ArticlePDF Available

Nouns and Countability

Authors:

Abstract

The customary disjunctive marking of lexical entries for English nouns as [± countable] does not match the fact that the majority can be used both countably and uncountably in different NP environments: this binary opposition is characteristic not of the nouns, but of the NP's which they head. Nevertheless, nouns do have countability preferences; some enter countable environments more readily than others. And not all nouns occur in all kinds of countability environments. A noun's countability preference can be computed by checking its potential for occurrence in a definitive set of countability environments. In the dialect examined here, well-formedness conditions on NP must consider eight levels of countability among English nouns-not, as custom has it, only two.
http://www.jstor.org
Nouns and Countability
Author(s): Keith Allan
Source:
Language,
Vol. 56, No. 3, (Sep., 1980), pp. 541-567
Published by: Linguistic Society of America
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/414449
Accessed: 30/04/2008 17:02
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=lsa.
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We enable the
scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that
promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
NOUNS AND COUNTABILITY
KEITH ALLAN
Monash University
Clayton, Victoria,
Australia
The customary disjunctive marking of lexical entries for English nouns as
[+ countable] does not match the fact that the majority can be used both countably
and uncountably in different NP environments: this binary opposition is character-
istic not of the nouns, but of the NP's which they head. Nevertheless, nouns do have
countability preferences; some enter countable environments more readily than others.
And not all nouns occur in all kinds of countability environments. A noun's count-
ability preference can be computed by checking its potential for occurrence in a
definitive set of countability environments. In the dialect examined here, well-
formedness conditions on NP must consider eight levels of countability among English
nouns-not, as custom has it, only two.*
NOUNS, COUNTABILITY,
AND NOUN PHRASES
1.1. Tradition has it that a noun like car is countable, whereas lightning is
uncountable: we talk about one car or many cars, but not normally about *one
lightning or *many lightnings. More generally, the following rule is observed in
English:
(I) If the head constituent of an NP falls within the scope of a denumerator,
it is countable.1
Here the phrase 'falls within the scope [or domain]' of a denumerator means 'is
denumerated' by it; i.e., the NP reference is quantified by the denumerator as a
number of discrete entities. All denumerators are quantifiers, and the paradigm
set of denumerators
consists of the natural (cardinal) numbers from one to infinity.
In addition, a denumerator is any quantifier which necessarily identifies one or
more discrete entities (but not necessarily a precise number of them), and which
can be substituted for a natural number within any-and perhaps every-NP,
ranging over the same domain and causing no change in the well-formedness or
ill-formedness of the NP. Thus the quantifiers
in 1 are all denumerators, but those
in 2 (other than the natural numbers one and two) are not:
(1) 'one ' one
a a
[<
each >car]Np *[q
each lightning]Np
every every
,either, ,eitherd
* I am grateful to William Bright, Ray Cattell, James Hoard, Rodney Huddleston, and D. T.
Langendoen, whose comments on earlier versions of this paper led to a number of improve-
ments. The faults that remain are mine alone.
1 In order
not to prejudice
the issue, here and in Rule II, the word 'it' is ambiguous between
coreference with the NP head vs. the NP as a whole.
541
LANGUAGE, VOLUME 56, NUMBER 3 (1980)
'three ' three
several several
[<
many > cars]Np *[4 many lightning(s)]Np
both both
,(a) few, ,(a) few,
(2l [one carN *[one lightning]NP
(2)
[no; } ]NP [no lightning]NP
{two
{ *[two lightning(s)]NP
all J
some ca]NPll lightning]NP
In summary, the quantifiers no, all, and some do not necessarily denumerate; but
a(n), each, either, several, many, both and (a)few do. Only the latter are denumera-
tors within the terms of Rule I.
Predictably, the morphological category of number intersects with countability;
but there is no universally
applicable correlation between the two. Thus, in Sinhalese
(Indo-European) and Swahili (Bantu), uncountable nouns are formally plural; but
in English they are formally singular, and the following rule can be set up:
(II) If the head constituent of an NP is plural, it is countable.
The surface morphology of a head noun usually indicates whether it is plural by a
contrast of form; but when this is not the case (e.g. with such nouns as sheep,
means, scissors, measles, or physics), Rule II is opaque, and recourse must be made
to the syntactic context of the noun.
In many languages, not only is the NP reference named by the noun, but the
NP also contains a constituent that identifies its salient characteristic.
This supple-
mentary classification of the NP reference varies from language to language, both
in the type of characteristics
indicated and in the range of NP environments that
require supplementary classification. Thus Bantu noun class prefixes distinguish
material differences in the reference of different NP's headed by the same noun
stem: cf. Swahili m-tu 'person' vs. ki-tu 'artifact, thing'; Kikuyu mu-ti 'tree' vs.
gi-ti 'wooden artifact, seat' vs. ma-ti 'woody mass, undergrowth'-or the Luganda
series mu-ganda 'Ganda person', ba-ganda 'Ganda people', ki-ganda 'Ganda
culture', lu-ganda 'Ganda language', bu-ganda 'Ganda country'. In numeral or
demonstrative expressions, many languages require the presence of an NP con-
stituent to classify the NP reference
according to shape, configuration, consistency,
or material characteristics (cf. Allan 1977a for extensive discussion): three such
languages are Yucatec (Mayan), Kiriwina (Austronesian), and Thai (perhaps Sino-
Tibetan). The reference of locative expressions is classified in one of four ways in
the northeastern
Australian language Dyirbal. In the Wakashan
languages of north-
western America, the visibility and location of the NP reference must be encoded
within the NP. English requires
that the countability of the NP reference
be known,
and this affects NP constituency through application of the following rule:
(III) If his listeners do not already know the countability of the NP reference,
the speaker must make it known to them.
542
NOUNS AND COUNTABILITY
This rule states a condition for disambiguation, i.e. for marking contrasts; it is not
a rule for neutralizing contrasts. Thus the plural, which marks a contrast by
unambiguously indicating countability, will never be neutralized through the
operation of Rule III; but there are both countables and uncountables which are
singular, and so under the stated condition Rule III will operate to decide the
countability of singular NP's. Where the speaker judges that his listeners are
already aware of the NP reference because of either previous mention or general
knowledge, he uses a definite NP; otherwise the NP will be indefinite (cf. Allan
1977b:39 ff., Christophersen 1939, Grannis 1972, Hawkins 1978, Kramsky 1972).
Being aware of the NP reference entails knowing its countability; otherwise Rule
III would operate to mark the countability of definite singular NP's, which it
does not:
(3) THE LIGHTNING has frightened Caspar, and he's hiding under THE
CAR.
THIS CAR has front wheel drive.
THIS WATER'S
cold.
THAT FLOUR'S damp; but then, so's THAT CUPBOARD.
Here there is no visible formal distinction between the countables the car, this car,
that cupboard
and the uncountables the lightning, this water, that
flour. Indefinite
NP's indicate that the speaker judges his audience not to be aware of the NP
reference prior to this occasion of mentioning it; so he is required by Rule III to
indicate its countability. Typically, plural indefinites are morphologically marked
as countable; thus, by Rule II, all the emphasized NP's in 4 are marked for
countability:
(4) LIONS
can be dangerous.
ONE-ARMED
IRISH WASHER-UPPERS
exist only in TELEVISION SITUATION
COMEDIES.
WORKERS
came pouring out of the factory gate.
Within TEN MINUTES the sugar I had dropped was cleared away by ANTS.
But singular indefinites have no comparable countability-marking in noun mor-
phology; hence, to satisfy Rule III, countable indefinites are marked by a denu-
merator
which ranges over the NP head, as in 5. By contrast, uncountable
indefinites
cannot take a denumerator, and often lack any determiner
at all;2 cf. 6:
(5) A LION
can be dangerous.
There's A LION
escaped from the zoo.
ONE
CAR
is not enough for the average Australian family.
EVERY
RECORD HE
OWNS
is badly scratched.
(6) SEA WATER
is saline.
SEA WATER got into the petrol tank.
There is SOFT BROWN SUGAR
on the table.
Because every singular countable falls within the scope of one or another
determiner, we can usually assume that, if the head constituent of a singular NP
does not fall within the domain of a determiner, it is uncountable.
2 Strictly speaking, the Determiner is not a constituent of NP structure, but a portmanteau
term for Articles, Demonstratives, Possessives, and Quantifiers.
543
LANGUAGE,
VOLUME
56, NUMBER
3 (1980)
Exceptions to this rule of thumb are the closed class of pronouns and the
restricted class of proper names. Exceptions that may be more apparent than real
are the pronominal quantifiers
one, two,
fifty, many, several etc., as in
one.
(7) I would like to take jtwo.
several.
It seems likely that these quantifiers are the survivors of NP's in which they were
originally determiners, and which have been beheaded-i.e. have lost their head
nouns under certain specifiable conditions which will not be elaborated here (cf.
Allan 1977b:169 ff., Jackendoff 1971).
All such NP's, consisting only of pronominal
quantifiers,
are indefinite; they are also countable if the quantifier
is a denumerator.
Thus the principle is maintained that the countability of indefinite NP's is normally
indicated. All other undetermined NP's consisting of pronouns or proper names
are definite:
(8) Is this yours, or isn't it?
Hermione is beautiful; but she's Henry's, or was when we were in Paris.
And we have already seen that definite singular NP's are not marked syntag-
matically for countability. Indeed, for nouns like management, congress, or
government-which may function as either common or proper names-the proper-
name function is indicated by the lack of a determiner:
(9) Management reserves the right to dismiss staff who are persistently late.
Congress believes that shorter working hours are the right of every
worker.
Government will publish a law banning transvestism in public urinals.
When determined, these nouns cease to be proper names. The same is true for
regular undetermined proper names like John or Hermione, which are not used as
fully-defining proper names in the following:
(10) I don't believe there is a management in this country that would accept
such impossible conditions.
The John I spoke of is Egbert's brother.
