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Property rights issues involving plant genetic resources: implications of ownership for economic efficiency
Abstract
The economic theory of property rights is applied to the issue of the conservation of plant genetic diversity, an issue often discussed in terms of benefit sharing, in order to demonstrate that the assignment of property rights is important for reasons of efficiency as well as for equity. Given the existence of transactions costs within an industry, the location of a property rights assignment is a crucial factor determining the incentives for efficient levels of investment at various levels of that industry. In the context of plant genetic resources, this means that property rights that are located at the retail end of the pharmaceutical and plant breeding industries may not have sufficient effect to generate the incentives to supply adequate amounts of plant genetic resources to the research and development sectors at the base of these industries. In general, property rights systems must be carefully specified if they are to generate incentives for efficient investment in systemic values, such as the informational flows from genetic resources.
... Some theoretical studies have concluded that IPR would lead to an increase in resources used for innovation (Swanson and Göschl, 2000). Others propose that strong IPR would provide incentives for R&D from northern companies addressing the needs of developing countries, in areas such as plant breeding or tropical diseases (Panagariya, 1999; Perrin, 1999). ...
... This situation implies rent transfers from consumers to innovators, hence affecting the welfare of the different groups involved in the transaction (Primo Braga et al, 2000). It is generally agreed that IPR provide support for industry concentration and vertical integration (Swanson and Göschl, 2000). Downstream integration often generates more revenues than licensing activities, as could be observed in the Life Sciences industry at the end of the 1990s. ...
... Ex situ conservation consists in static methods of storage (genebanks) while in situ conservation, aiming at protecting plant populations in their natural environment, depends on the active participation of traditional farmers. IPR create incentives for breeders to invest in plant breeding (Swanson and Göschl 2000): the problem would hence be to develop other tools providing incentives for traditional farmers to conserve genetic resources. The main threat to in situ conservation is in any event more related to the modernization of agriculture than to IPR. ...
This exploratory study attempts at identifying the impacts of strengthening Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) on the Mexican maize breeding industry through empirical research performed with Mexican maize breeders. According to the breeders, - IPR would provide incentives for the development of foreign inventions adapted to the local needs and conditions; - Plant Breeders' Rights would support the diffusion of germplasm and information, while patents would restrict it; and - Stronger IPR would foster the performance of private breeding. The potential causes behind the few impacts identified and the general low level of use breeders in Mexico make of IPR are discussed: The level of development of the industry, transaction costs related to registration and enforcement and the widespread use breeders make of CGIAR materials are presented as potential explanations. Increased diffusion of protected matters, new domestic institutional arrangements and exercise of negotiation power at the international level are presented as potential methods to increase the benefits from stronger IPR accruing to developing countries. Finally, recommendations for further research activities in this area are presented.
... Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture are an especially relevant part of PGR, as they constitute the basis for advances in plant breeding and are thus an essential resource for agricultural production and food security. They are a source of genetically encoded characteristics (Virchow, 1998) that can be transferred into other plant varieties in order to achieve the necessary adaptations to an ever changing production environment (Swanson and Goeschl, 2000). Most of the currently known PGRFA are conserved and made available for research and development through an international network of gene banks. ...
... Economic development and the continuing integration of the rural economy into consumer and supply markets lead to a transformation of land-use patterns, leading to intensified but genetically impoverished production systems (see for example: Brush et al., 1992). This transformation process aggravates the problem of genetic erosion on a global scale and threatens the long-term supply of PGRFA (Swanson, 1996; Swanson and Goeschl, 2000). Parallel to this development there has been a substantial reorganization of the plant breeding industry in most industrialized countries over the last decades. ...
... Most of the provisions aim at the establishment and the harmonization of legal systems for the protection of new knowledge related to plant varieties and other biotechnological innovations in agriculture through the establishment and enforcement of intellectual property rights. The intention is to solve the exclusion problem that such knowledge-based innovations are faced with, in order to generate and secure benefit streams towards the innovators, which should serve as incentives for investments into research and development (Janssen, 1999;Swanson and Goeschl, 2000). ...
... In bioprospecting, there is a huge lack of foresight of the outcomes; indeed, as has been shown in the economic literature, there is great uncertainty over the value of biological resources generally. This uncertainty is related to the specific character of the asset (Swanson, 2000). The value of a biological resource is created progressively through the various steps of the process of value creation-from the extraction of the resource itself, through the laboratory screening to product development or new 2 Through the provisions on Access and Benefit Sharing, the 1993 Convention defined general principles for the institutional framing of bioprospecting activities. ...
... The timescale of bioprospecting activities is very long and the probability of leaving the contractual relationship very high. As has been argued elsewhere, due to the uncertainty in the option value of the genetic resources being sought in bioprospecting, the parties can exit the process at different points in the process of value creation, whether it be on the level of relationships with the local community, laboratory research, or in the final stage of product development (Swanson, 2000). ...
... (a) ex ante: negotiations between interested parties regarding the definition of property rights relative to collected and/or genetically decoded living resources can take into account the social and environmental externalities of bioprospecting; and 6 The problem of low financial return has been extensively documented in the literature and shows one of the core insufficiencies of the classical conception of bioprospecting as bilateral contracting (see Ten Kate and Laird, 2000 for an overview). Moreover, as has been shown, the idea of generating financial incentives through an intellectual property rights mechanism is highly insufficient: it only comes in at the bend of the pipelineQ (Swanson, 2000), and only addresses the actual extraction value of the resource and not the broader option value of biodiversity as a public good (Swanson and Johnston, 1999, pp. 52-68). ...
In this paper I evaluate the contribution of new institutional economics to reflexive governance in the field of bioprospecting. My hypothesis is that the design of governance arrangements that are both efficient and legitimate necessitates taking into account the reflexivity of the actors on the proposed institutional design. In considering this hypothesis, I apply current theoretical insights from new institutional economics as developed by Oliver Williamson and Douglas North to the issue of complex contractual relationships in the field of bioprospecting. Building on these insights, I propose some means for ameliorating the current proposals for institutional framing of the contractual relationships.
... The organization of the R&D process that delivers crop improvements can be analysed from a number of perspectives such as sociology (Buttel 1999; Busch et al. 1991) and history (Ruttan 2001; Palladino 1996). For economists, an essential determinant of this organization is effected through the assignment of property rights to different actors at different stages of the R&D process (Swanson and Goeschl 2000). These property rights take the form of residual ownership over various inputs and outputs of the R&D process. ...
