Verification of Ballistic Missile Bans and Monitoring of Space Launches

Full text

Verification
of
Ballistic
Missile
Bans
and
Monitoring
of
Space
Launches
Jurgen
Scheffran
General
Problem
Areas
1.)
Supply-side controls, like the MissileTechnology
Regime
(MTCR),
have
no
specific verification
and
enforcement mechanisms and
are
inefficient in stopping
the spread
of
missile technology in the
long
run.
It
is
difficult
to
monitor
the
end-use
and
the destination
of
commodities,
in
particular, re-transfers from non-critical countries to critical countries, and
illegal
exports
via
"dummy
firms". Technology in the
public
domain and
basic
scientific research
are
obviously available without
restrictions.
Due
to
its inherent ambivalence, the
progress
in
civilian aerospace technalogies
can
contribute
to
military missile programs. Rigid and global controls
of
all
duab
use
items to all critical countrics would
be
very
difficult to implement and may
be
counterproductive to the economic interests
of
both
the
suppliers and
the
customers. Although they
can
slow-down
the
spread
of
missilc technology,
export
control measures are
not
an unsurmountable
barrier
for
Third
World
countries
which
have a strong
desire
to
possess
their
own
missiles.
2.)
To
curb the development
and
spread of missiles
effectively
in
the long
tcrm, the
MTCR
needs to
be
extended
to
a
non-discriminatory
arms
control
and
disarmament
treaty
aiming
at
the elimination
of
missiles
on
a
global
scale.
To
overcome
the
shortcomings
of
the
MTCR,
the following arms-control
measures could
be
implemented:
-
Strengthening the
MTCR
by
broader
coverage
including conventional
missiles (or
even
manned
aircraft), additional
members
or
stricter
enforcement
and verification.
-
Globalizing the
1987
Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces
(INF)
Treaty
by
eliminating all missiles with
ranges
of
500
to
5500
km.
-
Abolishingballistic missiles
in
a
global
"zero
ballistic missile"
(ZBM)
regime.
3.)
One majar obstacle
to
the
verification
of
an
agreement restricting
or
eliminating ballistic
missiles
is
their
close connection to
space
launchers.
J.
Schtflran,
A.
Karp,
The
National
Implemcntarion
of
rhe
Missile
Technology
Control
Regime.
The
US
and
Gcrmm
Experienms,
in:
H.G.Brauch,N.J.r-.d.Gra>f,
J.Grin.
\V.Smit
(Eds.),
Controlling
he
Dcvcloprnent
and
Spread
of
Milirary
Technology,
VU
University
Press
Arnstcrdarn,
1992,
pp.
235-255
Scheffran, J. (1995) Verification of Ballistic Missile Bans and Monitoring
of Space Launches. In: W. Liebert, J. Scheffran (Eds.) Against Proliferation
Towards General Disarmament, Agenda-Verlag, pp. 156-164.

Verification
bf
Ballistic
Miile
Bans
and
Monitoring
of
Space
Laud-
$5~
The
experience
of
t!ae
leading
missiie
powers.
shaws
that,
in
many
respew,
space
laun~h
vchicles
(SLVs)
and
ballistic
misdes
{&his)
are
very
sirnilfit
Bath
are
large
multi-swge
rmkca
Iaunchd
from
the
grwnd
wing
high-
thtus~engines,
stage-separation
=hniques,
protective
mver
around
the
paylmd,
guidance
and
telemetry
systems.
Both
have
to
withstand
heavy
vibrations
and
thermal
stress
during
the
boast
phase,
space
flight
and
reentry
(if
required
for
space
objects).
There
is
also
an
overlap
in
the
infrastructure,
e.g.
for
radars,
telemetry
systems
or
testing
and
production
faiIities.
Therefore,
monitoring
a
distinction
between
both
functions
is
a
difficult
msk.
On
the
other
bnd,
several
differences
between
SLVs
and
BMs
eomp!iate
the
conversion
in
both
directians,
requiring
costs,
he
expenses
and
arganimional,
personal
and
strumra1
changes
whirh
ate
partially
observable,
While
early
generations
of
SLVs
and
BMs
were
vergr
similar
and
thus
could
be
used
intetchangeabIy,
the
deveIqmt
fell
apart
with
the
increased
sophistication
and
different
requirements
for
civilian
and
military
purpnses
of
rocke~.
