An Assessment of Russian Nuclear Materials Safeguards

Abstract

Since the early 1990's, prior to the demise of the Former Soviet Union, there has been considerable international concern over the security of the Russian nuclear weapons and nuclear materials. After the breakup, the earlier system of personal control of material was no longer adequate likewise the state controls on the individual were relaxed or eliminated altogether. Having been one of the first Americans's to have the opportunity to work directly with the Russian nuclear institutes on the Topaz space reactor program and later on the Material Protection, Control and Accountability (MPC&A) program I witnessed firsthand the critical needs facing the Russian institutes in nuclear material safeguards. This provided a direct view of the financial issues facing Russia from guards sleeping at their posts to impressive and innovative nuclear systems whose missions had been cancelled. Over the past 18 years significant changes have been implemented within Russia including the handling and dismantling of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, the rebuild of many thousand new weapons and the processing, packaging and storage of nuclear materials or conversely the down-blending of hundreds of metric tons of special nuclear materials. Material safeguards have steadily improved and the legal basis for physical protection and material accounting has been established. The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the changes within the Russian nuclear complex, their nuclear stockpile and material safeguards. Furthermore the paper will show how the Russian government planned expansion of nuclear power also incorporates improvements in their nuclear material safeguards, the environment and consolidation. These large changes constitute a new baseline for nuclear agencies within Russia, a break from the past that needs to be recognized and appreciated, while opening up new opportunities for US and international nonproliferation and counter-terrorism programs. INTRODUCTION The Russian government has established a set of safeguard guidelines, a legal framework, review procedures and methods for multi-agency, large scale exercises for testing the readiness and coordination between agencies for their key nuclear sites. This set of activities is the basis for nuclear safeguards within Russia and was established in part through the work with the US/Russian MPC&A program and through separate efforts by the Russian government. The Russian safeguards program and the US MPC&A program have been progressing in parallel since the 1990's. The US/Russian MPC&A program has covered the development of guidelines and regulations, computerized material and accounting at the institute and state-level, operational equipment, a strong training program and the implementation of engineered high-tech solutions. The Russian program appears to have greater emphasis on human and administrative controls. The average wages in Russia continue to be relatively low and therefore their emphasis appears to be on the use of human controls and less on the use of technical solutions that require additional costs to operate, certify and maintain. The Russian approach is culturally specific to their current economic circumstances.

Full text

An Assessment of Russian Nuclear Materials Safeguards
Susan Voss
Global Nuclear Network Analysis, LLC
PO Box 4850, Los Alamos, NM 87544
ABSTRACT
Since the early 1990’s, prior to the demise of the Former Soviet Union, there has been considerable
international concern over the security of the Russian nuclear weapons and nuclear materials. After
the breakup, the earlier system of personal control of material was no longer adequate likewise the
state controls on the individual were relaxed or eliminated altogether. Having been one of the first
Americans’s to have the opportunity to work directly with the Russian nuclear institutes on the Topaz
space reactor program and later on the Material Protection, Control and Accountability (MPC&A)
program I witnessed firsthand the critical needs facing the Russian institutes in nuclear material
safeguards. This provided a direct view of the financial issues facing Russia from guards sleeping at
their posts to impressive and innovative nuclear systems whose missions had been cancelled. Over the
past 18 years significant changes have been implemented within Russia including the handling and
dismantling of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, the rebuild of many thousand new weapons and
the processing, packaging and storage of nuclear materials or conversely the down-blending of
hundreds of metric tons of special nuclear materials. Material safeguards have steadily improved and
the legal basis for physical protection and material accounting has been established. The purpose of
this paper is to provide an overview of the changes within the Russian nuclear complex, their nuclear
stockpile and material safeguards. Furthermore the paper will show how the Russian government
planned expansion of nuclear power also incorporates improvements in their nuclear material
safeguards, the environment and consolidation. These large changes constitute a new baseline for
nuclear agencies within Russia, a break from the past that needs to be recognized and appreciated,
while opening up new opportunities for US and international nonproliferation and counter-terrorism
programs.
INTRODUCTION
The Russian government has established a set of safeguard guidelines, a legal framework, review
procedures and methods for multi-agency, large scale exercises for testing the readiness and
coordination between agencies for their key nuclear sites. This set of activities is the basis for nuclear
safeguards within Russia and was established in part through the work with the US/Russian MPC&A
program and through separate efforts by the Russian government. The Russian safeguards program
and the US MPC&A program have been progressing in parallel since the 1990’s. The US/Russian
MPC&A program has covered the development of guidelines and regulations, computerized material
and accounting at the institute and state-level, operational equipment, a strong training program and
the implementation of engineered high-tech solutions. The Russian program appears to have greater
emphasis on human and administrative controls. The average wages in Russia continue to be
relatively low and therefore their emphasis appears to be on the use of human controls and less on the
use of technical solutions that require additional costs to operate, certify and maintain. The Russian
approach is culturally specific to their current economic circumstances.

SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS IN RUSSIA
Russia is currently assessed as having the largest quantity of weapons-usable nuclear material of any
country in the world. According to Cochrani the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) nuclear
stockpile peaked in 1986 with 45,000 warheads and declined more than 20% to 32,000 warheads by May
1993. The Russian have declared that their nuclear weapons have a lifetime of 10 to 15 years and have
maintained a program of rebuild during these turbulent times. In 2006, the Stockholm International Peace
Institute (SIPRI) estimated that Russia had 3352 strategic nuclear weapons (SNW) and 2330 nonstrategic
nuclear weapons (NSNW) for a total of 5682ii
. If we assume additional nuclear weapons are awaiting
assembly or disassembly bringing the estimated number to 8000 nuclear weapons, this would imply that
roughly 1/5th of all nuclear weapons related materials is still used for the stockpile and 4/5th’s has been
removed from the nuclear weapons stockpile. If we further assume that an additional 1/5th will be held for
future contingency for nuclear weapons then roughly 3/5th’s of the total amount of nuclear materials
would require transition from the weapons program to long-term storage, use in the civilian or defense
fuel program or down-blended for sale or use in the nuclear fuel cycle.
It is estimated that the USSR had produced a total of 1200 MT of high enriched uranium (40% to 90%)iii
through 1988 and approximately 125 to 150 MT of weapons-grade plutonium by 1993.iv v
In addition,
Russia has produced an estimated ~40 MT of civilian plutonium from the separation of the VVER-440,
submarine, ice breaker, research reactors and BN fast reactor fuel and additional weapons-grade
plutonium (~90% Pu-239 and above) in their production reactors. Under the US/Russian high enriched
uranium (HEU) agreement over 300 MT of 90% HEU has been down-blended to low enriched uranium
(LEU) and additional HEU and medium enriched uranium (>20% and <80%) has been used for their own
reactor fuel needs. This would imply that Russia has less than 900 MT of HEU/MEU and approximately
200 MT of weapons, civilian and Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement plutonium. Using the simple
fractions of nuclear weapons released from the nuclear stockpile outlined above, this would imply there
is less than 720 MT of HEU (40% to 90%) and around 90 MT of weapons-grade plutonium outside of the
weapons program.
The Russian complex can be broken into three primary types of sites: transitory, long-term storage and
research and development. A specific institute can have all three functions or a single function. For
example, the Mayak Production association has three primary functions including:
1. Transitory: HEU/LEU blend-down where the material arrives on the site, it undergoes processing
and is sent to the next site for conversion and down-blending.
2. Long-term storage: Civilian plutonium is stored long-term at the RT-1 site and weapons
plutonium is to be stored at the Fissile Material Storage Facility.
3. R&D: Mayak has facilities for the R&D for MOX fuel.
Each type of site therefore has different requirements for the safeguarding of nuclear materials within the
Russian nuclear complex based upon the types of materials at the site, the quantity of material, the
function of the site. There are an estimated 57 non-weapon sites within Russia that have HEU or MEU
and an estimated 12 sites with plutonium. Roughly 30 to 40 MT of HEU is transferred between
approximately 10 sites per year as part of the US/Russian HEU down-blend program and for Russian fuel
manufacturing. This does not include the amount of HEU that is transferred for the assembly and
disassembly of nuclear weapons. Approximately 1 to 1.5 MT of civilian plutonium is produced per year
and through May of 2008 approximately 1 MT of weapons-grade plutonium was produced per year. The

