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Editor’s Note
Religious Reflexivity: The Effect of Continual
Novelty and Diversity on Individual Religiosity
Gerardo Martı´
Davidson College
Drawing on recent scholarship by Margaret Archer, Ulrich Beck, and Peter Berger, I summarize a
core dynamic of modern experience through the concept of “religious reflexivity.” Religious reflexivity
points to a deliberative and problem-solving dynamic that is a distinctive and unavoidable element of
contemporary religious selves. Rather than rely on conventional processes of socialization, Archer,
Beck, and Berger argue that we must acknowledge that segmented and pluralistic societies contain
new sources for self-formation, self-promotion, and legitimization for new forms of self-construction.
Religiously, there arise new religiosities, new imperatives for proper or desired religiosity, and new
ways of legitimizing religious thoughts, practices, and even larger orientations. Religious reflexivity is
so constant and inevitable that a crucial quality of future religious virtuosi will be this: Those who are
most able to accommodate the varied pressures of modern society and craft a sustained—even
elegant—capacity for consistent, legitimated, and reflexively responsive religious behavior will most
readily attain the highest levels of religious prestige and influence.
Key words: agency; individual religiosity; modernity; modernization; pluralism; religious experi-
ence; secularization; social change; theory.
Since the beginnings of the discipline, sociologists have repeatedly reconsid-
ered and re-conceptualized the relationship between religion and modernity—
i.e., how changed social structures impact the organization, social practice, and
subjective experience of religion in society. More recently, this effort has become
more salient with the abandonment of monolithic paradigms of secularization
(e.g., Berger 1999,2014). Rather than secularization, most sociologists now em-
phasize differentiation, meaning that institutional spheres are distinguished in
such a way that religion is now a segmented, rather than overarching, aspect of
the modern world. The experience of navigating the imperatives of multiple
domains of modern society have religious consequences for individuals. More
specifically, the plurality and pace of change in our modern world precludes an
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Sociology of Religion 2015, 76:1 1-13
doi:10.1093/socrel/sru084
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individual’s ability to craft holistic religious identities able to confidently address
all situations and choices. It may even be argued that the fascinating inven-
tiveness of modern religious experience is a corollary of dealing with religious
difference—whether such encounters are experienced as threatening or enriching.
An interesting development in the subjectivity of religious experience today is
therefore how individuals are being released from religious action based on a deep
treasure trove of stable identity packages and secure programmatic responses.
A pressing question is: Can individuals today rely on dependably stable
religious orientations amidst the near constant experience of contradiction and
difference? Several new publications unintentionally coalesce around this
question. Recent books by Margaret Archer (The Reflexive Imperative in Late
Modernity), Ulrich Beck (A God of One’s Own), and Peter Berger (The Many
Altars of Modernity) extend theoretical projects to describe what makes contem-
porary society different compared with the society of sociology’s theoretical
founders. While I do not claim to have a comprehensive mastery of Archer’s,
Beck’s, or Berger’s analytic frameworks, I read each of them with appreciation and
continue to draw connections between their writings and the religious dynamics at
the center of my own research interests. There is simply not enough room to prop-
erly represent the scope of each of their theoretical projects; nevertheless, using
these three books as a heuristic launch point, I suggest that together they provide
cumulative insights into how changed social structures affect individual religiosity.
Following their lead, I affirm that religion is indeed a segmented aspect of
modern, “Western,” everyday life stemming from profound transitions captured
in terms like modernization,globalization, urbanization,mass transportation and
migration,literacy and education, and communication technologies, including social
media. Apart from immersion in high-boundary congregations and other gather-
ings or arrangements that act like religious enclaves (both short and long term),
religion is not readily consonant with the majority of our everyday settings and
activities. Although Nancy Ammerman (2013) reveals how religious activity is
indeed present in everyday life and that some activities and occupations have
greater religious/spiritual connections than others (e.g., family dinners, helping
professions, times of crisis or illness, etc.), the incongruousness of religion
and much of our daily activities inevitably provokes the exercise of personal
reflexivity.
