The politics of persuasion: UN climate change negotiations

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6 The politics of persuasion: UN climate change
negotiations
Radoslav Dimitrov1
Friends, I do not ask my country or any country to suspend national interest but to advance it more
intelligently. For nothing matters more to any nation’s interest than the fate of the only world we
have. … To the developing world I say: the technology now exists to gain the dividends of a
high-growth economy without incurring the damage of a high-carbon economy.2
What do governments say to each other during negotiations? Global environmental politics
feature a high number of multilateral conferences in which countries negotiate collective policy
responses to various ecological problems. Governments have held at least 78 global multilateral
environmental conferences in addition to regional meetings and bilateral communication across
borders.3 These conversations regularly produce policy agreements to combat ecological
problems, including some of the strongest policy regimes in global governance. In the process
of these interactions, countries occasionally reconsider their national interests and change their
positions.
This chapter examines argumentation and techniques of persuasion in global environmental
negotiations. It explores the micro-dynamics of international climate negotiations and the actual
communicative exchange. Documenting the argumentation offered by delegations in support
of their positions allows us to uncover the foundations of negotiating strategies and clarify how
actors seek to persuade others. Preliminary ndings presented here are based on participatory
observation of UN climate negotiations between 2007 and 2010, interviews with negotiators
and policy-makers, and document analysis of ofcial delegation statements.4 My research
assistants and I attended 12 negotiation conferences and recorded hundreds of hours of country
statements.
Key Propositions
Several observations emerge. First, governments spend considerable efforts in persuading others
rather than muscle their way through. They engage in purposeful communication aiming to
reshape policy preferences in other countries. Quite simply, people try to change each other’s
minds and not merely policy behavior. Second, political actors use a variety of approaches to
persuasion and a typology of arguments is outlined below. Third, some approaches to persuasion
work better than others. Effective argumentation focuses on the interests of other countries.
Shrewd negotiators formulate their own argumentation with a view to accommodating the
interests of their target audience.
1 Research for this project is funded with a generous grant by Canada’s Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council. I am grateful also to Melissa Harris and Jon Gamu for valuable research assistance at global conferences.
2 Gordon Brown, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, speaking at the UN climate conference in Copenhagen,
15 December 2009.
3 Kimo Goree, Director of IISD Reporting Services, personal communication. See http://www.iisd.ca/meetings/2010.
html.
4 The author attends the UNFCCC negotiations as government delegate for the European Union and Bulgaria.

The politics of persuasion: UN climate change negotiations 73
A “Trojan horse” hypothesis advanced here is that countries seek to change national positions
from within the camps of their rivals, by bringing information that reects national interests
abroad. Gentler than the warlike name would suggest, this approach relies on empathy: actors
take their rivals’ interests seriously and deliver information on policy paths that would serve
others’ national interests more effectively. Such “other-orientation” is an intelligent pursuit of
the national interest by taking others’ interests seriously. This remarkable phenomenon
challenges the prevalent assumption of national egoism in world affairs and therefore deserves
further examination in international relations (IR) scholarship.
Finally, conversations and good arguments help change national policies. Today climate
policy is rapidly gaining speed in many countries. A global pattern of national policies for
low-carbon development today closely matches the European argument about the economic
benets of climate policy. The current global policy shift toward a clean economy reects the
European concept of “win–win” solutions to climate change.
Argumentation and Negotiations: The Missing Literature
Multilateral negotiations have been described as “a process of mutual persuasion and adjustment
of interests and policies which aims at combining non-identical actor preferences into a single
joint decision.”5 The process through which human communities make collective decisions in
the governance of public affairs is shaped by many factors. The political process itself, however,
is human communication: the exchange of messages and information between political actors.
This most apparent and ubiquitous media of social interaction sometimes remains under the
radar of IR scholars.
Governments talk but scholars rarely listen. Communication is rarely explored in the study
of multilateral negotiations. There is an academic tendency to treat international politics as a
series of strategic policy moves, hence our traditional focus on state “behavior” and action
rather than words. Talk is cheap indeed (until you hire a lawyer) yet international relations
occur through speech acts as well as policy actions. Listening to intergovernmental
conversations is important and also interesting.
