Implicit Motives: A Look from Personality Systems Interaction Theory

Abstract

This chapter provides an outline of Personality Systems Interaction (PSI) theory and its contribution to an understanding of implicit motives. It will be argued that the concept of motive can be applied across preconceptual, conceptual, and self-regulatory levels of analysis, which are related to three different motive measures (i.e., TAT/PSE, grid technique, and OMT, respectively). The Operant Motive Test (OMT) by Kuhl and Scheffer (1999) will be described in more detail. Recent results on the interaction between motives and cognitive mechanisms will be functionally analyzed: (a) Congruence between explicit and implicit motives, (b) self-determined versus incentive-focused levels of motive enactment, and (c) the role of need content in the modulation of cognitive behavioral systems.

Full text

Chapter 13
Implicit Motives: A Look from Personality
Systems Interaction Theory
NICOLA BAUMANN
University of Trier
MIGUEL KAZE
´N
University of Osnabru¨ck
JULIUS KUHL
University of Osnabru¨ck
During the ‘‘long past and the short history’’ of scientific psychology
(Boring, 1929), motivation has been seen in contrast to cognition:
Whereas cognition refers to the cognitive machinery that generates knowledge
about the world, motivation is about what drives this machinery, its velocity,
direction, and persistence (Atkinson, 1958; Heckhausen, 1991; McClelland,
Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953; McDougall, 1932; Murray, 1938). Cognition
relates to how questions (function) whereas motivation concerns why questions.
The distinction between mechanisms causing behavior and purpose giving it
direction and energy can be traced back to the distinction between causa efficiens
and causa finalis in medieval thinking, a distinction underlying the dualistic
world view of ancient philosophers (especially Aristotle). Today, the sharp dis-
tinction between mechanism and purpose ceases to be a useful position.
Purposive behavior depends on mechanisms. An example for the close relation-
ship between motivation and mechanism can be found in the work by the
pioneers of motivational science cited above: The functional basis of motives
can, at least in part, be explained on the basis of simple learning mechanisms
such as classical conditioning and instrumental learning. For example, the
achievement motive, which directs perception and action toward opportunities
for meeting standards of excellence, can be related to acquired habits to associate
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an affective change with clues that were associated with such a change in the
ontogenetic past (McClelland et al., 1953).
In addition to being supported by associationistic learning mechanisms,
motives also include a cognitive component that adds a higher level of intelli-
gence to them. Specifically, some researchers conceived of motives as extended
networks of experiential knowledge acquired during early childhood years
(e.g., Trudewind, 1989; Winterbottom, 1958). From a theoretical point of
view, associative networks that bind innumerable personal episodes cannot
reasonably be conceptualized in terms of verbally explicable analytical knowl-
edge: Their extendedness would overtax any limited capacity system. The
notion that motive-related knowledge is rooted in preconceptual (partly even
preverbal) states of development suggests conceptualizing this knowledge com-
ponent of motives in terms of implicit experiential networks (McClelland,
1985). Later in this chapter, we will expand this view applying the concept of
motive across preconceptual, conceptual, and self-regulatory levels of analysis.
As elaborated in other chapters of this volume (e.g., chapters 11 and 12), this
theoretical conception of implicit motives was confirmed by research that
demonstrated that explicit (i.e., self-reported) motive strength fails to predict
the frequency of motive-related spontaneous thought and action (McClelland,
Koestner, & Weinberger, 1989). In this chapter we will expand on an elabora-
tion of those early attempts to connect motivation with function. Specifically,
we will provide an outline of personality systems interactions (PSI) theory and
lay out how this theory relates to implicit motives. In a subsequent section, we
will describe how the Operant Motive Test (OMT) attempts to extend Murray’s
(1938) classical Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) and its empirically devel-
oped elaborations (Atkinson, 1958; Winter, 1994) to encompass cognition–
motivation interactions up to the highest levels of cognitive-volitional mechan-
isms (Kuhl & Scheffer, 1999). In a final section, we will provide some recent
results on the interaction between motives and cognitive mechanisms.
A Brief Summary of PSI Theory
In a nutshell, PSI theory proposes the following cognitive-emotional architec-
ture in order to accommodate previous and more recent research on motives,
goals, and self-regulation (Kuhl, 2000, 2001): Two motivational orientations
(i.e., approach and avoidance) can be distinguished within each of seven levels
of personality functioning (Kuhl & Koole, 2008). Positive and negative affects
modulate the interactions among low-level and high-level systems. The seven
levels are (1) intuitive/automatic behavior control and object perception, (2)
motor activation and sensory arousal (‘‘temperament’’), (3) positive and nega-
tive affect, (4) stress- and coping-dependent progression (top-down) versus
regression (bottom-up) between higher levels (5–7) and lower levels (1–3),
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376 BASIC CONCEPTS AND PROCESSES

(5) preconceptual motives, (6) conceptually represented specific and global
goals, and (7) a disciplined versus an integrative form of volition (self-control
involving intention memory vs. self-regulation).
According to PSI theory, affect-based modulation of the interaction between
these levels of processing becomes especially evident at Level 4, the interface
between low and high level processes: Presumably, Level 4 compares low-level
inputs (behavioral tendencies aroused by habits, global activation, and/or posi-
tive or negative affect) with inputs from higher-level systems (motives, goals, and
intentions) and ‘‘computes’’ whether top-down or bottom-up forces are stronger
to be allowed to determine ongoing behavior. The two affect modulation assump-
tions of PSI theory are depicted in Figure 13.1. The first modulation assumption
explains how high versus low positive affect (PA) modulates the interaction
between intention memory (Level 7) and intuitive behavior control (Level 1).
Specifically, intention memory is activated when a difficulty of enactment is
encountered (e.g., when an individual has committed himself to an unpleasant
activity): One does not form an intention unless there is some difficulty associated
with performing an activity (without any difficulty one would simply go ahead
and do it). The confrontation with difficulty (which is characteristic of achieve-
ment-related contexts) is typically associated with an initial dampening of posi-
tive affect (low PA). When an intention is to be performed, facilitating positive
affect has to be generated, either from external sources (encouragement) or on
the basis of a self-regulatory effort (self-motivation).
Experimental evidence confirms that positive primes (especially achievement-
related ones) facilitate the enactment of difficult intentions, even to the extent
Self-Control
PA-
Intention
Memory (IM)
Object
Recognition (OR)
NA+
Self-Regulation
NA-
Extension
Memory (EM)
Intuitive Behavior
Control (IBC)
PA+
_
_
Efficient Will
Self-growth
Figure 13.1 Cognitive systems of PSI theory and their modulation by high (+)
versus low () positive (PA) or negative (NA) affect.
Note: Dashed arrows indicate antagonisms between cooperating systems that can only be
overcome through an affective change.
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A LOOK FROM PERSONALITY SYSTEMS INTERACTION THEORY 377