... In the presence of transaction costs, however, the nature of the asymmetry is of critical importance for the overall efficiency of the choice of institutions. Here we merely note the presence of this asymmetry and refer the reader to Swanson and Goeschl (2000) for a full discussion of whether the implicit differentiation of property-rights protection to different forms of land use are a potential source of inefficiency. ...
This paper examines the linkages between the system that society uses to incentivize R&D by private innovators in the area of crop improvement on the one hand and the environment on the other. This examination is an important addition to the technology-assessment exercise conducted in the context of transgenic crops since it focuses on the organization of the R&D process rather than on the outputs. The paper first demonstrates that design choices with respect to the system of rewards under which crop improvement is carried out determine important characteristics of R&D outputs. In particular, it shows that choosing a patent-style system of intellectual property rights (IPR) will impact on the rate, direction, pace and mode of technological change in the agricultural system. This is relevant in an environmental context because the R&D outputs thus generated interact with biological systems. Specific production and adoption characteristics of these outputs therefore matter in environmental terms. While the presence of these environmental impacts is a generic characteristic of carrying out crop R&D under patent-style IPRs, the extent of these deviations differs between conventional and transgenic crops and is determined by a number of biological, technological and legal key determinants. A comparison of the differences in these key determinants between conventional and transgenic crops shows that there are some areas in which there is no difference between conventional and transgenic crops, in particular with respect to the mode and direction of technological progress. In those areas where we find differences, the differential environmental impact of moving from conventional to transgenic crops is ambiguous.
... Indeed, patent systems take into account the trade-offs between the requirements of a perfectly competitive market and those of an incentives demanding R&D private sector. (Swanson and Golsh 2000). Thus, cartel strategies involve not only the price but also the technique. ...
... Thus, cartel strategies involve not only the price but also the technique. At date, no institution seems to be able to intervene over this asymmetric information and reduce the transaction costs it produces (Swanson and Golsh, 2000). ...
"The paper discusses the role of local institutions in defining how animal genetic resources are governed at the village level emphasising the interaction between private and common property regimes in rural areas of Rajasthan, India. The legal pluralism approach has been applied and an institutional analysis has been carried out considering the rules in use at the local and global levels."
... A vertical industry model depicts the chain of production required to move the product from the stage of an initial idea through production and into the hands of the consumer. In very general terms, industries that use genetic resources, such as plant breeding or pharmaceutical firms consist of at least four stages (Figure 1) (Swanson and Goeschl, 2000). they make. ...
... In the case of genetic resources, TRIPS places the property rights in the information generated within the industry at the user stage of the industry, where they are implicit within the exclusive marketing rights to biotechnological innovations given to the industry by means of intellectual property rights. According to the Coase Theorem, the predicted outcome would be that users become the 'managers' of the entire industry chain by distributing the property rights across the industry in a manner that creates incentives for the efficient supply of genetic resources (Swanson and Goeschl, 2000). The rights holder would allocate property rights at those levels of the industry that are seen as important to the maximization of the value of the industry. ...
The relationship between the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the WTO Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is characterized by a persistent potential for disruptions in implementation, such as 'biopiracy' conflicts, because of the agreements' incompatible provisions on property rights over genetic resources. The lack of consolidation is often explained by attempts to strategicallly exploit interplay between the two istitutions. Countries of the North and the South are said to push for provisions under their preferred agreement in order to circumvent obligations under the other. We develop an alternative explanation based on a conception of international negotiators acting as agents of particular interest groups rather than as representatives of the state as a whole. Using a Two-level Games model of independent negotiations for agreements on functionally interdependent issues, we analyze the incentives for negotiators to delay or prevent consolidation for strategic reasons. Our analysis shows that, under certain conditions, persistent disruption may be due to a strategic dilemma that prevents negotiators from taking initiatives for consolidation.
... A common point in such analyses is the added difficulty due to the diffuse character of the values, both monetary and non-monetary, created by biodiversity within evolutionary socio-ecological systems. Swanson (2000) argues that added value of biological resources is created at each step of the innovation process-from the ecosystem itself creating the natural diversity, through the contributions of the local communities and research laboratories to industrial applications, and not only at the final stage of the innovation process. The existing intellectual property mechanisms only address the top of the icebergthe property associated to the final stage of this mechanism-and remains insufficient as a mechanism for rewarding and valorising the other stages ( Goeschl and Swanson, 2002;Laird, 2002). ...
... Solving the problem of the uncertainty on the potential value of these contributions through compensating only the few lucky cases of biological resources that make it to the marketplace is a poor strategy from an economic perspective. Figure (2) represents this problem of uncertainty in the context of the KMBS by adapting the scheme proposed for analysing a four-step industry (Swanson, 2000) to the case of knowledge generation for research / industry input through biodiscovery. Biodiscovery depends on an investment in the resource at the level of (1) ecosystems that produce diversity; (2) communities of local users (traditional farmers, healers, etc.) that co-evolve and manage the bioresource stock; (3) the scientific community doing research into new properties; and (4) product development. ...
This paper examines the use the use of economic incentives for knowledge generation through biodiscovery, in the particular case of the use of a highly valuable biogenetic resource stock from the South for industrial/research input. The focus is on a dynamic approach to contracting and property rights building upon insights from institutional and ecological economics. Two important conclusions come out of this analysis. First, it highlights the necessity to go beyond standard market approaches to economic valuation in order to address the issues of future possibilities of use and innovation and the integration of the different stages in the process of value creation. Second, it shows the necessity of developing alternatives to the current intellectual property rights regime, including systems for appropriate protection of the traditional knowledge of local communities.
... This is especially important where the environment itself cannot be improved by agricultural practices, for example in low-input agricultural systems. As restrictive and expensive seed certi®cation procedures (Hardon 1999), as well as the application of the current system of intellectual property rights (Swanson & Go Èschl 2000), may threaten the maintenance of these plant genetic resources, our results suggest that agricultural policies should encourage the use and certi®cation of local varieties and protect farmers' rights to grow these in accordance with the spirit of the Convention on Biological Diversity (United Nations Environment Programme 1992). Improvement in the performance of local varieties could be one goal of selective breeding; another could be the development of plant material with low sensitivity to selection across localities (Jinks & Pooni 1984). ...
