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Policy Analysis:
US Doctrine and Joint Warfare: Planning and
Implementation
By Scott Nicholas Romaniuk
April 2015
1
Executive Summary
The US constantly looks to the future of its strategic environment to understand
where its military, security, economic, technological, and informational challenges
might lie, and how “old” or present dangers are expected to change. Today the US
military operates in a complex strategic environment in which both “old” persist
and new dangers frequently emerge. This report addresses key features of the US
military in what is referred to as the “new security environment” of the 21st
century. It considers formulations of the US military as a joint force and criteria
that might set it apart from a non-integrated or non-joint force. Aspects of planning
and implementation expected to meet some of the major security challenges of the
contemporary period, as outlined by the US government, are examined. How
operations can be conceived of as effective is no simple task; but can be undertaken
by looking at cases in which the US and its various military services engaged in
large scale combat operations. “Operation Iraqi Freedom” and “Operation
Enduring Freedom” provide the bases for looking at joint planning and execution
in practice, and the challenges of joint operations that take place in conjunction
with civil-based organizations and agencies. While this report makes a
preliminary assessment of the lessons learned from two major US operations,
many different perspectives can be applied to these in order to outline key
challenges of joint operations as well as the principles and structures, which the
US and its allies might be able to employ in order to achieve success in future
strategic, operational, and tactical planning and execution.
2
Introduction
The US and its military today, faces a much different range of threats in a very
different security environment than it did decades ago. During the Cold War, the
US and its allies contended with a monolithic threat that came in the form of the
Soviet Union and operated in a security environment defined by bipolarity. Today,
the US faces multiple threats, both conventional and unconventional. While many
of the “old” dangers (i.e., nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, among
others) still persists as part of the threat matrices that occupy the US security
agenda, a much wider range of factors contribute to a more dangerous and more
unpredictable security environment. The US has also increasingly looked to
partnering within its own borders (i.e., amongst US military service) and amongst
organizations and states around the world to enhance its abilities to ensure
security and stability, and to protect its national interests. This report looks at key
features of the US and its military within a new security environment. First it
considers conceptualizations of the US military as a joint force and how it
implements planning. Second, and on a more substantive level, it looks at
examples of effective operations using existing cases in order to outline the key
challenges of joint operations, as well as the principles and structures that can be
used to inform successful operations in the future.
Joint Doctrine Development and Warfighting
Joint Vision 2020 establishes a useful template for bringing together the
capabilities of multiple military services. Each of the services of the US military
possesses its own unique ability and skillset. Combined, the services are able,
according to the vision and strategy of the US government through its publication;
bring to the table a coherent and unified structure with innovative leadership.
“The traditional concepts of maneuver, strike, protection, and logistics are
leveraged with technological advances and information superiority to produce
improvements that are potentially so powerful that they become, in effect, new
operational concepts.”
1
The operational concepts include:
Dominant maneuver – the multidimensional application of information and
maneuver capabilities to provide coherent operations of air, land, sea, and
space forces throughout the breadth, depth, and height of the battlespace to
seize the initiative and control the tempo of the operation to a decisive
conclusion.
1
Federation of American Scientists (FAS) “Joint Warfighter S&T Plan – Chapter II: Vision and
Strategy,” no date, https://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/defense/97_jwstp/jw2.htm (accessed
1 Arp. 2015).
3
Precision engagement – the capability to accurately locate the enemy,
command and control friendly forces, precisely attack key enemy forces or
capabilities, and accurately assess the level of success.
Full-dimensional protection – the capability to protect our forces at all levels
and obtain freedom of action while they deploy, maneuver, and engage an
adversary.
Focused logistics – the capability to respond rapidly to crises, shift warfighting
assets between geographic regions, monitor critical resources en route, and
directly deliver tailored logistics at the required level of operations.
