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SISSA - International School for Advanced Studies Journal of Science Communication
ISSN 1824 - 2049 http://jcom.sissa.it/
RECEIVED: January 23, 2013
PUBLISHED: June 24, 2013
JCOM 12(2), June 2013 Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0
Article
Public anxiety, trust, and the role of mediators in
communicating risk of exposure to low dose radiation
after the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant explosion
Saho Tateno and Hiromi M. Yokoyama
ABSTRACT: The explosion at the Fukushima Nuclear Plant highlighted serious
social concerns about risk communications; the public found it difficult to take
preventive actions based on scientific information of radioactive fallout. We
investigated public perception of the risks from low dose radiation and the role of
information providers through the Internet survey focusing on parents in four
Japanese regional groups. Mothers felt more anxious than fathers in Fukushima
but not in further groups, and that the furthest group felt the most ambiguous
anxiety. Their anxiety derived from distrust of the government and uncertainty
about scientific information, rather than the lack of knowledge although risk
communication emphasized learning the scientific mechanism. The mediators
should provide more information for individual decision-making of day-to-day
risk management in regions with different levels of radiological contamination;
key issues include improving parents’ perceived control to their lives and easing
their tension of responsibility to children’s health.
Context
Fukushima as the third case of nuclear disaster
Fukushima nuclear disaster was a practice scenario for risk communications. The
explosion at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant triggered by the tsunami of the Great
East Japan Earthquake on March 11, 2011, had an enormous impact on Japanese
society. It raised many issues regarding suitable procedures for managing the risk of
radioactive fallout and disseminating scientific information.
Since the early 2000s and before the nuclear crisis, the government had frequently
used the phrase “pursuing the safe and secure society.” In April 2004, the report
summarizing the findings of a “meeting on how to construct the safe and relievable
society with science policy” was published, which led the Ministry of Education,
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology-Japan (MEXT) to establish “the Office of
Science and Technology for a Safe and Secure Society, Policy Division, Science and
Policy Bureau” in 2005.1 Although the program represented an effort to improve the
government’s communications initiative regarding risk management and safety issues
S. Tateno, H.M. Yokoyama 2
associated with science and technology, challenges in smooth interactions between the
public, experts, and mediators were evident for the crisis that followed the Fukushima
nuclear disaster. Consequently, efforts to protect the public from radioactive hazards
were not effective as desired.
There have been a lot of controversies regarding communication after the disaster
especially about the way of providing risk information. One of them was the
government’s (i.e., MEXT’s) delayed timing for the release of information from
SPEEDI (System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information).2
More residents living near the plant in the Fukushima prefecture could have been
alerted to evacuate much earlier with the system, however, the government announced,
“The radioactive fallout does not have any immediate health effects,” making the
public doubt the government’s reassurances.3,4
Another example of controversy and information confusion concerned the actions of
academic societies; the Meteorological Society of Japan made its members refrain from
personally publishing prediction data about radioactive fallout spread from the plant.5
Even with full media coverage of the disaster and subsequent publications of books
about radiation for risk communication, the public did not trust the government,
experts, or the media, and therefore, there was considerable anxiety about low dose
radiation from the environment and food intake.6
The health effects of low dose radiation have been uncertain, according to several
international organizations. For example, the International Commission on
Radiological Protection (ICRP) published a report recommending that humans control
annual individual exposure to radiation to 1 millisievert per year. Local governmental
agencies, such as Fukushima’s prefectural office, have worked to remove radioactive
fallout from the land and improve risk communications by organizing forums.7 In April
2012, the government set up a system for monitoring food markets and allowing public
access to the resulting data,8 but the anxiety remains.
In a survey conducted in March 2011 by a think tank (“nri”), 80% of respondents
selected NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation) as the most credible information
source, and 29% of respondents believed that the government lost credibility after the
disaster.9 It appears, therefore, that the extent of public trust toward information
providers such as journalism, the government and experts changed after the disaster
because of attitudes about releasing information. In this article, by reviewing the
relevant literature in the past and looking at our data from the case of Fukushima
nuclear accident, we would like to develop the further discussion of risk
communication associated with low dose radiation after a nuclear accident, especially
focusing on how to deal with public anxiety and distrust of information providers.
Risk perception research after nuclear accidents
Once a nuclear accident occurs, the society confronts the risks of radiation and it has to
consider risk management according to the studies conducted after Three Mile Island
accident in 1979 and Chernobyl accident in 1986. Earle and Cvetkovich discussed, as
lessons from Chernobyl, that radioactive hazards can be managed in three general
3 Public anxiety, trust, and the role of mediators in communicating risk of exposure to low dose radiation after
the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant explosion
ways: “(a) through improved engineering and technology; (b) through regulation; (c)
through communication” (p173).10 For better communication, the third one, public
perception of radiation has been studied every time after the nuclear accidents.
Studies of the perception of risk from radiation by Weart and Slovic described that
public people tend to have special sensitivity to the radiation exposure: they see more
risks of radiation technology than most of technical experts see.11,12 Slovic also added
that, overall, public perception of radiation technology differs in accordance with how
the technology is used, for instance, as medical treatment, as power generation or as
weapon.12 The studies of public perception after the nuclear accidents have developed
after the cases of Three Mile Island and Chernobyl.