Geographic variation can lead to the evolution of different local varieties, even in widespread forage plants. We investigated the performance of common forage plants in relation to their genetic diversity and local adaptation at a continental scale using reciprocal transplants at eight ®eld sites across Europe over a 2-year period. The overall performance of the three test species, Trifolium pratense, Dactylis glomerata, Plantago lanceolata, was generally highest for plants replanted at their home site and declined with increasing transplanting distance. The three species differed in the ®tness components responsible for the increased overall performance and selection advantage at home sites. In addition to the effects of local adaptation, the majority of measured traits in all three species also showed ecotypic variation. However, no single ecotype of any species was able to outperform the locally adapted strains and do best at all sites, highlighting the importance of maintaining these plant genetic resources.
... Similarly, poor and politically disempowered farmers might be excluded if they cannot defend their rights against powerful actors such as multinational companies (Anderson and Centonze, 2007). However, it is important to note that in a vertical industry, the location of a property rights assignment is a crucial factor determining the incentives for efficient levels of investment at various levels of that industry (Swanson and Göschl, 2000). In the context of (plant) genetic resources, the current assignment of property rights has been at the retail end of the pharmaceutical and plant breeding industries. ...
Subsistence-based and natural resource-dependent societies are especially vulnerable to climate change. In such contexts, food security needs to be strengthened by investing in the adaptability of food systems. This paper looks into the role of agrobiodiversity conservation for food security in the face of climate change. It identifies agrobiodiversity as a key public good that delivers necessary services for human wellbeing. We argue that the public values provided by agrobiodiversity conservation need to be demonstrated and captured. We offer an economic perspective of this challenge and highlight ways of capturing at least a subset of the public values of agrobiodiversity to help adapt to and reduce the vulnerability of subsistence based economies to climate change.
... For example, one such concern is that genetically engineered herbicide-resistant crops will give rise to herbicide-resistant weeds (Tisdell and Wilson, 2003). Market transactions and legal proceedings usually involve costs and these can be quite high in the case of property rights in genetic material (Swanson and Göschl, 2000). This further adds to cost. ...
... vación. En el caso de los procesos de investigación para el mejoramiento u obtención de nuevas variedades vegetales, los intercambios de recursos genéticos son y deben ser recurrentes, por lo que los marcos contractuales bilaterales para el acceso a estos recursos genéticos podrían ser engorrosos generando además costos de transacción muy elevados.Swanson et Goëschl, 2000 ; Goëschl et Swanson, 2002). Es más, los derechos de propiedad intelectual, en cuanto sistema de incitación funciona muy mal para innovar e investigar en temas orfelínos, para los cuales una demanda suficientemente solvente no existe. Así mismo, éstos se revelan imperfectos para los países que se encuentran lejos de los actuales avances c ...
... Hence, genetic resources have a physical dimension and an informational dimension (Schei & Tvedt, 2010, p. 10; Swanson, 1996; Vogel, 1997). Mostly, it is the information that is valuable for R&D (Stone, 1994, p. 597; Swanson & Göschl, 2000, p. 78). New technologies involve a growing production and use of digital genetic information, allow research on genetic resources of increased scope, reduced time and higher precision, and open up new fields of R&D (Laird & Wynberg, 2012). ...
Many industries benefit from public biodiversity conservation through the use of genetic resources in R&D processes. The conservation of biodiversity, though, is an under-provided public good. The aim of this paper is to analyze a global mechanism as a policy tool to internalize the positive conservation externalities accruing to commercial users of genetic resources. The United Nations ‘Convention on Biological Diversity’ (CBD) and its ‘Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilisation’ provide a framework for such mechanism. In light of economic arguments in favor of a global mechanism, we study official CBD documents and an online discussion forum launched by the Convention’s Secretariat on a global multilateral mechanism, as well as conduct expert interviews with important political stakeholders on genetic resource trade. We find that the economically preferable instrument of a comprehensive global mechanism is politically not feasible any time soon due to path dependencies and an arguably narrow understanding of national sovereignty. Technological progress in genetic resource use, though, might finally induce countries to establish a confined one in the mid-term future. We provide substantiated findings on countries’ preferences for its scope and modalities.
... An international agreement on the conservation of biological diversity is needed to put an end to this vicious circle and remedy the market and policy failures. According to Swanson, it should establish a set of corrective measures through the development of intellectual property rights (Swanson and Göschl, 2000 ), the institution of a global funding system for reserves and reforms in conservation policies to achieve sustainable wildlife traderegimes. With the Rio Summit looming, many mainstream environmental economists became interested in biological diversity. ...
International conventions are seldom reviewed in the literature devoted to environmental policy instruments. However, coordination is needed at a global level for global environmental problems characterised by scientific controversies, uncertainty, irreversibility, long-term impacts, economic and geopolitical dimensions. The Convention on Biological Diversity is a good illustration in this regard. The rules it promotes are clearly inspired by mainstream economics. It has therefore been celebrated as a textbook example of sound environmental policy. However, its success has been limited so far and its position within the international conservation regime is challenged. We argue that an alternative analytical approach to environmental global policies is needed and that the French theories of conventions and régulation open up promising prospects in this respect. © The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Cambridge Political Economy Society. All rights reserved.
... Consequently, they only function effectively as an incentive mechanism for new plant varieties or plant material for which the value is already known (even partially) either from available data on characterization or assessment. Thus, intellectual property rights provide far too few incentives for the exchange of most components of genetic diversity found ex situ (even less for those in situ, where the value of genetic diversity is still unknown at the time of its accession) (Swanson and Goëschl, 2000; Goëschl and Swanson, 2002). In addition, intellectual property rights are not an effective incentive for innovation and research – either in cases of low demand, or for countries lagging behind in the scientific advances of cutting edge innovation. ...
As proposed by FAO, the General Assembly of the United Nations declared 2013 as the International Year of Quinoa (IYQ), highlighting the potential role of quinoa’s biodiversity in contributing to global food security, given its high nutritional value and tremendous potential to adapt to different agroclimatic conditions. The declaration recognizes the role of the Andean communities in creating this biodiversity and conserving numerous local varieties of quinoa. The cultivation of quinoa on other continents will continue to expand in the coming years, and there will be an increasingly widespread distribution of systems of intellectual property rights (IPR) governing varieties or genes. It is, therefore, essential to recognize the contribution made by the
Andean communities, applying measures to guarantee the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits derived from the use of quinoa’s genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge. This chapter addresses these issues.
