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Abstract
For the past two years, the Asia-Pacific seems to have returned to the back seat in U.S. foreign policy priorities because of crises in Europe and the Middle East, and Washington’s own fiscal problems. Given both global and domestic developments, it is a legitimate question to ask whether the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific is still valid. This paper asserts, “Yes, it is.” Washington has made steady progress across military, diplomatic, and economic realms of the rebalancing. It has strengthened and expanded military ties with regional states and prepared for its naval forces to operate more intensively. It has become a member of major multilateral institutions and expanded support for appropriate organizations. And it is striving to complete the most important trade deal in a generation, the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Despite budget pressures, the Obama administration has kept the Asia-Pacific high on its foreign policy agenda, and the rebalance has enjoyed bipartisan support. While the high-profile rebalancing moves have been relatively modest so far, the Obama administration’s achievements should not be understated. More balancing effort is certain to come.
... Nevertheless, the level of jointness between China and Russia remains very low in comparison to that of military drills by other allied forces in general, and has inherent limitations in that there is no aim to form any kind of military alliance between China and Russia. While the conflict between the United States and China is increasing due to the Obama administration's rebalancing efforts in Asia 46 and China's projections of military power in the South China Sea, some predict that Beijing will not continue to use lowprofile strategies regarding issues of core national interests such as territorial disputes. 47 Regardless, there is no possibility of the SCO becoming entangled in the territorial disputes of member countries, because the SCO has no rules or regulations stipulating an obligation to intervene in the disputes. ...
For the past 15 years, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has preserved its non-Western (and sometimes anti-Western) identity and its policy toward the West has been based on a “soft-balancing” strategy. This paper aims to examine the SCO’s identity positioning and understand the implications of its strategy and policy toward the West. India’s membership effect will be able to soften the SCO’s image of the club of authoritarian states or an anti-Western group as well as to make less-assertive its non-Western identity. China’s economic power projection aiming at the “peaceful rise” is inclined to make the SCO’s identity less anti-Western. Russia’s policy of expanding partners and widening cooperation in greater Eurasia is also likely to weaken not only the rhetoric, but also the substance of the anti-Western narrative. The SCO’s shift of identity positioning, in general, from the non-Western to a less assertive non-Western is likely to soften the SCO’s soft balancing against the West, and the anticipated range and effect of the softer balancing could be greater due to the widened platform and the improved image.
This paper posits four ranked, generic goals of state foreign policy, maps them against the American ‘pivot,’ and concludes with possible handicaps of that shift. Drawn broadly from realism and liberalism, those abstract goals are as follows: national security, economic growth, prestige among the community of states, and the promotion of cherished national values. Applying this framework specifically to Northeast Asia, the USA, regarding security, is likely to increasingly ‘hedge’ China, and its North Korean client, with regional allies, off-shore balancing, and a shift toward AirSea Battle. On trade, the USA will continue its decades-long effort to reduce Asian mercantilism by tying Asian traders into multilateral, neoliberal rule sets. Regarding prestige, the ‘Beijing Consensus’ is a growing challenge to US soft power which the pivot seeks to refute. In addition, on values, the USA will continue to nag especially China to conform to US standards of law and human rights. The USA will continue to push the broad liberalization of Asian polities and economies. The democratic peace and liberal trade are the ideological frame and motivation of the pivot. Nevertheless, significant US handicaps may slow the pivot: American cultural distance from Asia means little public support and understanding of its necessity; strong regional allies will tempt the USA toward offshore balancing on the cheap; and the dire US budget shortfall will reduce the resources necessary to fund it.
Although a latecomer, economically important Asia has emerged at the forefront of global free trade agreement (FTA) activity. This has sparked concerns about the negative effects of Asian FTAs, including the “noodle bowl” problem. Amid slow progress in the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Doha negotiations and the global financial crisis, however, Asian regionalism seems to be here to stay. The focus for policymakers should then be how best to minimize the costs of FTAs while maximizing their benefits. Adopting a pragmatic perspective, this paper examines key trends and challenges in Asian FTAs. It provides new evidence from firm surveys, analysis of specific agreements, and computable general equilibrium estimates. It provides the following set of recommendations: strengthen the support system for using FTAs; rationalize rules of origin and upgrade their administration; ensure better coverage of agricultural trade; forge comprehensive “WTO-plus” agreements; and encourage a region-wide FTA. Political economy considerations suggest that a likely scenario is for FTA consolidation in Asia—by creating a People's Republic of China–Japan–Korea FTA, combining it with ASEAN + 1 FTAs, and then involving Australia, India, and New Zealand—to be followed by connections with North America and Europe. In conclusion, the analysis suggests a bottom-up approach to a Doha Round Agreement should be adopted.