Archer, Beck, and Berger reveal how reflexivity is involved in any attempt
by individuals to live out/construct/produce/engage/negotiate their religious selves
in everyday settings. This is not because people are deliberately attempting to act
consciously “religious” in every arena of life but because the settings and acti-
vities they find themselves in are most often not inherently structured for their
religious values, commitments, or desires. Human beings in late modernity are
constantly faced with what Archer calls “novelty,” which necessitates the need
for individuals to reflexively consider how to manage or apply their religiosity
in multiple (although semi-conscious) ways. Theoretically acknowledging the in-
creased need for reflexivity helps account for how meditation, Bible reading,
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small group discussions, quiet moments in the car, and daily walks around the
neighborhood with one’s dog can be considered distinctively “religious” acts—a
striking finding from Ammerman’s (2013) study. It also highlights the uncertain,
ambiguous, and outright chaotic paths of belief and behavior sociologists regular-
ly report in modern religion.
By resourcing Archer, Beck, and Berger, I summarize a core dynamic of
modern experience through the concept of “religious reflexivity.” Reflexivity is a
ubiquitous human dynamic, yet the capacity for distinctively religious reflexivity
is strained to the degree that the logics and routines of religious life fail to fit the
logics and routines that dominate civic, market, and state-mediated contempo-
rary life. Here, I stress that religious reflexivity points to a deliberative and problem-
solving dynamic that is a distinctive and unavoidable element of contemporary religious
selves. In times of greater social change, the imperative for reflexivity is made
incumbent for all; moreover, the greater the degree of social change, the greater
the invocation of religious reflexivity. This is not to say that religion is “rational”
or that it involves a narrowly defined sense of personal “belief.” Instead, the
notion of religious reflexivity accentuates how individuals exercise their agency
in living out their religious imperatives in the modern world. How might the
concept of religious reflexivity illuminate pervasive dynamics found in contem-
porary religion?
CONDITIONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF RELIGIOUS REFLEXIVITY
The expansion of globalized structures, the introduction of new or previou-
sly unknown institutional domains, and the hybridization of institutionalized
practices are creating emergent and uncertain forms of activity that demand
learning, assessment, and creativity. The conflict of previously unproblematic in-
stitutionalized domains provokes reflexivity (see Beck, Bonss, and Lau 2003). To
the extent that religious subjectivity relies on certainties for stability, the en-
counter with difference makes religious orientations that rely on certainty diffi-
cult to sustain. When we additionally consider processes of de-traditioning and
de-institutionalization, the demands on individual reflexivity expand even fur-
ther. In short—reflexivity is inversely related to routinization.
Moreover, because societal processes of change are disjunctive, they affect
some institutions more quickly than others. Some arenas of society change
quickly, while others appear to stay the same. This “lack of synchrony” (Archer
2012:24) has real implications, especially since our contemporary selves interact
with many organizations and multiple institutional spheres daily, creating the
need for us to navigate the propriety of actions within and between settings.
Today’s everyday situations are inevitably complex and require interaction with a
plurality of institutional logics, sometimes simultaneously (e.g., a divorce with chil-
dren can involve family, education, work, law, and religion, among others).
Although some institutions are compatible, the logics that govern them are not
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intended to be universally valid, so individuals must reflexively deliberate their
desires and obligations. Overall, as Archer, Beck, and Berger all argue, the continu-
al encounter with difference and novelty—pluralism and cleavage—makes individ-
ualized reflexivity a constant and distinctive feature of contemporary society.
In the past, the inherent desire for cohesion led people to managing conflict-
ing demands either by shielding themselves from difference or by adopting rule-
oriented programs with clear direction. Such effort includes not only the use of
professionalized services through psychiatrists, gurus, life coaches, etc., but also
accounts for the profound attraction toward fads of simplicity, like “biblical”
diets and exercise regimes or reliance on certain readily accessible books and TV
programs. The direction of sociological analysis consequently focused on how in-
dividuals cultivated a self-contained, holistic identity. Recognizing the untena-
bility of such analytical strategies, Archer, Beck, and Berger now provoke more
interesting questions on how people equip themselves for the ability to constantly
navigate novelty and cope with their sustained lack of cohesion.
