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Israel's quest for recognition and acceptance in Asia: Garrison state and diplomacy
Abstract
This title represents a comprehensive study of Israel's attempts to build diplomatic relations with countries on the Asian continent. The author argues that, despite the persistence of the Arab Israeli conflict, the Israeli Foreign Ministry was remarkably successful in gaining recognition in most Asian countries. He provides an overview of Israel's relations with Asian countries from 1948 until the present, and analyses the political, social and economic factors in each country and the role that each played in the process of rapprochement with Israel. He explores the reasons for Israel's successes as well as its failures, and analyses the flaws in Israeli diplomacy.
... well aware, many had arrived and settled in all parts of the country " (Abadi, 2004). It should also be noted in this regard that Âlî Pasha, Minister of Foreign Affairs, had given a chance to some Jews to participate in a diplomatic mission in 1865 that was sent to European countries.Theodore Herzl founded the World Zionist Organization (WZO) at the first conference of the Zionist movement in Basel, Switzerland, on 29-31 August 1897 (Swirski, 1999). ...
... Additionally, in the same year, there was a secret meeting between the officials in the two countries in Ankara. Ben-Gurion, Golda Meir and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff represented the Israeli side, while Adnan Menderes, the former Turkish Prime Minister and other senior officials represented the Turkish side (Abadi, 2004)As a result of these sessions, both countries signed the trident agreement in 1958 along with the Shah's Iran. According to this agreement, the Mossad, the Israeli's secret service, established an intelligence centre in Turkey (Shlaim, 2001) ...
The Turkish foreign policy is a heated subject, studied widely by various scholars. In recent years, coupled with many domestic, regional and international developments, Turkey and its politics have become true topics of interests even beyond these said scholarly circles. Much scholars were giving attention to the Turkish foreign and domestic policy because of events such as Turkish-Israeli tensions, Turkish-Palestinian relations, EU accession question, Kurdish conflict, Arab Spring, the internal power struggle between Kemalist and Islamic political group as well as its involvement in the Syrian war. This dissertation delves into a much-neglected field of study with regards to the Turkish policy towards Israel and Palestine. Therefore, this dissertation mainly examines the governing period of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) from 2002 until 2016. The relationship between these three countries will be coined as the Turkish-Palestinian-Israeli triangle. This triangle forms of the pillars of Turkish foreign policy under AKP. The analytical and theoretical framework of this research proves that both material and idealistic interests formed the AKP government’s foreign policy. As a result, Turkey’s relations with these two countries has been used as a tool for both internal and external power manifestation and expansion for AKP. This thesis builds on the continuity and changes in the triangle relations, starting from the Jewish immigration to the Ottoman Empire until the attempted coup of 2016, with a predominant emphasis on the period 2002-2016. In this dissertation, it will be argued that during the first period, from 2002 until 2007, there was an internal and external expansion of the traditional Turkish foreign policy. This expansion was due to a harmony between AKP’s material and idealistic interests. During the periods of 2007-2011 and 2011-2015, the idealistic interests were prioritised in shaping the AKP’s foreign policy. The overuse of idealistic interests in the Arab Spring period harmed Turkey’s material interests. As a result, Turkey moved towards one of zero friends, more enemies and more isolation. After the middle of 2016, the AKP government attempted to find a harmony between its material and idealistic interests. Within this context, Turkey and Israel reached a normalisation agreement in June 2016 which served as a confirmation of Turkey’s recalculated policy position.
... 11 Rajiv Gandhi met with Shimon Peres during the UN General Assembly meeting in 1985 and attempted to strengthen the cooperative potential of the two states. 12 After the launch of a surprise air strike on an Iraqi nuclear facility (Osirak reactor) in 1981, Israel expressed support for the Indian idea of destroying the embryonic growth of Islamabad's nuclear program. 13 Mossad was exceedingly active in providing the intelligence services and sharing details with the Gandhi regime about Pakistani nuclear facilities. ...