Differences
exist
in
the
form
of
the
tmjecc~ry,
the
size
of
the
rwkd~,
the
paylaad,
&e
types
sf
guidance
and
propulsion
system,
tfre
launching
ad
testing
facilium
and
their
pt~eedures,
However,
the
applia~iun
of
spa#
launch
technologies
and
infraswcnrrt
for
ballistit
missile
development
cannot
be
excluded
without
a
comprehensive
set
of
control
measures.
4.)
Adequate
verification,
providing
timely
warning
againw
the
breaking
of
a
rreaty,
is
an
essential
condition
of
any
agreement
restricting
ot
eliminating
ballistic
missiles.
Verification
demands
and
costs
would be
very
different,
depending
on
how
comprehensive
the
approach
were
and
the
dgra
of
effectivenw
that
would
k
required
to
minimhe
the
risk
of
non-~ompfia~e,
H~wevet~
dl
of
these
options
would
require
a
more
or
less
comprehensive
safeguards
and
verification
system
for
ballistic
missiles, including
confidence-buildink
measures
such
as
launch
notifieatiam,
exchange
of
informarion,
esrablishmenr
of
data
centres,
and
flight
testing
restrictions.
Monitoring
of
missile
testing,
production
and
deployment,
focusing
rm
observable
characteristic$
of
rackets,
wonld
be
necessary,
bur
no1
sufficient
to
ensure
adequate
verification.
Pravidons
for
cooperative
verificaticm
would
be
needed
to
ensure
that
the
treaty
Es
being
camplied
with.
Tbe
coage~ative
verification
measures
introduced
by
the
START
Treary
provide
an
example
of
this.
The
s+arding
of
space
launchers
would
have
to
be
included
to
prment
those
from
being
used
in
a
ballistic
mode.
J.
Schcffran,
Dual-Usc
of
Missile
and
Space
Technolagits,
in:
G.
Neuneck,
0.
I~htbeck
m.),
Missile Prolitcration,
Missile
Defenreand
Am~s
Conrrol
Badm-Badtn:
Nornos,
1983,
pp.
69-78

158
Jiirgen
Scheffran
Monitoring
Techniques
and
Rocket
Characteristics
5.)
To
monitor ballistic missiles
and
their elimination, a variety
of
technical
and non-technical means
of
verification exist
to
measure
observabie
missde
characteristics. Among
the
technical
means
are
the following:3
-
Sensors
in
the
visible,
infra-red
or
radar
spectra,
based
on
satellites,
aircraft
or
on
the
gromd:
If
a
launch facility
is
close
ta
an
accessible border
or
coastline, optical sensors carried
by
ships
or
aircraft can
be
placed nearby.
Optical reconnaissance sateliites in low-earth
orbits
(LEO)
can
rakc
photos of
missiies
and
their launch and test facilities, but normally
cannot
track
a
rocket
in
flight.
While
military satellite
sensors
arc
able
co
provide
high-resolution
pictures
with
a
resoIution
of
tens of
centimeters
to identify important
rnissilc
cllaracteristics
(length,
diameter
and
number of stages), current
generations
of
civilian satellites
such
as
SPOT
and
LANDSAT
arc
unable
to
detect single
missiles
on
the
ground.
Improvements
in
resolution
below
two
meters would
allow
for
detection
and
identification. Additional informationcan be
achieved
by
using infra-red scnsors
to
detect
smatl
temperature differences
or
to
providedctailed dataon
the
chemicalcomposirion
of
the propellants. Satellite-
born
infrared
detectors in geostationary
orbits
can
provide reliable warning
that
a
ballistic missile has
been
launched
(as
Desert
Storm demonstrated).
While large ground-based phased-array radars
of
several
thousand
kilometers
range
are
available only to the former superpowers, ship-based radars
of
less
range can
be
useful if
the
approximate
ocean
reentry area
of
test
launches
is
known beforehand.
Mobile
ground-based radars
such
as
that
of the Patriot
air defense
system
provide
a
shorter
detection
range.
