Unified Korea, much like the Republic of Korea today or indeed Chosun and earlier modern-Korea precursor states, will face complex security issues. While wanting to stand tall and independent, it too may be forced to make the realistic decision to rely on other states for at least some of its security needs.
I contend that Unified Korea will require a dynamic security strategy with the following
... [Show full abstract] components at a minimum: an ?independent? foreign policy aimed at ensuring that all regional actors consider a strong, secure and independent Unified Korea is in their security interest; a security alliance with the United States to guarantee independence; active participation in multilateral fora at the regional and international level; and a comprehensive strategy addressing conventional as well as nuclear defense.
In many respects, a unified Korea could decide the future of the region. A reliable, strong and secure Korean peninsula will be a source of great stability for the region as a whole. A unified Korea that is weak and/or insecure will continue to be a source of regional instability and major-power rivalry.
The unification of the Korean peninsula is not yet at hand. However, it is an eventuality. When it occurs, it will change the way the states of Northeast Asia interact with the Korean peninsula and with the other regional states. It is imperative that we begin contemplating the future of this important region. US policy planners would do well to begin long-term strategy assessments, mulling over the most likely security environment created by the probable chokes of Unified Korea and the effects on US policy.