that they remove the well-known Stroop interference effect (Kaze
´n & Kuhl, 2005;
Kuhl & Kaze
´n, 1999). This principleof positive affect (PA assumption) facilitating
the interaction (i.e., information transfer) between intention memory and an
enactment-oriented system also works outside the laboratory: When people are
asked to alternate between positive fantasies about goal attainment and a focus
on difficult or unpleasant steps to be taken, the rate of enactment of difficult
intentions (e.g., and success criteria such as losing weight, taking medicine, etc.)
is significantly increased (Oettingen, Pak, & Schnetter, 2001).
The second modulation assumption of PSI theory concerns the interaction
between perception of isolated objects and their integration into an extended
(‘‘holistic’’) experiential network. This network is called extension memory, and
the part of it that integrates information about the person’s autobiographical
memory, preferences, values, and so forth, is called the integrated self (see
Fig. 13.3). This integration process is regarded as the functional basis of self-
growth. PSI theory holds that negative affect (NA) facilitates object perception.
An object is defined as an isolated (i.e., ‘‘decontextualized’’) cognitive repre-
sentation of a new, unexpected, or even threatening experience as a separate
entity apart from its context. Abstraction from context helps recognize objects
across different contexts, which can be especially useful for avoiding threa-
tening objects. Active down-regulation of negative affect then facilitates inte-
gration of isolated experience into extension memory and the self. This process
is called self-growth because the integrated representation of personally rele-
vant knowledge (i.e., the self) grows through the integration of novel and
sometimes even painful experience.
An empirical test of this NA assumption has been attempted on the basis of
the self-infiltration technique. This method is based on the assumption that
access to the integrated self, and thus to extension memory, can be measured
by the extent to which a person can tell apart self-chosen goals from exter-
nally assigned goals. Confusions about the source of a goal or intention, called
false self-ascription, can be a sign of impaired self-access. Empirical findings
from self-infiltration experiments are in accordance with the NA assumption:
When participants scoring low on a scale that assesses the ability to down-
regulate negative affect (i.e., so-called state-oriented participants) are put into
a negative mood, the rate of false self-ascriptions increases (Baumann & Kuhl,
2003; Kuhl & Kaze
´n, 1994). In contrast, participants who are able to down-
regulate negative affect (i.e., action-oriented participants) do not confuse
assignments as self-selected when being put into a negative mood. A scale
assessing individual differences in self-access confirms our interpretation of
the relationship between excessive negative affect and self-integration as an
indication of impaired self-access (Quirin, Koole, & Kuhl, 2009): Self-access
(but not self-consciousness) correlates negatively with scales related to nega-
tive affect such as neuroticism, threat-related state orientation, life stress, and
physical complaints.
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Motives Across the Three Levels of
Higher-Order Processing
In this section we will apply the distinction between the three highest levels of
personality functioning to the motive concept. In a nutshell, motives can be
discussed in terms of preconceptual, conceptual, or self-regulatory levels of
personality functioning, which helps distinguish different conceptualizations
of implicit motives and may explain why different methods can be used to assess
them. More specifically, PSI theory provides a functional interpretation of the
commonalities and differences between three levels of motive measurement.
The commonalities between the three levels of motive organization relate to three
criteria defining a motive: (1) extended network representation, (2) implicit level
of awareness, and (3) apperception in terms of need-related interpretation of
perceptual input, a meaning-providing process that presumably results from
close interaction between perception and higher-level representations (which
modulate the interpretation of perceptual input). The three methods of motive
assessment (i.e., the classical TAT/PSE, the OMT, and the grid technique)
discussed in this section clearly satisfy those three criteria (albeit to various
degrees). After briefly discussing the preconceptual and conceptual levels and
the two instruments related to them (i.e., the TAT, PSE, and the grid technique,
respectively), we introduce a third level of motive measurement, which will be
elaborated in the next section.
The original concept of a motive refers to preconceptual or even preverbal
stages of development. Presumably, motives are acquired at a developmental
stage when children use words that do not refer to clear-cut concepts. The
Russian psychologist Vygotski (1978) has described this stage in terms of pre-
conceptual language, in which words denote associative conglomerations of
images, emotional episodes, actions, and cognitions. For example, a child
might say ‘‘I want cap’’ and mean ‘‘I want to go out to the playground.’’ In
this example, a word does not signify a concept as defined by a logical hierarchy
of more general and more specific terms (e. g., a cap is a piece of clothing
comprising a variety of exemplars) but refers to an idiosyncratic conglomeration
of images and memories from personal experience (as when mother asked the
child to put on a cap before she took her to the playground and met many friends,
etc.). In PSI theory, the term extension memory denotes such an extended experi-
ential network (including preconceptual and conceptual networks). McClelland
(1985) defined a motive in terms of a similar network with affective and imagery
components as well as ‘‘cognitive overtones.’’ Through its close association
between need-related affect and ‘‘perceptual imagery,’’ a motive should be
‘‘observable’’ in apperception, which can be defined as a process of understanding
something perceived in terms of high-level representation of previous experience.
Extension memory is not confined to the preconceptual level. In fact, in his
theory of personal constructs, George Kelly (1955) used the term ‘‘extension’’
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A LOOK FROM PERSONALITY SYSTEMS INTERACTION THEORY 379

to describe the widening of a construct or concept (e.g., when a therapist helps a
compulsive patient to widen his narrow definition of ‘‘order’’ from ‘‘putting all
pencils on his desk in an exactly parallel arrangement’’ to ‘‘being able to find
everything on his desk without having to search for it’’). It goes without saying
that need-related cognition is not confined to the preconceptual level. Goals can
be considered the most important example of motivationally relevant concep-
tual representations (Brunstein, 2001; Brunstein, Schultheiss, & Gra¨ssmann,
1998; Elliot & McGregor, 2001). With his distinction between definition and
extension of constructs, Kelly (1955) reminded us of two different types of
concepts or constructs that we might also want to take into account when
we talk about goals. Specifically, narrowly defined conceptual representations
of goals (i.e., concrete goals such as ‘‘staying away from fattening food’’) can be
distinguished from global goals that refer to an extended network of acceptable
actions (e.g., ‘‘losing weight’’ or ‘‘being thin’’). Sometimes specific goals can
outperform global goals (Gollwitzer, 1999). Under other conditions (to be
specified yet), positively charged global goals (e.g., ‘‘staying thin’’) can have a
more powerful effect on behavior than concrete goals (Ferguson, 2007).
The conception of extension memory as a parallel (connectionistic) network
can accommodate global goals and the network of conceptually represented
actions and outcomes associated with it. When the ‘‘cognitive overtones’’ of a
motive (McClelland, 1985) are to include extended networks of conceptually
represented outcomes (i.e., global goals), assessment procedures should be
adapted to that purpose. Since Kelly (1955) developed a valid method for
assessing constructs on a conceptual level, one might think of using this
‘‘role repertory grid’’ for the assessment of global goals and all conceptual
and emotional components associated with them. The grid technique devel-
oped by Schmalt (1999) and his associates is based on this rationale. From a
terminological point of view, one could argue whether network representations
of conceptually represented constructs can be called motives. We do not see any
problem in extending the narrow definition of motives from the preconceptual
to the conceptual level as long as the crucial characteristics of a motive are
preserved. Schmalt’s grid technique clearly satisfies the three criteria of a
motive defined above (i.e., based on an extended network of need-related
episodes, having an implicit component, an affecting apperception). As long
as one knows which subtype of motive one refers to in a given context, it
becomes a futile discussion whether one should insist on a strict and narrow
or permit an extended definition of the motive concept. Note that our theore-
tical approach to a multilevel conceptualization of motives does not require
substantial correlations among motives across levels of representation:
Whether or not a preconceptual motive is also supported by conceptual or
self-regulatory networks remains an empirical question.
In the remainder of this chapter, we will focus on the third, self-
regulatory, level of motive operation. On this level (i.e., Level 7 in PSI
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380 BASIC CONCEPTS AND PROCESSES

