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New elements of a theory of mind in wild chimpanzees
... Pre-emptive protection may also serve as an epimeletic form of targeted helping (Pérez-Manrique & Gomila, 2018) with cases of wild chimpanzees providing flexible helping behaviour such as cleaning conspecific's wounds (Boesch, 1992) and assisting moving between trees (de Waal, 2008). Hirata (2009) outlined a variety of occasions where chimpanzee mothers have rescued infants from dangerous circumstances by observing their behaviour and responding accordingly. ...
... Apparent expressions of concern and consolation towards distressed or suffering conspecifics has been observed in great apes and monkeys (Bezerra et al., 2014;Boesch, 1992;Campbell, 2019;de Waal, 2019). Furthermore, proactive helping responses have also occurred despite no clear solicitation or signalling (Pruetz, 2011). ...
... Systematic data on instrumental helping and perspective-taking indicates that many primates are capable of understanding the needs of others, and this may enable them to provide flexible situation-dependent responses. Current evidence indicates that great apes may be more flexible in their responses than monkeys (Boesch, 1992;Pruetz, 2011) and that more complex forms of prosociality may also relate to social tolerance and a species' cooperative tendencies. ...
Researchers have studied non-human primate cognition along different paths, including social cognition, planning and causal knowledge, spatial cognition and memory, and gestural communication, as well as comparative studies with humans. This volume describes how primate cognition is studied in labs, zoos, sanctuaries, and in the field, bringing together researchers examining similar issues in all of these settings and showing how each benefits from the others. Readers will discover how lab-based concepts play out in the real world of free primates. This book tackles pressing issues such as replicability, research ethics, and open science. With contributors from a broad range of comparative, cognitive, neuroscience, developmental, ecological, and ethological perspectives, the volume provides a state-of-the-art review pointing to new avenues for integrative research.
... Other examples of possible nurturant or succorant behaviour are provided by caring for sick, injured or disabled individuals. In the Taï forest chimpanzees have been seen licking, cleaning and preventing flies from accessing the wounds of other individuals, sometimes for extended periods (Boesch, 1992). These chimpanzees seem to adapt their behaviour to the specific needs of the injured individual: dominant males prevent other group members from disturbing the wounded individual, and the whole group wait for the injured individual to begin to walk again (Boesch, 1992). ...
... In the Taï forest chimpanzees have been seen licking, cleaning and preventing flies from accessing the wounds of other individuals, sometimes for extended periods (Boesch, 1992). These chimpanzees seem to adapt their behaviour to the specific needs of the injured individual: dominant males prevent other group members from disturbing the wounded individual, and the whole group wait for the injured individual to begin to walk again (Boesch, 1992). There are also reports in which chimpanzees and Japanese macaques care for disabled infants (Turner, Gould & Duffus, 2005;Matsumoto et al., 2016). ...
... While Taï chimpanzees care for wounded group members independent of kin relationship, a non-kin member with a wound elicits a reaction of fear or disgust in Gombe chimpanzees. This differential pattern of behaviour may be explained by the high predation pressure that Taï, but not Gombe, chimpanzees experience from leopards (Boesch, 1992). Animals could obtain survival and reproductive benefits by caring or helping group members with whom they are likely to be genetically related (Vasconcelos et al., 2012). ...
While empathy is a century-old psychological concept, its study in non-human animals has become the focus of much recent scientific interest, as it promises to provide the clues to understand the evolutionary origins of our social and moral nature. A review of the comparative study of empathy is thus timely to complement and constrain anthropocentric views, and to integrate current findings. However, this is not an easy task. The study of animal empathy has developed using different paradigms, different concepts of the phenomena involved, and the absence of a systematic program. Herein, we carry out a comprehensive review of the literature on complex forms of empathy in non-human animals: sympathetic concern and empathic perspective-taking. In particular, we focus on consolation and targeted helping, as the best examples of each category. In so doing, we try to shed light on the current debate concerning whether these phenomena are exclusively human traits. First, we try to clarify the terminology and taxonomy of forms of empathy, providing operative criteria for these phenomena that are applicable to both human and non-human animals. Second, we discuss whether the available evidence qualifies such behaviour as empathic. Third, we aim to provide an integrative view of the field, clarifying the challenges and conditions to satisfy. We also hope to highlight the importance of the study of these processes for elucidating the evolutionary history of this capacity across the animal kingdom.
... There is also recent evidence that some great apes, in contrast to monkeys, may have at least some of the elements of a "theory of mind" (Premack, 1988;Premack & Woodruff, 1978) that is manifest in a number of ways. These include the use of pedagogy in both the laboratory (Fouts, Fouts, & van Cantfort, 1989) and the field (Boesch, 1991), deception of conspecifics (Whiten & Byrne, 1991), displays of apparent empathy and compassion (Boesch, 1992), the ability to imitate (Byrne, 1994;Meador, Rumbaugh, Pate, & Bard, 1987), and the more general ability to imagine other possible worlds (Byrne & Whiten, 1992). On the basis of such evidence, one may even be tempted to relocate the "gap" so that it separates the great apes, rather than only humans, from the other animals (Savage-Rumbaugh, 1994b). ...
... This has received at least some support. Records of apparent compassion (Goodall, 1986), perhaps even empathy (Boesch, 1992), cooperation (de Waal, 1982(de Waal, , 1989Menzel, 1974), imitation (Byrne, 1994;Meador et al., 1987), role taking (Povinelli, Nelson, & Boysen, 1992;Povinelli, Parks, & Novak, 1992) and tactical deception Whiten & Byrne, 1988) can be cited in support of the claim that great apes may have at least some understanding of motivational mental states. There is virtually no evidence for these qualities in monkeys. ...
... Evidence for the attribution of informational states, such as knowledge and belief, is less extensive. There are at least two recorded incidences of teaching (Boesch, 1992;Fouts et al., 1989). Although several ingenious attempts to prove experimentally that chimpanzees attribute informational states (Povinelli, Nelson, & Boysen, 1990;Premack, 1988) have been published, none has provided unequivocal evidence (Heyes, 1993;Gagliardi, Kirkpatrick-Steger, Thomas, Allen, & Blumberg, 1995). ...
This article contains the argument that the human ability to travel mentally in time constitutes a discontinuity between ourselves and other animals. Mental time travel comprises the mental reconstruction of personal events from the past (episodic memory) and the mental construction of possible events in the future. It is not an isolated module, but depends on the sophistication of other cognitive capacities, including self-awareness, meta-representation, mental attribution, understanding the perception-knowledge relationship, and the ability to dissociate imagined mental states from one's present mental state. These capacities are also important aspects of so-called theory of mind, and they appear to mature in children at around age 4. Furthermore, mental time travel is generative, involving the combination and recombination of familiar elements, and in this respect may have been a precursor to language. Current evidence, although indirect or based on anecdote rather than on systematic study, suggests that nonhuman animals, including the great apes, are confined to a "present" that is limited by their current drive states. In contrast, mental time travel by humans is relatively unconstrained and allows a more rapid and flexible adaptation to complex, changing environments than is afforded by instincts or conventional learning. Past and future events loom large in much of human thinking, giving rise to cultural, religious, and scientific concepts about origins, destiny, and time itself.
... : : : while the San maintain a system of simple marriage, they often practice divorce, 749 remarriage, polygamous marriage and even the zaa-ku relationship : : : the San are making 750 great efforts to maintain their society by utilizing the complex network of inter-personal 751 relationships. ...
... In particular, chimpanzees 590 show a wide range of cooperation in forming coalitions, hunting, sharing food, and 591 patrolling their range borders (Nishida and Hosaka 1996;Mitani et al. 2000;Boesch 592 and Boesch-Achermann 2000). They also show compassion and empathy for others 593 in distress or injury (Boesch 1992;O'Connell 1995;Flack and de Waal 2000). 594 However, most cooperative activities in nonhuman primates are limited among kin 595 relatives or within a group, and the other-regarding behavior of chimpanzees is 596 mostly based on selfish motivation (Jansen et al. 2006;Vonk et al. 2008;Yamamoto 597 and Tanaka 2010; Silk and House 2011). ...
Spider monkeys are one of the most widespread New World primate genera, ranging from southern Mexico to Bolivia. Although they are common in zoos, spider monkeys are traditionally very difficult to study in the wild, because they are fast moving, live high in the canopy and are almost always found in small subgroups that vary in size and composition throughout the day. This book is an assimilation of both published and previously unpublished research. It is a comprehensive source of information for academic researchers and graduate students interested in primatology, evolutionary anthropology and behavioral ecology and covers topics such as taxonomy, diet, sexuality and reproduction, and conservation.
