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Intersexuality and Trans-Identities within
the Diversity Management Discourse
Thomas K€
ollen
1 Introduction
1
By using the term LGBTI many organizations purport to explicitly consider inter-
sexuality and trans-identities as part of their diversity management activities.
LGBTI, then, is often defined as the name of the target group for organizational
initiatives that focus on the dimensions of “sexual orientation/identity” and “gender
identity”: lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex persons. However, a
closer examination of the concrete actions that are implemented on this issue by
most organizations reveals that the target group in most cases is reduced to lesbian,
gay, and (partially) bisexual employees. Only very rarely do organizations imple-
ment actions that explicitly address transgender employees, and intersexuality
remains totally excluded from consideration when it comes to concrete organiza-
tional practices and initiatives. This shows that the usage of the term LGBTI in the
context of organizational diversity management practices is predominantly moti-
vated by being somehow “politically correct” and trying, at least on the level of
semantics and language, to be all-inclusive. Because of this, how far the single
elements of this term share any commonalities, and how this would potentially
legitimize grouping them together (or not), has rarely, if ever been called into
question.
In this context, this chapter provides a closer examination of those categories
included in the term LGBTI that are infrequently, if at all, considered in the
T. K€
ollen (*)
Institute for Gender and Diversity in Organizations, Department of Management, Vienna
University of Economics and Business (WU), Vienna, Austria
e-mail: thomas.koellen@wu.ac.at
1
A shorter German version of this chapter, entitled “Intersexualita
¨t und Transidentita
¨t im Diver-
sity Management”, appears in: Genkova, P, Ringeisen T. (Eds.). 2016. Handbuch Diversity
Kompetenz: Gegenstandsbereiche. Heidelberg: Springer.
©Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016
T. Ko
¨llen (ed.), Sexual Orientation and Transgender Issues in Organizations,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-29623-4_1
1
discourse on diversity and diversity management: Intersexuality and transgender-
ism. The different theoretical approaches to both phenomena will be outlined, along
with a discussion of what both phenomena have in common with each other, and
where they fundamentally differ from each other. As a result it will be shown that
intersexuality and transgenderism are gender/biological sex categories that are,
indeed, by definition related to different sexual orientations, as they are defined
by the gender/sex of the desired and the desiring subjects. However, there are
substantial ways in which both phenomena do not have anything in common with
different sexual orientations, and actually, within the discourse of diversity and
diversity management, they should be integrated into a more holistic concept of the
category of gender. This, then, creates an opportunity to redefine and to rethink the
present approach to “gender” as one dimension of diversity, and to question
whether it is justifiable at all to separately treat gender and sexual orientation as
two distinct categories. It will be argued, rather, that gender/biological sex, gender
identity, and sexual orientation should be seen as one related dimension or category.
This carries with it several implications for developing and modifying adequate
diversity management approaches and initiatives that include transgenderism and
intersexuality.
2 Sexuality, Sex, and Gender
Distinguishing between sex and gender has become a widespread standard in social
sciences. It differentiates sex, as the biological bodily aspect, from gender, the
socially constructed, cultural aspect (Oakley 1972; Gatens 1983) of being a man or
a woman, or of being masculine and feminine respectively. In English, these two
terms cover perforce the whole spectrum of possibility in naming the sex and/or
gender of an individual; in everyday speech, as well as in many scientific disci-
plines, “sex” and “gender” are often used interchangeably when referring to the
categories of being a man or a woman, e.g. when labeling this category in a
passport, or on a form listing personal information. Some other languages, espe-
cially Romance languages, have borrowed the concept of gender by using an
equivalent for the Latin word “genus” in their language (such as “genere” in Italian
or “genre” in French), or by adding the word “social” in the given language, to the
word for “sex”. However, in many languages, the English term “gender” is today
frequently used in its “original” English form, instead of being translated (e.g. in
German, Hungarian, and Polish). The word is frequently used very inconsistently,
especially in language areas that have introduced the English word “gender” as a
technical term. In many cases this contributes significantly to confusion over
precisely what, in concrete terms, is being talked about; moreover in English-
speaking areas themselves, the inconsistent use of “sex” and “gender” sometimes
causes confusion.
Up until the 1970s, women’s studies, and sex- or gender-studies were mainly
shaped by trying to explain social aspects of the sexes biologically. This subsequent
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conceptual distinction between gender and sex, however, provided an opportunity
to question the assumed predestinating and determinative impact that biological sex
has on sex roles and sex-specific behavior. Henceforth, the social and cultural
aspects of male and female bodies could be interpreted as phenomena that are
produced on a daily basis, without solely having to refer to biological explanatory
models. Gender-research could now focus on precisely these processes of socially
producing men and women, or femininity and masculinity. As it is conceivable that
these processes could work on a basis other than the “traditional” gender-related
stereotypic images, the emergence of the concept of gender has broadened the
scope of their potential individual self-conceptualizations for both men and women.
Meanwhile, the term “gender” is often used in a political way, for example in the
context of “gender mainstreaming” approaches. However, the political usage of the
term gender often reveals its inconsistent usage. These approaches frequently
assume different needs of men and women as a given, and they typically do not
focus on the social production and construction of these need-differences, but on
the goal of achieving equal opportunities and an equal allocation of resource
between the biological sexes.
For a long period the distinction between gender and sex adhered to a binary
model of only two sexes, namely men and women. Though the concept or construct
of “gender” sometimes has a broader approach in terms of potential manifestations
of different genders, it often embodies the tendency to assume only two types of
genders that oppose each other in a bipolar way: masculinity and femininity. To a
certain degree trans-identities might, conceivably, be able to be aligned with this
world order, but for the phenomenon of intersexuality, at least, this is much more
problematic.