Classical Kautilyan and modern Nehruvian wisdoms laid the foundation of Indian strategic thinking. While maintaining cooperative interaction with the outside world, New Delhi endeavours to establish its hegemony in South Asia. New Delhi's closeness with Tel Aviv is an appropriate example of Kautilyan realpolitik model of pleasantly managing of foreign relation beyond the neighbouring nations. In opposition to Pakistan's counterweighting behaviour, New Delhi preferred to uphold Israel in its mainstream Middle Eastern policy. The mutual geostrategic interests of both India and Israel in Middle East and South Asia forced them to develop multiple areas for strategic cooperation while fighting against their bordering Muslim states. Moreover, the persistently increasing regional hegemonic thrust of Tel Aviv and New Delhi jeopardized the security of both Western and Southern corners of larger Asian region. The anti-Islamic collaboration cemented in racially discriminatory patterns of Hindu-Zionist ideologies leaves serious repercussions for territorially adjoining Islamic states generally, and Pakistan specifically. Islamabad's counterbalancing role against New Delhi's offensive South Asian policy along with its non-recognition of Israel's as a dejure state let India to explicitly pursue Kautilayan model of diplomacy. Indeed, Indo-Israel strategic cooperation would be having impact on the South Asian strategic environment in general and Pakistan in particular.
... Rajiv Gandhi became the sixth Prime Minister of India after the assassination of Indira Gandhi. Rajiv Gandhi wanted a different policy to be constructed toward Israel, he wanted to end the non-alignment movement and turn India into Western democracy (Abadi, 2004). When the Hindu nationalist party, Bhartiya Janata Party, came to power, they wanted to extend full diplomatic relations with Israel to counter Pakistan. ...
India and Israel have engaged themselves in advanced military and strategic partnerships which are modernizing and improving from time to time. Both partner states have initiated cooperation in many areas such as space, cyberspace, and many other areas of defense. The Indian space program in partnership with Israel is acquiring modern means and it will give the Indian military, a dominant position in the conflict-prone region of South Asia where the Indian hegemony is challenged by Pakistan. The intelligence sharing and modernizing of the Indian military will help India to acquire advanced technology for the contemporary combat environment. This paper argues that India already enjoys superiority in South Asia and Indo-Israel strategic partnership will create a strategic imbalance. Moreover, this strategic imbalance will compel Pakistan to look for countermeasures.
... En 1958, Turquía e Israel crearon en REIM Nº 33 (diciembre 2022) ISSN: 1887-4460 119 secreto la Alianza de la Periferia con Irán y Etiopía, centrada en cuestiones militares y de inteligencia. En junio de 1954, el entonces primer ministro turco Adnan Menderes había interpelado a los Estados árabes para que reconocieran al país, a lo que la Liga Árabe respondió condenando a Turquía por mantener buenas relaciones con Israel (Abadi, 2004). En su objetivo de posicionarse del lado occidental, Turquía también apoyó otras empresas coloniales: el 6 de diciembre de 1957 en la Asamblea General de la ONU, votó en contra de un proyecto de resolución sobre la independencia de Argelia, y no fue hasta 1960 que aceptó apoyar el derecho de autodeterminación del pueblo argelino. ...
El artículo examina con detalle el periodo 2009-2016, el año que precedió y los 6 años que sucedieron al ataque sobre el Mavi Marmara, como un “episodio contencioso”. Lo hace a través de un enfoque inspirado en repertorios que ayuda a considerar de forma sistemática y superpuesta las prácticas mixtas de tanto amistad y cooperación, como de enemistad y conflicto, que Turquía ha desplegado hacia, por una parte, Israel y, por otra, la causa palestina. El objetivo principal es así indagar cuál es la relación entre la relación bilateral entre Turquía e Israel y la postura de Turquía frente a la causa palestina, y en última instancia demostrar que el apoyo de Turquía a la causa palestina está desanclado de la relación Israel-Turquía y viceversa, en contradicción con el discurso oficial turco, así como una gran parte de la literatura.
... Зарубежные ученые в большей степени не обращали отдельного внимания на анализ влияния США на израильско-китайские и израильско-индийские отношения. В основном данный вопрос рассматривался исключительно в контексте общего анализа сотрудничества Израиля с данными странами [Abadi 2004;Kumaraswamy 2010;Shai 2011Shai , 2016Xian 2016;Katz, Bohbot 2017;Inbar 2017;Cowshish 2017;Chaziza 2017;Wang 2020;Harutyunyan 2020]. ...
