain's finances offered yet another opportunity for a major reform of the tariff, and that no one was more conscious of this opportunity than Gladstone, then the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He was particularly concerned about annuities worth £2 million, due to mature the following year, and was determined that this large sum of money should not‘ pass into the great gulf of expenditure there to be swallowed up ’. He informed Richard Cobden that if under the favourable financial circumstances nothing was done for ‘trade and die masses, it would be a great discredit and a great calamity ’.2 Secondly, that while Gladstone was resolved that the large sum at his disposal should not be wasted, the enthusiasm of persons who had no official position, particularly Cobden and Michel Chevalier, directed his attention to the possibility of using that amount to further Anglo-French commercial relations.
Article
In an earlier survey of the history of British imperialism we suggested that closer attention should be given to the connexions between the slow and uncertain development of British industry and the pace and direction of overseas expansion.1 We also argued that insufficient regard had been paid to the influence of non-industrial forms of capitalism on both overseas development and imperial policy. In the course of that survey, the former problem was dealt with in some detail, whereas the latter was treated briefly and tentatively. The purpose of the present article is to correct this deficiency and to advance a new perspective on British imperialism for the period between the Glorious Revolution and the Second World War.
Article
Liberal international trade regimes do not emerge from the policies of one state, even a hegemonic one. Trade liberalization among major trading states is, rather, the product of tariff bargains. Thus, hegemons need followers and must make concessions to obtain agreements. The liberal trade regimes that emerged in both the 19th and the 20th centuries were founded on asymmetric bargains that permitted discrimination, especially against the hegemon. The agreements that lowered tariff barriers led to freer trade not free trade; resulted in subsystemic rather than global orders; and legitimated mercantilistic and protectionist practices of exclusion and discrimination, and thus did not provide a collective good. Moreover, these trade agreements (and trade disputes as well) had inherently international political underpinnings and did not reflect economic interests alone. Trade liberalization also required a certain internal strength on the part of the government. Furthermore, only a complete political rupturing of relations, such as occurs in wartime, can destroy such a regime. A hegemon's decline cannot do so alone. These arguments are developed in a historical reassessment of the evolution of the international trading order since 1820. Eras commonly seen as liberal, such as the 1860s, are shown to have included a good deal of protection, and eras seen as protectionist, such as the 1880s, are shown to have been much more liberal than is usually believed.
Article
One challenge facing hegemonic stability theory is to specify the processes by which hegemonic countries construct and maintain a liberal international economic order. Earlier studies have focused on direct coercion or ideological manipulations by the hegemon as a principal technique for manipulating the trade policies of other countries. This article explores a different face of hegemony. Specifically, we contend that by altering relative prices through the exercise of their international market power, hegemonic leaders influence the trade policy preferences of their foreign trading partners. We examine this argument in the case of the American Walker Tariff of 1846. American tariff liberalization was intimately related to Britain's repeal of its Corn Laws. In the antebellum United States, Northern protectionist and Southern free trade proclivities were fixed; Western grain growers held the balance of power. By allowing access to its lucrative grain market, Britain altered the economic and political incentives of Western agriculturalists and facilitated the emergence of the free trade coalition essential to the passage of the Walker Tariff.
Article
Nish dealt with the diplomacy of Britain and Japan in the five months before the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, arguing that it was not a 'natural alliance' but that there were pockets of opposition to it which had to be overcome. In the case of Japan, this was associated with the activities of Marquis Ito in Europe on which much new material was presented. In the case of Britain, the naval and military arguments in favour of closer relations with Japan eventually overcame those against any change in policy.Steeds argued that all three of the alliance treaties could be numbered among the successful alliances of history. The 1905 treaty was about deterring any kind of Russian revenge in East Asia (for Japan) and Central Asia (for British India) and was successful; but because of a diplomatic revolution which took place after 1907 it became increasingly irrelevant.Hotta-Lister started with an account of the Japan-British Exhibition of 1910 which was a means of educating Britons about their ally. The 1911 alliance was the weakest of the three treaties. From Britain's standpoint a major purpose was to ensure the security of her dominions in the Pacific, possibly against Japan, while from the Japanese standpoint it was to protect her against her fear of isolation in the Pacific vis-�-vis the United States.
Great Britain and China 1833-1860
  • W C Costin
  • WC Costin
The Age of Reform 1815-1870
  • Sir Llewellyn Woodward
  • L Woodward
The Trade Policy of Great Britain and her Colonies since 1860
  • Carl Fuchs
  • Johannes
  • CJ Fuchs
The Age of Empire, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson
  • Eric J Hobsbawm
  • EJ Hobsbawm
The Theoretical Evolution of International Political Economy; A Reader
  • Alexander Hamilton
  • A Hamilton
The Zollverein, London: Frank Cass amp
  • W O Henderson
  • WO Henderson
Russian Economic Policy Under Nicholas I
  • W M Pintner
  • WM Pintner
The Anglo-French Treaty of Commerce of 1860 and the Progress of the Industrial Revolution in France
  • A L Dunham
  • AL Dunham
London: Methuen amp; Co., Ltd
  • François Crouzet
  • Anthony The Victorian Economy
  • Tr Forster
  • F Crouzet
Tariff Reform in France 1860-1900
  • Michael Stephen Smith
  • MS Smith
Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy
  • J A S Grenville
  • JAS Grenville
Modern Tariff History Germany-United States-France
  • W L Percy
  • Ashley
  • PWL Ashley
The Alliance of Iron and Wheat in the French Third Republic
  • Herman Lebovics
  • H Lebovics
The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism 1860-1914
  • Paul Kennedy
  • P Kennedy
The Tariff, Taxation, Class and Economy: Protectionism in Germany 1870-1914
  • John Hobson
  • J Hobson