Four main targets can be identified: recognition of the Andean identity of quinoa’s genetic resources and the associated traditional knowledge; conservation of the components of biological diversity and ecosystems; sustainable and effective use of quinoa’s genetic resources in order to encourage innovation; fair and equitable sharing of the benefits derived from the use of these resources and associated traditional knowledge.
... Whereas IPRs create incentives to invest in R&D in the steps of formal R&D and industrial production, no comparable incentives exist at the level of earlier production stages, that is, where basic information is created by informal R&D processes as effectuated by traditional breeders and indigenous people. Thus, the benefits from retaining diversity are appropriated at a level within the agricultural industry far removed from the individuals making decisions concerning land conversions (Swanson et al., 1994; Swanson and Göschl, 2000). Swanson and Göschl (2000) conclude that, in order to maintain basic investments and innovation processes, incentives should also be created at the level where the information is created, that is, at the level of the indigenous and farming communities. ...
... Perrings, 1995; Weitzman, 2000; Schläpfer et al., 2002; Swanson and Goeschl, 2003), @BULLET different use and ownership regimes of biodiversity (e.g. Sedjo and Simpson, 1995; Lerch, 1998; Swanson and Goeschl, 2000b), @BULLET the relation between biodiversity loss and poverty or, more generally, the distribution of wealth and income (e.g. Munasinghe, 1992; Dasgupta, 1995; Myers, 1995; Swanson and Goeschl, 2000a), and @BULLET the design of cost-effective and efficient measures of nature conservation (e.g. ...
Our aim in this essay is to identify and analyze some of the difficulties with
interdisciplinary integration of economic and ecological contributions to the study of
biodiversity loss. We develop our analysis from a widely accepted definition of economics
which is based on the concept of scarcity. Taking a closer look at this notion, we find that
economics actually limits itself to a very particular aspect of scarcity, which we denote as
relative scarcity. We describe in what respect the economic approach towards biodiversity is
based on this notion, and also reflect on the specific understanding of the relation of humans
and nature behind the economic approach. We then turn to absolute scarcity as another notion
of scarcity, and show that this is not within the scope of economics, but has been a theme of
ecology and ecological economics. We describe in which way ecological and ecological-
economic approaches towards biodiversity are based on the idea of absolute scarcity, and also
reflect on the specific understanding of the human-nature relationship behind this notion of
scarcity. Against this background, we discuss the roles of economics and ecology for nature
conservation. We conclude that the interdisciplinary integration of ecology and economics
requires a philosophical underpinning, and suggest a framework for further research.
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... Alternatively, genetic level measurements can be more relevant when phenotypic differences are linked to the environment. To recognize their role in agricultural R&D and value genes, it is the information in the genetic resource, not so much the tangible resource itself, that is important (Swanson and Göschl, 2000). In any case, the choice has to be guided contextually by considering mainly what (stock and/or diversity of any resource) is impacted. ...
This paper highlights the need for and the conceptual challenges/issues in exercising biodiversity impact assessment (BIA), a subject hardly considered in most environmental impact assessment (EIA) activities so far. The paper attempts to lay the foundation for how future assessments can address biodiversity impacts more explicitly. The paper shows how development interventions and projects meant to take care of peoples' livelihoods are impacting on biodiversity. It presents the possible directions BIA has to focus in integrating externalities to inform decision making on the feasibility of development interventions. This is in essence to prevent, reduce and offset any adverse impacts (on biodiversity) of future development interventions. Addressing biodiversity valuation issues and identifying the appropriate methods to quantify the impacts will remain imperative in future endeavours to evaluate biodiversity impacts.
... This is especially important where the environment itself cannot be improved by agricultural practices, for example in low-input agricultural systems. As restrictive and expensive seed certi®cation procedures (Hardon 1999), as well as the application of the current system of intellectual property rights (Swanson & Go Èschl 2000), may threaten the maintenance of these plant genetic resources, our results suggest that agricultural policies should encourage the use and certi®cation of local varieties and protect farmers' rights to grow these in accordance with the spirit of the Convention on Biological Diversity (United Nations Environment Programme 1992). Improvement in the performance of local varieties could be one goal of selective breeding; another could be the development of plant material with low sensitivity to selection across localities (Jinks & Pooni 1984). ...
Geographic variation can lead to the evolution of different local varieties, even in widespread forage plants. We investigated the performance of common forage plants in relation to their genetic diversity and local adaptation at a continental scale using reciprocal transplants at eight field sites across Europe over a 2-year period. The overall performance of the three test species, Trifolium pratense, Dactylis glomerata, Plantago lanceolata, was generally highest for plants replanted at their home site and declined with increasing transplanting distance. The three species differed in the fitness components responsible for the increased overall performance and selection advantage at home sites. In addition to the effects of local adaptation, the majority of measured traits in all three species also showed ecotypic variation. However, no single ecotype of any species was able to outperform the locally adapted strains and do best at all sites, highlighting the importance of maintaining these plant genetic resources.
... Et Swanson de passer ensuite en revue ce jeu d'acteurs et les diverses dynamiques institutionnelles qui l'accompagnent, lesquelles, selon lui, ont convergé pour donner naissance à la CDB : mouvement conservationniste et débats autour des aires protégées, discussions portant sur différents types de mécanisme de financement international, controverse relative aux accords de bioprospection. L'approche adoptée à cette occasion par Swanson pourrait presque être qualifiée d'institutionnaliste, si ce n'est qu'elle n'est jamais revendiquée comme telle… Mais, bientôt, il va en être autrement : toutes ces problématiques étant liées, selon Swanson, à des défaillances des structures de droits de propriété que l'on peut observer à tous les niveaux d'organisation de la biodiversité, du gène à l'écosystème, cet auteur va se tourner vers une lecture inspirée par la nouvelle économie des institutions [Swanson & Göschl, 2000] ; d'autres économistes, comme nous allons le voir, l'ayant précédé dans cette voie. ...