The article analyses the US influence on Israeli policy towards both China and India. The United States has had and still has a significant influence on the dynamics of Israeli-Chinese and Israeli-Indian relations. The relevance of the issue stems from the growing importance of China and India in the world affairs amid rising tensions between the US and China that are spilling into a trade war. The article aims to explore the US influence on Israels policy in Asia. It examines the way how the Israeli leadership has adapted to Washingtons influence while promoting its strategic cooperation with China and India. The study comprises historical method, comparative analysis and historical-systematic analysis. The author comes to the following conclusions. First, Washingtons influence on Sino-Israeli relations has gone through five development stages: the first stage (1971-1989): implicit US support for the development of Sino-Israeli relations; the second stage (1990-1998): American criticism of military and technical cooperation between Israel and China; the third stage (1999-2005): Washingtons shift from criticism to pressure policy in order to prevent the Israeli leadership from military cooperation with China; the fourth stage (2006-2016): Israels acceptance of US demands and refusal to supply arms to Beijing (with Tel Aviv focusing on the development of trade and economic relations with China); the fifth stage (2017 - present): U.S. criticism of Israeli-Chinese economic cooperation amid worsening contacts between Beijing and Washington. The Israeli government is trying to meet Washingtons demands as well as preserve its strategic economic relations with Beijing. Second, the US factor, on the contrary, contributed to normalization of Indian-Israeli relations, having a positive impact on the development of trade, economic and military cooperation between Tel Aviv and New Delhi. Third, the US actions can be explained by an attempt to preserve its national interests. At the same time, the author stresses that the US influence on Israels policy in Asia complies with Washingtons regional priorities set forth in the 2017 US National Security Strategy.
... In the early 1970s, Sino-Israeli hostility relationship began to cool very slightly. Chinese supported the PLO less than before while Israel supported China's admission to the United Nations in 1971 [22]. Also, the United States ...
... Building on a range of available literature -most importantly, works by Yossi Alpher, Howard Patten, Jean-Loup Samaan 1 Among the major publications dealing with the doctrine explicitly, Patten (2013), and Samaan (2018) need to be mentioned. There is also related literature dealing with Israel's relations with Third World countries in general, with particular regions subject to the doctrine or with bilateral relations between Israel and periphery doctrine countries, such as: Abadi (2004), Carol (2012), Curtis and Gitelson (1976). Noa Schonmann's book inspired by her 2009 Ph.D. thesis is expected to be published in the course of 2019 by I.B. ...
Israeli 2010s foreign policy is marked by development of ties – in a wide range of spheres of cooperation – with various countries in Israel’s neighbourhood and beyond. This policy is often compared to, and seen as, a continuation of the “periphery doctrine”, launched in the
late 1950s. While some experts contest mere appropriateness of the term “periphery doctrine” in analyses of contemporary phenomena, others argue for broadening of the scope of its understanding. This article discusses several authors’ stances on the main contentious issues regarding application of the term, highlighting contradictions between them and drawing conclusions on the analytical consequences of their choices. Moreover, it overviews the two existing attempts of applying international relations’ theoretical approaches in studying the phenomenon and reflects on other possibly applicable
explanatory frameworks. As a result, this work suggests that the issue is comprehensively approached through Copenhagen school methodology. The “periphery doctrine” seems to still be a relevant instrument for analyses of Israeli foreign relations, though the term must be used cautiously and with apt methodological rigour.
... w czasie masakry dokonanej w 1972 roku w Monachium w czasie igrzysk olimpijskich. 10 . Także amerykański generał John K. Singlaub, pełniący funkcję szefa sztabu Dowództwa Narodów Zjednoczonych w Korei, wskazywał, że w 1976 roku, pertraktował z jednym z ważniejszych koreańskich wojskowych, generałem Hanem, attaché wojskowym w Egipcie podczas wojny Jom Kippur, umożliwienie pilotom sił powietrznych Korei Północnej loty na Migach 21 przeciwko Izraelowi. ...
