Influences in the British Decision-making Process in International Crisis Situations: the Falkland War and the Iraq War

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Influences in the British Political
Decision-making Process in
International Crisis Situations
The Falkland War and the Iraq War
Nicole Horevoorts
9958789
Doctoral Research Paper
English Language and Culture, University of Utrecht
May 2006
Supervisors:
Dr. V.S.E. Falger
Dr. A.J. Hoenselaars

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Summary
The British political system is a one-party government system. The party that wins the most
votes in election is the party that takes seat in government. The other parties will have the
function of the opposition. Both parties take seat in the House of Commons. This is an
important body in the decision-making process. In the House of Commons a bill can be
approved or rejected. The two main parties of Great Britain are the Labour Party and the
Conservative Party. There political ideologies differ. Both parties can influence the decision-
making process.
The question that is answered in this research paper is:
Is the output of decision-making in international crisis situations determined by political
preference?
The cases used to answer this question are the Falkland war in 1982 and the Iraq war in 2003.
When a leader has to take the decision to go to war many factors are influencing him or her.
When the decision to recapture the Falkland Islands had to be taken, Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher had to deal with a bad political and economic environment. These situations made it
easier for her to decide to go to war, because it would drive the attention away from the
domestic problems. When Prime Minister Tony Blair had to decide if Great Britain went to
war with the United States of America against Iraq, he also had to deal with a bad economic
situation. This also may have been one reason why he decided to enter the war: to change the
focus from domestic problems to foreign problems.
Other influences came from the four p’s: politicians, public opinion, press, and pressure
groups. In the case of the Falkland war all these factors were supportive of recapturing the
islands. This influences made it easier for Thatcher to decide to undertake military action.
Tony Blair had more problems with these influences. Almost all these factors were opposed to
war against Iraq. Especially the press was a strong opponent of the British government. He
decided to go to war anyway. He was confident enough to ignore these influences.
What is always important when a war is concerned is intelligence. Margaret Thatcher
received several intelligence assessments that warned her that an Argentine invasion of the

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Falkland Islands was imminent, but she ignored them. She chose to only react on intelligence
that described less bad situations. The intelligence did not influence her decision directly but
her ignorance of it led to the invasion, which forced to have to make that decision. Tony Blair
used intelligence to make his case for war, so that the government would approve the
decision.
One of the most important influences was the relationship between Great Britain and the
United States of America. Because of her good relationship with the American President
Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher felt confident that she had the support of the US, which
made it easier for her to decide to go to war. Tony Blair saw in the relationship with the US a
chance to gain more power for Great Britain. He thought it worse to let the US go to war
alone, so he said Great Britain would join.
A last factor is the influence of the leader’s personality. Margaret Thatcher was a headstrong
and proud woman, who was known as the Iron Lady. When Argentina invaded the Falkland
Islands she had to recapture, because her pride left her no choice and she could not resist a
challenge. Tony Blair was a man with many sides. He was very self-confident and could adapt
himself quickly to different kinds of audiences. He used his skills to convince others to do it
his way. His confidence together with his want for power was a combination that led him to
the decision to go to war.
The general conclusion that is drawn is that political preference does not determine decision-
making in international crisis situations. It is probably the least of influences. The relationship
with the United States of America and the leader’s personality are the most influential.
Because of these strong influences it does not matter from which party a leader comes; he or
she will be influenced by other factors than political preference.

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Foreword
There are many people that I would like to thank. I will name the most important here and
hope that the others know that I am grateful for their support. First, I would like to thank my
supervisor Dr. Falger. He guided me through the process of writing this research paper and
kept me focussed. Secondly, I would like to thank my second supervisor Dr. Hoenselaars for
supporting me whenever I had trouble going on. Next I would like to support the employees
of the library of the Clingendael Institute. They have seen me very often the past two years
and have helped me gathering useful sources. The last person I would like to thank is my
partner who has been supportive throughout the process and pushed me to continue, even
when I lost hope of ever finishing this paper. It is his contribution that this research paper is
laying here in front of you.

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Table of Contents
Summary ................................................................................................................................................................ 1
Foreword ................................................................................................................................................................ 4
Table of Contents .................................................................................................................................................. 5
Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................... 6
Chapter 1. The British Political System .............................................................................................................. 8
1.1 The Conservative Party ................................................................................................................................. 8
1.2 The Labour Party........................................................................................................................................... 9
1.3 The Liberal Democratic Party ..................................................................................................................... 10
1.4 Parties and their Programmes ...................................................................................................................... 11
1.5 Decision-Making Process ............................................................................................................................ 14
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................................ 16
Chapter 2. The political and economic environment ....................................................................................... 17
2.1 Foreign Policy ............................................................................................................................................. 17
2.2 Economic Circumstances ............................................................................................................................ 19
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................................ 23
Chapter 3 Expectations of the Political Leader ................................................................................................ 25
3.1 Politicians .................................................................................................................................................... 25
3.2 Public Opinion ............................................................................................................................................ 29
3.3 Press ............................................................................................................................................................ 30
3.4 Pressure Groups .......................................................................................................................................... 32
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................................ 34
Chapter 4 Intelligence ......................................................................................................................................... 36
4.1 The Falklands War ...................................................................................................................................... 36
4.2 The Iraq War ............................................................................................................................................... 39
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................................ 42
Chapter 5 The Special Relationship .................................................................................................................. 44
5.1 A history of the special relationship ............................................................................................................ 44
5.2 The special relationship during the Falkland War ....................................................................................... 46
5.3 A special relationship in Iraq? ..................................................................................................................... 52
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................................ 58
Chapter 6. The leader’s psyche .......................................................................................................................... 60
6.1 Margaret Thatcher ....................................................................................................................................... 60
6.2 Tony Blair ................................................................................................................................................... 62
6.3 Two personalities taken together ................................................................................................................. 67
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................................ 68
Chapter 7. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................ 69
7.1 The Falklands War ...................................................................................................................................... 69
7.2 The Iraq war ................................................................................................................................................ 72
7.3 General Assessment .................................................................................................................................... 75
Suggestions for Additional Research ................................................................................................................. 78
Appendices ........................................................................................................................................................... 79
Appendix A ....................................................................................................................................................... 79
Appendix B ....................................................................................................................................................... 82
List of Works Cited ............................................................................................................................................. 86

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Introduction
A democratic decision-maker is always aware of being responsible to the society which lies
behind the political process. But responsibility is ambiguous and relational, because there are
many constituencies which must be borne in mind simultaneously: at home there are
colleagues in government, the party machine, the constituency voters who brought you to
power in the first place, sponsors of various kinds, and ultimately the electorate as a whole.
In the international realm there are allies, neighbours and colleagues in a network of similar
parties, together possibly with ‘the international community’ (Hill, 2003, 250).
When in my fourth year of University I started to think about a possible subject of my
research paper, the war against Iraq had just started. I thought it would be a challenge to write
a paper that treated the Iraq war. In the years before, I had studied different subjects, but never
had I done any research in the political area. I thought it interesting to write my research paper
about a subject that was completely new to me. This decision made it hard to find a tutor
because in the English faculty there were no tutors with enough knowledge on the subject to
guide me. Eventually I found a tutor, Dr. Falger, who could and would help me in the
department of history. He asked me to follow the course Introduction to International
Relations first, which I did. After some consultation with Dr. Falger we agreed that the
question to be answered would be:
Is the output of decision-making in international crisis situations determined by political
preference?
My thesis statement was as follows:
The output of decision-making in international crisis situations is not determined by political
preference.
To prove this I used the cases of the Falklands war in 1982 and the Iraq war in 2003. In the
following chapters I describe different kind of factors that influence a leader in taking
important decisions in the international arena. I started this introduction with a long quotation
from Christopher Hill. The content of this quotation is very appropriate to the contents of this
research paper. Chapter 1 starts with a description of the British political system. This is the

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basis on which decisions are taken. Chapter 2 continues with the political and economic
environment at the time that decisions were taken. In the first half it focuses on foreign policy
and in the second half it describes the economic situations. Chapter 3 treats the four p’s that
are of influence: politicians, public opinion, press, and pressure groups. These p’s are to a
greater or lesser extent important, dependent on the situation. In chapter 4 one of the most
important constituencies that a leader has access to is described, namely the intelligence
provision. Certainly in international situations, intelligence plays a big role. Chapter 5
continues with another important factor that can seriously influence a leader, namely the so-
called special relationship between Great Britain and the United States of America. Chapter 6
describes the personalities of the leaders. In the end personality can decide how much weight
is awarded to different influences. Chapter 7 is the concluding chapter, in which I question my
thesis statement. The chronological description of events of both wars can be found in the
appendices.
The material I used is varied: secondary literature, articles, government sources, and
various internet sources. Most of my literature I found at the Clingendael Institute in The
Hague which has a reasonably large library with works concerning international relations.
Other sources I have found in the library of the University of Utrecht and the University of
Tilburg. A good source was the internet. The internet was especially useful to find official
sources of the British government. I have tried to use material written by renowned writers,
although sometimes I have used sources from less established writers to use a different
approach to the subject, or to describe some critical views.
It proved especially difficult to find academic and trustworthy information in the case of the
Iraq war. When I started gathering sources the war was not over yet and it may be argued that
to this date it still is not over, although most large scale military action has ceased. This
caused new bits of information to appear almost every day. When I had made progress in
writing more works appeared that gave a total image of the Iraq war. These became useful to
check the bits of information I had gathered so far. In the case of the Falklands war it was
fairly easy to find information. Much has been written on this dispute. Most of these books,
however, were old already and had to be searched at the basement of the Clingendael
Institute. All in all I have been able to create a clear picture about the political and non-
political influences to which leaders are exposed.

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Chapter 1. The British Political System
A political leader is subject to many influences. Influences that come from outside, for
example the media and pressure groups, but also influences that have their origins inside the
political system. In fact even the political system itself influences the decisions of a political
leader. This chapter describes the most important aspects of the British political system.
Paragraphs 1 to 3 describe the three major parties. Paragraph 4 continues with the
programmes of the two biggest parties. Paragraph 5 ends with the decision-making process.
Great Britain has a one-party government. The party that wins the majority at election time
takes seat in government. The other parties form the opposition. Members of the governing
party and opposition enter the House of Commons. These members are elected by the people.
There is also the House of Lords. Members of this body are not elected; they inherit the
position. The House of Commons and the House of Lords have the power to approve or to
disapprove bills that are put to them by the government. Especially the House of Commons
enjoys much power in such cases. The House of Lords can approve or disapprove, but does
not have the power to reject a bill, like the House of Commons has. The most important
parties are the Conservative Party and the Labour Party. A third party that plays a role but is
less important than the previous is the Liberal Democratic Party. It is mostly used by the other
two parties when they need votes to form a majority. This is why the Liberal Democrats are
described as a party, but their programme is not treated. Its programme is not of great
importance to the British political system, because the two major parties use it for their own
goals. It is not of importance either to the thesis of this research paper.
1.1 The Conservative Party
The Conservative Party dates from the late seventeenth century. It was then known as the
Tory Party. After political reforms in the eighteenth century, the party changed its name into
the Conservative Party. The members chose the name Conservative because they were
opposed to more changes in the political system and wanted the system to remain as it was. At
first it only attracted the society’s elite, but it gradually started to address all communities
during the final quarter of the nineteenth century. Due to much internal division the
Conservative Party suffered three electoral defeats at the beginning of the twentieth century.
During both world wars it formed a coalition with the Liberal Party and the Labour party. In

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between the wars it was mostly the Conservative Party that held office. After the Second
World War the Conservative Party suffered a second major defeat. Only by adapting some
Labour policies were the Conservatives able to regain power in 1951. It then remained in
office until 1964. Because of economic stagnation and public scandals the party lost two
successive elections and regained power in 1970. However, the Prime Minister, Edward
Heath, was unable to form sustainable policies, and lost the next election. In 1979, the
Conservative Party came back again with a new and strong leader, Margaret Thatcher.
Because of her strong personality she was able to lead the Conservatives in the right direction
again. Despite the downfall of Thatcher in 1992, the Conservative Party was strong enough to
remain in office for another period until 1997. In 1997 it suffered the greatest defeat of the
century, and it has not regained power since (Ball, “A Brief History”).
Historically the party is known as having much concern with defence and patriotism,
although in this last decade it has been challenged by the Labour Party on that subject. The
Conservatives have always paid a considerable amount of space to foreign policy in their
manifestos. Only in the late 1970s hardly any information on foreign policy could be found in
the manifestos, because of the rather peaceful period and other, more important, internal
matters at the time. Besides the attention for foreign policy the Conservative Party is also
known for managing the economy through the private sector. The Conservatives are seen as
representatives of the business interests and the middle classes and in general the party has
many elderly voters. However, this group is not large enough to give the Conservatives a
majority at the elections. The party has therefore adopted a broad and diverse programme to
attract voters from all possible layers of society. The party is sometimes called a “catchall”
party, seeking support where it can be found and normally avoiding any clear statement of
ideology (Rose, 1980, 7).
1.2 The Labour Party
The Labour Party was established in 1900. It served as a mouthpiece for the working class,
trade unions and socialist societies. It did not even have any members, only affiliated
organisations. It tried to influence policies by co-operating with the Liberal Party and indeed
made some achievements. Although it was difficult to gain any territory in the political
system, Labour gained much popularity across the country. When the Liberal Party split in
1916 the Labour Party was ready to fill the void. The first years were difficult for the Party. It

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did not have enough support to win elections with a majority, although it formed a
government twice, albeit with a minority. It depended on the support of the Liberals. During
the Second World War Labour was asked to form a coalition with the Conservatives. After
the war, in 1945, Labour won the election for the first time with a majority. It then had the
opportunity to make the changes it had proposed for many years, the most noteworthy of
which has been the introduction of the National Health Service. After these achievements
Labour lost three elections in succession and sat in the opposition for a long time until 1964.
Another period of great achievements followed. Until 1970 the Labour Party had the
opportunity to put in practice almost all the ideas of its manifesto. Five years later it took
office again, although under difficult circumstances, because of only a five seat majority.
Another long period in opposition, due to many internal conflicts, was inevitable. The Labour
Party has a history of internal conflicts, which always reflects on its manifesto. It was not
until 1997 and many changes in Labour policy that the Labour Party was returned to office.
However, it was not just returned to office. It won the election with a majority of 179 seats.
The 2001 election showed almost the same result: a majority of 167 seats (Labour Party,
“History”). The new policies of the Labour Party seemed to be working. The manifestos of
so-called New Labour focussed on education, crime, health, jobs, and economic stability. The
manifestos were supported by 95% of the party members, which might be the secret of its
success.
The Labour Party originally represented the working class and the trade unions. Its policy
is expected to be socialist and favours the welfare state. This means that much money must
come from public expenditure. The party is known for its lack of attention to foreign policy,
although the manifestos of the past decade include more policy intentions in this area. As is
the case with the Conservative Party, the Labour Party realises that working class voters are
not enough to give it a majority and also has many different policy intentions in its manifestos
to reach as many voters as possible. In general, the Labour Party attracts mainly young voters
(Rose, 1980, 21).
1.3 The Liberal Democratic Party
Before 1900 there were only two parties: the Tories and the Whigs. As described above the
Tory Party became the Conservative Party. The Whig Party became the Liberal party in the
nineteenth century. The Liberals represented the urban interests as opposed to the rural

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interests of the Conservatives and fought against the concentration of power. In the beginning
of the twentieth century the Liberals won the election and were responsible for large-scale
social legislation on minimum wages and old age pensions, among other things. The Liberals
still sat in government when the First World War started. When two strong persons in the
party (David Lloyd George and Herbert Asquith) could not agree on the direction on war the
party split in 1916. Dissatisfaction with the leaders of the Liberal Party first led to a weak
government in 1918 and later to the defeat of the party by the growing Labour Party. The
latter drew much of the working-class support away from the Liberals. After this defeat the
party became politically weak. Its influence returned during the period from 1977 to 1979,
when the majority of the Labour Party was so small that it needed the support of the Liberals.
When the Liberal Party withdrew its support the government fell. In 1981 the Liberal Party
started co-operating with the Social Democratic Party, which was a group of moderate Labour
party MP’s. When results still did not show the two parties merged to become the Liberal
Democrats in 1988. In this new form they still claim to oppose concentration of power.
Nowadays their concern is that the power remains with corporations and not with
government, national or local (Liberal Democrats, “History”).
The party’s target group is everyone they can reach. The Liberal Democrats’ ideology is
‘Power to the People’. They oppose any intervention of the government in personal affairs.
They do not stand left or right on the political scale, but claim to stand everywhere or
nowhere. They oppose undemocratic power in any form and therefore promote the
decentralisation of power. The party favours participation in the European Union and joining
the Euro. Another policy is to replace the House of Lords by a second chamber, in which
member are elected by proportional representation. This election system must also be applied
to the House of Commons. The party does not have many supporters in the upper classes,
because it wants to raise taxes for this group. The elite will in this way pay for the well-being
of the lower classes. Except for the elite, the party tries to reach every other person in the
country (Free Dictionary, “Liberal Democrats”).
1.4 Parties and their Programmes
Before every election all parties draw up a manifesto. This is the election programme in
which the parties state what its ideals are, its beliefs and goals. The manifestos are expected to
differ, because if all programmes contained the same ideals and goals, it would not make a

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difference which party were to be elected. Many theories have been written on the subject of
party differences. Two theories that are often used are the Adversary Model and the
Consensus Model. The Adversary Model assumes that parties are adversaries. To prove this
the model looks at two parties in different positions at the same point in time. One party is in
government and the other is in the opposition. In this situation it is expected that the party in
the opposition will have different ideas than the government party. If the opposition party
only confirms what the party in government says and does it would not be offering the voters
a choice, because both parties would be the same. Traditionally the party in opposition is
supposed to oppose only for the sake of it. The party in opposition is supposed to point out
different solutions to a problem, so that at the end of a debate the best option can be chosen.
Secondly the parties are expected to oppose each other because they have conflicting
interests. In this case the interests of the Labour Party are the trade unions and the working
class and the interests of the Conservative Party are business and the middle class. Their
programmes must use clear terms to show this difference in order to satisfy their loyal voters.
The party in opposition can behave in two ways: it can act as a critic without giving other
options or it can act as a shadow government. In the first case it does nothing else but criticise
the ideas of the party in government. In the second case it will come up with alternative ideas
and policies. Especially when a party has suffered a considerable defeat it is important to
come up with new policies. The defeat shows that the electorate does not appreciate the
existing policies and that it is time for new ones. The perfect way to show new policies is
through a shadow government. However, this does not mean that the opposition party gives
good alternatives. It does not have access to the information needed to offer good solutions to
a problem like the government party has. It should therefore be cautious to make
commitments it will not be able to keep (Rose, 1980, 20-22).
The Consensus Model assumes that parties do not differ in their actions when in
government, despite the arguments made during the opposition. Although a party can have
different ideas about solutions to problems the intention should be the same, according to this
model. When the intention is the same it will follow that when the party that first was in
opposition takes seat in government, it will take the same overall decisions as the previous
government. The intention must be the same, because the majority of the voters take a middle-
of-the-road position. To compete for this group means that both parties must propose and
accept middle-of-the-road policies. Therefore both parties will have the same intentions. Not
only will the intention cause the party in government to act the same as previous
governments. The political system itself will have this effect. When the newly elected