In very basic terms, trans-identities, or transgenderism and transsexuality, rep-
resent an incongruence between one’s biological sex, and one’s gender identity.
Trans-persons, then, can aim at resolving this incongruence to different degrees, in
different ways, in order to adjust their body and their appearance to their gender
identity. For trans-persons, both their biological sex and their gender identity may,
in many cases, fit into a model of only two sexes and two genders. Thus, transgen-
der individuals often have a clearly male or female gender identity. However, it
remains in question as to what extent this gender identity can be equated with the
concept of a social “gender”. The latter was created primarily to make the processes
of social construction, and their inherent interchangeability and mutability com-
prehensible; biological sexes are thereby frequently forced into tight corsets of
characteristics, and to these biological sexes are ascribed certain gendered scripts,
and related expectations about the behavior of each sex (Hanappi-Egger 2015).
However, this gender perspective focuses on the level of societal ascriptions,
attributions, and expectations. For trans-persons, on the other hand, their gender
identity represents the level of an individual’s acquisition of gender identity. Thus,
it is not about ascribing a bundle of preconceived role expectations to an individual,
it is much more about breaking with these stereotypes, and acquiring another
identity. It is not about the constrictions of society, and its methods of confining
the individual, it is much more about that individual him-, her-, or *self, and the
Intersexuality and Trans-Identities within the Diversity Management Discourse 3
individual’s way of expressing a societally non-conforming gender identity. Thus
the gender focus moves from the level of being a social ascription, to the level of
being an individual sensation and expression. Indeed, one could hold the opinion
that that individual can only acquire and express what “society” made available as
being acquirable. However, many concrete gender identity-concepts of trans-
persons do not reflect this (see e.g. Engel 2002). The estimations about the number
of trans-persons within society differ wildly, between 0.04 % and 5 % of the
population, depending on how the term “trans” is applied, and what trans-identities
are subsumed under it (Olyslager and Conway 2007).
Intersex or intersexuality questions the model of having only two sexes and two
genders to a far greater degree than transgenderism does. Biologically and medi-
cally, intersex is often described as a sexual ambiguity. However, this “ambiguity”
results solely from the fact that in biological and medical terms only two sexes are
provided for, unambiguously classifying the sex of an individual. Intersex-persons
are classified as persons who possess sexual characteristics from both sexes. The
prefix “inter” describes exactly the intermediate position between the “unambigu-
ous” sexes, namely men and women. However, a system is eminently conceivable
in which intersex persons can be taken as that which they are, without pressing them
into a binary or dichotomizing sex system by attaching a (mostly negatively
connoted) intermediate position to them. This would reflect much more accurately
the self-image of many intersex people, and it would much more adequately serve
the biological and medical spectrum of phenomena that are subsumed under the
category of “intersex”. Just as with trans-persons, the estimations about the number
of intersex-persons within society differ widely. The estimates range from
0.0002 % to 1.7 % of the population, depending on which medical diagnoses are
subsumed under the term “intersex”, and which scientific sources are cited (Sax
2002).
In the English language it is nowadays very common to use the words “intersex”
and “intersexuality” synonymously. However, the use of the latter is responsible for
a certain confusion, in English, as well as in other languages. The second part of the
word “-sexuality” is due to an inexpert transfer of the Latin term “sexus” into
German, that was first applied by Goldschmidt in the formulation of the term
“Intersexualita
¨t”. In his English publications he translated this term as “intersexu-
ality” (Goldschmidt 1917,1931). Thus, intersexuality is not related to the way the
terms “Sexualit€
at” in German and “sexuality” in English are used in everyday
speech in their respective languages, as intersexuality does not include the aspect
of “sexual desire” at all. The term “sex”, as the English equivalent of the Latin
“sexus”, covers, more or less, the concept of the Latin term (which allows the
distinction between sex and gender linguistically). Therefore, the English term
“intersex” refers more precisely to a medical biological level, but the term “inter-
sexuality” intuitively creates false associations, that are related more to the level of
sexual desire. These ambiguous (and partly false) connotations that are related to
the term “intersexuality” also exist in other languages. Sharing the same prove-
nance in translation from Latin to German to English (Benjamin 1966), the same
confusion can occur when using the term “transsexuality” (instead of
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“transgender”, “trans*”, etc.). However, expressions such as “LGBTI” falsely
appear to make sense in this context, as all parts of the initialism seem to represent
different sexualities or sexual orientations.
In the next two sections the phenomena of trans-identities and intersexuality will
be looked at more closely, and from different perspectives. From this will be
derived those aspects that are relevant for workplace settings, and that serve as
starting points for diversity management initiatives that aim to create a supportive
work environment, and an appreciative and inclusive climate for transgender and
intersex employees.
3 Intersexuality
Until the 1950s the term “intersex” was not in widespread use in the English-
speaking world, and intersex-persons were frequently designated “hermaphrodite”,
a term which continued to be used as synonymous with “intersex” even after that
word had gained more currency. In present-day English, the term “hermaphrodite”
is now used exclusively for plants and animals in the fields of botany and zoology,
but in other languages, such as in Danish or German, it is partially still in usage as a
synonym for “intersex”. The term derives from Hermaphroditos, the son of Aph-
rodite and Hermes in Greek mythology, who fused with the nymph Salamakis, and
from then on possessed traits of both male and female sexes (Zajko 2009). Another
term that is related to intersexuality is “androgyny”. Androgyny is composed of the
ancient Greek word for man (“andros”) and woman (“gyne”) and is used for
persons that express both male and female characteristics. However, there is no
clear definition about the commonalities and differences of the concepts of intersex
and androgyny, and different intersex people use androgyny in their self-images
and self-concepts in different ways and intensities; many, too, do not use the
concept at all (Rosselli 2015).