Quand, à la fin des années 1980, le terme biodiversité est inventé [Wilson & Peter, 1988] et progressivement érigé au rang de préoccupation environnementale majeure, il s'agit de rendre compte et d'alerter sur une convergence de dynamiques. Ce terme devient le synonyme englobant des différents niveaux d'organisation du vivant – gènes, espèces, écosystèmes –, de leurs interrelations et des menaces qui les affectent. Les rythmes d'extinction des espèces et de conversion des écosystèmes semblent s'accélérer. Parallèlement, le développement du génie génétique attire l'attention sur la valeur économique potentielle des gènes. De nombreuses innovations sont attendues dans les domaines de l'agrochimie, de la pharmacie ou encore de l'industrie semencière et les firmes réorganisent leur stratégie autour du contrôle de ces techniques, ce qui favorise l'extension des brevets au vivant. L'apparition de signes avant-coureurs d'un marché et l'anticipation de nouvelles activités lucratives fondées sur l'exploitation de la biodiversité, au moment même où les scientifiques s'inquiètent de son érosion, font naître une demande de régulation. De plus, la biodiversité est étroitement associée aux forêts tropicales, aux centres d'origine des principales plantes cultivées, autrement dit aux pays du Sud, qui en seraient les détenteurs majeurs, tandis que les pays industrialisés contrôlent les techniques de valorisation des ressources et les droits de propriété intellectuelle afférents. L'exploration des ressources génétiques des plantes à la recherche de principes actifs suscite ainsi espoirs et craintes : espoirs pour certains pays de disposer d'un « or vert », leur ouvrant des opportunités en matière de commerce international et de développement, crainte pour le plus grand nombre d'une nouvelle vague de spoliation de leurs ressources et savoirs, accaparés et valorisés loin de leur contexte initial de production et sans contrepartie pour les populations locales. Tous s'accordent pour reconnaître la nécessité d'une régulation internationale pour encadrer ce secteur économique en devenir, consensus qui témoigne d'une certaine ambivalence, puisqu'il s'agit pour les uns de favoriser les conditions de l'émergence d'un marché et pour les autres d'en contenir les excès. C'est dans ce contexte qu'au terme d'un processus de négociation d'une dizaine d'années est adoptée la Convention sur la diversité biologique (CDB), lors du Sommet de la Terre de Rio en 1992 [Hermitte 1992 ; Dombé-Billé 1997 ; McGraw, 2002]. Ce texte est une convention-cadre, qui fixe les orientations majeures de la politique internationale de lutte contre l'érosion de la diversité biologique mais laisse en suspens les considérations plus pratiques de mise en oeuvre, qui sont abordées et précisées ultérieurement, lors des Conférences des parties [Kiss, 1993]. Ayant été conçue initialement dans un esprit « englobant », afin de « chapeauter » d'autres traités internationaux relatifs à la protection de milieux et d'espèces, la CDB a des objectifs multiples vis-à-vis d'un très grand nombre d'objets. Cependant, celui qui a principalement retenu l'attention des négociateurs depuis son entrée en vigueur en 1993 est la mise en place de mécanismes et instruments permettant l'accès aux ressources génétiques et le partage juste et équitable des avantages qui en sont retirés (voir encadré n°1). Les problèmes de gestion des ressources génétiques – et des savoirs qui leur sont associés – semblent ainsi avoir pris le pas sur le problème d'environnement proprement dit, à savoir le risque que fait peser l'érosion de la diversité biologique sur la dynamique de la Biosphère et, plus largement, sur les facultés d'évolution de la vie.
... There is also the problem that biodiversity can be decreased as farmers will not be able to draw on the knowledge of the firms for free due to patent protection if Article 27 (3) b of TRIPS is enforced. One concern is that this would lead to a decrease in the variety of plants worldwide (Shand, 1997; Swanson and Göschl, 2000). 1 In their recent contribution, Droege and Soete (2001) was the first to formally incorporate the important notion of farmers' rights into a model of strategic trade policy under imperfect competition. Specifically, the authors examined the environmental issues of biological diversity by developing a North-South model where a Northern firm and a Southern firm export crop seeds to a third market. ...
In this paper, we examine how biodiversity levels are affected by different regimes of trade-related intellectual property rights (IPRs) in a two-way trade framework where the North and South import and export to each other`s market. This approach incorporates domestic consumption (and hence consumer surplus) into the welfare maximization problem of the Southern government in a three-stage game under alternative IPR regimes. We find that for achieving a maximal level of biodiversity and socially optimal welfare in the South, the Southern government should protect farmers` rights. Further, we find that the Southern government has economic incentives to acknowledge international patents and protect biodiversity even in the absence of farmers''s rights.
... Similarly, poor and politically disempowered farmers might be excluded if they cannot defend their rights against powerful actors such as multinational companies (Anderson and Centonze, 2007). However, it is important to note that in a vertical industry, the location of a property rights assignment is a crucial factor determining the incentives for efficient levels of investment at various levels of that industry (Swanson and Göschl, 2000). In the context of (plant) genetic resources, the current assignment of property rights has been at the retail end of the pharmaceutical and plant breeding industries. ...
Subsistence-based and natural resource-dependent societies are especially vulnerable to climate change. In such contexts, food security needs to be strengthened by investing in the adaptability of food systems. This paper looks into the role of agrobiodiversity conservation for food security in the face of climate change. It identifies agrobiodiversity as a key public good that delivers necessary services for human wellbeing. We argue that the public values provided by agrobiodiversity conservation need to be demonstrated and captured. We offer an economic perspective of this challenge and highlight ways of capturing at least a subset of the public values of agrobiodiversity to help adapt to and reduce the vulnerability of subsistence based economies to climate change
... Consequently, at the household level, the market encourages specialization and uniformity, not diversity. As the frontier of the modern sector expands, homogeneity continues to replace diversity (Swanson 1995). The market supports the production and marketing of only varieties embedding those attributes that have consumer market demand (Brush et al. 1992;Smale et al. 2001;Wale 2004). ...
It is widely recognized that developing countries lack technical and institutional capacity to effectively implement genetic
resources policy. This has led Bioversity International (the then IPGRI) to initiate a project called Genetic Resources Policy
Initiative (GRPI) in six countries (Ethiopia, Egypt, Zambia, Peru, Vietnam and Nepal). Drawing from the literature and experiences
of this project, this paper has attempted to document some of the lessons from the project and present the issues and challenges
that need to be addressed for effective genetic resources policy. Recognizing its cross-cutting nature, the paper has argued
that genetic resources policy has to be part of the broader development agenda to effectively deal with trade-offs and harmonize
the conflicts. Essentially, the important policy question is to strike the balance and simultaneously promote the diversity
of genetic resources and welfare outcomes. The major thrust of GRPI has been the multi-disciplinary, -sectoral, and -stakeholder
(3M) approach. Despite all its theoretical merits, its implementation has been a serious challenge in practice. This has,
among others, been due to ‘‘A project for all is a project for none’’ dilemma. Engaging decision makers in 3M deliberations
has revealed that many of them tend to think that maintaining genetic diversity promotes traditional farming and retards agricultural
development. Clearly, addressing each of these challenges and policy loopholes requires innovation in a diversity of institutions.