... Chimpanzees are one of the species in which this behavior has been most frequently documented. For example, chimpanzees have often been observed to inspect, groom, or lick their groupmates' injuries (Boesch 1991(Boesch , 1992Goodall 1986;Nishida and Hiraiwa-Hasegawa 1985). In addition, a group of chimpanzees was observed to wait for an injured individual who was left behind when the group traveled to another location (Boesch 1992). ...
... For example, chimpanzees have often been observed to inspect, groom, or lick their groupmates' injuries (Boesch 1991(Boesch , 1992Goodall 1986;Nishida and Hiraiwa-Hasegawa 1985). In addition, a group of chimpanzees was observed to wait for an injured individual who was left behind when the group traveled to another location (Boesch 1992). Moreover, an adolescent male chimpanzee was observed to help carry an infant when the mother chimpanzee was injured (Pruetz 2011). ...
Previous studies have shown that humans experience negative emotions when seeing contextual cues of others’ pain, such as injury (i.e., empathic pain), even without observing behavioral expressions of distress. However, this phenomenon has not been examined in nonhuman primates. We tested six chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) to experimentally examine their reactions to others’ injury. First, we measured viewing responses using eye-tracking. Chimpanzees spontaneously attended to injured conspecifics more than non-injured conspecifics, but did not do so in a control condition in which images of injuries were scrambled while maintaining color information. Chimpanzees did not avoid viewing injuries at any point during stimulus presentation. Second, we used thermal imaging to investigate chimpanzees’ physiological responses to others’ injury. Previous studies reported that reduced nasal temperature is a characteristic of arousal, particularly arousal associated with negative valence. We presented chimpanzees with a realistic injury: a familiar human experimenter with a prosthetic wound and artificial running blood. Chimpanzees exhibited a greater nasal temperature reduction in response to injury compared with the control stimulus. Finally, chimpanzees were presented with a familiar experimenter who stabbed their (fake) thumb with a needle, with no running blood, a situation that may be more challenging in terms of understanding the cause of distress. Chimpanzees did not physiologically distinguish this condition from the control condition. These results suggest that chimpanzees inspect others’ injuries and become aroused by seeing injuries even without observing behavioral cues, but have difficulty doing so without explicit (or familiar) cues (i.e., open wound and blood).
... The literature suggests that the expression of true imitation may be, at best, fragile in great apes (Whiten & Ham, 1992); it may strain their capabilities, or its eliciting circumstances may be narrowly constrained. Also, earlier experimental studies may have used inhibiting conditions in which true imitation was unlikely to have developed or guided performance (Boesch, 1992;Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990;Hall, 1968;Huffman, 1984;Nishida, 1986). In establishing more appropriate conditions, considerations of ecology and development are likely important (Charlesworth, 1983;Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990;Davey, 1989;Dickinson, 1989;Dumas & Dore, 1986;Kummer & Goodall, 1985). ...
... Emulation involves reproducing observed goals with no effort to replicate the behavioral techniques demonstrated; impersonation involves replicating the techniques. We speculate that we found something resembling impersonation, whereas others have found only emulation because of models' identities; Boesch (1992) recently made a similar suggestion. Our imitators selected their own models, and those they chose were overwhelmingly individuals or groups with whom each imitator had well-established, stable, and positive affective relations (parent or friend); experimenters have tended to preselect models, with no apparent attention to models' relationships with subjects. ...
We made an observational study of spontaneous imitation in orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus). Previous studies may have underestimated great apes' imitative capacities by studying subjects under inhibiting conditions. We used subjects living in enriched environments, namely, rehabilitation. We collected a sample of spontaneous imitations and analyzed the most complex incidents for the likelihood that true imitation, learning new actions by observing rather than by doing, was involved in their acquisition. From 395 hr of observation and other reports on 26 orangutans, we identified 354 incidents of imitation. Of these, 54 complex incidents were difficult to explain by forms of imitation based on associative processes grounded in experimental learning alone; they were, however, congruent with acquisition processes that include true imitation. These findings suggest that orangutans may be capable of true imitation and point to critical eliciting factors.
... Neither the female nor infant had expressed any markers of distress, and this behaviour was reported as unusual for this male and did not appear to bring him any direct benefits. Similarly, a group of chimpanzees have been observed to wait for an injured group member who was unable to keep up (Boesch, 1992). In addition, Hirata (2009) has outlined a variety of instances where chimpanzee mothers have rescued infants from dangerous circumstances by observing their behaviour and responding accordingly. ...
Empathy is a complex, multi‐dimensional capacity that facilitates the sharing and understanding of others' emotions. As our closest living relatives, bonobos ( Pan paniscus ) and chimpanzees ( P. troglodytes ) provide an opportunity to explore the origins of hominin social cognition, including empathy. Despite certain assumptions that bonobos and chimpanzees may differ empathically, these species appear to overlap considerably in certain socio‐emotional responses related to empathy. However, few studies have systematically tested for species variation in Pan empathic or socio‐emotional tendencies. To address this, we synthesise the growing literature on Pan empathy to inform our understanding of the selection pressures that may underlie the evolution of hominin empathy, and its expression in our last common ancestor. As bonobos and chimpanzees show overlaps in their expression of complex socio‐emotional phenomena such as empathy, we propose that group comparisons may be as or more meaningful than species comparisons when it comes to understanding the evolutionary pressures for such behaviour. Furthermore, key differences, such as how humans and Pan communicate, appear to distinguish how we experience empathy compared to our closest living relatives.
... Chimpanzees, for example, will sometimes spontaneously help someone who needs something out of reach (Melis and Tomasello 2013;). There are reports of chimpanzees occasionally providing food for others without simply acquiescing to a demand (Boesch 1992; Pérez-Manrique and Gomila 2017). In one case, an adolescent male helped a mother to carry her infant for a period of two days when illness forced her to drop behind the group (Pruetz 2011). ...
In Hidden Depths, Professor Penny Spikins explores how our emotional connections have shaped human ancestry. Focusing on three key transitions in human origins, Professor Spikins explains how the emotional capacities of our early ancestors evolved in response to ecological changes, much like similar changes in other social mammals. For each transition, dedicated chapters examine evolutionary pressures, responses in changes in human emotional capacities and the archaeological evidence for human social behaviours. Starting from our earliest origins, in Part One, Professor Spikins explores how after two million years ago, movement of human ancestors into a new ecological niche drove new types of collaboration, including care for vulnerable members of the group. Emotional adaptations lead to cognitive changes, as new connections based on compassion, generosity, trust and inclusion also changed our relationship to material things. Part Two explores a later key transition in human emotional capacities occurring after 300,000 years ago. At this time changes in social tolerance allowed ancestors of our own species to further reach out beyond their local group and care about distant allies, making human communities resilient to environmental changes. An increasingly close relationship to animals, and even to cherished possessions, appeared at this time, and can be explained through new human vulnerabilities and ways of seeking comfort and belonging. Lastly, Part Three focuses on the contrasts in emotional dispositions arising between ourselves and our close cousins, the Neanderthals. Neanderthals are revealed as equally caring yet emotionally different humans, who might, if things had been different, have been in our place today. This new narrative breaks away from traditional views of human evolution as exceptional or as a linear progression towards a more perfect form. Instead, our evolutionary history is situated within similar processes occurring in other mammals, and explained as one in which emotions, rather than ‘intellect’, were key to our evolutionary journey. Moreover, changes in emotional capacities and dispositions are seen as part of differing pathways each bringing strengths, weaknesses and compromises. These hidden depths provide an explanation for many of the emotional sensitivities and vulnerabilities which continue to influence our world today.
... Interestingly, prosocial behavior is not unique in humans but also exists in nonhuman primates such as chimpanzees, monkeys, and apes (de Waal and Suchak, 2010;Yamamoto et al., 2012;Gilbert and Basran, 2019). Spontaneous assistance among nonhuman primates is abundant (de Waal, 2008;Silk and House, 2012;Mercier et al., 2017), ranging from bringing a mouthful of water to an incapacitated individual to slowing down travel injured companions (Boesch, 1992;de Waal, 1997). However, prosocial behavior seems to be relatively fragile compared to the more robust prosocial behavior in humans (Drayton and Santos, 2014). ...