The main purpose of this article is to outline the relationships of North Korea with the Middle East and its most important conditions. It describes the policy of the Pyongyang authorities towards the Arab world from the beginning of their mutual contacts in the 1960s to the present day. In particular, the contemporary conditions of relations between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Iran, Egypt, Israel, Palestine, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are analysed.Firstly, I take a look at the history of theses relations, focusing on the Cold War and the North Korean co-operation with Palestinian terrorists, as well as with the Iranian authorities after Ayatollah Khomeini took over government. Then I analyse the contacts between the communist regime and Iran, primarily based on supporting the Iranian nuclear programme. Another important aspect is the attitude of the DPRK authorities towards the Arab Spring and the related conflict in Syria, during which the new leader of the country, Kim Jong Un, significantly accelerated the work on nuclear weapons, considering it to be a guarantee of security for the regime. In the next part of the work, I describe the current relations of the Pyongyang government with Israel and Palestine, as well as with Sunni monarchies, such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Yemen.Finally, I try to answer the question of whether development of co-operation between North Korea and the Middle East should be expected in the future. Moreover, I make an attempt to answer the question of whether the possible co-operation of both sides will affect today’s international security.
... Some of the notable peace process initiatives directed towards addressing the Palestine-Israel conflict after the end of the Cold War include but are not limited to the Madrid and Oslo talks, which took place in 1991 and 1993 respectively (Abadi, 2004). It has been argued that the Madrid and Oslo negotiation processes be a direct result of the unipolar World Order system led by the United States of America. ...
The Palestine-Israeli Peace Process after the Cold War
Mohamad Morra
Abstract
This paper provides a detailed and intricate analysis of the impact of a New World Order on the Palestine-Israel peace process, which took shape after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The end of the bipolar World Order and the eventual emergence of a new unipolar World Order paved the way for the emergence of different opportunities as well as challenges in the Palestine-Israel peace process. In particular, the United States being the only remaining single superpower once the Soviet Union collapsed has managed to enjoy a substantial amount of influence and a form of hegemony with regard to matters of international relations (Aruri, 1992). This paper intends to provide a detailed and critical discussion of how the New World Order under the American superpower on the Palestine-Israel peace process. This paper explores and analyses the structural changes that took place both within and outside the Middle East region after the collapse of the Cold War as well as the political maneuvering involved in the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the Israeli government. It looks at the effects of the structural changes that took place once the Cold War came to an end with regard to the Palestine-Israel peace process
Full Text: PDF DOI: 10.15640/jirfp.v4n2a4
The Palestine-Israeli Peace Process after the Cold War
Mohamad Morra
Abstract
This paper provides a detailed and intricate analysis of the impact of a New World Order on the Palestine-Israel peace process, which took shape after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The end of the bipolar World Order and the eventual emergence of a new unipolar World Order paved the way for the emergence of different opportunities as well as challenges in the Palestine-Israel peace process. In particular, the United States being the only remaining single superpower once the Soviet Union collapsed has managed to enjoy a substantial amount of influence and a form of hegemony with regard to matters of international relations (Aruri, 1992). This paper intends to provide a detailed and critical discussion of how the New World Order under the American superpower on the Palestine-Israel peace process. This paper explores and analyses the structural changes that took place both within and outside the Middle East region after the collapse of the Cold War as well as the political maneuvering involved in the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the Israeli government. It looks at the effects of the structural changes that took place once the Cold War came to an end with regard to the Palestine-Israel peace process
Full Text: PDF DOI: 10.15640/jirfp.v4n2a4
... Throughout its history, Israel has practised what has been termed 'garrison state diplomacy'. 1 With a number of hostile neighbours it has striven to expand its relations with non-Arab Middle Eastern, Asian and African countries. 2 This was the case beginning in the early 1990s with the South Caucasus and Central Asian states. ...