theory), motives are associated with self-regulatory functions (plus Levels
3, 4, and 5, i.e., affect, regression, and preconceptual elements). Since
neither the TAT nor the PSE assesses the degree to which preconceptual
motives are connected with self-regulatory functions, we developed the
Operant Motive Test (OMT).
The Operant Motive Test (OMT)
The Operant Motive Test (OMT) uses a modified TAT technique that extends the
assessment of basic social needs (nAffiliation, nAchievement, nPower) from
the preconceptual and conceptual levels to the level of self-regulatory support of
motive enactment. It is not the aim to assess self-regulatory strategies per se,
but to assess the extent to which motives are integrated in self-referential
representations. For example, when the need for achievement is integrated
with the self, self-regulatory competencies can be employed even at the level
of apperception. On this level, a strong achievement motive not only facilitates
detecting challenging tasks in the environment, but also down-regulates per-
ceived difficulty (self-motivation) or negative cues associated with fear of failure
(self-relaxation). This type of integration should implicitly affect the way people
interpret motivationally relevant scenes and respond to them, albeit in a some-
what different manner compared to preconceptual or conceptual motive
representations.
Participants are presented with 15 ambiguous pictures depicting social and
nonsocial episodes (see Fig. 13.2). They are to choose one character from those
depicted in the picture as the protagonist. Identification of the participant with
a single character serves to facilitate elaboration of personal needs in fantasy
behavior. The OMT pictures have a clear-cut, albeit implicit relation to motive
themes in order to activate implicit representations of motives (Kuhl, Scheffer, &
Eichstaedt, 2003; Scheffer, Kuhl, & Eichstaedt, 2003). Participants are asked to
invent a story. In contrast to classical measures (i.e., TAT; PSE, ‘‘Picture Story
Exercise’’), participants do not have to write down the full story. Instead, they
are instructed to write down their spontaneous associations (e.g., very short
sentences or even single words rather than full narrative accounts) to four
questions: (1) ‘‘What is important for the person in this situation and what is
the person doing?’’ (2) ‘‘How does the person feel?’’ (3) ‘‘Why does the person
feel this way?’’ (4) ‘‘How does the story end?’’ The reduction of the explicit
response format to verbal associations rather than full stories was chosen to
reduce distortions caused by logical reasoning (similar to distortions that occur
when dreams are verbalized in a story format). The response format has the
additional advantage that it cuts both administration and scoring time con-
siderably while allowing for presentation of more pictures (e.g., 15 or more in
OMT vs. 3–8 in PSE).
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A LOOK FROM PERSONALITY SYSTEMS INTERACTION THEORY 381

In addition to motive contents (i.e., ‘‘what’’ a person is striving for), the OMT
assesses the interaction between motives and volitional functions, that is, ‘‘how’’
a person is striving to meet his or her needs. Thus, the OMT coding system takes
theoretical advances into account that are derived from the integration of self-
regulatory processes into motivation psychology (Elliot & Church, 1997; Elliot &
McGregor, 2001; Heckhausen, 1991; Kuhl, 1981, 1983, 2000): Extending the
classical distinction between approach and avoidance motivation (e.g., hope for
success vs. fear of failure), the OMT further differentiates four approach compo-
nents for each motive (i.e., OMT Levels) on the basis of crossing two affective
sources of motivation (positive vs. negative) with self-determined versus incen-
tive-focused forms of motivation (see Table 13.1).
A full introduction into OMT scoring would be beyond the scope of this
chapter. We will confine this description to a brief summary of the coding
procedure (see Kuhl & Scheffer, 1999, for an elaborated coding manual). For
each picture story, the OMT coding procedure starts by checking whether one
of the three basic motives (affiliation, achievement, power) is present or not (cf.
Winter, 1994) and whether approach or avoidance behavior is present (OMT
Figure 13.2 Four sample pictures of the Operant Motive Test (OMT).
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Table 13.1 Five-Level Model and Content Categories of the Operant Motive Test (OMT)
Motive
Dominant Macrosystems Affiliation Achievement Power
PA (self-regulated)
ÞTask-involvement: context-
sensitive switching among
macrosystems
1.1 Intimacy, affective sharing
– Interaction (mutual, joyful-intuitive
exchange)
– Process-like relation; love
– Empathy
2.1 Flow
– Curiosity and interest; feedback
– Learning something
– Being absorbed, concentrated
– Fun with a task, variety
3.1 Guidance
– Helping and protecting
others
– Pass on knowledge;
educate
– Convey values
– Convince; calmness
PA (incentive-based)
ÞIncentive-orientation:
intuitive behavior control
1.2 Sociability
– Extroverted contact (superficial)
– Interest; entertainment
– Good mood
– Erotic; flirt
2.2 Inner standards
– Pride; focused on results
– Doing something well
– Solving tasks
– Persistence in thinking
3.2 Status
– Being the focus of
attention
– Receiving recognition
– Having prestige and
authority
– Observing others
NA (self-regulated)
ÞSelf-regulated coping:
extension memory
(acknowledging problems or NA
and constructive coping)
1.3 Coping with rejection
– Positive reevaluation of a rejection
– Attempts to restore an attachment
(positive outcome)
– Delimitation, dislike, disgust
2.3 Coping with failure
– Positive reevaluation of failure
– Perception of threat associated with
active coping
– Identification of problems
– Task rejection (‘‘disengagement’’)
3.3 Coping with
power-related threats
– Asserting wishes
– Having influence
– Expressing feelings
– Relaxing
– Making decisions
(continued)
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Table 13.1 (Continued)
Motive
Dominant Macrosystems Affiliation Achievement Power
NA (incentive-based)
ÞGoal-oriented behavior:
intention memory & intuitive
behavior control (denial of
anxiety by acting)
1.4 Avoiding insecurity, familiarity
Acting with hope for:
– Safety
– Security
– Closeness
– Being loved
2.4 Pressure to achieve
– Social standards; trying to be best
– Effort (with success); hope
– Relief (after success)
– Avoiding failure; passing exams
– Persistence; solving difficult tasks
3.4 Inhibited power,
dominance
– Fear of using power
– Denial; sense of duty
(‘‘must’’)
– Many actions; having
‘‘survived’’
– Dominance
Low PA & high NA
ÞPassive fear (rumination):
object recognition &
intention memory (conscious
focus on fear)
1.5 Dependence
– Being lonely
– Feeling left alone, abandoned
– Desperate, hopeless, sad
– Rejected
– Not being understood
2.5 Failure
– Stressed
– Helpless
– Disappointed
– Anxiety
– Getting help
3.5 Powerlessness
– Obedient, guilty, sick
– Being a petitioner
PA = positive affect; NA = negative affect.
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Levels 1–4 vs. OMT Level 5, respectively). If an approach tendency is apparent,
the next step is to code whether more internal, self-regulatory processes (i.e.,
participation of the integrated self) or more external triggers (e.g., incentives
present in the situation) are involved in the motive-specific approach tenden-
cies (OMT Levels 1 and 3 vs. OMT Levels 2 and 4, respectively). For example,
when a person in the story is confronted with a threat to need satisfaction,
participation of the self is coded if he or she generates a creative solution.
Whether or not the self is involved is derived from the functional profile of the
integrated self (i.e., the self-related part of extension memory) spelled out in
PSI theory (Kuhl, 2001; Kuhl & Koole, 2004): For example, feeling satisfied
with own actions (i.e., self-positivity), having access to multiple and creative
action alternatives (i.e., extended network structure), and perceiving and
down-regulating negative affect (i.e., integrative capacity).
The final step in the assessment of self-determined and incentive-focused
forms of motivation is to code whether they are based on positive (OMT Levels 1
or 2) or negative affect (OMT Levels 3 or 4). The affective sources of motivation
do not have to be consciously experienced or explicitly reported in participants’
associations to OMT pictures. For example, the effects of latent negative affect
that is not associated with self-integration (i.e., OMT Level 4) can be inferred
from rather ‘‘tight’’ or rigid forms of behavior even if negative affect is not
directly mentioned (e.g., ‘‘she wants to be close to the other person’’; ‘‘he just
wants to beat his competitor’’). The narrowness criterion is derived from the
second modulation assumption, which states that excessive negative affect
impairs access to extension memory and the integrated self. As a result, need
satisfaction is associated with implicit avoidance and/or narrow scope of goal
maintenance if no creative and socially integrated forms of need satisfaction are
apparent (which would be OMT Level 3). Examples for Level 4 codings are: (1)
reduction of affiliation motivation to receiving security and closeness from a
person rather than engaging in an extensive personal exchange (Cell 1.4); (2)
competitive achievement motivation that is reduced to ‘‘trying to be better than
others’’ rather than developing one’s own skills independent of social norms
(Cell 2.4); (3) dominant implementation of power needs according to an ‘‘all-or-
nothing-principle’’ rather than responsible and socially integrative forms of
power (Cell 3.4).
In contrast, if participants explicitly mention negative affect in conjunction
with a creative search for solutions, OMT Level 3 is coded: Active and creative
coping with rejection (cell 1.3), failure (cell 2.3), or power-related threats (cell
3.3). Thus, negative affect is not always associated with avoidance (OMT
Level 5) but may motivate approach behavior and creative coping attempts,
even if it is not mentioned (as on OMT Level 4).
Similarly, positive affective sources of motivation are differentiated into
a form involving participation of the self and its volitional mechanisms (OMT
Level 1) and a form without participation of the self (OMT Level 2). The
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A LOOK FROM PERSONALITY SYSTEMS INTERACTION THEORY 385

