ChapterPDF Available

History of Zimbabwean Migration

Authors:
1
Alois S. Mlambo
Population migration into and out of present-day Zimbabwe long pre-dates European
conquest and the imposition of artificial colonial borders. Not only did people move
from one area to another as need arose, ethnic boundaries were fluid enough to allow
individuals or groups to move in or out of population clusters and ethnic groupings with
relative ease. Movement did not cease after the establishment of colonial boundaries
either. These arbitrary borders divided families, clan groups and ethnic communities
between different colonies. Examples abound: the Kalanga of southwestern Zimbabwe
and northeastern Botswana; the Shangaan, Venda and Tsonga peoples of southern
Zimbabwe, southern Mozambique and northern South Africa; the Manyika and Ndau
people of eastern Zimbabwe and central Mozambique; and the various ethnic groups
astride the Zambian-Malawi, the Zambian-Zimbabwean and the Zambian-Angolan
borders, as well as the border between Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC). Not surprisingly, local communities generally ignored these colonial impositions
and went about their normal business with their kith and kin, crossing borders without
regard to colonial laws and immigration requirements. They also crossed borders in
search of employment, and for other reasons, and continue to do so to this day.
This chapter traces the long history of Zimbabwean migration from pre-colonial times
to 1990.
1
For much of this history, Zimbabwe was a destination country for migrants.
Population movement into the area began with the peopling of the Zimbabwe Plateau. In
the nineteenth century, there was an influx of groups from the south fleeing the
Mfecane/Difaqane in South Africa. In the twentieth century, white immigrants from
Europe and South Africa established farms and plantations and mines where they
employed black migrants from neighbouring countries such as Malawi and Mozambique.
Southern Africa’s “Thirty Years War” of liberation (from the 1960s to the 1990s)
brought white immigrants fleeing independence in Africa and black refugees from the
civil war in Mozambique.
Zimbabwe was also a “sending” country during the twentieth century although the
numbers were generally much smaller. Migrant workers from some parts of Zimbabwe
engaged in circular migration for work in South Africa. Zimbabwe’s own war of
liberation forced many blacks into exile in the 1970s. They returned at independence,
just as whites began to leave in growing numbers. However, in general, Zimbabwe was
more of a receiving than a sending country before 1990. This was to change in the 1990s
as the country was dramatically transformed into a leading migrant sending country. The
primary purpose of this chapter is to situate this post-1990 transformation in historical
context to identify the distinctive aspects of the current “exodus” when compared to
earlier rounds of migration to and from the country.
PRECOLONIAL PEOPLING OF THE ZIMBABWE PLATEAU
Zimbabwe was originally the home of hunter-gathering, stone-age people who are
believed to have inhabited the region from 100,000 years ago onwards. They were
eventually displaced by the Bantu, an iron-age people with skills in mining and iron
smelting, coming in from the north. By the year 1000, a cattle-keeping culture, referred
2
to by archaeologists as the Leopard Kopje culture, had developed in south-western
Zimbabwe, reaching its climax around 1100 with the development of Mapungubwe on
the Shashe-Limpopo River confluence. This cattle-keeping and farming community
traded in ivory and gold with traders from as far afield as China.
The Mapungubwe culture went into decline after 1300 with the rise of the Great
Zimbabwe culture, with its capital at the Great Zimbabwe complex, built between 1200
and 1450, south-east of the modern Zimbabwean city of Masvingo. Like its
Mapungubwe predecessor, the Great Zimbabwe culture was based on cattle-keeping and
farming, as well as trade in gold with the Swahili coast. In its turn, this kingdom went
into decline from about 1450 onwards, with some groups moving westwards to found the
Torwa state whose capital was at Khami near the present-day city of Bulawayo. Others
moved north-westwards to establish the Munhumutapa Kingdom, which by 1500 had
expanded as far as the Indian Ocean and whose economy was based on gold mining and
trade. The Munhumutapa Kingdom eventually went into decline in the face of growing
Portuguese influence along the Indian Ocean. At the end of the 1600s, a new political
power, the Rozvi Changamire state, emerged and remained powerful until it was
destroyed, in turn, by the Nguni invasion from the south during the Mfecane/Difaqane.
In the early 1800s, political and demographic upheaval in the eastern part of South
Africa (known to historians as the Mfecane/Difaqane), led to population movements that
greatly impacted upon the demographic profile of the land between the Limpopo and the
Zambezi and beyond. Some attribute the Mfecane/Difaqane, and the resultant
depopulation of large swathes of land in the South African interior, to aggressive nation-
building campaigns by the Zulu under Shaka.
2
Others have labelled this view a self-
serving historical invention and rationalization to justify white occupation of the interior
with the excuse that it was unoccupied when they arrived because of the
Mfecane/Difaqane. They attribute the population dispersal to drought and environmental
degradation, trade, and the advance of white settlement. Whatever the causes, the
Mfecane/Difaqane induced northward population movements which had far-reaching
political and demographic effects on Zimbabwe.
In the 1820s, the first wave of Nguni migrants from the south under Zwangendaba
destroyed the Rozvi/Changamire Kingdom, before crossing the Zambezi in 1835 and
proceeding further north, reaching Lake Tanganyika in the late 1860s. Another group
originating from northern Natal in the 1820s, under the leadership of Soshangane,
devastated the area around present-day Maputo and then established the Gaza Empire,
part of which encompassed the Shona-speaking groups of eastern Zimbabwe, such as the
Manyika and the Ndau. Lastly came the Ndebele under Mzilikazi. Having initially
settled in the northern Transvaal, Mzilikazi and his followers were forced to move
northwards in 1837 because of the encroachment of Boers from the south. They
eventually settled in southwestern Zimbabwe and established the Ndebele Kingdom
incorporating local Rozvi groups in the process. Ndebele hegemony over southwestern
Zimbabwe was to be broken only with the arrival of European colonialism at the turn of
the century when white immigration changed the political and demographic profile of the
country even further.
WHITE MIGRATION, 1890–1990
3
3
White hunters, adventurers, explorers and missionaries had long traversed the land
between the Limpopo and the Zambezi before British colonization in 1890, but none had
settled permanently in the region. This was all to change with the arrival of a group of
approximately 700 whites, calling themselves the Pioneer Column. Armed and funded by
Cecil John Rhodes through his recently-established British South Africa Company
(BSAC), this advance party of British imperialism claimed the territory that was to be
known as Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) for Britain by raising the Union Jack at Fort
Salisbury (now Harare) in 1890. Thereafter, the BSAC and subsequent self-governing
administrations after 1923 made determined efforts to encourage white immigration into
the country in line with Rhodes’ dream of developing Rhodesia as a “white man’s
country.”
4
Early white immigration was fuelled in the run-up to the establishment of the Union
of South Africa in 1910. There was a large inflow of mostly English-speaking
immigrants from South Africa between 1901 and 1911 (from 11,000 to over 23,000),
making this the fastest white population growth decade in the entire period of colonial
rule (Table 2.1).
5
Negotiated on favourable terms for the Afrikaners, the Union helped to
push English-speaking South Africans into Rhodesia.
6
Table 2.1: White Population Increase 1891-1969
Year Total % Increase
1891 (Est.) 1,500
-
1904 12,596
14.0
1911 23,606
87.0
1921 33,620
42.0
1931 49,910
48.0
1941 68,954
38.0
1951 136,017
97.0
1960 218,000
60.0
1969 262,000
14.0
Source: Rhodesia, Census of Population 1904-1969 (Salisbury: CSO, 1969), p. 62.
Increased white immigration was also a result of vigorous efforts by the BSAC
government to entice white farmers into the country. Rhodes’ colonizing project had
been driven by the belief and hope that the land north of the Limpopo had large gold
deposits that would compare favourably with, if not surpass, those on the Rand. While
4
the country did have some gold deposits, they were nowhere near as abundant as had
been envisioned. The BSAC government turned to vigorously promoting commercial
agriculture from 1902 onwards, once it “accepted the unpalatable fact that gold-mining
was never going to constitute a basis for great wealth on the lines of the Witwatersrand.”