Despite the widespread recognition that “in essence, international negotiation is communi-
cation,”6 communication is the terra incognita of negotiation studies. Sweeping literature
reviews conclude that the exchange of arguments is the least explored topic in this eld of
research.7 The negotiation literature is dominated by game theory which focuses on structural
variables, downplays process and ignores what countries actually tell one another. Previous
explorations of multilateral negotiations examine congurations of interests and changes in
national positions,8 coalition building,9 the role of leadership,10 and the role of issue linkage.11
Important books by Farhana Yamin and Joanna Depledge rectify the general neglect of process
and provide detailed descriptions of the logistical and bureaucratic organization of climate
negotiations but also leave out the discursive exchange among delegations.12
5 Rittberger 1998, 17.
6 Stein 1988, 222; and Sycara 1990.
7 Jönsson 2002; and Zartman 2002.
8 Andresen and Agrawala 2002; and Vogler and Bretherton 2006.
9 Hampson 1995; and Dupont 1996.
10 Young 1991; and Underdal 1994.
11 Zartman 1994; and Hopmann 1996.
12 Yamin and Depledge 2004; and Depledge 2005.

74 Handbook of global environmental politics
What do delegations actually say to one another? “The back-and-forth communication … the
dynamics of mutual persuasion attempts that we usually associate with negotiations are
insufciently caught.”13 Thomas Risse14 cogently argued the need to study communicative
behavior, and the few scholars who tried to follow up admitted failure to produce conclusive
results, partly due to a lack of verbatim records of negotiations.15 Scholars rarely have access to
international negotiations, particularly behind closed doors. The research presented here explores
the argumentative processes of policy deliberations through direct observation and primary data.
Global Climate Negotiations
Today governments are busy negotiating a new international policy agreement that will
effectively replace the Kyoto Protocol as the centerpiece of the climate policy regime. The new
treaty would likely strengthen climate policy through stringent emission reductions in advanced
economies, concrete actions by developing countries, and international nancial and
technological support for climate policy. While the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) process is the main negotiation forum, multilateral discussions
take place elsewhere including the Major Economies’ Forum on Energy and Climate Change,
the G8, and the G20 annual meetings.
The formal UN process began in 2007 when countries launched the Bali Action Plan, a legal
mandate for formal negotiations that requires governments to produce an agreement containing
four building blocks: mitigation (read greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reductions), adaptation
(to the consequences of climate change), and nancial and technological support for developing
country actions.16 Two parallel processes of formal negotiations are currently underway. One
aims at renegotiating emission reductions by industrialized countries under the Kyoto Protocol
(the “Kyoto track” or AWG-KP). The second, “Convention track” (AWG-LCA) is a broader
negotiation of global policy by all countries, including developing countries.
Comprehensive guides to the negotiations documenting the complex policy issues on the table
and taking stock of progress have been published elsewhere.17 Countries disagree on the legal
architecture of the future policy regime: whether to extend the Kyoto Protocol, create a new global
agreement with obligations for all countries, or both. Other key debates are on the level of
obligation for developing countries; long-term goals for temperature limits and global emission
reductions; level and mechanisms of international funding; and the role of agriculture and forestry.
The stakes are uniquely high. Climate change is the only truly global problem whose grave
consequences affect most human communities. The realities of global warming now accepted
by the global political elite and the international scientic community threaten economic
growth, long-term prosperity and the physical survival of human populations. Under a business-
as-usual (BAU) scenario, climate change can reduce global GDP by 5 to 20 percent.18 Expected
consequences include: decline in food production from disruption of agriculture; water scarcity;
human health problems on epidemic scales; increase in the intensity and frequency of natural
disasters; sea-level rise and inundation of agricultural lands; and refugee waves.19 To avoid the
13 Jönsson 2002, 224.
14 Risse 2000.
15 Deitelhoff and Müller 2005.
16 Clémençon 2008.
17 Kulovesi and Gutiérrez 2009; Dimitrov 2010; and Sterk et al. 2010.
18 Stern 2007.
19 IPCC 2008; and Schneider et al. 2010.

The politics of persuasion: UN climate change negotiations 75
most catastrophic impacts and limit temperature rise to below 2˚C, advanced economies would
need to cut GHG emissions 25–40 percent by 2020, and global emissions need to be reduced
50–80 percent by 2050.