Perception research after Three Mile Island focused on an expectation of control in
the lives after the accident. Langer thinks that maintaining an expectation of control is
essential to develop each one’s sense of wellbeing as people affected by a disaster feel
lack of control in their lives after the incident.13 The individual levels of perceived
control related to the decision-making on whether each one moved out of the local
affected area near the damaged nuclear plant or not, as the result by Prince-Embury and
Rooney showed, and a tendency of such migration could be predictable primarily by
demographic variables like age and years of resident near the plant rather than
individual attitude to the accident.14,15 They also described that the lack of perceived
control led the public to move out and to distrust of experts who explained the risks of
radiation even though the levels of worry between who moved and who stayed were
similar.15
In addition to the perceived control, another issue of deficiency after Three Mile
Accident was that the lack of the information of the risks about the accident increased
the level of public anxiety. Research by Prince-Embury and Rooney presented that the
local people who moved after the accident and were not parents of children under the
age of 18 showed more psychological symptoms such as depression, increased worry,
loss of faith in experts and less perceived control about their lives than those who had
not moved; the report concluded that the results derived from the lack of the
information.15 Baum, Gatchel, and Schaeffer discussed that the lack of information
about the exact amount of radiation released during Three Mile Island accident,
maximal levels of radiation allowable for human safety, and the possibility of another
accident made the residents think living in more uncertainty without control and feel
more stress.16
In the perception research by Eiser et al. after Chernobyl accident, farmers and
parents in the closest region to the plant felt the strongest psychological reaction, and
the research pointed out that it was due to the issues of food contamination; farmers
prepare it for their consumers and parents prepare it for their children.17 In conclusion,
one’s responsibility or fear to the lack of responsibility for the lives of others was a key
issue of risk perception then. After the Chernobyl accident, Hoijer noted that men and
women focus on and absorb different aspects of available information about radiation.18
There would be difference in risk perception between fathers and mothers.
Compared to Three Mile Island accident, more information related to the accident
was provided to the public in the case of Chernobyl. However, the way of providing the
S. Tateno, H.M. Yokoyama 4
information of radiological risks became a more critical issue. To demonstrate the
situation, an article referred to the Chernobyl disaster as an information disaster, and it
described the public’s efforts in West Germany to seek the most credible information
sources. It was concluded that “expertise” and “trustworthiness” were indispensable
elements when judging the credibility of these sources. “During the weeks and months
following the accident many people were unsure about what health consequences to
expect for their children and themselves, and about what precautions to take. A lack of
clarity and contradictions in the information published let critics speak of an
information disaster.”19 The kind of the information was very important as Renn
presented; when threatened by a hazard, the public has little need for technical detail;
what is needed is the information of how to cope, not information about the hazard but
information about hazard management.20
The third case of a nuclear disaster in the world was Fukushima nuclear plant
explosion. Japan has been through some cases of risk communication associated with
radiation including the case in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Hippel touched on a topic of
psychological consequences in terms of Fukushima accident in his article by comparing
to the case of Chernobyl reported by Chernobyl Forum: in Chernobyl, the exposed
population had twice level of anxiety and 3–4 times more with poor subjective health
situation than controls.21,22 He expected that a similar tendency would be shown in the
case of Fukushima. The public perception research in the case of Fukushima should be
necessary to investigate the exact psychological situation of the exposed residents near
the plant.
Risk communication and public perception
According to Lemyre, main issues of mass decontamination events like a nuclear
accident are categorized into: 1) perception, 2) somatization, 3) media role and
communication, 4) information sharing, 5) behavioral guidance and 6) organizational
issues.23 These elements make the social dynamics to a nuclear accident, and there are
many researches on the correlation among them. Now, we discuss more about risk
communication itself.
Leiss presented how the practice of risk communication has been developed: The
term risk communication first appeared in the literature in 1984.24 The basic idea in the
1980s and early 1990s was that understanding public risk perception would enable
researchers to develop risk communication models and experiments, and to design
more effective risk communication, which could be used by practitioners in their
everyday work. Boholm described numerous types of activities in environmental risk
communication: stimulating interest in environmental health issues, increasing public
knowledge, influencing attitudes and behaviors of people, acting in situations of
emergency or crises, aiding in decision making, and assisting in conflict resolution.25
Every risk situation requires different communication, and Renn points out the
importance of adjusting risk communication to the specific needs of the people so that
they can make a decision of their risk situation in accordance with how much they are
prepared and what extent of measures of safety they have.20
5 Public anxiety, trust, and the role of mediators in communicating risk of exposure to low dose radiation after
the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant explosion
Risk communication and trust
Trettin and Musham categorized three parties during the process of risk communication
as follows: individuals, groups, or organizations.26 Social standpoints of people such the
public, the media and the experts as well as the government communicate one another.