2
Joint warfighting planning has become enhanced due to the ideas of increased
flexibility and responsiveness. These elements are key in bringing about a military
force that is expected to operate in a new and emerging security environment
defined by both conventional and unconventional threats of the 21st century. When
services are brought together, the concept of “Total Force” emerges. The concept
encompasses the ability to the US military to “build the most effective force for
2020” by underscoring the necessity of becoming “intellectually, operationally,
organizationally, doctrinally, and technically” proficient and unified in its
approach to contemporary security threats.
3
Joint doctrine development strengthens joint warfighting planning by
expanding the scope of vision of current and future military forces. The range of
military operations is greatly expanded due to a building of “synergy of the core
competencies of the individual services, integrated into a joint team.”
4
The
following figure depicts this expanded range.
2
Federation of American Scientists (FAS) “Joint Warfighter S&T Plan – Chapter II: Vision and
Strategy,”; US Department of Defense (DoD), “Joint Vision 2020,” 2000,
http://www.fraw.org.uk/files/peace/us_dod_2000.pdf (accessed 1 Apr. 2015).
3
US Department of Defense (DoD), “Joint Vision 2020,”, p. 2.
4
Ibid., p. 7.
4
Figure 1: Range of Military Operations
5
An increased range of operations complements the new security environment in
which the US and its military services are expected to operate. A number of
persistent trends characterize this new environment: the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction, the rise of modern competitor states, violent extremism,
regional instability, transnational criminal activity, and competition for resources.
6
The question of how joint doctrine and development may lead to ideas and
capabilities that enhance joint warfighting planning cannot be addressed without
taking into consideration the environment in which that joint warfighting is
expected to take place. The two operate in concert because a joint force will have
to respond to the threats presented by its environment. The factors mentioned
facilitate the rise of a security environment in which there is likely to a higher
degree of unpredictability, greater complexity, and probably much more
dangerous than in the past.
7
Effective Translation: From Policy to Practice
Doctrinal planning and preparation provide the very basis for military operations
given that without proper preparation in terms of planning the implementation
5
Ibid., p. 7.
6
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) “CJCSI 3141,” 2011,
http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/3141_01.pdf (accessed 1 Arp. 2015), p. 2.
7
Ibid., p. 3.
5
phase of a military’s activities would be disastrous. Both doctrine and planning
are therefore seminal features of US military services and their operations. They
specify fundamental (if even basic) direction for a state’s military from national to
international domains. They are also essential determinants of how a state’s
military and its various elements act in the face of military conflict, the prevention
of war and violence, military development, and the use of force for the defense of
critical national interests. Effective joint operations are further tied to state
(political) sovereignty, and territorial integrity.
The terms doctrine and planning are inherently conceptual in nature and may
have different meaning prescribed to them. Within the context of the US and the
US military, doctrine is critically understood as a formulation of means and ends.
It represents an essential roadmap for what and how the US will go about fulfilling
its major objectives and obligations. I take planning and doctrine as means to
effective (joint) operations. Accordingly, joint operations are intrinsically tied to
planning and doctrine though conceptualizations of effectiveness. This is ultimately
one of the major purposes of national security documents, including JP 5-0,
8
JOPES,
9
and CJCSI 3141.
10
Figure 2 illustrates the overlap between the concepts of
doctrine and planning so as to yield a desired effectiveness.
Figure 2: Interrelationship of Doctrine and Planning, and Joint Operations
The essence of the US NSS
11
(via the NSC) involves taking into consideration
political and military situations on select levels or in certain spheres such as those
8
US Department of Defense (DoD), “JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning,” 2011,
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf (accessed 1 Apr. 2015).
9
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), “User’s Guide for JOPES,” 1 May 1995,
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/other/jopes.pdf (accessed 1 Apr. 2015).
10
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) “CJCSI 3141”.
11
The White House, “US National Security Strategy,” 2010,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed
1 Apr. 2015).
6
mentioned above. They can also be considered and based on elite-level prognosis,
guides politico-military development, requirements, and possibilities of the state,
its allies, and dangers in the world to ensure security through joint operations. The
process builds on a general strategic approach of the US and its forces. Part of the
role of doctrine is to consider transformation in different contexts of all types of
danger in the world and link them with political and military threat. This is
particularly true of the US military and the currently security environment as
explained previously.