Global climate politics has rightfully attracted much academic attention. Insiders to the UN
political process have provided valuable analytical summaries of global climate negotiations.20
Many studies analyze existing climate agreements, evaluate progress in negotiations, and
discuss future prospects for cooperation.21 Others explore the comparative politics of climate
change, the national policies and negotiation positions of particular actors,22 and domestic
social discourse within countries.23 Another important body of literature debates future policy
options, offers policy recommendations, and discusses issues of justice and equity.24
Sixteen rounds of formal negotiations occurred between Bali 2007 and April 2011. Recently,
countries reached two breakthrough agreements in Cancun, Mexico, in December 2010. The
Cancun Agreements are historic because they set for the rst time an ofcial global goal of
limiting temperature rise to below 2˚C, and stipulate that developing countries “will” take
nationally appropriate mitigation actions. Countries agreed on a bottom-up approach to
emission reductions whereby each country determines voluntary national targets and actions
and reports them internationally. The agreements also establish a global Adaptation Framework;
an international registry for developing country policies; and a Green Climate Fund with $30
billion dollars of short-term nance and a commitment to provide $100 billion per year for
climate mitigation and adaptation by 2020.25 These interim nonbinding agreements presumably
serve as a basis for a future legally binding treaty (or two) as countries continue to negotiate.
Positions of Key Players
The European Union
Clearly the global leader on climate policy, the EU advocates a strong global agreement with
stringent economy-wide emissions reductions, substantial international nancial support, and
robust compliance mechanisms.26 Europeans stress “win–win” solutions to climate change that
benet the economy and the environment:
European Union: Let us agree to the 2 degree objective and to global emissions reductions of at least
50% as well as aggregate developed emission reductions of at least 80–95% by 2050 compared to
1990 levels, and in the order of 30% by 2020. Developing countries as a group should commit to
actions that achieve a substantial deviation below the currently predicted emissions growth rate in the
order of 15–30%.27
20 Fry 2008; Kulovesi and Gutiérrez 2009; Dimitrov 2010; and Oberthür 2011.
21 Paterson 1996; Harris 2000; Ott 2001; Victor 2001; Betsill 2004; Yamin and Depledge 2004; Depledge 2006;
Clémençon 2008; Ott et al. 2008; and Watanabe et al. 2008.
22 Hovi et al. 2003; Harrison and Sundstrom 2007; and Oberthür and Kelly 2008.
23 McCright and Dunlap 2003; Pettenger 2007; see also the special issue of Global Environmental Politics (November
2007).
24 Gupta 2000; Agrawala and Andresen 2001; Aldy et al. 2003; Najam et al. 2003; Bodansky 2004; Victor 2004;
Adger et al. 2006; Roberts and Parks 2007; Hare et al. 2010; and Müller 2011.
25 The text of the Cancun Agreements are in documents FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 and FCCC/Kyoto Protocol/
CMP/2010/12/Add.1 available at http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_16/items/5571.php, accessed 14 April 2011.
26 Harris 2007; and Oberthür and Kelly 2008.
27 EU opening statement at the AWG-LCA, delivered by Sweden, December 7, 2009. All quotations of statements
by country delegations are primary data recorded by the author and his research assistants during the negotiations.

76 Handbook of global environmental politics
The EU frequently shows exibility and deferred to developing countries’ insistence on the
continuation of the Kyoto Protocol, provided there are reciprocal binding obligations in the
developing world under a separate agreement. Bent on strong ecological results, Western Europe
is pressing Eastern European members to forsake surplus emission reductions and adopt brand
new pledges in the post-2012 period. On international nance, Europe has the most elaborate
position among industrialized countries and the European Council decided to provide €2–15
billion per year by 2020.
The Umbrella Group
The Umbrella Group consists of Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, Kazakhstan, New Zealand,
Norway, the Russian Federation, the Ukraine, and the United States who seek to coordinate
positions and deliver common statements. Three countries in particular oppose the continuation
of the Kyoto Protocol and insist on a single global treaty that ensures actions by all major
emitters. Their opening statement in Copenhagen 2009, delivered by Australia, summarized
the group’s preferences:
Our vision is simple: we recognize the scientic view that the increase in global average temperature
above pre-industrial levels ought not to exceed 2 degrees Celsius. We want a global outcome that puts
the world on a path to 50 percent reduction in emissions by 2050, and peaking emissions as soon as
possible. We want all countries to act according to their national ability.