In his book Symposium, for example, Plato has Aristophanes tell the story of the
three original types of people, who were spherical, each individual having two
bodies that were attached back-to-back. There were those that had two male bodies
fused together, those that had two female bodies fused together and, finally, those
that had one male, and one female body fused together. These last beings were
androgynous. Because of some infraction against divine will, so the story goes, the
gods split each of these dual-beings into two halves, and, from then on, each half
formed a sexual desire that compelled it to search for its former second half. Not
only did Plato, as an extrapolation of this story, expressly indicate that homosex-
uality was “normal”, he used, for the first time, the term “third sex” for the
androgynous individuals, an expression that also nowadays is frequently used in
the context of intersexuality (Groneberg 2008; Herdt 2003).
In 1917, the German geneticist Richard Goldschmidt came up with the term
“intersexuality” for the first time in one of his publications in English language
(Goldschmidt 1917). In the same period he also used the term “Intersexualit€
at”in
Intersexuality and Trans-Identities within the Diversity Management Discourse 5
his publications in the German language (Goldschmidt 1931). His publications are
seen as the reason that this expression became widely accepted, both in the English-
and German-speaking worlds, especially in medical discourse (Stern 2010;
Morland 2014). Goldschmidt combined the Latin word “inter” (“in between”)
and “sexus” (“sex”), which, as already explained, is less ambiguous in the English
language than it is in other languages, such as German. In public discourse, and also
on the level of individuals’self-declarations, “hermaphrodite” and other equivalent
expressions are still sometimes used, especially in other languages than English
(Zehnder 2010). In order to take account of the vast number of different individual
self-concepts and related sex- and gender-identities, “inter*” has become a more
inclusive, and more frequently used term (Remus 2015). However, by using the
prefix “inter”, the binary model of only having two sexes is still not called into
question. In international medical discourse, the term “intersexuality” is increas-
ingly being replaced by the pathologizing term “disorders of sex development”
(DSD) (de Silva 2008), or in a less pathologizing way, the word “disorder” is
replaced by “differences” or “divergences” (Kl€
oppel 2010, p. 21; Diamond and Beh
2008; Reis 2007).
3.1 Social Constructivist Perspective
The scientific discourse on intersexuality is primarily shaped by medical perspec-
tives (Kl€
oppel 2010). However, there are perspectives in the sphere of social
sciences that consider biological sex to be mutable, rather than stable, and less
binary than it is frequently taken to be. Sex can be seen as a product of a Euro-
American discourse (Yanagisako and Collier 1987), within which sexual charac-
teristics are interpreted as visible signs that index humans as being either male or
female as the only possible sexes (Errington 1990). Closely related to this binary
division of sexes is the cultural interpretation of bodies and their sexual character-
istics on the basis of their functional meaning for the reproductive process (Moore
1994). Although her work has been largely overlooked for some considerable time
(Gildemeister 2005; Gildemeister and Wetterer 1992), as early as 1984 Hagemann-
White (1984) considered “being-a-man” or “being-a-woman” not as a biological
matters of fact, but rather as “symbols in a social system of meaning” (Hagemann-
White 1984, p. 79) that through individuals’interactions are permanently created
anew. At the beginning of the 1990s, the works of Judith Butler contributed to a
re-evaluation of the strict distinction between sex and gender, since the biological
sexed body can also be seen as a discursively constructed cultural product (Butler
1990,1993). The emergence of this perspective—often labelled as a postmodern
(or queer) approach—was paralleled by a process of reducing and constraining
bodies and sexes as phenomena that are solely constituted linguistically, as dis-
courses can only proceed via language as vehicle.
Feminism had initially converted the established ideology that “biology is
destiny” into “biological differences are shaped culturally”; postmodernism further
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changed this ideology to (Behrend 1994, p. 176) “culture is destiny; everything is
culture, including biology” (Landweer and Rumpf 1993, p. 4, in Behrend 1994).
Thus, biological determinism made way for a social or cultural determinism. In
Western societies this sex-shaping discourse springs from the assumption of only
two sexes. In order to make “sense” in cultural or social terms, a sexed body has
either to represent a man or a woman. Thus, Western discourse normalizes the
sexual possibilities of being (Wetterer 2004). For intersexual persons (as well as for
their parents and physicians) this creates a cultural pressure to disambiguate their
sex into one direction. This approach to sex as a product of cultural forming, that
gets its content (or essence) only by permanently discursively performing it,
expands individuals’scope of action, and makes other performances or “stagings”
of one’s sex thinkable. Butler introduced the term “performativity” in this context.
This perspective liberates intersexual persons from their pathological status, as
every sex is produced and constructed socially anyhow. It also follows, therefore,
that its essence and meaning are changeable and modifiable, and there is no reason
to declare certain constellations of sexual characteristics as deficient or deviating
from any standard, as there cannot, perforce, be any legitimate standard from which
something can deviate. For intersexual persons, taking this perspective can be a
relief, psychologically speaking.
However, as mentioned above, the medical perspective on intersexuality is still
the dominant one in Western societies. It is therefore important to comprehend this
perspective as well.