“Burden sharing,” stated within the NSS, is a requisite part of strengthening
the political and military architecture of the US with the view of meeting the
challenges in the contemporary international system.
12
It represents a distinct part
of US military doctrine and informs that manner in which any and all services
operate to achieve collective security (i.e., by services working together and
through joint [multinational] partnerships and effort). Joint operations
effectiveness is essentialized in the NSS by referring to an engagement on
strengthening and the galvanization of collective action by US departments and
agencies (particularly those of the US military).
The NMS
13
outlines the “disciplined action of force” in order to ensure
operational success. The NMS underscores the concept of Joint Force and applying
it against the transformation of danger to threat. The effectiveness aspect of the
general relationship is ensured through the integration of core military
competencies transcending all elements of the national government. Within the
scope of effectiveness are considerations for capabilities and constraints (i.e.,
geographic conditions as part of the contemporary security environment).
Capabilities or competencies encompass complementary practice, multi-domain
power projection, joint forcible entry, maintaining joint force access to theaters of
operations and other vital regions, and the general ability of the US’ forces to
fight.
14
All three concepts ([1] Doctrine and planning; [2] Effectiveness; [3] Joint
Operations) share a strong relationship. It is nearly impossible to separate the three
and still view the US military as a joint force. The relationship shared by
effectiveness and joint operations are predicated (in part) on the work of, for
example, DoD agencies, field activities, and others: (1) US Army, (2) US Marine
Corps, (3), US Navy, (4) US Air Force, (5) US Coast Guard, and (6) US Army
National Guard.
15
There is growing interdependence fostered as a result of the
relationship between these and other services.
12
The White House, “US National Security Strategy,” 2010.
13
US Department of Defense (DoD), “The National Military Strategy of the United States of America,”
2011, http://www.army.mil/info/references/docs/NMS%20FEB%202011.pdf (accessed 1 Apr.
2015).
14
Ibid.
15
US Department of Defense (DoD), “Military Services,” 2013,
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/milservices.html (accessed 1 Apr. 2015); Each of these services also
includes a reserve component.
7
Planning, it might well be argued can only be truly effective, if command,
planning, operations, intelligence, logistical support, communications systems
support, and information management come together to support overall mission
planning. Each of these areas shares distinct relationships with another.
16
These
relationships are based upon the interaction of individuals, units, services, and
departments.
17
Taken together, there is a comprehensive network of relationship
being built in order to serve larger national security concerns and interests. Initial
planning may be undertaken to provide strategic, operational, and tactical options
for higher levels of command. Specific tactical and operational missions should
directly link with larger (strategic) level security considerations (i.e., objectives) JP
3-05.1.
18
Since operations can range in size and can be tailored to unique and often
unpredictable situations, the dynamics of military engagement, security
cooperation, situational response, and larger campaigns can vary extensively. The
flow of information is critical in making this network function appropriately.
19
“It
provides, according to JP 3-05.1, “a centralized point for the handling, tracking,
and recording of information.
20
Joint Planning and Execution: Lessons from “Operation Iraqi Freedom”
An interesting relationship can be observed between strategy, operations, and
tactics. In some cases, a strong strategy is able to make up for tactical errors during
the course of a military campaign. Joint planning, according to the JCS, includes:
the requirement to plan for all six phases of a mission, which include
Shape (Phase 0), Deter (Phase I), Seize the Initiative (Phase II), Dominate
(Phase III), Stabilize (Phase IV), and Enable Civil Authority (Phase V).
Occupation is included in Phase IV (Stabilize).
21
It is important to acknowledge these conditions because should one of them fail to
fall into place at both the strategic and operational levels, then tactical operations
could prove disastrous and fail to achieve their objectives. “Operation Iraqi
Freedom” offers a solid case in point in terms of how success can be obscured by
a lack of improper strategic, operational, and tactical planning and
implementation. The overall campaign demonstrates that faulty planning at any
16
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), “User’s Guide for JOPES,” 1 May 1995,
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/other/jopes.pdf (accessed 1 Apr. 2015), p. 20.