The United States, after having stayed out of the climate regime during the Bush years, changed
course in 2009 and now seeks a comprehensive global agreement involving all countries,
reliance on market mechanisms and existing global nancial institutions, low-carbon technology
research and development and a global “climate technology hub” for exchange of information
on clean technologies. The US cannot participate in renegotiating the Kyoto Protocol because
they have not ratied the Protocol, and negotiates only in the AWG-LCA track.
Japan
Japan made a dramatic U-turn in September 2009 when the Hatoyama government announced
plans to reduce its own emissions by 25 percent below 1990 levels by 2020, contingent on a
global policy framework involving all major economies. Japan favors “sectoral approaches”
to emission reductions, that is, international agreement to target particular economic sectors
and thus allay competitiveness concerns for those sectors. The Japanese are strongly against
Kyoto 2 but appear committed to creating an ambitious new treaty and generally play a
constructive role in the talks. At Copenhagen they provided $11 billion of public funding for
international policy, and the head of their delegation spoke earnestly and passionately during
the imbroglio over adopting the Copenhagen Accord in 2009:
Japan: We are here neither to accuse each other nor to blame each other. We are here assembled to do
our utmost to save the Earth. It is shameful of ourselves condemning each other. The whole world is
watching us. Our delegation has grave concerns on the life and death threat facing small islands,
vulnerable countries on the surface of the Earth. We are here not just to save these nations but also to
save ourselves, our children and our future generation.
Russian Federation
The Russian Federation is generally uninvolved in debates and rarely speaks in the discussions.
They advocate voluntary bottom-up approaches that allow each country to determine so-called

The politics of persuasion: UN climate change negotiations 77
“no-lose” targets whose achievement would bring rewards but wherein non-compliance brings
no penalties. Domestically, Russia is currently considering national emission reduction goals.
Developing Countries
Developing countries negotiate as a coalition, “the G77 and China.”28 They are united in
advocating Kyoto 2 with stringent binding policy in the North, voluntary policy in the South,
substantial international nancial and technological support, and no international reporting of
policies that are unsupported internationally. The G77 demand rm legal obligations for
developed economies before making any policy commitments themselves, and decry demands
for a global treaty as attempts by industrialized nations to “destroy Kyoto” and shun their
historical responsibility for global warming. Delivering a formal opening statement on behalf
of the coalition, Sudan stated:
G77/China: We reject attempts of developed countries to shift the responsibility of addressing climate
change and its adverse effects on developing countries, and we equally object to their objective of
concluding another legally-binding instrument that would put together the obligations of developed
countries under the KP and similar action of actions of developing countries. This would revoke the
principle of “common, but differentiated responsibilities” and “historical responsibility” under the
Convention.
The coalition is fractured by profound conicts of interest among heavy industrial emitters
such as China and India, forested countries, fossil-dependent OPEC (Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries) members, and the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS). These
conicting interests are deliberately suppressed for the sake of unity but they regularly ruptured
the coalition.29
China, India, Brazil, and South Africa (the BASIC Group)
The BASIC group are heavyweight GHG emitters with strong inuence on the G77 coalition.
Unlike other G77 members who emphasize international nancial and technological support,
money is not their priority: BASIC countries want freedom of national economic development
unencumbered by legal treaty obligations. They insist their actions should be discussed after
nalizing negotiations on developed country actions. Notably, all four appear positioned to
take domestic action.
Indonesia, Congo, Brazil, and Other Heavily Forested Countries
These countries can reap considerable nancial benets from a global agreement rewarding
forest conservation for the sake of climate change abatement. They carefully negotiate
institutional arrangements and nancial details and, given the right incentives, would break
ranks with the G77 on the need for developing country actions. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand,
seeks to obstruct negotiations in every possible way, engaging in diplomatic carpet-bombing
of sorts. Heavy reliance on fossil fuels makes their economy extremely vulnerable to prospective
energy efciency and alternative energy policies. Their delegation champions discussions on
negative consequences of climate policy and compensation for “spillover effects” of low-carbon
development strategies in advanced economies.
28 China is not a formal member but associates itself with the G77 and participates in their daily internal discussions.
29 Vihma 2010.

78 Handbook of global environmental politics
The Alliance of Small Island States
AOSIS want action as strong and swift as possible, due to their extreme vulnerability to sea-
level rise. Some of the most proactive players in the negotiations are in this group, with many
innovative policy ideas and key substantive text proposals coming from Tuvalu and Micronesia.