Is there a Hermione in your class? I've always wanted to meet a
Hermione, but such has never been my good fortune.
We can distinguish a fully-defining proper name from a proper name used as an
appellative, viz. like a common noun. The proper name is fully defining when it is
the sole constituent of an NP and when, for any and every occasion, the NP
uniquely labels and guarantees the existence of the referent or set of referents (in
either the real or a fictional world). It is not necessarily the case that the reference
of a given proper name is identical on every occasion: not all Johns are the same
John. So the significant characteristic of a fully-defining proper name is the fact
that it always uniquely labels, and so fully defines, the referent or set of referents.
As a result of the fact that it uniquely labels the referent,
a fully-defining proper
name
is definite; because it guarantees the existence of the reference, it is specific (cf.
Fodor 1970, Karttunen 1976, Palacas 1977, Partee 1972, Rivero 1975, 1977); hence
the ungrammaticalness
of *Is there Hermione in your class ? Any proper name in a
544
NOUNS AND COUNTABILITY
non-specific NP, an indefinite NP, or an NP where it is not the sole constituent,
therefore is, not a fully-defining proper name. That is why the proper names in 10
are not fully defining; and also why fully-defining proper names do not permit
restrictive relative clauses, though appositional clauses are acceptable:
() The London? I am talking about is London, Ontario. (RESTRICTIVE)
London, which is for me the greatest city on earth, was my home for
many years. (APPOSITIONAL)
(12) The John who will be in your class is a minister's son. (RESTRICTIVE)
*John
John, who will be in your class, is a minister's son. (APPOSITIONAL)
(13) The congress taking place in Blackpool agreed on the following motion.
*Congress
(RESTRICTIVE)
Congress, taking place in Blackpool, agreed on the following motion.
(APPOSITIONAL)
(14) A management which denies the right of workers
to hold union meetings
*Managementf
during office hours will suffer the strike of an outraged work force.
(RESTRICTIVE)
Management, which mercilessly exploits the work force, must be made to
pay the price. (APPOSITIONAL)
Appellative proper names (ones that are not fully defining) are countable:
(15) I once knew a Euphemia.
My atlas lists six Lewistons but only one Paris.
(fNoam Chomsky }
There is only one Roam Chomsky known to me.
1
River Thames
Fully-defining proper names which are plural, e.g. the United States or the
Grampians,
are countable by Rule II-but nevertheless non-denumerable, because
denumeration changes the status of a fully-defining proper name to an appellative.
For the same reason, it is impossible (using NP-internal structural criteria) to see
any sense in which a singular fully-defining proper name can be countable.
1.2. In English, then, countability is marked syntagmatically in singular NP's;
in plural NP's it is marked morphologically, and on occasion syntagmatically as
well. But uncountability is never marked. That countability is the marked member
of the duo is 'natural': many languages mark countability morphologically or
syntagmatically (or both), but have no marking for uncountability. And although
languages exist which arguably make no such distinction between countables and
uncountables (e.g. Bantu languages), none systematically marks uncountables
while leaving countables unmarked.
1.3. For grammarians, the conventional wisdom is that countability is a
characteristic of nouns, and consequently should be accounted for by marking the
lexicon entry of a noun with a feature [
+ count]-or something equivalent (cf.
Jespersen 1933:206, Chomsky 1965:82, McCawley 1975, Quirk et al. 1972:127)
545
LANGUAGE, VOLUME 56, NUMBER 3 (1980)
The descriptive inadequacy of this analysis has hitherto been overlooked except by
Weinreich-although McCawley had an inkling of it. Weinreich (1966:435) noted
that 'it fails to account for the ability of English words [sic] to be used as EITHER
count or mass nouns.' He suggested three alternative solutions. One was to create
separate countable and uncountable lexical entries for the same noun; but this
was rejected because it almost doubles the number of nouns in the lexicon, and
because it failed to show that some nouns are more countable than others. His
second suggestion was to make countability a feature on determiners, to be trans-
ferred to the (countability-neutral) noun 'by a concord-type rule'; but without
discussing the interesting possibilities of such an hypothesis (cf. Allan 1977b, ch. 5),
Weinreich rejected
it on the grounds that determiners like the, any, this, and my are
countability-neutral. The solution he adopted was to maintain the conventional
binary marking for countability on the lexical entries for nouns, and in addition to
mark NP nodes for countability. This bipartite proposal requires the use of a
semantic calculator to resolve the various effects of locating a [ count] noun in a
[? count] NP; but this is an unwelcome complication to the grammar of count-
ability, and my own analysis will show it to be unnecessary. Weinreich's proposal
contains two additional flaws. Although his model demanded it, he offered no
solution to the problem of determining whether a given noun is countable or
uncountable: e.g., on what grounds would he decide the countability of cake, and
what would be the grounds for agreeing or disagreeing with him ? His adherence to
the conventional view of countability as a binary feature on the lexical class of
nouns renders the problem insoluble. The second, and less serious flaw in Wein-
reich's proposal is the lack of explicit justification for his substantially
correct claim
that countability is a feature of NP's. I shall, below, justify a rather similar claim.
Weinreich's discussion of countability can be seen as an attempt to shore up an
indefensible traditional kind of analysis by introducing additional apparatus. In
this paper I present a radically different approach, based on the assumption that
countability is not in fact a characteristic of nouns per se, but of NP's; thus it
is associated with nouns in syntagmata, not with nouns as lexical entries. Clear
evidence for this lies in the fact that countability is indicated in singular indefinite
NP's not by any modification of the noun, but by its falling within the domain of a
denumerator. Thus a noun like cake can regularly be used both uncountably and
countably, occurring both in undetermined singular NP's and in the scope of
denumerators:
(16) Hetty likes to gorge herself on cake.
(17) Whenever Hetty gobbles down a cake, her diet 'starts tomorrow'.
There are many parallel examples involving nouns less frequently seen in both
environments:
(18) Oak is deciduous.
An oak is deciduous.
(19) Small farmers in Kenya grow corn rather than wheat.
Triticum
aestivum
ssp. vulgare
is a wheat suitable for high altitudes.
(20) Nick Frenzy plays guitar with Noise.
Carol has just bought a guitar.
546
NOUNS AND COUNTABILITY
(21) The scrapyard is full of smashed car awaiting recycling.
The driveway was blocked by a car with its front end stove in.
(22) We went to school by car.
Is there a school around here?
(23) In bed they were blissfully happy.
You could buy a bed cheaply down on the lane.
(24) There's not enough table for everyone to sit at.
We need a bigger table.
(25) Emmy finds squashed spider more nauseous than the thing alive.
We were worried that even a squashed spider would upset Graham
enough to make him suicidally depressive.
Innumerable examples may be found: there seems to be no absolute constraint to
stop any noun, other than pluralia tantum nouns and perhaps plural proper names,
from heading an undetermined singular NP (cf. Gleason 1965:137). It is true that
there may be constraints on the location of such NP's within sentence structure,
and restrictions on the inclusion of other NP constituents; but this will not alter
the fact that nouns commonly used within the scope of a denumerator-and
therefore countably-can elsewhere head undetermined singular NP's, and so be
uncountable. This makes it absurd to propose that countability is a function of
nouns per se. To maintain that lexicon entries for nouns are marked with a feature
such as [ +?
count] would, for the majority of nouns, be either (a) contradictory or
(b) vacuous. First, for the lexicon entry to be simultaneously countable and
uncountable is a contradiction. Second, disjunctive countability-marking would
entail that a pair of homophonous, homographous, yet different nouns exist-one
countable, the other uncountable (cf. Yotsukura 1970:60); but then we face the
fact (of much greater significance than the inadequacies noted by Weinreich)
that
the selection of one of the disjuncts rather than the other would necessarily be
determined by countability features in the intended host construction, viz. the NP.
This dependence proves that disjunctive marking in the lexicon is vacuous. Count-
ability must perforce be a feature of NP's and not nouns; only then can the
uncountable/countable pairs of identical nouns in 16-25 be properly accounted
for.3 Exactly how this should affect our view of NP grammar has been discussed
elsewhere (Allan 1977b:144 ff.), and will not be considered here; instead, I will
discuss the consequences for nouns.
3 I am grateful
to William Bright
for drawing
my attention to recent philosophical
literature
on mass terms, where ideas similar
to the ones presented
here have occasionally
been advanced.
For example, Pelletier 1975 imagines a 'universal grinder' into which can be fed any object
labeled by a countable; the grinder chops and grinds it into a homogeneous mass, which is
then appropriately
labeled by the same noun used uncountably. So he concludes that every
noun must have both a count and a mass sense (which, as we shall see, is not quite accurate).
Bunt (1976:81) writes: 'the count/mass distinction is not really a distinction between words,
but a distinction between
ways of using words ... The count/mass distinction
can be drawn not
only between bare nouns, but also between complex noun phrases. In what follows, when we
speak of mass nouns, this has to be understood as short for: noun phrases, used in a mass
sense' (cf. also Bunt 1979, Ware 1975). These philosophers
seek to elucidate the semantics of
count and mass terms; with the exception of Bunt (1979:250-51), they virtually ignore the
syntax of countability. By contrast, in this paper I shall virtually ignore the semantics of
countability (which I discussed in Allan 1977b), to concentrate on the syntax of nouns in
relation to countability environments.