7
In 1908, it adopted a white-agriculture policy that deliberately promoted settler
agriculture; this included reducing land prices to prospective settlers and expanding the
foreign and contract labour supply system to provide sufficient agricultural labour.
8
The Company government’s commitment to settler agriculture included the
establishment of recruiting and promotional offices in London and Glasgow, and a Land
Settlement Department and Land Bank in Salisbury. As a result “there began a steady, if
not very large, stream of immigrants of a good type, many being experienced farmers.”
9
The Company also enticed immigrants through its own farming and ranching activities.
From 1907, Company ranches “with pure-bred dairy of beef stock, citrus estates with
large irrigation schemes, experimental tobacco estates with warehouses, and farms where
mealies were the main crop, were acquired, stocked and equipped.”
10
After a hiatus during World War One, white immigration picked up again.
11
The
attainment of Responsible government in 1923, the subsequent provision of development
assistance by the British Government, and the British inauguration of a sponsored three-
year settlement scheme led to substantial immigration from 1924 to 1928. The numbers
declined from 1931 to 1936 because of the Great Depression and the deliberate
Rhodesian government policy of discouraging immigration in order to minimize
unemployment. Immigration also declined considerably during World War Two due to
the difficulties of overseas travel.
After the War, immigration increased dramatically as hundreds of demobilised British
soldiers entered the country as part of the Rhodesian government’s post-war settlement
scheme. In 1948, a record 17,000 immigrants arrived.
12
Over 100,000 Africans were
moved from their lands to accommodate the new arrivals.
13
Additional immigrants were
attracted by job and other economic prospects in the rapidly-industrialising Rhodesian
economy. Job reservation provided unlimited opportunities for white immigrants who
could live “a privileged, comfortable life.”
14
Economic depression in the Central African Federation from 1956 to 1958, and the
rise of militant African nationalism, led to a decline in white immigration. This decline
continued in the 1960s when economic sanctions were imposed on Rhodesia after its
unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) in November 1965. Escalating military
clashes between the regime and nationalist liberation forces made the country
unattractive as a destination for European migrants. However, some immigrants entered
the country fleeing black rule in African countries such as Kenya, Zambia and the
Congo. The country also received large numbers of immigrants from Mozambique and
Angola in 1975 following the end of Portuguese colonial rule in those countries.
Throughout the twentieth century, foreign-born whites outnumbered those born in the
country (Table 2.2). The dominance of immigration over natural increase was still
evident as late as 1969 when approximately 59 percent of the white population were
foreign-born. Of these, over 55 percent arrived after World War Two (Table 2.3).
15
5
Table 2.2: White Population by Country of Birth, 1901-1956
Year % Zimbabwe % South Africa % UK/Eire % Other
1901
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
1904
10.1
27.3
44.4
18.2
1911
13.6
30.7
40.9
14.8
1921
24.7
34.6
31.4
9.3
1926
29.1
32.6
29.2
9.1
1931
29.2
34.5
27.1
9.2
1936
34.1
32.8
23.8
9.3
1941
34.1
27.9
26.4
11.6
1946
37.7
26.4
18.3
17.6
1951
31.4
30.4
28.8
9.4
1956
32.5
28.9
28.1
10.5
Source: A. Rogers and C. Frantz, Racial Themes in Zimbabwe: The Attitudes and
Behaviour of the White Population (New Haven: Yale University, 1962), p. 14.
Table 2.3: White Population by Country of Birth, 1969
Place of Birth No. %
Rhodesia 92,934
40.7
Britain 52,468
23.0
South Africa 49,585
21.7
Portugal 3,206
1.4
Elsewhere 30,103
13.2
N= 228,296
Source: Southern Africa: Immigration from Britain, A Fact Paper by the International
Defence and Aid fund (London: IDAF, 1975), p. 17.
6
Until 1961, net migration consistently outnumbered natural increase (Table 2.4). One
reason for the slow increase of the locally-born white population, at least in the early
period, was the paucity of white women in the country. Until 1911, the gap between the
sexes was very wide. Thereafter it narrowed as more vigorous efforts were made to
attract female immigrants. The percentage of white women in the country rose from 34
percent to 44 percent between 1911 and 1921. Increasingly, the white population began
to resemble that of older settler societies (Table 2.5).
16
Table 2.4: White Net Migration and Natural Increase, 1901-1969
Period Net Migration Natural Increase Total Increase
1901-1911 11,083
1,491
12,574
1911-1921 5,835
4,179
10,014
1921-1931 10,145
6,145
16,290
1931-1941 11,025
9,019
19,044
1941-1951 50,066
16,576
66,642
1951-1961 47,097
38,811
85,908
1961-1969 (-) 13,914
20,706
6,792
Source: Census of Population, 1969, p. 3.
Table 2.5: White Population Sex Ratio, 1901-1956
Year
Sex Ratio (Male:Female x 100)
1901
278
1904
246
1911
194
1921
130
1926
126
1931
120
1936
116
1941
113
7
1946
116
1951
111
1956
107
Source: Rogers and Frantz, Racial Themes in Southern Rhodesia, p. 15.
Table 2.6: Racial Composition of Population, 1911-1951
Year White Asian “Coloured” Black*
1911 23,730
880
2,040
752,000
1920 32,620
1,210
2,000
850,000
1930 47,910
1,660
2,360
1,048,000
1940 65,000
2,480
3,800
1,390,000
1947 88,000
3,090
4,750
1,781,000
1948 101,000
3,280
4,880
1,833,000
1949 114,000
3,400
5,000
1,895,000
1950 125,000
3,600
5,200
1,957,000
1951 136,017
4,343
5,964
2,000,000
* These were estimates based on periodic population counts. The first comprehensive
census of the African population was not until 1962, although limited sample surveys
were taken in 1948, 1953 and 1955.
Source: Southern Rhodesia, Central Statistical Office, Official Yearbook of Southern
Rhodesia (Salisbury: Rhodesia Printing and Publishing Company, 1952), p. 130.
Because natural population growth was slow and immigration flows were limited by
highly selective government immigration policies, the white population was increasingly
outstripped by the African population so that the dream of developing Rhodesia as a
white man’s colony remained unfulfilled (Table 2.6).
A prominent feature of the history of white migration was its high turnover rate. For
every ten immigrants who entered the country between 1921 and 1926, seven left.
17
Between 1926 and 1931, the ratio was 5:3 and between 1931 and 1936, 9:7. An analysis
of net migration between 1921 and 1964 shows that, in this period, Rhodesia received a
total of 236,330 white immigrants but lost 159,215, or 67 percent, through emigration
(Table 2.7).
8
Table 2.7: Net White Migration, 1921-1964
Period Immigrants Emigrants Net Migration
1921-26 9,400
6,676
+ 2,724
1926-31 20,000
12,685
+ 7,421
1931-36 9,000
7,058
+ 2,032
1941-46 8,250
6,192
+ 2,058
1946-51 64,634
17,447
+ 47,187
1955-59 74,000
39,000
+ 35,000
1960-64 38,000
63,000
- 25,000
Source: Census of Population, 1969, p. 168.
White emigration increased during the UDI years as the economic and political
situation deteriorated and the military conflict between the regime and nationalist
liberation forces intensified. In the first few years of UDI, however, the country actually
recorded net migration gains, partly as a result of concerted campaigns by the Rhodesian
government to woo immigrants through vigorous propaganda campaigning in Europe,
travel subsidies, and the provision of housing, tax relief and customs concessions, among
other incentives. Immigrants were also attracted by job opportunities as the beleaguered
Rhodesian economy adopted import substitution industrialisation strategies that created
career openings for skilled workers in the country’s expanding manufacturing sector.