With the breakup of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War, three republics in the South Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) achieved independence for the second time during the twentieth century. Their first experience was contentious and short-lived, had little or no support from the Western powers and was brought to end by the newly formed Soviet Union with the tacit approval of Turkey. While Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijani national aspirations were quashed in the early post-First World War era, Zionism was given encouragement with the establishment of the Palestine Mandate. When Israel was established it was given immediate recognition by the Soviet Union, but most Jews from Georgia and Azerbaijan - Armenia's population was very small in comparison - only made their way to Israel during the last years of the Cold War. On the other hand, following the Second World War, some members of the Armenian Diaspora, including those in the Arab world, immigrated to the Soviet Union. While Soviet-Israeli relations had been strained since the Six-Day War, the end of the Cold War not only brought better ties between Russia and Israel, but it allowed Israel to establish relations with the other successor states of the former Soviet Union. Many of those countries sought ties with Israel (and the other Western states) to insure their continued independence from Russia, while, at the same time, Arab-Israeli relations improved and Turkey and Israel drew closer together. Iran was regarded with suspicion by Azerbaijan and along with Georgia, which wanted to enhance its ties with the West, drew closer to Turkey. Both countries have benefited from the transport of oil. Jews from Georgia and Azerbaijan have kept close connections with their former countries, where anti-Semitism was never the problem it was in Russia. Armenia has remained the closest to Russia with its conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh and its distrust of Georgia. However, Armenians experienced genocide at the hands of the Ottomans and have sought support from Israel over that issue.
The Arab-Israeli normalization, characterized by the Abraham Accords and subsequent diplomatic engagements, has sparked significant debate among regional actors especially among Muslim countries. In this context, Malaysia's response is analyzed by employing a combined theoretical framework of Regional Security Complex (RSC) theory and national interest theory. The study employs a qualitative method of analysis of official statements, policy documents, and diplomatic engagements. It also examines the historical context of Malaysia's stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the shifts and nuances of its response in light of recent events. In addition, this study examines the domestic factors, such as public opinion, political dynamics, and the influence of religious and civil society actors, that influence Malaysia's foreign policy decisions. This study reveals that Malaysia has voiced its opposition to the process of normalisation, which has been influenced by regional security concerns rooted in Muslim solidarity and the support for Palestinian rights. Additionally, Malaysia's opposition is driven by its own national interests, encompassing domestic politics and economic relations with Arab nations.
During the Cold War, three countries were partitioned into two states: Germany, Korea, and Vietnam. The last was a result of its war of independence against the French following World War II and continued until 1954. Following a victorious war against the United States-backed government in the south, the communist government in the north reunited the country between 1975 and 1976. In 1988, facing economic troubles, Vietnam instituted Doi Moi market reforms while relaxing its ideological worldview and expanded its diplomatic and economic relations. In 1995, Vietnam joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which it had regarded as a pro-Western organization during the Cold War. Meanwhile, first North Vietnam and later a reunified Vietnam went from a country whose relations were exclusive with states in the communist bloc and a few other non-aligned countries to one that today has ties with almost every country in the world. Academic studies on Vietnam’s foreign relations largely focus on those with Russia, China, the US, its ASEAN partners, and other countries in Asia. However, since the end of the Cold War, countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region are an import source of Vietnam’s crude oil and natural gas and an expanding market for its exports, while MENA states, in this era of globalization, have sought to increase diplomatic and economic ties throughout Asia.
While there has been a growing interest in Israel and Taiwan in intensifying the relationship between the two states and peoples, little heed is being paid by the research literature, which remains scarce and scattered across disciplines (and languages). By way of filling this lacuna, this article offers the first comprehensive overview of the existing Israel-Taiwan literature while illustrating the room for further theory and policy-oriented research and making recommendations as to how to further develop the study area.
This article deals with the Namsang project in Burma, run in the late 1950s and early 1960s to engage demobilised soldiers in establishing a series of cooperative villages modelled on Israeli settlements with Israeli technical and other assistance. The article explores the Burmese modernisation project in the context of the unification of the country and the birth of the Non-Aligned Movement. In its examination of the Namsang project, this article offers a microscopic view of the translation of planning practices to other contexts in general, but also asks some more specific questions, such as how Burmese and Israeli national identity, memory, and history defined the project agenda, what the planners’ ambitions were, and why the project failed.
Turkey and Israel have been strategic partners since the 1990s. Yet, there has occurred a deep crisis between the two countries, particularly since 2009, but the beginning of the deterioration in bilateral relations dates to the early 2000s. Today both countries designate each other as opponents despite the history of a strategic partnership. What are the reasons for this radical shift in the Turkish–Israeli relations? How might the stalemate in the relations be explained? This study analyses the rupture in the bilateral relations, particularly on the recent events that paved the way for a rupture and stalemate and evaluates it via three levels of analysis laid by Kenneth Waltz. The study argues that bilateral relations have taken shape at three levels in different times and that the deterioration and amelioration of the bilateral relations hinge upon the identity and ideology of the leadership at the individual level, domestic factors at the state level, and structural factors at the systemic level. In this regard, it seeks to reveal which of the levels of analysis are in play in the determination of bilateral relations since 1948.