547
LANGUAGE, VOLUME 56, NUMBER 3 (1980)
COMPUTING THE COUNTABILITY
PREFERENCES OF NOUNS
2.1. Even though countability is characteristic of NP's and not nouns, it is still
true that some nouns are generally located in countable NP's, while others are
located in uncountable NP's. The former set includes car, boat, beetle, carpet,
closet, and table; the latter lightning, mankind,
equipment,
evidence,
furniture, and
physics. Between these polar countables and uncountables are words like cake,
coffee, and lamb-which are common in both countable and uncountable NP's in
everyday language. These particular characteristics of nouns I call their COUNT-
ABILITY PREFERENCES. The countability preferences of nouns can be computed by
comparing the relative frequencies
of their occurrence in countable and uncountable
NP's, respectively. One way of doing this would be to take a large sample of texts,
then add up and compare the actual countable and uncountable occurrences of the
same noun, to build up a picture of countability usage; but however extensive the
sample, this method would not provide a justifiable basis for a decisive statement
about the countability potential of nouns. To discover the extent to which a noun
is countable (as distinct from the extent to which it has been used in countable
NP's within a given sample of texts), we must set up a test battery of countability
environments consisting of every kind of unambiguously countable NP and every
kind of unambiguously uncountable NP: then, for all these, a given noun will be
tried as NP head, and the result judged for grammaticality. The set of such judg-
ments will give a countability scan for the noun, from which its countability
preference
can be computed.
We can look to Rules I-II above as the starting point for discovering appropriate
test environments for countability. Rule I states that an NP in which a denumerator
ranges over the head constituent is countable; and we found that the set of
denumerators is a(n), each, every, either, several, many, both, (a) few, and the
natural numbers from one to infinity. But not all nouns that fall within the scope of
one denumerator will fall within the scope of every other denumerator. Compare
these examples:
(26) John has bought his wife a car.
Each car cost more to produce than it can sell for.
Two cars were badly damaged by the falling wall.
Many cars are not properly maintained because of the exorbitant cost.
(27) Penelope's is an admiration that I treasure.
*Each admiration contains an element of awe.
*Both Charlotte and Emily admired Anna's poems, and it was these two
admirations which she most appreciated.
*Linda Ronstadt has received many admirations.
(28) *A cattle has died in the west paddock.
*Each cattle out in the hurricane was killed.
*Two cattle were severely injured by the falling wall.
Many cattle died in the cyclone.
Some nouns (like car) are countable with all denumerators;
others (like admiration)
are countable only with unit denumerators a(n) and one; and pluralia tantum
nouns (together with one or two others like cattle) are countable only with fuzzy
548
NOUNS AND COUNTABILITY
denumerators. Fuzzy denumerators are those like (a) few, several, many, a dozen
or so, about
fifty, and high round numbers as infive hundred
cattle, 70,000 cattle-
denumerators which do not state a precise number, unlike (say) two,
fourteen, or
twenty-one. The various co-occurrence conditions demonstrated in 26-28 are
tabulated in Figure 1.
TYPE OF DENUMERATOR HEAD NOUN IN THE DOMAIN OF
THE DENUMERATOR
car admiration cattle
A. unit, a(n), one + +
F. fuzzy
(plural)
e.g. several, about fifty + +
0. all others +
FIGURE
1.
Type O denumerators are a motley collection; but as Fig. 1 shows, they can
be logically excluded from our test battery, which need only differentiate
environments containing unit denumerators from environments containing fuzzy
denumerators:
any noun which can fall within the domains of both unit and fuzzy
denumerators will also fall within the domain of all other denumerators. For
convenience, I shall refer to the test environment of NP's with a unit denumerator
as the A + N Test, and that of NP's with a fuzzy (plural)
denumerator
as the F + Ns
Test. With these two tests, four differences
in countability can be computed: nouns
like car occur in both environments; nouns like equipment
in neither; those like
admiration
pass only the A + N Test; and those like cattle pass only the F + Ns Test.
Rule II states that, if the head constituent of an NP is plural, the NP is countable.
This suggests that noun morphology, and in particular the acceptance of a plural
inflection, might be an appropriate test for countability; and on many occasions
it is. But the morphology of nouns like sheep, means, scissors, measles, and physics
does not indicate their grammatical number, which can be determined only from
the context of the noun. Thus we can do no better than decide the countability of
these nouns by using the two tests for countability that have just been instituted.
These reveal that sheep and means are fully denumerable, like car:
(29) Jim barbecued a sheep to celebrate.
A few sheep nibbled vacuously at the roadside herbiage.
(30) A phaeton is a most elegant means of transport.
Several means of transport are available from the station.
Scissors, like cattle, fails the A+N Test:
(31) *Don't you have even one scissors?
But, unlike cattle, it is not clearly grammatical
in the F+ Ns environment:
(32) ?How many scissors do we have?
?Quite
a few scissors have disappeared
that way.
Measles, like equipment, fails both tests:
(33) *Have you ever had a measles?
*Several measles broke out in the town.
549
LANGUAGE, VOLUME 56, NUMBER 3 (1980)
And finally, physics is like admiration
in passing only the A + N Test:
(34) A physics in which energy is lost rather than transferred is quite
inconceivable; where would the energy go to?
*There are several physics: geophysics, astrophysics, nuclear physics-
and I don't know what else.
With the exception of certain proper names (to be discussed in due course), any
noun which can be plural can also head NP's within the domain of a fuzzy denu-
merator, and so will pass (if perhaps only dubiously) the F+Ns Test. Hence, if a
countability test were defined on whether or not a noun can take a plural inflection,
it would give results identical to those of the F + Ns Test, making one of these tests
redundant. And there is no doubt which test is the more satisfactory: whereas noun
morphology does not necessarily indicate countability, the F + Ns Test unambigu-
ously defines countables. The conclusion must therefore be that a countability test
based on noun morphology, and in particular
on the possibility of plural inflection,
would be redundant.
Consider the emphasized NP's of 35, which have adjectival head constituents of
immutable morphological form, and which refer to groups of human beings:
(35) THE MEEK
shall inherit the earth.
Politicians nowadays are forever claiming to succor THE POOR.
Labor governments get their kicks by soaking THE RICH.
In soap operas THE WICKED
are always punished.
None of these NP's is denumerable:
(36) *There isn't a poor now that we have a welfare state.
*We passed two poor begging under the bridge.
*Many poor cannot be blamed for their lot; but a few can.
However, we know that these NP's are countable-not only because of their
reference, but also because they govern plural NP-external number registration:
(37) THE MEEK
ARE going to inherit the earth, ARE THEY?
THE WEALTHY WERE being soaked by the wicked lefties, who hated THEM.
THE WICKED ARE always punished, ARE THEY?
Otherwise, only countable NP's govern plural external number registration:
(38) THESE
TWO
GIRLS
WERE stealing skirts, WERE THEY?
THREE
SHEEP WERE nibbling the carrot tops when farmer Giles noticed
THEM.
NOT ALL CATTLE
ARE bovine, ARE THEY?
There ARE THREE ELEPHANT
browsing in that thicket, and one of THEM
is a tusker.
It is not even necessary
for the internal number of a countable NP to be plural when
the NP head is collective (cf. Allan 1979):
(39) THE HERD WERE grazing peacefully when a lion disturbed THEM.
MY COLLECTION
ARE fetching higher prices than the valuers expected
THEM to.
But uncountable NP's can never govern plural number registration:
550
NOUNS AND COUNTABILITY
(40) *THE LIGHTNING ARE
frightening Caspar, who's always been terrified of
THEM.
*SUGAR ARE
cheap
this week,
AREN'T THEY!
*THE ADMIRATION
OF HIS FRIENDS ARE what he wants most of all, AREN'T
THEY?
*EQUIPMENT ARE getting ever more expensive, ARE THEY not?
*MEASLES ARE no fun to have, ARE THEY, doctor?
Therefore we can set up a countability test that will identify an NP as countable if it
governs plural external number registration. I will refer to this environment as the
EX-PL Test.
It was pointed out in ?1 that any undetermined singular NP which is neither a
pronoun nor a fully-defining proper name is uncountable. But any noun (except
pluralia tantum) can head such an NP; so this environment would be completely
unrevealing as a test of countability preference. The question arises whether any
restricted uncountable environment exists. To guard against the unusual use of the
noun in an uncountable NP, it would be best to look to one that makes universal
reference-either a generic NP, or an NP determined by a universal quantifier.
Generic NP's are difficult, if not impossible, to define. They are formally identical
with non-generic NP's; and the only intrinsic characteristic
peculiar to them is the
scope of their reference. It might be that formal definition of generic NP's could be
achieved through identifying the predication on them (cf. Allan 1977b:70, Chafe
1970:189, Dahl 1975)-which is to say that there are no generic NP's, only generic
statements couched in generic sentences. Compare the generic statements of 41
with the non-generic ones of 42:
(41) The lion is carnivorous.
Sea water is saline.
(42) The lion is hungry.
Sea water had got into the petrol tank.
It is a defining characteristic
of certain species to be carnivorous, but to be hungry
is not defining for any species; it is by recourse to this kind of knowledge, I think,
that we distinguish the generic NP the lion in 41 from the non-generic instance in
42: the projection of genericness on the subject NP of 41 is a result of the predica-
tion on it. It is often the case, as in 41, that a generic NP is the subject of a sentence
which describes some characteristic feature of the reference of that subject NP; but
this is not necessarily so:
(43) Caspar is afraid of the dark.
Emily likes eggs.
I greatly respect the lion.
In each sentence of 43, it is the object which is the generic NP, and this is so because
of the predication on it-or by the nature of the statement in which the NP is
located (if this is not the same thing). It is clear from Dahl, though he never
proclaims it, that generic predications do not take for their arguments only the
kind of NP's that have traditionally been regarded as generic; e.g., it seems to me
that the following sentences are generic in that they make law-like statements:
(44) Staring at some people makes them blush.
Tickling their feet makes many people writhe.
551
LANGUAGE, VOLUME 56, NUMBER 3 (1980)
If this is correct, the question arises whether the NP's some
people and many
people,
despite the fact that they are explicitly NOT
universal, are generic in 43. Perhaps,
before making a serious attempt to define 'generic NP', it would be well to discover
whether the effort is necessary for the present purpose. It seems that generic NP's
can usually be recognized intuitively; on this assumption, let us consider the
possibilities that generic NP's define countables-and more importantly for us,
that there is a restrictive uncountable generic environment.
Although the plural generic defines countable NP's (by Rule II), all those nouns
which may head plural generics may also head other plural NP's, and they are all
accounted for already by either the F + Ns Test or the EX-PL Test. The the-generic
mostly occurs with countables:
(45) a. The car is 20th century man's horse.
b. *Car is 20th century man's horse.