self-determined form of positively oriented motivation is coded if needs are
implemented in a creative, integrative, and flexible manner. In this case both
creativity and flexibility are associated with positive incentives that seem to
‘‘flow’’ out of the activity itself: affective sharing and intimacy in the affiliation
domain (Cell 1.1), flow in mastering difficult tasks in the achievement domain
(Cell 2.1), and prosocial and socially integrative influences on others in the
power domain (Cell 3.1). Thus, according to PSI theory, the intrinsic motiva-
tion associated with OMT Level 1 results from mainly unconscious workings of
self-regulatory functions that maintain the fun and interest in the task (Kuhl &
Koole, 2004). In contrast, if positive affect is not self-generated but primarily
elicited by incentives, OMT Level 2 is coded: social contact motivated by social
incentives such as having fun together (Cell 1.2), achievement incentives based
on doing well according to inner standards rather than within a flow context
(Cell 2.2), and explicit reference to power-related incentives such as being the
focus of attention and having status (Cell 3.2).
In addition to four approach components, the OMT also includes a ‘‘clas-
sical’’ avoidance component for each motive (OMT Level 5): fear of rejection
(Cell 1.5), failure (Cell 2.5), and powerlessness (Cell 3.5). The protagonist in
participants’ OMT associations consciously experiences negative affect and is
passively fixated on it. Whereas negative affect may motivate active approach
behavior on OMT Level 4 (without being mentioned) or creative coping
attempts after being acknowledged (OMT Level 3), avoidance is coded when
participants explicitly mention negative affect in their associations to OMT
pictures without any active or creative coping attempt. Note that the fourth
question of the OMT (‘‘How does the story end?’’) sometimes elicits an unex-
pected ‘‘happy ending’’ of a story that is not derived in a plausible way from
previous answers but seems to come ‘‘out of the blue.’’ Such instances of good
luck are not coded as active approach (but OMT Level 5).
In the OMT, no correction for length of protocol is necessary because only one
of the 15 cells (3 motive contents 5 levels) can be coded per picture. If no
motive theme is apparent, a ‘‘zero’’ is coded. To assess implicit motives, the OMT
can be used in multiple ways. First, computing a sum of OMT Levels 1–4 for each
motive allows assessing rather ‘‘traditional’’ measures of approach motives in
affiliation, achievement, and power. Second, the combination of OMT Levels 1
and 2 and OMT Levels 3 and 4 for each motive assesses the effects of positive
versus negative affective sources of motivation, respectively. Third, the combina-
tion of OMT Levels 1 and 3 and OMT Levels 2 and 4 assesses the effects of
primarily self-determined versus more incentive-focused forms of motivation,
respectively. Finally, each cell resembles a unique interaction between motives
and volition that is expected to have its own predictive power. Whereas the
individual cells are often not normally distributed, the compound measures
typically are. In sum, the five-level model of the OMT allows to test theoretically
interesting differences in the type of self-regulation involved in need satisfaction.
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386 BASIC CONCEPTS AND PROCESSES

Scorers are able to learn the 3 5 coding scheme of the OMT within several
weeks of training. We usually have two independent scorers and calculate
interrater agreement following the same procedure as outlined by Winter
(1994) for the PSE. In previous OMT studies, interrater agreement was above
.85. Furthermore, the OMT has been used successfully not only for research but
also for applied purposes (cf. Kaschel & Kuhl, 2004).
Reliability and Validity of the OMT
Operant tests were criticized because they do not satisfy classical psychometric
criteria, especially internal consistency and test–retest reliability, which fluc-
tuate around .30 (e.g., Entwisle, 1972; Fineman, 1977; Tuerlinckx, De Boeck, &
Lens, 2002). Recent work with the OMT suggests that reliability and validity of
operant tests can be improved by its separating the assessment of need and
implementation components (Baumann, Kaschel, & Kuhl, 2005; Chasiotis,
Hofer, & Campos, 2006; Hofer, Busch, Chasiotis, Ka¨rtner, & Campos, 2008;
Kaze
´n & Kuhl, 2005; Kuhl & Kaze
´n, 2008; Scheffer, 2005; Scheffer, Eichstaedt,
Chasiotis, & Kuhl, 2007; Scheffer et al., 2003). The OMT shows sufficient
reliability even according to indices based on classical test theory (Scheffer
et al., 2003): (a) internal consistencies (Cronbach’s Alpha) of .74, .70 and .78
across the four levels of affiliation, achievement, and power, respectively, when
looking at the lower and higher quartile of the distribution, and (b) sufficient
retest stability across the four approach components (around r¼.72) as well as
for individuals cells of the OMT (around r¼.60). Furthermore, recent studies by
Chasiotis, Bender, Kiessling, and Hofer (in press), Chasiotis et al. (2006), and
Hofer et al. (2008) show that the OMT is cross-culturally applicable and free of
cultural biases.
Chasiotis and Hofer (2003) did not find a convergent validity between PSE
and OMT in their cross-cultural sample of German, Costa Rican, and
Cameroonian participants (N¼370). Only in the Cameroonian subsample
(N¼126) were there significant relationships between PSE nPow and OMT
nPow (r¼.21) as well as OMT Category 3.4 (inhibited power/dominance,
r¼.27) and between PSE nAch and OMT Category 2.3 (coping with failure,
r¼.23). Both PSE and OMT demonstrated predictive validity. When entering
both instruments at the same time, the OMT showed incremental validity in
more outcome criteria than the PSE (Chasiotis & Hofer, 2003), which may be
due to the higher initial correlation with the selected criteria. More importantly,
there is a pattern of consistent relationships between compound measures as
well as individual cells of the OMT and external criteria. For example, the OMT
category of guidance (Cell 3.1: prosocial power motivation) significantly pre-
dicted parenthood across different cultures and gender (Chasiotis et al., 2006).
The OMT category of achievement flow (Cell 2.1) accounted for unique
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A LOOK FROM PERSONALITY SYSTEMS INTERACTION THEORY 387