17
US Department of Defense (DoD), “The National Military Strategy of the United States of America”.
18
US Department of Defense (DOD), “Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations,” 26 Apr. 2007,
https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_05_01.pdf (accessed 1 Apr. 2015).
19
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), “User’s Guide for JOPES”, p14.
20
US Department of Defense (DOD), “Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations”, p. xiv.
21
Matthew R. Hover, “The Occupation of Iraq: A Military Perspective on Lessons Learned, 2012,
International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 94, No. 885,
https://www.icrc.org/spa/assets/files/review/2012/irrc-885-hover.pdf (accessed 1 Apr. 2015);
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) “CJCSI 3141,” Chapter III, Section C.
8
single level can actually have positive effects on the structure and coordination of
military forces and potentially future campaigns.
Contemporary US military, according to Figure 3, planning can be depicted as
follows:
Figure 3: US Military Planning
22
Considering the broader picture (including the much broader objective of
deposing former-leader of Iraq Saddam Hussein), “Operation Iraqi Freedom” has
been referred to as a success. Looking at the military aspect of the campaign, US
services performed their duties to achieve the overarching objective as established
by PotUS. What the US military was hesitant to engage in, however, were length
stability operations and the much more daunting exercise of nation building for
no simpler reason than the latter is simply not what the US military was designed
for. It is still the responsibility of CENTCOM to plan for the implementation of
Phase IV in any operation or campaign in any theater of operation. When the US
military was successful in moving through the initial phases of the military
campaign, there were considerable obstacles in their way by the time Phase III
need to be faced.
A fundamental flaw in US campaign preparation was the failure to focus on
civil-military operations before the US launched its military invasion.
23
Moreover:
owing to the fact that civil affairs officers and units were in short supply,
this lack of training was extremely detrimental to initial stability
operations, because these civil–military operations tasks fell to combat
units untrained for the job.12 This was particularly true during the days
22
US Department of Defense (DoD), “JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning,” 2011,
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf (accessed 1 Apr. 2015); Figure based on JP 5-09
description of US military planning.
23
Hover, “The Occupation of Iraq: A Military Perspective on Lessons Learned”, p. 342.
9
and weeks following the fall of Baghdad, when the military had the
initiative but had also created a power vacuum in Iraq.
24
Pre-deployment training was stated as one of the main reasons for civil affairs
resources unable to fulfill their duties to their fullest. While their primary purpose
was the tend to the needs of the Iraqi government, they were burdened with issues
pertaining to internally displaced persons (IDPs), oil field that were set ablaze,
chemical decontamination, among other factors.
25
What US military doctrine of
the previous decades has underscored was the need to win battles as opposed to
winning wars. Moreover, adhering to the older doctrine kept them from adapting
not necessarily to methods of warfighting but rather the types of wars that they
would have to fight in the future. The Iraq War clearly demonstrated that
warfighting methods had to align with an understanding and awareness of the
types of war that services and their personnel would be facing.
The US military can be accreted with winning a wide spectrum of battles in
Iraq following the invasion of 2003. Was also stands as a stark realization is that
failure to win the war in Iraq ultimately led to renewed battles for which the US
military has proven itself largely ill-equipped to address. Acclimatizing to this
reality may be an unfinished success story; however, what is more apparent is that
the US demonstrated through its withdrawal that certain gaps existed in its
military’s practice of planning and implementation.
Challenges of Joint Operations: The Case of Afghanistan
Military operations in Afghanistan, as part of “Operation Enduring Freedom,”
tested the skillset of US military services and individuals within those services in
a way that has not been witnessed since US operations in Vietnam. At the same
time, the war in Afghanistan added the unique ingredients of interagency players,
and both international and non-governmental organizations (IOs or public interest
groups) from multiple regions to the situation. One of the most apparent
challenges in an environment such as Afghanistan is the difference in
interpretations of multinational operations. A good bridge between the obfuscated
fields of war and peace in Afghanistan is stability operations. Stability and
stabilization became a focus of all major force contributions to the region by 2003.