Synthetic
aperture
radar
on
aircraft
or
satellites electronically
scan
huge
areas
for
larger
objects
on
the
ground or
in
the air, day and
night
under any weather
conditions.
Over-the-
Horizon radars have
longer
ranges
but
are
expensive
and
are
more
difficult
to operate.
-
Signals
and
electronic
intelligence:
During testing, training and operation
a
rocket communicates
with
its
operators
by
sending
and receiving signals.
Telemetry signals
can
be
intercepted
by
receivers
on
ground stations, vehicles
and
satellites. Non-cncrypted telemetry gives all
the
necessary information
an
missile characteristics and, in
addition,
encrypted
telemetry
provides
a
visible
source
to
track
the trajectory.
Due
to
the
Doppler
effect several
receivers
appropriately located
can
measure
the
vehicle's
velocity
and
acceleration
which
allows conclusions
to
be
drawn
on
the
missile's mass distribution.
-
Human
intelligence:
In
principle, human beings, either
as
spies or using
public
sources,
can
provide information different
to
that obtained from
technic31 monitoring
equipment.
This
includes information
not
only
on
observable characteristics of
the
development, testing, production, operation,
F
Zimmaman,Verification
of
Ballistic
Missile Acrivitits,
Papcrprcrented
at
the
Ballistic
Missile
and
Space
Rocket
Workshop,
Montere):
CA,
June
1993

t
Verification
of
Ballistic
Missile
Bans
and
Monitoring
of
Space
Latincha
r
and
deployment
of
missiles,
bur
also
on
their
clandestine
po~ession
as
well
as
on
inrentions
and
plans
to
build
or
use
&ern.
The
problem,
howwer,
is
the
unavailability
of
human
sources
in
the
c~assified
military
sdctor,
the
unreliabiIiry
of
their
information
and
the
difficulry
in
proving
their
"stories".
Whistleblowers
can
be
tremendously
impormr
in
bringing
more
information
on
secret
missile
programs
to
the
public
and
&auld
be
supported
by
the
international
communiry.
6.
A
monitoringscheme
for
baHisiimbsiie
elirninationcdd
detect a
number
of
observable
racket
chracteristics.'
a)
Flight
srzljemry:
Monitoring
of
the
flight
trajeetor)r,
either
during
tests
or
operational
fights,
is
essential
to
determine
the
physical
capabilities
of
a
BM.
During
the
boost
phase,
the
hot
gases
expelled
by
a
BM
provide
a
stmng
signature
which
under
adequate
weather conditions
can
ewily
be
detected
from
space
by
infra-red sensors
to
determine
helaunch
site
if
the
trajectory
I
is
above
10
or
20
kin
altitude.
Hidden
activities at
specific
facilities
can
be
detected
by
using
thermal
Sra-red
sensors
to
differentiate
amperature
differences,The
emission
spectrum
of
exhaust
gases
in
the
short-wavelength
infrared
and
ultravioIetregions
a
fingerprint
of
the
chemical
speeies
in
the
pmpeI1ants.
Rising
above
the
horiion,
a
reentty
vehicle
can
be
detected
by
radars,
which
give
the
full
positional
infomation.
The
reetluy
trajectory
allaws
the
determination
of
many
design
deds
af
the
reentry
vehides.
The
acceleration
profile
during a
flight
can
be
measured
by
radar
tracking.
Because
of
the
curvature
of
the
earah,
at
greater
dismces
important
portions
of
the
reenthy
and
launch
trajectory
are
below
the
radar
beam.
b)
Physical
capabrln'tiex
Range can
be
increased
by
making
the
rocket
system
physically
biggcr
which
improves
the
chances
of
detection.
The
size
of
a
rocket
(length
and
diameter)
can
be
measured
from
highly
accurate
satellire
images,
aircraft overflights
or
spy
phsros.
Due
to
the
rocket
equation,
maximum
range
can
be
determined
by
the
launch
ms~es,
the
fraction
of
propellant
and
the
specific impulses
(thrust
per
weight)
of
each
rocker
stage.
Because
af
the
rangepayload
trade-off
it
i
possibje
to
some
degree
to
inwe
the
range
of
missiles
by
reducing
the
payhad.
The
type
of
propellant
could
be
discovered
by
andyzing
the
emission
spectnl3n.