Son on yıl boyunca İsrail, Türkiye’nin desteğini kaybetmek pahasına, Doğu Akdeniz’de politik güzergâhını değiştirerek Yunanistan ve Güney Kıbrıs Rum Yönetimi’yle müttefik oldu. Söz konusu ittifak, genel olarak, 2009-11 yıllarında bölgede keşfedilen gaz rezervleriyle açıklandı. Fakat troyka, politik olarak kullanışlı ve masum açıklamaların aksine, gerçek bir askeri ittifakın parçaları oldular. Buna göre, enerji diplomasisi, ilişkilerinin özünü örtebilmek için kullanıldı. Bu çalışma öncelikle dış politika-ulusal güvenlik ilişkilerini kavramsal bir anlayışla analiz ediyor. Sonrasında, bu çalışmanın, İsrail dışişlerindeki ulusal güvenlik tahakkümüne dair temel argümanını test edebilmek için İsrail dış politikasının seçme vakaları masada olacak. Son olarak, Ocak 2020’de imzalanan Doğu Akdeniz Boru Hattı anlaşmasına kadar geçen süredeki askeri gelişmeleri ortaya koyarak, troykanın askeri ittifakını açığa çıkaracak. Çalışmanın izlediği bu metodoloji, kuşkusuz bahsi geçen askeri ittifakın gerçek yüzünü ve sivil bir girişim olmadığını gösterecek.
The aim of this article is to analyze Turkish-Israeli relations in the second half of the 20th century. By presenting the most important events in bilateral relations between Ankara and Jerusalem, the authors intend to demonstrate that these relations in the analyzed period were characterized by the sinusoidal nature, consisting on the repeated change of mutual diplomatic engagement while maintaining a strictly pragmatic approach to bilateral relations. Presenting the evolution of Turkish-Israeli relations during the first five decades of the existence of an independent Jewish state may serve as a basis for further research on the relationship between the indicated states and a starting point for formulating predictions about abovementioned countries’ behavior in an international order. Tracking the discussed contents will also allow for a better understanding of the complexed links between states located in the Middle East’s geopolitical region and the nature of their alliances.
Its close alliance with the West over the course of seven decades notwithstanding, Israel has embarked on an East-looking orientation during the past several years. Aiming to cultivate multifaceted connections to various Asian countries, the new Israeli approach has striven to enhance the Jewish state’s relationship with the East in the political, military, economic, financial, technological, and cultural spheres. For their part, many Asian states have displayed a keen desire to expand their growing interactions with Israel, smoothing the way for the success of Israel’s East-looking drive.
Recently, Israel has resuscitated its ‘periphery doctrine’: the attempted circumvention of Arab hostility, by cultivating relations with other nearby actors. Despite the expanding literature on the periphery doctrine, no study has delineated Israel’s contemporary relations with the Caucasus and Central Asia. This deficit is conspicuous, because earlier works noted Israel’s employment of the periphery doctrine to create durable relations, across both regions. This assessment contrasts with non-regional literature, which stresses the periphery doctrine’s limited utility. This essay therefore provides an updated assessment of Israel’s regional ties. We argue that Israel has, in fact, failed to create long-term partnerships in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Thus, these cases illuminate the periphery doctrine’s deficiencies.
Israel-Taiwan relations have evolved quite remarkably since the establishment of non-diplomatic ties in the early 1990s. Yet little attention has been paid in the literature to the analysis of the current relations between the two states in general and to the problems and challenges attending this relationship in particular. Based on interviews with Israeli and Taiwanese policymakers, this article seeks to fill this gap as well as to examine to what extent Jerusalem and Taipei are willing and/or capable of utilising the full potential of this emerging partnership.