18
The inflow of white immigrants into the country might have been larger had
successive Rhodesian governments not been very selective about the type of immigrants
that they would accept. Determined to allow in only the “right type” of immigrant, by
which they meant British immigrants, the government discouraged other nationalities
and ethnic groups from migrating to the country. Of the 33,620 whites in Rhodesia in
1921, 32,203 were British by birth or naturalization. By 1931, British settlers accounted
for 92 percent of the white population. Similarly, the majority of immigrants during the
immediate post-War period were British born and nearly half migrated directly from
Britain to Rhodesia.
19
So determined were the Rhodesian authorities to maintain the “Britishness” of the
country, that they passed the Aliens Act in 1946. The Act established a quota system
under which non-British immigrants were allowed into the country at the rate of only
five to ten percent of British immigrants and subject to the control of an immigrants’
selection board which would maintain the “right standards.”
20
As late as 1957, a
Government Economic Advisory Council’s report on immigration endorsed the long-
standing policy of giving preference to immigrants from the United Kingdom “because
of the importance of preserving the British way of life.”
21
9
Throughout the period under study, therefore, the immigration of non-British whites
was kept to a minimum. Afrikaners remained generally suspect and unwelcome.
22
A
strong anti-Semitic undercurrent ensured that Jewish immigration was also tightly
controlled, despite the fact that Rhodes himself had been very partial towards Jewish
immigration.
23
Other groups such as Poles, Greeks, Italians and Spaniards fared no
better.
24
Despite such attitudes and restrictions, the number of non-British immigrants did
increase slightly in the 1930s and during World War Two. By 1946, there was a sizeable
Italian population in the country. Other non-British groups that entered in the war years
included Germans, Poles, Greeks, Americans, Lithuanians, Swiss, Yugoslavians,
Czechoslovakians and Swedes. But collectively, they remained a small minority
compared to the largely British white population in the country.
25
After UDI, however,
the widely-ostracised and reviled Smith government was glad to accept any white people
who wished to enter the country. While building the country as a British settlement
remained the ideal, Afrikaners, Greeks, Italians, Portuguese and other European ethnic
groups were now welcomed.
26
As for Indians, laws were enacted early in the century to limit their entry.
27
Indian
immigration was repeatedly discouraged, starting with the immigration law of 1903,
followed by legal restrictions in 1924 and, lastly, in 1963. Because of these measures, the
Asian population never constituted more than 2 percent of the total population of the
country.
The country recorded a net gain from migration of 47,121 whites, Asians and
“coloureds” in the 10 years following the declaration of UDI.
28
By the mid 1970s,
however, white emigration began to increase. For a brief period following the
independence of Mozambique and Angola in 1975, there was a sudden surge of
immigration when an estimated 25,000 whites fled the Portuguese territories to
Rhodesia.
29
But the escalating guerrilla campaign and growing economic hardships as a
result of tightening international economic sanctions made Rhodesia an increasingly
unattractive place to live. In 1976, the country recorded a net white migration loss of
7,702, while in 1978, 13,709 whites left the country, many of them skilled professionals
whose services were essential to the country’s economy.
30
In a bid to stem the outgoing
tide, the Rhodesian authorities reduced holiday allowances in September 1976 to prevent
intending emigrants using them as a cover to repatriate their capital. Despite this
measure, emigration continued to swell (Table 2.8).
Table 2.8: Net White Migration, 1972-1979
Year Immigrants Emigrants Net Migration
1972 13,966
5,150
+ 8,816
1973 9,433
7,750
+ 1,683
1974 9,649
9,050
+ 599
1975 12,425
10,500
+ 1,925
10
1976 7,782
14,854
- 7,072
1977 5,730
16,638
- 10,908
1978 4,360
18,069
- 13,709
1979 3,416
12,973
- 9,557
Source: Monthly Migration and Tourist Statistics (Salisbury: Central Statistical Office,
1972-1979); Annual Reports of the Commissioner of the British South African Police,
1972-1979.
High levels of white emigration continued into the independence period. An estimated
20,534 people, mostly whites, left the country in 1981, fleeing the incoming black
government. Between 1980 and 1984, net migration losses exceeded 10,000 annually
despite the fact that there were many black Zimbabweans returning from exile.
31
By
1987, there were only 110,000 whites left, approximately half of the white population in
1980.
MIGRANT LABOUR TO ZIMBABWE
Labour migrancy in Southern Africa dates back to the 1850s with the development of the
sugar plantations of Natal. Thereafter, it intensified with the discovery of diamonds at
Kimberley in 1870 and gold on the Witwatersrand in 1886. The uneven development of
capitalism in Southern Africa, with its emerging mining and agricultural economic
centres in South Africa in the nineteenth century and Zimbabwe in the twentieth, led to
new forms of migration, as workers from neighbouring countries migrated in search of
work. These “southernmost centres, where capital was best developed and entrenched,
each in turn fed off the less developed northern periphery for part of its labour
supplies.”
32
Labour migrancy linked the various countries and colonies in the sub-region into one
large labour market, with various countries sending and receiving migrants.
33
Sub-
regional labour migration was facilitated by a number of factors including the very
porous borders that made it easy for work-seekers to travel to mining centres and
plantations in Zimbabwe and South Africa. In this regional migration network,
Zimbabwe played a dual role as both a receiver of migrant labourers from its neighbours
and as a supplier of migrant labour to South Africa. Sometimes it was used merely as a
conduit by migrant labourers from Malawi and Zambia en route to South Africa who
would work in Zimbabwe for a while to earn enough to finance their journey southward
and then move on.
The country’s expanding agricultural sector and mining industry required abundant
cheap labour which, for a variety of reasons, was not available locally in sufficient
quantities despite colonial efforts to coerce Africans, through taxation, to sell their labour
power. Local Africans were reluctant to work on the mines and farms, partly because
they were still able to produce agricultural surpluses and meet their increasing tax
11
obligations to the colonial state. The colonial authorities resorted to coerced labour (or
chibaro) to try to obtain the labour they required.
34
The general reluctance of local Africans to enter the colonial labour market led to
growing reliance on foreign migrant workers. They dominated the wage labour market in
the early colonial years, not just on the mines and farms, but also in the urban centres.
The early colonial labour shortfall was met through the recruitment of African labour
from neighbouring territories, with the main recruiting grounds being Malawi, Zambia
and Mozambique. Rhodesian mine owners also experimented with recruiting Aandab,
Abyssinian, Somali and Chinese migrant labour without much success.
35
Foreign migrant
labour became increasingly important in the Rhodesian economy before 1910 (Table
2.9).
Table 2.9: Africans Employed in Mining, 1906-10
Year Mining Other
Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total
1906 6,345
11,359
17,704
1907 7,673
17,937
25,610
1908 10,368
20,563
30,931
1909 10,689
21,948
32,637
14,518
11,425
25,943
1910 12,739
25,086
37,825
15,962
13,548
29,510
Source: Report of the Native Affairs Committee of Enquiry, 1910-11 (Southern Rhodesia
Government, 1911), para. 214.
Between 1903 and 1933, a government agency, the Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau
(RNLB), recruited foreign labour and supplied an average of 13,000 workers to
employers each year.
36
Many other workers migrated on their own, outside the auspices
of the RNLB and other agencies. Indeed, the majority of labour migrants probably made
their own way to Zimbabwe under the so-called selufu (self/independent) system.
37
They
did so through dangerous territory and at great personal risk.
38
By 1912, there were
10,000 Malawian workers in Zimbabwe, accounting for 35 percent of the country’s
entire African mine labour force of 48,000.
39
They were soon to displace the Tonga and
Ngoni people from Zambia and workers from the Tete area of Mozambique who had,
until then, been the largest group of migrant workers.
40
From 1920 onwards, Malawian
migrant workers “exceeded even Southern Rhodesian Africans.”