Measuring
the
accuraGy
af
a
miash
is
difficult,
even
for
one's
owta
missiles,
since
it
is
affected
by
several
uncanuallabie
factors
such
as
wmther.
To
get
a
xeIiable
statistical
average,
numerous
tests
are
required
which
are
observable.
Many
quantities
are
measured
during
the
flight
(e.g.
accehration,
fuel
consumpdon
rate,
temperature
in
the
reentry
vehicle)
and
then
trammitt4
to
ground
stadens.
If
it
is
not
encrypted, intercepdon
of
this
telemetry
could
give
'
R.
Hmw,
Monitoring
rhe
Gpabilitim
of
Third
World
Ballistic
Missiles,
in:
Nwncck,
lrchcbcck
1993,
a.a.O.,
pp.
lOf-113

important information on the missile
characteristics,
including throw-wcigl~t
and
accuracy.
c)
D~pIojled
mirsilcs:
Dnta
on
numbers and deploynicnt
rnodcs
of ballistic
missilcs
can
bc collected from combining
a
variety nf sources,
nonc
of
n-hicIi
are sufficient
by
themselves.
Missiles
in
fixed
deployment modcs such as
hardcned
silos can be located and counred
cvcn
with
SPOT
imagery. Missilcs
based in rnobile
modes
cm be hiddcli
from
satellite
imagcry
because
of
rhc
limited revisit time. Somcti~nes secondary bur chnmctcristic facilities
likc
garages can be uscd for identification. Aerial overflights,
interception
of
command
and
control signals to missilc sites
and
human
intelligence
offer
opportunities to detect mobile
modes
of
dep1oylnent.
If
tIlc missilcs are
produced
within
a
country, watching thc input and output
of
production
facilities
may
yicld infomiation
about
the
numbers
of
missiles
a
councry
owns.
d)
Missile
warhead
types:
The
Gulf War dcmonstratcd that
by
monitoring
on15 little information can
be
acquired
on
the typc
of
warhcads which
Third
\Vorld nations have dcployed
on
their ballistic missiles.
Estimates
arc
often based on indications
and
assumptions on the country's programs for
weapons
of
mass
desrruction.
e)
Infrastrt~cts~re:
Production
and
destruction facilities, development programs
and
tcst
mngcs,
tracking
and
communication facilities, missile
cont
nlners
'
and missile-carrying vchicles are observable
by
most
kinds
of
rcconn-t'
.
~ssance
cquipmenr. Their function and relationship to missiles, however, can still be
unclear.
During
the Cold
War,
huge resources
were
spent on monitoring
the
test ranges of
the
opponent. For shorter
mngc
systems
rcsred in dcveloping
countries, such intensive tracking might
be
impractica1.
Whereas
the
fact
that
a
country
has
ballistic missilcs cannot be conccaled,
many
measures can
be
takcn
to prevenc individual
mobile
launchers
from
being detected
and
localized, as has bcen demonstraced by
Irnq
in
the second
Gulf
War.
7.)
To
ensure adequate verification
of
ballistic missilc dimination regimes,
rechnical
mcans
of verification need
to
bc
accompanied
by
measurcs
of
cooperative verification.
-
Infomation
exchange:
States could
inform
each
other
regularly
(or
when
significant changes
occur)
about relevant missile characteristics and facilities.
Before
ballistic missile tests and space launchcs, short-notice information
should
be
givcn with rclevanc
data
on
the launchcs.
Making
telemetry
available
mould allow the
checking
of
basic
missile
dara.
-
Reconnaissance
overflights,
as
agreed
on
in the
Open
Skics
Treaty,
provide
an
alternative
co
satellite monitoring
for
many countries
and
can cven provide
superior information.
5
J.
Altmann,
Ballistic
Missilt
Lirnitarions
md
Their
Vcrificarion,
in:
Neuncck,
Ischebcck
1993,
a.a.0,
pp.
91-100

I
VKifiesrion
of
Baktic
Missile
Bans
and
Monitoring
of
Space
Launeha
161
I
-
Imptiom
As
the
impeccians
of
the
UN
Special
Commission in
Iraq
have
I
shown,
a
regime
of
unimpeded
fast
access
to
suspectsires
is
required
rn
detect
reliable
evidence
of
non-compIianw.