variance in daily flow experience whereas the established PSE construct of
nAch did not correlate with flow experience (Baumann & Scheffer, 2008,
2009). It goes without saying that these incremental aspects of OMT validity
do not discount the merits of PSE measurement: Our theoretical analysis of the
three levels of motive measurement provided in the first part of this chapter
helps explain when which level of motive measurement should be appropriate.
Furthermore, the evaluation of the discriminant, convergent, and unique
validity of each of the 15 OMT components (plus sum scores) represents a
monumental task that at this point is far from finished.
Congruence between Explicit and
Implicit Motives
Congruence between explicit and implicit motives has been identified as an
important factor for emotional well-being and health (e.g., Baumann et al.,
2005; Brunstein et al., 1998; Hofer & Chasiotis, 2003). Whereas goal imagery
(Schultheiss & Brunstein, 1999) and self-determination (Thrash & Elliot, 2002)
seem to foster congruence between the implicit and explicit motive systems,
state orientation and stress have detrimental effects on motive congruence
(Baumann et al., 2005; Brunstein, 2001). These findings can be functionally
explained within the framework of PSI theory (Kuhl, 2000, 2001).
According to PSI theory, explicit goal orientations and implicit motives are
associated with two different cognitive systems. Goal orientations are asso-
ciated with the explicit and verbal format of intention memory whereas implicit
motives are associated with implicit representations in extension memory, an
extended semantic network operating according to connectionist principles
and supported by intuitive-holistic processes (Beeman et al., 1994).
According to PSI theory, extension memory provides access to preconceptual
or conceptual implicit representations of one’s own needs, values and wishes.
Within the PSI framework, motive dispositions can be defined as ‘‘intelligent
needs,’’ that is, as implicit cognitive-emotional networks of need-related affec-
tive experiences and possible actions that can be performed to satisfy basic
social needs in a context-sensitive way across a variety of situations. This
explication of the motive construct can be regarded as an elaboration of earlier
conceptualizations of the motive construct (Heckhausen, 1991; Kuhl, 2001;
McClelland, 1980; Winter, 1996). According to this definition, motives can be
considered the need-related part of the implicit self-system (Greenwald &
Banaji, 1995), which in turn can be regarded as the self-related part of exten-
sion memory (see Fig. 13.3).
Within the framework of PSI theory, congruence between explicit and
implicit motive measures is expected to occur when information can be
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388 BASIC CONCEPTS AND PROCESSES

exchanged between the two processing systems. More specifically, intention
memory needs to ‘‘communicate’’ with extension memory in order to form
valid representations of implicit needs in terms of self-congruent goals (cf.
Fig. 13.1). An asymmetric activation of intention memory or—even worse—
an inhibition of extension memory (e.g., through self-incongruent external
demands) is expected to disturb the communication process and reduce con-
gruence between explicit orientations and implicit needs.
The two affect modulation assumptions of PSI theory described earlier in this
chapter specify conditions that disturb the communication process between
intention and extension memory: (1) Reduced positive affect (frustration) is
associatedwith an asymmetric activation of intention memory and consequently
reduces the influence of extension memory in action control, for example, on
explicit orientations (Kuhl & Beckmann, 1994). (2) Unattenuated negative affect
is even worse for information exchange because it directly inhibits extension
memory (Baumann & Kuhl, 2002; Bolte, Goschke & Kuhl, 2002), thereby
impeding access to implicit needs. The empirically identified moderators of
motive congruence (see Chapter 11) support this functional explanation of
motive incongruence: The finding by Thrash and Elliot (2002) that implicit
and self-attributed motives are only positively correlated for individuals high in
self-determination underlines the crucial role of access to extension memory
and the implicit self because, on a phenomenological level, self-inhibition
should be experienced as low self-determination. Furthermore, individuals
with deficits in self-regulation of affect (i.e., state-oriented individuals) tend to
build commitment to unrealistic and motive-incongruent goals (Brunstein,
2001) especially when stressful conditions are naturally present or experimen-
tally induced (Baumann et al., 2005): The finding of increased motive incon-
gruence for individuals with self-motivation deficits under demanding (low
positive affect) conditions supports the assumption of detrimental effects of an
Extension Memory
Implicit Motives
(,,Intelligent“ Needs)
Implicit Self
Figure 13.3 Theoretical relationship between extension memory, the implicit
(integrated) self, and implicit motives.
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A LOOK FROM PERSONALITY SYSTEMS INTERACTION THEORY 389

asymmetrical (over-) activation of intention memory whereas the relationship
between self-relaxation deficits under threatening (high negative affect) condi-
tions is a further example of the detrimental effects of self-inhibition (Baumann
et al., 2005).
Whereas unattenuated stress seems to reduce cognitive balance and
motive congruence, Schultheiss and Brunstein (1999) found goal imagery
to bridge the gap between implicit motives and explicit goals. According to
PSI theory, imagery can be conceived of as activating extension memory
whereas the goal content of the imagery can be conceived of as activating
intention memory. Findings are consistent with the assumption that the
interaction between intention and extension memory is a central aspect of
motive congruence: Equal activation of both memory systems enables a
balanced communication process. In contrast, imagery about something
neutral (i.e., goal-irrelevant) does not seem to foster motive congruence
(Schultheiss & Brunstein, 1999).
Motive incongruence has been identified as a ‘‘hidden stressor’’ that med-
iates the relationship between unattenuated stress and psychosomatic symp-
toms (e.g., Baumann et al., 2005). According to PSI theory, the chronic need
frustration associated with striving for unwanted (motive-incongruent) goals
can be conceived of as an unspecific stress factor that may increase the ‘‘stress
hormone’’ cortisol. Consistent with this assumption, Quirin, Koole, Bauman,
Kaze
´n, and Kuhl (in press) found a significant (albeit correlational) relationship
between self-infiltration (i.e., a tendency to misperceive external assignments
as self-selected activities) and cortisol level. Excessive levels of cortisol have
been associated with a variety of psychosomatic symptoms (Sapolsky, 1992).
Therefore, in addition to any symptom-specific causes, motive incongruence
can be conceived of as a general mechanism that contributes to the chronifica-
tion of stress and psychosomatic symptoms as confirmed by our empirical
findings (Baumann et al., 2005): The relationship between unfavorable condi-
tions (a combination of state orientation and stressful life events) and chron-
ification of psychosomatic symptoms over a period of 3 months was partially
mediated by motive-incongruent achievement orientations (see Fig. 13.4).
Because of the stress-contingent inhibition of extension memory, state-oriented
participants tend to over- or underestimate their implicit achievement motive
when experiencing high levels of stress. Both types of mismatch between
implicit and explicit modalities were associated with a chronification of psy-
chosomatic symptoms. Furthermore, motive incongruence partially mediated
between unattenuated stress and psychosomatic sysmptoms.
The functional explanation of motive congruence within the framework of
PSI theory underlines the importance of a dynamic view on motivation:
‘‘Healthy’’ goal striving, self-integration, and intrinsic motive components are
based on flexible and balanced interactions between basic cognitive and affec-
tive systems (cf. Table 13.1). In contrast, fixations on affective or cognitive
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390 BASIC CONCEPTS AND PROCESSES