41
Meanwhile, the colonial state assisted employers to secure labour by concluding
labour agreements with Mozambique, Zambia and Malawi. These included the Tete
Agreement of 1913 with Mozambique and the Tripartite Labour Agreement of 1937 with
Malawi and Zambia. Malawian labour migration was boosted by the introduction of a
free transport service for migrant workers in 1927.
42
The Free Migrant Labour Transport
12
Service (popularly known among Malawian migrant workers as “Ulere”) enabled
workers to travel to and from Zimbabwe free of charge and provided them with free
rations and accommodation.
43
Until the end of World War Two, Malawian immigrants
were in the majority in Salisbury (Table 2.10) and the rest of the country (where they
accounted for between 35 and 50 percent of all migrant workers).
44
Inner Salisbury was
dominated by “foreign” Africans, as the local Shona inhabitants preferred to remain on
the outskirts of the growing colonial town to produce agricultural commodities that they
sold to the urban population to raise the income they that required to meet growing
colonial tax demands.
45
Table 2.10: African Population by Nationality, Salisbury, 1911-1969
Origin 1911 1921 1931 1936 1941 1946 1951 1962 1969
Local
2,052
(49%)
3,346(4
1%)
6,406(4
9%)
9,550(5
5%)
12,935(
49%)
15,810
(44%)
30,958(
41%)
154,80
(72%)
231,980(
83%)
Malawi
-
3,219(4
0%)
4,637(3
6%)
5,406
(31%)
7,665(2
9%)
9,509(2
6%)
16,399(
22%)
41,530
(19%)
28,830(1
0%)
Zambia
1,155
(28%)
366(4%
)
791(6%
)
774(4%
)
935(4%)
1,355(4
%)
2,339(3
%)
4,800(2
%)
2,770(1
%)
Mozam
bique
879(2
1%)
1,149(1
4%)
1,008(8
%)
1,612(9
%)
4,665(1
8%)
9,486(2
6%)
25,367(
34%)
13,350(
6%)
13,460(5
%)
South
Africa
&
Others
70(2
%)
59(1%)
161(1%
)
119(1%
)
161
198
425
1,260(1
%)
1,870(1
%)
Unspeci
fed
66
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1,180
Total 4,222
8,139
13,003
17,461
26,361
36,358
75,488
215,81
0
280,090
Source: T. Yoshikuni, African Urban Experiences in Colonial Zimbabwe: A Social
History of Harare Before 1925 (Harare: Weaver Press, 2007), p. 160.
In 1946, the government established the Rhodesia Native Labour Supply Commission
(RNLSC) to recruit foreign workers for the country’s farming sector. The RNLSC
imported an average of 14,000 workers per year from 1946 to 1971.
46
Migrant labour
inflows were further encouraged during the Central African Federation from 1953 to
1963 when Malawian migrants coming into Zimbabwe were allowed to bring their
families with them. Others were allowed to settle in Zimbabwe after a stipulated period
of service. An estimated 150,000 Malawians and Zambians took this opportunity to settle
13
in the country.
47
In 1958, an estimated 123,000 Malawian men, out of a total of 169,000
then outside the country, were in Zimbabwe.
48
The number of male labour migrants from Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique
continued to increase (Table 2.11). By the 1950s, they were well-represented in all
sectors of the economy (Table 2.12). With the exception of commercial agriculture, there
were few female migrants from these countries. Foreign workers continued to be very
significant in that sector until the 1970s (Table 2.13). Of approximately 890,000 Africans
employed in the economy in 1973, about 200,000 were foreign-born.
49
The majority of
foreign workers continued to be Malawian, accounting for 20.2 percent of male
agricultural workers in 1972. Mozambicans were next.
50
Table 2.11: Origin of African Male Employees in Zimbabwe, 1911-1951
Year
Zimbabwe
Zambia
Malawi
Mozambique
Other
Territories
Total
1911
35,933
17,012
12,281
13,588
5,341
84,155
1921
52,691
31,201
44,702
17,198
1,524
147,316
1926
73,233
35,431
43,020
13,068
2,218
171,970
1931
76,184
35,542
49,487
14,896
2,983
179,092
1936
107,581
46,884
70,362
25,215
2,440
252,482
1941
131,404
48,163
71,505
45,970
2,468
299,510
1946
160,932
45,413
80,480
72,120
4,399
363,344
1951
241,683
48,514
86,287
101,618
10,353
488,455
Source: P. Scott, “Migrant Labor in Southern Rhodesia,” Geographical Review, 44 (1),
1954, p. 31.
Table 2.12: Foreign Workers in Zimbabwe, 1956
Zambia Malawi Mozambique
Sector
M F M F M F
Mining 9,718
63
15,976
91
11,579
44
Commercial Farming 12,218
1,027
57,226
4,315
54,896
8,441
Manufacturing 5,762
154
14,694
326
13,050
201
14
Construction 4,478
2
10,435
12
14,870
7
Services 704
0
1,694
0
1,411
2
Commerce 1,380
17
4,567
17
3,599
7
Transport 1,801
0
3,316
13
2,517
2
Domestic Work 4,847
127
19,534
284
16,281
28
Total 40,908
1,390
127,442
5,058
118,203
8,732
Source: J. Crush, V. Williams and S. Peberdy, “Migration in Southern Africa,” Report
for SAMP (Cape Town, 2005), p.4.
Table 2.13: Foreign Workers in Commercial Agriculture, 1941-74
Year No. % of Total Employment
1941 56,083
-
1946 84,089
56
1951 114,878
62
1956 137,030
60
1961 135,330
50
1969 130,235
43
1970 114,693
39
1971 119,275
39
1972 120,964
36
1973 118,000
34
1974 119,000
33
Source: D. Clarke, Agricultural and Plantation Workers in Rhodesia (Gweru: Mambo
Press, 1977), p. 31.
MIGRANT LABOUR TO SOUTH AFRICA
15
By 1911, the South African gold mines had become the major regional employer of
migrant labour.
51
Mine labour recruitment was mainly handled by the Witwatersrand
Native Labour Association (WNLA) in Namibia, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi and
Mozambique and the Native Recruiting Corporation (NRC) in Botswana, Lesotho and
Swaziland. Zimbabwe contributed to the South African mines’ labour complement,
although its numbers were never as large as those of the other countries in which the
WNLA and NRC operated.
Table 2.14: Contract Labour Migration to South African Mines, 1920-90
Year
Angola
Bots. Les. Malawi
Moz. Swaz.
Tanz.
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Other
Total
1920
0
2,112
10,439
354
77,921
3,449
0
12
179
5,844
99,950
1925
0
2,547
14,256
136
73,210
3,999
0
4
8
14
94,234
1930
0
3,151
22,306
0
77,828
4,345
183
0
44
5
99,355
1935
0
7,505
34,788
49
62,576
6,865
109
570
27
9
112,498
1940
698
14,427
52,044
8,037
74,693
7,152
0
2,725
8,112
0
168,058
1945
8,711
10,102
36,414
4,973
78,588
5,688
1,461
27
8,301
4,732
158,967
1950
9,767
12,390
34,467
7,831
86,246
6,619
5,495
3,102
2,073
4,826
172,816
1955
8,801
14,195
36,332
12,407
99,449
6,682
8,758
3,849
162
2,299
192,934
1960
12,364
21,404
48,842
21,934
101,733
6,623
14,025
5,292
747
844
233,808
1965
11,169
23,630
54,819
38,580
89,191
5,580
404
5,898
653
2,686
232,610
1970
4,125
20,461
63,988
78,492
93,203
6,269
0
0
3
972
265,143
1975
3,431
20,291
78,114
27,904
97,216
8,391
0
0
2,485
12
220,293
1980
5
17,763
96,309
13,569
39,539
8,090
0
0
5,770
1,404
182,449
1985
1
18,079
97,639
16,849
50,126
12,365
0
0
0
4
196,068
1990
0
15,720
108,780
72
50,104
17,816
0
0
2
0
192,044
Source: J. Crush, A. Jeeves and D. Yudelman. South Africa’s Labor Empire (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1991), pp. 234-235.