3.2 Biological-Medical Perspective
From a biological or medical perspective on intersexuality, there are three
sex-characteristics that are indicative for different types of intersexuality: chromo-
somes, gonads and genitals. For most people all three of these indicators are
corresponding and indicate the direction of being either male or female (Calvi
2012, p. 54):
1. The genetic/chromosomal sex is determined at the time at which the sperm cell
fertilizes the egg cell and mostly leads to the development of a male (46, XY) or
female chromosome complement (46, XX); these chromosomal complements
then indicate an individual’s male or female sex development, respectively.
2. The gonadal sex is determined by the gonadal tissues present. Individuals with a
male chromosome complement mostly have testes that produce testosterone as
the principal male sex hormone, and individuals with a female chromosome
complement usually develop ovaries that produce estrogens and progesterone as
the principal female sex hormones.
3. The phenotypic sex is indicated by individuals’reproductive organs/genitals,
thus by having a vagina, labia, and clitoris in the case of a female, or by
possessing a penis and scrotum in the case of a male (see Calvi 2012, p. 54).
Intersexuality and Trans-Identities within the Diversity Management Discourse 7
Intersexuals can possess different constellations of these three types of
sex-characteristics that do not have to point in the same sexual direction. They
may also have differing manifestations of each of these sex-characteristics. There
are different medical approaches to categorize these controversially-labeled “dis-
orders of sex development” (DSD). According to the Chicago Consensus Statement
DSD “is proposed, as defined by congenital conditions in which development of
chromosomal, gonadal, or anatomical sex is atypical” (Hughes et al. 2006b: 149).
There is a proposed distinction to be made between 1) sex chromosome DSD, 2) 46,
XY DSD, and 3) 46,XX DSD (Hughes et al. 2006b). Table 1gives an overview
about how DSDs can be classified.
The first group also includes persons with 45,X0 or 47,XXX karyotypes, who
often do not show any bodily differences. There are also individuals with different
chromosomes at different somatic cells, who then possess some kind of chromo-
somal mosaic. The second group comprises persons whose gonads are not fully
developed or who have male and female (sometimes not fully developed) gonads
and/or genitals (Reis 2007; Meyer-Bahlburg 1994). Until very recently it was the
established medical practice for a newborn child with a DSD diagnosis to be
Table 1 Classification of DSDs according to the Chicago Consensus Statement (Hughes
et al. 2006a,p.2)
Sex chromosome DSD 46,XY DSD 46,XX DSD
(A) 45,X (Turner
syndrome and variants)
(A) Disorders of gonadal (testicular)
development
(A) Disorders of gonadal
(ovarian) development
1. Complete gonadal dysgenesis
(Swyer syndrome)
1. Ovotesticular DSD
(B) 47,XXY (Klinefelter
syndrome and variants)
2. Partial gonadal dysgenesis 2. Testicular DSD
(e.g. SRY+, dup SOX9)
3. Gonadal regression 3. Gonadal dysgenesis
(C) 45,X/46,XY (mixed
gonadal dysgenesis,
ovotesticular DSD)
4. Ovotesticular DSD (B) Androgen excess
(B) Disorders in androgen synthesis
or action
1. Fetal (e.g.,
21-hydroxylase deficiency,
11-hydroxylase
deficiency)
(D) 46,XX/46,XY
(chimeric, ovotesticular
DSD)
1. Androgen biosynthesis defect (e.g.,
17- hydroxysteroid dehydrogenase
deficiency, 5 alpha reductase
deficiency, StAR mutations)
2. Fetoplacental (aroma-
tase deficiency, POR)
2. Defect in androgen action (e.g.,
CAIS, PAIS)
3. Maternal (luteoma,
exogenous, etc.)
3. LH receptor defects (e.g., Leydig
cell hypoplasia, aplasia)
(C) Other
4. Disorders of AMH and AMH
receptor (persistent Mu
¨llerian duct
syndrome)
(e.g., cloacal extrophy,
vaginal atresia, MURCS,
other syndromes)
(C) Other
(e.g., severe hypospadias, cloacal
extrophy)
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“disambiguated” into one sexed direction, via an operation and, often, subsequent
hormone therapy (Richter-Appelt 2004). In order to be socially and culturally
viable, it was assumed that humans had to be either men or women. The doctor’s
job was to maintain an illusion of unambiguousness as far as was possible through
medicinal, operative, and psychological treatment. With the emergence of the
voices of intersex-associations decrying this coercive treatment, medical practice
has, now, largely changed, though the former practices of “medical disambigua-
tion” have not fully disappeared. The insight that it is quite possible to live a life as
an intersex person, has gained in both prominence and importance over the past few
years, and thus, more and more diagnoses of DSD do not coercively lead to a sexed
“disambiguation”; the one major exception is where “medical disambiguation” is
necessary to save a newborn’s life, but this is only very rarely the case. In not
performing this sexed “disambiguation” on newborn babies, the individual is given
the opportunity to decide by him- or her- or *-self what way of life he/she/* wants to
live in terms of his/her/* sex-identity (Voß 2012).
As outlined in Table 1there are many types of intersexuality with different
medical designations. Without going more into detail here, it can be seen that there
is a broad variety of sexed possibilities of being that question the dichotomous
model of only two sexes as the only valid organizational system of ordering. The
question then arises as to how organizations or companies can deal with this.