systems are associated with alienation from own preferences (e.g., motive
incongruence) and rigidity in goal striving (e.g., OMT Level 4).
Self-Determined Versus Incentive
Focused OMT Levels
Implicit motives have been described as rooted within the implicit self (cf.
Fig. 13.3). Nevertheless, the implicit self does not have to be equally involved
in different strategies or levels of motive enactment (cf. Table 13.1). According
to PSI theory, incentive-focused forms of motivation, for example, are more
strongly supported by intuitive behavior control and/or intention memory than
by extension memory and the implicit self. However, the distinction between
primarily self-determined versus more incentive-focused forms of motivation as
measured by the OMT requires validation: Are scorers able to distinguish
between self-determined and incentive-focused forms of motivational orienta-
tions on the basis of content analysis? A positive answer to this question would
require measures of self-access to be positively related to levels 1 and 3 of the
OMT, that is, to the three approach components associated with self-regulation
of positive affect (OMT Level 1: intimacy, flow, guidance) and to the three self-
regulated forms of coping with negative affect (OMT Level 3: self-confronta-
tional coping with rejection, with failure, and with power-related threats). In
contrast, approach components associated with positive incentives (OMT Level
2: sociability, inner standards, status) and negative incentives (OMT Level 4:
security, competitive achievement, dominant/inhibited power) are expected to
show no significant relationships with measures of self-access.
How can we measure self-access? In previous research, two nonreactive
measures of self-access have been used. Koole and colleagues (Koole,
Dijksterhuis, & van Knippenberg, 2001; Koole & Jostmann, 2004) used short
latencies during a self-evaluation task as an indicator of intuitive access to the
State Orientation
x Threats
Motive-incongruent
Achievement
Orientation
Psychosomatic
Symptoms t2
(controlling for t1)
.32 * .27 *
.23 ns (.31 *)
Figure 13.4 Motive-incongruent achievement orientation as a partial mediator
between the direct effect of perceived life stress (i.e., threats) and failure-related state
orientation (i.e., low self-relaxation) on chronification of psychosomatic symptoms
over a period of 3 months reported by Baumann, Kaschel, & Kuhl (2005, JPSP, 89,
781–799).
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A LOOK FROM PERSONALITY SYSTEMS INTERACTION THEORY 391

self. In their studies, participants were to decide as quickly as possible whether
they themselves possessed a trait or not by pushing either a ‘‘me’’ or ‘‘not me’’
button. Target traits were 15 positive (e.g., creative, reliable) and 15 moder-
ately negative traits (e.g., silent, impulsive). Participants who can easily eval-
uate whether various adjectives describe themselves or not are assumed to have
intuitive self-knowledge and to easily access it, that is, they are clear and
certain about features related to themselves (McGregor & Marigold, 2003).
This measure focuses on the intuitive characteristic of the self and will be labeled
‘‘intuitive self-access’’ in the remainder of this chapter.
In contrast to intuitive self-access, Kaze
´n and colleagues (Kaze
´n&
Baumann, 2005; Kaze
´n, Baumann, & Kuhl, 2003) focused more strongly on
the integrative ability of the implicit self that is especially visible in counter-
preferential decisions, that is, when participants have rejected something
attractive (e.g., reject having a positive trait) or have accepted something
unattractive (e.g., accept having a negative trait). Individuals with high self-
regulatory abilities and valid self-representations (i.e., action orientation) take
significantly more time to make such counterpreferential decisions than indi-
viduals low in self-regulation (i.e., state orientation), presumably because they
perform a more thorough self-compatibility checking, which should in turn
increase the likelihood of detecting the implicit conflict associated with counter-
preferential decisions (Kaze
´n et al., 2003). Therefore, we used increased self-
evaluation latencies in counterpreferential compared to preferential decisions
in a self-classification task as an indicator of ‘‘integrative self-access’’ (as a
measure of the conflict-sensitive and self-confrontational Level 3 of the OMT).
Why is the integrative (deeper) measure of self-access expected to be more
relevant for the active coping component of the OMT (Level 3)? Self-integration of
negative traits and coping with negative affect may require deeper integrative
competence. This hypothesis is confirmed by findings that demonstrate a close
relationship between the ability to cope with negative affect (i.e., action orienta-
tion) and integrative competence as assessed by remote-associates tasks that
require comprehending semantic overlap between remotely associated words
(Baumann & Kuhl, 2002). Furthermore, Showers and Kling (1996) found that
participants who have a superior ability to integrate positive and negative self-
aspects into a coherent self (i.e., participants who describe themselves with
positive as well as negative traits in their various life domains) are better able
to down-regulate experimentally induced negative affect when confronted with
the self (i.e., writing a story about who they are) compared to a condition when
distracted from the self (i.e., working on easy numerical tasks) and compared to
participants with a low ability to integrate positive and negative self-aspects. The
finding supports the theoretical link between integrative competence of the self
and coping with negative affect as assessed on OMT Level 3. In contrast, the
intuitive (easy) measure of self-access is expected to be more relevant on OMT
Level 1, which is driven by positive rather than negative affect.
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In a study with N¼58 psychology undergraduates, we applied the OMT and
a self-evaluation task with 18 positive (e.g., creative, tolerant) and 18 moder-
ately negative traits (e.g., lazy, moody). Participants had to decide whether the
traits described themselves or not. Both intuitive and integrative measures of
self-access were calculated from self-evaluation latencies as described above.
The nonparametric correlations (Spearman-Rho) between OMT scores and
intuitive as well as integrative self-access are listed in Table 13.2. Consistent
with expectations, participants with high scores in self-determined motive
components (OMT Levels 1 and 3) showed significantly better self-access in a
subsequent self-evaluation task. More specifically, the positively charged
intrinsic components (OMT Level 1) of nAffiliation (i.e., intimacy) and n
Power (i.e., guidance) were associated with intuitive (‘‘easy’’) self-access as
defined by Koole et al. (2001). These findings are consistent with the assump-
tion that intuitive self-regulatory functions are involved in intrinsic motivation
associated with this motive level, which is associated with positive affect.
Furthermore, the active and self-confrontational coping components (OMT
Level 3) of nAffiliation (i.e., coping with rejection) and nPower (i.e., coping
with power-related threat) were associated with integrative self-access as
defined by Kaze
´n et al. (2003). The pattern is consistent with our theoretical
expectations: Coping with negative affect (OMT Level 3) requires more inte-
grative competencies than self-generation of positive affect (OMT Level 1).
Consistent with our assumptions, neither measure of self-access showed
significantly positive correlations with incentive-oriented or avoidant motive
levels. However, Table 13.2 shows an additional finding concerning the
Table 13.2 Spearman-Rho Correlations Between Intuitive and Integrative
Measures of Self-Access and Content Categories of the Operant Motive Test (OMT).
Intuitive Self-Access
a
Integrative Self-Access
b
OMT All nAff nAch nPow All nAff nAch nPow
Level
1.50** .48** .12 .41** .21 .11 .16 .21
2 .04 .25 .11 .24 .09 .06 .18 .25
3.13 .11 .03 .13 .39* .45** .01 .32*
4.12 .36* .02 .10 .14 .05 .05 .15
5.06 .01 .00 .09 .05 .02 .25 .11
Note: The OMT levels indicate five different strategies to implement basic social needs (cf. Table 13.1). Levels
1 and 3 are theoretically associated with self-access. Correlations in boldface signify theoretically expected
relationships. N=58
a
Shorter self-evaluation latencies indicate better intuitive self-access (cf. Koole et al., 2001). Mean self-
evaluation latencies were reversed so that higher scores indicate be tter intuitive self-access.
b
Longer self-evaluation latencies for counterpreferential (i.e., accepting negative and rejecting positive
items) compared to preferential decisions (i.e., accepting positive and rejecting negativ e items) indicate
better integrative self-access (cf. Kaze
´n et al., 2003).
*p<.05 ** p<.01.
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A LOOK FROM PERSONALITY SYSTEMS INTERACTION THEORY 393