Over time, labour migration to the mines became entrenched in parts of Zimbabwe,
particularly Matabeleland and the eastern part of the country. It became almost a rite of
passage for young men to go kuWenela (with WNLA to the South African mines) to
16
raise cash to meet colonial tax requirements at home and to earn money for lobola
(bridewealth) to enable them to settle down and start their own families.
52
So important
did the Wenela experience and anticipated economic rewards become that young men
risked their lives, walking for weeks through lion-infested country, spending nights tied
to branches in trees to escape the ravages of wild animals, and braving the crocodile-
infested Limpopo River, to get to the mines. As recently as the 1960s, among the Ndau
of eastern Zimbabwe, those who had spent time in South Africa were known as Magaisa,
highly respected as men of substance, especially when they returned after many years of
absence with money and valuable goods.
Similarly, in southwestern Zimbabwe, going to work in Egoli (Johannesburg) became
a virtual rite of passage for young Ndebele men. The people of Matebeleland had always
had close ties with South Africa, given the Nguni origins of the Ndebele people in that
country. Moreover, the similarity of the Ndebele language of Zimbabwe with some
South African languages, such as Zulu and South African Ndebele, also meant that
migrants could easily blend in once they were on the mines or on the farms. However,
Zimbabwean workers were still a small minority of contract labourers on the South
African mines between 1920 and 1990 (Table 2.14).
Table 2.15: Foreign Black Workers Employed Legally in South Africa
Country of
Origin
1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Angola 623
804
69
120
68
48
44
22
Botswana 3,016
29,528
29,169
26,262
25,963
26,439
27,814
28,244
Lesotho 152,188
136,395
150,422
140,719
145,791
136,443
139,827
138,193
Malawi 39,308
31,772
30,602
27,558
29,612
29,268
30,144
31,411
Mozambique
150,738
60,490
59,391
59,323
61,218
60,407
68,665
73,186
Swaziland 16,390
11,981
13,418
13,659
16,773
16,823
22,255
21,914
Zambia 914
914
727
787
743
1,274
833
2,421
Zimbabwe 8,897
20,540
16,965
11,332
7,742
7,492
7,428
7,304
Other 8,512
3,102
995
2,512
71,105
71,072
73,998
75,430
Total 414,586
295,026
301,758
282,272
358,021
351,260
271,008
378,125
Source: E. Leistner and P. Esterhuysen, eds., South Africa in Southern Africa: Economic
Interaction (Pretoria: African Institute of South Africa, 1988), p. 125.
17
Zimbabwean labour migrancy to South Africa increased considerably in the 1970s.
The South African mines targeted Zimbabwean workers when supplies from the
traditional source of Malawi temporarily dried up. This followed a disagreement between
the South African and Malawian governments, after a plane accident in Botswana killed
over 70 Malawian migrant workers. As a result, there were well over 20,000 black
Zimbabweans working in South Africa’s mines in the 1970s, with a peak of 37,900 in
1977.
53
In 1981, the independent Zimbabwean government ended the migrant labour
system to South Africa’s mines. However, around 7,000 Zimbabweans were still
working legally in other sectors in South Africa for most of the 1980s (Table 2.15).
MIGRATION AND THE THIRTY YEAR WAR
Migration in the sub-continent was also fuelled by the region’s liberation struggles that
raged from the 1960s and ended with the political transition in South Africa in 1994. The
wars generated a large number of refugees from the conflict countries of Angola,
Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa to neighbouring states, especially
Zambia, Zaire and Tanzania. Angolan refugees tended to flee to Zaire and Zambia, while
South African and Zimbabwean refugees went to Zambia and Tanzania and, after the
defeat of Portuguese colonialism in 1975, to Mozambique. In 1975, for example, an
estimated 15,000 Zimbabwean refugees entered Mozambique.
54
By 1976, 70,000
Zimbabwean refugees had crossed the border.
55
The number rose to 150,000 by 1979.
56
Many Zimbabwean refugees also went to Tanzania and Lesotho. By 1980, approximately
1.4 million people had been displaced by the war. Of these, 228,000 were in the
neighbouring countries of Mozambique (160,000), Zambia (45,000), and Botswana
(23,000).
57
Following the signing of the Lancaster House Agreement in 1979, the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was invited to coordinate the repatriation
and resettlement of Zimbabweans who had taken refuge in neighbouring countries and to
arrange the resettlement of internally displaced people who were living either in
“protected villages,” or in urban areas. The total number of returnees and internally-
displaced persons in need of immediate assistance was estimated at 660,000. The
repatriation was carried out in two phases starting in January 1980. By 31 December
1980, 72,000 refugees had been brought back into the country under this programme. At
the same time, an unknown number of refugees made their own way back from
Mozambique.
58
While most refugees had been repatriated to Zimbabwe by the end of
1981, a number continued to trickle back into the country throughout the first
independence decade and may have contributed to the numbers of “returning residents”
(Table 2.16).
Table 2.16: Immigrants to Zimbabwe by Category, 1978-1987
Year
Returning
Residents (%)
Temporary
Residents (%)
New
Immigrants (%)
Total
(%)
Total
Number
1978
35.5
6.5
58.0
100.0
4,650
18
1979
44.3
6.7
49.0
100.0
3,649
1980
38.4
5.9
55.7
100.0
6,407
1981
29.0
4.1
66.9
100.0
7,794
1982
19.5
2.4
78.1
100.0
7,715
1983
17.9
29.9
52.2
100.0
6,944
1984
13.0
58.5
28.5
100.0
5,567
1985
23.3
51.8
24.9
100.0
5,471
1986
22.3
37.8
39.9
100.0
4,452
1987
13.4
41.4
45.2
100.0
3,925
Source: L. Zinyama, “International Migration to and from Zimbabwe and Influence of
Political Changes on Population Movements, 1965-1987” International Migration
Review 24(4) (1990): 748-67.
The 1980s witnessed two waves of out-migration, mostly to South Africa. The first
was the exodus of whites fleeing black rule.
59
The second migration wave, as yet
unquantified, was the movement of thousands of Ndebele people from the southwestern
part of the country into South Africa and Botswana to escape the Gukurahundi massacres
of the early 1980s when the Zimbabwean government’s Korean-trained 5th Brigade
brought terror to Matebeleland in its effort to put down anti-government rebels labelled
by the government as “dissidents.”
60
Continuing its traditional role as both a receiver and a sender of migrants, Zimbabwe
also played host to many refugees from Mozambique and South Africa during its first
independence decade. Mozambican refugees were fleeing from that country’s South
Africa backed fratricidal war between the ruling Party, FRELIMO, and the Mozambican
Resistance Movement (RENAMO) that broke out soon after independence in 1975.
Thousands of Mozambicans sought refuge in South Africa, Malawi, Tanzania, and
Zimbabwe. By October 1992, when the two warring parties signed a peace agreement, an
estimated 4.5 million Mozambicans had left the country as refugees and around 140,000
were in Zimbabwe. This may be an underestimate since there were probably another
100,000 unregistered refugees living outside the official camps.
CONCLUSION
Migration has clearly been an important part of the history of Zimbabwe since early
times. From the arrival of the Bantu during the Iron Age, through the Mfecane/Difaqane
and the subsequent period of white immigration and inward and outward labour
migrancy, groups of people have moved into and out of Zimbabwe for a variety of
19
reasons. Population movement and labour migration between Zimbabwe and its
neighbours has been a constant feature of the region’s history. As in the past, labour
continues to migrate from one country to another in search of better opportunities. South
Africa, continues to attract migrants from the rest of the region.
There are, however, some notable differences in the population flows now as
compared to the past. For instance, the volume of migration is presently much higher
than in the past, especially from Zimbabwe to South Africa, as political and economic
problems in the home country force many people to migrate to escape hardships at home
and to seek better economic conditions. Thus, what had been a trickle in the past has
become a virtual flood, with many risking life and limb crossing the Limpopo River and
entering the country without proper documentation in their determination to find greener
pastures.