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government takes office, it will start on a basis that has been laid by many previous
governments from different political backgrounds. The constitution is part of this basis. It has
to accept this basis and move along with it. It is impossible to reject all the previously made
policies and start afresh (Rose, 1980, 23-26).
The Labour and Conservative Parties claim to have different target groups and therefore
also different programmes. However, as stated above, the parties also share a large group of
voters, the median voters. The question is if the programmes really differ or not. When
writing a programme the parties both have to deal with the same areas, for example security,
housing, defence, and jobs. They cannot change these subjects, because the electorate wants
to know what the parties’ ideas and policies are. However, they can make a difference in the
way they treat the subjects. Traditionally the Conservative Party as well as the Labour Party
tends to blame each other for the problems in Great Britain. In this way they behave like
adversaries. In almost every manifesto subjects begin with what the other did or will do
wrong. For example, the 1979 Conservative Manifesto started with an enumeration what
Labour did wrong during the previous fifteen years. The Labour Party already started to warn
against the Conservative way in the foreword of the manifesto. Although they behaved like
adversaries they also followed the Consensus Model, because both parties used exactly the
same tactic in their manifestos. What followed in the programmes are the problem areas and
the way the parties were going to deal with these. Most subjects again started with pointing
out what the other did wrong. What followed is the right way to solve the problem. Both 1979
manifestos started with the problem of rising inflation. Both parties wanted to bring inflation
down. The Conservatives wanted “proper monetary discipline” with” publicly stated targets
for the rate of growth” (Conservative Manifesto, 1979, par. 2.1). The Labour Party had set the
target to bring inflation down to five per cent by 1982 (Labour Manifesto, 1979, “Foreword”).
Although the Labour Party had a clearer target than the Conservatives, they had the same
general goal: to bring inflation down. In the 2001 manifesto of the Labour Party and the
Conservative Party both parties wanted to lower taxes for families. They both proposed to do
this by giving more credit to families with young children.
The case in most of the manifestos is that the proposed policies are so vague that they can
be accepted any way the voter wants. The parties set goals but do not say how they will
realise these and if they propose specific measures, they do not say what they will cost or how
they will affect other areas. Another, even larger, problem is that the manifestos do not cover
the same specific areas. They treat the same subjects, but they each highlight another part of
the problem, which makes it very hard for the voter to compare them. It is common for parties

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in Great Britain to evade confrontational subjects during election time, not in speeches and
apparently not in manifestos either. When in government and opposition, however, they
confront each other often in a harsh way. They also attack each other over past decisions. This
does not mean that parties never attack each other during election time, but this is only done
on decisions that are in the past or over subjects that can be discussed without giving
problems when the party is chosen to govern. Parties are always aware that when they make a
strong statement during election time, they have to follow it up when chosen in government.
In words parties are often more hostile than in deeds and the harshest words are spoken during
the governing period. So all in all parties are both adverse as consensual. They need to be
adversaries to give the voters a choice, but this is often about big words. Because both parties
will have to act on the same basis laid by previous governments, whoever will be chosen,
their decisions will most probably be alike, thus supporting the consensus claim. There are
only a few areas in which parties can make a difference and that is only when all other
circumstances, like the economy, are in balance.
1.5 Decision-Making Process
Once the people have chosen their party their influence ends. Only at election time do British
people have the power to make a difference. This means that although parties are chosen for
their policies in the manifestos, they can change their policies while in government. However,
it is not wise to do so, because the government will face much criticism from the opposition if
it tries to change the promised policies. The opposition party, which can exist of more parties,
sits together with the government party in the House of Commons. In 2006 the House of
Commons consists of 659 members. Every seat in the House of Commons represents a
constituency. In 1979, 635 constituencies were allowed to choose an MP.
When a party is in opposition its assumed tasks are:
1. to contribute to the formulation of policy and legislation by constructive criticism,
2. to oppose government proposals it considers objectionable; seek amendments to
government bills,
3. to put forward its own policies in order to improve its chances of winning the next
general election (Rose, 1980, 19-32).
It depends on the results of the general election how many MPs of the opposition take seat in
the House of Commons. If the government party won with a majority of five seats it would

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have a difficult time in government because it could count on much opposition for there will
be almost as many members of the opposition in the House of Commons as there will be
members of the government party. Every policy or legislation will be tested and criticised. If
the government party won by a convincing majority it would have less trouble getting policies
and legislation approved. However, a bill will not only be contested in the House of
Commons. It already starts before it is put in front of the House. When a department proposes
a bill it will also receive criticism from other departments, like the department of Finances.
When a bill finally makes it to the House of Commons it has already been contested and
controversial points will have been smoothed out. The next step is to debate over the bill in
the House of Commons and finally the vote will take place. Commonly this takes place by
majority vote.
Although it is important for a party to reach the goals it has set in the manifesto, it is not as
important as it seems. Only one-tenth of government legislation is based upon initiatives set
out in party manifestos. More than three-quarters of all the legislation that a government
introduces is derived from the ongoing policy process in Whitehall (Rose, 1980, 70). The
parties cannot dismiss their initiatives because they promised their voters to put them into
practice, but they cannot put too much time and effort in them, because many other policies
are waiting and might be more urgent. An extreme example of a more urgent decision is in the
case of war. In such a case all the other policies are put on hold.
The opposition’s role also seems more important than it is. Although some subjects cause
the House to be divided, most of the subjects receive some criticism, but this is only to refine
one or two points of a bill. Two kinds of bills can be distinguished: policy bills and
administration bills. Policy bills involve “substantial changes in public policy upon which
there [has] already been public debate” (Rose, 1980, 82). Administration bills are measures
that “sanction administrative changes, including changes in financial powers, to implement
existing public policies” (Rose, 1980, 82). In other words, policy bills actually make a change
and administration bills make policy bills possible. The decision to go to war in Iraq in 2003
was a policy bill and the financing plan for the war in Iraq was an administration bill.
Normally there will be more debate over policy bills than there will be over administration
bills. However, if the administration bill helps to implement a controversial policy, debate
over the administration bill also can be expected. Between 1970 and 1974 only one per cent of
the administration bills and seventeen per cent of the policy bills caused major divisions.
Policy bills were debated most frequently, but only one out of six caused a major division
(Rose, 1980, 82). The majority of bills is passed without much important debate. Only if the

16
party that won the election did this with a small majority will there be more debate and will
the government party be depending on the support of one or two parties in the opposition. In
Great Britain, the Liberal Democrats are important for the support in opposition. Officially the
opposition and the government are adversaries, but in practice they more often follow the
Consensus Model than the Adversary Model.
The second occasion where a bill is debated is in the House of Lords. The House of Lords
used to have the same influence as the House of Commons. However, in 1911 the Liberals got
the Parliament Bill through that gave supremacy in all financial matters to the House of
Commons. Since then the House of Lords has only had the ability to delay matters. The
reason why the Liberals wanted this legislation was because membership in the House of
Lords is inherited. The members of the Lords in 1911 were mainly Conservatives and,
therefore, it proved very difficult for other parties to get bills approved in the House of Lords.
The Act of 1911 solved this problem (Free Dictionary, “Parliament Bill 1911”).
Conclusion
Important to realise is that although there are three relatively big parties in Great Britain (the
Labour Party, the Conservative Party, and the Liberal Democrats) the focus is on the two
biggest parties, to know the Labour Party and the Conservative Party. They are the most
influential parties. These two parties are supposed to behave as adversaries because of their
fundamental differences and different voters, but the last decades they have become more
alike, because of the greater group of middle-of-the-road voters. In words they often behave
as adversaries, but if looked at the actual major divisions these hardly ever occur. In reality
the decisions they take are often generally the same. However, the major divisions are the
subjects that receive the most attention; therefore it seems that there are more irregularities
than there actually are. The British political system is known for its shouting to and fro but
that is more show than actual disagreement. The harshest discussions often take place in one
party between the frontbenchers and the backbenchers. This is the political framework in
which the decisions are taken on which this paper will focus.

17
Chapter 2. The political and economic environment
This chapter shows that the political and economic environment play an important role in the
decisions of a political leader. Paragraph 1 takes a closer look at the political programmes of
1979 and 2001. Especially foreign policy in these programmes will be examined. Paragraph 2
focuses on the economy just before the Falkland War and the Iraq War.
2.1 Foreign Policy
In this paragraph only the programmes of the Conservative Party and the Labour Party will be
discussed. The programme of the Liberal Party, or the Liberal Democrats as it is currently
named, will be left out, because it does not contribute to the focus I have chosen.
In the Conservative Manifesto of 1979 relatively little space was devoted to foreign policy.
Contrary to the Labour Party, the Conservatives planned to increase the budget for the armed
forces. They would provide the armed forces with better equipment, raise their payment,
create better living conditions, and keep the reserve forces in good shape. The Conservatives
kept their options open by stating that they would have to consult with the Chiefs of Staff
when they were to become the governing party, before deciding what amount of money would
be spent. Traditionally the Conservative Party is known as the nationalist party that will spend
on defence, so the foreign policy statement contains what the electorate expects the Party to
stand for. However, if we look at the period when the Conservative Party was elected, it
shows a different approach. In 1981 the Minister of Defence John Nott delivered a defence
review proposing severe cuts in the naval forces. One aircraft carrier was to be scrapped and
another one was to be sold to Australia. The number of frigates and destroyers was to be cut
from sixty to forty and two assault ships were also to be deleted. One of the ships that would
be sold was HMS Endurance. This ship was stationed in the waters around the Falkland
Islands. The announced withdrawal of the ship later turned out to be one of the incentives for
the Argentine junta to invade the Falkland Islands (Campbell, 2003, 128). In this case the
Conservative Party did not follow the policy it stated in its programme. Although the
Conservatives had been wise enough to say that they first had to consult with the Chiefs of
Staff, the policy did not imply that cuts would have to be made and that is exactly what the
party did. Luckily for the Conservative Party the cuts had not yet taken effect when Argentina
invaded the Falklands in 1982. Although some ships had been sold already, these had not yet

18
left Great Britain. When the invasion of the Argentine junta took place, the Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher immediately cancelled the deals and used the ships to fight the junta.
The foreign policy of the Labour Party in 1979 is less clear. The party wanted to solve
disputes peacefully. It wanted to avoid stating very clearly that it would cut defence costs, but
the text nevertheless implied this line of policy. It continually stressed the peaceful way of
solving problems, the importance of international organisations, and the problem of inequality
that needed to be solved (Labour Manifesto 1979, “Foreign Policy”). Labour only once used
the word “disarmament” and it was used in an enumeration, so that it did not draw much
attention (Labour Manifesto 1979, “Foreword”). However, it was clear that the Labour Party,
if in government, would have made cuts in the armed forces and defence in general. Although
the parties proposed different foreign policies, they both would have had to encounter the
problem with the Argentine junta, whoever was in government.
In 2001 the Labour Party took a different position. The foreign policy in the 2001 manifesto
stated that the Party wanted to increase the budget on armed forces. It emphasised the
efficiency of the armed forces. Money had to be spent on better management and efficiency,
so it would save money later on. Armed forces had to be more versatile, because conflicts
would not take place near Great Britain but in other parts of the world. The Labour Party
acknowledged the threat of terrorism and crime. It wanted to co-operate more with the
European Union and played an important role in the co-operation between the United Nations
and the European Union. In case the United Nations did not want to make decisions in a
certain area, the Labour Party wanted the European Union to take over. Labour also still
promoted the disarmament of nuclear weapons. Striking, however, is that the manifesto talked
about the disarmament of the United States and Russia, but did not want to disarm Great
Britain. Great Britain still had the Trident, a nuclear deterrent (Labour Manifesto 2001, 38).
Although there is little evidence about how much of the planned foreign policy was put
into practice by the Labour Party before the war against Iraq started, it may be expected that
the Party indeed spent more money on the armed forces. The preparation of the war against
Iraq started long before the fighting started. The Labour Party also tried to unite the United
Nations and the European Union. More specifically, it tried to act as a bridge between the
United States and Europe. Although the party did not succeed completely - there were several
European nations that did not support the American cause - it followed the plans it had
formulated in the manifesto.

19
The Conservative manifesto of 2001 was slightly different from the Labour Party. The
Conservatives also wanted to spend more on the armed forces, but they wanted to spend it on
the soldiers’ wages and living conditions. They wanted to reform the Territorial Army, to
make it stronger. The Territorial Army acts on territorial conflicts near the borders of Great
Britain. The point where the Conservatives differed strongly from the Labour Party is on the
issue of the European Union. The Conservatives only wanted to support NATO. They wanted
to co-operate with the European Union in the defence area, but only if supported by NATO. A
last point on which the parties differed was nuclear disarmament. The Conservatives
supported a ballistic missile defence system that protected America and Europe (Conservative
Manifesto 2001, 30).
If the Conservative Party had won the election of 2001 it would not have made a
difference. As stated in its manifesto it would spend more money on the armed forces,
because it would also support the war against Iraq. It might not have spent as much attention
to the European Union as the Labour Party did, but it would have gone to war with the United
States. The United States were and still are such powerful allies that they only had to ask the
government of the Great Britain to join. The government of Great Britain, whatever it
political colour, would agree under the pressure of the United States. It did not have the power
or the intention to disagree with the government of the United States.
2.2 Economic Circumstances
When Margaret Thatcher and the Conservative Party were elected in 1979 the economy
seemed at its worst. The election of that year was a result of the so-called “Winter of
Discontent”. The winter of 1978/1979 was a winter of chaos. Over one million people were
without a job and inflation was rising continually. The situation erupted when the government
announced a five percent wage rise limit in late 1978. Several unions went on strike. One after
the other followed. At the height of the uprising the rubbish was in the streets with rats
running through it, and in some cities the dead were not buried anymore because the
gravediggers were on strike. After the unions and the government resolved their
disagreement, peace returned. However, there was no confidence anymore in James
Callaghan and new elections were called for (Free Dictionary, “Winter of Discontent”). This
was the economic situation that Margaret Thatcher had to manage. The economic policies
changed from Keynesian to monetarist.

20
The Keynesian theory first was developed in the book The General Theory of Employment,
Interest and Money by John Maynard Keynes. Keynes argues that the economy can be
managed by managing demand and supply. If the economy is suffering from recession,
demand is low, because people do not have faith in it and prefer saving their money. When
demand is low companies experience lower profits, which leads them to fire people and lessen
investments, which again leads to lower demand. Keynes’ solution to break this vicious circle
is to put more money in the economy. The way to do this is by increasing public expenditure
and lowering taxes. By doing this, the government will stimulate demand. It is the task of the
government to manage the economy, contrary to beliefs that the economy can run itself. If the
economy is booming, it is the task of the government to increase taxes and lower public
spending. In this way the government will avoid a high level of inflation. Keynes’ theory links
inflation with a booming economy. However, in the seventies there was a high level of
inflation, but an economic downfall with a high level of unemployment. This is called
stagflation. Keynes’ theory had no solution to this problem, which caused economics to look
for other theories (Wikipedia, “Keynesian Economics”).
One economic theory that became popular after Keynesian theory failed was monetarism.
The leading character was Milton Friedman. Monetarists believe that the economy in stable
situations can run itself. In unstable situations the government has to act by printing more
money or decreasing the money supply. If consumers receive more money, they will not put it
in a saving account, but will spend it. In the stable situation preceding the unstable situation,
consumers were in equilibrium resulting in a certain amount of money to be saved. If they
receive more money it will be extra, and can be spent completely. Printing more money will
therefore result in greater demand. However, more money also means higher inflation. In the
seventies inflation already was at a very high level, so monetarists were mostly concerned
with fighting inflation. If inflation was controlled, price stability would follow and the
economy would recover. Inflation could be controlled by decreasing the money supply. The
way to control inflation according to Friedman was by following a simple rule that stipulates
that the money supply be increased at a constant annual rate tied to the potential growth of the
total production, e.g. three to five percent (Encyclopædia Britannica, “Monetarism”).
The monetarist theory is the theory that Thatcher and her economists adopted. They
wanted to decrease the money supply by cutting public expenditure and they wanted to lower
taxes to stimulate the demand. However, because of the high level of unemployment more
money had to be put in social security and in the first years the Conservative government had
a higher amount of public spending. They did manage to lower income taxes, but the Value

21
Added Tax and the National Insurance contributions increased so that overall taxation rose
instead of declined. Not only was Thatcher unable to bring inflation down, the unemployment
level also kept rising. When Thatcher accepted the monetarist theory, she decided that
bringing inflation down would be her first economic goal. She therefore hardly paid any
attention to rising unemployment. She thought that when the level of inflation started to fall,
the rest would follow. However, because she was at first unable to lower the inflation level,
unemployment and other economic problems also kept rising. This caused much social unrest.
It erupted eventually in April 1981 when riots started in the areas of Brixton, Liverpool,
Birmingham and other cities. In July the riots suddenly stopped, although without a clear
reason. The patriotic sentiment surrounding the wedding of Prince Charles and Lady Diana
might have been the reason of the sudden end of the riots. Mrs. Thatcher herself did not find
the solution to end the riots. She refused to acknowledge that the unrest was a consequence of
the high unemployment. She condemned it as a matter of disrespect for the law. Thus,
although the riots had ended, the social unrest did not disappear (Campbell, 2003, 115-16).
To make matters worse she also lost almost every support in Cabinet. When Geoffrey
Howe and Leon Brittan, the Chancellor and his Chief Secretary, produced a report that
announced new spending cuts for 1982-83 the whole cabinet except for one rebelled. Thatcher
not only lost support among the electorate but also in her own cabinet. Her solution to the last
problem was to fire some members, hire new, more loyal, supporters and move other member
to new positions. In this way she made sure that she had her most loyal supporters close to her
and the most threatening members were moved to harmless positions (Campbell, 2003, 119).
However, Thatcher’s popularity was at its lowest at the end of 1981, and so was the economy.
The beginning of 1982 showed a small recovery of Thatcher’s popularity as well as the
economy, but it still was not even close to a satisfactory situation (Campbell, 2003, 125). The
invasion of the Falkland Islands therefore was a solution to Thatcher’s problems. She
immediately understood that she could restore people’s faith in her if she handled this
situation right. For Thatcher the Falkland War could lead the attention away from domestic
problems and, if won, could restore the people’s faith in her.
When Blair came to office in 1997, the economy was blooming. After a recession in 1993 the
economy had recovered and inflation was under control. However, in the beginning of 2001
the economy of the United States suffered an economic setback. Officially the recession
started in March and lasted almost a year (The Economist, 1 December 2001, 35). The United
States is the biggest economy of the world and if it has economic problems they are

22
experienced in almost all economies. Exports fell and many companies had a hard time. When
in September 2001 America was attacked by terrorists the problems got worse. People got
scared and lost faith in the economy. This resulted in fewer investments and share markets
were dropping everywhere. However, the economy of Great Britain did not suffer as much as,
for example, the countries of the Euro area. Most of the Western European countries saw a
decline in economic growth. In the second quarter of 2001 the Euro area had an economic
growth of 0.1%, compared to the growth of the British economy between 1.0% and 2.0% (The
Economist, 1 December 2001, 35). Although economic growth was higher than in other
countries it still meant a decline in growth. The decline simply was smaller.
In 2002 the British economy still prospered more than others. Growth expectations
remained higher than in the Euro area. Reasons for this difference were the high housing
prices, the independent Bank of England, the big spending programme of the government, and
high inflation. High prices for houses meant that consumers had to borrow more money and
more money was therefore put into the economy. The Bank of England could respond very
quickly to economic problems, because it was independent and was not responsible to other
bodies. Furthermore, the government increased public spending and also put more money in
the economy (The Economist, 26 January 2002, 33). A last reason for the difference was the
high inflation. The inflation level is used to manage an economy. If the economy is going
through difficult times, the Bank of England can try to lower the inflation level to improve the
growth. Less inflation means lower prices and people will spend more money. However, if
inflation is around 3%, lowering it will not have any effect anymore on the economy’s
growth. It is then at its lowest manageable level. Lowering it means risking that deflation will
take place and that is harder to manage than inflation. Great Britain had a relatively high level
of inflation compared to other G7 countries and the Bank still had plenty of room for
manoeuvre, without risking deflation. This helped to buffer the influence of bad economies
around Great Britain (The Economist, 5 October 2002, 40). Another area in which Britain
performed better than other European countries was in the area of employment. Great Britain
had the lowest unemployment rate in 2002 compared for example the other members of G7
(Germany, France, Italy, Japan, the United States and Canada) (The Economist, 26 January
2002, 34).
However, unemployment was rising and especially the manufacturing sector had problems.
This was due to poor workforce skills, a failure to innovate as successfully as America and
insufficient capital. The first problem was the workforce. The manufacturing sector lacked
people with managerial skills. Many managers had grown from the lowest level to the office.