amount of weapons-grade plutonium produced per year has been reduced to a few hundred kilograms
with the shutdown of the Tomsk production reactors. Ensuring nuclear material protection during
transportation, transfer to multiple sites for processing, conversion and down-blending or reprocessing
and preparation for storage has been and will continue to be a large task for Rosatom.
ROSATOM STATE CORPORATION
Sergey Kiriyenko was appointed the head of the Russian Atomic Agency, Rosatom, on November 15,
2005. Kiriyenko established a broad plan to convert Rosatom and the associated institutes from a Federal
Agency to a private corporation while retaining the federal functions. As the head of Rosatom, Kiriyenko
brought in a team of business specialists to run key organizations and institutes, while maintaining many
of the nuclear professions within their senior positions. Prior to Kiriyenko’s leadership, senior positions
were filled by the nuclear experts from the technical institutes. This led to a strong sense of protecting
specific institutes and traditional thinking. Kiriyenko has lined up the new Rosatom Corporation with the
goal of meeting the nation’s aggressive energy and economic goals.
Many of the new generation leaders are business people with an eye for capitalizing their existing
infrastructure and capabilities for economic growth through the increased international need for energy.
Nuclear power development and expansion is an integral part of Russia’s overall energy and national
economic strategy, thereby ensuring adequate funding to acquire the key elements of the nuclear power
industry. In 2007 and 2008, as Rosatom morphed into its new conception of a State Corporation and
began reacquiring many of the key nuclear manufacturing and construction companies and institutes. The
commercial ventures will be managed within Rosatom by AtomEnergoProm Corporation by offering end-
to-end service including: uranium mining; uranium conversion; uranium enrichment; fuel fabrication;
reactor design, manufacturing, construction and operation; spent nuclear fuel take back and reprocessing.
ROSATOM SAFEGUARDS
Based upon the programs that Kiriyenko has developed, it appears that he understands that to become
accepted as one of the key suppliers of international nuclear technology and fuel it is imperative that
Rosatom Corporation be viewed as highly professional and capable. This requires the implementation and
enforcement of safeguard standards. It also requires that nuclear diversions from Russian institutes are a
thing of the past and the nuclear material is well accounted and controlled. And finally, Russia cannot be
seen as a supplier of potentially proliferant technology, such as Iran. It is clear from the specific steps that
have been implemented and the proposed budgets that these issues are of primary concern to Kiriyenko as
he continues to guide the future of the Rosatom Corporation.
The Russian government has made significant progress in establishing their national nuclear MPC&A
system. They have created a foundation for the establishment of standards and have implemented
procedures for review and evaluation. They have steadily built their foundation and have demonstrated
their readiness to take over the long-term responsibility for its implementation through the approval of the
Federal Target Program (FTP) on Nuclear and Radiation Safety in conjunction with the expansion of their
nuclear power program. A summary of the important changes to nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation
since 2000 is listed below with additional details on each item below:
1. Establishment and implementation of Russian nuclear safeguard requirements;
2. Reduction in the number of sites within the nuclear weapons complex.
3. Conducting audits of the sites against the physical protection requirements including reported
removal of management for noncompliance to MPC&A;
4. Large scale, multi-agency security exercises at the Rosatom sites; and