3.3 Intersexuality and Diversity Management
The social constructivist perspective on sex would help to destigmatize intersex
persons and to take away the pressure on them to conceal their intersexuality, or to
assign themselves to one sex. However, very rarely does diversity management
practice take this perspective. Most diversity approaches assume two sexes as a
given, and diversity management then equals either the direct, and one-sided,
support and promotion of women; or the attempt to create framework conditions
that offer the same opportunities to both men and women. The starting points of
such approaches are frequently either the recognition of the different (stereotypic)
needs of men and women, or the organizational compensation of societally existing
disadvantages for men and women, e.g. by implementing quotas and women-only
networks or mentoring programs. From the perspective of assuming men and
women to be nothing more than culturally- and socially-shaped sexed bodies both
of these starting points would find little favor, since from this perspective one would
not wish to be the means of perpetuation of the maintenance and performative
construction of the dichotomous sex paradigm, any more than one would wish to be
an active agent or conduit for its performative staging. In this context, it is
misleading to label this dimension of diversity as “gender” and to allege that it is
only about the social and cultural aspect of gender/sex and therefore also about the
overcoming or dispersal of the stereotypic social ascriptions to the different sexes.
The decomposition of certain stereotypic ascriptions to men or women (which lead
Intersexuality and Trans-Identities within the Diversity Management Discourse 9
to an unequal allocation of opportunities and resources) might be an intermediate
goal or a valued side effect of some diversity management initiatives. However,
ultimately this all promotes the inclusion, equal treatment, or selective empower-
ment of biological sexes. In no way does it dissolve sex-categories, since such
dissolution would then remove the starting point for balancing the framework
conditions for men and women. To include intersexuality within the so-called
diversity dimension of “gender”, it would seem, would carry with it the danger
that, in terms of the respective sex (out of two sexes) that is contextually under-
privileged, the point of origin for any political claim could get lost, since that point
of origin would be, perforce, a seemingly unambiguous biological sex.
It seems that intersex persons cannot really expect a great deal of support or
positive assistance from the current diversity management approach to the dimen-
sion of “sex/gender”. In fact, quite the contrary seems to be true. Although
intersexuality is clearly a phenomenon that represents a manifestation of the
category “sex/gender”, it is (on those occasions when it is mentioned at all), always
grouped together with (or “disposed of” to) the diversity dimension of “sexual
orientation”. This widespread practice occurs despite the fact that intersexuality
really has little to do with diverse sexualities or sexual orientations, except in so far
as all humans (can) have a sexuality or sexual orientation. However, this would
connect all the other dimensions of diversity with “sexual orientation” in the same
way, as every human also has, for example, an age or a skin color. Linguistically
this grouping together of LGBTI is legitimized by the false assumption that—in the
case of “T” being interpreted as transsexuality (instead of transgender or trans-
identity)—all of these letters represent a broad spectrum of sexualities (homo-, bi-,
trans-, and inter-sexuality) which can then be addressed and served conjointly by
“adequate” diversity management practices. As already outlined, this misunder-
standing is largely due to a questionable linguistic application of the Latin word
“sexus” to an English-language term (via German). Nowadays, the meaning of the
term “sexuality” is exclusively concerned with sexual desire, and erotic interest and
practices. Therefore, by using this word in relation with “trans-” and “inter-”, the
misunderstanding outlined here is already linguistically predetermined.
4 Trans-Identities
By using the different terms “trans-identity”, “transgender”, and “transsexuality”,
attempts are often made to emphasize different trans-facets. However, in everyday
language, as well as on the level of trans-persons’self-designation, these terms are
sometimes used synonymously, and conversely sometimes assigned individually
different meanings. In order to respect the plurality of trans-identities, and to avoid
narrowing down the ways of interpreting and describing trans-identities available to
individuals linguistically, a frequently used term employed to cover the whole
spectrum of trans-identities without having to name them is “trans*”. All of these
terms have in common that they describe individuals who (in different ways)
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perceive their gender identity as being different from the way that their biological
sex would, conventionally speaking, be socially determined. The usage of the term
“transsexuality” would seem to originate with Magnus Hirschfeld (Pfa
¨fflin 2008).
He coined the term “transsexualism” in 1923 in his German article “The Intersexual
Constitution” [“Die intersexuelle Konstitution”] (Hirschfeld 1923). In this article,
he developed the concept of “psychic transsexualism” [“seelischer Transsex-
ualismus”] (Cauldwell 2006) as a desire that exceeds transvestism in not only
adapting one’s “vestiture” to that of the other sex, but also adapting one’s body.
Hirschfeld had already proposed the concept of the “transvestite” as a distinct
category in 1910 (Hirschfeld 1910), to make the concept of transvestism distinct
from that of homosexuality. His motivation for this was largely so as not to
endanger his primary political goal of abolishing Paragraph 175 of the Imperial
Penal Code in force in the German Empire at the time, which criminalized homo-
sexual practices between men as “unnatural fornication”; a goal which he perceived
as being jeopardized by the increased visibility of, and domestic “scandals”
(Eulenburg-Affair) surrounding gay men in the entourage and cabinet of the then-
Kaiser, Wilhelm II (Herrn 2005; Domeier 2014; Hekma 2015; Beachy 2010;
Oosterhuis 1992). Amongst the trans-terms, “transsexuality” is the term most
related to the physical body, and is often associated with actions that aim to adjust
the individual’s biological body to the individual’s gender identity surgically and/or
hormonally (Benjamin 1967; Reiche 1984).
Trans-identities do not, by and large, challenge the binary model of only two
sexes, neither on the level of social genders, nor on the level of biological sexes.
Transsexual persons are mostly biological men or women with a gender identity in
the other sex respectively, who wish to adjust their body into this direction, often
ideally in such a way that they are perceived publicly and societally as having a
sexed body that totally corresponds with their gender identity.
