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© Radical Philosophy Review Volume 15 number 2 (2012): 359–364
DOI: 10.5840/radphilrev201215228
Immigration:
The Missing Requirement
for an Ethics of Race
José Jorge Mendoza
In her latest book, The Ethics and Mores of Race, Naomi Zack writes:
“[t]here remains a big rhetorical and social distance between philosophi-
cal and formal ethical treatments of race, on the one hand, and what race
means in practice and how ordinary people think about it, on the other.”1 In
other words, while academics have developed sophisticated condemnations
of racism, in the public sphere these same condemnations have either been
dismissed as mere opinion or misunderstood as being a potential source of
sets of discourse, for example the discourse of network news programs as
opposed to the discourse within Ethnic Studies departments, stems from
What may be genuine ethical judgments about race often sound like at-
tacks on existing mores because the common ground on which they can be
expressed and understood, as ethical judgments concerning race, does not
yet exist. (xiv)
so disconnected from each other is that the difference between “ethics” and
might be able to help. Understanding the difference between ethics and
mores is tricky, because the difference between the two is not immediately
obvious. Both ethics and mores aim to provide normative guidance, but this
Zack, is something like the following. Mores “are closely tied to understand-
1. Naomi Zack, The Ethics and Mores of Race: Equality after the History of Philosophy
this work will be parenthetical.
— 360 — José Jorge Mendoza
• • •
and agreement of individuals, who do not have to be in the same place and
time as either one another or the philosopher being read” (xii). In short, mo-
res provide a particular, localized, form of normative guidance that, while
perhaps helpful in navigating within a particular community, might be valid
only within that particular community. In contrast, acting ethically might
ethically, however, is to provide normative judgments that aspire towards
universal validity.
But even if we accept this distinction and believe that it is important
enough to always keep it in mind, we might still want to ask why we should
develop an ethics of race as opposed to working towards changing the mo-
-
can society. Ethics used to be the primary tool against white oppression”
slavery and civil rights movement of the 1960’s. In short, Zack’s answer to
than mores, have historically been (and will likely continue to be) the true
catalyst for bringing about social justice—especially with regards to race.
But even if this further point is accepted, a persistent critic might still
want to ask: Why develop an ethics of race as opposed to simply broadening
It would not be necessary to have an ethics of race, distinct from race-
neutral ethics, if the human rights of individuals and groups were not
consistently violated in ways motivated by, and affecting, racial identities.
women, the disabled, and children were codicils to the UDHR [the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights]. (165)
-
hensive and illuminating examination of philosophical ethics concludes by
-
-
of race (in particular discussions about racism), as well as make the subject
of ethics more inclusive (xvii).
My view is that Zack’s argument is basically on solid footing. My only
concern, however, is that in her exposition Zack does not emphasize the is-
The Missing Requirement for an Ethics of Race
• • •
— 361 —
completely, she does make repeated mention of the issue throughout the
-
fense of immigrant rights. My concern is that the issue of immigration, much
like the issue of slavery (although very different in many important ways),
has historically played an important role in the construction of “whiteness”
and in particular in the establishment of white privilege and the perpetua-
-
Arbitrary
and discriminatory immigration controls must be held to be ethically wrong.
An ethics of race demands that with regard to immigration admission, exclu-
sion, expulsion, and enforcement, the presumptive right be on the side of im-
migrants and not on the side of the state. A legitimate state (i.e., a state that
respects human equality) does have a right to self-determination and security,
but these rights may be checked by a commitment to the moral equality of all
persons and the political equality of all citizens. In short, if a legitimate state
wishes to control immigration into its territory, it faces a substantial burden
of proof to show how its immigration policies and strategies do not violate a
prior commitment to universal equality.
In the rest of this article I make a case as to why I think this should be
how immigration controls in the U.S. have historically helped to construct
“whiteness” and functioned to establish and maintain white privilege and
-
many) might better exemplify the connection between immigration con-
Zack’s exposition on the connection between slavery and race (71–74).
Immigration and White Supremacy
-
-
cally clear that only “white persons” were eligible for naturalized U.S. citizen-
ship.2
Court ruling of Dred Scott v. Sandford
1790).
— 362 — José Jorge Mendoza
• • •
race, whose ancestors were brought to this country and sold as slaves, is not a
‘citizen’ within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States.”3
Less than ten years after the Dred Scott case, the end of the Civil War
slaves and their descendents to become citizens of the U.S. and extended the
Dred Scott decision. Yet, as Kevin Johnson has argued in the Huddled Masses
Myth
began to bear the brunt of new discriminatory laws. Johnson writes:
Reconstruction amendments went into effect. With the harshest treatment
nation transferred its animosity to another discrete and insular racial mi-
nority—one whose immigration status, race, and perceived impact on the
fortunes of white workers made the treatment more socially acceptable.4
-
same amendments did not do away with the “whiteness” clause altogether.
-
migration (i.e., cases involving the admission, exclusion, and expulsion of
non-citizens).5 Overt forms of discrimination were allowed to continue in
immigration cases because the U.S. federal government was understood to
enjoy plenary power
self-determined state, the U.S. federal government was (and is still) pre-
sumed to have the right to regulate immigration free from judicial review.
from China and made all Chinese immigrants ineligible for U.S. citizenship,
thereby converting Chinese nationals who were already in the United States
into legal permanent residents.6
the Supreme Court. In the most famous of these cases, Chae Chan Ping v.
United States, the Court concluded that
3. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
4. Kevin R. Johnson, The “Huddled Masses Myth: Immigration and Civil Rights
5. Mae Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 38.
1882).
The Missing Requirement for an Ethics of Race
• • •
— 363 —
the United States, through the action of the legislative department, can
exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition which we do not think
open to controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent is an
incident of every independent nation. It is a part of its independence. If it
could not exclude aliens it would be to that extent subject to the control of
another power.7
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled
that besides having the presumptive right to admit and exclude non-citizens,
the federal government also has the unilateral power to expel non-citizens
8 -
portation was not considered a punishment, the due process protections of
the Constitution were not applicable to removal cases.
-
ment, in the sense in which that word is often applied to the expulsion of a
citizen from his country by way of punishment. It is but a method of enforc-
ing the return to his own country of an alien who has not complied with the
conditions upon the performance of which the government of the nation,
acting within its constitutional authority and through the proper depart-
ments, has determined that his continuing to reside here shall depend. He
has not, therefore, been deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
trial by jury, and prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, and cruel
and unusual punishments, have no application.9
Chinese Exclusion Acts, supplemented by these Supreme Court deci-
expanded the scope of those ineligible for U.S. citizenship, which came to
India.10
-
ble for citizenship.11
particular set of numbers was that the 1890 Census best captured the true
7. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
8. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
9. Ibid.
10.
11.
sess. (May 26,1924).
— 364 — José Jorge Mendoza
• • •
racial and ethnic composition of the U.S.12
disproportionately favored northern Europeans. In this way, the notion of
the U.S. as a “white” nation was perpetuated through immigration law.
-
13 But while U.S. admission and exclusion policies are now technically
non-discriminatory, the plenary power doctrine—which the U.S. government
enforcement and expulsion strategies, such as “Prevention through Deter-
It should come as no surprise that these strategies disproportionately
affect certain communities within the U.S. and in turn mark the members of
-
ly “white.” What this shows is that immigration controls—by which I mean
not only immigration admission and exclusion policies, but also immigra-
tion enforcement and expulsion strategies—need to be accounted for in an
12. Ngai, Impossible Subjects, 23.
13.
82nd Cong., 2nd sess. (June 27, 1952) and 1965 Immigration and Nationality
1965).