AOSIS advocate 45 percent emission cuts by 2020 and limiting global temperature increase to
below 1.5˚C. On the opening day of Copenhagen, Grenada stated:
Alliance of Small Island States: We have a moral imperative to act. All of us face this. But as small
island states going under water, losing our territorial integrity, facing increased poverty, and frankly,
given that our very survival is threatened, we stand to lose the most if nothing happens here.
Typology of Argumentation
Governments justify their negotiating positions by several principal types of arguments:
pragmatic, moral, legal, procedural, and ideological. The pragmatic argument centers on
effective problem solving. The moral arguments appeal to morality and a sense of justice.
Procedural arguments are drawn to follow agreed upon mandates and fair process. Legal
arguments refer principles of international law and existing treaties. Finally, ideological
argumentation goes outside the specics of the policy problems at hand and focuses on
overarching paradigms of socioeconomic development.
Pragmatic Arguments
Pragmatic arguments focus on problem solving. Delegations commonly argue that steep
emission reductions are needed in order to combat climate change and reduce its negative
impacts on human communities. A few typical examples of the countless statements made
along these lines over the years of climate conferences:
Paraguay: Today we face the worse security crisis in the history of humanity. As long as developed
countries continue to postpone the fulllment of their obligations of emissions reduction commitments,
the conditions for well-being and survival of billions of human beings will hang in the balance.
Samoa: Climate change is an issue of survival for Samoa and other low-lying islands – hence our
support for a legally binding instrument to reect the science under the two tracks with an effective
and equitable compliance regime. This is not a political slogan to win over support or a campaign
gimmick to enlist sympathy.
Climate change is real. We see and experience it everyday. Our coastlines have been eroded, our corals
bleached, and salt water intrusion is affecting fresh water resources and crop cultivation along coastal
areas. We have been forced to relocate populations and necessary infrastructure to higher grounds at
very high costs, both nancially and socially.30
Many statements center on the effectiveness of various policy options. The US, the EU and
others, for instance, stress market mechanisms as the most cost-effective and politically feasible
policy approach.
Moral Arguments
Moral arguments are based on considerations of ethics and justice. During the 1990s,
developing countries successfully argued they bear no policy responsibilities to mitigate climate
30 Statements at the Fifteenth Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC, Copenhagen, 7–19 December 2009.

The politics of persuasion: UN climate change negotiations 79
change because the problem was created by industrialized countries. European countries
accepted this as a fair argument and the resulting Kyoto Protocol exempted developing countries
from emission reduction targets. Today the situation is somewhat different because half of
current emissions originate in the developing world. Yet many use similar arguments related
to climate justice:
Ethiopia: Every one of us knows that Africa has contributed virtually nothing to global warming but
has been hit rst and hardest. Africa is indeed paying with the misery and death of its people for the
wealth and wellbeing that was created in the developed countries through carbon intensive
development. That is fundamentally unjust.31
Solomon Islands: It is therefore morally and ethically correct for developed countries, with their
historical responsibility [for climate change], to adopt a package that will reduce their collective GHG
by more than 45 percent below 1990 levels by 2020 and 95 percent below 1990 levels by 2050. It is
morally and ethically correct, to provide new, additional and predictable funding.32
Legal Arguments
Legal arguments emphasize legal precedent and commitments under existing international
agreements, including legal mandates. Developing countries press developed countries to carry
the policy burden of reducing emissions by referring (again and again) to the principle “common
but differentiated responsibilities” established in the UNFCCC. In demanding international
nance, they refer to the legal mandate of the Bali Action Plan to negotiate four building blocks
including nance and technology transfer.
Paraguay: Industrial countries are not complying with the commitment to mitigate climate change,
which not only violates the Convention, but also violates the basic principles of international
environmental law, including the principle that stipulates that States have the obligation to not cause
grave damages to the territories of other States.