23
This meant that they did not have the education and therefore the skills to manage a company.
Secondly, British manufacturers paid little attention to research and development. This
resulted in out-of-date processes and inefficient work. These two problems led to the third
problem. Because of the inefficiency, many manufacturers failed to make the production
cheaper. Foreign manufacturers succeeded. Many of these foreign manufacturers landed in
Great Britain, because it was a good stop before focussing on overseas areas, or if the foreign
companies came from overseas, before focussing on the European mainland. Because of the
cheaper production the investments went mainly to these foreign manufacturers, which left
the British ones in an even worse position. What also did not help was the strong pound
sterling. It did not promote the export because there were many countries with lower export
prices. The British companies lost even more money (The Economist, 28 July 2001, 35). The
trade unions were another problem for the government. In 2002 there were many rumours of
strikes. The main problem was that the unions did not like the changes that Tony Blair had
forced on the unions. These changes were all directed to lessen the influence of the unions.
Besides that the unions were discontent with the financial policies. Almost every area
received less money from the government, except for the public area. And even the public
unions were not satisfied, because they thought that a too small part of that money went to the
employees. Threats of strikes were made in many areas. However, luckily for Tony Blair the
unions did not have enough power and were not organised enough to realise these threats (The
Economist, 14 September 2002, 30). A last forthcoming problem was that the public spending
could not last without a raise in taxes. The money had to come from somewhere. This would
mean that the public had less money to spend and the economy would become worse.
The period in which Tony Blair had to decide to take part in the war against Iraq might not
have been so bad as the period before the Falkland invasion, but there also was an economic
decline and Blair probably was glad to focus on something else than the domestic problems.
He expected to solve the problem in Iraq quickly, which would lead to more popularity in
Great Britain itself. With more support he would then be able to solve the domestic problems
more easily.
Conclusion
The political and economic circumstances were in both periods favourable with regard to the
leaders’ decisions towards war. Because of the political and economic unrest war was a way

24
to solve at least the political unrest. The economic unrest could then be solved because the
support and confidence in the leader would have returned. This means that both leaders
expected to win the war. They were confident in themselves and through war tried to win the
confidence of others. There is a difference, however, between the two situations. Although
both leaders experienced political unrest, because of the bad economic situations, Margaret
Thatcher received much support for her decision to go to war, whereas Tony Blair had to go
to much trouble to convince enough politicians that there was a cause for war. However, Blair
may have had the example of Thatcher in mind and saw how winning a war could completely
change the political game. In any way, it is safe to say that the bad economic situations were
helping the leaders towards the decision to go to war. This was more the case with Margaret
Thatcher, but Tony Blair must have been relieved to have been able to show his capabilities in
an area that was away from the domestic political problems.

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Chapter 3 Expectations of the Political Leader
In this chapter the four P’s that put pressure on a leader are discussed. Paragraph 1 starts with
colleague politicians. This is a group that stands very close to a leader and can have much
influence. Paragraph 2 deals with public opinion. Because the leader is dependent on the
electorate to be re-elected, he has to pay attention to public opinion. Paragraph 3 continues
with the press. The press can influence the public and is therefore an important pressure
element. Paragraph 4 ends with pressure groups. Besides the influences discussed in the
previous paragraphs, there are relatively small groups that have an opinion and have methods
to influence the leader, and are called pressure groups.
3.1 Politicians
In Great Britain the political leader is the Prime Minister. He has much power, but often still
needs the support of other politicians. In some cases politicians bond together to try to push
the Prime Minister in doing it their way. In the Falkland case it worked both ways. The
Falkland issue was not a sudden one. It started many years before the invasion of 1982. In
fact, British governments had tried to grant sovereignty since 1965. When Margaret Thatcher
came into office, the idea was to give sovereignty to Argentina but to let Great Britain lease
the Island for ninety-nine years to assure that the Islanders could remain there. Although
Thatcher disliked the idea of giving British property away, she went on with the plan.
However, there was much opposition to the idea, ranging from the left to the right of the
political spectrum. Labour patriots, like Peter Shore and Douglas Jay, Scottish Nationalist
leader Donald Stewart, Liberal Russell Johnston all opposed the idea. In the Conservative
party Julian Amery, Bernard Braine and Viscount Cranborne voiced the opposition
(Campbell, 2003, 128). Eventually the idea did not become reality because the Islanders did
not agree. However, the situation was not yet resolved. The Falkland Islands were still a stage
of political tug-of-war. When an Argentine vessel landed on one of the islands and planted an
Argentine flag, Great Britain initiated an attempt to remove the flag and the Argentine
workmen. This was mostly the work of the Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington who persuaded
Thatcher to send the ship Endurance with twenty marines. When the ship arrived at the island
most of the workmen had already left and action was at that point unnecessary. Lord
Carrington was one of the politicians near Margaret Thatcher who could influence her

26
effectively. Unfortunately, when it was truly important that she listened to him, she did not.
Carrington warned against the withdrawal of HMS Endurance, which was stationed in the
waters around the Falkland Islands (Franks, 1982, 34). The announcement that Great Britain
would withdraw the ship was one of the reasons why the Argentine junta saw the
circumstances right for an invasion.
When it was clear that the Argentine Junta would try to invade the Falkland Islands,
decisions had to be taken very quickly. Margaret Thatcher wanted to recapture the Island
whatever it would take. This meant that she was willing to send a task force and recapture the
Islands with force. Her Minister of Defence, Secretary of Defence, the Minister of Foreign
Office, and some officials all tried to temper this feeling. In their eyes it was very difficult to
run a military operation so far away. They also doubted that a task force could be ready fast
enough to perform an effective counter strike. They favoured the idea of a diplomatic
solution. Thatcher followed their advice and asked the United States for help. First Secretary
of State Alexander Haig tried to find a solution. Then President Reagan himself telephoned to
the Argentine President Galtieri, but he also could not change Galtieri’s plan (Campbell,
2003, 131). It was not until immediately after the invasion had taken place that she decided to
send a task force. Although many of the politicians supported this, there was also a
considerable amount of disquiet, mainly from within the Tory Party. A group of Tory front
liners openly supported the mission, but were also preparing a coup in case anything went
wrong. Other Tory Cabinet Ministers were condemning the mission as ‘ludicrous’ and ‘a
folly’. However, when the Cabinet had to vote for military action there was only one person
that openly dissented and that was John Biffen, who was Lord President of the Privy Council
and Leader of the Commons (Campbell, 2003, 134-36). Although she had the support of the
Cabinet, she could not have gone through with it if she had not had the support of the Chiefs
of Staff. If they had said that military action would be impossible, it could not have taken
place.
When the decision to go to war was taken, Thatcher formed a War Cabinet with persons
she trusted and on whom she could count for support. She invited Willie Whitelaw, deputy
Prime Minister, and also her closest ally, to sit on the War Cabinet. She could not avoid
having Francis Pym and John Nott in the War Cabinet as they were Foreign and Defence
Secretaries. She completed this party of five with Cecil Parkinson, the Tory party chairman
and also an ally whom she trusted because he shared Thatcher’s political instincts and was
good with public relations. If there were to be a division about a subject it would always be
Thatcher/Whitelaw/Parkinson versus Pym/Nott and the Thatcher side would win. She was

27
very effective in surrounding herself with loyal allies. To secure the support of the full
Cabinet she introduced a second weekly meeting, aimed to keep everyone fully informed
about the proceedings of the war (Campbell, 2003, 135-36). However, she lost the support of
the Cabinet on 5 May, a few days after the British navy had sunk an Argentine cruiser and the
Argentine air force had sunk a British destroyer. When the first casualties fell, the Cabinet did
not support military action anymore but wanted a diplomatic solution. Thatcher had no other
choice but to agree. That was and still is the power of the Cabinet. A Prime Minister has to
have its support or no action will be taken. Thatcher always was good at convincing her
colleagues of the justness of her case, but she failed this time. Even Willie Whitelaw thought
it best to seek a diplomatic solution. Luckily for Thatcher the Argentine junta was not
searching for diplomatic solutions. They wanted everything or nothing, so they rejected the
proposition for talks. After six weeks of trying to negotiate, the order was given to launch a
counter-invasion, with the support of the Cabinet (Campbell, 2003, 147-49).
In 2003 when the House of Commons had to vote on the issue of going to war against Iraq the
House was more divided than in 1982. When the vote took place on supporting an amendment
that would give Saddam Hussein more time to disarm, 217 said yes and 396 said no. That is a
difference of 179 votes, which is not a great difference on more than 600 votes. When that
issue was resolved the members of the Commons had to vote on whether they would support
the government in approving military action against Saddam Hussein. 412 members voted for
the government and 149 voted against. This is a more convincing difference. Once the
amendment was out of the question most members of the House of Commons decided to
support the government.
Several members of the House of Commons resigned over the issue. Some because they
did not support military action at all and some because they did support military action against
Iraq, but not in the way it was happening. There was too much division in Europe to go
through with the military action and because it looked like the war would go on with Britain
supporting it, they resigned (The Guardian, “Iraq Timeline”). Even more impressive was the
resignation of Robin Cook on 17 March 2003. He was the leader of the House of Commons
and more importantly the Foreign Secretary. He did not agree on the fact that the Iraqi regime
formed a threat. In his view there was no evidence that there was a threat. Because military
action was the plan, he too resigned (Hansard1, 18 March 2003, columns 902-11).
Even before the decision was taken to use military force political unrest existed. More than
160 MPs signed a Commons motion expressing “deep unease” at the prospect of war with

28
Iraq (The Economist, 7 September 2002, 41). Since 8 November 2002 when Resolution 1441
was passed by the United Nations, questions were asked almost every session in the House of
Commons. There was much concern that the governments of the United States and the United
Kingdom thought that regime change would be a reason for military action. The House of
Commons did not find regime change a legal reason for military action. The main worry of
many members of the House of Commons was that there would be a war without legitimate
reasons. They wanted to see proof that Al-Qaeda was linked to the Iraqi regime and they
wanted to see proof of weapons of mass destruction. Another concern was that the
government of the United States was influencing the United Nations too strongly. Members of
the House of Commons feared that the government of the United States wanted a war against
Iraq and would ensure that it would take place (Hansard, 10 December 2002, columns 139-
40). To avoid this many members wanted to see a second UN resolution that would provide
for legitimate reasons for military action. However, this resolution was never written, because
France announced that it would veto any such a resolution. This meant that Great Britain
would go to war without a second resolution and this caused much political unrest. Tony Blair
was able to convince many front benchers of the necessity of war against Iraq, but many back
benchers were opposed.
It also appeared that more Conservative MPs supported Blair than Labour MPs. In fact,
when the decision of war against Iraq had to be taken in the House of Commons it was a
Labour back bencher, Peter Kilfoyle, who proposed an amendment for Resolution 1441
stating that “the case for war against Iraq has not yet been established” (Hansard2, 18 March
2003, column 779). Mainly Labour MPs were asking questions in the debate on war. The first
Conservative asking a question started by stating that he would support military action. The
second Conservative complimented Tony Blair with his powerful and compelling speech.
These are the only two Conservatives who asked questions to the Prime Minister. After these
first questions Ian Duncan Smith, who was the leader of the Conservative Party, took over the
debate with a speech in which he stated that the official opposition would support the
government on the vote. Following was a speech of the leader of the Liberal Democrats,
Charles Kennedy, who stated that he and his friends would vote for the amendment and not
for the government. Even if the amendment were to be lost, he would not vote for the
government because in his opinion there was not enough evidence to support a war. Further
on in the debate it proved mostly the Labour Party that was divided. The Liberal Democrats
were against the war (98%), most of the Conservatives were supportive of it (90%), and

29
members of the Labour party were supportive (62%), against the war (21%) or did not know
(17%) (House of Commons, 2003, 5).
Luckily for Blair he eventually got enough votes to go through with military action. The
serious noises of opposition and distrust came when the war went on for a longer period than
expected and claimed more and more casualties without finding evidence of weapon of mass
destruction. This is often the case. Initial supporters of war back down when the war is not
over in half a year or when there are too many victims. Contrary to Margaret Thatcher, Blair
has to deal with a long-running war and hardly any progress. The confidence of Tony Blair
convinced others to support him, but it could turn out that this confidence was misplaced.
3.2 Public Opinion
Another very powerful influence to take into account is public opinion. If the Cabinet agrees
but the public does not, it is very dangerous to proceed, because the Prime Minister depends
on the public to be re-elected. Only if the leader is absolutely certain that the results will be so
good that the public will forget that the leader has ignored them, might the leader consider to
proceed. The Falkland War had no long preparation period. According to the conservative
government at the time the Falkland War started almost without warning with the invasion of
the islands by Argentina on 2 April 1982. Therefore, there was no long period of monitoring
public opinion. However, what can be found is that 60% of the public blamed Margaret
Thatcher for allowing the invasion to occur (Campbell, 2003, 133). This did not mean that the
public did not support the war. They did want Thatcher to retake the islands. It was a matter
of pride. No-one could take possession of British territory without a fight. On 14 April 1982 a
poll showed that 83% of people asked thought that Great Britain should send the naval
taskforce to the islands. Another question that was asked was whether troops should land on
the islands. 67% answered that they should. After the British destroyer Sheffield was sunk
72% answered that troops should land (MORI, April-May-June 1982). On 16 May 1982 a
survey asked how long negotiations should continue before Britain should invade the
Falklands. A majority of 36% answered that Britain should invade immediately. In the same
survey people were asked if negotiations were to break down which action they would prefer.
59% answered that they would prefer a full-scale invasion of the Falklands (MORI, 16 May
1982). A survey on 23 May 1982 asked if Britain should continue fighting until the
Argentines left the islands or if Britain should seek a ceasefire, now that the attempt to

30
recapture the islands had started. 63% answered that Britain should continue fighting (MORI,
23 May 1982). These surveys show that Margaret Thatcher had full public support. So
although there was no pressure against the war, Thatcher could have felt public opinion as a
pressure to go on with the war. People wanted her to recapture the islands and they even
approved military action. It may have been hard to ignore this group in case she did not want
to go to war.
Tony Blair seemed to have chosen to ignore the public. In many debates about Iraq previous
to the actual war, questions were asked about the importance of public opinion. Many MPs
had noticed that public opinion was not supportive of war against Iraq. An opinion poll in
August 2002 showed that 52% was opposed to war with Iraq (The Economist, 10 August
2002, 14). Another poll in February 2003 showed that 54% still preferred disarmament
through inspections, rather than through a war (YouGov, 19 February 2003, 2). In the days
before the debate in the House of Commons took place, 60% believed that Britain should not
join the United States in war if the United Nations did not support the action. In this same
survey people were asked what should happen if Britain went to war without the backing of
the United Nations, 49% answered that Tony Blair should no longer be Prime Minister against
43% who answered that Tony Blair should carry on as Prime Minister (YouGov, 17 March
2003, 1-2). Blair must have been aware of the fact that he was risking his job by proceeding
with military action. In another survey the question was asked if Tony Blair should stand
down if the war proved to be a failure. 55% answered that he should against 34% who thought
he should not (YouGov, 1 March 2003, 4). Blair must also have been very certain that the
outcome of the war would not be a failure. Although he lacked public support he decided to
go on with military action. So public opinion can be a great pressure, but Blair decided to
ignore this pressure and push his plan forward. Whether this was the right decision he will
find out when the next election takes place.
3.3 Press
During the last decades the freedom of press has improved much. The new information
technology enables the media to cover anything they want, everywhere they want. It is hard
for a government to keep anything secret. Sooner or later the press will find out. Before the

31
era of new information technology, the press had to rely much on what the government told
them. Before the Argentines invaded the Falkland Islands journalists had to get their
information about the situation directly from the press office of the Ministry of Defence. The
islands were invaded at 8 o’clock in the morning, but the press office denied this until six
o’clock in the evening. Then the Government finally confirmed that the islands were seized.
The press had to rely on information from the government on many occasions. Once the
newspapers heard that the islands were taken they had to choose the position from which they
would report about the Falkland Islands. Most of the newspapers supported military action.
There was one clear exception and that was the outspoken left-wing tabloid Daily Mirror.
They explicitly advocated peaceful solutions. They did not want any military action and were
worried that the price would be too high if military action were to proceed. They wondered
what the government would do if the islands were recaptured. Would they be able and willing
to protect the islands for a very long following period? The Mirror preferred a peaceful
solution that would give the islanders the choice to move to a pleasant place somewhere else
or stay and accept Argentine sovereignty. It wanted the government to spend the money
needed for military action on the islanders, so that they could settle somewhere else. This
attitude infuriated the journalists of the tabloid The Sun, which explicitly chose for military
action (Harris, 1983, 38-55). The Sun called the journalists of the Mirror traitors. It was the
ultra-patriotic newspaper in the period before and during the Falkland war. The Sun’s point of
view was: “It was us or the Argentineans” (Harris, 1983, 45). Other tabloids shared this
position although they used less venomous expressions in their articles. Some newspapers and
the BBC were later attacked by Thatcher of not being patriotic enough because they had
talked about the British army and the Argentine army instead of our boys and the enemy.
However, the press with the exception of the Daily Mirror supported Thatcher in undertaking
military action. The press reflected the public opinion and vice versa.
In the run-up to the war against Iraq the situation had changed. Every news organisation had
access to the latest technology and was therefore not dependent on the information the
government gave. Reporters lived around the world and any important event could be covered
within hours. This meant that they actually could see and experience the effects that war had
on, for example, civilians. In this way they did not regard war as a political game but as a
real-life event. The result of this access to the whole world had a negative impact on Blair,
because many news organisations did not back military action. Their concern was with the
inevitable deaths of British soldiers as well as Iraqi civilians. They were concerned with the

32
destruction it would cause. In fact, in April 2003 the BBC was again accused of not
supporting the war. It presented Baghdad’s point of view too eagerly (Della Cava, 2003, par.
8). The BBC received even harsher criticism when in January 2004 the results of the Hutton
Inquiry were published. This inquiry was started after a broadcast of the BBC eventually led
to the death of weapons expert Dr. David Kelly. In the broadcast an anonymous source
accused the government’s communication chief Alastair Campbell of being the one
responsible for the sexing-up of the government’s intelligence report on Iraqi weapons of
mass destruction. This resulted in a major row between the government and the BBC. The
government made the name of the source (Dr. David Kelly) publicly known. Dr. Kelly
committed suicide after his name was made public. The Hutton inquiry concluded that the
BBC was mainly to blame, because it did not check the story of the reporter. There were many
unfounded allegations in the report (BBC, 28 January 2004, points 7 and 13-16). Alastair
Campbell was cleared, although he resigned and remained suspicious to the public. The
government was also cleared of allegations that it had sexed-up the government dossier, but
during the inquiry it received much negative press coverage. Although the newspapers did not
all protest against the war, the majority seemed to do so. They did not believe the claim that
Tony Blair had made about the accuracy of the intelligence he received. They wondered if
Blair had made it up to convince the government that the war was justified and had to take
place (Call, 2003, par. 5).
The press maybe did not have much influence directly on the government, but it certainly
must have influenced public opinion. It provided much information on which the public could
base its opinion. However, because almost all news organisations were opposed to war or at
least opposed to the path that lead to war, the public only received biased information and was
pushed into one direction. This shows how much influence the press can have.
3.4 Pressure Groups
In both cases there were several pressure groups. In 1981 the first pressure group was the
population of the Falkland Islands. Great Britain had been trying for a long time to find a
solution for the islands. They wanted to transfer the sovereignty eventually, but they did not
want this to have consequences for the islanders. The islanders did not want sovereignty to be
transferred to Argentina and started to lobby in Parliament to prevent this. This is why there
was much opposition to the leaseback scheme which planned to give sovereignty to Argentina

33
in 99 years. Because the islanders were opposed to a transfer of sovereignty and because
members of parliament appreciated the opinion of the islanders above all, the leaseback plan
did not receive much support. However, the government decided to go on with it, because it
was the only option they had left. They tried to change the contents a little so that the
islanders would approve the idea. The islanders were given time to consider the plan and they
decided that they would vote for it the next election. However, the Argentine did not want to
wait so long and the situation got worse and eventually ended in war (Franks, 1983, 23-24). In
a way the islanders have their part in causing the war. Firstly, because they lobbied against a
solution that could be accepted by the British as well as the Argentine. Secondly, because they
wanted more time and the Argentine would not give it. This was a pressure group that
probably did not want war, but lobbied very hard to prevent any other solution. In the end
they got what they wanted because eventually the Falkland Islands were still British territory.
A second pressure group was the army. A defence report in 1981 stated that cuts had to be
made in several areas of the army. The army and especially the navy, who suffered the most
cuts, did not appreciate this. When a war against the Argentine junta became an option it was
the navy that started lobbying. Margaret Thatcher was told by the Secretary of Defence and
the Foreign Secretary that a military action would be highly risky and they would not advise
it. It might even be impossible to run a military action 8,000 miles away from headquarters.
At a meeting on 31 March 1982, Margaret Thatcher had to decide whether to send a naval
task force or not. An uninvited visitor came in and gave her the advice she needed to hear.
The visitor was the First Sea Lord, Sir Henry Leach. He told Thatcher that he had discussed
the issue with senior admirals and that they were convinced that a task force could be ready in
a matter of days and that they could recapture the islands should they be seized (Campbell,
2003, 132). This was exactly what Thatcher wanted to hear. She trusted the navy more on this
subject than her colleagues of Defence and the Foreign Office. Ironically, it was also the navy
on the Argentine side that pressed for war.
The army also acted as a pressure group concerning Iraq. In this case, however, they did not
support the war but advocated their unease about it. First of all retired generals, who often
speak for their brother officers still in uniform, warned Tony Blair that a battle with Saddam
Hussein could be harder than anybody thinks. Secondly, serving officers and defence planners
were uneasy because they had not been told much about the thinking behind an attack on Iraq
and what to do when Saddam Hussein had been defeated. The government kept as much
information secret as possible, because too much openness could harm the operation.