So, do exclusivist religious orientations remain tenable? Increasingly, the
answer is “no” since the proximity of difference is constant; indeed, pluralism in-
volves the enforced proximity of difference, something that is ubiquitous in
modern society (Beck 2010). The availability of a closed religious system, one
that Beck (2010:15) states “denies the reality of religious plurality, repudiates
modernity, denies individualization and, in light of the irrevocable historical
pressure in favor of individual religious commitment and choice, takes refuge in
dogmas of faith that are incompatible with individualized experiences and am-
bivalent feelings,” is limited. Beck (2010:41) writes, “The territorial exclusivity
of religious imagined communities is coming to an end, and even where it still
exists, the voices of the different religions collide with one another in a global
society where communication knows no bounds.”
The involuntary encounter with difference has consequences for our general
orientation toward religious truth. Berger (2014:32) writes, “Pluralism, by its
very nature, multiplies the number of plausibility structures in an individual’s
social environment.” More points of validity and truth are encompassed in our
religious imaginations. Moreover, as people seek to orient their religious behav-
ior, they find fewer people who are “like them.” Failing to find neutral or conge-
nial spaces for conversation with fewer familiars (i.e., friends and families with
whom we congenially share religious orientations) and lacking habituated re-
sponses for novel pressures, individuals must reflexively deliberate on their own.
Archer (2012:30) writes, “Autonomous reflexivity expands because pluralism,
sectionalism, and competitive conflict have increasingly deprived many people
of disinterested ‘similars and familiars,’ who could act as interlocutors since most
of us are in the same boat—and mostly out to sea.” Everyday people are (con-
stantly, aggressively) confronted with options, spurring deliberation, demanding
religious reflexivity in light of our concerns.
As diversity increases and ready-found religious commitment wanes, deeply
religiously committed people will still promote (often aggressively) particularistic
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packages of religiosity carrying prescribed societal responses. While many consid-
er religion to be an affective dimension of behavior, such active promotion of
religious interests leads to the use of instrumental rationality for reflexively creat-
ing new forms and practices—a strategic pragmatism. Knowing that no one can
ultimately demand religious belief or action, religious leaders aggressively
promote schemes and organize members to foster the conditions that move the
reflexivity of individuals to accept certain positions as good, right, and worthy of
allegiance. The irony is that as multiple religious groups aggressively promote
multiple religious interests individuals are “thrown back” upon their own resourc-
es in their attempt to distinguish among them, i.e., the more religious groups
solicit their beliefs by knocking at my door, the more reasons I must come up
with for rejecting them upon opening it. Archer (2012:34) writes, “Because of
the intrinsically competitive nature of these situations, subjects must determine
where their own best interest lie and deliberate about the best means to achieve
theses ends.” Individuals are have little choice but to rely on themselves.
REFLEXIVELY SHAPING A RESPONSIVE RELIGIOUS SELF
Archer, Beck, and Berger argue that our ceaseless encounter with different
and demanding institutional domains alters the circumstances of everyday life.
Fundamental to today’s changed social structures is that individuals rely on them-
selves—what Beck (2010:95) describes as “institutionalized individualization”
(see also Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1995). Archer (2012) explains that the cir-
cumstances of our contemporary, individualized selves are bound up in reflexive
deliberations to a heightened degree—a hyper-reflexivity—because we are con-
stantly confronting “novelty,” i.e., diversity, plurality, hybridity. Novelty is char-
acterized by the absence of scripts, and since much of what was readily familiar is
no longer “taken for granted,” individuals are left to find their own paths. Tacit
knowledge is insufficient, and internal deliberations accompany encounters of
situational variety. The encounter with novelty not only increases the burden of
individual choice, it also arguably “undermines many of the certainties by which
human beings used to live. Put differently, certainty becomes a scarce commodity”
(Berger 2014:9). The processes inevitably involve individuation since the indi-
vidual must choose courses of action based on their unique intersection of imper-
atives and institutional demands stemming from what Georg Simmel (1955)
creatively labeled our “web of affiliations.” As Archer (2012:6) writes, “Our in-
ternal conversations define what courses of action we take in given situations,
and subjects who are similarly placed do not respond uniformly.” This openness
elicited by our unique social location gives rise to an increasingly normalized ex-
perience of idiosyncrasy.