affiliation motive: A negative relationship between need for security (Cell 1.4)
and the measure of simple (nonconfrontational) self-access. Apparently,
seeking contact based on a need for security, closeness, and being loved is an
affiliative concern that does not require extensive self-access because a deeply
personal interaction is not central or even avoided by security-seeking indivi-
duals. Taken together, findings are consistent with our assumption that
implicit motives encompass enactment strategies that vary in their degree of
participation of the self.
In contrast to nAff and nPow, self-determined levels of nAch did not correlate
with intuitive and integrative self-access (see Table 13.2). Is there any theore-
tical reason that the self plays a different role in self-determined achievement
compared to its role in the other two motivational domains? The latency
measures of self-access based on positive and negative trait self-ascription
may tackle a rather broad tendency to activate the self. Is it possible that
individuals who are self-determined in affiliation and power domains activate
intuitive and integrative functions of the self rather broadly whereas indivi-
duals who are self-determined in the achievement domain do not activate their
intuitive and integrative abilities on a general basis, but only when they
encounter task-related difficulty? It can be hypothesized, indeed, that self-
access is useful during specific moments of achievement-related episodes
only: When confrontation with some difficulty reduces positive affect, self-
access may be needed to recruit counterregulation through reviving confidence
based on past experiences of success (i.e., self-motivation).
Within the achievement domain, participation of the self may thus be a
necessary but not a sufficient condition for self-determination. According to
this view, self-access per se is not central to the satisfaction of achievement
needs. Self-access is important only to the extent that the self provides emo-
tional support for self-motivation when tackling difficult tasks (Level 1) or for
self-relaxation when confronted with failure (Level 3). The central functional
basis of achievement motivation is the maintenance of difficult goals in inten-
tion memory and their attainment through appropriate action. Volitional facil-
itation is our term for the enactment of difficult intentions through mobilizing
positive affect (i.e., through self-motivation). If achievement flow (Cell 2.1) is
about the ability to self-generate positive affect when the going gets tough, the
effects of self-determined levels of nAch on cognitive processing may only be
revealed on difficult tasks. Coping with failure (Cell 2.3) is expected to be less
relevant for volitional facilitation because it is about down-regulation of nega-
tive affect as opposed to up-regulation of positive affect.
In order to test the hypothesis about the relationship between volitional
facilitation and self-access as assessed by the OMT (Level 1), an experimental
paradigm was used to operationalize enactment of difficult intentions.
Specifically, removal of the Stroop interference effect has been found to be a
good measure of volitional facilitation (Kaze
´n & Kuhl, 2005; Kuhl & Kaze
´n,
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394 BASIC CONCEPTS AND PROCESSES

1999), as discussed in the next section of the chapter. Thus, achievement flow
(Cell 2.1) may not predict self-activation (and the ability to regulate affect) per
se but rather a tendency to activate the self in conjunction with intention
memory. Consistent with this assumption, Baumann and Scheffer (2009)
found significant relationships between OMT achievement flow (Cell 2.1) and
volitional facilitation (i.e., removal of Stroop interference): Participants with
higher scores on achievement flow had significantly reduced reaction times,
¼.33, p<.01, and errors rates, ¼.28, p<.05, in response to incon-
gruent compared to control stimuli. Consistent with expectations, the correla-
tion between coping with failure (Cell 2.3) and volitional facilitation was not
significant. This motive component may be more important when a task is not
only difficult (i.e., reduces positive affect) but entails a threat (i.e., increases
negative affect).
External observations of participants’ overt behavior in an outdoor assess-
ment center further support the assumption that achievement flow (Cell 2.1)
predicts self-activation only when intention memory is active (Baumann &
Scheffer, 2008): During several team tasks, participants high in the achieve-
ment flow motive (Cell 2.1) showed a unique pattern of overt behaviors
indicative of joint activation of intention memory (i.e., ‘‘seeing difficulty’’:
generating hypothesis, planning, analytical problem solving) and self-related
functions (i.e., ‘‘mastering difficulty’’: high commitment to the task, spreading
optimism and generating positive affect, motivating the team). The achieve-
ment flow motive predicted the product (seeing mastering difficulty) after
controlling for main effects of seeing and mastering difficulty. Findings con-
tribute to the validity of the achievement flow motive. On a more general level,
the presented findings support the assumption of PSI theory that individual
OMT cells can be conceived of as entailing very specific interactions of cognitive
and affective systems.
Need Specificity Hypothesis
According to our theoretical account of motives, each need is associated with a
specific bodily and mental configuration that includes specific goal objects. In
this section we elaborate on the role played by need content on the specific
modulation of cognitive behavioral systems. The need specificity hypothesis
(Kaze
´n & Kuhl, 2005; Kuhl, 2001) asserts that when a need is activated (e.g.,
through need-related imagery or external cues), a particular configuration of
the mental apparatus is aroused that supports need-specific cognition and
behavior. For example, when one gets hungry, there is a configuration of
one’s mental resources that supports efficient processing of need-related cues
(such as noticing the word ‘‘cake’’ or its picture on an advertisement or
smelling it out of a hot oven), as well as instrumental behavior to obtain food
(the specific goal object) and consume it. In the following paragraphs, this
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hypothesis is explained for achievement, affiliation, and power needs. Actually,
it should be applicable to other social needs, such as those included in the
original list by Murray (1938): ‘‘recognition,’’ ‘‘autonomy,’’ ‘‘defendance,’’
‘‘nurturance,’’ and so forth, assuming that they represent valid constructs.
From the perspective of PSI theory, activation of a need or motive generates
a specific system configuration, that is, activation of the macrosystem(s) spe-
cialized in the satisfaction of that need or motive. For example, if the achieve-
ment need is aroused through an external stimulus (e.g., a cue signaling a
difficult task to be mastered), it is assumed that intention memory rather than
intuitive behavior control will be engaged first because the former system is
specialized in sequential-analytic thinking and maintaining difficult intentions
active in memory whereas the latter is specialized in generating intuitive
behavior patterns that can be executed instantaneously. Confrontation with
a difficult task means that ready-to-go intuitive behaviors are not available
(otherwise the task would not be called difficult). In contrast, when the need of
affiliation is aroused, the opposite system-activation pattern is expected:
Spontaneous behavior such as smiling and small talk (that does not involve
explicit planning or difficult goals) is typical of affiliative interactions. In a
similar vein, the need for power does not necessarily require difficulties to be
mastered: Having an impact on others can satisfy the power motives even if no
difficulties are encountered.
Empirical studies support the need specificity hypothesis across achieve-
ment, power, and affiliation domains. This research involved short presenta-
tion of need-related cues (words or pictures), and we measured their impact on
subsequent cognitive performance. We assume that the need content of the
cues exerts its influence on cognitive processes very quickly, even to the extent
that it overrides the effect of stimulus valence (positivity or negativity). In that
sense, the need specificity hypothesis entails a primacy of motivation over affect in
motives’ effects on attention, cognition, and behavior. This motivational pri-
macy hypothesis is implied by the conceptual relationship between affect and
need: To the extent that positive and negative affect indicates need satisfaction
or frustration, respectively, there is a prototypical sequence starting with a need
state, which is followed by an affective state whose valence depends on the
degree of satisfaction or frustration encountered.
In a series of experiments on the Stroop effect (Kaze
´n & Kuhl, 2005; Kuhl &
Kaze
´n, 1999), weexamined the assumption that achievement but not affiliation-
related primes activate a specific system configuration related to dealing with a
difficult task. The first series of studies (Kuhl & Kaze
´n, 1999) was designed to test
the positive affect modulation assumption of PSI theory. If intention memory is
activated by confrontation with a difficult task, the link between intention
memory and intuitive behavior control is inhibited as long as problem solving
is needed to overcome the difficulty. When an external cue eliciting positive affect
is presented, it should signal ‘‘ready-to-go’’ (e.g., solution found) and re-establish
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396 BASIC CONCEPTS AND PROCESSES