34
However, in Britain such a high level of secrecy had never been used before. That was why
officers felt frustrated by it. A final concern was that officers felt that their weapons were not
up-to-date anymore. There was a large gap between American weapon technology and British
weapon technology. Although the government announced to spend more money on defence,
these plans would not be ready in time to help with the war against Iraq (The Economist, 10
August 2002, 30).
Besides the army there were many more pressure groups against the war. On the internet
dozens of organisation against the war could be found. Media Workers against the War, No
War on Iraq Liaison, Our World Our Say, Labour against the War, Oxfam Conflict
Campaign, SOAS Stop the War, Stop the War Coalition, were the names of some of them.
These were all relatively small groups that tried to influence the British government. They
organised protests and sent emails and letters to the government. A large organisation that was
opposed the war and had more power to be heard was Greenpeace. When talks about a
possible war against Iraq started to become more serious, this organisation immediately
started protests and made it clear that it preferred a peaceful diplomatic solution. On 27
January 2003, it blocked a military port in Great Britain (Common Dreams News Center, 27
January 2003). On 4 February 2003, they again entered the military port and climbed into
tanks about to be loaded onto supply ships. They asked attention over and over again by
performing these ludicrous actions (Greenpeace, 2004, par. 5). None of these pressure groups
have been able to prevent the British government to decide to join the war. Unfortunately for
them, they were not as influential as the Falkland islanders in 1982.
Conclusion
The four p’s that put pressure on a leader are to some extent important. Politicians have more
influence than the press and the importance of pressure groups and public opinion varies with
the dilemma discussed. In the Falkland case politicians and the islanders’ pressure group were
very important. In the Iraq case the press had an important role in influencing the public
opinion, but it had its most impact after the decision was already taken. The politicians were
the ones that had the most influence, because they could make or break the case for war.
Luckily for Tony Blair, he has done a good job in convincing them, but he must have felt a
considerable amount of pressure coming from that corner. In 1982 almost all the four p’s were
pressing her towards the decision to go to war. A single newspaper or a dissident MP was

35
opposed, but most of the pressures were supportive. In 2003 it was the other way around.
Almost all the pressure divisions were propagating against the war. Public opinion swayed
forth and back, politicians were initially unsupportive, pressure groups were almost all against
the war as was the press. Blair knew that the politicians were the most important to convince.
He pressured them in turn to think otherwise, and he succeeded.

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Chapter 4 Intelligence
What is of great influence in an international crisis situation is the provision of intelligence.
The lack of intelligence can fail a mission. Sufficient intelligence can make a mission
successful. Even before the decision is taken to join a mission, intelligence can influence the
decision. If a leader thinks he or she has enough intelligence to safely undertake that mission
it can make the decision to join easier. This chapter treats the intelligence provision in the
case of the Falklands war and the Iraq war.
4.1 The Falklands War
The actual Falkland war started with the Argentine invasion of the islands on 2 April 1982.
However, the situation was deteriorating long before that day. The dispute between Argentina
and Great Britain about the sovereignty of the Islands was an ongoing issue for centuries. The
British and the Argentinean government had been negotiating for many years without result.
The Argentineans had threatened to use force on several occasions, but they never did.
Because of this history the British government did not expect the Argentineans to invade the
islands when negotiations failed in February 1982. Of importance is, however, if intelligence
sources agree with the government’s view that the invasion could not have been predicted.
It is always hard to find evidence of what intelligence was available at the time for the
government. These sources are mostly classified. However, because the Falklands War now is
an event described in history books, more and more information is available. The Falklands
sovereignty issue became heated when the negotiations in New York in February 1982 were
unsuccessful. Before this date the British government had received an intelligence assessment
about the situation on 9 July 1981. It said that the Argentine government wanted to settle the
dispute through diplomatic solutions, but that this was only done with the expectation that
sovereignty would eventually be transferred. If it would appear that sovereignty would not be
transferred, the Argentine government would turn to military action. A full-scale invasion of
the islands could not be discounted (Franks, 1983, 27). After the Argentinean President
Galtieri distanced himself at 1 March 1982 from the communiqué written by Argentine and
British diplomats the negotiation process came to a stop. In this month much intelligence was
gathered about an eventual invasion, although Margaret Thatcher claims in her autobiography
that the government “had no intelligence until almost the last moment that Argentina was

37
about to launch a full-scale invasion. Nor did the Americans” (Thatcher, 1993, 176).
However, in the beginning of March the British Defence Attaché in Buenos Aires had sent a
letter to the British government. According to the Franks Committee this letter reached the
Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office around 9 March 1982. The
letter was written on 2 March 1982 and described the views the Attaché had formed after a
visit to the Falkland Islands in January 1982. He said, among other things, that: “on the worst
possible interpretation of developments, an Army President, who had already demonstrated
his lack of patience when frustrated over such issues, could give orders to the military to solve
the Malvinas problem once and for all in the latter half of the year”. The Attaché also said that
the Navy was most fervent against British sovereignty and that the Argentineans had much
experience with and admired a military coup (Franks, 1983, 44). Although the attaché
estimated that the invasion could take place in the latter half of the year, this was the first
indication that the Argentineans could be preparing a military invasion. Then on 10 March
1982 an officer in the Defence Intelligence Staff of the Ministry of Defence circulated a
minute in the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. This message
drew attention to intelligence that indicated that: “if there was no tangible progress towards a
settlement by the end of June, the Argentine Navy would push for a diplomatic offensive in
international organisations, a break in relations with Britain and military action against the
Islands, but that neither President Galtieri nor the Army was thinking along those lines”
(Franks, 1983, 44-45). Only the Navy was keen on military action.
The next important message came on 26 March. A British intelligence source in Buenos
Aires “warns that an Argentine invasion is imminent” (Falklands.info, 1982 Falkland
Timeline). There is no evidence that the government reacted on this information. Then,
according to Falklands.info, on 29 March the “Joint Intelligence Committee reports an
invasion is imminent” (Falklands.info, “1982 Falkland Timeline”). This is the date when the
British government reacted. According to several sources Thatcher ordered that three nuclear
submarines had to head to the islands (Campbell, 2003, 130, and Falklands.info, “1982
Falkland Timeline”). Strangely enough, Thatcher says in her book that she agreed to send
only one submarine to the islands and to make preparations to send a second one (Thatcher,
1993, 178). This is confirmed in the report that the Franks Committee wrote (Franks, 1983,
63). Although the amount of submarines remains questionable it is clear that the government
did not react on the military threat until 29 March 1982, when the government became
convinced that Argentine military action in one form or another was inevitable. Ironically,
intelligence was received on the same day presenting the views of Argentine officials, which

38
said that these Argentineans were expecting military action stopping short of a full-scale
invasion (Franks, 1983, 63). So, when all other intelligence sources were crying out
‘invasion’, the Argentineans themselves were not yet aware of there being planned an
invasion or they tricked the intelligence.
After this day events followed each other very rapidly. On Tuesday 30 March the British
Naval Defence Attaché in Buenos Aires warned the Ministry of Defence that “five Argentine
warships including a submarine were sailing to South Georgia; that another four warships had
sailed from Puerto Belgrano; and that travel restrictions had been imposed on personnel there”
(Franks, 1983, 64). Still the British government was looking for a diplomatic solution. On
Wednesday 31 March Thatcher received information from intelligence that the Argentineans
were watching how Great Britain would react on the presence of an Argentinean ship on the
islands which had landed there a week and a half before. Intelligence said it still not expected
a full-scale invasion, although they expected some action (Thatcher, 1993, 178). Then, in the
early evening of the same day, John Nott received message from Ministry of Defence officials
that the Argentine fleet was preparing an invasion on Friday 2 April (Franks, 1983, 67). At
this point the British government finally accepted the inevitable: the Argentine Army was
going to invade the Falkland Islands.
The intelligence the government received was often conflicting. Sometimes it said that
negotiations were preferred and there was no threat of military action until negotiations were
at a dead-end. Then there was intelligence that said that some military action could be taken,
but that it would not be a full-scale invasion. At last there were several warnings that an
invasion was being planned. A flaw in the government’s thinking was that it did not want to
believe that the Argentineans were prepared to capture the islands by force. They expected the
Argentinean government to think as rationally as the British government did. They forgot that
the Argentine government had gained power with military force. Even when more and more
sources pointed in the direction of some kind of military action, the government choose not to
react by sending many ships because it was afraid that it would disturb an eventual diplomatic
solution. This lack of action was an incentive for the Argentineans. When the government
eventually did send submarines, it was already too late, because it made the Argentineans
only decide to go forth with their plans a little faster. Had the government taken the letter
from the British Naval Defence Attaché and the minute from the Defence Intelligence Staff
officer more seriously they would have seen that in the end military action was an expected
reaction. They could have sent a naval task force immediately which might have prevented
the invasion. On the other hand, can the government be blamed of wanting to think positive?

39
It is a Western European habit to want to solve problems through diplomacy. If countries
immediately grabbed for military solutions there would have been many more wars
comparable to the Falklands war.
4.2 The Iraq War
In the case of the Iraq War intelligence was used to make a case for war. This was one of the
first times that intelligence assessments were the actual arguments for war. Before 11
September 2001 Western societies only engaged in war in reaction. First there had to be an
aggressor before a country undertook military action in the form of war. After 11 September
2001 there was a shift of attitude. The more accepted view was that if there existed a
dangerous state that could in the future undertake military action against Western societies, it
should be made harmless through pre-emptive action. This was also confirmed in the Butler
Report: “Tony Blair’s policy to Iraq shifted because of 11 September, not the pace of Iraq’s
weapons programmes” (BBC, 14 July 2004, point 17). Saddam Hussein was deemed a
dangerous individual before 2001. There is a history of economic sanctions and military
action (the Gulf War and Operation Desert Fox). After the Gulf war in 1991 UN inspectors
were continually present in Iraq in order to investigate if Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD) were made or in stock. Sanctions also were still in place. Around 1998 the situation
deteriorated. Although the inspectors were continuously crossed, the obstruction became
worse in 1997. Some participating countries became wary of the usefulness of sanctions.
Support for sanctions and inspections was deteriorating. This resulted in Operation Desert Fox
in December 1998 (Freedman, 2004, 9-13). In the period between 1990 and 1998 a
considerable amount of intelligence was gathered, although incomplete and sometimes from
unreliable sources. The period between 1998 and 2002 is characterised by its lack of
intelligence. Inspections were cancelled, so there was no first-hand information (Freedman,
2004, 24-25). In 2002 inspections were reinstated again, in order to give Saddam Hussein a
chance to co-operate with the UN. This failed at first, although inspectors claim that co-
operation was improving (The Guardian, “Iraq Timeline”).
When the government of the United States decided in 2002 to undertake military action
against Iraq, they had three reasons: first, they wanted to get rid of Saddam Hussein. Second,
human rights were violated on a large scale. Third, Iraq was thought to be in possession of
WMD and was therefore a threat to neighbouring and Western countries. Tony Blair made it

40
clear from the beginning that he would join the United States but preferred to go through the
UN. The first two reasons to go to war would not receive the support they needed to proceed.
So Blair and Bush decided that the third reason had to be the one that justified war against
Iraq. To make a strong case, however, they had to rely on intelligence. The problem was that
there was a lack of it from the period between 1998 and 2002. The first thing the Security
Council of the UN decided was to put inspectors back in Iraq and to investigate if there truly
were WMD in Iraq. To prove this, they needed full co-operation from Saddam Hussein. As
this did not happen, Bush and Blair saw this as proof that Saddam had something to hide.
They only needed the intelligence to back them. Especially in the US politicians (Cheney,
Powell and Bush) had already made strong statements in which they said that there was no
doubt that Saddam had or was developing WMD (Freedman, 2004, 27). In Great Britain Blair
was more cautious, but he too made clear that he expected nothing else than that proof would
be found that Saddam was in the possession of or in the process of developing WMD. These
expectations from leaders put much pressure on intelligence services, certainly when their
assessments would become public. Tony Blair asked the intelligence services to compose a
dossier that he could present to the Chambers. This dossier, named Iraq’s Weapons of Mass
Destruction, was published 24 September 2002. In it intelligence was gathered about the
presence of WMD and all that was related to it, for example laboratories, knowledge and
plans. It did not state literally that there were WMD present, but it implied that there were.
The content of the dossier became subject to much criticism and even an official research
chaired by Lord Butler, whose findings appeared in a report on 14 July 2004. A few months
before the appearance of this report, another report was published by Lord Hutton on 28
January 2004, who also investigated among other things the motives of the government. Lord
Hutton recognised the pressure that was put on the intelligent services. He said in his
conclusion of the Hutton report:
[...] the desire of the Prime Minister to have a dossier which, whilst consistent
with the available intelligence, was as strong as possible in relation to the threat
posed by Saddam Hussein’s WMD, may have subconsciously influenced Mr.
Scarlett and the other members of the JIC to make the wording of the dossier
somewhat stronger than it would have been if it had been contained in a normal
JIC assessment. (qtd. in Riddell, 2004, 214)
This was confirmed in the Butler report, where one of the main points was that “Judgements
in the dossier ‘went to (although not beyond) the outer limits of the intelligence available’”
(BBC, 14 July 2004, point 25).

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Especially the so-called ‘forty-five-minute claim’ received much criticism. In the dossier
the government judged that “Iraq has military plans for the use of biological and chemical
weapons, including against its own Shia population. Some of these weapons are deployable
within 45 minutes of an order to use them” (UK government, 2002, 19). What was left out
was that the forty-five-minute claim applied to battlefield weapons and not to strategic
weapons (Bluth, 2004, 883). The Butler report blames the JIC for this mistake. It states:
[T]he JIC should not have included the ’45-minute’ report in its assessment and in
the Government’s dossier without stating what it was believed to refer to. The fact
that the reference in the classified assessment was repeated in the dossier later led
to suspicions that it had been included because of its eye-catching character.
(Butler, 2004, 127).
The 45-minute claim was not the only flawed or unclear evidence in the report. Other subjects
that became criticised were “Uranium from Niger”, for which there was no “conclusive
evidence that Iraq had actually purchased the material” and “Mobile biological weapons
laboratories”, on which the report said that it was “reasonable”, but also that “the intelligence
from the source did not show Iraq had recently produced stocks of biological agents” (BBC,
14 July 2004, points 20-22).
What is striking about the Butler report is that it never blames the government. It only
blames the JIC. The JIC is criticised for not letting experts in the Defence Intelligence Staff
read the report, so that they could read it critically and might even raise some concerns (BBC,
14 July 2004, point 29). The quality of intelligence was also questioned, for the JIC had relied
on many human intelligence sources and had even used intelligence from third hand sources
(BBC, 14 July 2004, points 1-3). Nowhere was the government blamed for using incomplete
information.
This received again much criticism from many political organisations and writers. The
Intelligence and Security Committee criticised the government’s dossier for the fact that “a
statement asserting that Iraq could not launch a nuclear strike against the United Kingdom
was removed from the dossier because it would have clarified the limited nature of the threat”
(Bluth, 2004, 883). Lawrence Freedman blamed policymakers to become “prone to seize any
piece of corroborative evidence, even before it had been properly evaluated” (Freedman,
2004, 32). Peter Riddell puts it even stronger: “Tony Blair and the Government were at fault
in not highlighting the uncertainties in any intelligence report” (Riddell, 2004, 215). He also
implies that Alastair Campbell was one government member that wanted the dossier
strengthened (Riddell, 2004, 212). Although the government may not have asked the

42
intelligence services directly to make a strong case for war, it seems that they must have felt
the pressure. The question is if the government was aware of it and might even have endorsed
it. It is reasonable to believe that they were aware of this. Without this kind of intelligence the
British Government could never have made the case for war, and war against Iraq was not
something Blair wanted to give up.
On 2 December 2002 the government produced a dossier about the violation of human
rights in Iraq. This report also received much criticism; some of the worst violations took
place when the British government was helping Saddam Hussein to arm himself in 1980’s and
were ignored by the Foreign Office. The government was also questioned for their motives for
publishing this report, because it contained no new information (MacAskill and Watt, 2002,
pars. 7-11).
It is true that the intelligence services are not blameless. They should stand above political
pressure. In this case they did not. Not only the British intelligence services were influenced,
but also the American, French, German and Israeli intelligence services (Riddell, 2004, 212).
Especially in the US there is a clear tendency to make evidence stronger when looked at
intelligence assessments through the years leading up to the Iraq war. In 1998 two separate
American panels concluded “that allegations about the state of Iraqi WMD were based on
reasonable suspicions rather than hard facts.” In 1999 the CIA said about the acquisition of
WMD “that little could be said about reconstitution since Desert Fox” (Freedman, 2004,
p.24). After September 2001 suddenly reports appeared with at least a so-called reasonable
suspicion that Iraq was in the process of developing or acquiring WMD. They should have
stayed neutral, although it is not clear in which way the pressure was put on these
organisations. Maybe it was too strong to resist.
Conclusion
In a way the case with the Falklands dispute and the Iraq war are different cases with regard
to intelligence. In the first case intelligence was used to estimate if it would come to military
action. The intelligence was used to react on (or sometimes not to react). The decision to go to
war was not taken on the basis of intelligence. Thatcher ignored important signals that an
invasion was coming. In the second case intelligence was used to build a case for war. It was
an argument to act instead of react. Tony Blair had already taken the decision to go to war for
himself; he only needed intelligence to make the decision to go to war in the Cabinet. There is

43
also a similarity. In both cases the British leaders had already a focused mindset. Thatcher
could not believe that a leader, even a dictatorial one, could undertake military action against
Great Britain. This caused her to ignore intelligence that said that the Argentineans were
indeed planning an invasion. Tony Blair was convinced that war against Iraq was inevitable
and had to take place. He therefore ignored intelligence that might undermine his case for
war. Although different situations, intelligence exercised influence on the leaders in both
cases. It led Thatcher into the direction of war, because intelligence sources were not in one
line and she ignored the worst case intelligence sources. It pushed Blair into the direction of
war, because without it he could not have built his case for war in the way that he did now.
Without it, it would have been impossible for him to receive the support in government that
he needed. Whereas Thatcher ignored worst case intelligence sources, Blair ignored best case
intelligence sources. The situation was not as bad as Blair wanted the government to believe.