Seved
types
of
on-site
inspections
can
be
used
to
verify limits
on
ballistic
missiles.
a)
Obrematioa
of
buIIktk
mirsiL
tests:
If
ballistic missile
tests
remain
allowed
under
certain
conditions
pr
in
limited
numbers,
observers
can
be
invited
to
the
launch
sites
and
to
the
areas
of
reentry.
Some
information
on
ballistic
missiles
can
be
gained
simply
by
visual
observation.
Significantly
more
information
can
be
gathered
by
radars
close
to
the
launch
and
reentry
sites
or
if
the
signals
of
existing
range
radars
are
open
to
the
inspecuon
tams.
If
telemetry
is
not
encrypted
as
part
af
a
recording
scheme,
as
under
the
STARTTreaty,
relemetry
receiversdlow
ro
check
all
important
missile
flight
parameters.
b)
Okerum'm
of
SpCe
launches:
Limited
inspection
of
launch
vehieks
and
pyloads
as
well
as
observation
af
che
launches
can
help
assurance
&at
no military
ballistic
missiles
are
being
developed
under
a
civilian
space
program.
E)
Routine
and
challenge
inspections
of
missile
and
space
hunch
facilities:
Systematic
iospectiuns
af
all
ballistic-misG1-e-tdad sites
an
prmda
basic
information
of
an
initial balance.
Random
short-notice
inspections
O£
declared
sites
can
be
used
for
continuous
assurance.
They
have
to
be
augmented
by
a
system
of
chdenge
inspections
to
undeclared
sites.
The
START
and
CFE
Treaties
may
seserveas
examples.
d)
he-hwncb
inrpe6tr*~ns
ensure
that
an
undpskd
paybad
i
not
used.
Countries
and
companies
&at
hunch
space
rach~
do
not
like
to
open
up
their
payloads
for
&spection.
On
the
other
hand,
there
are
non-inuusivive
devices
and
techniques
for
detprmining
the
basic
payload
type
wirhaut
discIodng
propriermy infatmadap.
Sandng
and
radiographic
devices,
for
instanm,
could
&iscover reentry
vehic1es
on
top
of
a
rocket.
Related
verification
would
be
much
easier
to
solve
if
the
srates
cooperare
and
are
ready
to
exchange
information.
e)
Pr~d~&n
mmirarkg:
Pr~ucution
of
ballistic
missiles
can
be
effectively
conrr~lled
by
portal-perimeter
mmitoring
of
the
final
assembly
plants
without
entv
into
the
sire,
similarly
to
the
regufations
of
tbt
INF
and
START
Treaties.
Since
the
handling
of
soEd
fuel
requires
specid
precautions
and
facilities,
there
will
not
be-many
such
installations
in
any
given
country.
f)
Derhr~ction
manitoring:
The
desrruction
process
should
be
open
ta
inspection
without
any
quota
(similar
to
MF,
CFE,
START).
Warheads
can
be
removed
to
withhold
sensitive
weapons
deip
information.
The
rest
of
the
mis~iles,
including
the
reentty
vehicles
would
be
destroyed
under
he
inspector's
observance.

I
6r
Jiirgen
Schcffran
A
Safeguards
and
Verification
System
for
Ballistic
Missiles
8.)
A
global ballistic missilc test
ban
~vould
be
an
essential
step against the
development of
new
BM
typcs.
To prevent
a
country from
gaining
experience with ballistic rnissilcs testing
(c.g.
lligh-speed reentry and systcnl integration),
a
key provision would bc
a
flight test ban for
BMs.
Monitoring would
be
possiblc
bccnuse
the infm-red
emissions from missile launches
arc
visible from early warning satellitcs using
infm-red
scnsors,
as
was shown during
thc
Gulf \Var. The
test
areas are well-
known,
ground-based monitoring equipmcnt (radars, ships) exists in several
places. Thus, one cannot miss
BM
launches. Verification problems can occur for
space
launchers tested in
aBM
mode,
although
onc cannot dcvclop reliable BMs
only
with
space
launches.
Substantial modifications
of
spacc
launchers
probably
wouId
be
observable
by
National
Technical
Means.