Procedural Arguments
Sometimes countries successfully oppose substantive policy proposals and block entire draft
agreements with objections on purely procedural grounds. When the 2009 Copenhagen
conference ground to a halt, the organizers proposed establishing a small group of 25 heads of
state to seek a breakthrough as an efcient alternative to the arduous task of reaching consensus
among 192 delegations. This “Friends of the Chair” group was supported by most delegations
and produced a draft Copenhagen Accord. The agreement was overturned by several small
countries such as Sudan, Tuvalu, and Bolivia who argued that the decision-making on the
Accord was not inclusive, violated the UNFCCC procedures of consensus building, and
therefore the Accord was illegitimate. Cuba protested against “grave procedural violations,”
the “antidemocratic approach,” and “arbitrary, exclusive, and discriminatory” debate formats.
Cuba: What you call, Mr. President, “a group of representative leaders” is a gross violation of sovereign
equality that is enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and a mechanism that would impose
decisions on the international community.
31 Statement by Ethiopia on behalf of the African Group at the UN climate conference in Copenhagen, December
2009.
32 Statement of the Solomon Islands at the Copenhagen conference, December 2009.

80 Handbook of global environmental politics
Political Ideology
Political ideology is also evident in international debates. Bolivia and Venezuela portray
capitalism as the root cause of climate change, and decry Western policy proposals as capitalist
instruments of domination. In the limelight of global media, Hugo Chavez quipped “If the
climate was a bank, the West would have saved it by now!”
Venezuela: Here, today, in this fateful hour, the imperial interests are being imposed, and this is really
ying in the face of those who are the most vulnerable. … Our dignity, Mr. President and Mr. Secretary
General, does not have a price tag. We will not sell our principles … even for 30 billion dollars.
Other Arguments
Finally, some statements feature a mixture of two or more types of arguments. Cuba, for
instance, weaved the imperatives of problem solving and morality:
Cuba: [The agreement] must include a strong mechanism by developed nations for the nancing of
mitigation actions and especially for the adaption of developing countries to climate change. This is
not a work of charity, but above all, a moral obligation to the countries of the South and it is a legal
obligation deriving from the commitments assumed under the Convention.
The Winning Argument: The Trojan Horse Approach
A principal technique of persuasion that actors use is to alter perceived costs and benets of
action. Mainstream IR scholarship has established that countries use threats and sanctions to
raise the costs of undesired political behavior. In climate negotiations, governments convince
others also by raising the benets of desired behavior. The EU and others have repeatedly
emphasized the economic benets of low-carbon development. Thus, European countries try
to generate genuine national interests in the US and other countries in clean energy policy and
a strong climate agreement. Delivery of information on the co-benets of reducing emissions
has been central in multilateral discussions.
One interesting nding is that some countries focus on the interests of other nations. To
persuade others during negotiations, some states tailor their arguments to the interests of their
target audience. Countries seek to take others in a particular policy direction by delivering
information that reects their rivals’ interests. This is a “Trojan horse” approach to argumentation
because it seeks change from within the camps of other nations. Actors seek to affect their
opponents’ policy preferences by molding their own arguments to their opponents’ concerns.
The EU, for instance, seeks strong climate action but emphasizes the economic reasons for
environmental policy. Facing opposition by countries who fear how climate policy would affect
their economy, the EU has been emphasizing the economic benets of a low-carbon economy
based on renewable energy and energy efciency. Back in the early 2000s, Europe introduced
the concept of “win–win solutions” to the international climate policy debate.
European Union: We think the industrialized countries need to take the lead. They need to make 30
percent cuts collectively by 2020 … and 60–80 percent cuts by 2050. The EU is particularly
encouraged by the broad range of mitigation potentials. A signicant part is available at low or no cost
and brings additional benets for energy security and air pollution in what is referred to as “win–win”
solutions.33
33 Statement at the Third Session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties to the
Kyoto Protocol, Bonn, Germany, 7–18 May 2007.

The politics of persuasion: UN climate change negotiations 81
Europeans tirelessly advertise co-benets of climate policy including nancial savings from
energy efciency and clean energy, competitive advantage and energy security – issues of key
importance to the US and China. To persuade developing countries, they focus on priorities in
those countries. The UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown addressed other heads of states in
Copenhagen:
To the developed world I say: environmental action is the most powerful engine of job creation in an
economy urgently in need of millions of new jobs. To the developing world I say: the technology now
exists to gain the dividends of a high-growth economy without incurring the damage of a high-carbon
economy.