5. New FTP for 132 B-Rubles (~$5.5B) for 7 years to address nuclear safety and security.
6. Increased role of the FSB within domestic nuclear terrorism and at the nuclear site level.
1. Russian Nuclear Safeguard Requirements: Establishment of the Russian nuclear safeguard
requirements forms the foundation for the nuclear material safeguards program for which each site is
evaluated, including:
1. 9/1994 Presidential Decree on the priority measures to improve the nuclear material
accounting and protection systems.
2. 3/7/1997 Decree #264 Regarding Approval of Rules of Physical Protection of Nuclear
Materials, Nuclear Fuel and Points of Storage of Nuclear Material.
3. 10/10/2001 Decree #550 On Approving the General Requirements of Physical Protection
Systems at Minatom’s Nuclear Hazard Facilities.
4. 12/4/2003 Fundamentals of State Policy in the Field of Ensuring the Nuclear and Radiation
Safety of the Russian Federation through the Year 2010 and beyond. And the 12/2/2005 Plan
for Measures for Implementation of the 12/4/2003 Policy.
The legal framework was established with the support of the US/Russian MPC&A program and adopted
legally by the Russian government. Rosatom, the Federal Service for Supervision of Environment,
Technology and Nuclear Management (Rostekhnadzor), the Federal Security Service (FSB) and external
teams have been conducting safeguard audits including physical protection, and material accounting and
control at Rosatom sites since 1999 through the present day. The importance for the safeguards at the
nuclear facilities is clear based upon the number of domestic terrorist attacks suffered within Russia since
1999, including:
1. September 9, 1999 Chechen attack on Moscow apartment buildings.
2. October 2, 2000 Chechen attack on the Moscow Dubrovka theater, and
3. September 1, 2004 Chechen attack on the Beslan School.
It has been reported that the Chechen groups have considered targeting nuclear assets as well. It was
reported that prior to the attack on the Moscow theater, the Chechen group had also considered the seizure
of at least one of the nuclear reactors at the Kurchatov Institute within Moscow, but after casing the site
determined the security was too tight.vi On October 25, 2001, the Head of the 12th Main Directorate
responsible for nuclear weapons reported that there had been two attempts to perform reconnaissance at
nuclear storage facilities in February and April of 2001.vii
It was later reported that Minatom established a
task force to address these specialized security concerns and issues.
2. Reduction of the Number of Sites Working on Nuclear Weapons: On June 24, 1998 the Russian
government approved the implementation plan for the Restructuring and Conversion of the Defense
Industry. Former Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy, L. Ryabev, provided an overview of the key
changes during his presentation during the fall of 1999 Carnegie Institute conference that included
reducing the number of nuclear weapon assembly sites from four to two, the number of nuclear
component sites from two to one, and to end the production of plutonium. These changes reduced the
number of sites handling and storing nuclear weapons materials and reduced the transportation routes for
nuclear weapons materials and nuclear weapons.

3. Action Plans for Identified Deficiencies: Rosatom, Rostekhnadzor, FSB and other experts have been
conducting audits at the nuclear sites where action plans are established to deal with identified
deficiencies. In one case, it is reported that an institute director was removed based upon his poor record
of MPC&A (these charges were later refuted as incorrect reporting but they do appear potentially valid).
Examples include:
A. It was reported in November 2005, Rosatom lead an inspection team consisting of 24 auditors who spent
two weeks reviewing the security at the Siberian Chemical Combine (SCC). The deficiencies were to be
addressed in future site planning.viii ix
B. It was reported that the Director of the Bochvar Institute was dismissed on March 13, 2007 reportedly
due to:
“The action followed a complaint … lodged by the oversight agency Rostekhnadzor's Central Interregional
Territorial District, specifying " 'violations of the schedule and procedure for conducting physical
inventory, and of the rules for making confirmatory measurements of nuclear materials during the inter-
balance period. Rostekhnadzor found that the Institute has no system for quality control of measurements
of nuclear materials and the use of access control equipment; there is no system for professional training
and checking the knowledge of personnel responsible for implementing accounting and control of nuclear
materials and radioactive substances..”x
A. Putilov, the technical science director to Rosatom was Bochvars director’s replacement. Putilov later
denied that there had been any problems and that this was a false report. If indeed it did occur, it would
represent a positive step in enforcing institutional issues with MPC&A within Rosatom at the very core–
within the senior management.
C. In 2007, the head of Rostekhnadzor approved the plans to ascertain compliance with “ecological,
industrial and radiation safety requirements.” In 2007 there were 14 checks and inspections planned
including the Beloyarsk Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), the Bochvar institute, the Mayak Production
Association, and the Elektrostal fuel fabrication plant.xi In March 2007, it was reported that Rostekhnadzor
planned to have in-depth inspections of the state accounting and control at the facilities under its purview.xii
One area of future concern will be the continued independence of the Rostekhnadzor to perform reviews
in the face of the new Federal Target Program for Nuclear Power Development. There will be tremendous
pressure from many parts of the Federal government to not limit progress in the advancement of the
domestic and international program. This may offer opportunities for other countries independent nuclear
review organizations such as the US Nuclear Regulatory Committee (NRC) to work with Rostekhnadzor,
Rosatom and AtomEnergoProm. Maintaining a strong independent regulatory organization will be critical
for AtomEnergoProm in their international nuclear program.
4. Large Scale Exercises: The Russian government has staged a number of large-scale, multi-agency
exercises simulating terrorist attacks on nuclear material transportation and site security. These provide a
mechanism for the Russian government to evaluate roles of the various agencies and to test effectiveness
of existing integration. Examples include:
A. 10/12/1999 Ural-99 exercise of a terrorist group train derailment.
B. September 21, 2000 terrorist exercise at Tomsk-2000.
C. 10/17/2000 the FSB anti-terrorist exercise at the Ural Electrochemical Integrated Plant (UEIP).
D. June 25, 2002 Mining and Chemical Combine (MCC) emergency response exercise of nuclear
material transportation.
E. 12/25/2002 FSB test at MCC with mock bomb at the spent nuclear fuel facility.