(46) a. (*)The lightning frightens cowardly Caspar.
b. Lightning frightens cowardly Caspar.
The parenthesized asterisk of 46a indicates that the sentence cannot be interpreted
generically, though it may legitimately have a non-generic interpretation-viz., for
some particular occasion, there was lightning that frightened Caspar. The meaning
of 46b is quite different from this, of course. But in some environments, the the-
generic NP is headed by nouns that are typically uncountable:
(47) Milquetoast is afraid of the dark.
Caspar, our pet mole, hates the light.
The lightning delights Vulcan the most; he doesn't give a fig for thunder.
The admiration of one's peers gives a better trip than DMT.
So the the-generic NP's do not appear to provide a reliable test for countability.
That brings us to those generics in which we are most interested, namely the
uncountable generics-undetermined singular generic NP's like those emphasized
here:
(48) LIGHTNING
is caused by the discharge of ELECTRICITY
from the clouds.
SEA WATER
is saline.
EQUIPMENT gets more and more expensive as it becomes more and more
sophisticated.
These may be contrasted with
(49) *Car is 20th century man's horse.
*Spider has eight legs.
*Bed is for lying in, not sitting on, according to my landlady.
Is this the restricted uncountable environment we have been looking for? Alas, it
is not: against 49, we can set 50, in which the same head nouns which failed the
uncountable generic environment of 49 are successful with different predications:
(50) Car is the best mode of transport.
Spider is a shrike's favorite food.
Bed has so many happy associations for William and friend.
This finally wipes out the generic NP as a catalyst for testing countability, and so
makes it unnecessary to define a generic NP.
552
NOUNS AND COUNTABILITY
Of course, the generic makes characteristic reference rather than universal
reference; thus there is no contradiction in
(51) Lions can be dangerous; but not all lions are dangerous.
Dogs have four legs. But not every dog has four legs; and any dog that
does not is abnormal.
So let us turn our attention from generic to universal NP's, and consider universal
uncountable NP's with all. Compare 52 with 53:
(52) All lightning is caused by the discharge of electricity from the clouds.
All sea water is saline.
All equipment gets more and more expensive as it becomes more and
more sophisticated.
(53) *All car is 20th century man's horse.
*All car is the best mode of transport.
*All spider has eight legs.
*All spider is a shrike's favorite food.
*All bed is for lying in, not sitting on, according to my landlady.
*All bed has so many happy associations for William and friend.
This may seem a suitably restrictive uncountable environment for the test battery;
but, without qualification, it is flawed because of sentences like
(54) This may look like an old jalopy to you, but it's ALL
CAR.
That stripper is ALL WOMAN, drooled Dirty Dick.
My boyfriend is ALL
MAN,
boasted Anita Bussom to Penny Plane.
The emphasized NP's of 54 can surface only as predicates (cf. Allan 1973), and
therefore they are non-referring:
the noun in each has very much the quality of an
adjective, with all an adjectival qualifier in the sense of 'completely'. By contrast
the all+ N phrases of 52 are never predicates,4
and they are typically used to refer
to a genus. It is also significant
that, in 52, the N of the all+ N construction is not a
covert NP: if it were, the preposition of could be inserted between all and N (cf. all
the lightning = all of the lightning;
all Paris = all of Paris). But *all of lightning,
*all of sea water, *all of equipment
would be ungrammatical
in 52. Hence, we can
establish all+ N as the restrictive
uncountable environment we have been seeking,
provided only that the N is not a covert NP (such that all+ N = all+ of+ N), that
the NP is not predicative, and that it is-potentially-genus-referring. Note that
all is the sole determiner in both 52 and 53; to avoid controversy, I will make it
a condition of this test that all must be the sole determiner. The singularity of the
NP will have to be determined on the basis of NP-internal
and NP-external number
registration.
Thus we finish with a test battery containing only four NP environments to test
the countability preferences of nouns. Having described the battery, it would be
well to clarify exactly what is to be measured. Countability consists of the binary
opposition between countableness and uncountableness; and the countability prefe-
ence of a noun will be either the degree to which it potentially occurs in uncountable
4 In sentences like They are all animals, the word all is a floating quantifier appositive to
they, and so not part of the predicate.
553
LANGUAGE, VOLUME 56, NUMBER 3 (1980)
NP's or that to which it potentially occurs in countable NP's. The degree to which a
noun is countable will be the negative complement of the degree to which it is
uncountable, and vice versa; so, for the sake of simplicity, we must decide either
to postulate that a noun is COUNTABLE to a certain extent (which implies that nouns
are basically uncountable), or to say that a noun is UNCOUNTABLE to a certain
extent (which implies that nouns are basically countable). All the evidence indicates
that nouns are basically uncountable, with many of them being countable to a
certain extent. Of the NP environments in the test battery, three out of four are
countable because these are more restrictive than uncountable environments:
so uncountable environments are the more general, and presumably more basic
than countable ones. Again, countableness is marked in both morphology and
syntax; uncountableness is unmarked, and so presumably is the basic form. Some
nouns, like lightning, head only uncountable NP's; I find nothing to prevent the
ungrammatical NP's *a lightning and *these lightnings from being interpreted as
'flashes of lightning', and their ill-formedness seems arbitrary. This opinion is
substantiated by comparing the grammar of such nouns as equipment
in standard
English and in certain dialects spoken where English is a second language. In
standard English, equipment
can head only uncountable NP's; but in many African
and Asian varieties of English, it is found in countable NP's, e.g. At great expense
we have bought
a new equipmentfor
the lab, or Many equipments
have been removed
from the laboratory by unauthorized
persons. Such instances of the countable use of
equipment are correctly interpreted in terms of the standard English classifier
construction 'pieces of equipment'-which is, of course, the denotation of the word
in the non-standard dialects. Because no semantic anomaly results from the count-
able use of this noun and others like it, it is difficult to convince the ESL speaker
that he should use it only in uncountable NP's. The point of interest here is that,
however arbitrary
it may seem, there are nouns that can never, in standard English,
head countable NP's. However, all English nouns (except pluralia tantum nouns)
can head uncountable NP's; and on those occasions, they occur in their unmarked
base form. Even the pluralia tantum cease to be plural when used adjectivally,5
cf. scissor movement,
pant(y)-hose, suspender
belt, Nutcracker Suite; and since the
adjectival form of the noun is identical with the uncountable and unmarked form
for all nouns, it follows that pluralia tantum have base forms which look just like
the uncountable forms of most other kinds of nouns-even though they cannot be
used to head uncountable NP's. Thus all nouns have what I have just called a base
form, which is the adjectival and uncountable form. In consequence, it is justifiable
to measure the countability preferences of nouns in terms of their degree of count-
ableness.
2.2. The four NP environments which will provide a test for the countability of
their head nouns are the A + N Test, the F +Ns Test, the EX-PL Test, and the
All+N Test: of these, the first three define countable environments, the last one
an uncountable environment. The procedure will be to try a noun as the head of
each of these test NP's, and judge the resultant grammaticality. The degree of
5 Viz. as a 'noun modifier' which holds the position in surface NP structure between the
rightmost adjective
and the head noun.
554
NOUNS AND COUNTABILITY
countability of a noun will be determined on the basis of its success (viz. gram-
maticality) in the countable frames, and of its failure (ungrammaticality) in the
uncountable frame. Where possible, I will conflate the F + Ns and the EX-PL Tests.
There is a set of nouns like car which are 100% countable, in the sense that they
occur in all the countable environments, but are ungrammatical in the all+N
uncountable NP's. Nouns like beetle, needle, banjo, ball, deed, wall, table, and cat
are in this set:
(55) The A+N Test
John has bought himself A NEW CAR.
Elspeth trod on A BEETLE.
Nick has A GUITAR
as well as A BANJO.
Lucky found ONE
BALL
after losing two the day before.
ONE GOOD DEED deserves another.
(56) The F+Ns and EX-PL Tests
SEVERAL CARS chased Idi round the parade ground.
The sight of A FEW BEETLES
gobbling up your roof timbers can make
your nights marish.
If you want THEM, there ARE ABOUT
FIFTY
NEEDLES in that drawer.
SEVERAL DEEDS ATTRIBUTED TO THE DYNAMIC DUO WERE actually
performed by Steed and Purdey-who carried THEM out without a
whisper.
There AREN'T TOO
MANY GUITARS that sound like a uke, ARE there?
(57) The All+N Test
*ALL CAR is 20th century man's horse.
*ALL BEETLE
tastes good to a woodpecker.
*ALL CAT is a feline quadruped.
*ALL GOOD
DEED is rewarded, isn't it?
2.3. The next set of nouns to consider are those which succeed in all four envi-
ronments, and which thus differ from nouns like car because they are grammat-
ical when heading all+N uncountable NP's. This set seems to comprehend four
kinds of noun: (a) those like oak, lamb, potato, jacaranda, and wahoo-in which,
characteristically, the countable use describes a discrete object that is the source
for the constituent substance described by the isomorphic uncountable; (b) those
like hair, stone, or cake, whose countable form is typically used to indicate an
instance of what is denoted by the same noun used uncountably; (c) those like wine,
wheat, or coffee, whose countable use typically connotes species, types, or kinds of
substances denoted by the same noun used uncountably; and (d) nationality nouns
like Greek or Russian, which are fully inflecting, and others ending in -ese, like
Chinese (but not English, Welsh, Irish, Dutch, or French, which form a separate
class). The uncountable use of these nationality nouns denotes the language-and,
except occasionally in A +N constructions, the countable refers to the people.
Illustrations of these four kinds of noun are:
(58) The A+N Test
There is ONE
OAK
standing alone in a beech copse.
'Waiter, there's A HAIR in my soup!'-'It's rabbit, sir.'
555
LANGUAGE, VOLUME 56, NUMBER 3 (1980)
Myself I prefer A RED WINE
with white meat, but then I've never been
a gourmet.