The opening chapter introduces the current high levels of anti-Semitism and anti-Israel sentiments in Malaysia and outlines the history of Judaism and anti-Semitism in Southeast Asia. Addressing how Judaism and Israel becomes a rather abstract concept, the chapter then assesses the development of such racism in Malaysia in recent years. This includes highlighting the growth of Islam as a form of identity among ethnic Malays, the close relationship between religion and ethnicity as well as the Malaysian state’s close relationship with the Palestinian Authority. The chapter then explores the complicated internal discourses within which anti-Semitism and anti-Israel discourses become entwined and finally outlines the reasoning for this study and the necessity of the qualitative nature of the research.
‘Palestine belongs to the Arabs in the same sense that England belongs to the English or France to the French.’ This remark made in November 1938 has been the most widely statement of Mahatma Gandhi on foreign policy, especially on Israel, Palestine and wider Middle East/West Asia. This was seen as the epitome of Gandhi’s ‘consistent’ opposition to the formation of a Jewish national home in Palestine. However, a closer reading of the article published in the 26 November issue of Harijan presents a more complex picture and depicts Gandhi’s unfamiliarity with Judaism and his limited understanding of Zionism. Furthermore, while demanding Jewish non-violence even against Hitler, he was accommodative of Arab violence in Palestine.
As Southeast Asia gains prominence in global geostrategic and geoeconomic environment, Israel’s overture to South Korea is not an exception. Despite prolonged frosty relations between Israel and South Korea between the 1970s and late 1980s, both have managed to strengthen military–security relationship after reopening their embassies in the early 1990s. Currently, their defense cooperation revolves around arms trade but is expanding toward joint ventures, coproduction, and upgrading programs. Arms export is an important component in promoting Israeli foreign policy goals. At the same time, South Korea requires constant defense upgrade as it faces a hostile neighborhood. Within this context, the article argues that military and defense relations are the driving forces in flourishing Israel–South Korea relations.
Israel seeks to have good relations with most members of the international community, and establishes friendly relations with as many states as possible. As part of the Asian continent, Israel has been interested from its inception in good ties with China and India in particular. In this regard, besides India and China, another important Asian country with which Israel's relations are flourishing is Japan. Over recent years, the two countries’ relations have steadily progressed. Cooperation between the two countries could be productive, and both Israel and Japan have much to gain from developing a relationship. In this context, this article firstly gives a brief summary of Israel's developing relations with two important countries of Asia, India and China, then tries to explain the nature of the developing relations between Israel and Japan, and aims to point out possible future areas of cooperation.
Israel’s strategy of the “periphery Doctrine” served as a way to enhance security and economic ties and reduce isolation. Following the deterioration of the regional situation Israel had begun to consolidate new relations with peripheral nations. The post-Arab Spring regional order has largely transformed the Central Asia-Israel potential partnership. New regional order has jeopardized Israel’s geostrategic balance, and so that country is looking to deepen alliances in the Muslim world. Central Asian states can fill that role. The basis for this partnership is the understanding by the involved parties that they share certain security and economic interests that can provide benefits. The relationships between Israel and Central Asian countries are long-established and cordial in the political, economic and strategic realms, and based on shared views of world order and intense person-to-person relations. All of the Central Asian governments cultivated their secular traditions and stepped up their anti-Islamic stance for fear of the development of domestic, Islamic-oriented opposition. Islam has no specific legal status in any of the five states in the region, and the fight against alleged Islamic extremism has become a mainstay of domestic and foreign policies. This article surveys the constellation of bilateral ties that has formed between Israel and the Muslim states of Central Asia and draws a comparison to Israel’s previous relations with peripheral countries Turkey and Iran. Person-to-person relations between Israel and Central Asia are probably Tel-Aviv’s leading means of influence in the region. Israeli investments have strengthened the political partnership.
Recent reports mention the opening of two synagogues in Manado and Tondano, two cities in the Minahasa region of North Sulawesi. This is remarkable as Jewish corporeal presence is considered insignificant in contemporary Indonesia. It thus raises the crucial question on the interpretation of the presence of ‘Jews’ in Minahasa. A closer look reveals that these synagogues were started by a group of Messianic Judaists; a Christian religious sect whose members trace their family tree back to a Jewish progenitor in Europe. This article traces matters of Jewish identification in Minahasa from colonial times to the present. These are made visible through the (re)configuration of the socio-political landscape in Indonesia as mirrored by the family history of the Dutch Jewish entrepreneur Abraham Fontein and his descendants.