Antisocial behavior and prosocial behavior in the condition of inequality have long been observed in daily life. Understanding the neurological mechanisms and brain regions associated with antisocial and prosocial behavior and the development of new interventions are important for reducing violence and inequality. Fortunately, neurocognitive research and brain imaging research have found a correlation between antisocial or prosocial behavior and the prefrontal cortex. Recent brain stimulation research adopting transcranial direct current stimulation or transcranial magnetic stimulation has shown a causal relationship between brain regions and behaviors, but the findings are mixed. In the present study, we aimed to study whether stimulation of the DLPFC can change participants’ antisocial and prosocial behavior in the condition of inequality. We integrated antisocial and prosocial behavior in a unified paradigm. Based on this paradigm, we discussed costly and cost-free antisocial and prosocial behavior. In addition, we also measured participants’ disadvantageous and advantageous inequality aversion. The current study revealed an asymmetric effect of bilateral stimulation over the DLPFC on costly antisocial behavior, while such an effect of antisocial behavior without cost and prosocial behavior with and without cost were not observed. Moreover, costly antisocial behavior exhibited by men increased after receiving right anodal/left cathodal stimulation and decreased after receiving right cathodal anodal/left anodal stimulation compared with the behavior observed under sham stimulation. However, subjects’ inequality aversion was not influenced by tDCS.
... Examples of care behaviour involve others showing care and compassion toward a wounded individual, or helping an incapacitated individual to move (e.g. Boesch, 1992;reviewed in Pérez-Manrique and Gomila, 2018;Pruetz, 2011; see e.g. also in elephants, Bates et al., 2008;in dolphins, reviewed by Pérez-Manrique and Gomila, 2018). These cases certainly suggest a cognitively processed understanding of the other's need. ...
The aim of this review is to discuss recent arguments and findings in the comparative study of empathy. Based on a multidisciplinary approach including psychology and ethology, we review the non-human animal literature concerning theoretical frameworks, methodology, and research outcomes. One specific objective is to highlight discrepancies between theory and empirical findings, and to discuss ambiguities present in current data and their interpretation. In particular, we focus on emotional contagion and its experimental investigation, and on consolation and targeted helping as measures for sympathy. Additionally, we address the feasibility of comparing across species with behavioural data alone. One main conclusion of our review is that animal research on empathy still faces the challenge of closing the gap between theoretical concepts and empirical evidence. To advance our knowledge, we propose to focus more on the emotional basis of empathy, rather than on possibly ambiguous behavioural indicators, and we provide suggestions to overcome the limitations of previous research.
... In some cases, such as in captive communities where strong bonds may developed between unrelated individuals, and in the Tai National Park where leopard predation is high the whole community may be involved in the care of a sick individual, extending over months. 131 Apes, alongside dolphins and elephants even show a level of self-awareness and understanding of others which means that they can truly 'step into another's shoes'. It may well be from such an understanding that these levels of care arise, as dolphins and elephants also attempt to help others who are injured. ...
Our capacity to care about the wellbeing of others, whether they are close family or strangers, can appear to be unimportant in today's competitive societies. However, in this volume Penny Spikins argues that compassion lies at the heart of what makes us human. She takes us on a journey from the earliest stone age societies two million years ago to the lives of Neanderthals in Ice Age Europe, using archaeological evidence to illustrate the central role that emotional connections had in human evolution. Simple acts of kindness left to us from millions of years ago provide evidence for how social emotions and morality evolved, and how our capacity to reach out beyond ourselves into the lives of others allowed us to work together for a common good, and form the basis for human success.
... Violence, aggression, and struggle over resources have characterized our species since early hominin evolution. At the same time, empathy to the distress of conspecifics is an evolutionary-ancient phenomenon; it is observed in rodents (Bartal, Decety & Mason, 2011) and primates (Boesch, 1992), relies on mimicry and sensorimotor resonance , is enhanced by familiarity (Donaldson & Young, 2008), and shuts down when the sufferer is member of an outgroup (Feldman, 2017). Human empathy evolved from these ancient roots to include cognitive flexibility and interoceptive representations, clear differentiation of self and other, and networks supporting affective representations, not merely sensory-motor resonance (Zaki, Ochsner, Hanelin, Wager & Mackey, 2007). ...
The rapid increase in terror-related activities, shift of battlefield into civilian locations, and participation of youth in acts of violence underscore the need to find novel frameworks for youth interventions. Building on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and social neuroscience models we developed an eight-week dialogue group-intervention for youth growing up amidst intractable conflict. Eighty-eight Israeli-Jewish and Arab-Palestinian adolescents (16-18years) were randomly assigned to intervention or control groups. Before (T1) and after (T2) intervention, one-on-one conflict interaction with outgroup member were videotaped, oxytocin levels assayed, attitudes self-reported, and youth interviewed regarding national conflict. We tested the hypothesis that dialogue intervention would enhance empathic behavior and increase oxytocin levels following interaction with outgroup member. Intervention increased youth perspective-taking on national conflict. Oxytocin increased from T1 to T2 only for adolescents undergoing intervention who improved perspective taking in the process. Structural equation modelling charted three pathways to behavioral empathy toward outgroup member at T2; via endogenous oxytocin, empathic cognitions, and dialogue intervention; however, an alternative model without the intervention arm was non-significant. Our findings highlight the important role of empathy in programs for inter-group reconciliation and support evolutionary models on the precarious balance between the neurobiology of affiliation and the neurobiology of outgroup derogation.
... Humans express SA differently than other primates, so one important key will be determining which aspects of distinctively human behavior and cognition were critical in reshaping SA. For example, although some primates, and in particular apes, appear to have a limited theory of mind (Boesch, 1992;Hare, Call, Agnetta, & Tomasello, 2000), most lack the sophisticated sense of self that humans possess. Nonhuman primates are thus not likely to be as vulnerable as are humans to distress associated with insult to one's self. ...
This review of recent evolutionary theories on psychopathology takes on controversies and contradictions both with established psychological thought and within the evolutionary field itself. Opening with the ancestral origins of the familiar biopsychosocial model of psychological conditions, the book traces distinctive biological and cultural pathways shaping human development and their critical impact on psychiatric and medical disorders. Analyses of disparate phenomena such as jealousy, social anxiety, depressive symptoms, and antisocial behavior describe adaptive functions that have far outlasted their usefulness, or that require further study and perhaps new directions for treatment. In addition, the book’s compelling explorations of violence, greed, addiction, and suicide challenge us to revisit many of our assumptions regarding what it means to be human.
Included in the coverage:
· Evolutionary foundations of psychiatric compared to non-psychiatric disorders.· Evolutionary psychopathology, uncomplicated depression, and the distinction between normal and disordered sadness.
· Depression: is rumination really adaptive?
· A CBT approach to coping with sexual betrayal and the green-eyed monster.
· Criminology’s modern synthesis: remaking the science of crime with Darwinian insight.
· Anthropathology: the abiding malady of the species.
With its wealth of interdisciplinary viewpoints, The Evolution of Psychopathology makes an appropriate supplementary text for advanced graduate courses in the evolutionary sciences, particularly in psychology, biology, anthropology, sociology, and philosophy.
... Humans express SA differently than other primates, so one important key will be determining which aspects of distinctively human behavior and cognition were critical in reshaping SA. For example, although some primates, and in particular apes, appear to have a limited theory of mind (Boesch, 1992;Hare, Call, Agnetta, & Tomasello, 2000), most lack the sophisticated sense of self that humans possess. Nonhuman primates are thus not likely to be as vulnerable as are humans to distress associated with insult to one's self. ...
Social relationships constitute a highly rewarding context for most people, providing a source of support and nurturance, as well as protection against loneliness, depression, and even death (Cacioppo, Hawkley, & Thisted, 2010; Cohen, 2004; Steptoe, Shankar, Demakakos, & Wardle, 2013). Interpersonal relationships can also, however, be stressful. They are marked by periodic conflict with others and entail inherent risks of negative evaluation or criticism (Bertera, 2005; Rook, 1984). Further, social strains contribute to psychological and physical health problems (Seeman, Gruenewald, Cohen, Williams, & Matthews, 2014; Yang, Schorpp, & Harris, 2014). It is thus not surprising that interpersonal difficulties constitute one of the most common reasons that people seek psychological treatment (Bankoff, 1994; Benton, Robertson, Tseng, Newton, & Benton, 2003; Pledge, Lapan, Heppner, Kivlighan, & Roehlke, 1998). One particularly common manifestation of such difficulties is social anxiety (SA), defined as an excessive fear of negative evaluation that can lead people to avoid social engagement. Its associated behavior patterns may result, in the most severe cases, in a clinical diagnosis of social anxiety disorder (SAD, formerly called social phobia; APA, 2013). Indeed, this disorder is common. Approximately 7–8% of adults meet the criteria for SAD in a given year (Kessler, Chiu, Demler, & Walters, 2005), and an additional 10–11% have at least some impairing symptoms (Fehm, Beesdo, Jacobi, & Fiedler, 2008).