... The contractual arrangements may be able to specify various concerns that each of the party to the transaction may have as distinct from the approach of deriving these concerns through property right laws. Swanson (1998) 49 looks at the property right issues in the same context and observes, "existing IPR system creates incentives to invest in R&D at the end of the industry (the plant breeding sector), but is not generating investments in the earlier parts of the industry (the genetic resource providers)". This happens, Swanson suggests, because (a) farmers in developing countries do not have property rights on their genetic resources and have no direct incentive to invest in diversity and (b) plant breeding industry located primarily in the developed world did not feel it necessary to justify their own independent investments in conservation of insitu diversity in developing countries because of lack of control or rights over this diversity in developing countries. ...
The traditions of creativity, conservation and innovation exist in various developing countries along side the continuation of obsolete or inefficient technologies and resource use practices. At any point of time, one would notice certain resource use practices continuing in almost the same form with very little change for more than a millennium, few hundred years or few decades. However, such a situation coexists simultaneously with the spurts of contemporary creativity using traditional biological and genetic resources. This creativity manifests in the traditional ways of using an existing resource with a new purpose in mind or in a modern way (that is using modern techniques or tools) for meeting a contemporary need. There has been a widespread concern that erosion of traditional knowledge is as serious a problem as erosion of biological and genetic diversity. While there are many reasons for this erosion such as expanding physical and urban infrastructure, increasing incorporation in market economies, weakening link between grand parent and grand children generation, higher emigration of youth from rural areas, faster diffusion of modern crop varieties (largely developed by public sector for public domain use during green revolution), diffusion of few biological species under monoculture in forests, fisheries, and other sectors, and reduced control of local communities on their own resources. Indifference of public policy makers in various countries towards the positive aspects of certain Traditional Knowledge Systems (TKS) including community institutions for conservation, exchange and augmentation of biological diversity have also contributed to this erosion. It is ironic that many countries complain about unfair treatment of TK and genetic resources in the international markets (and rightly so) but take very few steps to stop similar exploitation in domestic markets. In addition to these factors one factor, which contributes significantly, though not entirely
... While providing interesting insight to the problem of protecting biodiversity, there are some limitations to their model setup. First, because of the assumption that the North and South export a commodity to a third market, there is no inclusion of domestic consumption (and hence consumer surplus) in the welfare maximization decision of the Southern government. 2 Consumer surplus could have very important implications for the Southern government as increasing the overall level of production 1 Swanson and Göschl (2000) examine how intellectual property rights affect the incentive to conserve plant genetic diversity. They indicate that the current IPR system puts more emphasis on the retail end of the plant breeding industry and less on plant genetic diversity. ...
The first essay is on TRIPS (trade related intellectual property rights), biodiversity and North-South trade. This essay explores how true North-South trade and different IPR (intellectual property rights) regimes affect the level of biodiversity that is maintained by a Southern government. The results show that protecting farmers’ rights only is the regime that will be chosen by the Southern government and that will lead to the maximum level of biodiversity. This is important for policymakers as provisions for protecting farmers’ rights do not currently exist. This finding confirms previous results that did not include true North-South trade. Another result, and one that departs from existing literature, is that positive levels of biodiversity will be maintained by the Southern government if only international patent protection is implemented. The second essay focuses on factors that affect attendance at MLS soccer matches, in particular David Beckham. The primary results in the study are that David Beckham has a very large, statistically significant effect on attendance at MLS matches. This effect is estimated as at least a sixty-five percent increase in attendance in games Beckham plays in. Other results from this study are that there are no significant effects from the months matches are played and that the only day of the week with a significant effect is Saturday (its effect is positive). The results from this study provides insight to MLS as it faces upcoming decisions about designated players, such as Beckham, and about the calendar upon which the MLS season is played. The final essay is on moral hazard, market power and the demand for health insurance. The issue of health insurance is one of the main questions facing the U.S. government and its citizens. This essay explores the particular interaction of moral hazard and market power in the form of a duopoly in a pharmaceutical market. The results from this essay show that there are notable differences in the effects on the welfare of market participants under duopoly as compared to monopoly, such as the importance of cross-price effects that do not show up in a monopoly market. Doctor of Philosophy Doctoral Department of Economics Yang M. Chang
... These changes are happening at the same time that a revolution is advancing biotechnology within agricultural and pharmaceutical industries (Fernandez-Cornejo, 2004). In this new environment, with extensive private participation in the international market, the protection of intellectual property rights and its role in shaping the biotechnology market has been highly debated (Kesan, 2000; Kesan and Janis, 2001; Swanson and Goschl, 2000; Janis and Kesan, 2002; Goldsmith, Ramos and Steiger, 2002; Goldsmith, 2001; Lesser, 1998; Moschini, 2001; Moschini and Lapan, 1997; Rohrbach, Minde and Howard, 2003; Alston and Venner, 2002; Frisvold, Sullivan and Raneses, 2003; Graff, Rausser and Small, 2003 and Diez, 2002). Governments, international organizations, the private sector (firms and farmers), scholars and scientists are discussing how changes affect the market for seeds and how property rights should be defined and enforced to promote social welfare (Fernandez-Cornejo, 2004). ...
... These changes are happening at the same time that a revolution on biotechnology is advancing on agriculture and pharmaceutical industries (Fernandez-Cornejo, 2004). In this new environment, with wide private participation in an international market, the protection of intellectual property rights and its role in shaping the biotech market has been highly debated (Kesan, 2000; Kesan and Janis, 2001; Swanson and Goschl, 2000; Janis and Kesan, 2002; Goldsmith, Ramos and Steiger, 2002; Goldsmith, 2001; Lesser, 1998; Moschini, 2001; Moschini and Lapan, 1997; Rohrbach, Minde and Howard, 2003; Alston and Venner, 2002; Frisvold, Sullivan and Raneses, 2003; Graff, Rausser and Small, 2003 and Diez, 2002). Governments, international organizations, the private sector (firms and farmers), scholars and scientists are discussing the implications of these changes for the market for seeds, and how property rights should be defined and enforced to promote social welfare (Fernandez-Cornejo, 2004). ...