The term “transgender” is often used or adopted if one’s individual self-concept
does not exactly fit into a binary gender model. This term is often noted as being
coined by Virginia Prince in 1969. Prince uses “transgender” to designate persons,
who express their gender identity “solely” through their dress and their appearance,
without having the wish to adjust their biological bodies according to their gender
identity that does not conform their biological sex (Papoulias 2006). She herself,
however, refused to be seen as the initiator of this concept, as her primary intention
was to draw a line of distinction between gay men and male transvestites (Ekins and
King 2006). As a relatively new term “trans-identity” covers a much broader
spectrum of possible self-concepts. One’s trans-identity then may contain a bodily
adjustment, but, equally, it may not; it may also be a potentially “new” or very
individual and unique self-concept or gender identity that results from a perceived
incongruence between one’s biological sex and the rejection of the related, socially-
expected gender identity. Trans-identities can also oppose the societal pressure of
having to assign oneself to a clearly-delineated, distinct sex or gender at all; one
might, instead, perceive oneself as being “somewhere in between” (e.g. as
genderqueer, intergendered, multigendered, or gender fluid), or one might
Intersexuality and Trans-Identities within the Diversity Management Discourse 11
deliberately opt to elude gender or sex classification at all (Kuper et al. 2012; Dargie
et al. 2014).
4.1 Medical Perspective
In 1980 the American Psychiatric Association recognized transsexuality as a
“mental disorder”, revising this designation more specifically in 1994 as a “gender
identity disorder”. In 2013 the the term for diagnosis was changed to “gender
dysphoria” in order to make it sound less pathological (Zucker 2015). Another
term that has been used in order to de-pathologize the diagnosis of trans-identities is
“gender incongruence” (Drescher et al. 2012). The WHO defines transsexualism as:
“...a desire to live and be accepted as a member of the opposite sex, usually accompanied
by a sense of discomfort with, or inappropriateness of, one’s anatomic sex, and a wish to
have surgery and hormonal treatment to make one’s body as congruent as possible with
one’s preferred sex” (WHO 2015).
Once an individual has been given a medical diagnosis of gender incongruence,
gender dysphoria, or gender identity disorder, the public health care systems of
many countries, as well as many health insurances, will cover the costs for
necessary medical treatment, such as sex reassignment surgeries, or hormonal
treatments. In most countries operations pertaining to gender reassignments are
legally regulated. In Germany, a person is obliged to prove that it is very unlikely
that he or she will ever change his or her gender identity through psychological
assessment, before he or she can officially request a change of civil status (Franzen
and Sauer 2010). Since 2011 proof of one’s infertility is no longer a precondition for
requesting this change in Germany; however, in many other countries this still
remains a necessary precondition (Rauchfleisch 2014).
4.2 Societal Perspective
As already outlined above, instead of challenging the binary model of only two
sexes, trans-identities often rather oppose the coercive assignment of a certain
gender identity to the respective biological sex. Whether one adheres to the binary
model on the level of one’s gender identity is something that differs from person to
person, and is expressed in individually diverse self-concepts and identities. Many
trans persons clearly assign themselves to one gender, whilst others see themselves
more as being somewhere in between or outside these gender categories. These
“new” constellations or alignments of sex and gender identity categories within one
individual are still not fully accepted within many socities, and this non-acceptance
is frequently an enormous obstacle for trans-persons’desire to live a “normal” life
within their gender identity. As soon as an individual is perceived as being trans,
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they often have to face incomprehension, animosities, and vilifications in their
everyday live. The direct perceptibility of their trans-status often differs strongly
between trans-women and trans-men. While trans-men (female-to-male trans per-
sons) can initiate some of the changes of male puberty to a certain degree by taking
male hormones, trans-women (male-to-female trans persons) are largely unable to
undo the effects of the male puberty that they have already undergone. Thus, the
bodily frame, the height and the pitch of the voice of trans-women frequently make
them identifiable as such, whereas trans-men are often more able to pass as
cisgender men. “Going stealth” is much more a possibility for trans-men than it is
for trans-women, and it “enables” them to live a life within their gender identity,
without being permanently identified as a trans-person. Therefore, on average,
trans-women experience much more non-acceptance in their everyday life than
trans-men. Closely linked to this is the fact that the public image, and the public
perception, of transgender-issues has been, and continues to be, much more shaped
by trans-women then by trans-men.
Something of a disjunction exists in the seeming compatibility of, on the one
hand, the political trans*-claim for a higher degree of societal acceptance for
individuals living their lives in their gender identity, and, on the other hand, certain
feminist claims. Interpreted restrictively, transsexuality (and also transgender and
trans-identity) is a clear gender identity that differs from a clear biological sex
within a binary model of two sexes and two genders. This seems to confirm the
feminist standpoint and line of argumentation based on a model that allows the
separation of the phenomena of biological sexes from the phenomena of social
genders. Transsexuals or transgender-persons seem to be ideal examples to support
the claim that biological women are not (and do not have to be) per se feminine
(or female), and consequently they do not have, per se, to be restricted by the corset
of “appropriate” gender stereotypes that produces and legitimizes their societal
secondariness (Elliot 2009,2012; Snyder 2008). The big difference between the
trans-claim for recognition (and appreciation) and feminist striving for equality is
that trans-identities address (sometimes stereotypic) self-ascriptions, whilst the
demand for gender-equality addresses stereotypic ascriptions that are ascribed by
others (or, indeed, by society as a whole). To put this in its most exaggerated and
least nuanced form, this means that, for example, trans-women may (possibly) wish
to adopt an idea of femininity, and a possibly ultra-feminine lifestyle that, from a
feminist perspective, is often perceived as highly problematic. Taking into account
the fact that transgender persons may not necessarily wish, need, or be able to adjust
their bodies to their gender identity (neither as far as possible, nor gradually) in
order to live within their gender identity, this causes the notion of “solidarity” with
feminist claims to falter, since here the very categories of sex and gender them-
selves are called into question. This might be welcomed from a queer-theoretical,
postmodern perspective (Halberstam 2005; Bendl et al. 2008). However, politi-
cally, this involves the danger of blurring the important starting point for all
political claims for equality and redistribution, namely the dichotomy of being-a-
man or being-a-woman.