Diplomatic relations between South Korea and Israel were formed only in 1962. Furthermore, as the two countries from both ends of the continent cooperated in various areas during the 1960s and 1970s, relations were becoming more complicated and even officially rather cool in light of Korea’s evolving relations with the Arab world. Against this backdrop, and based on the reading of contemporaneous Israeli press, the study argues that culture mattered very much in the early stages of the relations. Cultural contacts between Koreans and Israelis started well before the establishment of full diplomatic relations, and cultural diplomacy played a significant role in maintaining them in the decades that followed. Like today, both parties often emphasized the cultural and historical affinities between the two peoples, and in the process, the Israeli public was exposed to early glimpses into Korean culture while images of Korea and its people were created as well.
This preliminary survey of international relations (IR) teaching in Singapore argues that while the hegemonic goals of the
nation-state have been pervasive since 1956, the influences upon IR teaching have become more complex and subtle in tandem
with Singapore's transition from pristine developmentalism to an aspiring global city. Today, IR teaching has acquired characteristics
of a division of labor among the main universities, research institutes, and business-oriented schools. Nonetheless, the dialectics
of whether the future lies in open-ended knowledge inquiry or hewing to some version of state-associated pragmatism remains
unresolved.
Turkey's relations with the Middle East have entered into a new era in the post-Cold War period. This era has been characterized by the increasing involvement of Turkey in Middle East politics. The nature of this involvement, however, has changed over time in response to domestic and regional developments as interpreted by the Turkish political and military elite. The newest and at the same time the most controversial aspect of Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War Middle East has been constantly developing Turkish-Israeli relations. In a relatively short period of time economic relations flourished between the two countries and culminated in the signing of a free trade agreement in 1996. Cultural and educational links accelerated at an unprecedented degree. Furthermore, and the most controversial of all, the two countries increased security cooperation within the framework of two agreements that were signed in 1996. This increasingly deep and open relationship between the two countries disturbed some of their neighbours in the region. It has been argued that growing ties between these two countries were steadily changing the regional balance of power. The discussion that follows treats Turkey's rapprochement with Israel in the post-Cold War era from the perspective of Ankara's policy. In the first part the reasons for increasing ties between Turkey and Israel in the 1990s will be discussed. In the second part, different aspects of the relationship between Turkey and Israel will be highlighted. Finally, there will be a discussion of the future prospects and limitations of the relations between the two countries.
Sri Lanka was the model British crown colony that made the transition from dependence to sovereign status without rancour or violence. Transfer of power was in stages and the island's political elites were, unlike in the case of other volatile societies in Asia and Africa, voluntarily put through a gradual process of political education and experience which taught them to exercise power with moderation and democratic fervour. It was the same with the electors, the island being the first among colonial territories to have universal franchise, years before independence, as early as in 1931. The Buddhist ethos and a continuing process of modernisation even up to present times have, through the years, contributed in no small measure to generate that tolerance and accommodation which are so necessary for the satisfactory functioning of parliamentary government. Our chapter dealing with the problems of Ceylonese society spells out in detail this process of give and take, of compromise and middle-path solutions which have in fact been the guidelines of Sri Lanka's political development since the beginning of the twentieth century. Whereas in other societies, communal and religious strife have become endemic and more the rule, in Sri Lanka these have, with one or two exceptions (the Sinhalese Buddhist-Muslim disturbances of 1915 and the Sinhalese-Tamil riots of 1958), been kept within the bounds of constitutional agitation, and on occasion extra-parliamentary but non-violent protests.
This article explores Israeli-Turkish relations within the context of the deepening polarization between Turkey's secular elite and the religiously oriented segments of society. Examining the causes and political context of the alliance, the author argues that the deepening ties are at least partly a function of the sense of beleaguerment of the Turkish military, guardians of Kemalist orthodoxy, in the face of domestic challenges to its homogenizing vision. After describing the features of the axis itself, the author shows how it intermeshed with the accelerating showdown between the military and the Islamist-led civilian government. Finally, the paper examines the relationship in the light of Turkish national interests, concluding that Turkey's main problems are internal and not amenable to outside solutions.