Up in Nyeri you need A WHEAT
that likes high altitude.
I think the man I saw was AN ITALIAN
because his words didn't quite
keep up with his hands.
(59) The F +Ns and EX-PL Tests
Caspar poached A FEW OAKS
from the forest and planted THEM in his
garden, where THEY ARE a monument to his dishonesty.
Gerry tried to swap me SEVERAL WAHOOS
for one sailfish but I didn't
want THEM; THEY just DON'T have the cachet!
There ARE MANY CAKES with more egg in THEM, but none so tasty as
this.
We have ABOUT
FIFTY WINES on our list, sir. Would you wish to peruse
it?
SEVERAL
WHEATS
HAVE been developed for high altitudes.
MANY GREEKS BELIEVE that democracy is a thing of the past, DON'T
THEY?
(60) The All+ N Test
All oak is deciduous.
To me all lamb tastes better than pork.
All brick is artificial; only stone is natural.
All wine is acidic.
All wheat is highly nutritious.
All Italian sounds mellifluous,
no matter
where the speaker
comes from.
This is the most interesting class of nouns, because of the well-recognized concrete
distinction between the countable and uncountable reference of the nouns, nicely
brought out in sentences like
(61) Mary won't touch lamb because she adores lambs.
I have shown elsewhere (Allan 1977b:270 ff.) how the very different denotation and
reference of the countable and uncountable use of the same noun derives from a
common semantic item, as well as a common lexical form; this justifies talking
about THE
NOUN
lamb, oak, hair, Greek etc.
The two sets of nouns considered hitherto have been successful in both the A + N
and the F+Ns Tests; in consequence, any of these nouns may occur within the
domain of all denumerators:
(62) Two cars collided head-on outside the house this morning.
Each beetle Graham sees he steps on.
Two oaks stood sentinel over the driveway entrance.
Each hair on her head is daubed with henna individually!
We shall have two wines: a rouge and a blanc.
Each hybrid wheat selects some advantages of its ancestors, but often
also has unpredicted weaknesses.
Two Armenians stood arguing in front of the three Chinese.
The rest of the nouns I shall discuss do not share this characteristic:
they can occur
only within the domain of a restricted
set of denumerators,
or of none.
556
NOUNS AND COUNTABILITY
2.4. Consider a number of pluralia tantum nouns with different countability
characteristics.
At first sight, there seem to be three classes of them; as an example
of each, I will take the nouns cattle and scissors and the NP head poor, which I will
temporarily treat as a noun. They differ from each other only in respect of the
F+Ns Test:
(63) The EX-PL Test
Those cattle are going to have to be shot, aren't they?
Those scissors you lent me are jolly blunt, aren't they, old girl?
The poor are a burden to us richer folk, so I don't know why you
should feel sorry for them.
(64) The All+N Test
*All cattle is bovine.
*All scissors was taken away, wasn't it?
*All poor needs the help of the better off, doesn't it?
(65) The A+ N Test
*One cattle was injured when the livestock carrier
crashed.
*Give me a scissors, will you?
*Whether we like it or not, we've got a poor.
(66) The F + Ns Test
a. We only run a few cattle.
Several cattle have been lost to rustlers.
About fifty cattle died in the cyclone.
b. ?How many scissors do you think we need to order?
?Only
a few scissors could never be used as weapons.
?We've
bought her several scissors since she started school, but she
loses them.
c. *A few poor stood or knelt by the road side begging for baksheesh.
*His charity has been extended to many poor.
*Each year about fifty poor starve to death in New Delhi.
Cattle is unique-the only noun in its set. Like other pluralia tantum nouns, it is
fully denumerable by using a classifier construction, and by ranging the denu-
merator over the classifier:6
(67) Not a single head of cattle was lost on the trail.
We flushed out two head of cattle from the brush by the creek.
We lost about fifty head of cattle in the cyclone.
All other pluralia tantum nouns (this excludes poor, of which more below) are like
scissors. As can be seen from 66b, their occurrence within the domain of a fuzzy
denumerator is not altogether impossible, though it is nearly always avoided by
using a classifier
construction instead-usually one containing the classifier
pair(s):
(68) How many pairs of scissors shall we need for the cut-out game ?
Bert's ruined several pairs of trousers that way.
6 What I am here calling a classifier might, in English grammar, be more appropriately
called a 'quantifying adjunct'; but I have already used the term 'classifier' for similar com-
ponents of other languages (cf. Allan 1977a), and it has a wide currency.
557
LANGUAGE, VOLUME 56, NUMBER 3 (1980)
This group of pluralia tantum includes the /-s/ nationality names Cornish, Dutch,
English, French, Irish, Welsh, and one or two others for which the head noun
-man/men
(or alternatively
person/people)
is used in free denumeration,
instead of the
classifier construction employed with pluralia tantum NOUNS. These nationality
names are, of course, adjectives, and not subject to the morphological rules which
govern nouns-even when they head NP's. Nor, in themselves, do they have
any countability preference:
(69) He speaks an English that I can barely understand
at all; and I was born
in London.
(70) ?We encountered only two Russians, but several English-all wearing
long shorts and knee socks.
In 69 English is in the domain of a unit denumerator; in 70, it is in the domain of a
fuzzy denumerator. Because English can fall in both domains, it should be the case
that it can be denumerated by all denumerators
(cf. Fig. 1). But this entailment is
false: *two English, *each English etc. are all ungrammatical. However, we note
that, within the domain of a unit denumerator, English can only mean 'English
language':
(71) *We picked up an English who claimed to be hitchhiking round the world.
And, within the domain of a fuzzy denumerator, English can only mean 'English
people':
(72) *Traveling through Asia and Africa you come across several different
English(es).
It seems that, unless English
and other /-s/ nationality names constitute an exception
to the entailments on denumerability that hold for all other nouns, we are not
dealing with a single item English, but with two different ones. The nouns English,
Dutch etc., referring
to the languages, have a countability preference
identical with
that of admiration; I will discuss these nouns in due course. The pluralia tantum
English, Dutch etc. refer to 'English people', 'Dutch people' etc.; and in this use,
the nationality name is an adjective,
not a noun, and has no countability preference.
Elsewhere (Allan 1977b:177 ff.) I have accounted for the human reference of such
NP's as the police, the English, the poor etc. by, in effect, postulating a head noun
with the semantics of 'person/people'; this does not appear on the surface of these
NP's as a lexical item, but remains
understood. The same underlying
NP constituent
accounts for a number of other implicitly human-referring
NP's as well. A detailed
account of its distribution, and the conditions on its failure to surface, will not be
given here; but it is a subset of these conditions that accounts for the behavior of
the pluralia tantum English etc.-a behavior that has nothing to do with count-
ability preference. The underlying head of these NP's is fully countable; but under
certain conditions it may not surface, and under other conditions it cannot.
Essentially the same explanation holds for pluralia tantum like the poor, the
wealthy, the wicked, the pure in heart-in which the head is also an adjective not
governed by the rules of noun morphology. With these human-referring
NP's the
underlying head noun fails to surface only when the determiner is the and the NP
is plural: thus we never find *a poor, but only a poor man; never *these
poor, but
these poor people; not *some poor, but some poor man/men; not *all poor, but
558
NOUNS AND COUNTABILITY
all poor people. Thus poor etc. will be excluded from consideration here: they are
adjectives,
not nouns.
We are left with one set of nouns that consists only of cattle;7 and another
consisting of the regular pluralia tantum nouns scissors, braces/suspenders,
glasses/
spectacles,
pants, nutcrackers,
pliers, scales, tights, tongs, and tweezers,
all of which
have referents
perceived as two moveable leg-like members pinioned to a bridge at
one end, or so as to cross each other.
2.5. The next set of nouns to consider are those like admiration, heat, sincerity,
physics, thunder; the LANGUAGE nouns Cornish, Dutch, English, French, Irish,
Spanish and Welsh; and derived nominals with suffixed -ness, e.g. darkness or
redness. These are nouns which are very restrictedly countable-only by the unit
denumerator:
(73) The A+ N Test
Hermione's is an admiration that I value very greatly.
A dry heat is so much more bearable than a damp heat.
Einstein was responsible for the development of a new physics.
The cavalry arrived with a thunder of hooves.
Sean's is an English full of the lilt of the Western Isles.
An oppressive darkness hung all around us.
(74) The F +Ns and EX-PL Tests
*I am vying for several admirations at the same time and failing miser-
ably to win them.
*There are many heats and I have tried most of them: Lagos, the
Sahara, bed with Fluzy Suzy, and the inside of Granny's fish and
chip shop.
*You can detect several English(es) in the Caribbean.
*Few darknesses are as oppressive as this!
(75) The All+ N test (which shows these nouns to be predominantly uncount-
able)
All admiration does the ego good.
All heat is a form of energy.
All mathematics requires a logical mind.
All thunder is shattering to my nerves.
All Welsh has initial consonant mutation rules, though there are dialect
differences.
All darkness frightens Caspar Milquetoast, the booby.
The only countable NP's that such nouns can head are those with unit denumera-
tors; otherwise, they may only head uncountable NP's. As a result of the relatively
rare countable use of these nouns, countable occurrences
sometimes appear to refer
to instances or occasions of particular
note:
(76) We got up in darkness.
(77) *We got up in a darkness.
(78) We got up in a pitchy darkness.
7 For some Australian speakers of English, cattle is a fully countable noun just like sheep.
Both may be denumerated
using a classifier
construction and the classifier head.
559
LANGUAGE. VOLUME
56, NUMBER
3 (1980)
Clearly, the reference in 78 is to a particular kind of darkness, not just to ordinary
darkness.
2.6. The noun mankind is like admiration
in nearly all respects; it differs only in
passing the EX-PL Test because of its collective semantics (cf. Allan 1979):
(79) Anthropophiles believe in a mankind full of sweetness and light, but we
cynics see it rather differently.