Intersexuality and Trans-Identities within the Diversity Management Discourse 13
4.3 Trans-Identities and Diversity Management
Until very recently, trans* has been a marginalized issue in diversity management
(Ozturk and Tatli 2016). If it has been mentioned at all, it has largely only been as
one element of the initialism LGBT (or LGBTI). Within employee resource groups
that use this initialism, then, trans-persons are officially included verbally, but,
when it comes to concrete network activities, they are largely unacknowledged.
Equalization guidelines or corporate codes of conduct do not, by and large, include
one of the trans-terms in their written versions; furthermore, to the terms “sex” or
“gender” (or their equivalents in other languages) is only rarely added the word
“identity”. The self-evidently and seemingly consensually perpetuated
non-integration and non-consideration of transsexuality and trans-identity as one
facet of the diversity dimension of “gender” would seem to reveal that the societal
normalization of appropriate gender identities is widespread, even within the field
of diversity management.
The shunting of the “T” (as well as the “I”) here into a miscellaneous category
that nebulously groups it together with diverse sexual orientations highlights that
little weight is given to trans-identities. Furthermore, it indicates the way that
diversity initiatives monopolize the dimension of gender (or sex) for cisgender
men and women, i.e. for biological men or women, whose gender identity corre-
sponds to their biological sex, and how those initiatives can actually work to
exclude, rather than include, some dimensions. That said, there are indeed several
organizations that do explicitly recognize trans* by having implemented very clear
guidelines on how to handle transitionings within the organization. These guide-
lines have, of necessity, to cover formal and bureaucratic aspects, and they also
have to clarify how a change of a civil status is handled within the organization, in
order to minimize the danger of the trans employee having to running the gauntlet
of potential everyday embarrassments and incomprehension. Furthermore these
guidelines must state how the organization handles potential emerging uncertainty
within the workforce in the case that someone decides to initiate transitioning, and
how the trans person is supported during this phase. It should be noted that besides
helping the trans-person, organizations that implement such guidelines do them-
selves benefit from them. Were an employee to decide to start his or her transition
during employment in a specific organization, one without specific guidelines in
place, the employer or manager, or superior of that individual may find themselves
uncertain of how to handle such a situation, which they may have previously never
encountered. Out of ignorance, misapprehension, fear, or, indeed, in trying to
overcompensate from a fear of doing or saying something wrong, the employer
or manager may inadvertently behave in a hurtful, unsupportive or disrespectful
way, and, as a consequence, the transitioning individual might leave the organiza-
tion. Guidelines can establish clarity, can provide space and opportunities to
address insecurities, and to search for solution possibilities together. In the long
term, therefore, they can help the individual, the employer, the co-workers and the
company itself form a more reciprocally supportive and nurturing framework,
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which can only strengthen and benefit the organization as a whole, and all of the
individuals within it.
In summation, an outline will follow of a potential diversity management
approach, which considers trans-identities and intersexuality to be an integral and
equal component for the goal of creating an integrative and inclusive work envi-
ronment and organizational climate. The key to this reconceptualization lies in a
more integrative approach to the dimensions of gender/sex, gender identity, and
sexual orientation, which no longer treats these dimensions as if they are phenom-
ena that are separable from each other.
5 Conceptualizing an Integrative Diversity Management
Approach on Gender/Sex, Gender Identity, and Sexual
Orientation
As already mentioned above, if trans-identity and intersexuality are mentioned in
the context of diversity management at all, they are usually grouped together with
“sexual orientation” into one very heterogeneous residual dimension of diversity.
This grouping together in, for example, the initialism LGBT(I) follows the ques-
tionable but common practice of defining the individuals that are represented by
these letters as one “community”, although their social recognition goals are quite
heterogeneous. On the level of language this aggregation gains legitimacy, as
(in the case of the “T” being interpreted as transsexuality) all of these letters
seem to represent different “sexualities”, namely homo-, bi-, trans-, and inter-
sexuality. As has already been outlined, this “commonality” is based solely on
the specious (and for many languages outright fallacious) use of the term “sexual-
ity” within the terms “intersexuality” and “transsexuality”, where “sexuality”
derives from the Latin term “sexus” which designates the biological sex. Within
the terms “homosexuality” and “bisexuality”, on the other hand, “sexuality” stands
instead for a sexual desire or sexual interest. Whilst in English this ambiguous
usage of the term sexuality is merely confusing, in other languages, such as in
German or Polish, it is outright incorrect. Trans- and inter-sexuality represent sex-
or gender categories. However, the diversity dimension of gender/sex is related to
the dimension of “sexual orientation”, insofar as the manifestations of the different
sexual orientations are defined by the desiring and the desired gender/sex, for
example as a same sex/same gender or as opposite sex/opposite gender sexual
desire.