Some, such as Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), maintained their focus on
combat operations due to increased insurgent activity and enemy forces.
However, despite ongoing combat operations on multiple fronts and in careful but
complex coordination with friends and allies, attention was simultaneously
captured by the need to rebuild Afghanistan on multiple levels.
Political and military dimensions of the operation in Afghanistan meant that
a great deal of unity of effort was required. It was often the case that too much
24
Hover, “The Occupation of Iraq: A Military Perspective on Lessons Learned”, p. 342.
25
Ibid., p. 343.
10
distance could be found between military commanders at various military
installations and bases, and political officers in Kabul and elsewhere. By 2003, it
was estimated that over 1,600 NGOs were registered with the Ministry of Planning
in Afghanistan. Although many of these are Afghan NGOs, the international and
multinational ones could be found in relatively large numbers.
26
There are now
four NGO coordinating bodies in the country: (1) Afghan NGOs Coordination
Bureau (ANCB), (2) Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR), (3)
Islamic Coordination Council (ICC), and (4) South West Afghanistan and
Baluchistan Association for Coordination (SWABAC).
27
One of the most persistent problems regarding the operations of so many
international and multinational organizations in Afghanistan revolves around the
issue of security. Taliban and other insurgent forces retained control of areas over
the past decade of operations and continue to do so. With both insurgents and aid
workers in the country, the US military’s responsibilities in many areas multiplied;
this is especially the case given that many were eager to commence with
humanitarian missions, stabilization programs, and building programs. The
United Nations (UN) Country Team alone constituted over 20 organizations
spread throughout the country.
28
Funding for programs was also hindered by
ongoing combat and security operations. Since 2001, military and security
assistance represented more than half of all of the funding that the US (provided
by DoD) sent to Afghanistan.
29
By 2009, the priorities in United Nations Assistance
Mission in Afghanistan’s (UNAMA) mandate were extensive. They included:
Promote more coherent support by the international community to the
Afghan Government;
Strengthen cooperation with ISAF [International Security Assistance Force];
Provide political outreach through a strengthened and expanded presence
throughout the country;
Provide good offices in support of Afghan-led reconciliation programs;
Support efforts to improve governance and the rule of law and to combat
corruption;
Play a central coordinating role to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid;
Monitor the human right situation of civilians and coordinate human rights
protection;
Support the electoral process through the Afghan Independent Electoral
Commission;
26
CHR Michelsen Institute (CMI) “Afghanistan Peacebuilding,” no date,
http://www.cmi.no/afghanistan/themes/ngos.cfm (accessed 1 Apr. 2015).
27
Ibid.
28
Rhoda Margesson, “United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan: Background and Policy
Issues,” CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, 30 Jul. 2009,
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/128823.pdf (accessed 1 Apr. 2015).
29
Ibid., p. 8.
11
Support regional cooperation in working for a more stable and prosperous
Afghanistan.
30
Although coordinating so many organizations while maintaining security and
continuing with combat operations in Afghanistan has been so simple task for the
US military and its allies. A several key lessons can be drawn from the Afghanistan
case that may be used to successfully integrate such actions in the future. First, a
clear delineation between combat operations and stability operations needs to be
conceptualized prior to the application of force. When the moment comes to
initiate stabilization operations, commanders and policy makers need to be
confidence that pre-operations training and procedures were undertaken in
preparation for stability missions and programs. Second, it is important to
understand the environment in which military, and international and
multinational organizations are entering. By environment, one can infer the
concept of history.
Understanding the country and the culture is part of knowing its history.