(80) *Mr. Spock waxed eloquent on the differences
between the several man-
kinds he's met with; but as usual no one was listening.
(81) All mankind shall praise his name.
(82) If we are to believe Doctor Who, mankind are his favorite species: but
the Mekon fails to understand
what he sees in them!
But mankind seems to be very unusual in this; its only peer is womankind.
2.7. The last set of nouns to be subjected to the tests are the true uncountables,
which never head countable NP's: nouns like lightning, equipment, laryngitis,
measles, and ornithology,
and gerunds like thinking, knowing,
running, smiling, and
swimming. These are unacceptable in any of the countable environments, but are
grammatical in singular NP's within the domain of all:
(83) The A+N Test
*A lightning lit up the sky.
*He borrowed one equipment yesterday.
*I think she has caught a measles.
*A smiling will help you win friends.
(84) The F+Ns and EX-PL Tests
*Weren't they beautiful, those several lightnings that lit up the sky?
*We need many equipment(s),
but unfortunately
we cannot afford them.
*Few measles are as bad as these; I don't know what to do about them.
*I've done about fifty swimming(s) this year, and it's only January
third.
(85) The All+ N Test
All lightning is caused by the discharge of electricity from the clouds.
All electronic equipment gets more and more sophisticated every year.
All measles is dangerous.
All running is said to be good for you-even running round the
corner for a packet of smokes.
2.8. All nouns discussed so far in ?2 have been common nouns; to complete the
picture of countability preferences
of English nouns, it is necessary only to consider
the behavior of proper names. It was pointed out in ?1 that a fully-defining proper
name is invariably the sole constituent of an NP-more precisely, a definite and
specific NP that cannot contain a restrictive relative clause. Thus a fully-defining
proper name is defined not as a particular kind of noun, but as a class of NP, and
conditions on its countability are not relevant to the present essay. However, an
appellative proper name is one used like a common noun (what distinguishes it is
that it is ordinarily used as a fully-defining
proper name, whereas a common noun
is not). An appellative proper name is, therefore, relevant to our analysis of the
countability preferences
of nouns. There may appear to be a problematic difference
between a proper name like Nepal and one like John: John has many potential
560
NOUNS AND COUNTABILITY
referents, but at first sight Nepal has only one. However, the latter name can be
used as an appellative; e.g., one can quite legitimately say things like
(86) I know there are two Oxfords, why not two Nepals ?
I shall therefore assume that, in principle, all proper names can be used as appel-
latives; even though for some, such use would be very unlikely.
Singular appellative proper names are 100% countable, like car; thus they pass
the A+ N Test (87), the F +Ns Test (88), and the EX-PL Test (89):
(87) There is a Richard Devantpeau on the phone, dear.
(88) There have been several Tarzans, but J. W. was the best.
(89) Those six Lewistons, are they all in America?
An appellative proper name will fail the All+ N Test:
(90) *All Noam is a linguist.
(91) (*)All Lewiston is agog at Rachel's exploits.
In 91, the parenthesized asterisk means that, although the sentence is grammatical,
all Lewiston fails the All+N Test on the grounds that Lewiston is a covert NP.
This is demonstrated by the synonymy between 91 and 91':
(91') All of Lewiston is agog at Rachel's exploits.
Like car, such proper names as these are genus-referring
when they head plural
NP's quantified
by all:
(92) All cars are instruments of pollution.
All Lewistons listed in my atlas are in the U.S.A.
It might be expected that plural proper names like the United States, the Hima-
layas, or the Grampians
would have the same countability preference as pluralia
tantum like scissors; but this turns out not to be the case, and they form a separate
preference set. Perhaps the most significant difference is in their denumerability.
The only denumerator that may range over a plural proper name is, rather sur-
prisingly, the unit denumerator; so they pass the A+N Test, but completely fail
the F + Ns Test. It seems that the plural morphology of these proper names is
misleading: when used to refer to a single entity, e.g. a country (The United States
is in dire financial straits), an institution (It is a great squanderer of money, the
United Nations), or a place (The Himalayas, that's where
Edmund
longed to climb),
they are singular. Thus they pass the A+N Test:
(93) To read Dickens you would never know there could exist a British Isles
that is not fogbound.
It isn't really a United Nations, but a Disunited Nations.
There is only one Himalayas-nowhere else like it.
Plural proper names really are plural when used in referring
to a country's people
(The United States are spying on Russia), members of an institution (The United
Nations are by no means united), or some other plurality
(The Himalayas [the mount-
ains] lie between China and Nepal). It is also the unmarked number for these names:
(94) There are some Grampians in Australia, as well as in Scotland; but I
don't know exactly where they are.
There is a Grampians in Australia, as well as in Scotland; but I don't
know exactly where it is.
561
LANGUAGE, VOLUME 56, NUMBER 3 (1980)
From this we see that plural proper names will pass the EX-PL Test. However,
they fail the All+ N Test (95) and the F+Ns Test (96):
(95) *All United Nations is in New York.
*All Himalayas is in Asia.
*All Solomon Islands is to the west of PNG.
(96) *There are quite a few British Isles.
*We thought we could perceive several United Nations.
*Knowing how the Scots have fled their homeland, I wouldn't be sur-
prised to find several Grampians dotted about the globe.
It is impossible to determine to what degree the ungrammaticality of 96 is a
consequence of the very restricted class of real or imaginary potential referents for
plural proper names.
Plural proper names like Himalayas constitute a distinct preference set by
passing the EX-PL and A+N Tests, but failing the All+N and F+Ns Tests.
However, all the tests to which singular proper names were subjected have shown
them to fall in the same countability preference set as car.
THE COUNTABILITY PREFERENCES OF ENGLISH NOUNS
3. The four tests used to determine the countability preferences of English
nouns have been the EX-PL Test (NP-external plural registration), the F +Ns Test
(a fuzzy plural denumerator ranging over the noun), the A+ N Test (a unit denu-
merator ranging over the noun) and the All+ N Test (all ranging over the noun in a
genus-denoting or genus-referring singular NP). In addition, Fig. 1 showed that
any noun which passes both the A + N and F + Ns Tests is fully denumerable; i.e.,
it may occur within the domain of all denumerators. This actually gives us five
environments for deciding the relative countability of nouns: the fifth-that of
denumerators other than the unit, or fuzzy denumerators-will be referred to
below by the abbreviation O-DEN.
Eight sets of nouns were identified in ?2 as having distinct countability prefer-
ences; examples for each set are car, oak, cattle, scissors, mankind, admiration,
equipment,
and Himalayas. All these except the set represented by equipment
are,
to a greater or lesser extent, countable. None of the tests proves positive with all
seven countable sets, and thus none serves to define the class of countable NP's;
but that is not the intention of this paper, nor would it make any useful contribution
to the computation of the relative countability preferences of English nouns. The
results of subjecting nouns from each countability preference set to the five NP
environments that have been identified are tabulated in Figure 2,8 where the NP
NOUN
ENVIRONMENT car oak cattle Himalayas scissors mankind admiration equipment
EX-PL + + + + + +
A+N + + + + +
All+N + + + +
F+Ns + + + ?
O-DEN + + FIGURE
2.
(+ indicates that the given NP environment defines the head noun as countable.)
8 In the All+N Test, it is FAILURE
that gets a plus, not success.
562
NOUNS AND COUNTABILITY 563
environments are ranked in order of choosiness: the least choosy, EX-PL, is at
the top, and the most choosy, O-DEN, at the bottom. The least choosy environ-
ment is the one with most plusses to its left, the most choosy that with fewest-the
one that excludes all but the most countable nouns; thus the choosiness of each
environment is in inverse proportion to the number of preference
sets that it defines
as countable. It follows that for a noun to be defined as countable by the EX-PL
environment is much less significant
than to be defined as countable by the O-DEN
environment: this can be represented by making each 'plus' a reciprocal of the
total number of plusses for a given NP environment. Thus each EX-PL plus is
worth 1/6, an A+N plus is 1/5, an all+N plus is 1/4, an F+Ns plus is 2/7
(because ' ?' is assigned the value of half a plus, see below), and an O-DEN plus
is 1/2. A countability score can be computed for each noun by summating the
values assigned to each plus in the column below it. There is, of course, a problem
with the value of' ?' in the scissors column on the F + Ns line; to give it the value
of a plus would imply that pluralia tantum like scissors have the same countability
profile as cattle, and that they are fully grammatical in the domain of a fuzzy
denumerator. If this were true, the following sentences would not be dubious:
(97) ?How many scissors do you need, for heaven's sake?
?Few nutcrackers are so constructed as to save the nuts from going the
same way as their shells.
?Joe bought a few tights from this bloke at the pub, and when he got
home he found the legs ended at the knee.
?The fire destroyed about fifty trousers in boxes at the back of the shop.
However, because these sentences are not ungrammatical, it would be wrong to
assign no value at all to the '?' in Fig. 2, thus classing true pluralia tantum with
plural proper names like Himalayas. A compromise is to assign half the value of
the usual F + Ns plus, viz. 1/7, to the countability score of scissors. Using the arith-
metically convenient denominator of 420, the countability scores for each noun
representing
a countability preference
set are given in Table 1, along with the same
scores expressed as percentages-on the basis of nouns like car being 100%7
countable. Also included is a digit indicating the level of countability of each set
of nouns in relation to the other sets, expressed on a scale from zero to seven
corresponding to the uncountable and the most countable, respectively. The rank
order of nouns according to levels of countability was incorporated into Fig. 2.
REPRESENTATIVE NOUN COUNTABILITY SCORE PERCENTAGE LEVEL OF
COUNTABLE COUNTABILITY
car 589 100 7
oak 484 82 6
cattle 295 50 5
Himalayas 259 44 4
scissors 235 40 3
mankind 154 26 2
admiration 84 14 1
equipment 0 0 0
TABLE 1.