When considering the integration of intersexuality and trans-identity into diver-
sity management programs, one should possibly pre-empt this consideration by
asking oneself why one should follow, or should want to follow, a diversity
management strategy at all. One fundamental idea of diversity management is
that management practice should break away from stereotypic images of the
different manifestations of the different dimensions of diversity. Management
Intersexuality and Trans-Identities within the Diversity Management Discourse 15
practice should rather work towards an ideality where these manifestations are no
longer criteria for organizational allocations of resources and opportunities. For
employees’career development, and the intra-organizational allocation of tasks and
responsibilities, it should ideally not matter at all whether an employee is intersex-
ual or a trans-man. The only considerations that should be valid are the individual’s
capabilities and the individual’s potential contribution in accomplishing the orga-
nizational goals, and these should be based on parameters such as experience or
talent, rather than founded in stereotypic dimension-related pre-assumptions about
his or her capabilities and contributions. In order to come close to this ideality in
terms of intersexuality and trans-identity, the dimension of “gender/sex” has to be
understood in a much broader und much more integrative way. The dimension
should lose its characteristic of only being understood in a binary way, as being
represented solely by cisgender men and women, i.e. by men and women who have
a gender identity that corresponds to their unambiguous biological sex. The goal of
this integrative approach has to be that the concrete manifestations of one’s sex or
gender become less important, as with it an individual’s self-pigeonholing into a
fixed template of legitimate manifestations would become less important. If an
organization could succeed in creating such a climate of inclusion, or at least if an
organization come close to this ideal, intersex and trans employees would not be
forced anymore to permanently legitimate, defend, or categorize themselves, and
they would no longer have to develop and to apply any debilitating coping strate-
gies. It is true that such a goal of diversity management might smack of an
unrealizable utopian construct, but this is precisely because of the declining, but
still prevalent, societal pressure to unambiguously self-categorize oneself within a
binary model of only two sexes, and to live a gender identity that mostly corre-
sponds to one’s biological sex. Nevertheless, this seems to be the right overall
objective, as it helps to avoid mistakes on the level of concrete actions and
initiatives that might prejudice the related objective of achieving a higher degree
of inclusion for intersex and trans* employees. A working climate that has rid itself
of the pressure to categorize oneself as belonging to a certain sex and gender, and
therefore of attaching to oneself a certain sex- or gender-value, would automatically
make the diversity-dimension of sexual orientation pointless and irrelevant, as it
would need an unambiguous gender/sex assignment by definition (see
e.g. Lewandowski and Koppetsch 2015).
In terms of designing organizational diversity management initiatives this
necessitates the consideration of the dimensions of sex/gender, gender identity,
and sexual orientation as being one common and conjoint field of action, or one
conjoint dimension of diversity. Care must be taken, when addressing the three
layers of this dimension, to address the whole spectrum of potential manifestations
in a value-neutral and unweighted way. Special care should be taken in allowing
space for individually differing identities, self-concepts, and self-designations. A
rough scheme of different manifestations is as follows (Table 2):
Analogous to the concept of trans*, cissexuality or cisgender stands for the
congruence of one’s biological sex and gender identity (Taylor 2010; Sigusch
1991). One’s sexual orientation then can be defined by one’s biological sex or by
16 T. K€
ollen
one’s gender identity. Whether, for example, a trans-women who is sexually more
interested in women defines herself as being lesbian, or whether she defines her
sexual orientation in another way is individually different.
Having the diversity goal of unshackling individuals’developmental possibili-
ties and scopes within the organization from their sex, gender identity, and sexual
orientation, must go hand in hand with an approach which keeps in mind and
integrates all of its manifestations, in the case where one of these levels is
addressed. Employee networks that are established around the dimension of sexual
orientation, for example, should also invite, and be open to, heterosexual
employees (K€
ollen 2016). The term LGBT(I) should be avoided, as it might have
a negative impact on two accounts: for one thing, it mixes up different dimensions
and with it different claims; for another thing, it includes only selected manifesta-
tions of these dimensions, which might effectively stabilize the polarization and
hierarchization amongst the manifestations. It is entirely conceivable that initiatives
could be developed that conjointly address the three dimensions, but these initia-
tives must then address the whole spectrum of manifestations of all these dimen-
sions. In this context one must be critical of initiatives that aim at the advancement
or promotion of exclusively women (or exclusively men) as well as of one-sided
mentoring programs, or quota systems. Furthermore, one should approach the
question of applying a gender-neutral language with care. One should at least be
aware that, if linguistically men and women are included in address, this is anything
but gender neutral, as it of course reproduces and stabilizes the binary model of only
two sexes and genders; this is an issue that is especially relevant in, for example
Romance, Slavic, and Germanic languages.
The integration of intersexuality and trans-identity into diversity management
programs opens up a new perspective on approaches to diversity management, and
to the dimensions of diversity management in general. This reframing can be used
to refresh or enlarge one’s interpretation of the term of “inclusion”. In terms of
trans* and intersexuality, inclusion has to mean giving intersex and trans employees
the scope and opportunity to develop individually. Organizations should aim at
creating an organizational diversity climate (K€
ollen 2015) that considers every sex
and every gender identity to be equal, a climate which removes and forestalls any
pressure to demonstrate legitimacy, and any pressure on intersex and transgender
employees to justify themselves within the workplace.
Table 2 Manifestations of sex, gender identity, and sexual orientation
Dimension of diversity Manifestations
Sex Woman—intersex/inter*—man
Gender identity Transgender/transsexual/trans*—cisgender/cis*
Sexual orientation Homosexual—bisexual/*sexual—heterosexual
Intersexuality and Trans-Identities within the Diversity Management Discourse 17
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