Mogan et al insisted that one of the keys to risk communication is supplying the public
with the “information they need to make informed, independent judgments about risks
to health, safety and the environment” (p4).27 There are also several key determinants
in risk perception of the public in risk communication which were discussed in
previous literatures such as trust, affect and emotions as Sjoberg and Visshchers.28,29 In
social psychology field, it is indicated that the less trusted an organization is, the
stronger the anxiety level of citizens regarding hazardous situations involving the
organization.30 Research by Holt and another survey by Dohrenwend, Dohrenwend,
Kasl, & Wowheit, documented a higher level of distrust of authorities after Three Mile
Island accident, and how the audience perceived the information in risk communication
after the nuclear accident strongly related to the faith in experts.31,32
There have been a number of articles on how to build public trust to information
providers on the matter of science and technology. An article introduced the case of
Cumbrian sheep farmers in the United Kingdom who responded to scientific advice
concerning radioactive fallout because of Chernobyl, and it suggested that experts’
attitudes toward society should become more reflexive, as much as the public people
are, questioning the “deficit model”: a one-way enlightening or educating
communication style to explaining technical knowledge.33 A two-way communication
would build more trust between experts and the public; otherwise, the information
catastrophe would be attributed to ideological disorganization within the social clusters
of information providers as shown in another article described the effects of Chernobyl
in Norway as the endangerment of culture and health together.34
A recent article argued that for the development of public trust, policy makers and
experts should respect each other; additionally, mediation should play a more
prominent role with participation by NGOs, news services, and online portals
throughout the world.35 Another suggestion was the construction of a system to support
better communication between experts and members of society to facilitate evidence-
based policy making.35
Risk communication and the media
Again, the media play the important role in risk communication after a nuclear
accident, and there some researches focused on it. For example, Lemyre et al insisted
that, “Public perceptions are influenced not only be the degree of exposure to a hazard,
but also by the content and delivery of risk messages” (p20).23 Mazur and Lee also
discussed that it is not the content that influences people’s opinions, but the sheer
amount of coverage. Other researches suggested that, in Durfee’s work, a tone of
reporting influence the public perception of risk (a tone of changing society is more
influential than that of status quo or balanced news), and, in Wahlberg’s work, the
S. Tateno, H.M. Yokoyama 6
media has influenced on public perception of risk, especially general risk perception
rather than personal risk perception.37,38
Studies of reporting three nuclear disasters
How the media deal with the emotions of the audiences is another key issue for
communicating risks of low dose radiation. Regarding news features of the Chernobyl
accident, research showed that some journalists and TV news anchors in the United
States relied on headlines that induced fear. The article pointed out that U.S. news
reports of Chernobyl compared it to the Three Mile Island accident, thus fostering a
climate of fearfulness. Another nuclear power plant accident that occurred in the past
was introduced to the audience, but it differed in scale and could make public
misunderstand.39
Friedman compared and contrasted the way of reporting the risk of radiation after
three nuclear accidents: Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima.40 One of the
similarities of reporting three accidents was that journalists reported on-going incidents
in real time even though it sometimes led to lack of accuracy. Because of the nature of
a nuclear accident, how to deal with technical jargons was one of the challenges at
press conferences and interviews. Most of the journalists were not so knowledgeable
about radiation. The author points out that the variety of terminologies for the
measurement of radiation was an element to make the risk communication between
journalists and the public more complex. Another difficult part in communication was
as to describing “potential health effects” (p57).40
In Friedman’s comparison of the media coverage of nuclear crisis cases, the case of
Three Mile Island was that a lot of the media used X-ray radiation to explain row-dose
radiation and the amount of the information was limited as discussed earlier in the
present paper. In Chernobyl, the description of the extent of the scattering radiation was
not numerical, and it covered just the levels of radiation. In Fukushima, long and
detailed feature articles were published with info-graphics and multimedia outlets.
Interaction of reporters and readers were very active in the case of Fukushima on the
Internet.
The most notable difference among three accidents was that the case of Fukushima
was the first nuclear accident after the age of the Internet, which changed how the
information was provided via the Internet along with the traditional media such as TV
and newspapers saying as follows:
“The Internet, websites, and social media are major reasons for the deluge of
Fukushima information, and they have changed the definition of mass media in
many ways” (p56).40
“Scientists offered extensive online tutorials about nuclear plants and radiation,
and science journals such as Nature and Science posted articles on their news
pages” (p56).40
Many individuals and groups published online their updates and interpretations
of news from traditional news or other web outlets such as websites, blogs and
7 Public anxiety, trust, and the role of mediators in communicating risk of exposure to low dose radiation after
the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant explosion
messages on SNS. Twitter discussions under many hash-tags such as
#Fukushima or #nuclear. Other online tools including Wikipedia and Google
search changed the way of receiving information although the author pointed
out that lack of accuracy is problematic regarding the online information.
In this way, the case of Fukushima was illustrated as an improved media coverage
compared to the past cases of Three Mile Island and Chernobyl media analysis point of
view. The author generally described the tendency positively, however, more research
should be necessary on how the audience perceived the information of radiation and
how they selected the information during Fukushima disaster would be necessary.
Risk communication and emotion
A recent article suggested that the public and scientific community should discuss risk
in the social context for the purpose not only of raising public familiarity with scientific
knowledge or public engagement of activities related to science but also for considering
how to live in a risky society with the support of such knowledge.41 The article also
demonstrated the importance of developing public trust for providers of scientific
information by addressing the emotional concerns of citizens, as opposed to making
rational appeals.