... This is significant as allies are important to survival. We know that injuries lower the 'rank' of chimpanzees and their previous allies often abandon them: the rank of the Tai forest chimpanzee Jomeo was substantially reduced when he injured his foot, for example (Boesch 1992), and the Gombe forest chimpanzee Faben was reduced to a lower rank, submissive to his younger brother Faben, after he could no longer use his arm (Goodall 1986). ...
Is autism part of what makes us ‘human’ today? Autism has traditionally been seen as a condition of people somehow outside society. However recent research has challenged this view, suggesting in contrast that autism is part of the processes that allow societies work together.
In the light of the potential value of autistic insight and action in certain contexts it is possible to view the archaeological record rather differently. Rather than a progressive sophistication of a single human ‘mind’, a more plausible explanation for much of the patterning in the archaeological record is as the marked emergence of autistic traits within a modern ‘humanity’ made up of complex interrelationship between different minds.
... For example, it is not uncommon for a wounded chimp to be attended to—fed, groomed, and protected—by other members of the social group. Dominant adult males even chase away playing infants or noisy group members to keep them from disturbing the injured chimp (Boesch, 1992). A recent series of experiments provides more direct support for empathy and altruism in chimps (Warneken & Tomasello, 2006). ...
... The temptation to assume common motives is especially great with species that are closely related to humans, like chimpanzees, and animals that are intimately associated with humans, such as dogs. Chimpanzees have been inferred to experience grief at the loss of a close associate (Brown 1879), sympathy and pity for a sick conspecifi c (Yerkes & Yerkes 1929), concern for others who have been in confl icts , and empathy for injured group members (Boesch 1992). Some primatologists are fi rmly convinced that other primates are empathic (O'Connell 1995;Preston & de Waal 2002;de Waal 2008). ...
... Self-awareness (Gallop 1982;Parker et al. 1994;Parker 1996) including awareness of the thoughts of others (theory of mind) (Premarck 1988;Premarck and Dasser 1991) and deception (Whiten and Byrne 1988;Russon et al. 1996;Byrne and Russon 1998;Gibson et al. 2001, 83, 85) could be observed among apes. Also empathy and compassion (Boesch 1992;Povinelli et al. 1992) exists among the latter species. Consequently all characteristics considered hitherto as unique human are at least to some degree present among animals. ...
Rationality and the clash of religions Despite the appearances to the contrary we live in times of religious struggles. By "religion" (=rel 0), however, not necessary a belief in a God or gods is meant, but every world-view, which: (a) claims to explain everything in the world and in human existence, (b) gives meaning to the life of its adherers, (c) confers a special dignity on their existence, (d) is disposed to proselytize, (e) regards its opponents as somehow inferior, (f) can be fully understood only from inside, (g) provides some cultic elements (liturgy, sacred books, martyrs etc.). The criteria of rel 0 are met by "secular religions" (=rel sec), "esoteric religions" (=rel esot) and "traditional religions" (=rel trad). The somehow self-contradictory term rel sec designates all world-views which invoke a higher cause, being explicitly not God, in order to fulfill their mission as described above (Eric Voegelin). The task of the higher cause can be fulfilled by different substrates: by revolution, as in the case of French Revolution (Claude Lefort), by proletariat, as in the case of Marxism (Leszek Kolakowski; Sam G. MacFarland), by nation/race, as in the case of Nazism (Stanley Stowers; Michael Ley; Claus-Ekkehart Bärsch), and by scientific naturalism as promoted by Richard Dawkins, Daniel C. Dennett, Carl Sagan et al (Karl W. Giberson 2008, 43-46). 1 However not only rel sec meet the criteria of rel 0 . These criteria are both met by rel esot and rel trad . While rel esot emphasize the individual spiritual experience and are mainly not interested in providing rational explanation for different beliefs (Sutcliff), rel trad , especially the Western theism, claim that at least some part of their doctrine is rational, yet not entirely accessible by the mere ratio. Western theism, by which the 1 Scientific naturalism as represented by Dawkins and consorts certainly meets the criteria (a) to (f) described above. Dawkins (2004) meets at least the criteria (a) to (c) when he writes: "My objection to supernatural beliefs is precisely that they miserably fail to do justice to the sublime grandeur of the real world. They represent a narrowing-down from reality, an impoverishment of what the real world has to offer." By calling anyone who rejects evolution "ignorant, stupid and insane" (1989) he meets the criterion (e). Other proponents of nat scien employ a quasi religious language as described by Giberson (2008, 174-182) which strikes odd as to people who call themselves rationalists. Interestingly enough Dawkins, Dennett and other proponents of nat scien belong to a proselytizing movement of "the brights" (Giberson, 44) whose main ideas such as a naturalistic worldview can be traced back to the times of preceding the French Revolution. Even if cultic elements of "the brights" are not mentioned on the movement"s page (http://the-brights.net) they probably exist.
... In particular, many interesting studies indicate a willingness of non-human primates to help others at a cost to themselves, but may not have immediate implications for brain mechanisms that support exchange institutions. This includes, for example, papers that report altruistic consolation (De Waal & Aureli, 1996;De Waal & Roosmalen, 1979;Fraser, Stahl, & Aureli, 2008;Koski & Sterck, 2009), natural helping behavior (Boesch, 1992;De Waal, 1997b), or nonreciprocal food-sharing outside immediate kin group (Feistner & McGrew, 1989;De Waal 1997a;Bonnie & de Waal, 2004). ...
Experiments with human participants have inspired new theories to capture human social, economic, and justice preferences, and shed new light on the foundation of institutions that promote and support large-scale exchange. Another source of valuable data for informing this agenda derives from studies with non-human primates. Here, we argue that primate studies of social preferences provide behavioral evidence supporting the role of the brain as an evolved social record-keeping device. Our argument follows Dickhaut et al. (Accounting Horizons 24:221–255, 2010), who pointed to record-keeping as critical in enabling large-scale trade. Here, we note that record-keeping also underlies justice judgments in both personal exchange and large-scale trade. The reason is that evaluating whether an allocation is just requires tracking not only benefits that accrue locally, but also benefits for distant others. Further, if record-keeping is an evolved trait (as Dickhaut et al. in Accounting Horizons 24:221–255, 2010 suggest), then it seems reasonable to expect it to be evidenced not only in humans, but also in non-human primates. Indeed, we argue that evidence from non-human primate research supports the Dickhaut hypothesis, thus supporting the role of justice in the emergence of fair and efficient economic exchange.
... For example, it is not uncommon for a wounded chimp to be attended to—fed, groomed, and protected—by other members of the social group. Dominant adult males even chase away playing infants or noisy group members to keep them from disturbing the injured chimp (Boesch, 1992). A recent series of experiments provides more direct support for empathy and altruism in chimps (Warneken & Tomasello, 2006). ...
Proposes that a scientific understanding of the self—identity, self-esteem, and self-regulation— is not only possible but is in fact fundamental to the science of personality. The authors present a short history of the self as a central construct in personality theory, noting the recent renewed interest in the role of the self in general theories of the person. They address questions regarding the nature and structure of the self, how and where it is realized in the brain, what its adaptive functions are, returning to W. James's initial set of issues as when he first formulated a naturalist perspective on self and consciousness.
[ Robins, R.W., Norem, J.K., & Cheek, J.M. (1999). Naturalizing the self. In L.A. Pervin & O.P. John (Eds.), Handbook of personality: Theory and research (2nd ed., pp. 443-477). New York: Guilford.] NOTE: This chapter appeared in the second (2nd) edition of the Handbook. http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=iXMQq7wg-qkC&oi=fnd&pg=PA443&ots=uD6b95iwmf&sig=lcO0LzOLk2Qj6rjGNsoEFt0smNU#v=onepage&q&f=false
In the third (3rd) edition of the Handbook in 2008 an updated version of the chapter was published with different co-authors. Robins, R. W., Tracy, J. L., & Trzesniewski, K. H. (2008). Naturalizing the self. In O. P. John, R. W. Robins, L. A. Pervin (Eds.) , Handbook of personality: Theory and research (3rd ed.) (pp. 421-
447). New York, NY, US: Guilford Press.