5. Federal Target Programs for the Nuclear Industry: The Russian government has established a number
of high priority programs to be funded over the next 5 to 10 years in support of their overall national
defense and economic growth in the areas of science, technology and energy. Included within these plans
is a nuclear power program to develop and build nuclear power plants domestically and internationally.
The domestic nuclear power plants are planned to increase the share of domestic electricity from NPPs
from the current 16% to 25% by 2030 with the planned construction of 40 nuclear power plants during a
period when the majority of their RBMK NPPs that account for 48% of the total number of NPPs will be
shutdown. By increasing the share of electricity production to nuclear power it will allow the Russian
government through its State Corporations to increase the amount of oil and gas that can be sold
internationally. The 1,471 B Ruble (~$55.5B) FTP for NPP will also stimulate all areas of mining,
manufacturing, banking, science, technology and construction. Roughly half of the funding for this FTP is
to come from the Federal budget and half from the nuclear sector budget and private investment. This
FTP will impact many of the key sectors within the Russian economy.
Figure 1: Overview of the Investment Strategy for the Russian NPP Development Program
($B based upon a 26.5 R/$)xiii
To implement the FTP for nuclear power, the Russian government passed the Tunnel Law that
approves the establishment of AtomEnergoProm within Rosatom and the transfer of 55 State Unitary
Enterprises to become part of the new corporation. This change allows government institutes to be
converted to a private corporation that is 100% owned by the government. This has many advantages
for investments. On November 13, 2007 the law was approved by the State Duma to convert all of
Rosatom, including nuclear weapons and civilian power, into a state corporation. One December 12,
2007 S. Kiriyenko was appointed the new head of the corporation.
Critical to the success of this new state corporation and the proposed investment of billions of rubles
for the development of nuclear power is ensuring the security of the nuclear material and reduction of
the ecological impact. In short, their goal is to be an internationally viable corporation. On July 13,
2007 the 132B ruble (~$5.5B) FTP on Nuclear and Radiation Safety was approved. This provides
funding for nuclear MPC&A. It includes material consolidation and reduction. It also covers site