In another research field, classical rhetoric, it has argued that Aristotle’s three
elements of persuasion — ethos (trust), logos (logical appeal), and pathos (emotional
appeal) should be employed in good balance, in the society even related to science and
technology (e.g., science policy).42 Too much logical approach without ethos and
pathos could lead rushing to a conclusion because of the scientific community’s
prejudice against emotion during the policy-making process. It also explained that the
denial of emotions could lead to logical leap, emotional manipulation, or lack of social
morals. Thus, emotional aspect of communication is of importance in various
discussions, not only in perception research or psychology research.
Moreover, in empirical studies of social science, the sub-rationality of collective
actors in modern societies has been studied. As an emotional aspect, anger, is one of
the keys to motivate individuals to participate in collective action for the change of the
society especially in the situation of relative deprivation.43,44,45
Parents’ perception study after the Fukushima accident
In the case of the Fukushima nuclear explosion, parents with small children were
thought to be part of a social cluster that suffered the most from the disaster. According
to the report from the Fukushima prefecture, more than 16o,ooo people who were
forced to evacuate their homes in Fukushima remain displaced, and lots of parents and
children are included.46
In this case of crisis, the public had strongly requested scientific information about
low dose radiation before such information was released. They would have appreciated
more immediate and detailed scientific information about the risks of low dose
S. Tateno, H.M. Yokoyama 8
radiation so that they could consider prompt evacuation and food/water safety better.
This was a different situation to other science communication topics to imply a “deficit
model,” or illustration of a scientific case study, offering scientific knowledge for
enlightenment, education, and improved public engagement with the scientific
community or science policy.
Many parents after the Fukushima nuclear disaster have felt uncomfortable with
their families’ living situations since the nuclear disaster.47 A key emotional element
would be worry or anxiety in comparison with the case of collective actors’ anger. We
would like to see the relationship among the parents’ anxiety, trust, and information for
risk communication. The parents’ psychological situation from the aspect of emotion
(especially levels of anxiety) and distrust of information providers would necessary to
be researched further so that this social issue has some resolutions; improved risk
communications would undoubtedly help.
Objectives
To improve risk communications regarding low dose radiation, we developed the
research questions below:
What are the actual details regarding Japanese parents’ anxiety levels and the
underlying causes? How do differences in gender and distance from the
exploded plant affect anxiety?
How have the information sources in Japan influenced public perception of low
dose radiation since the explosion and what are the key elements to building
public trust and reducing public anxiety?
Methods
1. Consideration of research methodology
Perception survey was selected as our methodology by following other past studies
from psychometric paradigm approach.
In the field of science communication, Gurabardhi described the development of
methodologies to analyze risk communication with five main approaches such as
psychometric paradigm, cultural risk theory, the mental models approach, the attitude-
behavior models, and the stress-coping paradigm.48 These approaches are based on the
risk assessment of the public’s subjective features rather than objective risk
measurement. Other review work done by Kallens et al. demonstrated empirical
researches of perception and communication by searching reports on empirical research
analysis on flood risks.49
The mainstream of risk perception research is psychometric paradigm introduced by
Fischhoff et al. and Slovic.50,51 That aims to quantify each person’s risk perception by
conducting a survey with questionnaires. As most of the reviewed perception studies
9 Public anxiety, trust, and the role of mediators in communicating risk of exposure to low dose radiation after
the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant explosion
after nuclear accidents selected psychometric paradigm (Prince-Embury and Roony in
Three Mile Island and Eiser in Chernobyl), we followed them by selecting
psychometric paradigm for our research.14,15,17
2. Survey
Online survey was selected as it enabled us to reach the broader range of parents in
Japan who have access to the Internet with bigger number of samples.
A survey on the Internet was selected as the research method while the perception
survey conducted after nuclear accidents in the past were by mails or interviews.14,15,17
There have been discussions about the suitability of an Internet survey for academic
research in the social sciences or science communication studies. An article pointed out
that an Internet survey could have only limited functions as empirical research.
However, a case study about genetically modified food was conducted with a survey
distributed via the Internet and by post; Findings were not a largely different for
contents of responses on computer-based questionnaires and paper questionnaires.
Although there were differences demographically according to gender and distribution
of generations, the contents of the answers between computer-based and paper-based
did not change. But responses to computer-based questionnaires tended to be more
extreme such as “strongly agree” or “strongly disagree.”52
Although limited social clusters use the Internet and its use for survey purposes is
unorthodox for sampling and answering questions, benefits of an Internet survey
include its potential to reach a wider and larger sample and preserve the anonymity of
respondents. Consequently, it was anticipated that more answers were honest.
After considering the merits and demerits of the Internet survey, we set our focus on
parents in Japan with access to the Internet; survey questions were designed to assess
the public’s risk perceptions about low dose radiation and related information. Limiting
the group to those with the Internet access solved the issues of the Internet survey.
3. Samples
Four regional groups of parents in Japan were selected for the online survey to
investigate the differences of perception according to gender and distance/level of
contamination in the environment.
The past similar researches focused on several groups for their studies: Prince-
Embury and Rooney interviewed two groups by face-to-face: residents who moved and
those who remained after four years of TMI accident.14,15 Eiser et al conducted
perception research in regards to four social clusters of three regional groups in Sweden
according to the distance from the Chernobyl accident by a mail survey.17 We also
designed the survey to investigate the difference in gender and distance from the
accident.