During the 1990s the market for biotechnology in agricultural and pharmaceutical sectors have became an international economic force. Investment in research and development (R&D) of new seed varieties has become a key factor for market success. In the last decades the investment in R&D switched from state sponsored research to private funding. At the same time, the market moved towards a strong concentration in a few multinational firms, which now control most of the biotechnological research and development around the world. These changes are happening at the same time that a revolution on biotechnology is advancing on agriculture and pharmaceutical industries. In this new environment, with wide private participation in an international market, the protection of intellectual property rights and its role in shaping the biotech market has been highly debated. Governments, international organizations, the private sector (firms and farmers), scholars and scientists are discussing the implications of these changes for the market for seeds and how property rights should be defined and enforced to promote social welfare. Developed countries have tried to enforce intellectual property rights over new varieties of seeds in developing countries in order to promote and protect the investments of their companies abroad. On the other hand, developing countries have insisted on sustain a loose property rights system in order to favor their farmers and obtain new technologies at the lowest possible cost. The creation of effective property rights legislation to promote a high level of R&D, even though this implies the presence of some monopoly power in the market, is a key instrument for biotechnology in agriculture. Accordingly, property rights should protect the creators of new plant varieties and they should be thoroughly enforced. Of course, the scope and definition of rights will depend on the characteristics of the plant to be protected. In this paper we analyze the incenti
... Economists have only recently begun to explore the economics of biodiversity. Important aspects of biodiveristy that have so far been addressed include the benefits of biodiversity as a genetic resource base (Weitzman 1992; Simpson et al. 1996; Swanson and Göschl 2000), aesthetic and existence values (Hanley et al. 1995; Weitzman 1998; Montgomery et al. 1999), and the insurance value of biodiversity (Perrings 1995; Folke et al. 1996; Göschl and Swanson 2000). An insurance effect from biodiversity can arise in two ways. ...
Recent ecological experiments suggest that theinterannual stability of ecosystem productivitymay be determined by the diversity of organismspresent in the system. We investigate whethersuch effects of biotic diversity on ecosystemstability may translate into economic valuesand possibly into an economic argument for themaintenance of biodiversity in managedhabitats. Applying a stochastic model fromfinancial economics to long-term harvest datafrom a grassland ecosystem we examine thepotential “insurance” value of plant diversityon the stability of yields and economic returnsin a drought-sensitive agricultural setting.Putative insurance premiums priced as putoptions on revenues from hay yield were higherfor fertilized low-diversity grassland than forunfertilized species-rich glassland. From thisperspective the annual “insurance value”(differential insurance premiums required tolock in specific rates of returns) of diverseplant communities may amount to $3.50 to$6.00 per acre. The results suggest thatincreased costs of risk in species-poorfertilized grassland may affect the optimumlevel of fertilization making lower fertilizerinput and concomitantly higher plant communitydiversity more desirable. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002
What is scarcity? Goods and services are scarce, if not enough of them is available to fulfil all wants; for example in a desert water is scarce or in a besieged castle food is scarce. Similarly we experience today that environmental goods like clear air and non-polluted soil are becoming scarcer and scarcer.
We want to analyse the various aspects of the concept of scarcity and its different uses in Mainstream Economics, Ecological Economics and Ecology. In particular, we will answer the question “what does it mean when something is declared as scarce?”
Secondly, we wish to use our results to identify and analyze some of the difficulties with interdisciplinary integration of economic and ecological contributions to the study of biodiversity loss.
1. Einleitung Biodiversität ist zunächst ein Thema der Biologie bzw. der Ökologie, und nicht der Ökonomik als der Wissenschaft vom Wirtschaften des Menschen. Dementsprechend stammen die ersten wissenschaftlichen Beiträge zur Biodiversität und ihres in jüngster Zeit beobachteten dramatischen Verlustes von Ökologen, die an den Auswirkungen dieses Verlustes für Ökosystemfunktionen interessiert waren. 1 Die offensichtliche Be-deutung der Biodiversität für die menschliche Wohlfahrt machte das Thema aber bald auch für Ökonomen interessant, die die Rolle der Biodiversität für den wirtschaftenden Menschen in den Mittelpunkt ihrer Untersuchungen stellten. Heute ist die ökonomische Dimension von Biodiversität zentral für die allgemeine Diskussion über die Ursachen und Folgen des gegenwärtigen Biodiversitätsverlustes. 2 Im Rahmen der bisherigen ökonomischen Forschung zur Biodiversität stehen die folgenden Fragen im Zentrum: – In welchem Sinne kann man Biodiversität als einen Gegenstand der Ökonomik auffassen? – Worin besteht der ökonomische Wert der Biodiversität? – Welche ökonomischen Erklärungen gibt es für den gegenwärtig zu beobachtenden Verlust an Biodiversität? – Welchen Beitrag können ökonomische Mechanismen zum effektiven und effizienten Schutz von Biodiversität leisten? In diesem Beitrag geben wir eine Einführung in das aktuelle ökonomische Denken über Biodiversität und stellen zentrale Positionen und Argumente aus der Literatur dar. Da-bei reflektieren wir besonders die Leistungen und Grenzen des ökonomischen Zugangs zur Biodiversität, die sich aus dem Selbstverständnis der Ökonomik als Wissenschaft ergeben. Der Aufsatz ist entsprechend der oben genannten vier zentralen Fragen ge-gliedert.
To the extent that they exist, markets for genetic resources (GR) and traditional knowledge (TK) are incipient, thin and subject to a series of imperfections. While a growing body of literature address the role of valuation and property rights for such resources, much remains to be understood concerning the factors that influence concrete GR and/or TK access agreements. This paper constitutes an attempt to explain empirically bioprospecting contract performance in terms of investment uncertainty theory. Specific attention is paid to cost and price uncertainty, as represented by information acquisition through experience, and industry characteristics, respectively. Interviews and the bioprospecting literature suggest that such uncertainty distort both supply and demand of GR and TK. We apply an ordered probit model to explore how uncertainty affects the performance of bioprospecting contracts. The model is also aimed to control for investor characteristics, participation and legal framework. Preliminary results support theory by suggesting a negative uncertainty-investment link in bioprospecting projects, specifically, by causing project cancellations and distortions. This has implications for the way providers and demanders should think about access agreements and the preparation of such agreements.