LANGUAGE, VOLUME 56, NUMBER 3 (1980)
I doubt that the countability scores or the concomitant percentages of count-
ability have any intrinsic value. To say that car is twice as countable as cattle is not,
in itself, an interesting
fact about English; a difference in countability is interesting
only when related to the different environments in which one noun is grammatical
and another is not. The significance of these scores is to rank the countability pref-
erence sets in respect of each other, i.e. to be the means of deciding the respective
levels of countability. Thus the significant part of Table 1 is the level-of-count-
ability scale from 0 to 7. Reference will have to be made to points on this scale when
stating well-formedness conditions on the locating of nouns in NP's. If the argu-
ments of this paper are accepted, the traditional matching of an a-countable noun
from the lexicon with an a-countable NP environment cannot be based on a binary
system, but instead will have to be based on an octal system correlated with the
eight levels of countability. For example, it will need to be specified that a unit
denumerator can range over a head noun only from levels 1, 2, 4, 6, and 7 if the NP
is to be well-formed. A fuzzy denumerator
may range over a plural head noun from
levels 5, 6, and 7 in an assuredly grammatical NP; over a noun from level 3 in a
dubious NP; or over a noun from level 0, 1, 2, or 4 only in an ill-formed NP.
Each preference set is defined by the behavior of a representative noun, as the
NP head, in just two or three of the five tests; cf. Table 2. So it would be possible
to guess the countability preference set of a noun, and to check the guess by
submitting the noun to the tests defining the predicted set. However, the gamble
would be inappropriate
in serious analysis of countability preference,
which would
entail submitting the noun to all the tests instituted in ?2.
LEVEL OF COUNTABILITY GRAMMATICAL IN THESE UNGRAMMATICAL IN THESE
DEFINED ENVIRONMENTS ENVIRONMENTS
7 O-DEN All+N
6 O-DEN, all +N
5 F+Ns A+N
4 F+Ns, all+N
3 ?F
+ Ns all+N, A+N
2 all+ N, EX-PL F + Ns
1 A+N EX-PL
0 A+ N, EX-PL
TABLE
2.
In Fig. 2, the five countability environments were ranked in order of choosiness;
but more general relations also exist between them. For instance, there is the plural
hierarchy:
a noun grammatical
in the O-DEN environment will also be grammatical
in the F + Ns environment; and any noun that heads a well-formed F + Ns phrase
will also be grammatical in an NP which has plural external number registration.
This can be stated more formally:
(98) O-DEN -+ F + Ns -+ EX-PL
(where Vx,y E {O-DEN, F+Ns, EX-PL} when a head noun is wf in x
then it is wf in y iff x -* y)
The relations between members of the plural hierarchy
are (predictably)
maintained
within another hierarchy that encompasses all five countability environments; it is
564
NOUNS AND COUNTABILITY
defined on the lowest level of countability exhibited by any noun which may in that
environment head a well-formed NP. Plural number registration of any kind is a
mark of countability, but NP-internal plural is associated with more exclusive
countable environments than is NP-external plural registration; and, of course,
among internal plurals, nouns that enter F + Ns are of lower countability than those
in O-DEN environments. Nouns of levels 0 and 1 can only enter singular environ-
ments, those with zero countability only the all+N environment. The hierarchy
between the five countability environments is shown in Table 3.
NP environment O-DEN > F+Ns > EX-PL > A+N > all+N
Lowest level of
countability
of NP head 6 5(?3) 2 1 0
TABLE 3.
CONCLUSION
4. This paper began with a sketch of what is meant by countability. In the
paradigm cases, that which is countable is denumerable. Although countability is
a linguistic category, it typically has perceptual correlations: the reference of what
is linguistically countable is ordinarily perceived in terms of one or more discrete
entities. What is uncountable is typically, though not necessarily, perceived as an
undifferentiated unity. The significance of the referential distinction between
countable and uncountable is quite clear from 99, where it is just this distinction
which gives the sentence its bite:
(99) It is because I like lambs that I don't like lamb.
The rule for English is that the countability of an NP must be known or made
known to the audience. In a definite NP, it can be assumed to be known, because
such an NP is used only where the speaker believes his audience to be aware of the
reference, which will ordinarily mean knowing the countability. In indefinite NP's,
however, this knowledge cannot be assumed; therefore countability must be
indicated. An NP is either countable or uncountable, so only one of these need be
marked; and in English, as in all other languages which mark only one, the
countable NP is the marked opposition. In plural indefinite NP's, the only obliga-
tory marking is the plural suffix on the head noun; in singular indefinite NP's,
where the head-noun morphology is identical for countables and uncountables,
there is obligatory inclusion of a denumerator. No problem arises from the fact
that fully-defining proper names and pronouns-other than quantifiers
and one(s)-
are non-denumerable, because they are invariably definite NP's.
Although countability has been traditionally thought a subcategory of the
lexical class of nouns, this view does not accommodate itself to the facts. Most
nouns can be used either countably or uncountably, making it impossible to
propose seriously that either plus or minus countable is the intrinsic property of
each of them-although countability can be associated with each particular use of
a noun in an NP. But then the fact that marking for countability is syntagmatic, in
the singular, shows that countability is not intrinsic to the particular instance of a
noun, but is a feature of its environment. So countability can be properly accounted
for only as a subcategory of the NP.
565
LANGUAGE, VOLUME 56, NUMBER 3 (1980)
Even though countability is characteristic
of NP's, not of nouns, it is nonetheless
a fact that nouns do show countability preference-insofar as some nouns more
often occur in countable NP's, others in uncountable NP's, and still others seem
to occur quite freely in both. In ??2-3, it was shown that these preferences can be
computed in a non-arbitrary way by setting up a test battery of countability
environments, defining the head noun as either countable or uncountable. A given
noun is tried as the NP head, and the result is judged for grammaticality.
The set
of judgments gives a countability scan for the noun, from which its countability
preference is computed. Countability is a binary opposition between the countable
and the uncountable; and it must be decided whether to assume nouns are basically
uncountable, and then environmentally induced to be countable to a degree-or
vice versa. All the evidence points to nouns being basically uncountable, though
most of them exhibit a degree of countability.
One unambiguously uncountable NP environment has been discovered, and four
unambiguously countable ones.9 A representative sample of all English nouns has
been tested, and eight levels of countability found. The results are summarized in
Figs. 2-3. This analysis of the countability preferences of English nouns is exhaus-
tive for my dialect, in which the eight levels of countability exist. However, it is
certain that other dialects of English will differ, because of different responses to
the various countability tests.
What I hope to have shown in this paper is the true relationship between nouns
and countability: that countability is a subcategory of the NP, not of nouns, and
that nouns have computable countability preferences which can be incorporated
into well-formedness conditions on English grammar.
REFERENCES
ALLAN, KEITH. 1973. Complement noun phrases and prepositional phrases, adjectives
and verbs. Foundations of Language 10.377-97.
. 1977a.
Classifiers.
Lg. 53.285-311.
. 1977b.
Singularity
and plurality
in English
noun phrases:
A study
in grammar
and
pragmatics.
Doctoral thesis, Edinburgh University.
- . 1979. Number
registration
in English: Concord
and discord.
Talanya
6.1-13.
BUNT, HARRY
C. 1976. The formal semantics of mass terms. Papers from the 3rd
Scandinavian
Conference
on Linguistics, ed. by Fred Karlsson, 81-94. Turku:
Academy
of Finland.
-- . 1979. Ensembles
and the formal semantic
properties
of mass terms. In Pelletier
1979:249-77.
9 Bunt (1979:270) writes: 'Certain adjectives,
like size adjectives
(large, small, big, tiny, huge,
...), are always count; if we meet a noun combined with such an adjective,
it must be classified
as a count noun.' But since these adjectives will combine with nouns from the three lowest
levels of countability (0, 1, 2), as well as from the five higher levels, he is surely wrong. Cf. these
data:
The equipment
will be too large to fit inside this room.
The tiny equipment for Empress Eugenie's doll's house was made by the outfitters for a
flea circus.
I have a huge admiration
for Bette.
Mankind is small compared with the blue whale.
Restrictions do seem to exist on the co-occurrence of size adjectives
and nouns of low count-
ability, and I do not understand
what they are. But (pace Bunt) size adjectives
cannot define an
unambiguous
countability
environment.
566
NOUNS AND COUNTABILITY
CHAFE,
WALLACE L. 1970. Meaning and the structure of language. Chicago: University
Press.
CHOMSKY,
NOAM. 1965. Aspects of the theory of syntax. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
CHRISTOPHERSEN,
PAUL.
1939. The articles: A study of their history and use in English.
Oxford: University Press.
DAHL, OSTEN.
1975. On generics. Cambridge Colloquium on Formal Semantics of
Natural Language, ed. by Edward L. Keenan, 99-111. Cambridge: University
Press.
FODOR,
JANET DEAN. 1970. The linguistic description of opaque contexts. MIT dis-
sertation.
GLEASON,
HENRY A. 1965. Linguistics and English grammar. New York: Holt, Rinehart
& Winston.
GRANNIS,
OLIVER
C. 1972. The definite article conspiracy in English. Language Learning
22.275-89.
HAWKINS,
JOHN A. 1978. Definiteness and indefiniteness. London: Croom Helm.
JACKENDOFF,
RAY. 1971. Gapping and related rules. LI 2.21-35.
JESPERSEN,
OTTO. 1933. Essentials of English grammar. London: Allen & Unwin.
KARTTUNEN,
LAURI. 1976. Discourse referents. Syntax and semantics 7: Notes from the
linguistic underground, ed. by James D. McCawley, 363-85. New York: Academic
Press.
KRAMSKY,
JIRi. 1972. The article and the concept of definiteness in language. The
Hague: Mouton.
MCCAWLEY,
JAMES
D. 1975. Lexicography and the count-mass distinction. BLS 1.314-
21. [Reprinted in his Adverbs, vowels, and other objects of wonder, 1'65-73.
Chicago: University Press, 1979.]
PALACAS,
ARTHUR L. 1977. Specificness in generative grammar. Studies in descriptive
and historical linguistics: Festschrift for Winfred P. Lehman, ed. by Paul J.