Japan has major district names from Northern regions to Southern regions as
follows: Hokkaido, Tohoku, Kanto, Kansai, Chubu, Shikoku, Chugoku and Kyushu,
etc. Among them, sample groups were selected by picking up three districts (Tohoku
S. Tateno, H.M. Yokoyama 10
region, Kanto region, and Kansai region) along with Fukushima prefecture for the
survey regarding differences in public perception of low dose radiation based on
distances from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant. Specific descriptions of the
regions follow:
Fukushima prefecture, in which the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant is located
Tohoku region (within 300 km of the nuclear plant) next to the north side of the
Fukushima prefecture; area damaged by Great East Japan Earthquake (Usually
Japanese people call Tohoku including Fukushima prefecture, but this study
Fukushima prefecture is excluded in Tohoku group and we made it as another
group.)
Kanto region (within 300 km of the nuclear plant) to the south of the Fukushima
prefecture; includes the Tokyo metropolitan area
Kansai region (outside the 300 km radius of the nuclear plant) including the
area of Kyoto City
Figure 1. Four regional groups for online survey: Fukushima, Tohoku, Kanto and Kansai. A black dot in the center
of the map is the place of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant.
Figure 1 shows the areas of each group. The levels of contamination from radiation
in regards to the air and soil were different in the four regions. Some areas in
Fukushima prefecture had the most severe contamination, the areas in Tohoku region
and Kansai tended to show less severe contamination, and the furthest areas in Kanto
tended to show much less contamination. We intended to look at co-relation between
the perception, gender and distance/level of contamination after the Fukushima
accident.
11 Public anxiety, trust, and the role of mediators in communicating risk of exposure to low dose radiation after
the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant explosion
In our survey, the data was gathered by NTT Resonant, Inc., a research and marketing
company. The survey was conducted March 12–15, 2012, about one year after the Great
East Japan Earthquake (March 11, 2011) followed by the Fukushima nuclear disaster. In
total, the company collected responses from 1,793 parents living in Japan.
The timing of the survey, one year after the accident, was selected as the following
reasons: 1) If it was earlier, the respondents would not have been ready for the survey
because of the time and physical constraints such as evacuation and recovery of their
lives from the disaster. 2) If conducted later, the tendencies of their perception affected
by the accident would have disappeared.
We chose NTT Resonant, Inc., for its website called “goo” (http://www.goo.ne.jp/),
an online platform for news and searching functions (similar to Yahoo! and Google).
The company conducted a survey for users with free goo accounts. Anyone with access
to the Internet can create free accounts. By soliciting survey respondents from account
holders, the methodology was similar to random sampling.
4. Questionnaire
Four questions to select and two open-ended questions were asked in questionnaire. It
aimed to take merit and demerit both of questions to select and open-ended questions.
Discussions have taken place regarding the ideal way to ask questions to obtain
realistic perceptions regarding scientific issue. An article introduced the “open-ended
question,” in which respondents were asked to reply to survey questions in the survey
by writing text in their own words. The merits of the open-ended question are the
variety of response data and realistic descriptions illustrating current societal issues.53
In the questionnaire, six questions investigated the parents’ perceptions regarding
low dose radiation: extent of anxiety, reasons for anxiety, trusted people, trustworthy
media, interesting news topics about low dose radiation, and requests to information
providers. Participants could respond with a single answer, multi answers, or free text
in response to an open-ended question. The rates of anxiety in our questionnaire were
close to the ones by Prince-Embury and Rooney after TMI; 1=not at all worried,
4=very worried.14,15
5. Analysis
Selected answers were analyzed as quantitative data and text answers were analyzed as
qualitative data. With the combination of these two kinds of data, we looked at overall
tendencies of the survey.
The parents’ answers collected by NTT Resonant, Inc. were analyzed; text answers
in the last part of the questionnaire were examined by the procedure of text analysis,
consulting literature of discourse analysis.54 In some researches, data was analyzed
statistically with software designed for psychological and sociological analysis, such as
SPSS.55 In this survey, we chose certain answers to analyze statistically; we conducted
text analysis of the written answers for two open-ended questions. Text analysis
included reading each written text and categorizing similar answers into a top 10 list.
S. Tateno, H.M. Yokoyama 12
Results
Respondents
The total number of respondents was 1,793. All responses were valid for statistical
analysis. Age distribution of respondents included 62.4% in their 30s, 25% in their 40s,
12.2% in their 20s, 1.3% in their 50s, and 0.1% in their 60s. Regarding gender, 40%
(718 people) of parents surveyed were fathers and 60% (1075 people) were mothers.
Regarding respondents’ children, more than a half of the respondents had small
children under seven years old.
The distribution of the respondents by region was as follows: 4.1% (74 people) in
the Fukushima prefecture, 28.1% (55 people) in the Tohoku region, 47.6% (853
people) in the Kanto region, and 24.3% (435 people) in the Kansai region. Regarding
occupations of the respondents, 41.4% were housewives or househusbands; 14.2%
were engineers or professionals with expertise and 10.7% were administrators.
Levels of anxiety based on location and gender
A total of 73.3% of the Japanese parents surveyed experienced anxiety after the
Fukushima explosion. By region, 52.7% of parents in the Fukushima prefecture
experienced “strong anxiety” that was higher than in other regions. There were no
differences between the Tohoku and Kanto regions as shown figure 2. Further out in
the Kansai region, the data shows a low percentage of responses for “strong anxiety.”