Archer, Beck, and Berger argue that we rely less on socialization as determi-
native of religious action. Deviations are expanding faster than their regulariza-
tion within a stable social order, invalidating the assumptions about socialization
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from past social theorists. For example, Archer (2012:88) writes, “There is no
place for the ‘generalized other,’ or for the structural and cultural assumptions
supporting it, when theorizing about ‘socialization’ in the new millennium.”
Refurbishing George Herbert Mead, she recalls from his theory that in order for a
person to have “self-talk,” individuals must become an object to themselves (see
Mead 1934). We understand ourselves and evaluate ourselves by “taking the atti-
tude of the other” and adopting their assessments. The generalized other is based
on the attitude common to the group. Mead’s theorizing assumes a singular
group, a relatively closed clique, with a discernible shared sense of expectations
and assessments. But such a view of groups strains credulity for most Westerners
today. While later theorists (like Talcott Parsons and Niklas Luhmann) rescue
role expectations by asserting functional differences that maintain stable and
nonoverlapping role expectations, the dynamism of contemporary society pre-
vents our accepting such a convenient fiction. And Berger’s reliance on Alfred
Schutz’s (1970) notions of “multiple realities” and the segmentation of our con-
sciousness through “relevance structures” to parcel out a radical separation of
domains of thought and behavior is insufficient as it discounts the more continuous
and varied encounters provoking the reflexivity being discussed here. More specifi-
cally, religious reflexivity accommodates an approach that nuances how individuals
differentiate within religious orientations. For example, a Christian may see herself
as “a sinner saved by grace ”; however, she may be surprised that her particularistic
notion may not be shared; the resulting lack of clarity leads to a loss of a previously
stable source of self-understanding, and consequent ambiguities arise for how she
relates to “God,” “the church,” and other “Christians.”
Contemporary selves are caught within an endless cycle of evaluative engage-
ment of actions, and areas that had been determined or taken for granted are in-
creasingly placed at the discretion of individual choice. Berger (2014:5) describes,
“All of life becomes an interminable process of redefining who the individual is in
the context of the seemingly endless possibilities presented by modernity. This
endless array of choices is reinforced by the structures of capitalist systems, with
their enormous market for services, products, and even identities, all protected by
a democratic state which legitimizes these choices, not least the choice of religion.”
Archer (2012:65) similarly writes, “Reflexive deliberation is decreasingly escapable
in order to endorse a course of action held likely to accomplish it; self-interrogation,
self-monitoring, and self-revision are now necessary.” The combination of diversity,
unpredictability, and vast scope of options means there is less opportunity for inter-
nalization of norms because there is less that is “normal” and less that is normatively
binding. We consciously supervise our selves, selecting and correcting “on the fly,”
yetunabletodrawoneithersetpatternsorpastexperiences.
Religious reflexivity therefore involves continual self-critique in evaluating
the distance between the desire to actualize ultimate concerns and the visible pro-
gression evident in behavior so far. The burden is not only on the individual to
deliberate alternatives to action but also to evaluate for oneself the level of success/
failure in fulfilling one’s desires. This “exposes subjects to the consequences of
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their own fallibility. It makes them vulnerable to the contingencies of life in an
open system—one largely without a safety net, given the loss of community and
overall reduction in social integration” (Archer 2012:46). (This unabating evalua-
tion, by the way, provides insight into the significance of the WWJD slogan
“What would Jesus do?”—a symbolic throwing up of one’s hands—as an anguished
attempt by conservative Christians to provide a singular guideline for prompting a
uniformly “Christian” response to a never-ending array of ongoing and often unex-
pected situations.)
Traditional practices also require reflexivity just as much as the encounter
with novelty. Upholding religious tradition requires reflexivity because the self
must monitor whether behavior corresponds to traditional guidelines. Stated dif-
ferently, the legitimacy of being “traditional” requires competent performance.