Hopper, 187-208. Amsterdam: Benjamins.
PARTEE,
BARBARA H. 1972. Opacity, coreference and pronouns. Semantics of natural
language, ed. by Donald Davidson & Gilbert Harman, 415-41. Dordrecht: Reidel.
PELLETIER,
FRANCIS J. 1975. Non-singular reference: Some preliminaries. Philosophia 5.
[Reprinted in Pelletier 1979:1-14.]
(ed.) 1979. Mass terms: Some philosophical problems. Dordrecht: Reidel.
QUIRK, RANDOLPH; SIDNEY GREENBAUM;
GEOFFREY
LEECH; and JAN SVARTVIK. 1972.
A grammar of contemporary English. London: Longman.
RIVERO,
MARiA-LUISA.
1975. Referential properties of Spanish noun phrases. Lg.
51.32-48.
-. 1977. Specificity and existence: A reply. Lg. 53.70-85.
WARE, ROBERT X. 1975. Some bits and pieces. Synthese 31.379-93. [Reprinted in
Pelletier 1979:15-29.]
WEINREICH,
URIEL. 1966. Explorations in semantic theory. Current trends in linguistics
III: Theoretical foundations, ed. by Thomas A. Sebeok, 395-477. The Hague:
Mouton.
YOTSUKURA,
SAYO. 1970. The articles in English. The Hague: Mouton.
[Received 5 July 1979.]
567
Chapter
This chapter summarises a number of arguments regarding the syntactic and semantic nouniness of proper names, which are not nouns (or noun phrases) but nominals that imitate the syntactic and semantic behaviour of (common) nouns. As such, they really are pseudo-nouns. However, the semantic role they play is not devoid of categorising potential—thanks to their parallel with nouns—and that makes them perfectly good names, on a cline from identification to categorisation.
Article
This paper has two primary goals: to contribute to the discussion of typology of countability systems, and to document the countability system in Sorani Kurdish. While grammars show that Sorani Kurdish has a system of numeral classifiers system, the data reviewed in this paper includes counting constructions without classifiers and a number of morphosyntactic properties that are only used with a subset of nouns depending on their countability. We show that Sorani Kurdish has a mass/count distinction despite the fact that all nouns can be counted with classifiers, and that it has at least five countability classes. Knowing these characteristics of Sorani Kurdish helps to create a clearer picture of the linguistic variation regarding countability and suggests a relationship between the number of countability properties and countability classes in a given language.
Article
Full-text available
The starting point of the present article is the usage of mass nouns with indefinite articles, known from modern Bavarian and neighbouring dialects. Our analysis is dedicated to the use of the indefinite article varying with bare nouns in a historical perspective, based on a cookbook handwritten in 1556 in the East Swabian variety of Augsburg, containing about 900 instances of mass nouns with and without articles. Like in modern Bavarian, the readings OBJECT and QUALITY can be distinguished. A comparison with the de- nominals in Old Spanish recipes shows that the indefinite articles appear in equivalent positions with mass nouns mostly denoting non-specific regular objects as instantiations of the kind. The discussion of quantifiers and measuring expressions shows a special syntactic and semantic behaviour of ain wenig ‘a little’. The final discussion leads to the assumption that the indefinite article does not formally express a partitive relation, but, at most, produces partitive effects.
Article
Full-text available
Pseudo-partitive constructions give rise to multiple interpretive ambiguities including a container interpretation (i.e. individuating) and a contents (i.e. measuring) one. There are two competing analyses: one based on structural ambiguities (Landman in Indefinites and the types of sets, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004; Rothstein in Brill’s J Afroasiat Lang Ling 1:106–145, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1163/187666309X12491131130783, a.o.) and one based on a uniform syntax (Lehrer in Lingua 68:109–148, 1986; Matushansky and Zwarts in Lamont and Tetzloff (eds) North East Linguistic Society (NELS) 47, Volume 2, pp 261–274, GLSA, Amherst, 2016, a.o.). I contribute to this debate with data from Alasha Mongolian (Mongolic), which differentiates each interpretation via case marking on the quantizing noun: glass-comitative = individuating vs. glass-genitive/Ø = measuring. I argue that there is no large-scale structural ambiguity: the numeral and the quantizing noun always form a constituent introduced in the specifier position of a null functional head (Schwarzschild in Syntax 9(1):67–110, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9612.2006.00083.x; Svenonius in McNally and Kennedy (eds) Adjectives and adverbs: syntax, semantics and discourse, Oxford Studies in Theoretical Linguistics, pp 16–42, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008; Ott in J Comp Ger Ling 4:1–46, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10828-010-9040-x). I propose that (i) case differences on the quantizing constituent boil down to the presence or absence of a case probe on a higher Agr head; (ii) and, the interpretive differences between the individuating and measuring pseudo-partitives are the result of a more subtle syntactic distinction in the feature content of the quantizing noun, i.e. an interpretable [±Container] feature.
Chapter
In discussing English articles, we refer to the distinction between countable nouns and uncountable nouns. A countable noun is expressed in the “a + noun” form (e.g., an apple) or the plural noun form (e.g., apples), whereas an uncountable noun in the “Ø + noun” form (e.g., apple). Distinguishing what is countable from what is not seems fairly straightforward, and the use of countable and uncountable nouns in English should be easy. L2 learners, however, consider that English articles are among the most difficult grammatical items. A cognitive linguistics, which is an alternative to the traditional way of presenting English articles, claims that the countable / uncountable distinction applies not to the word, but to the referent the word denotes. The perception‐based principle of countability and a more general principle of individuation will be discussed here to draw pedagogical implications.
Article
Full-text available
We examine three constructions across several languages in which a mass noun is embedded in what appears to be a count environment, but the construction as a whole remains mass. We argue that the discussed phenomena—“Q-noun” constructions like lots of water, bare measure constructions like kilos of sugar, and pluralised mass nouns in languages like Greek and Persian—all involve portioning-out of the embedded mass denotation. We provide a structural account of portioning out and propose structures that derive both mass and count portioning out. Adopting an overlap-based approach to the mass/count distinction (e.g. Landman 2011; Rothstein 2011; Khrizman et al. 2015; Landman 2016) we provide a compositional semantics for the proposed structures. The examined phenomena all share an inference of large quantity or abundance that, we argue, cannot be reduced to the lexical meaning of the portioning-out expression, nor to a multiplicity inference contributed by plural morphology. We show that our cases of mass portioning-out involve a total order ≤ on portion size and propose to analyse the abundance inference in terms of an uninformativity-based Quantity implicature, following the analysis of the positive form (Mary is tall) in Rett’s (2015) approach to adjectival gradability.
Article
Full-text available
Esta investigación indaga sobre el procesamiento de la contabilidad nominal. De hecho, añade más evidencia a favor de una posible influencia del número semántico en el procesamiento de los sustantivos incontables en cuatro pacientes diagnosticadas con afasia de Broca, siendo su lengua materna es el inglés. Esto sugiere que el procesamiento de estos sustantivos sería un híbrido tanto sintáctico como semántico. Además, corrobora al igual que estudios previos, un déficit específico en la gramática de los sustantivos incontables.
Article
Full-text available
From a cognitive‑semantic perspective, two important conceptual schemas underlie determiner use and the count/mass distinction in languages such as English and French, namely bounding and definiteness. This paper investigates to what extent these concepts are related to noun phrase marking in Guianese French Creole (GFC). The corpus‑based analysis shows that GFC uses bare nouns not only with unbounded entities and in non‑referential and generic contexts, but also for representing singular and plural indefinite and definite referents. At the same time, GFC shows a clear count/mass distinction and also has definite and indefinite determiners. However, in contrast to article languages such as English and French, bounding and definiteness need to be examined alongside semantic‑pragmatic and discourse‑informational criteria in order to explain the use of determiners and bare nouns in GFC. Thus, determiner use as a grammatical individuation strategy clearly has a different weight in GFC, which does not fit into cross‑linguistic typologies of articleless and article languages (e.g. Chierchia 1998). The comparative results on GFC, French and English also serve to evaluate two recent typological claims: while they confirm Le Bruyn et al.’s (2017) hypothesis on a correlation between the richness of the article system and the freedom of bare noun use, Abraham et al.’s (2007) claim of a universally complementary distribution of articles and grammatical aspect distinctions in the verb phrase is not supported by the data.
Article
Full-text available
This paper, a reply to Rojas 1977, re-affirms my conclusion (Rivero 1975) that specificity is marked in Spanish NP's by the mood of restrictive modifiers, and that it is independent of the degree of definiteness and the existential claims associated with those NP's. Specific and non-specific NP's alike may be referring expressions depending on their position in sentences. However, contrary to what I previously assumed, the notion of specificity is not connected with the pragmatic distinction between the referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions.
Article
Full-text available
One of the goals of a certain brand of philosopher has been to give an account of language and linguistic phenomena by means of showing how sentences are to be translated into a “logically perspicuous notation” (or an “ideal language” — to use passé terminology). The usual reason given by such philosophers for this activity is that such a notational system will somehow illustrate the “logical form” of these sentences. There are many candidates for this notational system: (almost) ordinary first-order predicate logic (see Quine [1960]), higher-order predicate logic (see Parsons [1968, 1970]), intensional logic (see Montague [1969, 1970a, 1970b, 1971]), and transformational grammar (see Harman [1971]), to mention some of the more popular ones. I do not propose to discuss the general question of the correctness of this approach to the philosophy of language, nor do I wish to adjudicate among the notational systems mentioned here. Rather, I want to focus on one problem which must be faced by all such systems — a problem that must be discussed before one decides upon a notational system and tries to demonstrate that it in fact can account for all linguistic phenomena. The general problem is to determine what we shall allow as linguistic data; in this paper I shall restrict my attention to this general problem as it appears when we try to account for certain words with non-singular reference, in particular, the words that are classified by the count/mass and sortal/non-sortal distinctions.