clean-up, spent nuclear fuel storage and site restoration. This FTP is an important part of Rosatom
ensuring nuclear material safeguards at their institutions and represents a clear understanding of how
important safeguarding of the nuclear materials is to the future grown of Rosatom Corporation.
Another important change is the establishment of a new Federal Agency for Equipping State Borders.
It was reportedly established in October 2007 with the transfer of the customs infrastructure to the
new agency with a 10.5 B-Rubles budget from the Federal Target Program for 2008 to provide
equipment for the Russian borders.xiv
6. Expanded Role of the FSB: The role of the FSB was further expanded in the 2004 and 2005 time
period with increased role in the security at nuclear facilities and border regions. The increased role of
the FSB is legalized through Presidential Decree #116 dated 2/15/2006 on increased anti-terrorist
measures that places the FSB as the lead in combating and responding to terrorism, including nuclear
terrorism, at the federal and regional levels. This decree established a new National Antiterrorist
Committee headed by the FSB director. It has been reported that there is increased scrutiny of visitors
at the nuclear sites now that the role of the FSB has been expanded. It is perceived that it is therefore
more difficult for nonproliferation and counter-terrorism activities to take place.
FUTURE COOPERATION
The strengthening of the Russian economy through the sale of oil and gas products as part of their
national energy strategy creates a new opportunity for US/Russian nuclear cooperationxv
. It is an
opportunity to thank the Russian government and the people within the nuclear industry for allowing
numerous countries and organizations to provide safeguards support for their nuclear weapons,
nuclear submarines and nuclear complex during a difficult period of change and transition that
required significant openness on the part of the Russian government. But with the advent of their new
nuclear vision that includes federal and private investment in nuclear infrastructure, safeguards, and
border protection it appears that it is time to move to the next stage in nuclear cooperation. Below are
some proposed ideas for modifications by Rosatom to further their work in nuclear safeguards and
opportunities for international cooperation. Possible areas for future cooperation include:
1. Nuclear material declarations: Rosatom has transitioned from a Federal Agency to a State
Corporation with the goal of becoming an international end-to-end nuclear power supplier.
Consistent with their goal of openness and transparency Rosatom Corporation should consider
openly declaring their national stockpiles of nuclear material. This could be best supported by the
funding of the Plutonium Registry program and a similar program for HEU.
2. HEU reduction: There is significantly more HEU within Russia than plutonium. Even with the
down-blending of over 330 MT of HEU under the US HEU/LEU program, there is still an
estimated total of around 900 MT of HEU (40 to 90%) in storage and in nuclear weapons. HEU is
stored, used or processed at an estimated 57 sites distributed geographically across Russia as
compared to the estimated 12 sites with plutonium.
HEU is the primary special nuclear material moving throughout the Russian complex with tens of
tons transiting many sites every year as part of the nuclear weapons assembly and disassembly
process, preparing for long-term storage, HEU/LEU blend down process, the manufacture of fuel

elements and in the form of spent nuclear fuel elements. HEU is more easily shielded than
plutonium and it is difficult to detect as compared to plutonium. And the vast majority of nuclear
diversion cases involving special nuclear material have been MEU or HEU rather than plutonium.
Furthermore, a large percentage of the Russian research reactors use HEU. With the expansion of
the nuclear power program and the University programs for training students in science and
engineering, it is anticipated that the number of research reactors will increase. The FTP for
nuclear power also includes ~$5B to provide loans to foreign countries to purchase Russian
nuclear power plants. Therefore, it can be anticipated that more foreign students and nuclear plant
operators will study in Russia as part of their nuclear power program. Currently there are no rules
or guidelines in Russia that require an institute to consider designing a new research reactor
system or reconstructing an older system to use LEU. This may be an area where the International
Atomic Energy Agency can team to establish international guidelines for new and reconstructed
research reactors to consider LEU as a first option.
BN 600
Ice Breakers
Naval
Research
Reactors
HEU
Weapons
Newly
Enriched
Uranium
Elektrostal
NCC MPA
MCC
SCC
Dmitrovgrad
BOR-60
MPA RT-1
IPPE BFS-1
and BFS-2
CA
Figure 2: Illustration of the HEU Material Flow for Reactor Operations within Russia
A reduction in the amount of HEU used in nuclear reactors and research reactors will impact many
different sites and lesson the proliferation threat.
3. Next Generation Reactors and Fuel Cycle: One of the main issues pressing the US and Russia
will be the expansion of nuclear power and the possibility of closing the nuclear fuel cycle. While
many groups within the US still considers reprocessing as unnecessary, the Russian’s have
established reprocessing and the use of reprocessed uranium and plutonium within MOX as the
baseline for their next generation of nuclear power generation. There are many questions that will
need to be addressed before this technology is brought forward from a technical, nonproliferation,
counter-terrorism and ecological impact. This issue can be addressed best within a teaming