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Chapter 5 The Special Relationship
In this chapter the so-called special relationship between Great Britain and the United States
of America is discussed in the case of the Falkland War in 1982 and the Iraq War in 2003. In
the first paragraph a short account is given of the origin of the special relationship in 1940.
The years between 1945 and 1979 are not treated because of the lack of relevance for this
research paper. The years between 1982 and 2001 again are dismissed for the same reason.
5.1 A history of the special relationship
The exact moment in history when the relationship between the United States of America and
Great Britain emerged is hard to pinpoint. It is easier to say when the relationship became
special. This was during the Second World War when Great Britain was at war against
Germany and its allies. Prime Minister Winston Churchill realised that Great Britain could not
manage anymore on its own and needed help. He then for the first time appealed to the United
States for a considerable request. Eventually, after some cautious small steps of the United
States, full support was received. This was the start of a time in history where the special
relationship between the two countries was very evident. Winston Churchill made it possible
to grow and flourish. It started before the beginning of the Second World War when several
talks had taken place about defence programs, equipment and staff plans. However, when the
war broke out there still had not been established a special relationship. Churchill asked
several times for intelligence and destroyers that Great Britain needed. President Roosevelt
reacted cautiously and did not give any information. He did not want to make promises that
were not supported by the Senate and by public opinion. In the United States isolationism
flourished at that time. The denial of help turned into approval when in September 1940
Churchill promised him bases on British territory that the US army could use. In exchange for
the bases Churchill received the destroyers he had asked for. After this first agreement a series
of events followed. Most important was that talks were started on “the formation of a joint
grand strategy in the event of American entry into the war” (Baylis, 1981, 4). Although this
seemed very promising it still was not certain that the United States would not remain neutral.
Churchill therefore wanted to show a sign of good faith and sent information about the newest
developments on weapons and the newest information about uranium research. In these areas

45
Great Britain was more experienced than the United States. It was important for Churchill that
the American army would have the newest technology in the event of entry into the war.
The next step was the exchange of intelligence. It started again with an initiative of Great
Britain. The British Intelligence Service sent a colonel to liaise with American Intelligence
agencies. In reaction, Roosevelt sent a colonel back to London. After these first steps more
talks took place and during the ‘Standardization of Arms’ talks in August/September 1940
both leaders agreed to exchange intelligence when needed, “however secret” the subjects were
(Baylis, 1981, 6). Although it was agreed that intelligence could be shared, not much
happened until the United States entered the war. The difficulty for Roosevelt was that there
were strong isolationist feelings at the time in America, so every proposal he made to help
Great Britain received automatically much criticism. In the United States the view prevailed
that it was best for them not to interfere or interact with other states, except for necessary
exports and diplomacy. These isolationist feelings were very strong in the Senate and this
body turned all requests for help down at first. All this changed after Pearl Harbour was
attacked on 7 December 1941. However, it was not the attack itself that changed the direction
that Roosevelt had been taken so far. Immediately after the attack Roosevelt declared war
against Japan but still did not join in war against Germany. The government of the United
States was still considering if this act of aggression was a good enough justification to enter
the war completely. Luckily for Roosevelt this decision was taken out of hand by Germany,
who declared war against the United States on 11 December 1941 (Nicholas, 1975, 98). Ties
were reinforced and the relationship truly became special. Everything that the leaders had
talked about and promised each other now became reality. Although at first America had
focussed mainly on Japan it also joined in at the Western front after the German declaration of
war. It sent troops, shared intelligence and weapons and planned operations, in other words it
fully participated in war. This means that it was not because of the special relationship that the
United States entered the war, but because Germany and Japan left them no choice. This also
implies that the special relationship was not so special after all during the war.
After the war ended it was feared that the relationship would falter now that there was no
common enemy anymore. They did however have to co-operate in the post-war talks. After
the First World War in 1919 the League of Nations had been formed. The goal of this attempt
of international co-operation was to preserve peace and settle disputes legally. After the
Second World War the participating countries realised that the League of Nations had failed
but they still believed in international co-operation. The European victors discussed this with
the United States. During the war in 1942 a bond had been signed by 26 nations to join and

46
fight the German and Japanese invaders and their allies. This bond was called the United
Nations. After the war had ended this bond was extended with 24 more countries and the
United Nations Charter. This Charter that was signed in June 1945 became the most important
ground rules used to solve disputes in the following years. The United States and Great
Britain also found a common enemy in Russia’s communism. This created an even stronger
relationship. This relationship got disturbed for a brief period during the Suez crisis in 1956,
when Great Britain and America found themselves on opposing sides. Great Britain used
military force to oppose nationalisation of the Suez Canal, in which British companies had a
share of 44%. The Egyptian President Nasser had decided that the Suez Canal had to be
nationalised. The United States was opposed to the use of force and threatened to sell all
American reserves in Great Britain. This would be a hard hit for the British economy.
Eventually a UN task force was placed at the site, so that the parties could come to an
agreement. With the end of the crisis also came an end to the leading position of Prime
Minister Anthony Eden as he was forced to resign. His successor Harold Macmillan was
keener to involve the United States in British plans (Wikipedia, “Suez Crisis”).
In the period between the Suez crisis and the end of the Cold War the relationship had its
ups and downs. In the sixties domestic problems, divergences of national interests and a
growing disparity in power “tended to produce a cooling of relations between the two
countries” (Baylis, 1981, 77).
5.2 The special relationship during the Falkland War
After the ups and downs during the sixties and the seventies the relationship got a boost again
when Margaret Thatcher met Ronald Reagan. They not only had a political relationship but
also became personal friends.
Before Ronald Reagan became President it was Carter whom Thatcher had to deal with.
The relationship with the United States was not as close as it was during the Second World
War. There were different attitudes in both countries. The base for this attitude was originated
after the Second World War. One country preferred pre-emptive military action and the other
preferred soft power. Some years before Thatcher and Reagan strengthened the relationship
this difference in attitude was very clear. In 1977 America produced “the Presidential
Directive, PD-18, which ordered the creation of special units for rapid deployment in regional
danger spots” (Bartlett, 1992, 143). The United States were then able to react before any

47
actual attack had taken place. The worsening relations with the USSR accelerated the
American military build-up in the western Indian Ocean and the search for local base facilities
even before the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan at the end of 1979 (Bartlett, 1992, 143).
Great Britain on the other hand used its influence in the European Economic Community
(EEC) to secure added sanctions against Tehran in the spring of 1980 (Bartlett, 1992, 144). It
preferred to use soft power. Because of this difference in actions the United States became
more an opponent of the Western Europe countries than an ally.
Still Great Britain did not give up its support for America. This was mostly to blame on the
anti-European attitude of Margaret Thatcher. She preferred the ties with America to the ties
with the European countries. She prevented Great Britain to join in the European Monetary
System. She had more clashes with France and West-Germany than she had with America.
Margaret Thatcher always was distrustful of the European Community (EC). So although the
relationship with America was not close, it was preferred to the relationship with Western
Europe, even before Reagan became President. The fact that she preferred the relationship
with the United States did not mean however that this was a close relationship. Thatcher had
several clashes with the Carter administration.
For example, in November 1979 the American embassy in Tehran was attacked by Iranian
students backed up by Ayatollah Khomeini. Several Americans were held hostage. At first the
American government tried to end the situation by negotiating trough the United Nations. The
American government asked European countries for economic sanctions against Iran. The
European Community indeed agreed to a package of economic sanctions that were mostly
drafted by Foreign Secretary Peter Carrington. However, these sanctions could not carry away
Carter’s approval, because they were not strong enough (Sharp, 1997, 104). However, the
case was not as simple as it is described in the sentence before. It was indeed true that Carter
was not satisfied with the sanctions that the members of the United Nations took. The
pressure that was put on Iran was not enough to release the hostages. The European allies,
however, were dependent on the verdict of the vote of the United Nations. To legitimate
severe sanctions they had to be approved first by the United Nations. The chance that the UN
would approve to such measures was slim because of the Security Council’s permanent
members’ right to veto. It was expected that the Soviet Union would veto, because of its
interests in an unstable Middle East. In December 1979 Carter therefore sent Secretary of
State Cyrus Vance to Europe to convince the allies of the necessity of the sanctions even if the
Soviet Union would veto the resolution. He succeeded and received promises that the
European allies and Japan ‘would join with the United States in imposing sanctions even if

48
the Soviet Union vetoed the Security Council Resolution’ (Sick, 1985, 242). Later on in the
crisis the allies backed away again from this commitment (Sick, 1985, 355). The
unwillingness of the European allies became an ongoing issue in the hostage crisis. The allies
were reluctant to act not only because of the lack of a Security Council Resolution, but also
because of the commercial and financial relationships with Iran (Sick, 1985, 247). When the
crisis went on without a possible solution in the near future Carter even considered
threatening with military action to push the allies into taking economic sanctions (Sick, 1985,
283). He abandoned this thought later on, because of the risk that a military threat could
evolve in a war with Iran. At this point in history the relationship between Great Britain and
the United States was not very special. If Thatcher would have wanted to, she could probably
have taken sanctions in spite of the lack of a resolution. However, the risks in this case were
too high to take. She would not only have to answer to her government, but also would break
international law and it was not certain that the sanctions would have helped to solve the
crisis. The economy of Iran was already at a low point and it seemed that Ayatollah Khomeini
was not ready to release the hostages until his demands were granted.
At the end of the crisis came the change considering the relationship between the United
States and Great Britain. At this point Thatcher could and wanted to help. To get the hostages
released the government of Iran asked all frozen Iranian assets back that were in American
banks. The assets would remain in escrow at a foreign bank and would be transferred after the
hostages were released. The Bank of England was a choice to which both parties (America
and Iran) could agree. However, the Bank of England itself was not too happy about the
choice. Never before had a bank been part of such a big transfer of money. There was no
procedure to follow, so one had to be drafted. The different banks that held Iranian assets
found it difficult to agree on the procedure, because of the risks involved. Part of the deal was
that the banks would transfer the money to the Bank of England and that the Iranian loans that
were made at the various banks would be paid off immediately when the hostages were
released. It was difficult for the Bank of England to formulate this in an escrow agreement
and the Bank of England would not be escrow agent until all parties had signed the
agreement. This process delayed the process of solving the hostage crisis and it was not until
Margaret Thatcher intervened at the Bank of England that the agreement was drafted rightly
(Christopher, 1985, 219). At that moment Thatcher played an important part in solving the
crisis. She could get herself involved in the procedure of drafting an escrow agreement,
because she did not have a UN resolution to take in account in this case. So when it was all up

49
to her she chose to help the United States where she could. A basis was laid for Reagan to
build on.
After Ronald Reagan was elected in November 1980 the relationship became much more
special. Reagan and Thatcher had much in common when looked at their ideas on the USSR,
communism, the free market economy and the Cold War. In the economic area Americans
were surprised by the strong stand of Thatcher against the trade unions. She supported the free
market strategy continuously which led to the belief in America that their old ally was back
(Bartlett, 1992, 150-51). Also in the personal area they completed each other. Reagan
searched for strong characters in his surroundings. According to Leo Abse, this was because
he did not want to become dependent on anything as his father was dependent on alcohol.
This caused an uncertainty that led him to surround himself with strong personalities. He then
did not have to make important decisions all by himself, but had the help of his strong
personality staff (Abse, 1989, 72). Margaret Thatcher fitted this picture well. She was the
strong personality Reagan was looking for. A rather radical view of Leo Abse is that in the
case of Margaret Thatcher’s personal preferences, she looked for weaker personalities than
hers. She admired her father that much that it came dangerously close to sexual feelings. As
Abse puts it: “The woman denying her mother is claiming the father is hers – that the mother
never slept with her husband.” (Abse, 1989, 70). The, in her eyes probably, weaker
personality of Ronald Reagan was exactly the type of character Thatcher was looking for.
Even when this view is disregarded it is true that Thatcher made use of less strong
personalities than hers. She always was convinced that she was right and when a person had a
less strong character than hers it was easy for her to convince (or rather dominate) this person
of her ‘right’ idea.
During the period that both Reagan and Thatcher were leaders of their country Thatcher
supported and admired the United States. Although there were the occasional political clashes
she never stopped propagating the need for a close relationship with America. During the
years she had many critics and despised every one of them. There were the liberals who
compared the Americans with the Russians, or nuclear disarmers that saw a greater threat in
the American nuclear power than in that of Russia. There were academics who said that she
did not see the difference between tyranny and freedom. There were critics who called her the
poodle of Reagan (Campbell, 2003, 261). The fact that years later critics called Tony Blair the
lapdog of George Bush might be a referral to this point of criticism years before.
However, Thatcher did not pay much attention to her critics. She knew what she wanted
and that was to support the United States in good and bad times. Although she seemed

50
Reagan’s poodle in public addressings, she was very persistent on political matters when
dealing with Reagan in private. If she had her mind on something she would argue and argue
until she had what she wanted. This caused several clashes with the American government,
especially when the United States’ approach to the Soviet Union was regarded as too
aggressive, as was the case in many situations. For example, in December 1981 the United
States took sanctions against the Soviet Union, because of the latter’s imposition of martial
law in Poland. One of the consequences of these sanctions was that a British firm could not
deliver material for a pipeline that was to be laid between Siberia and Western Europe.
Margaret Thatcher could and would not accept that. She visited Washington to convince
Reagan that this particular sanction was not necessary. She found it very difficult to accept
because the sanction would hurt Western Europe more than any sacrifices the United States
had to make. After more communication back and forward she eventually got her way. The
ban was lifted in return for other measures that would limit Soviet export and import
(Campbell, 2003, 267-69). This was one of the rare cases that she stood up for European
interests, although British interests lay at the very heart of it.
In spite of the occasional clashes the relationship between Great Britain and the United
States was closer than it had been for a long period. This led Thatcher to believe that she
could count on American support in the case of the Falkland Islands. This might also have
been one of the reasons why she decided to go on with military action. Not only had she
support from the Falkland islanders and the British people, she also felt she had a strong ally
on the other side of the ocean. How betrayed she felt when Reagan did not give her support at
first. Ironically, the Argentine government may have been led by the same believe, because
they also thought that they had the support of the United States. As Paul Sharp puts it:
“Political and economic difficulties at home combined with the country’s new and flattering
counter-insurgency partnership with the US to provide the government with the motive and
the confidence, respectively, for acting as and when it did” (Sharp, 1997, 59). The new
relationship with the United States might just have given the Argentinean government enough
courage to take military action. During the first days of the dispute the Argentineans were
proven to be right. The American government chose not to interfere because of the
relationship with Argentina. However, luck changed when the dispute went on.
The Falkland Islands dispute took place in a period in which the American government
was trying to tighten the relationship with South American countries. According to Bartlett
“there was a powerful Latin American lobby among the diplomats who feared – or argued-
that American interest would suffer if the United States ranged itself against Argentina”

51
(Bartlett, 1992, 154). Opposite to this lobby was public opinion and Caspar Weinberger, who
was the American Secretary of Defence (Byrd, 1988, 22). Especially the latter might have
made the difference in the case, for he gave Britain on his own initiative vital military co-
operation. He made it possible for the British to use the US base on Ascension Island, he
accelerated the purchase of Sidewinder missiles and last but certainly not least gave the
British access to American intelligence. He took this initiative long before the American
government officially gave its support (Campbell, 2003, 142). At the end of April 1982
Washington stated that the United States would support Great Britain and “exert economic
pressure on Argentina.” It accepted that “Britain’s value as an ally outweighed any possible
injury to American interests in Latin America” (Bartlett, 1992, 155). This did not happen
overnight. It took much diplomatic effort of many British diplomats before the Americans
changed their minds.
The position that the American government took at the beginning of the dispute was that of
negotiator. It preferred to remain neutral and tried to help solve the dispute by sending
Secretary of State Alexander Haig to negotiate. However, both parties were unwilling to
change their views on how the issue should be resolved. The British demand was that before
they would negotiate the Argentineans had to leave the islands. A second demand was that the
wish of the islanders should be taken in account when negotiating. The Argentine demand
was that before they would leave the islands they would have the promise that when the
negotiations were over the sovereignty would be theirs (Sharp, 1997, 83). Haig found himself
in a stalemate situation. At this point American diplomacy had not worked. British diplomacy
however was working simultaneously and was more successful.
A major player in the British effort to receive American support was Sir Anthony Parsons,
the British Ambassador to the United Nations in New York. He persuaded the United Nations
Security Council to pass a resolution “condemning the Argentine action and calling for the
withdrawal of the occupying troops pending a diplomatic solution” (Campbell, 2003, 143). He
succeeded only one day after the invasion. This was an important step on the diplomatic path
because now Great Britain had international support of their demand that the Argentineans
first had to leave the Falkland islands before negotiations could start. At the same time Sir
Nicholas Henderson, the British Ambassador in Washington appeared on many television
broadcasts defending the British case (Campbell, 2003, 143). Many European countries
supported Great Britain with economic sanctions against Argentina. The support was given
only with the expectation that the British government remained ready to search for a peaceful
solution. Although several proposals were made by Haig, Thatcher could not accept them,

52
because her demand had not changed: Argentine forces first had to leave the islands. She was
however very clever, because she did not reject the proposals herself, but let the Argentineans
do this. She was convinced that they would not accept the proposals either and she was right.
In this way she managed to remain the reasonable party opposite to the aggressive
Argentineans. At this point the British military detachment had just started with their action.
They had reached South Georgia and drove the Argentine forces off. This island was still
more than a thousand miles away from the Falkland islands. A day after the recapture of the
islands the United States officially gave their support to Great Britain. Thatcher reacted with
the words: “We now have the total support of the United States [...] which we would expect
and which I think we always expected to have” (Campbell, 2003, 145). Especially the last part
of the sentence shows how certain she felt about the relationship between Great Britain and
the United States. She never thought otherwise than to expect the support of the US and
eventually she did receive it. It is worth to note that the US only gave support after the first
military action was taken. After it was clear that the US could not prevent Great Britain from
taking military action “it was of prime importance to the United States that they should not
lose” (Bartlett, 1992, 156).
It is clear to see the influence of the relationship between Great Britain and the United
States of America in the case of the Falklands War. Although the special relationship was of
great influence in British decision-making, it did not have the same effect in American
decision-making. In the case of British decision-making it was the expectation of American
support that was one reason for Thatcher to see the whole event through. In the case of
American decision-making it took much British diplomatic effort before the American
government officially gave its support and even then it came only after military action was
inevitable. The decision to take military action could not have been taken by Great Britain, if
it had not already had the unofficial support of Caspar Weinberger and the US Navy. It is
questionable if it would have brought the dispute to the same end if Great Britain had not
received the official support of the United States. It may be difficult to acknowledge for them
but the British were (again) subordinate to the Americans. This does not mean that the special
relationship is not special. It is just more special on British side than it is on American side.
5.3 A special relationship in Iraq?
Much is written about the relationship between George W. Bush and Tony Blair. Opinions
about the nature of the relationship vary. One vision is that Tony Blair is Bush’s lapdog or

53
“Bush’s poodle” (Riddell, 2004, 3). Although Blair sees himself as very important in the
relationship between Bush and himself (after all, he wants to be the bridge between the United
States and Europe) many critics claim he is nothing more than a lapdog. According to these
critics he has absolutely no influence on the decisions Bush makes, although Blair claims he
does. According to Blair he convinced Bush to wait with the war in Iraq until a United
Nations resolution was passed. However, the goal was to delay America’s decision to go to
war long enough until the U.N. Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission had
finished its search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and that goal was not met. Before
the second U.N. resolution was passed Bush decided to attack. Bush did not care about the
U.N. resolutions. According to a senior Bush administration official the second resolution
“was designed only to help British and Spanish leaders at home, where they face huge
opposition to war” (Wolffe et al., 1997, par. 4). This confirms the uselessness of Blair’s
efforts.
However, other voices can be heard. Most importantly is to realise that the partners are not
equal in power. The United States has more sources (military as well as economic) than Great
Britain. It has more influence and more possibilities than Great Britain has. If looked at Great
Britain as the junior partner of the United States a relationship can certainly be recognised. It
is true that if the United States want to take action, they can do so without allies of any kind.
However, the government of the United States probably realises that this would not be a wise
decision to take, because it would alter any relationship it has with other countries, allies or
enemies. Therefore it searches for allies if it wants action to be taken. In the case of the war in
Iraq it also chose to search for allies. Not only because it wanted to preserve relationships, but
also because intelligence and troops were very welcome. Besides these the government of the
United States also needed places to station its troops, because Iraq has a very small entrance
over water. It might have been possible to undertake unilateral action, but it was wiser to
search for help.
A recurring problem of the last decade in this relationship is the difference in attitude of
the two countries. The United States, as a superpower, believes in the force of pre-emptive
action: take action before it is too late. When there is a threat of any kind, the solution of the
United States is to react immediately and most of the times with military force. Great Britain,
as a part of the European Union, believes in the force of soft power. Economic embargos and
restraining laws are examples of soft power. The two countries chose these different types of
power because of their different history. What forms the recent history of Great Britain is the
experience of the Second World War. After the Second World War Europe, including Great

