“Política monetaria en el Imperio Romano Tardío (284-711)” undertakes the study of late Roman monetary policy between the reign of Dioclecian and the end of the Heraclian dynasty, in order to determine the origin, causes and effects of monetary mutations in these years. We analyze each one of those
alterations, relating them to their historical moment, in order to understand and explain them within the politics, administration, legislation, and fiscality.
The motivation and purpose of the thesis is firstly featured in the introduction: the need for a rigorous study that alleviates the absence of a significant interpretative synthesis on this topic, based on monetary and economic theory, that can be used as a framework for understanding the historical process and allows access to such an abundant and convoluted bibliography.
Starting from the decline of the denarius and the antoninianus, and the crisis of the Third Century, well known phenomenons, we continue with a brief approach to the historiographic conundrum raised by the difference of criteria when assessing the monetary reforms of Diocletian in relation to the preceding and subsequent ones.
Next, we study the theoretical framework of the nature of the Late Roman coinage, beginning with the concepts of money and money inflation themselves, the degree of monetization of its economy, reviewing the historiographic controversy on this matter, and the administrative and fiscal situation of the Roman Empire at the edge of the year 300. We conclude the existence of an economy that can be studied through modern economic science, and a disparity between the income and the expenses that had to be covered by the issue of inflationary currency.
Once these bases are in place, we continue surveying the evolution of the monetary system and the injections of liquidity during the Tetrarchy, the following civil wars, and the era of Constantine (293-337), as well as its effects, the most notorious of which was the raising of prices. The evolution of contemporary administration and taxation is not neglected.
Then we analyze the new devaluations and failed attempts to restore a strong billon coinage, and the evolution of gold and silver, under the dynasty of Constantine (337-367), followed by a period of political turmoil, and an absolute degradation of the small coins, which lost all its silver content, contemporary of the collapse of imperial power in the West, but that the pars orientalis managed to cope (367-498).
Finally, after reviewing the restoration of a strong and stable bronze coin under Anastasius and Justinian (498-538), we detail the terminal years of Roman currency and taxation, with a succession of devaluations and ephemeral attempts of deflation over decades of wars against Iran and against Islam, that brought the end of the ancient world and the transformation of the late Roman State into an properly medieval epigonous, the Byzantine Empire (538-711).
In the ending section of general and particular conclusions we recapitulate how we have achieved a detailed knowledge of the late Roman monetary policy and its overlapping with contemporary historical facts, based on an adequate understanding of the concepts of money and inflation, as well as the breakthroughs of each chapter.