the interrupted link between intention memory and the behavior control system
(i.e., volitional facilitation). Two successive Stroop tasks, each requiring a
response, were presented within a single trial (e.g., the word ‘‘GREEN’’ in blue,
and then the word ‘‘RED’’ in yellow). We looked at the effects of different types of
primes shown at the beginning of each trial on response latencies at the first
Stroop task. In accordance with our expectations, we found that positive primes
(e.g., ‘‘good luck’’ or ‘‘success’’) eliminated Stroop interference (6 ms in Study 1),
measured as the latency difference between the incongruent (e.g., responding to
the color blue of the word ‘‘GREEN’’) and the control condition (e.g., responding
to the color blue of a meaningless series of characters: ‘‘XXXX’’). Stroop inter-
ference was found with neutral and negative primes.
To examine the need specificity hypothesis, in the next series of studies
(Kaze
´n & Kuhl, 2005) we varied not only the valence of the primes (positive,
negative) but also their need content (achievement, affiliation, and power). We
presented on each trial a Stroop and a sentence evaluation task. Our main
prediction was that positive achievement primes (e.g., ‘‘success’’) would reduce
or eliminate Stroop interference (because they should predominantly activate
intention memory), whereas positive affiliation primes (e.g., ‘‘love’’) would
even increase Stroop interference (because they should first activate the intui-
tive behavior system, which could inhibit intention memory). We confirmed
these expectations. Figure 13.5 shows the results of three studies (with
–50
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Students Managers Unemployed
Stroop Interference (Incong. - XXX)
Success Shirt Failure
Figure 13.5 Latency differences (ms) between incongruent (e.g., word ‘‘GREEN’’
in blue) and control (e.g., ‘‘XXXX’’ in blue) Stroop conditions in three of the studies
reported by Kaze
´n & Kuhl (2005, JPSP, 89, 426–448) as a function of prime valence
(positive, neutral, or negative). Positive achievement primes (e.g, ‘‘erfolg’’)
significantly reduced or eliminated Stroop interference in each study not only as
indicated by these difference scores but also comparing their mean latencies with
those obtained with neutral (e.g., ‘‘shirt’’) or negative achievement primes (e.g.,
‘‘failure’’). Only in the study with unemployed participants was the latency
difference after negative primes significantly higher than after neutral primes.
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A LOOK FROM PERSONALITY SYSTEMS INTERACTION THEORY 397

students, managers, and unemployed graduates) for achievement: After posi-
tive achievement primes, there was a significant reduction or elimination of
Stroop interference, as measured by latency differences between incongruent
and control (XXXX) Stroop conditions. This volitional facilitation was also
confirmed comparing positive versus neutral or negative achievement primes.
Notably, the unemployed participants showed increased Stroop interference
after negative achievement primes compared to the neutral condition, indi-
cating failure-dependent volitional inhibition, which can be a cause of an effect
of their previous negative experiences in achieving their professional goals.
To test the need specificity hypothesis thoroughly, we need to compare
performance after positive achievement and positive affiliation primes with
performance in the neutral prime condition. As already seen, Stroop latencies
after positive achievement primes were significantly faster than those in the
neutral prime condition (Fig. 13.5). Stroop performance after positive affiliation
primes was different: In two studies (with students and unemployed graduates,
but not managers), Stroop performance (incongruent Stroop minus XXXX) after
positive affiliation primes was significantly slower (277 and 240 ms, for students
and unemployed, respectively) compared to that in the neutral prime condition
(114 and 157 ms). Finally, neither the negative affiliation nor the positive or
negative power prime conditions influenced Stroop interference in any study. The
previous results show (a) that the removal of the Stroop interference (volitional
facilitation) effectis specific tothe achievement domain, and (b) that needs have a
processing priority compared to valence, because the effect of the positivity of the
primes on cognitive performance was subordinated to the effect of need content
within the same groups of participants (i.e., positive achievement primes reduced
and positive affiliation primes increased interference).
The third study (with managers), provided a second way of testing the need
specificity hypothesis. The effect of external need-related cues should be stronger
in persons inwhich the corresponding need is more strongly aroused. This can be
expected in individuals scoring high on an implicit motive test, such as the OMT.
Therefore, we asked participants to fill out the OMT, as well as an explicit test
measuring self-attributed motives (the motive enactment test; Kuhl & Henseler,
2003). We carried out a median split of the 63 managers accordingto their OMT
scores (averaging Levels 1 to 4) and classified them into high (n¼31) versus low
(n¼32) in need for achievement. After repeating the analyses including this
factor, we found elimination of Stroop interference after positive achievement
primes only for participants with high nAch (8 ms, which was also significantly
faster than to the neutral condition: 74 ms). In contrast, there was only a small
reduction of the expected Stroop interference for participants with low nAch
(þ37 ms, which did not significantly differ from the neutral condition: 52 ms).
Notably, a median split using the self-attributed achievement motive measure did
not produce significant results. The overall pattern of findings thus confirms
again the need specificity hypothesis.
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398 BASIC CONCEPTS AND PROCESSES

Conclusion
The theoretical, methodological, and empirical work described in this chapter
suggests that motives may be distinguished on at least three levels of higher
cognitive-emotional functioning. Existing methods of motive assessment can be
related to these three levels: Classical methods (TAT and PSE) focus on the
preconceptual level with its impact on imagery and apperception (i.e., need-
related interpretation of perceived scenes). The grid technique developed by
Schmalt, Sokolowski, Langens and associates may help assess more differen-
tiated cognitive elaborations of motives (although systematic research deli-
neating commonalities and differences among the grid technique and
classical methods is still missing).
Finally, the operant motive test (OMT) focuses on the self-integration level of
motive measurement. The empirical findings reported suggest that the degree
to which the self participates in motive-guided fantasy and action can be
reliably and validly assessed from content analysis. Future research would
greatly benefit from comparisons between the three methods to further explore
their commonalities and differences. Our theoretical comparison of the three
levels involved suggests that, despite of their commonalities, each of the three
methods should have distinct behavioral correlates. Because of the close inter-
action expected among the preconceptual, conceptual, and self-regulatory
levels, the three methods of motive measurement may show converging rela-
tionships with many behavioral measures and converging lack of relationships
with self-report measures and some of their correlates. Note that the three levels
mentioned do not coincide with different levels of explicit awareness (‘‘con-
sciousness’’): Each of them relates to an implicit source of motivation. Even
more interestingly, the three methods may sometimes show unique relation-
ships when behavioral measures are taken that are dependent upon preconcep-
tual imagery, conceptually elaborated extensions, or self-regulatory functions,
respectively. Because interactions among mental systems are expected to be
facilitated by participation of the self, self-regulatory dependence of motive effects
are expected when one observes behavior that critically depends on systems
interactions (e.g., interaction among intention memory and intuitive behavior
control).
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