Given the existence of transaction costs, the location of property rights is an important factor in determining the incentives for efficient levels of investment at various levels of the industry. This paper applies some of the economic theories of property rights and industrial structure to the issues concerning the conservation of biodiversity. Although the expansion of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) systems into the area of genetic resources has increased private investment in R&D process of the agriculture, it does not generate enough incentives for in situ conservation of biodiversity. To solve this economic inefficiency, farmers’ rights and other design of incentives and institutional arrangement should be reconsidered.
This paper builds on the experiences from the numerous payment for environmental services (PES) and PES-like schemes in order to establish a framework for evaluating the potential of PES as an incentive mechanism for the conservation of agrobiodiversity per se in poor farming communities. Such - often indigenous - communities conserve much of the world's threatened plant and animal genetic resources (PAGR) and hence can potentially play an important role in the cost- effective, in-situ conservation of agrobiodiversity. Payment for agrobiodiversity conservation services (PACS) schemes are understood as market-based instruments that can increase the private benefits from utilizing PAGR on-farm by: i) alleviating market failures through individual-based or community-based reward mechanisms (monetary or non-monetary); or ii) reducing market frictions by developing/improving market chains in order to increase the competitiveness of certain species, varieties or breeds. As with PES, implementing of PACS schemes in practice requires the consideration of a number of demand-side, supply-side and institutional issues. This paper assesses the potential performance of PACS in terms of ecological effectiveness, economic efficiency and social equity, including through a comparative analysis of a range of PACS instruments, such as direct payment mechanisms, competitive tender approaches, and market chain development.
This chapter explores new opportunities offered by the Nagoya Protocol for global sharing of basic knowledge assets for scientific research. Two major institutional models dominate this debate, the first one envisioning contractual negotiations and exclusive ownership rights and the second one favouring public domain-like conditions and non-exclusive property right regimes. This chapter compares these models in the field of microbiology, concluding that public-domain like conditions for access to basic knowledge assets and a broad interpretation of the notion of non-commercial use is both possible within the framework of the Protocol and necessary for the pursuit of global scientific research.
Institutions for biodiversity governance are located at the interface of human and ecological systems. The analysis of such institutions is challenged due to addressing a multitude of complex interactions between these two systems occurring at different natural scales and levels of human organization. Due to this complexity, empirical analysis of biodiversity management often leads to context-specific explanations, providing little scope for comparative work or the development of more generalised, theory-based accounts. We aim at reducing complexity in understanding human–biodiversity relations, making cases comparable across sites, and propose that, in order to address complexity, we need a method of abstraction that leads to the development of a more structured analysis, based on selection of explanatory factors according to cconceptual models as well as empirical significance. We suggest that the stylisation of typical “resource use-perspectives” – the combination of typical transactions that are inextricably linked by the interest of the actor – can be a useful method for realizing appropriate model selection. In this paper, we provide an account of how use-perspectives can be developed and to what kind of analysis they can contribute, using the example of agrobiodiversity in grain as seed, food, or genetic material.
What should policy makers do in deciding between institutions promoting community livelihoods or sustaining wetland resources within an impoverished community? Prioritizing community livelihoods without understanding the impact of local institutions on wetland resources may only aggravate impoverishment. However, prioritizing sustainable wetland resource use may lead to short-term impoverishment with positive long-term effect on both community livelihood and sustainable wetland resources. This paper tries to address this difficulty by assessing local level institutions such as property rights and those that govern extraction of wetland resources in three wetland communities of Lake Victoria. The paper argues that reassessing institutions on 'tenure system' and 'access to' resources are desirable policy objectives that should guide such decisions.
The purpose of this paper is to develop a novel tenant mix model for shopping malls from an analogy of ecological theories. This study empirically investigated the tenant species-area relationship and tenant species-abundance distribution in shopping malls. By a sample of 25 shopping malls are carried out in Hong Kong, it is showed that, in line with the findings of biogeography, the tenant species-area relationship follows a power law of exponent of 0.30. And the analysis results suggest that different developers or mall operators adopt similar tenant-mix strategies. Furthermore, the species abundance distributions of several large-scale malls are found to be closely in track with a geometric distribution commonly found in ecology. The study provides a very good prediction model on the number of tenant species in a particular mall size, and on the tenant species abundance distribution pattern. These results provide very far-reaching implications for research and practice, including a quantitative benchmarking of tenant mix strategy and an optimal design of shopping malls.
Access and benefit-sharing (ABS) is a market-based approach aimed at preserving biodiversity. Its effectiveness has been questioned
in international discussions for many years. It is evident that the approach’s success has fallen far short of what was expected:
degradation of biodiversity continues, and only few benefits arising from the commercial use of biodiversity have been shared
with the providers of biodiversity. The reason for this failure is a lack of incentives. However, an analytical assessment
of the effectiveness of the concept is lacking so far. The present paper raises the question how ABS must be designed in order
to be effective while also helping to protect biodiversity and promote a fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from
its commercialization. This paper identifies six critical factors that determine the effectiveness of ABS governance and discusses
under what circumstances a critical factor increases or decreases in effectiveness. Furthermore, the paper analyses so-called
countermeasures that impact on these circumstances. In specifying the critical factors and their interplay with the countermeasures,
the paper gives guidance on how to develop more effective ABS regimes.
KeywordsAccess and benefit-sharing (ABS)–Convention on Biological Diversity–Biodiversity protection–Regime effectiveness–Institutional economics
This paper examines the recent decentralization of governance in Indonesia and its impact on local infrastructure provision. The decentralization of decisionmaking power to local jurisdictions in Indonesia may have improved the matching of public infrastructures provision with local preferences. However, decentralization has made local public infrastructures depend on local resources. Due to differences in initial endowments, this may result in the divergence of local public infrastructures in rich and poor jurisdictions. Using data from village-level panel surveys conducted in 1996, 2000, and 2006, this paper finds that (1) local public infrastructures depend on local resources, (2) decentralization has improved the availability of local public infrastructures, (3) local jurisdictions are converging to a similar level of local public infrastructure, and (4) to some extent, decentralized public infrastructures' provision reflects local preferences.
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