... For example, it is not uncommon for a wounded chimp to be attended to—fed, groomed, and protected—by other members of the social group. Dominant adult males even chase away playing infants or noisy group members to keep them from disturbing the injured chimp (Boesch, 1992). A recent series of experiments provides more direct support for empathy and altruism in chimps (Warneken & Tomasello, 2006). ...
... Qualitative descriptions of spontaneous assistance among primates are abundant, ranging from bringing a mouthful of water to an incapacitated individual to slowing down travel for injured companions (Boesch 1992;de Waal, 1996de Waal, , 1997a. Similar descriptions exist for both elephants (e.g. ...
Non-human primates are marked by well-developed prosocial and cooperative tendencies as reflected in the way they support each other in fights, hunt together, share food and console victims of aggression. The proximate motivation behind such behaviour is not to be confused with the ultimate reasons for its evolution. Even if a behaviour is ultimately self-serving, the motivation behind it may be genuinely unselfish. A sharp distinction needs to be drawn, therefore, between (i) altruistic and cooperative behaviour with knowable benefits to the actor, which may lead actors aware of these benefits to seek them by acting cooperatively or altruistically and (ii) altruistic behaviour that offers the actor no knowable rewards. The latter is the case if return benefits occur too unpredictably, too distantly in time or are of an indirect nature, such as increased inclusive fitness. The second category of behaviour can be explained only by assuming an altruistic impulse, which-as in humans-may be born from empathy with the recipient's need, pain or distress. Empathy, a proximate mechanism for prosocial behaviour that makes one individual share another's emotional state, is biased the way one would predict from evolutionary theories of cooperation (i.e. by kinship, social closeness and reciprocation). There is increasing evidence in non-human primates (and other mammals) for this proximate mechanism as well as for the unselfish, spontaneous nature of the resulting prosocial tendencies. This paper further reviews observational and experimental evidence for the reciprocity mechanisms that underlie cooperation among non-relatives, for inequity aversion as a constraint on cooperation and on the way defection is dealt with.
... Comforting conspecifics other than one's own offspring, is rare in animals but has been reported for chimpanzees (Boesch, 1992; de Waal, 1996; Goodall, 1986). Special care is given to conspecifics that are distressed or injured (de Waal, 1996). ...
This chapter reviews the evidence for theory of mind in great apes and evaluates Povinelli's so-called 'reinterpretation hypothesis'. Introduction As a soccer player, one of us was often confronted with the challenging dilemma of taking penalty kicks. Up to about age 13 I (T.S.) could quite reliably convert the shot by simply peeking briefly to one corner of the goal, running up and then casually placing the ball in the other corner. I relied not on the accuracy or velocity of my shot, but almost entirely on fooling the keeper that I intended to shoot in the opposite direction. But then some clever keepers picked up on this simplest of tricks and tried to thwart my attempt by jumping in the opposite corner to the one I looked to. Some even tried to turn the tables by offering one side (moving closer to the other post). The battle became increasingly more challenging as I was sizing up the keeper's ability to read my intentions and do the opposite of what I thought he thought. For example, I pretend to place it right, but I think that he thinks I am only pretending to place it right - so I may chose to place it right after all. This is 'theory of mind' in action. Most theory-of-mind research uses verbal paradigms to assess children's reasoning about the mind. As the above example illustrates, however, theory of mind manifests in our non-verbal actions. Naturally, investigations into potential theory of mind in non-human animals must rely on such non-verbal performances. Whether our closest animal relatives share such manifestations of theory of mind has been a topic of much research and discussion in recent years. But identification of an unequivocal behavioural indicator for mind-reading has proved frustratingly difficult...
... Beck, 1980)2. Recent evidence suggests that some great apes, in contrast to monkeys, may have at least a rudimentary3`theoryrudimentary3`theory of mind' (Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Premack, 1988), may be able to use pedagogy in both laboratory (Fouts, Fouts & van Cantfort, 1989) and field (Boesch, 1991) contexts, may show empathy and compassion (Boesch, 1992), may be able to truly imitate (Byrne, in press; Meador, Rumbaugh, Pate & Bard, 1987), and may have the ability (possibly underlying all those above) to imagine other possible worlds (Byrne & Whiten, 1992). Thesèdiscoveries' reveal more and more a picture of apes as thèmissing link' bridging the gap between the animal kingdom and humanity. ...
This article considers the role of mental time travel in human evolution. A central thesis is that other primates, although having memory and expectation, do not possess the same ability to live in the past or in the future. The first half of this paper argues that reconstructive access to the past (i.e. episodic memory) is dependent on other advanced cognitive capabilities (e.g. self-awareness and meta-representation) and focuses on the results of recent `theory of mind' research in order to evaluate the thesis. Mental simulation is the proposed underlying mechanism for the development of both mindreading and mental time travel. The second half contrasts flexible awareness of possible futures with other forms of `anticipatory behaviour' and reviews evidence about how far other primates may think ahead. The phylogenetic history of mental time travel and its adaptive and exaptive relationships to other features are discussed. Mental access to the fourth dimension is essential for many of the distinctive characteristics of our species.
... Thereby, they simply wash away, in one sentence, 50 years of data painstakingly collected by hundreds of researchers in such famous projects as those of Gombe, Mahale, Taï, and Kibale chimpanzees. Not only did these scientists produce masses of data, but many of the data pertain directly to cognitive abilities: cooperative abilities systematically documented in coalitions and alliances and in coordinated groups for hunting and territorial defense; altruistic and empathic abilities, including adoption and help to unrelated individuals; and culture, deception, pointing, mental maps, and others (Boesch, 1992(Boesch, , 2003(Boesch, , 2005de Waal, 2001;Nishida, & Hosaka, 1996;Sanz, Morgan, & Gulik, 2004). To be sure, these data were not produced with experimental designs similar to those used with captive chimpanzees. ...
Not all chimpanzees are captive chimpanzees and not all humans are White middle-class Westerners. In other words, ecological differences during upbringing and when tested are essential when making interspecies comparisons. C. Boesch (2007) suggested that this is too often forgotten when chimpanzees and humans are compared to understand "what makes us human." The comments by M. Tomasello and J. Call (2008) on C. Boesch (2007) illustrate nicely the urgency to take development and ecology seriously. The author presents additional data illustrating how the physical and social ecological conditions experienced by an individual during upbringing influence the development of his or her cognitive abilities. Such influences during the ontogeny are very diverse and can express themselves rapidly or much later in life. Luckily, some recent research has shown how increasing the fairness of cross-species tests increases the performance of the apes.
... Given the tactical importance of this behavior, its absence in such a political species as the chimpanzee is surprising. Complex social behavior, ranging from reconciliation to deception, has been repeatedly described for both captive and wild chimpanzees [Arcadi et al., 1998;Boesch, 1991Boesch, , 1992Boesch, , 2003Byrne & Whiten, 1989;de Waal, 1982de Waal, , 1989de Waal, , 1996de Waal, , 2000de Waal & Pokorny, 2005;de Waal & van Roosmalen, 1979;Goodall, 1986;Matsuzawa, 1996;Newton-Fisher, 1997;Nishida & Hiraiwa-Hasegawa, 1987;Whiten & Byrne, 1997]. Agonistic buffering might have passed unnoticed in chimpanzees because while reconciliation among macaques and baboons is typically directed from lower to the high-ranking individuals independent of the rank of the initiator of conflicts, the opposite is seen in chimpanzees [de Waal & Aureli, 1996]. ...
We present evidence of agonistic buffering in captive chimpanzees, recorded from 1993 until 2005, mainly from ad libitum sampling in over 2000 hr of observation. A total of 33 agonistic buffering episodes were analyzed for context and effects of this complex social behavior. Agonistic buffering was directed at the whole chimpanzee colony as they supported an individual who initially received aggression from the alpha male, independently of the victim's age, sex or social rank. Chimpanzee agonistic buffering behavior is compared with that in other nonhuman primate species, and we describe some particularities of chimpanzee agonistic buffering: the status of the buffers used-socially important offspring such as those from the alpha female-and the social rank of the adult male responsible for the buffering episode-alpha male. Possible functions for this behavior in chimpanzees are suggested as appeasement of group members in a particularly crowded captive setting, and/or as a "forced reconciliation" mechanism. Chimpanzees exhibit behavioral flexibility by adapting themselves to new social and physical situations and use novel behavior to achieve social benefits.