Another significant difference is the fact that, while in the past, migrants were mostly
labourers seeking jobs in the region’s mining and agricultural sectors, current migration
includes growing numbers of highly qualified professionals, including medical doctors,
engineers, academics, nurses, pharmacists and teachers, who are also leaving Zimbabwe
because of unfavourable economic and other factors. Lastly, unlike the past when
migrants were mostly male, women now comprise a sizeable and growing percentage of
migrants, with many criss-crossing regional boundaries as cross-border traders.
Thus, there are clearly differences in the composition, numbers and types of migrants
between the past and the present. What the history of Zimbabwe teaches, however, is that
no movement or trend is permanent. While Zimbabwe has, in the last two decades,
become a country of major out-migration, this is not its “natural” migration state. As
soon as the forces propelling this unprecedented out-migration are reversed, there is
every likelihood that Zimbabwe will attract back many of those who have left, becoming
once again a country of both origin and destination.
NOTES
1 Modern names for countries in the region are used throughout the chapter, except
where their use might cause confusion.
2 J. Omer-Cooper, The Zulu Aftermath: A Nineteenth Century Revolution in Bantu
Africa (London: Longman, 1966); A. Smith, “The Trade of Delagoa Bay as a Factor
in Nguni Politics 1750-1835” in L. Thompson, (ed.), African Societies in Southern
Africa (London: Heine-mann, 1969), pp. 171-89; J. Pieres, (ed.), Before and After
Shaka: Papers in Nguni History (Grahamstown: Institute of Social and Economic
Research, Rhodes University, 1981); J. Cobbing, “The Mfecane as Alibi: Thoughts
on Dithakong and Mbolompo” Journal of African History 29(3) (1988): 487-519; J.
Omer-Cooper, “Has the Mfecane a Future? A Response to the Cobbing Critique”
Journal of Southern African Studies 19(2) (1993): 273-94.
3 This section of the chapter draws on A. Mlambo, White Immigration into Rhodesia:
From Occupation to Federation (Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publishers, 2000).
4 A. Keppel-Jones, Rhodes and Rhodesia: The White Conquest of Zimbabwe, 1884-
1902 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1983).
20
5 R. Roberts, “The Settlers” Rhodesiana 29 (1979): 55-61.
6 B. Schutz, “European Population Patterns, Cultural Resistance and Political Change
in Rhodesa” Canadian Journal of African Studies 7(1) (1973), p. 7.
7 I. Henderson, “White Populism in Southern Rhodesia” Comparative Studies in
Society and History 14(4) (1972): 387-99.
8 D. Clarke, Agricultural and Plantation Workers in Rhodesia (Gweru: Mambo Press,
1977), p. 16.
9 E. Tawse Jolie, “The Chartered Company in Rhodesia,” The British South Africa
Company Historical Catalogue & Souvenir of Rhodesia Empire Exhibition,
Johannesburg, 1936-37 [www.tokencoins.com/bbp.htm].
10 Ibid.
11 Rhodesia, Official Yearbook (Salisbury: CSO, 1924), p. 37.
12 Schutz, “European Population Patterns” p. 16.
13 R. Palmer and I. Birch, Zimbabwe: A Land Divided (Oxford: Oxfam, 1992), p. 8.
14 Schutz, “European Population Patterns” p. 16.
15 Mlambo, White Immigration, p. 2.
16 Schutz, “European Population Patterns,” p. 8. See also, Mlambo, White Immigration,
pp. 8-9.
17 Rhodesia, Census of Population of Zimbabwe Pt. 1 (Salisbury: CSO, 1941), p. 5.
18 L. Zinyama, “International Migration to and from Zimbabwe and the Influence of
Political Changes on Population Movements”International Migration Review 24(4)
(1990): 748-67.
19 Schutz, “European Population Patterns” p. 17.
20 Ibid., p. 16.
21 National Archives of Zimbabwe, F170/18, Report on Immigration Policy by the
Economic Advisory Council, 1957.
22 For Rhodesian Attitudes to Afrikaners, see R. Hodder-Williams, “Afrikaners in
Rhodesia: A Partial Portrait” African Social Research 18 (1974): 611-42.
23 See M. Gelfand, ed., Godfrey Huggins: Viscount Malvern, 1883-1971- His Life and
Work (Salisbury: Central African Journal of Medicine, n.d.), p. 39; F. Clements,
Rhodesia: The Course to Collision (London: Pall Mall Press, 1939), p. 43; B.
Kosmin, “A Comparative Historical Population Study: The Development of Southern
Rhodesian Jewry, 1890-1936”, Henderson Seminar Paper, No. 17, University of
Zimbabwe, November, 1971; B. Kosmin, “Ethnic Groups and the Qualified Franchise
21
in Southern Rhodesia, 1898-1922” Rhodesian History 8 (1977): 33-70; B. Kosmin,
Majuta: A History of the Jewish Community in Zimbabwe (Gweru: Mambo Press,
1980).
24 For a discussion of Rhodesian attitudes to other non-British immigrant groups, see
Mlambo, White Immigration, pp. 64-7.
25 Ibid., p. 12.
26 Ibid., p. 20.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Rhodesian Government, Monthly Migration and Tourist Statistics (Salisbury: CSO,
1972-1979); M. Sinclair, “The Brain Drain from Zimbabwe to Canada: The Issue of
Compensation Payments” Issue: Journal of Opinion 9(4) (1979): 41-3.
31 Zinyama, “International Migration to and from Zimbabwe.”
32 C. van Onselen, Chibaro: African Mine Labour in Southern Rhodesia, 1900-1933
(Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1976), p. 120.
33 J. Crush, V. Williams, and S. Perbedy, “Migration in Southern Africa,” Paper
prepared for the Global Commission on International Migration Policy Analysis and
Research Program (September 2005), p. 1.
34 van Onselen, Chibaro.
35 Ibid., pp. 81-83.
36 Ibid., p. 25.
37 W. Chirwa, “‘TEBA is Power’: Rural Labour, Migrancy and Fishing in Malawi,
1890s -1985” PhD Thesis, Queens University, 1992, pp. 133-4.
38 E. Makambe, “The Nyasaland African Labour ‘Ulendos’ to Southern Rhodesia and
the Problem of the African ‘Highwaymen’, 1903-1923: A Study in the Limitations of
Early Independent Labour Migration” African Affairs 79(317) (1980): 548–66.
39 van Onselen, Chibaro, p. 122.
40 Scott, “Migrant Labor in Southern Rhodesia,” p. 32.
41 F. Sanderson, “The Development of Labour Migration from Nyasaland, 1891-1914”
Journal of African History 2 (1961): 259-71.
42 Clarke, Agricultural and Plantation Workers in Rhodesia, p.
43 Scott, “Migrant Labor in Southern Rhodesia,” p. 36.
22
44 Ibid., p. 32.
45 T. Yoshikuni, African Urban Experiences in Colonial Zimbabwe: A Social History of
Harare before 1925 (Harare: Weaver Press, 2007), p. 162.
46 J. Chadya and P. Mayavo, “‘The Curse of Old Age:’ Elderly Workers on Zimbabwe’s
Large-Scale Commercial Farms, with Particular Reference to ‘Foreign’ Farm
Labourers up to 2000” Zambezi XIX (i) (2002): 12-26.
47 F. Wilson, “International Migration in Southern Africa” International Migration
Review 10(4) (1976): 451-88.
48 A. Hanna, The Story of the Rhodesias & Malawi (London: Faber & Faber, 1960), p.
230.
49 Wilson, “International Migration” p. 461.
50 Clarke, Agricultural and Plantation Workers in Rhodesia, p. 32.
51 C. Feinstein, An Economic History of South Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2005), p. 63.
52 The author’s own father and his three young brothers all spent time working on the
mines before they started families upon their return.