Many development plans had become problematic and eventually led to the loss
of billions of dollars of funding. Third, national governments need to be aware that
war remains a political process and as such, requires the collocation of military
personnel at high-ranking levels in a way that allows them to know the political
dimensions of nation building and reconstruction programs. Fourth, allotting the
appropriate amount of time to rebuild a country is essential. In a sense,
Afghanistan was a rushed project of the US and its allies. The cliché about Vietnam
that, “it was not a ten year war, but a one-year war fought ten times,” finds a place
in the context of Afghanistan. Nation building efforts could not appropriately
move forward without the understanding of what was to come in the next few
months.
31
30
Margesson, “United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan: Background and Policy Issues”, pp.
22-23.
31
Joshua Foust, “Five Lessons We Should Have Learned in Afghanistan,” Public Broadcasting System
(PBS), 19 Jul. 2012, http://www.pbs.org/wnet/need-to-know/opinion/five-lessons-we-should-have-
learned-in-afghanistan/14284/ (accessed 1 Apr. 2015).
12
About the Author
Scott Nicholas Romaniuk is Staff Analyst for DefenceReport and a graduate
student at the School of Security and Global Studies, American Military
University. He specializes in military and strategic studies, and foreign policy
analysis. His areas of research include conventional and asymmetric warfare,
(counter)terrorism, (counter)insurgency, religious extremism, and processes of
(de)radicalization.
13
References
CHR Michelsen Institute (CMI), “Afghanistan Peacebuilding,” no date,
http://www.cmi.no/afghanistan/themes/ngos.cfm (accessed 1 Apr. 2015).
Federation of American Scientists (FAS), “Joint Warfighter S&T Plan – Chapter II:
Vision and Strategy,” no date,
https://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/defense/97_jwstp/jw2.htm
(accessed 1 Arp. 2015).
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), “CJCSI 3141,” 2011,
http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/3141_01.pdf (accessed 1
Arp. 2015).
_____. “Civil-Military Operations,” 2013,
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_57.pdf (accessed 1 Apr.
2015).
_____. “User’s Guide for JOPES,” 1 May 1995,
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/other/jopes.pdf (accessed 1 Apr. 2015).
Joshua Foust, “Five Lessons We Should Have Learned in Afghanistan,” Public
Broadcasting System (PBS), 19 Jul. 2012, http://www.pbs.org/wnet/need-to-
know/opinion/five-lessons-we-should-have-learned-in-afghanistan/14284/
(accessed 1 Apr. 2015).
Matthew R. Hover, “The Occupation of Iraq: A Military Perspective on Lessons
Learned, 2012, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 94, No. 885,
https://www.icrc.org/spa/assets/files/review/2012/irrc-885-hover.pdf
(accessed 1 Apr. 2015).
Rhoda Margesson, “United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan:
Background and Policy Issues,” CRS Report for Congress, Congressional
Research Service, 30 Jul. 2009,
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/128823.pdf (accessed 1 Apr.
2015).
The White House, “US National Security Strategy,” 2010,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_
strategy.pdf (accessed 1 Apr. 2015).
14
US Department of Defense (DOD), “Joint Special Operations Task Force
Operations,” 26 Apr. 2007, https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_05_01.pdf
(accessed 1 Apr. 2015).
_____. “Joint Vision 2020,” 2000,
http://www.fraw.org.uk/files/peace/us_dod_2000.pdf (accessed 1 Apr. 2015).
_____. “JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning,” 2011a,
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf (accessed 1 Apr. 2015).
_____. “Military Services,” 2013,
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/milservices.html (accessed 1 Apr. 2015).
_____. “The National Military Strategy of the United States of America,” 2011b,
http://www.army.mil/info/references/docs/NMS%20FEB%202011.pdf
(accessed 1 Apr. 2015).
Cover photo attribution:
"US Army Afghanistan 2006" by Staff Sgt. Brandon Aird, 173rd ABCT PAO - Flickr.
Licensed under Public Domain via Wikimedia Commons -
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:US_Army_Afghanistan_2006.jpg#/media/File:
US_Army_Afghanistan_2006.jpg