Bonobos (Pan paniscus) are a highly social great ape species that have evolved rich social and emotional capacities to enable them to navigate their complex social worlds. This includes sophisticated ways to express their inner states as well to respond to those of others, including prosocially to their needs. These capacities form a core basis of empathy, a term which broadly refers to the sharing and understanding of others’ emotional states. Although some of the more cognitively-complex forms of empathy are thought to represent evolutionarily-derived traits unique to our own species, comparative evidence from a range of animal and bird species reveals that many of the core foundations of empathy have deep evolutionary roots. This includes the capacity to share others’ states through emotional contagion and mimicry, as well as to behaviourally orientate towards others in distress in order to ameliorate their state, a phenomenon known as consolation). Given the importance of bonobos for understanding the evolution of empathy, the aim of this chapter is to review the concept of empathy, consider its evolution and discuss what we know thus far about the empathic capacities of bonobos. Evidence for empathy in bonobos will be discussed, spanning research conducted in captivity, semi-captivity and observations made in the wild. As chimpanzees are the close cousins of bonobos and extensively overlap in their socio-emotional tendencies, insights will also be drawn from chimpanzees and other species to get a richer picture of how empathy has evolved in Pan.
Recent interest in the development and evolution of theory of mind has provided a wealth of information about representational skills in both children and animals. According to J. Perner (1991), children begin to entertain secondary representations in the 2nd year of life. This advance manifests in their passing hidden displacement tasks, engaging in pretense and means-ends reasoning, interpreting external representations, displaying mirror self-recognition and empathic behavior, and showing an early understanding of "mind" and imitation. New data show a cluster of mental accomplishments in great apes that is very similar to that observed in 2-year-old humans. It is suggested that it is most parsimonious to assume that this cognitive profile is of homologous origin and that great apes possess secondary representational capacity. Evidence from animals other than apes is scant. This analysis leads to a number of predictions for future research.
This Chapter reflects human sociality against that of our primate forebears. Based on both extensive personal field research of gorillas, particularly in the Congo and Gabon, and analysis of the progression of understanding in the literature, the author takes us to the edge of primate-human evolution and shows us the difference. The argument demonstrates that society is not unique to humans, but whilst human sociality is deeply rooted in the common social features of the great apes, new social factors emerged, in particular as our humanoid ancestors moved into risky ecological niches outside tropical rain forests and needed to develop new communicative and shared productive capabilities. These included the development of language, food sharing, cooperative breeding, strong identity and community, and emotional traits such as empathy and sympathy. The Chapter concludes with an analysis of the consequence now for human sociality to survive the future.
Modern humans have unique life history traits compared to great apes, such as earlier age at weaning, later age at sexual maturity, shorter inter-birth interval, and longer life span. These features did not emerge together in the evolutionary history of hominids but interacted with each other to promote human adaptive abilities to new environments out of tropical forests and out of Africa. I analyze the order of these traits’ emergence and the factors shaping each trait by considering the life history traits of great apes, fossil evidence, and the subsistence of foragers. A comparison with great apes predicts that changes in diet and social features may have preceded or coincided with the development of human’s life history traits. Based on a comparison of social features among great apes, the Homo–Pan LCA may have lived in a medium-sized group with a multi-male and multi-female social structure characterized by a strong tendency of female transfer between groups and a weak tendency of male philopatry. They also had small sexual dimorphism in body mass, with females showing no overt sign of estrus. Large climatic changes in the late Miocene forced the human ancestors to expand their distribution from tropical forests to open lands. The dispersed food resources and high predation pressure they faced in the new environments constituted the driving force behind provisioning and early weaning, which shortened the inter-birth interval and increased the fecundity of early hominids. The dietary innovation of collecting high-quality foods including meat preceded encephalization and promoted a division of labor between sexes in foraging. Increased brain size led to the allocation of energy to rapid brain growth and caused a delay in somatic growth. Such changes in life history traits resulted in the emergence of childhood and adolescence unique to humans. The long dependency inherent to these periods required cooperative breeding and pair bonding, while risky environments strengthened kin-based alliance among males. Cooking and control of fire increased digestive ability and expanded the dietary range of hominids. Reductions in the time energy spent on processing and consuming foods allowed them to expand their social interactions. The prevalence of provisioning and food sharing in adulthood solicited development of reciprocity and prosociality, which possibly led to the creation of a multilevel community structure consisting of families, as observed in modern foragers’ societies. This social structure might have increased the resilience of the Homo clade to severe conditions in the new environments and led them in their first steps out of Africa. Menopause and extension of the post-reproductive period may have emerged recently, contributing to the increased survival of immatures and overall population growth. The development of speech using language and other cultural innovations played important roles in shaping this remarkable life history trait unique to modern humans.
Differences in the deployment of altruism in human and non-human primate groups raise two different questions in this article. This article considers some of the factors that may limit the extent of cooperation in non-human primate groups. In particular, it focuses on the evidence for the features that are associated with altruistic behaviour in humans: the capacity for empathy, the existence of moral sentiments, and the concern for the welfare of others. The article also defines cooperation as equivalent to the biological definition of altruism, and uses these terms interchangeably. It distinguishes between empathy and sympathy. The definition of empathy corresponds to Stephanie Preston and Frans de Waal's concept of 'cognitive empathy'. While one often conflates empathy and sympathy, the two can be uncoupled. Thus, empathy is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for sympathy.
To investigate the nature of social preferences in primates, researchers have recently devised a series of experiments in which animals are presented with opportunities to provide benefits to others at little or no cost to themselves. The choices that they make in these experiments provide insight about their social preferences. Although the discrepancy between the results obtained in experiments that were designed to examine chimps' social preferences may seem like an unfortunate complication, it provides with an important opportunity. If one can work out the reasons why the results of these experiments differ, one may gain deeper insights about the complexity and nature of chimps' social preferences. For example, the presence of food rewards might compete with selfish motives about food. If that is the case, then the chimps who were indifferent in the Silk/Jensen/Vonk experiments might behave prosocially in the protocol used by Warneken and his colleagues, and vice versa.
Do chimpanzees engage in religious behaviors? To date this question remains unanswered. I use methods from religious studies and anthropology of religion that demonstrate an answer in the affirmative. A comprehensive review of primatology reports reveals that chimpanzees do perform ritualized patterns of behavior in response to birth, death, consortship, and elemental natural phenomena. A structuralist analysis of these patterns shows that chimpanzees deploy similar formulaic action schemas involving recombination of syntagmatic and paradigmatic behaviors across all four of these life-situations. In the course of these performances, chimpanzees decontextualize and convert everyday communicative signals to express non-ordinary emotions of wonder and awe. The patterning of chimpanzee ritual behaviors evidences all the components of a prototypical trans-species definition of religion. These findings support hypotheses that propose religious behaviors for other species, including hominins prior to Homo sapiens sapiens.
We made an observational study of spontaneous imitation in orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus). Previous studies may have underestimated great apes' imitative capacities by studying subjects under inhibiting conditions. We used subjects living in enriched environments, namely, rehabilitation. We collected a sample of spontaneous imitations and analyzed the most complex incidents for the likelihood that true imitation, learning new actions by observing rather than by doing, was involved in their acquisition. From 395 hr of observation and other reports on 26 orangutans, we identified 354 incidents of imitation. Of these, 54 complex incidents were difficult to explain by forms of imitation based on associative processes grounded in experiential learning alone; they were, however, congruent with acquisition processes that include true imitation. These findings suggest that orangutans may be capable of true imitation and point to critical eliciting factors.
Many researchers assume that the answer to the question of imitation in apes is more positive due to two complicating factors. First, there are many different ways to ape. A number of theorists have demonstrated that the same behavioral outcome may result from very different processes of learning and social learning. This potential ambiguity in what it means to “ape,” thus, makes the current question less than totally straightforward, and it means that a certain amount of theoretical work must be done before the relevant research literature may be usefully examined. The second complicating factor is that research on the social learning of apes comes from very different sources. These studies have the virtue of ecological validity, but their lack of experimental control means that they are of limited usefulness in determining with any precision the learning processes that are responsible for the observed population differences. This chapter closes with the conclusion that captive chimpanzees raised by their mothers are a better model for wild chimpanzees than chimpanzees that are raised in human-like ways. This means that the answer to the more general question of whether apes ape is—only when trained by humans, either formally or informally, to do so. It is possible that there are further important distinctions to be made in various types of social understanding and learning that one has yet to recognize.