53 Zinyama, “International Migration to and from Zimbabwe.”
54 A. Adepoju, “The Dimension of the Refugee Problem in Africa” African Affairs
81(322) (1982), p 9; D. Knight, Refugees: Africa’s Challenge (London: Christian
Aid, 1978).
55 N. Shamuyarira, “Liberation Movements in Southern Africa,” Presented at the Eighth
Annual Hans Wolff Memorial Lecture, Dar-es-Salaam, April 1977.
56 Adepoju, “Dimension of the Refugee Problem,” p. 29.
57 Economist Intelligence Unit, Special Report No. 111: Zimbabwe’s First Five Years,
Economic Prospects Following Independence (London, EIU, 1981), pp. 15-16.
58 UNHCR, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (New York:
United Nations, 1981).
59 D. Tevera and J. Crush, “The New Brain Drain from Zimbabwe” SAMP Migration
Policy Series No 29, Cape Town, 2003, p. 6.
60 For a detailed account of the Gukurahundi massacres, see Catholic Commission for
Peace and Justice, Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace/Legal Resources
Foundation, Breaking the Silence, Building True Peace: A Report on the
Disturbances in Matebeleland and the Midlands, 1980 to 1998 (Harare: CCJP/LRF,
1997).
23
... As such, human mobility is not a new phenomenon in Zimbabwe. Human population movements in Zimbabwe can be traced back 10,000 years, when the local Mapungubwe people were displaced southwards by the Bantu people from North Africa, who were well known for their exceptional skills in iron mining (Mlambo, 2010). The human mobility patterns that followed the invasion of Zimbabwe by the Europeans in 1890 were imposed by the political and economic will of various kingdoms and empires, which claimed power and control over productive resources such as agricultural lands and livestock, and the ivory and gold trade (Mlambo, 2010;Mafa et al, 2015). ...
... Human population movements in Zimbabwe can be traced back 10,000 years, when the local Mapungubwe people were displaced southwards by the Bantu people from North Africa, who were well known for their exceptional skills in iron mining (Mlambo, 2010). The human mobility patterns that followed the invasion of Zimbabwe by the Europeans in 1890 were imposed by the political and economic will of various kingdoms and empires, which claimed power and control over productive resources such as agricultural lands and livestock, and the ivory and gold trade (Mlambo, 2010;Mafa et al, 2015). Consequently, the control and ownership of the means of production and trade in ancient Zimbabwe saw people displaced to various destinations across the country (Mlambo, 2010;Mafa et al, 2015). ...
... The human mobility patterns that followed the invasion of Zimbabwe by the Europeans in 1890 were imposed by the political and economic will of various kingdoms and empires, which claimed power and control over productive resources such as agricultural lands and livestock, and the ivory and gold trade (Mlambo, 2010;Mafa et al, 2015). Consequently, the control and ownership of the means of production and trade in ancient Zimbabwe saw people displaced to various destinations across the country (Mlambo, 2010;Mafa et al, 2015). The human mobility that took place in colonial Zimbabwe after the country's invasion by the Europeans from 1890 to 1980 was politically motivated and initiated to grab prime agricultural land from African farmers. ...
Article
This paper examines the role played by human mobility as a climate change adaptation strategy in Zimbabwe’s small-scale farming areas. Livelihoods in Zimbabwe’s small-scale farming areas are mostly agriculture-based and have long suffered from low levels of production. This is largely due to poor agroecological conditions and lack of agricultural investment, including income diversification projects from the central government. Recently, extreme climatic events in these areas have exacerbated food insecurity challenges, prompting many households to relocate. The findings of this study indicate that most households in the small-scale farming regions are resorting to either short- or long-term migration to areas that offer them food security. In these areas, poor households are forced to work on large commercial farms where they are paid in maize grain or trade their products for food to support their families. This paper argues that, if properly used together with other climate change policies promoted in Zimbabwe, human mobility can be an effective climate change adaptation strategy in small-scale farming areas.
... This study, undertaken from an indigenous knowledge systems (IKS) point of view, is on the ramifications of migration, particularly for children who remain behind as their parents or guardians emigrate. There is a plethora of literature on migration in Zimbabwe (Zanamwe & Devillard 2009;Mlambo 2010;Madebwe & Madebwe 2017;Muyambo & Ranga 2019) that focuses particularly on reasons for migration. This includes literature on the experiences of those who emigrate as either adults or youth (IOM 2009;World Bank 2008;Zinyama 1990). ...
... As alluded to earlier on, migration is not a new thing. It has been there before colonisation (Mlambo 2010), and is likely to continue despite the new challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Given this, we may need to understand how people have traditionally dealt with children who were left behind when their parents migrated. ...
... In this study, we focus on the South Africa-Zimbabwe migration corridor because there are millions of Zimbabweans currently working and living in South Africa. In addition, these two countries have a well-documented migration history (Maphosa 2010;McGregor 2010;Mlambo 2010;Ncube and Gómez 2011). Also, during the COVID-19 pandemic, Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa were under the spotlight as they were used by some politicians and some public activists as scapegoats for the worsening economic turmoil and high unemployment and crime in South Africa. ...
Article
Intergenerational support is a common cultural expectation and obligation in most African families. It is a form of reciprocal solidarity wherein a generation uses its privileges to assist a generation in need. This is typical of care and support relationships between parents and their children. As parents care and provide for their children, the unspoken expectation is that they are investing as their children will be obliged to take care of them in the future. In Zimbabwe, the obligations of this social contract have led many to migrate to other countries in search of economic opportunities. However, with the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and the resultant economic hardships, these reciprocal relationships have been negatively impacted. This paper assesses the impact of COVID-19 and the economic difficulties faced by migrants in South Africa, drawing from the life histories of dyads of five parents and five adult children. It explores how the governance systems implemented during the COVID-19 pandemic and the precarity of transnational migrants in South Africa affected intergenerational material support within transnational families. Findings reveal that the pandemic significantly affected intergenerational support within transnational families. The restrictive measures crafted to curb the spread of the pandemic led to notable adaptations in the provision of parental support by migrant children in South Africa. Parental support went beyond reciprocity and altruism, exhibiting a profound moral value embedded in the moral economy perspective, where children remain committed to providing support to their parents despite the economic struggles presented by the pandemic.
... Migration within Southern Africa is not a new phenomenon but has a long history dating back to the mid-19 th century (Crush et al., 2005;Mlambo, 2010). During the colonial period, migration was viewed as the single most important factor tying all colonies and countries together into a single regional labour market (Crush et al., 2005). ...
Article
Full-text available
Remittances transferred between migrants and non-migrants play a major role in alleviating poverty and improving social and economic well-being in many developing countries. Although remittances are regarded as an outcome of migration with far reaching effects as a livelihood strategy, not all non-migrants with migrant family members are recipients of remittances. Remittances are not transferred to all non-migrant family members in the country of origin. Migrants identify particular individuals as recipients of remittances, which they send to their home countries during the migration period. Therefore, it is important to understand the determinants of remittance flow and remittance behaviour during the migration period. This study explores relationships between migrants and non-migrants and how such relations influence the flow of remittances during the migration period. A qualitative approach was employed in which 60 interviews were conducted (30 with Zimbabwean migrants in Durban and 30 with their respective family members in Zimbabwe). The study found that the strength of social ties between migrants and non-migrants plays a major role in determining remittance flows.
... A long history of labour migration precedes the current individualised movement and particularly the movement of women on this corridor. For the longest time the gold mining industry was the single most important generator of movement in southern Africa, recruiting men from sub Saharan Africa through a formalised and state-led 'contract labour migration system' (Mlambo, 2010;Crush, 1997Crush, , 1999aMaloka, 1997). Large numbers of Zimbabwean migrants were amongst the mine workers. ...