Along this line, an EU joint statement sought to persuade developing countries to accept
climate policy commitments by emphasizing the priority interests in the developing world:
We cannot tackle hunger, disease, and poverty unless we also provide people with a healthy ecosystem
where economies can grow. Hunger, disease, and poverty will never be defeated in a world where
global warming goes above 2 degrees Celsius. … Let our Copenhagen Agreement be not just about
restrictions and constrains – but about sustainable development, green growth and possibilities!34
The essence of the European approach to persuasion was aptly captured in an opening
statement by Denmark’s Connie Hedegaard who presided over a December 2009 conference
in Copenhagen:
We don’t have to choose between economic growth and climate conservation. A global deal will drive
job creation, a global deal will drive competitive advantage, a global deal will drive energy security.
So ladies and gentlemen, let’s get it done. … Let’s mark this meeting in history, let’s open the door
to the low-carbon age – let’s get it done, and let’s get it done now.
Shrewd argumentation helps others see compelling reasons for action and perceive self-
interest in action. By contrast, not all negotiators use other-oriented arguments: many are
self-centered in international discussions and repeat over and over their own needs and desires.
Developing country statements, for instance, often reiterate their well-known demands for
international nancial and technical support. Repeating what you want others to do without
offering them reasons for action is not a particularly effective negotiating strategy.
The Power of Persuasion
Dialogue in world politics matters as it exposes actors to new information and reasoning that
helps them (re)consider their interests. While establishing a strict causal connection between
particular arguments and state behavior would be premature at this early stage, the extensive
global discussions on climate change over the last 10 years correlate with a global pattern of
national policy developments. Information on the climate crisis and the European argument of
“win–win” solutions have gained currency and many countries are taking serious action for
emission reductions and clean energy.
This overall positive assessment must be preceded by two caveats that justify reservations
about the role of persuasion in world politics. First, not all governments employ careful
34 Statement by the European Union at the Fifteenth Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC, Copenhagen, 7–19
December 2009.

82 Handbook of global environmental politics
argumentation or make genuine efforts at persuading others. In climate talks, many delegations
simply reiterate their own positions and preferences over months and years of discussion.
Occasionally entire conferences consist of lengthy reiterations of national positions that are
already well known to all participants. Some do so without either offering justication for these
particular preferences or integrating other interests in their own argumentation.
Second, persuasive arguments do not always, or perhaps even frequently, succeed in changing
the minds of governments and their policy preferences. Intransigence is common and creates
a chronic impasse in the UN climate talks. China, India, and Brazil were unbending between
Bali 2007 and Copenhagen 2009, dismissed outright all suggestions for policy actions, and
unapologetically trumpeted their freedom of economic development regardless of environmental
impacts. In that time period, Western countries argued cogently and made considerable
compromises yet received practically nothing in return from developing countries, until
recently.35
The State of Global Climate Policy
International conversations have helped change the world in the long run. Global climate
governance is dramatically different today, compared to the 1990s. A look around the world
reveals that climate policy is a remarkably vibrant realm of policy development and
implementation. Aggregate climate governance comprising regional, national, subnational, and
local policies as well as nonstate initiatives worldwide is thriving.36 The ts and starts of the
UN process should not obscure the bigger and brighter picture: today the vast majority of
countries with signicant emissions have ambitious domestic policies, many backed with
detailed policy implementation plans (Table 6.1).
Globally, there is a distinct policy convergence toward building a cleaner economy. Many
countries are heading toward low-carbon development, inuenced by arguments about the
economic benets of climate action. In 2008, South Korea ofcially embraced a “Green
Growth” paradigm of economic development, committed to 30 percent cuts by 2020 below
BAU, and established a Global Green Growth Institute to systematize the green growth theory
and spread it to developing countries to adopt it. Today countries are establishing new branches
of government dedicated to climate policy such as Australia’s Department of Climate Change
and Energy. Sweden plans to eliminate fossil fuels altogether by 2030. Norway plans to slash
its emissions by 40 percent by 2020 and be carbon neutral by 2030. Costa Rica’s policy is to
be carbon neutral by 2021.
National positions change slowly, but they do. The year 2009 marked the rst time in the
history of climate negotiations that developing countries agreed in principle to undertake
international policy obligations and quantied targets. Brazil adopted a national law in 2010
to reduce its national emissions by 36–9 percent by 2020 below BAU. China now pursues a
policy to achieve 40–45 percent cuts in carbon emissions per unit of GDP and to derive 15
percent of their energy from renewable sources and nuclear by 2020. Three years ago, Japan’s
decision to cut its emission by 25 percent by 2020 would have been stunning news exceeding
the boldest political hopes.