The comparison between fathers and mothers in the Fukushima prefecture revealed the
notable differences, indicating that 64.6% of mothers and 30.8% of fathers experienced
“strong anxiety.” Overall, parents in Fukushima 74.9% of fathers and 72.8% of mothers
experienced some level of anxiety after the nuclear disaster. In the three other regions,
there was no such difference in the selections of “strong anxiety” or “anxiety” by
fathers and mothers (figure 3).
Figure 2. Comparison of anxiety levels according to region.
13 Public anxiety, trust, and the role of mediators in communicating risk of exposure to low dose radiation after
the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant explosion
Figure 3. Comparison of anxiety levels by gender.
Reasons for feelings of anxiety according to locations
Based on the offering of multiple answers for each question, the predominant reason
for feelings of anxiety was distrust of the government’s position (table 1). The second
reason was uncertainty about scientific data disseminated in the past about low dose
radiation and its invisible risks, such as hot spots (a small spot with high dose
radioactive materials) and food that had not been monitored carefully for radiation.
“Lack of scientific knowledge regarding low dose radiation” was selected less
frequently than expected. According to region, more respondents in the Fukushima
prefecture expressed “uncertainty of low dose radiation,” while respondents who lived
further away from the nuclear plant tended to experience “ambiguous anxiety” as
shown in table 1.
S. Tateno, H.M. Yokoyama 14
Total
Uncertainty
of low dose
radiation
Lack of
knowledge
regarding
low dose
radiation
Distrust of
the outlook
and actions
by the
government
Hotspots and
unintentional
intake of
contaminated
food
Ambiguous
anxiety
without
any
reasons
Other
reasons
Total
%
100
40.7
29.2
45.2
40.8
8
1.7
Number
1793
730
523
811
732
143
30
Fukushima
prefecture
%
100
73
36.5
62.2
52.7
2.7
1.4
Number
74
54
27
46
39
2
1
Tohoku
region
%
100
41.8
30.6
43.9
40.6
6.7
1.9
(Excluding
Fukushima)
Number
431
180
132
189
175
29
8
Kanto
region
%
100
41.6
28.4
49
45
6.8
2.1
Number
853
355
242
418
384
58
18
Kansai
region
%
100
32.4
28
36.3
30.8
12.4
0.7
Number
435
141
122
158
134
54
3
Table 1. Residential differences and reasons of anxiety regarding low dose radiation.
Whose advice to trust
Also by offering the multiple answers, the people whom the respondents trusted the
most after the Fukushima nuclear disaster explosion were academic scholars (40.2%,
720 responses). The second most trusted people were family members and relatives
(32.9%, 590), followed by medical doctors (28.6%, 512). Once scholars spoke out
frequently in the media, they became less trusted (28.6%, 512) by the respondents.
Other people identified in the questionnaire were journalists (21.4%, 383), friends
(13.7%, 245), teachers at school (11.1%, 199), and others (15.2%, 272).
Trustworthy media after the explosion
In terms of trust for the media after the Fukushima nuclear plant explosion, traditional
news media rewarded with public trust included Japan Broadcasting Company (a
national broadcast company), print newspapers, and other commercial TV broadcasting
15 Public anxiety, trust, and the role of mediators in communicating risk of exposure to low dose radiation after
the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant explosion
companies (figure 4). The respondents selected academia as the next most trusted
source for information; they cited websites of academic institutes and scholarly
publications, although the general public accesses them less frequently. Parents as
respondents did not trust social networking services as much as we would have
expected.
Figure 3. Trusted media.
Food and health effects were the parents’ most interested news topics
Text answers regarding the most interesting news topics about low dose radiation and
childcare were categorized. The news topics that Japanese parents (128 people) found
the most interesting were something related to food safety; examples included
information about the new food monitoring system that began one month after the
survey, contamination of fish and milk, and consequences of unintentional intake of
contaminated food. The next topic of interest for 113 respondents was the possible
health effects on children over a long-term period; since this topic concerned caring for
the next generation, parents expressed vague anxiety. The third topic of interest for 104
respondents was news related to evacuation. Some families with small children left the
Fukushima prefecture because of radiation’s possible health effects on their children;
after evacuating, many families found it difficult to settle down again. Fourth, 102
respondents expressed concern about the current status of their children’s health (e.g.,
thyroid gland and radioactive cesium in urine). Fifth, parents wanted exact data about
safety of playgrounds and cleaning activities for the removal of radioactive materials.
Although there were many reports in the Japanese media about the Chernobyl accident
to explain what was happening in the Fukushima accident, only 39 respondents wrote
that they were interested in the information related to Chernobyl. A total of 524 survey
participants selected “No response” and “I don’t know” for the question related to new
topics of interest.
S. Tateno, H.M. Yokoyama 16
Request to information providers
In the text answers citing requests to information providers, the topic most frequently
referred to concerned needed improvement in the quality of information about low dose
radiation (table 2). Respondents complained of unclear or incorrect statements,
presentations that stirred up negative emotions, delays in release of information, lack of
objectivity, and unimportant information.