54
Britain, decided only to use that kind of power again, if other options were exhausted. They
put their faith in organisations like the European Community and the United Nations. Of
course, there are also examples when Great Britain did not try to avoid aggression. Take for
example the Suez crisis in 1956 and it is immediately clear that Great Britain will only use
this ideology if it will not be of any disadvantage to the interests of Great Britain. However, in
the case of war against Iraq Great Britain might have thought the moment appropriate for their
preference of soft power.
The United States also experienced the Second World War, but the country was not
devastated like European countries. The country was not invaded, although some property
was. The memories of the war have faded more quickly, although the memory of Pearl
Harbour will probably never fade completely. An important difference is that the United
States emerged as a superpower and Great Britain did not. Because America is the only
superpower left in the world it feels almighty. It may also have felt responsible for the safety
of Western society, but this changed with the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the
Pentagon on 11 September 2001. After the attacks the population of the United States is
deemed most and only important. To secure the safety of its inhabitants America will go all
the way. It will not hesitate to use military force if it will benefit the goal of the United States
(Keegan, 2004, 89).
This difference in attitude is the reason why the status in the relationship between the
United States and Great Britain can never be equal. Great Britain will always be insubordinate
to America, because it prefers a different approach. Of course it will also always be the junior
partner because it has less means to protect itself and others. This does not imply however that
Great Britain has no influence at all. As said before, the United States want to take the
European countries’ opinion in account. They value Europe’s opinion (mostly when it is
supportive) and Great Britain is the link between Europe and the United States through which
views are exchanged.
What also influenced the relationship between America and Great Britain in the case of
Iraq was the pressure delivered to Bush by Vice President Dick Cheney, Defence Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz. These three men were
especially keen on fighting a war against Iraq. They argued several times for a pre-emptive
strike on Iraq and they tried to persuade Bush not to wait too long. Especially Dick Cheney
was making himself clear on various occasions. In a speech he delivered in August 2002 on a
congress of veterans he said that it would be unwise to give Saddam Hussein more time to
prove that he has no weapons of mass destruction in his possession. According to Cheney it

55
would only give him extra time to build powerful nuclear weapon or to provide parts for
terrorists so they could build a nuclear weapon. Cheney advocated that America had to make
a pre-emptive move immediately, thereby implying that it should not seek allies or UN
approval, because that would take too much time (Reid and Beeston, 2002, pars. 8-11).
Donald Rumsfeld made a similar remark, saying that “though the US would seek support for a
possible strike against Iraq, it would not wait for international ‘unanimity’” (Deutsche Welle,
2002, par. 7). It was not unexpected that these three would advocate a pre-emptive strike. All
three are neo-conservatives and neo-conservatives believe in “the necessity of pre-emption”
and “the desirability of regime change in countries overtly hostile to the United States and
able to harm its interests or citizens” (Keegan, 2004, 96).
Opposite this group were “the internationalists/realists headed by Colin Powell (Riddell,
2004, 173). Powell favoured multilateral solutions, where Cheney, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz
favoured unilateral action. They did not see why they should search allies when the United
States had enough resources to handle the situation. Although Bush was not seen as a neo-
conservative at first, he surely must have felt the pressure of these three powerful men and
after the attacks of 9/11 he turned more to the neo-conservative trend.. By doing so he put
pressure on the relationship between America and Great Britain. Tony Blair obviously was
and still is not a neo-conservative, although he too changed his mind after 9/11. He put Iraq
higher on the agenda, but he wanted to avoid acting too soon. However, because it seemed
that the United States would attack anyway, with or without the help of Great Britain’s
military, Tony Blair had to decide fast whether to join the war against Iraq, despite much
opposition at home, or listen to his advisers and electorate and thereby ending or damaging
the special relationship. This kind of pressure surely did not do any good to the already frail
relationship between America and Great Britain.
Fortunately for Tony Blair, there was another powerful player in Bush’s surroundings.
Secretary of State Collin Powell was the counterpart of Cheney, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz. He
was convinced that the best way if action would be taken, would be international action. He
wanted the first step to be to put the United Nation weapons inspectors back into Iraq (Labott,
2002, par. 8). On several occasions he delivered speeches in which he tried to convince
whoever was listening that the right way was through the United Nations. He thereby collided
several times with Dick Cheney who wanted unilateral action to be taken. Both persons tried
to talk Bush into doing it their way. After a lengthy session in August 2002 Powell convinced
George Bush to first seek approval of the United Nations (Reynolds, 2002, par. 25). This
bought Tony Blair some time to convince his government and electorate of the justness of the

56
cause. Collin Powell was one of the reasons why the special relationship could survive for the
time being. During Bush’s request for approval at the United Nations Tony Blair found time
and possibility to convince enough members of Parliament to vote for entry in the event of
war. Public opinion swayed back and forth about entering, but in the end Tony Blair thought
that it would be enough to support him.
Although Tony Blair wanted the world to believe that he entered the war because he was
convinced of the good cause, it is more likely that he felt the pressure of the special
relationship with the United States. Being the biggest player in the world economy and
defence area the United States have many countries that are dependent on them. What would
Great Britain do without the help of the United States in areas like export and defence? When
Tony Blair had to decide if Great Britain would enter the war against Iraq, he had to choose
between a part of Europe that was against entry or the United States that wanted action. Tony
Blair had to choose who his most valuable ally was. Although he wanted to be the bridge
between Europe and the United States he suddenly found himself caught in the middle. He
could not make a decision without alienating one or the other. In the case of war against Iraq
he decided that the relationship with America was more valuable than the relationship with
France and Germany who were against the war in Iraq. This does not mean that he was
pushed in co-operation where he did not want it. Blair certainly believed in the cause for war.
In a speech delivered in Chicago in 1999 Blair said that “tyrants should not be allowed to
stand unchallenged in international affairs, and that if they seemed also to represent a threat to
the general peace, they would have to be dethroned” (Seldon and Kavanagh, 2005, 386).
From the start of his political career he has had a great concern for human rights. He realised
however that he could not go to war with any country that was in breach, so he preferred
diplomacy to handle situations. When the United States in this case did take the decision to go
to war he was fully supportive of it even if that meant that he had to collide with some
European leaders.
He also was more realistic than the other European members about the military capabilities
the United States had. He realised that the America was the biggest player in the world and
compared to this great power the European Union was still not as powerful even if they found
a way to put aside their differences and really unite. So instead of trying to be a counterweight
Blair thought it wiser to be as close as possible and try to influence any decisions that
involved Great Britain or Europe. If a good relationship was established it might just be
possible to delay an action or to take a different route to the same goal. This was the position
Blair took from the moment he became a political figure. Blair really believed that he could

57
act as a bridge, whereby he would be explaining American ideas in Europe and making
European ideas clear in Washington. Unfortunately, other European leaders did not share his
vision and distrusted the contact Blair had with Bush. Peter Riddell states in his book a part
taken from the book of Stephens written in 2001 in which it says: “Gerhard Schröder, in
general a friend of Blair, was widely reported as saying that the traffic across Blair’s bridge
always seemed to be in one direction” (Riddell, 2004, 138). These differences in views caused
many disagreements between European leaders, or more specifically between British and the
German and French leaders. These disagreements became more frequent and severe after 11
September 2001.
Even if the criticism that he received from other European countries had shaken his view, it
would be very hard and probably impossible for Tony Blair to change course. With the strong
words he said in several speeches after the attacks he committed himself to any course the
United States would choose. Blair had already been concerned about terrorist threat before the
attacks and was determined to support the United States in their efforts to stop terrorism. On
the day of the attacks he immediately appeared in front of the cameras to express “solidarity
and support for the American people” (Riddell, 2004, 151). Two weeks later when his visited
New York and Washington he said: “We stand side by side with the US – not least because
9/11 was the most serious terrorist attack on British citizens in modern times” (Riddell, 2004,
151). These remarks were made before a war in Iraq was a serious concern. But even when
Bush had talked about going to war with Iraq and said that regime change certainly was a goal
Blair did not speak more cautious. In a meeting in April 2002 he said in a speech at the Bush
Presidential Library:
Leaving Iraq to develop WMD, in flagrant breach of no less than nine
separate UN Security Council resolutions, refusing still to allow weapons
inspectors back to do their work properly, is not an option. The regime of
Saddam is detestable. [...] If necessary the action should be military and
again, if necessary and justified it should involve regime change. (qtd in
Ridell, 2004, 199)
With these words he supported the American case for war. Although he emphasised the words
‘necessary’ and ‘justified’ to express his need for the route through the United Nations he did
not oppose the arguments Bush used to justify the war. If Blair had any doubts when criticism
was building up and public support was wavering, it would have been impossible for him to
change his course without offending the Americans, thereby damaging the relationship. As

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was the case with the Falkland war the special relationship has had great influence in the
decision-making process of British politics.
What should be kept in mind is that the American government did not push Blair in a
direction he did not want to go. Blair was convinced of the good cause of the war. His
principles had told him long before the war that the regime in Iraq was a problem. However,
the road that led to the war in Iraq might not have been the path Blair would have chosen.
Blair might have first given the inspectors more time to investigate if Iraq was developing
WMD or he might have tried harder at the UN Security Council. So in this area the
relationship has had its influence.
Conclusion
In both cases the special relationship has had its influence in the process of policy-making in
Great Britain. It might even be said that it determined the policy-making process. Although in
both cases the influence could not have been this great if the leaders of Great Britain did not
have support the case, the relationship with the United States is clearly the greatest pressure in
the process of international policy-making when it concerns Great Britain’s foreign policy
decisions, directly or indirectly. This is not surprising, because America is the biggest player
in the international community since the Second World War and has since then thought that
the American way is the right way. After the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the
Pentagon this attitude became stronger and more dominant. However, this can also be said of
Germany and France, who opposed military action against Iraq. Because the leaders of Great
Britain put more value on the relationship between Great Britain and the United States than
the leaders of for example Germany and France do, they are destined to roughly follow the
policies of the latter. Tony Blair saw a chance to gain more power by sustaining and
nourishing the relationship. However, if the leaders of the United States of America value the
relationship with Great Britain, they should take in account the wishes of British leaders. In
both cases they complied to a substantial amount of the British wishes, although it remains
questionably if they had done so too if the wishes were less compliant with their own. It is
reasonable to say that the Americans value the relationship with Great Britain less than the
British do. This is not surprising, because the United States do not need the relationship in the
way Great Britain needs it. The leaders of Great Britain must never forget that Great Britain is

59
the subordinate partner in this relationship and that therefore the influence from the United
Sates over British policy-making shall always be greater than the other way around.

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Chapter 6. The leader’s psyche
Last but not least the preference of the leader is of influence in the decision he or she has to
take. Although there are many pressures that try to push a leader into a certain direction, in the
end it depends for a great part on the character of the leader. Is he or she strong enough to
make an independent decision? Can this person judge when a pressure is important enough
not to be ignored and when it can be ignored? Regardless of all the pressures that are present,
the character of the leader also is important. What should be taken in account besides the sort
of character of the leader is that most, if not all, leaders want a place in history. This is
inherent to the wish to become a leader and thus to become important. Most of the time the
only way to be remembered is to be involved in foreign policy and make controversial
decisions. This quality of character, the search for power, is influential when decisions have to
be taken, such as the decision to go to war or not. Whether they succeed in conquering this
place in history, depends on character and judgement calls.
6.1 Margaret Thatcher
During the election of 1979 Margaret Thatcher presented herself as a woman with a goal. She
stated several times that she wanted to put the ‘Great’ back in Great Britain. According to
Sharp “she promised that, if elected, a Conservative government would embark on a radical
project of restoring Britain to its former greatness” (Sharp, 1997, 25). This was a nicely put
goal, but she never made it exactly clear how the Conservative party was going to achieve it.
In her first campaign speech in Cardiff she spoke of putting Britain “back into the
international race” (Sharp, 1997, 25). In the foreign policy of the 1979 manifesto it remains
unclear how the Conservative party planned to do this. In fact, when Margaret Thatcher came
into office in 1979 she did not take interest in foreign policy. “Thatcher had no strong foreign
policy conviction at this stage... as far as international affairs were concerned, she knew little
and cared less,” Sharp states (Sharp, 1997, 28). Her main concern in 1979 was domestic
policies and more specifically economic domestic policies. By restoring Britain’s economy
she wanted to restore Britain’s position in international society. However, restoring Britain’s
economy was not easy. In her first three years she had a rough period with much protest and
unhappiness. This was mostly to blame on the bad economic situation which countries all

61
over the world were suffering from. At the end of 1981 she was “the most unpopular British
Prime Minister since polling began” (Campbell, 2003, 124).
Margaret Thatcher was and still is a woman with strong personality. When she set her
mind on something she would go all the way to ensure she would reach that goal. She played
clever politics, she overwhelmed, she baffled, she pushed and pulled, she did whatever was
necessary to reach her goal and she never emphasized her feminity. She never wanted to be
seen solely as a woman, but rather as a politician or as a scientist. Although she used her
feminity every now and then to stress the difference between her and her male colleagues, her
style was far from feminine. Campbell states: “Her use of language was always determinedly
masculine” (Campbell, 2003, 473). She was very dominant in politics. She had a typical way
of leading the government top-down. Her will had to be obeyed, because she was convinced
of the righteousness of it. To ensure that she got her way, she put her most favourable
supporters in important positions and she made sure that critics were replaced to weak
positions or even out of the government. As Sharp puts it, she had a “poor reputation for being
willing to tolerate views which differed from hers” (Sharp, 1997, 30). She also could not
stand to lose. This was apparent in discussions in the House of Commons. She liked an
argument, but was “extraordinarily difficult to argue with, because she would never admit to
losing an argument, but would become ‘unbelievable discursive’ and illogical if the point was
going against her, abruptly changing the subject in order to retain the upper hand” (Campbell,
2003, 17). Most of the time she knew what she was talking about, because she always made
sure she read all important information there was on a subject. When she then had made up
her mind it was almost impossible for other politicians to change her mind and even when
they succeeded in changing her mind she would never openly admit this to them. She was
intelligent, had “moralistic certainty,” a “clear-cut sense of righteousness,” but was also
stubborn, single-minded and proud, which could drive her colleagues crazy (Campbell, 2003,
140). All in all she was a woman with a strong character, who most of the time knew what she
wanted and what she was doing, and who, because of this, was often difficult to work with.
It was this personality that contributed to the decision to engage in war against Argentina.
Before the islands were invaded by Argentinean forces, talks were taking place about a
solution to the sovereignty disagreement. Several solutions were proposed, but never one that
could satisfy all three parties (the British government, the Argentinean government and the
inhabitants of the Falkland islands). One of the reasons why the British government, or more
specifically Mrs. Thatcher, did not agree was that Thatcher found it difficult to cede British
territory. During her first years she “had taught the public to see her as the Iron Lady: she

62
presented herself above all as a champion of strong defence, a resolute defender of British
interests and British pride” (Campbell, 2003, 126). It was this image that she wanted to retain
(or regain) and if she had agreed to any one of the proposed solutions it meant that the islands
would eventually become Argentinean territory. At this point she already was very unpopular,
so she could not risk making a decision that would led her to lose public support completely.
She felt she had to show that she was truly an Iron Lady. She could not cave in.
Then the Argentinean forces invaded and took possession of the islands. In her eyes this
was an act of aggression against Great Britain, so it justified a military reaction. It was the
only option for her, because to not react would be like surrendering. Margaret Thatcher was
not a person to surrender to anything. Her pride prevented her to participate seriously in
negotiations. However, she played it really clever, because for the international community it
looked like she was participating. She talked to the American Secretary of State Alexander
Haig, who was the appointed negotiator, but she only made proposals of which she knew the
Argentineans could never accept. She was determined to recapture the islands. She felt she
had no choice, because her believability was at stake (and more importantly her job was at
stake too). Douglas Kinney puts it as follows: “The Thatcher government pictured itself in a
political corner in which national honor would not permit either appeasing ‘a dictator’ or
appeasing invasion, much less the two combined” (Coll, 1985, 92). Campbell confirms this
view: “Mrs. Thatcher saw recapturing the Falklands as a matter of honour – her honour as
well as the nation’s honour – which could not be ducked without lasting national shame”
(Campbell, 2003, 159). Negotiating to come to a peaceful solution was not an option,
although she had to keep up appearances for the international community. Her pride and the
fact that she could not stand to lose an argument were important reasons to engage in military
action against the Argentinean invaders. It was a challenge, one she could not resist. The
challenge was formulated in famous words by the conservative MP Enoch Powell in reference
to her being called the Iron Lady: “she would learn in the next few weeks of what metal she
was made” (Sharp, 1997, 65). The die was cast. Amidst all other influences Margaret
Thatcher’s personality led her to the one possible option: to recapture the islands through
military action.
6.2 Tony Blair
Just as Margaret Thatcher, Tony Blair is seen as a strong leader. He wants to be in control. He
made several changes in the parliamentary system to ensure that all the departments had to

63
answer to him. He created project groups that cut across departments. In this way not only did
he know all important developments that were going on in different departments, he also
made sure that the departments never forgot that they were responsive to him (Seldon and
Kavanagh, 2005, 13). But there is more to Blair than the desire to be in control. Blair is, what
Riddell calls, an “instinctive/intuitive politician” (Riddell, 2004, 12). This means that he has
an instinctive feeling what will be an important subject. He already feels that a subject will
become an important issue, before it does. It is like he has a sixth sense, or feelers, to locate
coming events. A second description that Riddell uses is that Blair “has the skills of an actor
of public performer” (Riddell, 2004, 6). He knows how to address the public and fellow
politicians. He can easily create a relaxed environment by his theatrical skills. He has the
ability to make people feel at ease and talks to them like they are at the same level. This role
as an actor has led many people to accuse him of being a “smiling chameleon” and not being
sincere (Riddell, 2004, 5). However, Tony Blair is a politician that is most of the time sincere
about the subjects he talks about. He has a strong belief in himself. He has what Ridell calls a
“strong moral compass” which he uses to separate right from wrong (Riddell, 2004, 10). If he
raises a subject on the agenda, it is because he believes it to be important. From the time he
became a politician he has had a deep concern about the violations of human rights. These
“commitments to human rights and multilateralism that Blair and Cook had placed at the heart
of foreign and security policy” were important for Blair from day one (Dunne, 2004, 906).
For him a decision is either good or bad. His former mentor Lord Jenkins said about this:
The Prime Minister, far from lacking conviction, has almost too much,
particularly when dealing with the world beyond the UK. He is a little
Manichaean for my perhaps now jaded taste, seeing matters in start terms of good
and evil, black and white, contending with each other, and with a consequent
belief that if evil is cast down good will inevitably follow (qtd. in Kramer, 2003,
98).
1
Lord Jenkins confirms not only that Blair has a strong self-belief, but also that he sees issues
either black or white.
Another quality of character is that Blair has much personal charm and he uses it to
propitiate people. He finds it difficult to let people who are in disagreement with him leave his
office. He will try to persuade him with his charm. This can lead to awkward situations, for
example with Gordon Brown, the Chancellor. Brown and his camp were convinced that Blair
1
Manichaeism is a philosophy, founded by the Persian prophet Manes, dividing the world between good and evil
principles (Dictionary.com, “Manichaeism”).