The EU continues to lead by example as well as argument. In March 2011, after extensive
continent-wide public consultations, the European Commission adopted a “Roadmap for Moving
35 Dimitrov 2010.
36 Schreurs 2008; Selin and VanDeveer 2009; Dimitrov 2010; and Oberthür and Pallemaerts 2010.

The politics of persuasion: UN climate change negotiations 83
to a Competitive Low-carbon Economy in 2050.” The roadmap envisions emission reductions
up to 95 percent by 2050. The transition would cost €270 per year, or 1.5 percent of GDP, but
would save up to €320 per year on fuel costs. This long-term plan complements the existing highly
elaborate and ambitious policy that includes 20 percent reductions of GHGs, 20 percent reduction
of overall energy consumption, and 20 percent of that to come from renewables by 2020.37 The
“20–20–20 by 2020 policy” is now binding on all 27 member countries and is being implemented.
These policy developments are substantial and constitute major progress over time. They reveal
a rapid policy reorientation on a global scale toward creating a clean economy.
Signicance and Future Research
Documenting international argumentation illuminates the role of dialogue in the evolution of
policy preferences and helps clarify sociological processes of interest creation, reconstitution,
and change. Global climate politics conrms that national interests are malleable. Government
actors themselves believe that it is possible to change the preferences of others, and actively
seek to facilitate a process of social learning and interest reconsideration.
One nding of central importance is that some techniques of persuasion rely on empathy
rather than confrontation. In negotiations, states use carrots and sticks as external incentives
37 Oberthür and Kelly 2008; and Morgera et al., 2010.
Table 6.1 National emission reductions pledges by selected countries
Country
Pledged emission
reductions by 2020
(%) Baseline Long-term plans
Australia 5–25 2000
Belarus 5–10 1990
Brazil 36–39 BAU
Canada 17 2005
EU (27) 20–30 1990 80–95% by 2050
Iceland 30 1990
Japan 25 1990
Korea 30 1990
Liechtenstein 20–30 1990
Mexico 30 1990
Monaco 20 1990
New Zealand 10–20 1990 50% by 2050
Norway 30–40 1990 Carbon neutral by 2030
Russia 15–25 1990
South Africa 34
Switzerland 20–30 1990
United States 17 2005 83% by 2050 compared
to 2005 levels
Source: FCCC/SB/2011/INF.1 and Climate Action Tracker (www.climateactiontracker.org).

84 Handbook of global environmental politics
to change behavior. However, they also target others with information aimed at changing their
minds from within. Actors use existing national interests abroad to persuade foreign
governments to change their policy preferences. Governments understand the national concerns
of other countries. Some also appear to have a genuine respect for economic and political
priorities abroad. Negotiating strategies involve intellectual warfare that is surprisingly
empathetic rather than confrontational.38 This stands in contrast with the widespread view of
world politics as a muscular tug-of-war and ruthless self-centered behavior.39
The ongoing climate change negotiations present a precious opportunity to observe history
in the making. The successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol will be the pillar of international
climate policy and the policy commitments under the new treaty will shape Western societies
for decades to come. Given the historic signicance of the post-Kyoto treaty, documenting how
it was negotiated is highly worthwhile. The study generates valuable data about country
positions, how these positions changed over time, and the precise arguments countries used to
support their positions.
Further research on argumentation can make valuable contributions to two areas of
academic inquiry. First, it would enable conclusions on the effectiveness of negotiating
strategies. Uncovering the foundation of discursive strategies would help us build a
comprehensive inventory of argumentation. The resulting typology of arguments allows us
to compare the effectiveness of different approaches to persuasion. In the long run, the
research program will generate recommendations to policy-makers on designing effective
negotiating strategies. Second, argumentation research can facilitate the development of a
future theory of interest formation. Political scientists of all theoretical stripes agree that
social actors pursue their interests. Yet, we know little about how policy preferences emerge
and change.40 The role of dialogue in the evolution of policy preferences deserves concerted
exploration that will provide insight into sociological processes of interest creation,
reconstitution and change, and contribute to debates about how countries come to embrace
policy proposals they previously opposed.
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