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Misteriosos vientos se ciernen sobre nuestras vidas.

June 2015

June 2015
VI(37):39-40

Authors:

Pedro Joaquín Gutiérrez-Yurrita

National Polytechnic Institute and Federal Attorney for Environmental Protection

much talk about climate change in the world today, but very little is actually to stop, or even to adapt to the new climatic conditions of the planet Earth. the technology is in theory but lack power to apply for two reasons, State budget (science and technology development on climate change should be public and not private) and some skill to carry it out. However, if we do not change our patterns of consumerism and wasteful behavior, little can be done to prevent climate catastrophe that will affect us as humans.

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