Article
Full-text available
The migration of migrant domestic workers, who are mainly female, from Zimbabwe to South Africa is shaped by a number of agents and processes, even though the women exercise substantial individualism and agency in their migration decisions. It is influenced by generational, gendered and economic circumstances, as well as by intermediaries who facilitate the stages of migration. Those intermediaries include brokers with whom the migrant women are socially connected and those who are primarily service providers, even if they also share social connections with the migrants. This study of the migration experience of 40 women found the ease of passage for women once they have made the decision rests in a well-defined mobility pathway. Owing to restrictive immigration controls, the majority of women in the sample fell into irregular migration even if their first arrival in South Africa was regular. Their continued stay in South Africa has been made possible through similarly individualised tactics that tap into social networks and brokers. Furthermore, while domestic workers are legally protected, irregular migrants are at high risk of labour exploitation. The poor oversight of labour conditions in the workplace despite the existence of sound regulation protecting domestic workers in South Africa adds a particular local dimension to precarity of migrant domestic workers. There is a need to stabilise the mobility of these labour migrants through the implementation of a rational, facilitated migration regime.
Chapter
Zimbabwe is currently going through tidal waves of migration as people are leaving their motherland in search for greener pastures. Since time immemorial, human communities have been migrating from countries that are struggling economically as a survival strategy to enhance their livelihood assets. Granted, migration decreases or increases people’s access to assets and skills in diverse ways. Competition for economic opportunities between migrants and locals, as well as between migrant men and women, has put migrant women at a disadvantage. This chapter explores how migration in interaction with other factors is affecting Zimbabwean young women’s livelihood activities, opportunities, and choices in South Africa. The sustainable livelihoods framework (SLF) is used to examine the relationship between migration, survivalist marriages known as omasihlalisane, and young migrant women’s access to livelihood assets. The chapter also foregrounds how being entrapped in survivalist marriages infringes upon the young migrant women’s livelihood. Additionally, the chapter presents how these young women are vulnerable to shocks and stresses such as the illness or death of a partner or breakup leading to their impoverishment. Finally, a pastoral response is presented in an endeavor to address the challenges presented by omasihlalisane marriages, particularly in light of how this affects young migrant women’s access to livelihood assets. In this regard, religion through a contextual pastoral response can play a critical role in promoting women’s sustainable livelihoods.KeywordsFeministMigration Omasihlalisane Pastoral responseSurvivalist marriageSexual Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR)Sustainable livelihood framework (SLF)Sustainable Development Goals;Zimbabwean young women
Article
Full-text available
This article discusses consolidation of the Zimbabwean diaspora and its transnational activities. It presents formation of this particular diaspora as an unanticipated development that is contingent upon circumstances as they evolve in both sending and receiving countries. It draws from longitudinal research with Zimbabwean migrants in Germany and South Africa to illustrate this argument. It also borrows from Tsuda’s transnational outcome framework to provide a nuanced understanding of Zimbabwean migrants’ varied relationships with both Zimbabwe and the receiving countries. The article argues that migrants’ decision to settle for the long-term in the receiving country is not always made at the same time as the decision to migrate itself or in the initial stages of life in the receiving country. There are many cases among Zimbabwean migrants showing that migration was initially perceived as quest for reprieve from the country’s economic and political challenges while they “waited” for the situation to improve. However, the crisis in Zimbabwe has dragged on for more than two decades with no tangible solution in sight thus transforming waiting into settling. Economic and political factors in Zimbabwe as well as factors in the receiving countries influenced the formation and consolidation of the Zimbabwean diaspora and its transnational activities. Diaspora formation and consolidation in this case is an outcome of migrants’ adaptation of their initial plans to new realities obtaining in both the sending and receiving countries.
Article
There is extensive research on gender and migration, however, Uwakweh (2014) notes that there is limited research on first generation black African women's experiences in the global North. Consequently, their voices are often ignored and/or undermined within social policy. This paper is based on a phenomenological study that employed African Feminist Standpoint Theory with an intersectional approach exploring black Zimbabwean women migrants' experiences in Britain. The aims of this paper are firstly, to explore how gender intersects with other factors in black Zimbabwean women's reconstruction of their cultural identities and sense of belonging in Britain. Secondly, to examine how these cultural identities are established in spaces that socially position the women in multiply differentiated ways. Five focus group interviews, participant observations and nine semi-structured interviews were conducted with Zimbabwean women based in Reading, Manchester, Sheffield, Birmingham, Northampton,Coventry, London and Wolverhampton. Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis was utilised to analyse the narrations. The findings show that the women's cultural identities are ascribed by their cultures and mainly based on gendered roles. In Britain, these identities are fragmented, and the women then respond in divergent ways, based on the intersection of gender with race, age, culture, and prior experiences in Zimbabwe. The study contributes to gender and migration scholarship by demonstrating the everyday practises, mechanisms that migrant women employ in redefining their gendered cultural identities.
Chapter
International student migration in the southern African context is a scantily researched area. While research abounds on aspects of migration such as human rights, remittances, development efficacy of migration and transnationalism, the concerns, experiences and encounters of student migrants remains neglected. While in South Africa some migrants are exposed to xenophobic sentiments, little is known about experiences in places such as Zimbabwe. Employing Zimbabwe as a case, the author discusses context, experiences and the policy framework around international students from within the southern African region. It reveals the causes for migration, socio-economic experiences as well as exposure to life in Zimbabwe predominantly during the difficult decade at the turn of the millennium in 2000. In bringing up experiences and challenges, it highlights transformation in the enrollment patterns as well as areas for policy improvement.
Article
This paper discusses the complex issue of compensation payments in the brain drain as it relates to the Rhodesia/ Zimbabwe-Canada axis. It examines the available immigration figures and focuses on the circumstances and method of payment. In the contexts of the need for compensation and the numerous issues and complications in implementing such a scheme, the paper also discusses the brain drain income tax and the proposed international fund to be set up by Western governments to help facilitate the transition to majority rule in Zimbabwe. Discussion of the issue is timely because many professionals have already emigrated to Canada from Rhodesia owing to the prolonged and increasingly bloody liberation struggle, and many more may leave because of apprehension about the forthcoming Zimbabwean independence. Although most of the immigrants are likely to be whites, they could also include Asians, coloreds (persons of mixed color), and possibly Africans as well.
Article
In recent years Julian Cobbing has advanced a wide-ranging critique of the concept of the Mfecane in southern, central and east African history. The Mfecane, he has maintained, was in origin a colonial myth to conceal white wrong-doing and justify land expropriation. Revived by well-intentioned ‘Africanist’ historians in the 1960s the concept has subsequently been exploited to justify aspects of apartheid. Rather than being the accompaniments of institutional change in African societies, he maintains that the wars and upheavals of the period must be attributed to the effects of increased white demand for African labour expressed in the massive expansion of the Delagoa Bay slave trade and slave raiding for the Cape labour market by Griquas with missionary and official involvement in Trans Orangia, white traders in Natal, and British military forces in the Transkei. Examination of the evidence, however, shows that the expansion of the slave trade in Delagoa Bay came after the area had been affected by the spread of upheavals from the south and could not have been their cause. Evidence for large-scale slave raiding and trading by Griquas, missionaries, Natal traders and British military commanders likewise proves unsubstantiated. The bold new paradigm cannot be sustained. The debate has, however, raised important new questions, enlivened research in the area and ensured that the Mfecane will continue to occupy a prominent place in the developing historiography of southern Africa.
Article
Nyasaland has never been significant as a field of economic exploitation; mineral wealth is lacking and the territory's comparative inaccessibility has severely hampered agricultural development. However, she does possess an abundance of labour, the only mobile form of capital held in a subsistence economy. Today approximately one-third of the total male adult population is employed abroad; for, although Nyasaland is one of the most densely peopled areas in Southern Africa, she cannot provide regular paid employment for more than one-fifth of her male adults. An estimated 123,000 of the 169,000 migrant workers are in European employment in Southern Rhodesia where less than half that colony's requirements are obtainable from her own resources; the rest work mainly in South Africa and in Northern Rhodesia.