We studied the postconflict interactions with group members other than the former opponent in two groups of spectacled leaf monkeys. We found no evidence of redirection of aggression towards other group members. Victims and aggressors sought affiliative contacts with uninvolved third parties. There was no evidence for consolation—affiliative contact initiated by an uninvolved third party, directed towards victims of aggression—in either group when all affiliative behaviors were considered. However, embracing was a characteristic first-contact interaction between individuals involved in aggression and third parties. This finding mirrors the results concerning reconciliation in spectacled leaf monkeys. Accordingly, embracing may be a true consolatory behavior in this species. When contacts with third parties occurred before or in the absence of reconciliation, the timing of such contacts fell within the time window during which reconciliation normally occurs. These contacts also resulted in affiliation levels twice that of baseline levels, supporting the idea that these contacts may function as a form of substitute reconciliation. We discuss these results in light of recent theories concerning postconflict behavior in primates.
Empathy can be widely defined as the capacity to understand the emotional, visual, or cognitive perspective of another individual
and is perhaps reliant on the ability to attribute mental states. Behavioural events that may indicate empathy in chimpanzees,Pan troglodytes, are collated (1) using a questionnaire and (2) from the literature. These case studies are classified in a taxonomy of empathic
acts in which empathy is categorized as visual empathy, emotional empathy, concordance and extended empathy. In addition,
the circumstances surrounding the empathic acts are discussed: whether the recipient of the empathic act was a relative, an
unfamiliar individual, or a heterospecific. The cost to the animal showing empathy, whether it displayed any levels of intentionality
and if it communicated to a third party are also analyzed. Rescuing of an individual from a dangerous social or physical situation
is the only category where the animal shows empathy under all the specified conditions. From this preliminary analysis it
seems the chimpanzees may be capable of showing empathy across a wide range of circumstances.
Introduction: Every culture and epoch has had its ideas about the nature of mind and existence. We can reflect upon ourselves, upon others, and upon the world. Do animals do that too? Do they sit around and think that they are because they can think? Are they to be considered mindless if they do not reflect? How did our ability to think beyond the immediately present evolve? The self-awareness implied by 'cogito ergo sum', or 'I think, therefore I am', demands a reflective level of thinking that develops by about age four in children. Only then, recent research suggests, do children begin to reflect on their own mental states. It would be quite difficult, however, to convince people that younger children are mindless - mind can surely exist without being able to reflect upon its own existence. One can know, regardless of whether one knows that one knows. This means that the Cartesian assumption that the mind is necessarily transparent to the self is flawed (cf. Wimmer and Hartl 1991; Gopnik 1993). Instead, the reflective mind, or what I want to call the metamind, seems to depend on mental computations that gradually develop over the first four years of life and that have evolved over the last five million years of human evolution.
One-day-old rat pups adopt a supine posture before attaching to the mother's nipple. Body rotations performed to reach the nipple occur in a typical kinematic structure. First, the pup rotates along the longitudinal axis of the trunk and lies on its side. Next, the pup arches the trunk to achieve a U-shaped posture and then rapidly relaxes the trunk. A second cephalocaudal rotation follows at the peak of trunk relaxation as the pup achieves a supine posture. After reaching a supine posture, the pup crawls to a nipple by performing "stepping" movements on the mother's ventral surface. The kinematic structure of these movements is reminiscent of the structure of righting as seen in the newborn rat. Both righting and achieving a supine posture under the mother involve the expression of common motor modules. During righting the modules are executed in the direction of gravity, and when achieving a supine posture the modules are executed against the force of gravity. Simple motor behaviors expressed by the rat pup during early postnatal development may have common origins and common control mechanisms.
Recent interest in the development and evolution of theory of mind has provided a wealth of information about representational skills in both children and animals. According to J. Perner (1991), children begin to entertain secondary representations in the 2nd year of life. This advance manifests in their passing hidden displacement tasks, engaging in pretense and means-ends reasoning, interpreting external representations, displaying mirror self-recognition and empathic behavior, and showing an early understanding of "mind" and imitation. New data show a cluster of mental accomplishments in great apes that is very similar to that observed in 2-year-old humans. It is suggested that it is most parsimonious to assume that this cognitive profile is of homologous origin and that great apes possess secondary representational capacity. Evidence from animals other than apes is scant. This analysis leads to a number of predictions for future research.
Evolutionary theory postulates that altruistic behavior evolved for the return-benefits it bears the performer. For return-benefits to play a motivational role, however, they need to be experienced by the organism. Motivational analyses should restrict themselves, therefore, to the altruistic impulse and its knowable consequences. Empathy is an ideal candidate mechanism to underlie so-called directed altruism, i.e., altruism in response to anothers's pain, need, or distress. Evidence is accumulating that this mechanism is phylogenetically ancient, probably as old as mammals and birds. Perception of the emotional state of another automatically activates shared representations causing a matching emotional state in the observer. With increasing cognition, state-matching evolved into more complex forms, including concern for the other and perspective-taking. Empathy-induced altruism derives its strength from the emotional stake it offers the self in the other's welfare. The dynamics of the empathy mechanism agree with predictions from kin selection and reciprocal altruism theory.
The article is an exercise in the philosophical anthropology of politics. According to Aristotle, man is a political animal but not uniquely so, whereas, according to Hobbes, politics is artificial and the preserve of humans alone. Both Aristotle and Hobbes draw upon contemporary science. The dominant relevant science today is neo-Darwinism – humans are products of evolution and genetically closely related to the other primates. The argument that chimpanzees are political, thus putatively endorsing an Aristotelian rather than a Hobbesian perspective, is scrutinised. However, at best, chimpanzees are only metaphorically political. While this conclusion may weaken the Aristotelian position, it cannot of itself vindicate the Hobbesian one. The philosophical anthropological endeavour to investigate the relation between politics and human nature still has work to do.
An examination of the writings of 19th and early 20th century comparative psychologists indicates that they were well aware of many of the issues raised by the recent “cognitivism” in psychology and ethology. George John Romanes and C. Lloyd Morgan are particularly underappreciated. A survey of current lay attitudes on mental continuity between humans and nonhumans shows that emotional continuity is considered more likely than intellectual continuity and that acceptance of evolution favorably disposes people to both. Critical anthropomorphism often aids in formulating testable hypotheses, but cognitive approaches to animals are in danger of suffering a fate similar to the earlier comparative mentalism.
Some dyads of Japanese monkey adult males and females show remarkable spatial proximity and frequent exchanges of social behaviors.
It is suggested that some kind of “affinity” exists between them. Females obtain much unilateral benefit from “proximity effects”;
even lowranking females can dominate high-ranking females as long as they stay nearby their “affinitive” males. Males acquire
female followers in return. Mating relations and female mother-daughter relations play important roles in forming new “affinitive
relations.” Once monkeys have formed “affinitive relations,” however, they seldom mate with each other, as if they were kin-related.
Therefore, the acquisition of female followers appears inconsistent with a male's strategy for reproducing many genes in the
next generation.
How are we able to understand and anticipate each other in everyday life, in our daily interactions? Through the use of such "folk" concepts as belief, desire, intention, and expectation, asserts Daniel Dennett in this first full-scale presentation of a theory of intentionality that he has been developing for almost twenty years. We adopt a stance, he argues, a predictive strategy of interpretation that presupposes the rationality of the people - or other entities - we are hoping to understand and predict.These principles of radical interpretation have far-reaching implications for the metaphysical and scientific status of the processes referred to by the everday terms of folk psychology and their corresponding terms in cognitive science.While Dennett's philosophical stance has been steadfast over the years, his views have undergone successive enrichments, refinements, and extensions. "The Intentional Stance" brings together both previously published and original material: four of the book's ten chapters - its first and the final three - appear here for the first time and push the theory into surprising new territory. The remaining six were published earlier in the 1980s but were not easily accessible; each is followed by a reflection - an essay reconsidering and extending the claims of the earlier work. These reflections and the new chapters represent the vanguard of Dennett's thought. They reveal fresh lines of inquiry into fundamental issues in psychology, artificial intelligence, and evolutionary theory as well as traditional issues in the philosophy of mind.Daniel C. Dennett is Distinguished Arts and Sciences Professor at Tufts University and the author of "Brainstorms" and "Elbow Room." "The Intentional Stance," along with these works, is a Bradford Book.
The origin of modern human behaviour is traced to the point at which language emerged, giving rise to the radical change in perception that allows reference to what is perceived, propositional thought and other behaviours specific to modern humans. Four mechanisms have been postulated as having underwritten this evolution: vocal gestures; unexpressed cognitive capacities; the enlargign brain; and changing social structures. Serious theoretical problems attend each of them. Any approach to explaining the emergence of modern human behaviour needs both to pay closer attention to the archaeological record and to be informed by appropriate theory. An approach is needed that is founded in the special nature of language, which differs from the communication systems of other animals in that its constituent signs are used symbolically. The point of origin of language was thus the point at which the symbolic property of signs was first discovered. There are no signs of symbols in the archaeological record prior to about 32,000 years ago.