64
would hand power of to Brown in the second term after Blair had a meeting with Brown in
June 1994. This was probably an effect of Blair not being able to say in harsh words that that
would not happen (Riddell, 2004, 11-12). All in all, Blair has a strong personality with
instinct, actor skills, a moral compass, a great amount of self-confidence and personal charm.
In British foreign policy, Blair showed his strong personality, among other things, in his
conviction that Great Britain should be the bridge between Europe and the United States of
America. After his electoral victory in 1997 he said at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet on 10
November 1997: “We are the bridge between the US and Europe” (Wallace, 2005, 55). This
phrase would be used many more times after this speech. He did not believe as many other
politicians did, that he had to choose between the United States or Europe. It was and
probably still is Blair’s belief “that close relations with Europe are fully compatible with the
special relationship with the United States” (Kramer, 2003, 96). Many of his decisions that
concerned the US and Europe were taken on this firm belief that Great Britain should function
as a bridge.
His decision to take part in the war against Iraq can be led back to this conviction. When it
became obvious that George Bush wanted to attack Iraq, Blair immediately chose to support
Bush. He was aware that there was much protest from West-European countries, especially
from France and Germany, but he did not want Bush to take unilateral action. He saw an
opportunity to act as the bridge between the US and Europe. Many think that this was an
unwise decision and a miscalculation. A miscalculation because Blair thought himself too
important. He thought that he could make a difference in a situation that was out of his control
to start with. These critics thought that this was a moment that he should have stayed away
from the Americans. They accused him of leading Britain into “punch[ing] above its weight”
(Gray, 2004, 47). According to them, Blair deemed himself more important than he was by
joining Bush in the war against Iraq, thinking he could influence him. However, what these
critics did not realise was that Blair really believed what he was fighting for. Maybe they are
right in saying that Blair thought himself more important than he was. This does not mean that
he did not believe in the cause.
He believed it was worse to let the United States go to war alone. The United States would
never feel the necessity anymore to ask for assistance or legal authorisation. Blair feared that
if the United States were allowed to take unilateral action they would go out of control in
similar situations.
Another instance in foreign policy where his strong personality showed was in the case of
the Balkan war. In this case violations of human rights happened on enormous scale. In

65
Kosovo there was a war going on between to nationalities: the Serbs and the Albanians.
Although the Serbs were the minority in the country they used excessive force to oppress the
Albanians. They used ethnic cleansing to vanquish the Albanians. This meant that they burned
whole village and slaughtered every Albanian they could get their hands on. This issue
appealed to Blair’s moral feelings and principles. Although the international community
watched passively for several years, it finally aroused in 1998. After several unsuccessful
rounds of negotiations, Tony Blair was one of the first to call for military action. In a speech
he made on April 22, 1999 to the Economic Club of Chicago, he said that the Kosovo war
was a “just war, based not on any territorial ambitions but on values” (qtd. in Kramer, 2003,
98). Already in 1999 Blair justified military action with values and principles. These values
and principles were in 2003 again one of the reasons to participate in the war against Iraq.
An article in The Economist in 2002 summarises Blair’s reasons for joining Bush in the
war:
First, because he thinks that it is right to do so. The risks of not taking action
against Iraq, he believes, are greater than the risks of doing so. He has a history of
standing firm on issues he believes in, in foreign affairs at least [...] Second, Mr
Blair believes that a widening split between America and Europe, at this tense
time, would have disastrous consequences for world stability. He reckons he is
better placed than anybody else to try to close the gap [...] Third the issue goes to
the heart of Mr Blair’s world view. He believes that the growth of American
power since the end of the cold war means that anybody who wants to change the
world for the better can do so only with American assent. American power must
be harnessed as a force for good in the world, and only a loyal ally – such as he
has shown himself to be – can achieve that. (The Economist, 7 September 2002,
41)
This summary has almost all the characteristics of Blair’s personality description in it.
However, there is also a downside to his character. Because he has the skills of an actor it is
difficult to tell if he is sincere. He might just be telling people what they want to hear. What
he says depends much on public opinion and the amount of criticism he might be receiving.
Already in his pre-election politics he did not want to state clear directions about his politics,
because he feared they would turn against him during the election campaign. Anne
Applebaum recognises a pattern in his politics: “make strong proposals, allow them to be
picked up and mulled over by the press, retreat if the criticism is too harsh” (Applebaum,
1997, 51). This can be led back to his habit of not wanting to offend people. He wants to be

66
everybody’s friend. In the case of war against Iraq he could not be everybody’s friend. He
decided that Bush was his most important friend, who should not be offended.
The fact that he used his moral principles to justify his own motives for war, may just have
been a nice performance to convince the public that he meant well. The public fell for it too.
In a survey that was done three weeks before the decision to go to war was taken 40 percent
of the questioned persons said that they believed that Blair’s policy on Iraq was based on his
sense of morality and justice. In the same survey 41 percent said that they believed that Blair
was misguided by the United States and 58 percent said that the case for war had not been
made (YouGov, 1 March 2003, 2). He did not fool the public completely, for they still were
not supportive of war, although they believed he was sincere. They thought that he was
misguided by the United States, but it is more likely that the public itself was misguided by
Tony Blair. He must have been well aware of what was the aim of the United States and must
also have been aware that the case for war would be made on unstable grounds. However, he
valued the relationship with the United States enough to take the chance.
Another problem which has been already stated above by Lord Jenkins is that Blair has too
much confidence. He was convinced of his ability to turn matters in the right, or rather his,
direction. He did not hesitate to use his charm to dazzle the public and colleagues in order to
get his way. Even when only 12% of the public supported an attack on Iraq without UN
backing, he did not back off (The Economist, 7 September 2002, 41). He saw an opportunity
to gain his place in history books and simultaneously free a population from its dictator. Thus
it can be said that a big reason to participate in action against in Iraq were Blair’s personality
and principles, although it may have led him to defeat. There are however strong indications
that Blair truly believed there was a good cause for military action in Iraq. Steven Philip
Kramer names in his article a commentator Hugo Young who has stated that “Blair even said
that if Bush had held back from intervening in Iraq, Blair would have pushed him in that
direction” (qtd in Kramer, 2003, 97). This is probably put too strongly, but the fact remains
that Blair’s previously stated foreign policy statements left him hardly any choice but to join
George Bush in the war. Unfortunately for him he overestimated his own capabilities, the
capabilities of Great Britain, the United Nations, and the United States. Blair certainly has a
strong personality, but it does not necessarily mean that it leads him to take wise decisions. In
this case he would be better off had he not joined the war.

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6.3 Two personalities taken together
Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair both are leaders that have a strong will. To become a
leader, one must have a strong personality, but there are different degrees. John Mayor, for
example, is a Prime Minister who did not become known for his strong character. Margaret
Thatcher and Tony Blair are Prime Ministers that are known because of their strong
personalities, positively as well as negatively. Although there are similarities between the
characters of Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair, there are also differences.
Margaret Thatcher has proven herself to be trustworthy if it comes to doing what she said
she would be doing. She has earned her title ‘the Iron Lady’ in the Falklands War. She had an
uncompromising attitude, in other words she could not be bend in any other way than her
way. This attitude left her no other choice than to recover the Falklands islands. She had
always been very clear about wanting to make Great Britain great again and giving up the
Falklands islands did not fit that image. This straightforwardness did not mean that she did
not listen to her colleagues. On the contrary, she had many debates with her fellow MP’s. The
problem was that she was always very well prepared, so that it was difficult for other
politicians to disprove her arguments. She loved the game of politics. It was not just the
gaining of power that satisfied her, but winning an argument by debate, or convincing a
colleague that her way was the best way. She reshuffled Parliament many times in order to
remove critical colleagues and to surround her with more supportive colleagues. This was all
part of her game. She played politics real clever and enjoyed every second of it. This made
her such a good politician.
Tony Blair is more an aluminium man. He can bend himself in any way people want to see
him. Hence the criticism of being a smiling chameleon. He could just be letting the people see
what they want to see, but doing his own way anyway. Or, more probable, he could just be
missing a little bit of backbone to stand firm and say what he is planning to do and then do it.
He misses the straightforwardness, energy and clearness of Margaret Thatcher. His chameleon
skills may enable him to make more friends at the start, but they do not enable him to receive
the lasting support he needs in the end. He missed the public support he needed for the war
against Iraq, but his eagerness to do the right thing and put his name in history books made
him decide to join anyway. His want for power may cause his downfall.
Another difference is that they came from different parties. Margaret Thatcher was the
leader of the Conservative Party and Tony Blair was the leader of the Labour Party. They both
should have had different principles according to their political background. Margaret

68
Thatcher should have made decisions that supported the national feeling of Great Britain. She
wanted to put the ‘great’ back in Great Britain. She should have spent money on the army,
because that is what is of importance to the Conservative Party. Although the decision to go to
war was supported by the principles of the Conservative Party, it is not credible, because she
made a decision previously to war to spend less on the army. Tony Blair should have been
opposed to more expenses in the foreign affairs area. The Labour Party’s primary goals are to
spend more on domestic problems and make life easier for the working class. The decision to
join in the war therefore did not comply with his party’s principles. Although Thatcher and
Blair came from different parties, they both showed that parties’ principles do not matter in
international crisis situations. They were led by many influences, but their parties’ principles
were not among them.
Conclusion
Both Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair were leaders with a strong personality. This
personality led them to present themselves in a certain way, to make certain comments, and to
adopt certain policies that made it almost impossible for them not to undertake military action.
Margaret Thatcher had presented herself as the Iron Lady that would restore British pride and
nationality. When British territory was taken she could not ignore this, because it would show
that she was not an Iron Lady after all and because it hurt national pride. Tony Blair had
presented himself as a man with many sides. One side was that he was a politician with
principles and a moral compass. His foreign policy was based on these moral ethics. When the
possibility came along to free Iraq from its dictator, and simultaneously put his name on the
international chart, he simply could not let this chance go. He saw an opportunity to gain
more power, so he took it. After all, is that not what all politicians want: a place in history?

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Chapter 7. Conclusion
Although both cases have similarities there are also many differences. In this chapter the two
cases are described separately with regard to influences. A general conclusion that can be
drawn from the described cases in this research paper, concludes this chapter.
7.1 The Falklands War
Margaret Thatcher was the leader of the Conservative Party when she was elected in 1979.
The Conservative Party has traditionally been known as a party that applies to the elite of
society. It is also known for having much concern with defence and patriotism. Thus far this
view of the Conservative Party strokes with the decision to go to war against Argentina. The
foreign policy and defence decisions taken when the Conservative Party took office in 1979
did not stroke with this view. In the manifesto of 1979 relatively little space was spent on
foreign policy, contrary to previous years. What was stated in the manifesto was what the
electorate could expect, namely the increase of the Army budget, the raise of military
payment, improvement of military equipment, and the creation of better living conditions.
However, the Conservative Party did not want to make these promises irreversible, so they
implanted a sentence that they always had to consult with the Chiefs of Staff before any
decisions could be made. This clause made it possible for the Conservatives to find an excuse
if they were to depart from their line. They did depart from their line, because in 1981
Minister of Defence John Nott announced severe cuts in naval forces. They did exactly what
the Labour party said it would do, if they were the governing party. The Conservative Party
distanced itself from the statements it had made in the manifesto just before the invasion in
1982. At that point they did not follow their party ideologies. Party ideologies are only used
when convenient. It is not probable that the political grounds of the party were decisive when
the decision to go to war had to be taken. It is more likely that it was convenient, because the
electorate would have no reason to question the government’s decision, for it concurred with
their party ideologies.
The economic circumstances were of more importance. In the years before Argentina
invaded the Falkland Islands there was an economic slowdown. Both unemployment and
inflation were high. In April 1981 riots completed the turmoil. Because Thatcher was unable
to improve the economy to people’s satisfaction, many lost faith in her. This included the

70
support of her Cabinet members. For Thatcher the Falklands war was an excellent opportunity
to lead the attention away from the domestic problems and to restore people’s faith in her.
The Falklands war not only was a convenient solution to the domestic problems it was also
the solution to relieving the pressure put on Thatcher by the pressure group of the Falkland
islanders. They did not want sovereignty to be turned over to Argentina. They obstructed
every possible solution by lobbying to get enough support in Parliament against possible
transfer. The invasion by the Argentineans made it easy for her to finally comply with the
islanders’ wishes. After the invasion there was no question of handing over sovereignty to
Argentina.
Public opinion also was a strong incentive for Thatcher to recapture the islands. First,
because public opinion blamed her for the invasion and second because public opinion was
almost completely with her if she decided to send a task force to recapture the islands. The
first reason pushed her to this decision because she wanted to rebuild her image and restore
faith in her again. The second reason was a pressure, because she knew that the recapture was
what the British people expected. To ignore this pressure might easily have been her
downfall. At this point political support was low too. When the campaign was already
initiated there was a moment that politicians withdrew their support for military action and
preferred a diplomatic solution instead. To win this war would, according to Thatcher, solve
all her problems, and she proved to be right.
The press too was very supportive. Almost all news organisations preferred a military
solution. The islands had to be retaken. The only unsupportive newspaper, the Daily Mirror,
received much criticism from other newspapers and the reporters were often called traitors.
All domestic sources supported Thatcher if she decided to take military action. At the same
time they blamed her for letting it get this far. Why it had gotten this far was partly to blame
on intelligence and especially the interpretation and attached value of it. In the period before
the Argentineans invaded the islands intelligence assessments continuously reached the
British government. The first warning already came in July 1981. An intelligence assessment
of the JIC warned the government that Argentina might turn to military action, including a
full-scale invasion, if there was no hope of the transfer of sovereignty. This was confirmed by
a letter of the British Naval Defence Attaché in Buenos Aires. So when negotiations were
broken off on the first of March 1982 Thatcher might have expected military action and even
a full-scale invasion. She just could not believe that any government would turn to military
means in such a dispute, but she misjudged the Argentine President Galtieri. He came to
power with the use of military force, so it should not have surprised her that he would again

71
turn to military means to get his way. Of course it is easy to say this in hindsight, but fact is
that she ignored several intelligence assessments that warned her for the event to come. The
intelligence had not so much influence on her decision to go to war, but her ignorance of it led
her to the war.
A factor that did influence her decision to go to war was the relationship between her and
the American President Ronald Reagan. She had established a good relationship with Reagan
in the one and a half year before the Argentine invasion. They had many shares ideas about
communism and the free market economy. They discussed many political issues and she often
advised Reagan or asked his advice. She was confident that she could count on his support in
the case of the Falklands war. This presupposition gave her the confidence she needed to
make the decision. When at first she did not receive full support she was outraged. She used
all diplomatic ways to convince the Americans of her being right in recapturing the islands by
force. When she eventually received full support she said that she always had expected it.
This shows again how confident she was about her relationship with Reagan. This
relationship was the last pressure that tipped the scale towards the decision to undertake
military action to retake the Falkland Islands.
The reason that Margaret Thatcher turned to the Conservative Party was because of her
strong feelings of pride and nationalism. The Conservative Party must have appealed more to
her character than the Labour Party did. So it can be said that Margaret Thatcher’s personality
was of decisive influence. This personality caused her to become a member of the
Conservative Party in the first place and it also caused her to be unable to say no to the
challenge of removing the Argentineans from the Falkland Islands. She was a headstrong lady
who most of the time knew what she wanted and how to get it. She also was a proud lady with
strong nationalist feelings. When the islands were taken, it did not only hurt her pride but also
her nationalist sense. Everything in her character must have revolted. She was the Iron Lady
and she could not resist the challenge to show that she really was what she had said.
The economic and social instability, together with the confidence given by the relationship
with Reagan and her personality were the decisive factors that made Thatcher decide that she
had to recover the islands from the Argentineans. Most important was her character. This
invasion was a challenge she could not resist. Even when she did not yet have the support
from the United States she continued military action, while in the meantime ensuring through
diplomatic pressure that she would receive American support before the war was over. The
only scenario where she might have hesitated was if the United States were supporting
Argentina and therefore were an opponent of Great Britain. Maybe then she would have

72
hesitated. So although the relationship with the United States was not the most decisive factor
to go to war, it had just enough influence to make the decision easy.
7.2 The Iraq war
The war against Iraq was a different story. Not only was Great Britain not the initiator, but
pressurising factors were not as unanimously supportive as they were in the case of the
Falklands war. In the period leading up to the war much pressure was put on Tony Blair. Most
pressures, however, were advocating against war, or at least not yet. This pressure came
mainly from fellow politicians and much opposition came from within his own party.
The Labour Party has traditionally been known for its lack of attention to foreign policy,
because they find other subjects, like the National Health Service and the Welfare State, more
important. Those are the areas where the money should go to. Thus the fact that Tony Blair
decided to join the war did not agree with his party’s ideology. However, the manifesto of
2001 contained foreign policy statements that did not agree with this ideology. In this
manifesto it was said that more money would be spent on armed forces. It should be spent on
management and efficiency so that money could be saved in the future. The Labour Party
realised that in order to save money later they had to spend money first. It still remains a fact
however, that Labour prefers to spend more money on domestic sources than it does on
foreign policy.
This fact may have been the reason why he received much criticism from within his own
party. They did not agree with him, not only because the case was not made strongly enough,
but also because it was against their party principles. Although most Labour MPs voted ‘aye’
to the case for war (62%) it must have been painful for Blair to not have full support from his
own party. He even got more support from the Conservatives (90%). Although many
politicians questioned the case for war, they were mostly supportive if the government were to
join military action.
Other groups that were not convinced of the justness of the war, were the press and many
pressure groups. Because of the current information technology much information is directly
available to anyone who wants it. In the case of Iraq this meant that findings of the
Inspections did not long stay a secret. The press was very sceptical about the WMD claim,
because it had no information they existed. This was strange, because news organisations had
journalists everywhere, including in Iraq. They should have heard something about it.
Because of the lack of information the press was hard to convince. Critical articles were

73
written and this influenced the public and pressure groups. Many pressure groups arose, all
advocating against war. Demonstrations were organised. The army too expressed its concern
about military action, because of the lack of intelligence and support. Blair had to be aware of
these protests, but he chose to ignore them.
A third factor that was not convinced of the case for war was the public. Although the
public believed Blair’s moral grounds for the war, it was not convinced of the legal grounds
for war. People believed that he was misled by the United States and that he should not go on
with it if the United Nations did not support the action. They even said that he should stand
down if the war proved a failure, when he decided to go on with it. Tony Blair must have been
aware that he was taking a great risk with pushing through this decision to go to war. He did it
anyway, for he had a strong factor pressuring him to join the war, namely the United States of
America.
The United States were the initiators of the war against Iraq. After the attacks on 11
September 2001 they did not want to take a risk with states that posed a threat to their society.
They judged that Iraq was such a risky state and therefore should be handled. Saddam
Hussein had been a dangerous individual for a long time and it was now time that he should
be removed. The American government asked allies to join them and because it was the
biggest player in the international community it was hard to refuse. There were, however,
countries that did refuse. Great Britain was not one of them. Blair had always seen Great
Britain as the bridge between the United States and Europe. In this case he saw an opportunity
to play a big part in uniting the two. He saw an opportunity to gain more power. That was not
the only reason to join the United States. He also feared that it would be dangerous to let the
United States act alone. It would disrupt the balance of power in the world. He feared that if
they were allowed to act alone in this case, there would follow many comparable cases and
no-one would be able to stop them. To join the United States would not only give Blair a
chance to temper American feelings but also to rise in American’s estimation. To rise in the
most powerful player’s estimation, would give Blair more power.
The fact that he too believed that Saddam Hussein was a threat, was of less importance. It
is said that he decided to join the war because of his strong moral feelings. He was abhorred
by the violation of human rights in Iraq. It is true that his foreign policy that was already
stated in 1997 was based on these moral principles. However, these violations in Iraq were
long going on and Blair never decided to change this. It was not until the United States took
the initiative that Blair started to actively propagate against Saddam Hussein and his horrible
regime. He must have personally supported the case for war; else he would not have gone

74
through so much trouble to sell the case for war to the House of Commons. But the fact that
he believed in the case was not as important as the fact that he believed the relationship with
the United States too important to deny. This war was also an opportunity for him to gain
more power. If the war succeeded Great Britain would emerge as a victor and receive more
respect, from the British as well as the international community. Tony Blair would be
remembered as the Labour Prime Minister that freed Iraq from it dictator. A chance to gain
more power is always irresistible for a leader.
The war also came in a convenient moment. The economy was just recovering from a
major setback, but it still was a long way from being in balance again. Unemployment was
high, exports were low, trade unions were unsatisfied because of their diminishing influence,
and taxes had to be raised to enable the government’s high public spending. This caused much
social unrest. There were even rumours of strikes. With the war against Iraq Blair could focus
on something else for a moment, and if it went well, it would give him the support he needed
to solve the domestic problems. The economic situation, therefore, was a factor that also
pressured him towards the decision to go to war.
An often debated subject in this case is the use of intelligence. Intelligence had much
influence in the decision to join the war, but not in the actual decision to go. Tony Blair had
taken the decision already, but he needed intelligence to convince the House of Commons. It
depended on this House if the mission would take place. Intelligence was made look stronger
than it actually was, so that the members of the House of Commons would be more easily
convinced. Blair must have been aware that the claims that were stated in the government’s
intelligence report were not all proven beyond doubt. However, he used them anyway because
he had already promised Bush that Great Britain would join. He wanted to maintain the
special relationship at any cost.
The fact that so many factors propagating against war did not change Blair’s mind must
make clear that to join the US in the war against Iraq was most important to Tony Blair. He
risked everything to get is way. Although the United Sates is the biggest player in
international society, Blair could have said no. The leaders of France and Germany did. The
fact that Tony Blair did not do this was because he saw a chance to play an important role on
the international stage. He probably hoped that by doing this Great Britain would itself
become a more important player. He allowed American pressure to appear greater than it was,
because he saw Great Britain as the most important ally of the United States. He put too much
value on the relationship. Political party ideologies were long forgotten. The only thoughts
that survived were the preservation of the special relationship and the search for power.