Another topic frequently cited in text answers was a request for greater specificity in
disseminated information. Regarding the risks of low dose radiation and preventive
measures for children, the respondents wanted concrete recommendations about
protective measures rather than mere explanations of the scientific mechanism of
radiation. For example, they requested more information on food safety and radiation
data of local residences, indicating their interest in the daily influence of potential
radiation exposure.
Requests to information providers
Comments
Improvement in the quality of information
164
More specific information about the risks of radiation
92
Concrete recommendations for protection from radiation effects
60
Guidance regarding how to access the first scientific source
59
More information about food safety
59
Data of radioactive materials in local residences
50
Improvement in dissemination of important information from the
government
39
More direct information from the first scientific source
25
More information about other risks associated with daily life
20
More data and information from abroad
17
More TV programs on low dose radiation
17
More positive information
17
Others
119
No answers
1055
Total
1793
Table 2. Requests to information providers.
In summary,
1. In the Fukushima region, mothers (64.4%) expressed much stronger anxiety
than fathers (30.8%) whereas other regional groups did not show such tendency.
2. Many respondents did not attribute their anxiety to a lack of knowledge about
low dose radiation; instead, they attributed it to their distrust of the government
and the uncertain effects of low dose radiation.
3. The most trusted people after the explosion were scientists, followed by family
members and relatives. Regarding information sources, Japan Broadcasting
Company and print newspapers had high credibility.
4. The strongest requests to information providers were to improve the quality of
information, avoid stirring up negative emotions, and disclose full information.
17 Public anxiety, trust, and the role of mediators in communicating risk of exposure to low dose radiation after
the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant explosion
Conclusion
How to deal with mothers’ strong anxiety in Fukushima
We investigated Japanese parents’ perceptions about the risks of low dose radiation
after the Fukushima nuclear accident. Looking at the first result summarized above
regarding the extent of anxiety, more than 70% of respondents expressed “feeling
anxiety” (“strong anxiety” or “anxiety”), which is an unusual rate. The perception
research done after the Chernobyl accident described that farmers and parents had
expressed strong psychological reactions to the nuclear accident.17 In our perception
study, although we did not investigate other social clusters’ perceptions for comparison
or as control, the results confirmed the strong anxiety levels of parents in the case of
Fukushima. In this survey, residential distance from the nuclear plant and gender were
effective variables to clarify the tendencies of parents’ anxiety after the Fukushima
nuclear accident.
The most notable result was that mothers in the Fukushima prefecture expressed
much stronger anxiety than fathers. A past report after the Chernobyl accident indicated
that men and women tended to perceive risks of radiation differently.18 Such tendency
would grow among parents living near a nuclear accident as our data showed. Fathers
and mothers felt similar levels of anxiety in other regional groups.
The Fukushima accident happened after 25 years of the Chernobyl accident. In the
age of the Internet, scientific information providers have varieties of contents and tools
to tell the audience as Friedman pointed out, which made the information more
available and accessible.40 However, the fact did not directly lead the audience to
receive satisfactory information, which still made the parents after the Fukushima
accident felt strong anxiety.
Discussions of public perception and risk communication research after Three Mile
Island and Chernobyl as follows could be some clues to improve the situation of
parents in Fukushima, too:
1) Information should be supporting parents, especially mothers, in order to have
higher levels of perceived control in regards to their lives after the accident.13-15
2) Information should be easing parents' (especially mothers') too much feeling of
responsibility to the risk management of their children after the accident such as
by the risk of food contamination.17
Our data of text answers to the survey also showed that the risks related to food were
of great concern to the parents. The goal and motivation of providing information after
a nuclear accident should be set with consideration of above discussions. For example,
news coverage in regards to parents’ anxiety of low dose radiation tended to include the
interviews only of mothers with small children, and it could lead misunderstanding that
only mothers take responsibility in the issue; the interviews of fathers and other local
community members talking about risk management for children’s health would
improve the perception of the audience including the mothers.
S. Tateno, H.M. Yokoyama 18
Regional differences of the most critical information after the accident
Moreover, even in the same country, there were remarkable differences in parents’
anxiety levels toward low dose radiation based on distance from the Fukushima nuclear
plant. The selected reasons of their anxiety also varied; the parents living in a region
close to the explosion also tended to think more realistically about the government’s
response and scientific facts regarding the explosion than those in further regions who
experienced ambiguous anxiety.
The results indicate the difference of the most critical topic of the information after
the nuclear accident in regions; for example, in Fukushima prefecture, the most
important one would have been at first how to decide evacuating or not whereas in
much further place like Kanto, how to cope with the stress of ambiguous anxiety would
matter. Appropriate actions and dissemination of necessary scientific information
should vary, therefore, in accordance with proximity of a residence to the plant. This
conclusion is consistent to the research by Drottz and Sjoberg, the successful element
of risk communication is to influence the risk attitudes of the targeted audience by
providing critical information because each group has different motivation to gain the
information.56
Other recent researches conducted in Japan have pointed out that, by analyzing news
articles and communications among social networking services, mass media after 3.11
followed by Fukushima nuclear disaster had tended to report a lot of news to the
majority of the audiences living in Tokyo metropolitan areas rather than to the
individuals in the regions heavily damaged by the earthquake, tsunami or the
Fukushima nuclear explosion although, for the latter people, information would have
been even more indispensable to recover from the catastrophic event.57,58 The regional
differences of the most critical information should be more considered in risk
communication after a nuclear accident.