arrangement rather than having each nation working separately. Continued work in this area is
important.
4. Floating reactors: The Russians are beginning to build medium powered reactors that can be
barged to a region to provide power from a water platform. Rosatom has emphasized that they are
planning on using LEU fuel in these systems. But perhaps floating reactors are not a safeguards
issue, but are rather a possible counter-terrorism target? Joint studies could help identify possible
issues to be addressed during the design and construction phase.
5. Russian NPP expansion: The Russian NPP expansion program is in line with the overall Russian
government energy and economic development. To help insure independent review, Rosatom
may consider bringing in a second country or organization to provide independent review of their
nuclear power systems.
6. Nuclear Diversions Cooperation: During the past couple of years there have been two nuclear
diversion cases of high importance where the material is believed to have originated within
Russia:
a. June 23, 2003, the arrest of Armenian G. Dadayan with 170 gms of HEU in Georgia, and
b. February 2006 the arrest of Russian O. Khinsagov in Georgia with 100 gms of HEU.
It is reported in the press that the material originated from Novosibirskxvi . A 12/20/2002 article
from the NTI website suggests that the Russians authorities had discovered a possible leak of
HEU during the summer of 2002 from the Novosibirsk Chemical Combine (NCC) during a
standard reviewxvii
. Based upon reports on the type of material it is possible that the HEU
discovered from Georgia was from the NCC or could be legacy material outside of the system.
Samples of the material were reportedly provided to the Russian government for review, but the
Georgian government did not receive any information back from the Russian government. Both
HEU cases were down-played by the Russian government to reduce the international attention on
materials safeguards issues. Likewise, many questions remained unanswered regarding the
Polonium-210-related death of A. Litvienko in the United Kingdom.
Russia has a long and complicated history both in their international interactions and with respect
to their nuclear safeguards. A clear and open statement on the part of the Russian government
would help in the international communications. This also brings up the issue of nuclear forensics
– even though it is believed the HEU is from Russia it cannot be proven without the support of
the source country. Did the Russian government identify the missing material and is there
additional materials missing? Is it possible for nations to share key information regarding material
losses under possible emergency conditions and work together within a framework of multi-
country detection architecture? In June 2005, it was reported that Russia had 14,000 hits at their
radiation detectors at their points of entry with 200 of them involving potential attempts to
smuggle nuclear or radiological materials with 80% of the hits from people coming into the
country and 20% leaving the countryxviii xix
CONCLUSIONS
. Would the sharing of this type of information among
neighboring countries be helpful in identifying possible nuclear smuggling trends? These
questions may be best addressed within the IAEA or the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
Terrorism.
The bottom line is that continued discussion and cooperation is critical for both the US and Russia and
should be encouraged even during these times of change and transition.

The Russian government and Rosatom has made tremendous progress in addressing their nuclear
safeguard issues, yet with each of these changes new challenges appear. The expansion of the civilian
nuclear power industry provides new opportunities for openness and full disclosure on nuclear
materials and issues with nuclear diversions. A fully integrated government owned, private company
creates new issues to ensure the safeguards audits and safety design are truly independent – a difficult
task when the country is lined up to meet the future energy and economic goals. And with the
economic growth ensuring that sensitive nuclear technologies and capabilities are not transferred
under the umbrella of civilian nuclear programs. It is critical that the Russian government rises to
meet these difficult challenges during their next major transformation of growth and change.
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ii
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NTI web site: http://www.nti.org/db/nistraff/2002/20020900.htm.
xviii Testimony of David Huizenga for the House Committee on Homeland Security, 2005, 6/05.
xix IBR S. Danilov e-mail 2005.