Given the desire for self-assurance and social testimony to others, there is inher-
ent to tradition a need for “reflexive accounting” (see Garfinkel 1984). As Berger
(2014:10) states regarding neo-traditionalists, “For them tradition is not simply
given, they have chosen it.” Religious convictions, when enacted, become strate-
gic and therefore guided by instrumentality. Convictions in this case are sus-
tained by constant reinforcement; at the same time, they require constant
evaluation and arbitration between alternative forms of strategic action. Once
convictions are established, instrumentality becomes the dominant mode of re-
flexivity. In sum, whether encountering new situations or straining to remain
within established routines, both require reflexivity.
RELIGIOUS REFLEXIVITY GUIDED BY PERSONAL CONCERNS
Rather than rely on socialization, Archer, Beck, and Berger argue that
changing societies contain new sources for self-formation, self-promotion, and le-
gitimization for new forms of self-construction (see Archer 2012:94). Reflexivity
for Archer (2012:97) means that people orient their lives toward personally
meaningful choices (not merely instrumentally rational ones) and strive to
achieve governance over the trajectory of their lives. People are faced with the
necessity of selection because of the variety of opportunities available and the
lack of authoritative sources that normatively guide selections. Archer (2012:43)
writes, “Self-critique thus becomes intrinsic. . . . Because in a world of novelty,
there are no apprenticeships.” There is a lack of formal mentors and exemplars.
The only way forward in pursuit of any project is steady, constant reflexivity.
Religiously, that means there arise new religiosities, new imperatives for proper or
desired religiosity, and new ways of legitimizing religious thoughts, practices, and
even larger orientations. Again, Beck (2010:140) writes, “Believers of every con-
ceivable background open up new religious freedoms for themselves. They recast
pre-existing religious world-views and develop composite religious identities in the
various stages of their personal spiritual journey.” Still, what then guides religious
behavior?
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Given that habituation of thought and action is more difficult, individuals
are increasingly dependent on personal concerns as their only guides to action.
Archer (2012:42) forcefully argues that current society is characterized by “hall-
mark features of unpredictability, incalculability, and the valorization of novelty,
this means that personal ‘concerns’ play an increasing role in guiding delibera-
tions and the conclusions arrived at.” Archer (2012:64) argues that personal con-
cerns become compasses as individual values guide action, saying, “agents
navigate by the compass of their own personal concerns” since now all social
spheres entail diversity of perspective. Beck (2010:124) similarly writes, “They
are forced to learn how to create a biographical narrative of their own and con-
tinuously to revise their definition of themselves. In the process they have to
create abstract principles with which to justify their decisions.” While Beck
(2010:14) writes about “a life of one’s own,” Archer argues that humans seek “a
life worth living” (2012:15). For Archer, concerns are not merely preferences,
they are commitments “for who’s sake we will be altruistic, self-sacrificing and
sometimes ready to die and always, at least, be trying to live.” Concerns are there-
fore “constitutive of who we are” and affect our behavior in the world. Personal
concerns are so central that Archer states that our identity is “defined by our con-
stellation of concerns,” and asserts that human beings, to the extent they are
formed as persons, have concerns that configure their behavior. “The life of our
minds is always, to some extent, taken up with the life we want to live.”
Personal concerns do not consist of mere subjectivity; people exercise agency
to seek their realization. Archer (2012:22) writes, “It is our human concerns—
especially our ultimate concerns—that are pivotal because they serve to direct
what we do with our agency” (see also Emirbayer and Mische 1998). Again,
Archer (2012:97) argues that the basic imperative of people today is “shaping a
life.” The modern self is faced with an array of competing secular and religious
structures through which to enact their beliefs and practices. She writes, “Shaping
a life is fundamentally a matter of dovetailing the personal ‘concerns’ that have
been selected from the above melange together with others adopted form outside
the natal environs into a satisfying and sustainable modus vivendi. This includes
the prioritization, accommodation, subordination, and excision of those things
that each and every (normal) person has identified as mattering most to them,
because nothing guarantees their mutual compatibility.” Again, “Shaping a life is
the practical achievement of establishing a modus vivendi that is satisfying to and
sustainable by the subject” (103).