Information to support personal decision-making after the accident
The second result summarized above shows that communicating scientific information
about low dose radiation does not necessarily mean the explanation for the purpose of
fulfillment of scientific learning. The parents responded that their feelings of anxiety
toward radiation were caused by “discontent about the government’s leadership and
release of information,” as well as “scientific uncertainties about low dose radiation”
and “the ambiguous effects of low dose radiation to the environment.” Contrary to our
estimations, only a limited number of respondents selected “lack of scientific
knowledge” as a reason for feeling anxious.
Generally, the purposes of communication after the nuclear accident still tended to
be interpreted as delivering complex scientific contents in a way that the public can
understand in Japan, which would have been categorized as “deficit model.” Rather, the
parents who responded wanted specific recommendations based on discussions
between experts, governmental agencies, and mediators for the individual decision-
making process regarding topics related to their daily lives. For example, day-to-day
19 Public anxiety, trust, and the role of mediators in communicating risk of exposure to low dose radiation after
the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant explosion
risk management topics such as food, water, local environment and evacuation should
be included in the priority list to cover. As previously discussed, such information of
topics should be ideally provided in accordance with the regional differences of
priorities.
As Renn discussed, the important topics of the audience after a nuclear accident are
how to cope with and how to manage the risk and hazard, rather than the technical
explanation of nuclear explosion itself.20 Our results of parents’ perception after the
Fukushima case confirmed the point again, and it implied the challenge of practices for
the mediators to demonstrate how to cope with and manage the risk and hazard after a
nuclear accident so that the audience are supported to make a individual decision-
making with satisfaction.
Risk communication after a nuclear disaster in the age of the Internet
Such kinds of engagement by mediators would be successful in combination of the
traditional media and other media on the Internet. According to the third result noted
above, respondents selected traditional media including NHK (i.e., Japan Broadcasting
Corporation) and print newspapers as more trustworthy than social networks such as
Twitter and Facebook for communicating and sharing information during and after
such crises as 3.11 and the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant explosion.
There were some helpful information accessible to the Internet, but evaluation of
trustworthiness and scientific soundness in regards to the information was more
difficult than usual after the accident since more rumor and false information frightened
the audience. In terms of the fourth result summarized above regarding Japanese
parents’ requests to scientific information providers (i.e, media, public relations firms,
publishers, and communicators), there were numerous recommendations for improved
communication about the effects of low dose radiation. Improving the quality of
scientific communications in society was the top priority based on reports that some
articles in the media had stirred up negative emotions or sent inappropriate and
incorrect information.
Our results of the survey only showed the tendency of parents, not other social
clusters, and another research should focus on discussing further how the Japanese
traditional media should have worked after the Fukushima accident. Here, it should be
stressed that both of the media could work complementary for making use of the higher
credibility of traditional media and the promptness of participatory other media on the
Internet. As Lemyre et al said: “Social media applications present new methods of
delivering messages to the public. By using these new conduits for information
dissemination, it becomes possible to reach a larger number of people in a timely
manner with preventive and mitigating recommendations. Supplying pro-social images
of successful and innovative coping strategies and reminding the media of constructive
advice can support them in playing their role of assistance to the public”(p20).23
We perceived the need for mediators to engage in communication at a more personal
level. For example, 14 survey respondents in their text answers requested “a single
trustworthy web site for parents” with scientific information related to parenting. Six
S. Tateno, H.M. Yokoyama 20
respondents stated that schools should play greater roles in distributing information
about low dose radiation as part of “science education.”
Additionally, websites of academic institutes and academic publications were
selected as rather trustworthy, but they were not so accessible to the public. In other
words, lack of publicity kept them off the top of search engine lists or access was
limited for paid journal articles. After the explosion, both sources could have been
important in risk communications.
In conclusion, the audience’s individual decision-making process would be
supported by the information of different day-to-day risk management topics such as
food, water, environment and evacuation in accordance with the targeted audience.
Improving the perception of local residents near the nuclear accident by raising the
levels of perceived control and easing the tension of too much responsibility to others’
lives would be keys to discuss further. Slovic stressed, after Chernobyl, a strong
necessity to be better prepared for risk communication of a nuclear accident.12 After
Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and then Fukushima, we restate this statement of urgent
preparedness.
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Authors
Dr. Hiromi M. Yokoyama is an Associate Professor at the University of Tokyo, School
of Science. She received her Ph.D. for her research on particle physics at the Tokyo
University of Science, Tokyo, Japan. Her current research interest is science
communication and science policy. Email: yokoyama@sp.s.u-tokyo.ac.jp
Saho Tateno is a Research Fellow at the University of Tokyo, School of Science. She
received her M.A. in Written Communication at Eastern Michigan University,
Ypsilanti, Michigan, the U.S.A., and M.S. in Life Science at Tohoku University,
Sendai, Japan. Along with her research on science media and writing, she is also
working as a freelance writer specialized in science and technology.
Email: tateno@sp.s.u-tokyo.ac.jp
HOW TO CITE: S. Tateno and H.M. Yokoyama, Public anxiety, trust, and the role of
mediators in communicating risk of exposure to low dose radiation after
the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant explosion,
JCOM 12(02) (2013) A03.