9,)
A
global safeguards sysrem
for
space
launchers, rhcir technology and
infrastructure would
be
a
basic
pre-condition intended
to
limit
the
risk
of
using
them
for
ballistic missiles.'
A
scheme
for
safeguarding
SLVs
could
be
bascd on the agreement
not
to
acquire or develop (surface-ro-surface)
BMs
that
are capable
of
dclivcring
a
givcn
payload beyond
a
given
range.
Thc original
300
krn
and
500
kg
limits
dcfincd
in
the
MTCR
(now
the payload has
been
rcduced to zero) coulci
serve
as
a
modcl,
but
lower
limits should not be excluded.
In
this scheme,
the
"most
critical"
SLV
items
would
be
placed under
an
IAEA-likc supervision;
it
is
a
matter
of
discussion
as
to
whethcr
this
should only include payloads, launch, production
and
tcsting facilities
or
componcnts as
well.
10.)
SLVsafeguards
could
draw on the experience of the
IAEA
as
far
as
possible
but
should
avoid its shorrcamings.
Methods
of
material accounrancy, containment, and sun~cillancc
may
be
applied
to
control critic31
SLV
parts, finished goods,
and
production
and
launch
facilities
(SLV
items),
which
correspond
to
the
sensitive
nuclcar materials,
enrichment
and
reprocessing planss in
a
nuclear safeguards regime, dcspitc
obvious differcnccs.
To
prevent
the
divcrsian of
SLV
parts, systems,
or
facilities
for
illegitimate
use during
rhz
period
of
compliance,
an
international agency
could be initiated comparable tn
IAEA
for
nuclear materials.
11.)
To
deal
with thc verification problems and prevent
the
diversion
of
space
launchers
for
ballistic missile developmenr, thc establishment of an International
-
B
G.
Chon;
Enwrging
Nationel
Space Launch
Programs.
RAND-Reporr
R-
4179
-USDP,
Snntx
Monin,
1993

Ve&tion
af
Ballistic
Missile
Bans
and
Monitoring
of
5pace
Launches
163
Agency
for
Ballistitic MissileDisarmment
(IABMD)
has
bn
proposed
as
part
of
the
ZBM
'
Such
an
asncy
could
oversee
the
complete
eliminaiinof
EW
fat
rnilitary
purp&es
af
the
misting
missile
powers,
monitor
space
launch
activities
OII
a
global
scak
and
might
also
safeguards
measures
and
pre-launch
inspecsians
needed
m
control
suspect
declacarions.
12.1
Infwnational
cacrperaci~n
and
teshnolo~
transfer
in
civilian
space
pragams
would
be
important
ID
mntaiu
rnisapphcations
of
space
technology
for
missile
dwdopmenr.
Ti
suerigthen
international
space
cooperation,
a
World
Space
Organisation
(WSO)
has
been
pmpd.
Analysis
Bf
the
IAEA
experience
can
help
to
better
understand
the
utility,
capability,
costs
and
prablemsof
such
orgmizations,
and
whether
both
mskrshodd
be
merged
not.
Problem
Areas
of
a
Vixi&ation
and
Safeguards
System
for
Ballistic
Missiles
13
To
implement
an
cffectire
SLV
safeguards
system,
the
followhg
problem
areas
need
ta
tse
addressed:
-
The
range
limit
nee&
to
be
cIa&ed,
The
mare
stringent
the
re~traint,
the
moreunlikcly
it
would
be
hat
CQU~-
would
agree
tv
it.
On
theother
hand,
higher
range
limits
would allow
missile
development
and
technow
wader
up
to
the
cutsff
qgc.
Permitting
shprter-raege
BMs
in
an
SLV
safeguard
system
is
different
f10Il-I
the
WPT
wbkh
definitively
hnsdl
nudear
~Fom,
independent
from
their
yield,
in
the
hands
of
nonz~uelear
weapvnsstates.
-
Conipliance
with
an
SLV
safeguards
agrucmcnt
is
complicated
by
the
fact
&at
an
SLV
h
basidly
very
similar
to
a
*peaeefuIn
BM.
Both
use
es~idly
zhe
same
development
and
production
infrasnucmre.
SLV
fhght
wests
muid
be
all~d.