75
7.3 General Assessment
When an international crisis is evolving pressures come from many sides. It would be easy for
a leader to look only at his party ideologies and base his decision on them. This may be
possible when it concerns domestic problems, but when it concerns foreign policy problems
everyone wants to have a say. Domestic sources that are hardly ever heard when domestic
problems are in the process of decision-making, suddenly arise when international decisions
have to be taken. This is because international problems apply more to the sense of
nationality. When domestic problems are discussed it often results in complicated discussions
that are only understood by people with knowledge on the subject. Many people simply do
not care. When international problems are handled, it is in the news, it is talked about
everywhere and people care. Even if people do not have the knowledge to say anything wise
about it, they want to talk about it. Suddenly it is them and us. People unite and form pressure
groups. The press is more outspoken and surveys about public opinion are done more often. A
leader experiences much more pressure from domestic sources when a decision in an
international crisis situation has to be taken. It is important for a leader to take these domestic
sources in account, because if he loses support from all of his domestic sources, it will be
unsustainable for him or her to remain Prime Minister.
The external sources also become important in an international crisis. Many countries
immediately intervene and exercise pressure. They can influence a decision by convincing a
leader that sanctions need to be taken first against an aggressor. They can ask for deterrence
through the threat of using force. They can also ask for military action. They often contradict
each other and the leader then has to decide to which group of countries he will listen. The
best choice often is to side with the country on which Great Britain depends the most. This is
almost always the United States, because it is the biggest player in international society. The
most pressure is therefore often felt from American side. Not so much because the United
States actively exercises this influence, but because leader want to share in the power of the
United States. The only way to do this is by joining them, whenever possible. However, the
leader still has to question if it is the right thing to do, because it can have long-lasting
consequences when the decision of the United States turns out to have devastating results.
Instead of gaining more power a leader can lose his or her power. Blair wanted to join the
war, because he saw a chance to gain more power for Great Britain. Thatcher chose to use
diplomacy to get the United States on her side. Both leaders realised that they could not
manage without the help of the United States.

76
Last but not least the personality of a leader is of consequence. This was clear in the case
of Margaret Thatcher. Her pride and nationalist feelings left her no other choice but to
recapture the islands. The character of a leader can lead him or her towards a certain decision.
It influences the way the leader reacts to the different kind of pressures. In Blair’s case, for
example, his personal beliefs made him value the relationship with the United States in such a
way that he choose to side with them even if it risked him his job. This does not mean that a
different leader would not have made the same decision. It is very likely that they would have
done the same, because every leader wants the opportunity to gain more power. However, he
or she might have stood firmer. He or she might have required another UN resolution. It
would have made the decision to go to war more justifiable and in this way a leader could
have avoided the harshest criticism.
Apart from these influences the use of parties in general is questionable. They are useful,
because they give the electorate a choice between ideologies. However, once the parties have
taken office they behave alike. This is not surprising because both parties encounter the same
problems, for example a shortage of rented houses. Whoever is in government has to deal
with this problem, which has little to do with party ideologies. The way in which they choose
to solve a problem can be dependent on party ideology; the result will be the same. The
problem has to be solved. Much also depends on the available money. A party can
ideologically have a good solution, but if the money to enable this solution is not there, it has
to rely on other less expensive solutions. A party can state, as the Conservative Party did in
1979, to spend more money on the armed forces, but if during governing years there is a
money shortage they will have to deal with this and even spend less on the armed forces. The
decisions that are made in government often depend on the economic situation at the time.
Only when there is more than enough money can a governing party try to implement their
stated goals and follow their party ideology. Unfortunately, the last decades have been marked
more by national debts than by surpluses. It can be said that it does not make an elementary
difference which party is in government. The direction it will move in will be the same as the
other party would have moved in because of uncontrollable internal and external influences.
In the cases described in this research paper other sources than party ideologies played a
decisive role in the decision. In both cases it turned out to be a different influence that was
most important. In one case it was the leader’s personality and in the other case it was the
relationship between Great Britain and the United States of America. If other cases were to be
studied, it would probably turn out that the relationship with the United States often plays the
most important role. This will certainly involve cases that are initiated by the United States.

77
Everyday the influence of the United States is growing more. The desire of America to be
seen as an example for the rest of the world is also growing. This will cause more pressure
from the United States in future. Political preference, although it may coincide with a
decision, does not have decisive influence in decision-making in international crisis situations.
In the first chapter I gave a theoretical description of how the decision-making process
works. The government proposes a policy bill, or an administration bill, and it is discussed in
the House of Commons. The House of Commons has the power to approve or reject a bill.
The bill is also put before the House of Lords although they do not have the power to reject a
bill altogether. When the bill is approved in the House of Commons it is already certain that
the content of the bill will be executed. Both major parties are always represented in the
House of Commons. The number of members depends on how much of the majority the
winning party has received. One can expect that the most opposition will come from the
opposition because of the conflicting parties’ principles. However, in practice it often turns
out that the most opposition comes from inside the governing party. The backbenchers often
are the ones that question the motives of the frontbenchers. The fact that the opposition often
agrees with a bill is because before it is put in front of the House of Commons it is debated
several times. The governing party realises that in order to get it approved it needs the support
of the opposition and therefore formulates it in a manner that can carry the approval of the
opposition. The bills that are put in front of the House of Commons often concern everyday
politics that are not controversial. There is often no reason for the opposition to object,
because the subjects concerned need to be dealt with anyway. Every now and then there is an
important bill, such as a decision to go to war, that can receive much opposition. The
government will ensure in such a case that the bill is supported with strong arguments to
convince the opposition, as was the case with war against Iraq. So although on paper and for
the public the British politically system follows the Adversary model, in practice they agree
more with the Consensus model. The Consensus model supports my thesis statement that
political preference does not make a difference in the decision-making in international crisis
situations.

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Suggestions for Additional Research
 The case of the Suez Canal should be looked at from the point of view used in this
research paper. In this case Great Britain and the United States of America were
opposites. How did this change the pressures?
 A governing period of a leader with a less outspoken character should be studied.
Does this person behave in the same way; is he more or less influential?

79
Appendices
Appendix A
Timetable Falkland Islands War
General important events
British decisions and events
November 1980: First suggestion of a lease-back
arrangement, by Thatcher’s Secretary of State
Nicholas Ridley. The islanders refuse to accept it
9 July 1981: British government receives
intelligence from the Joint Intelligence Committee
(JIC) stating that Argentina may turn to military
action when there is no hope of sovereignty to be
transferred. A full-scale invasion cannot be
discounted in this event
20 December 1981: Argentine scrap-metal merchant
lands on South Georgia
9 January 1982: British Ambassador to Argentina
lodges formal protest against landing
12 January 1982: Argentine Joint Armed Forces
Committee planning military invasion of Islands
24 January 1982: Junta’s plans to capture Islands
revealed in a series of articles in La Prensa
newspaper
2 February 1982: Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
in a private letter to a Conservative Party activist
makes clear that she regards the Royal Marine
presence in Stanley as sufficient to prevent an
Argentine invasion
3 February 1982: Britain renews its formal protest
against the merchant’s unauthorised landing
9 February 1982: Thatcher confirms retirement of
HMS Endurance
20 February 1982: Deputy Foreign Minister Richard
Luce begins sovereignty talks with his Argentine
counterpart Ernesto Ros in New York
1 March 1982: British and Argentine deputy foreign
ministers issue a joint communiqué praising the
‘cordial and positive spirit’ of sovereignty
discussions held in New York
2 March 1982: Argentine foreign minister rejects
the communiqué and says that Argentina reserves
the right to ‘employ other means’ if Britain keeps
refusing to cede sovereignty
3 March 1982: MP Julian Amery asks if ‘all
necessary means are in hand to ensure the protection
of the Islands against unexpected attack’ but
receives an evasive reply
5 March 1982: Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington
refuses to send a submarine to patrol off the Islands
and South Georgia
6 March 1982: Hercules Aircraft operated by
Argentine military airline LADE, supposedly on a
mail run to an Antarctic base, lands at Stanley
Airport, falsely claiming a fuel leak, and carrying
several senior Argentine officers whom the local
LADE commandant takes on a tour of Stanley and

80
its environs
8 March 1982: Thatcher asks the Foreign Office and
Ministry of Defence for contingency plans in case
of an Argentine blockade or invasion of the Islands
9 March 1982: around this date the Ministry of
Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
receive a letter from the British naval defence
Attaché in Buenos Aires telling about the possibility
of an invasion in the latter half of the year and about
the Argentine preference for coups
10 March 1982: an officer in the Defence
Intelligence Staff of the Ministry of Defence
circulated a minute in the Ministry of Defence as
well as the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in
which it said that the Argentine Navy would push
eventually for military action against the Islands,
but that the Army and the Argentine President
Galtieri were not thinking along those lines
19 March 1982: an Argentine metal-scrap merchant
again lands on South Georgia without permission
and hoists the Argentine Flag. Britain lodges a
formal protest
20 March 1982: Thatcher sends HMS Endurance
and 24 Royal Marines from Stanley to South
Georgia
23 March 1982: Merchant sails from South Georgia,
but some workmen are left on the island
24 March 1982: Endurance arrives at South
Georgia, but receives message not to remove
workmen. New vessel lands on South Georgia with
Argentine workmen
26 March 1982: Argentine government says it will
give all necessary protection to the workmen on
South Georgia.
Argentine junta brings forward its invasion plan
from a national holiday on 25 May or 9 July
because of the deteriorating situation
26 March 1982: British intelligence source in
Buenos Aires warns that an Argentine invasion of
the Islands is imminent but the British government
dismisses the warning.
British Ministry of Defence advises the government
against a military response
27 March 1982: Two Argentine missile boats sail
south to South Georgia
28 March 1982: Argentina restates its claim to the
Falkland Islands and Dependencies, tells Britain
there will be no negotiations on South Georgia,
cancels leave for military and diplomatic personnel,
sends stores and equipment to naval bases of Puerto
Belgrano (Argentina) which is at a overflight
distance from Stanley
28 March 1982: Britain begins contingency plans
for the sending of a task force to the Islands.
Carrington ask US Secretary of State Alexander
Haig to intercede with the junta in an attempt to
avoid military action
29 March 1982: Joint Intelligence Committee
reports an invasion seems imminent.
Intelligence is received describing Argentine
officers’ view that military action will stop short of
full-scale invasion.
Thatcher orders three (or one) nuclear submarines
south to the Islands.
Royal Fleet auxiliary sails south to provide support
for HMS Endurance.
New Royal Marine detachments arrive at Stanley
aboard a research ship
30 March 1982: Carrington says a diplomatic
solution is pursued.
The British Naval Defence Attaché warns that 5

81
Argentine warships including a nuclear submarine
are sailing to South Georgia and another four
warships had sailed from Puerto Belgrano in
Argentina.
31 March 1982: Junta takes final decision to invade
the Islands on Friday 2 April.
31 March 1982: Chief of Navy Staff Admiral Sir
Henry Leach advises a crisis meeting headed by
Thatcher that Britain could and should send a task
force if the Islands are invaded.
Thatcher receives intelligence that Argentina is
watching reaction from Great Britain. The
intelligence expects some military action but not a
full-scale invasion.
Governor Rex Hunt is informed Britain believes
Argentina is planning a submarine landing on the
Islands as a means of increasing pressure over South
Georgia.
Thatcher telegraphs American President Ronald
Reagan asking him to warn the Argentines off.
Royal Marines commander Brigadier Julian
Thompson is informed of the crisis.
Later this day John Nott receives information from
Ministry of Defence officials that the Argentine
fleet is preparing an invasion on Friday 2 April
1 April 1982: UN Security Council meets at
Britain’s request and calls for restraint and
avoidance of force.
Reagan warns Argentine junta leader General
Galtieri not to take military action.
1 April 1982: British submarine Splendid sails from
Faslane.
Governor Hunt is informed that Britain now
believes a full invasion is planned and summons an
immediate meeting of government heads of
departments. He warns the Islander in a radio
broadcast and mobilises the Royal Marines and
Falkland Islands Defence Force.
Admiral Leach orders ships on exercise in the
Mediterranean to prepare to sail south
2 April 1982: Argentinean forces invade the Islands
2 April 1982: Emergency cabinet meeting approves
the sending of the task force to liberate the Islands.
3 April 1982: House of Commons endorses the
decision to send a task force.
Sources: Franks, Lord. Falkland Islands Review: Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors. London,
January 1983.
Falklands.info. 1982 Falklands War Timeline.
http://www.falklands.info/history/82timeline.html
Falklandswar.org.uk. Chronology of Events.
http://www.falklandswar.org.uk/chron.htm

82
Appendix B
Timetable Iraq war 2003
General important events
British decisions and events
January-April 1990: Gulf War. In April Iraq accepts
an UN resolution requiring it to end weapons of
mass destruction and to allow monitoring by UN
inspectors
16 -19 December 1998: Operation Desert Fox. After
Iraq fails to co-operate with the UN, the US and
Great Britain launch four days of air strikes.
Inspections are reinstated
11 September 2001: Terrorists attack the World
Trade Centre and the Pentagon in the United States
of America. Attitudes towards terrorism change.
30 January 2002: in the first State of the Union
address after the attacks on 11 September 2001 US
President George W. Bush calls Iraq part of the axis
of evil
5 July 2002: UN and Iraq fail to come to an
agreement about inspections in Iraq
12 September 2002: President Bush addresses UN
to put the case for war against Iraq
16 September 2002: Iraq accepts ‘unconditional’
return of inspectors
24 September 2002: British government publishes
dossier ‘Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction,’
claiming to have evidence of WMD
30 September 2002: US rejects proposal about
return of inspectors, because several demands are
not met. Return only possible with a new UN
resolution
8 November 2002: UN Security Council votes
unanimously to back a US-British resolution
(resolution 1441) requiring Iraq to reinstate
weapons inspectors after a four year absence
13 November 2002: Saddam Hussein accepts
resolution
18 November 2002: Inspectors arrive in Baghdad
22 November 2002: Russian President Vladimir
Putin warns President Bush not to go it alone
against Iraq
2 December 2002: British government publishes a
dossier documenting human rights abuses in Iraq
7 December 2002: Iraqi officials present the UN a
12,000 page dossier disclosing Iraq’s programmes
of weapons of mass destruction as demanded by
resolution 1441
18 December 2002: Foreign Secretary Jack Straw
indicates that the government believes that Iraq is in
breach of the UN resolution
19 December 2002: US accuses Baghdad of being
in material breach of the UN resolution
31 December 2002: Member of UN inspection team
reveals that there is no evidence found of weapons
of mass destruction. He also claims that the team
receives almost no help from western intelligence
agencies

83
6 January 2003: Saddam Hussein says that he is
ready for war, accuses inspectors of being spies and
calls his enemies the “friends and helpers of Satan”
9 January 2003: Hans Blix, UN’s chief weapons
inspector, says that there is no evidence of weapons
of mass destruction, but acknowledges that the Iraqi
dossier is incomplete
11 January 2003: A British naval task force leaves
for the Gulf carrying some 3,000 marines
13 January 2003: Prime Minister Tony Blair says in
his monthly televised briefing that WMD will reach
terrorists and that Britain could act against Iraq with
the US without a second UN resolution
19 January 2003: The US offers Saddam Hussein
immunity from prosecution if his departure from
Baghdad would avert war
5 February 2003: The US makes case for war with
an intelligence dossier in a determined attempt to
win over international opinion
7 February 2003: Downing Street admits that much
of its dossier on Iraq, released a week earlier in an
attempt to reinforce the case for war, was lifted
from academic sources and compiled by mid-level
officials in Alastair Campbell's Downing Street
communications department
8 February 2003: Hans Blix receives new
documents from Iraq and describes key talks with
Iraqi officials as ‘very substantial’
10 February 2003: France, Germany and Belgium
veto a US request for NATO to make plans to
protect Turkey if Saddam Hussein attacks, throwing
the Atlantic alliance into one of its worst-ever crises
11 February 2003: NATO's plans to defend Turkey
in case of war with Iraq remain deadlocked after
France, Germany and Belgium ignore the entreaties
of their fellow allies to back down
12 February 2003: UN inspectors announce they
have discovered that Iraq possesses illegal missiles:
they exceed the maximum range of 150 km
14 February 2003: Hans Blix reports that there is
much compliance from Iraqi side, thereby
undermining the British and US plans for a new
resolution mandating military action
15 February 2003: Biggest-ever protests in Great
Britain. Around one million protesters in London.
24 February 2003: Russia, France and Germany put
forward a counter-proposal to America’s and
Britain’s draft resolution: a step-by-step programme
for Iraqi disarmament
26 February 2003: 121 Labour MPs vote against
Tony Blair’s war strategy at the end of an
impassioned debate on Iraq. 198 MPs vote for an
amendment arguing that the case for war is not yet
made
27 February 2003: Saddam Hussein agrees ‘in
principle’ to destroy the missiles with a range over
150 km. US and Britain dismiss the concession as
game-playing
28 February 2003: Hans Blix’s interim report to the
UN is published, giving a mixed assessment of Iraqi

84
cooperation with weapons inspectors, but hailing
Saddam Hussein's commitment to comply with
tomorrow's UN deadline for the destruction of Iraq's
illegal Samoud 2 missiles
2 March 2003: it emerges that the US and Great
Britain have been increasing their air strikes on Iraq
in recent days, to soften up Iraq’s defences ahead of
war. The two countries deny
3 March 2003: Russia’s President Putin hints that it
Russia may use its veto to block a resolution
authorising war
4 March 2003: Gordon Brown gives his support for
the war by saying that he will spend what it takes to
disarm Iraq
5 March 2003: France, Russia and Germany declare
that they will not allow a resolution authorising war
to pass in the Security Council
6 March 2003: President Bush says on nationwide
television that war is very close
7 March 2003: Foreign Secretary Jack Straw
proposes UN sets 17 March as deadline for Iraq.
France threatens to veto
9 March 2003: The US and Britain agree to set out
the precise acts of disarmament that Saddam would
have to undertake by March 17 to avoid war
10 March 2003: Britain announces 'six key tests' for
Iraq to comply to if it is to avoid war, including
President Saddam making a TV address admitting
having weapons of mass destruction. The idea
galvanises some diplomatic support, but not enough
to suggest the US/UK could win a second UN
resolution, effectively authorising an attack
11 March 2003: The US defence secretary, Donald
Rumsfeld, causes a political storm after suggesting
America could attack President Saddam alone. Mr
Blair later stresses Britain will fight alongside the
US in any attack.
14 March 2003: The French president, Jacques
Chirac, removes any lingering doubts about France's
intentions on Iraq, confirming to Mr Blair in a brief
phone call that France was willing to seek a
compromise on disarming Saddam Hussein but
would not accept any UN resolution that set an
ultimatum
16 March 2003: Speaking at a hastily-arranged
summit in the Azores, Mr Bush and Mr Blair give
the United Nations a 24-hour ultimatum to enforce
its own demands for immediate Iraqi disarmament,
or face an American- and British-led coalition that
will go to war within days.
17 March 2003: With China, France and Russia
opposed to an attack, the US and UK abandon hope
of gaining security council support for a second
resolution authorising war on Iraq. They withdraw
the resolution, blaming the French veto threat.
The leader of the Commons, Robin Cook, resigns in
protest at the government's decision to back a war
without 'international authority nor domestic
support'
18 March 2003: In a televised address at 0100GMT,
18 March 2003: During the course of the day,

85
Mr Bush gives Saddam Hussein 48 hours to leave
Iraq or face invasion.
British government ministers John Denham and
Lord Hunt resign in protest, along with four
government aides. In the evening parliament holds a
debate over military action in Iraq. The
government's motion endorsing an attack is passed
by 412 to 149, although the number of rebel Labour
MPs voting for an anti-war amendment rises to 139,
up from 122 three weeks ago.
19 March 2003: The foreign ministers of Germany,
France and Russia condemn the impending military
action in strong terms, saying that the use of force
against Iraq has not been approved by any UN
resolution
19 March 2003: Government aide David Kinley
confirms he has resigned, bring the total of
government casualties over Iraq to nine
20 March 2003: War begins.
Sources: The Guardian. “Iraq Timeline: July 16 1979 to January 31 2004”. Guardian Unlimited. 9 May 2006.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/page/0,12438,793802,00.html

86
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