Autistic children were assessed for their understanding of seeing and wanting. In Experiment 1, they judged whether a target was visible to each of two observers [a Level 1 task of visual perspective-taking] and which of two targets each observer would identify as “in front” [a Level 2 task]. The autistic children performed as well as normal children of the same verbal mental age on both tasks. In Experiment 2, autistic children identified the emotion that familiar situations would elicit, expressed a selective preference or desire, and reidentified that desire despite an outcome that thwarted it. Their performance was similar to that of normal and retarded children equated for verbal mental age. An explanation is offered for autistic children's difficulty on some psychological tasks and their relative success on others.
the oleic acid on a live and wriggling sister or mother and refrain from evicting her from our hive. But does the occur rence of unintelligent behavior suffice to demonstrate the total absence of mental experience under any circumstances? Ethologists from some distant galaxy could easily discern ex amples of stupid and maladaptive behavior in our own species. But do instances of human stupidity prove that none of us is ever consciously aware of what he is dOing? No available evi dence compels us to believe that insects, or any other animals, experience any sort of consciousness, or intentionally plan any of their behavior. But neither are we compelled to believe the contrary. In areas where data are few and of limited rel evance, dogmatic negativity can easily limit what scientists even try to investigate, and thus perhaps delay or prevent im portant insights and discoveries. Many of the participants agreed that a good starting point would be to consider what we know of our own thinking, subjec tive feelings, and consciousness, and then move on to inquire whether other species experience anything similar. Such an ap proach was once considered fallaciously anthropomorphic. But it seems now to be widely if not universally recognized that this is a serious objection only if one has already assumed in advance that conscious thinking is uniquely human, and the accu sation of anthropomorphism is then merely a reiteration of the prior conviction.
My background and orientation is that of a psychologist with particular interests in animal behavior, and in what may be described as the evolution and natural history of minding. Because we are concerned here with the problems of communication between different scientific disciplines, it may serve a useful purpose if I begin by reviewing some general assumptions which I, as a working scientist, accept rather uncritically and which I believe are also accepted, at least implicitly, by a majority of empirical scientists, whether their principal interests are in behavior, or in some other field. I will treat these as areas of consensus, although I have never sought any direct evidence that this is the case. In my experience, scientists do not spend time discussing what they regard as self-evident truths. Instead, they proceed as though those with whom they form a community of interests hold the same basic attitudes and beliefs, until events prove them wrong. When that happens, of course, the problems of communication become acute, for it is seldom clear precisely where or why consensus breaks down. In the second section, I will consider some properties that are peculiar to behavior. They raise some difficult methodological and conceptual issues that are the subject of heated discussions within the behavioral sciences and are a continuing impediment to communication with other scientific disciplines. Next, I will present a perspective on behavior which is not new, but is different, I believe, from that held by scientists in other disciplines (and probably most non-biologically oriented behavioral scientists, as well).
In humans, self-recognition of own reflection is commonplace but not universal. The capacity to recognize self in a mirror appears to be subject to maturational and experiential constraints. In the first place, the ability to correctly interpret mirrored information about the self presupposes prior experience with mirrors. For instance, people born with congenital visual defects who undergo operations in later life—which provide for normal sight—respond just like nonhumans and initially react to themselves in mirrors as though they were seeing other people. Social behavior in response to mirrors begins at about six months of age, but the average child does not start to show reliable signs of self-recognition until 18 to 24 months. A prevailing view of self-concept formation in humans is that the sense of self emerges out of a social milieu. Self-awareness according to this view is a by-product of social interaction with others. For instance, according to G.H. Mead, in order for the self to emerge as an object of conscious inspection, it requires the opportunity to see yourself as you are seen by others.
Clark’s nutcrackers (Nucifraga columbiana) use spatial memory to recover stored food in the field. In the present experiments, an open-field analogue of the radial arm maze was developed and used to test the ability of nutcrackers to remember spatial locations. The nutcrackers showed high levels of retention after 6 h, but were close to chance levels after a 24-h retention interval. These results suggest that nutcrackers may use different spatial memory systems under different conditions. After long retention intervals, nutcrackers performed more accurately than pigeons tested by other experimenters using similar procedures. This raises the possibility of species differences in spatial memory, although much more research will be required to resolve this important issue.
A solution is suggested for an old unresolved social psychological problem.
W.V.O.Quine’s doctrine of referential inscrutability (RI) is the thesis that, first, linguistic reference must always be determined relative to an interpretation of the discourse and, second, that the empirical evidence always underdetermines our choice of interpretation--at least in principle. Although this thesis is a central result of Quine’s theory of language, it was long unclear just how much force RI actually carried. At best, Quine’s discussions provided localized examples of RI (e.g., ‘gavagai’), supplemented merely by arguments for the (in principle) constructability of more general referentially divergent manuals. In defense of Quine, Gerald Massey provides a method for generating large-scale referentially divergent manuals for a complex language. I argue that, while Massey’s rival manuals do meet Quine’s translational criteria, they are demonstrably inferior to their commonsensical “homophonic” competitor. This result provides a clear indication of seminal deficiencies in Quine’s behaviorial approach to the theory of language. Next I argue that Quine’s acceptance of standard assumptions about the nature of perception strongly influences the shape of his semantical theory. Finally, I suggest how an alternative to the standard account of perception might provide grounds for a more adequate understanding of language.
A recent book by Frosh on the relation of psychoanalysis to social-political thought is reviewed, and the book's paradoxical conclusion is noted, namely, that those psychoanalytic schools explicitly intent on the primacy of the ego and of interpersonal object relations seem less relevant to the political dimension than those stressing the primacy of instinctual drives, which are yet presented as incompatible with cultural socialization. Following, an attempt is made to propose an approach to socialization that could overcome the logical anomalies inherent in current psychoanalytic thinking concerning socialization. It is suggested that society should not be treated as something merely outside the person that somehow has to be learned, nor as something genetically present in the form of a social instinct or an innate collective mentality. Rather, if human psychology is conceived as evolutionarily selected for constructing a societal world, the necessary connection between the human individual and society can be made without resorting to an outside imposition, at the same time as full recognition is given to the constitutive but largely unconscious aspects of social institutions.
Observations were made following spontaneous aggressive incidents in a breeding group of captive stumptail macaques (Macaca arctoides). Participants were observed both during the first 10 min following the aggressive incident, and during matched-control observations. Data on 670 pairs of former opponents were collected, and compared with a sample of 573 such pairs of rhesus macaques (M. mulatta), which had been observed with identical methods in a previous study. Selective attraction between opponents was confirmed for the stumptail monkeys, i.e. both the absolute and the relative rate of nonagonistic body contact between individuals increased after aggression between them. The species was found to be considerably more conciliatory than rhesus monkeys, and to have a remarkably rich repertoire of reassurance gestures. The most characteristic conciliatory behavior is the hold-bottom ritual, in which one individual (usually the subordinate) presents its hindquarters, and the other (usually the dominant) clasps the other's haunches. The high rate of reconciliation among stumptail monkeys extended to all relationship classes, and a correlation with the closeness of social bonds (measured as time spent in association) could not be demonstrated. Because of the generality of the species' high peacemaking tendencies it is assumed that group cohesiveness is of great survival value in the wild.
In this study we establish that autistic children have severe and specific difficulty with understanding mental states. Even with a mental age of 7 years, these children mostly fail in tasks which are normally passed around age 3 and 4. We confirm previous results on the poor understanding of false belief but also find that autistic children's grasp of the notion of limited knowledge is grossly delayed. We rule out various other explanations for these results and further show that the autistic child's performance is not limited by failure to understand the causal notion of seeing. Likewise, memory failure cannot be blamed. Language delay can be ruled out as a cause of failure since a group of children with specific language impairment, matched for verbal mental age, performed at ceiling. We propose that autistic children are specifically impaired in their meta-representational capacity and that this impedes their construction of a ‘theory of mind’.
In previous studies we have found that autistic children were severely impaired in conceptual role taking, that is, in their theory of mind. In this study we consider two possible precursors to this impairment, both of which are early interpersonal abilities. The first is perceptual role taking. A test of this revealed no impairment, ruling it out as related to the impairment in theory of mind. The second is pointing. This was shown to be abnormal, both in comprehension and production, relative to non-autistic controls. In particular, protodeclarative pointing was impaired whilst protoimperative pointing was not. The possibility that impaired protodeclarative pointing may be a precursor to autistic children's impaired theory of mind is discussed.