This
is
different
fm
the
NPT
which
bans
the
developn!ent
of
upeace~l
nudear
"P1osi~*
(PNh).
Contrakg
the
yarie~
d
all
3LV
itemclisxed
in
the
MTCR
with
a
miss&
safepard
sfst%m
could
prove
to
be
more
difficult
than
fot
rtudear
safeguards
because
of
rhe
closer
connection
between
BMs
and
SLV
technolugies,
Fun-swpe
safeguards
would
therefore
be
difficult
to
.attain.
-
Warning
time
dwr
breakout
from
the
SLY
safepards
reime
extends
fruma
few
months
for
shorter-range
BMs
up
to
6%
years
ar
mre
fdr
Idnger-rang
BMs,
closely
dqending
on
the
vialarar's,
rechn~&a!
st;t-tus
at
breakout
(&ether
&Ad
Qr
unddaed)
ad
the
desired
reliability
of
his
mhsiles.
Reentry
at
high
speed
and
flight
wts
aP
the
full
missile
system are
two
RPiigitiRg
Zem
Ballistic
Missilm
-
Rugam's
Ebrgwtm
Dm,
'FR3.
Public
btcmr
Rsport*,
W)V/
Jw
1992

kcy
elci~~ents
in
thc
pust-breaknut derclop~ncnr llrogram. Kllowletl~c
nf
rccntry cnn
bc
gnthcrcd
L!.
cspcrlincnting wit11 film-~ctrieval cnnisters
nttd
other
recovcry
systems
uscd
111
~ntellires and ~ounding rockctq.
A
range
nf
reentry cnnditions
can
Z)c siti~ulntcd
in
n,it~ci-runnd txiliticq.
-
Another
question is stabilitv. For
rcry
Ion. m~~riEe
nt~mbcrs
rhcrc
is
a
ycnr
diffcrct~cc burn-ecn
no
misailcs
xnd
a
few
tiris~ilcs.
'The
situation is scnqitix-c
againqt
qrnnll vnrintioi~s .~nd uncerrair~ticq
in
thc missilc tiunlburs,
nlthough
the
conscqvcnces
of
n
fcn.
sccrct
BMs
may
bc
not ns
serious
ns
for
n
fc\v
~nuclenr
n7capons.
\l"itll
fen~cr
nui~lbers
of
Ells,
a
defcnse
systcm
could
xvork butter.
Ir
woulcl
be
difficult
to
define
a
~tnblc offcnse/dcfcnsc
Irrnlancc,
14.)
The
costs and risks
of
a
snfc~unrd
sysruiu
need
tn be con~pnrcd r\-iili
n
no-safeguard situation.
Sincc
snfczuards,
inspection<
and
nlonitoring
arc
nut
n
resitlual ri~k
rc~~lait~q
thnr countries could
Luilrl
3.
clandestine technical
RM
capabilit\. m-ithin
an
SLIT
prograln
which
cnn
be
used
to
produce opcrationnl
DM5
w~thin
rhc
lcnd
time.
Mon,c\,cr,
violntion
of
ntid brcnkout Crotn
An
international ~nfuguard
agreement
is
a
serious
act
n-hich
might lead to strong reaction< from rhc
internntionnl community. Thc lead time
betnrccn
st\-era1 months nnd scvcrxl
years
moulri
ptovid~
time
for
negotiations
or
s~ncrions
bcfore
3
missilc thrcnt
can
emcrge.
The
dcvcloping
nnd
testing of
BMs
xvould tiot bc enough. They
nccd
ro
be produccd
2nd
deployed in
n
wn!;
that
makc$
them militarily useful.
In
case
of
an
atmck,
other
mcans
of
reraliarion might
be
used
(c.g.
aircmfr).
Tn
nny
casc,
thc risk of
this
situatinn
ncccl~
to
be
compared
to
a
situ~tion nrhcrc
cvcry
cnuntnp has the right
to
build
as
many
BMs
as
possihlc
whiclr
r\+ould
nor
sccrn
m
bc ncccptablc.
Lccn
nn
irnperfcct
mi~silc snfcguards scgirnc ttiiglit luok
bctter than
an
ur~cnntrolled siruntiot~. Honrcrcr,
nll
the
pro<
and
cons
nccd
to
be
discussrd irl more dctnil.