Because the ambitiousness of religious frameworks typically involves assisting
adherents to craft a holistic, more comprehensive self (Williams 2013;frommy
own research, see Marti 2005,2008,2010), shaping a life is a construct with clear
ramifications for contemporary religiosity. Archer (2012:103) writes, “Our per-
sonal identities derive form our ultimate concerns, form what we care about
most.” Religious imperatives are among the most vital of ultimate concerns
evident among people today. Ultimate concerns are so important for Archer that
she claims that “our ultimate concerns are definitive of us” and that our ultimate
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concerns are not about duty or obligations but rather about not violating our very
own selves (which is relevant to the development of atheism as well, see LeDrew
2013). Moreover, the shaping of a life involves moving from concerns to projects.
People identify ultimate concerns and align them deliberatively, taking on social
identities through adopted roles and moral careers (see Goffman 1959,1961;ina
congregational context, see Marti 2008:158–59). Adopted roles and moral careers
can give impetus to congregational involvement. Congregations may be pursued
(or shunned) to the extent they are seen as places that allow for the actualization
of their ultimate concerns through roles available through them.
Whether through formal congregations or informal conversations, the work of
religious reflexivity inevitably involves a network of relationships (Ammerman
2014;LeDrew 2013;Williams 2013). One reason why congregations remain salient
for contemporary religion is because congregations are places that coalesce a rich
coterie of social relationships involved in prioritizing, accommodating, subordina-
ting, and excluding ideas and practices. Congregations legitimate religious princi-
ples and help individual adherents stabilize and maintain personal convictions
(Marti 2005,2008,2010;Marti and Ganiel 2014). So while individuals have
various social relations and social circles, the most organized “package” of respons-
es, the largest “resource” for reflection, and the highest concentration of relational
exchanges that serve religious reflexivity continue to be found in organized congre-
gations—however flexibly “congregations” may be defined (see Ammerman 2013;
LeDrew 2013;Marti and Ganiel 2014). Congregations sort, prioritize, modify, sub-
ordinate, and even seek to abandon concerns by their members. Even more, the
joining or leaving of a congregation is often hinged less on the congregation itself
(its programs, its hospitality) and more on the degree to which the concerns pro-
moted and upheld by congregational members dovetail with the concerns that
matter most to the potential member.
Overall, congregations continue to be instrumental in providing contexts, re-
lationships, and imaginative options that both encourage and bar actions that
affect the development of life projects and trajectories (Marti 2008). Even more,
congregations provide resources for sustaining commitments to a self-trajectory.
Dave Elder-Vass (2010) uses the term “proximate norm group” to represents those
who share beliefs or dispositions and together effect a strengthening of commit-
ment to shared group concerns by engagement with the group. Congregations
also help individuals shed religiously conflicting concerns and incongruent ele-
ments (sometimes called immorality, but can be labeled in other ways). Finally,
congregations may become sources of novelty in themselves by elaborating in-
novations in the shaping of ultimate concerns and creating higher order compli-
mentarities that had not been imagined previously (see Archer 2012:124; Marti
2005,2008,2010). As I and Gladys Ganiel (2014) found in researching the
Emerging Church Movement, congregations remain important because congre-
gations can legitimize a plurality of religious standpoints—even uncertain and
ambiguous ones—that still count as properly religious. Emerging Christians orient
themselves around and are supported by the varied practices of their “pluralist”
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congregations, yet such congregations can only exist with the widespread cultiva-
tion of religiously reflexive egos. The hybridization of practices, the openness and
fluidity of what liturgy means, and the importance and necessity of relational
conversation for deliberations are consistent with processes described by Archer,
Beck, and Berger.
RELIGIOUS REFLEXIVITY AND A NEW CRITERION FOR
RELIGIOUS VIRTUOSI
Berger (2014) argues that centering on “plurality” in our theorizing on reli-
gion is now necessary. Pluralism is not merely an ideology but an empirical fact
of our society. As Beck (2010:30) writes, “The pluralization of the religions has
come to replace the linear process of secularization.” By combining the insights
of Archer, Beck, and Berger, I propose that a useful concept for representing a
critical dynamic for understanding the experience of religion and modernity
today is religious reflexivity. Religious reflexivity urges us to search out new logics
guiding religious performances and points toward new approaches for legitimat-
ing thought and behavior. The varied response to changed societal circumstances
does not mean a loss of religion but rather an alternative invocation of it. Indeed,
religious reflexivity moves us away from determinism by opening the plurality of
“religiosities” that can play out among people (Kniss 2013). While sociologists
will surely continue to seek uniformities, religious reflexivity is not touted here as
a form of homogeneity; rather, religious reflexivity is a sustained mode of human
action necessitated by encounter with novel situations. Religious reflexivity is more
than a “cognitive balancing act” (Berger 2014:xii) of uncomfortably holding reli-
gion and secularity together; it involves recognizing the process of maneuvering
the broader realm of moral imperatives that confront individuals as they selec-
tively consider how to honor and navigate a variety of core concerns (Cadge and
Konieczny 2014). The more novel the situations, the less religiously routinized
action offers guidelines, and the greater the reflexivity required. Nor does religious
reflexivity nullify the impact of congregational life but rather suggests the manner in
which they remain important venues of religious commitment and identity forma-
tion because they provide resources for deliberation, guidance, and support.
Danie
`le Hervieu-Le
´ger (1999) distinguished between two religious types,
“the pilgrim” and “the converted,” as overarching forms of individualized religion
today. The pilgrim continues seeking their own religious path while the convert-
ed lands on a settled position. Morphostatic societies, where imitation, induction,
and initiation are sufficient to bring people to religious maturity, may elicit more
converts; morphogenetic societies promote more pilgrims (Archer 2012:38; see
also Archer 1995). Consequently, we need not assume that religious deliberation
necessarily results in settled convictions, especially since we now can find reli-
gious orientations that are almost entirely oriented toward the ongoing practice
of religious reflexivity (see Marti and Ganiel 2014).
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Said differently, Archer argues that the situational logic of competition among
well-formed alternatives is becoming an embracing of the situational logic of op-
portunity with more ambiguous possible avenues. While the burden remains
squarely on individuals “to chart their own courses of action” (2012:42; see also
Beck 2010,Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1995), one can embrace an awareness of
options and make ongoing deliberation a faithful religious act in and of itself as a
religiously engaged cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism involves “the erosion of
clear boundaries separating the markets, states, civilizations, cultures and not
least the lifeworlds of different peoples and religions, as well as the resulting
worldwide situation of an involuntary confrontation with alien others” (Beck
2010:68). This path of openness, this religious cosmopolitanism, sees plurality as a
source of revitalization rather than as a threat. Religious cosmopolitanism lies in
“the fact that the recognition of religious otherness becomes a guiding maxim in its
way of thinking, its actions, and its social existence. Cultural and religious differ-
ences are neither hierarchically organized nor dissolved, but accepted for what
they are and indeed positively affirmed.” Religious cosmopolitanism “perceives
religious others as both particular and universal, as different and equally valid”
(Beck 2010:71). Again, “The alien faith, the faith of the stranger, is not felt to
be threatening, destructive, or fragmenting. Rather, it is felt to be enriching”
(Beck 2010:71). Within the scope of Christianity, such religious cosmopoli-
tanism is clearly evident within the Emerging Church Movement (Marti and
Ganiel 2014).
I agree with Beck (2010:39) who writes, “with increasing modernization, reli-
gions do not disappear but change their appearance.” Religious reflexivity is pro-
posed as a way to expand the resources for conceptualizing contemporary religious
experience and to further stimulate future research (Ammerman 2014;Beyer
2012;Guhin 2014;Marti 2014). Aside from the strictest fundamentalists that
strive for isolation and keeping people away from exchange with diversity, the
future of religion may well involve the ubiquity of religious reflexivity, the ex-
pansion of pluralist congregations that resource and support individualized reli-
giosity, and the steady invocation of legitimation processes regardless of how
religious convictions are framed. Indeed, drawing together the implications of
Archer, Beck, and Berger, a crucial quality of future religious virtuosi will lie in
their ability to accommodate the varied pressures of modern society. More spe-
cifically, those who craft a sustained—even elegant—capacity for consistent,
legitimated, and reflexively responsive religious behavior will most readily
attain the highest levels of religious prestige and influence.
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