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Costs and Benets of Labour Mobility between the
EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
Country report: Belarus
Alexander Chubrik
Aliaksei Kazlou
EuropeAid/130215/C/SER/Mul
December 6, 2012
This country study is part of the project entitled “Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility
between the EU and the Eastern Partner Partnership Countries” for the European
Commission (Contract No. 2011/270-312, tender procedure
EuropeAid/130215/C/SER/Multi. The study was conducted under the direction of Luca
Barbone, CASE project director.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors, and should not be interpreted as representing the
official position of the European Commission and its institutions
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
BELARUS COUNTRY STUDY
Alexander Chubrik
Aliaksei Kazlou
Minsk
Tom Coupe
Hanna Vakhitova
Kyiv-2012
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
Country Study: Belarus
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List of Acronyms
€ Euro
Belstat The National Belarusian Statistical Committee
bn billion
BoP Balance of Payment
BYR Belarusian Rouble
CIF Cost, Insurance and Freight
CIS The Commonwealth of Independent States
CMEA The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
EaP The Eastern Partnership
eop End of Period
ETF The European Training Foundation
EU The European Union
FDI Foreign Direct Investments
FOB Free on Board
FSU Former Soviet Union
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GDR The German Democratic Republic
GNI Gross National Income
HBS Household Budget Survey
IFAD - International Fund for Agricultural Development
ILO – International Labour Organization
IMF – International Monetary Fund
IOM International Organization for Migration
IPM Institute of Privatization and Management
ISCO International Standard Classification of Occupations
LFS Labour Force Survey
mln million
NA Not Available
NACE Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European
Community
NBB National Bank of Belarus
ND Not-Defined
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NMS New Member States
PISA Programme for International Student Assessment
PPP Purchasing Power Parity
Q Quarter
SME Small and Medium Enterprise
SPF Social Protection Fund
yoy year-on-year
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
USA United States of America
USD, US$ United States Dollars
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WB The World Bank
WEO World Economic Outlook
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
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Contents
List of Acronyms ........................................................................................................................ 2
Executive summary .............................................................................................................................. 6
Introduction and Literature Review ................................................................................................ 10
Chapter 1.Background and recent economic trends ....................................................................... 11
A. Economy of Belarus: a snapshot ............................................................................................ 11
B. Recent trends and medium-term prospects ....................................................................... 13
Chapter 2.Labour Market Trends and Characteristics .................................................................. 14
A. Employment and unemployment ......................................................................................... 14
B. Sectors and industries ............................................................................................................ 18
C. Wages ....................................................................................................................................... 19
D. Education ................................................................................................................................. 20
1. Education system of Belarus: A snapshot ....................................................................... 20
2. Effects of education on wages and employment ............................................................ 23
E. Social inclusion issues ............................................................................................................ 23
Chapter 3.Trends in Labour Migration ........................................................................................... 24
A. History and trends in migration ........................................................................................... 24
B. Reasons and causes of migration (push and pull factors) ................................................ 28
C. Number of migrants ............................................................................................................... 34
D. Directions (countries) ............................................................................................................ 35
Chapter 4.Labour Migration Profile ................................................................................................ 37
A. Characteristics of the migrant profile .................................................................................. 37
1. Demographic characteristics ............................................................................................. 37
2. Education ............................................................................................................................. 39
3. Occupation and economic activities ................................................................................. 40
B. Migrants’ intentions and future migration trends ............................................................. 43
Chapter 5.Remittances ....................................................................................................................... 44
A. Individuals’ transfer flow trends .............................................................................................. 44
B. Remittances consumption patterns, effect on income, consumption, investment ........... 46
C. Effects of large remittance flows on macroeconomic management ................................... 49
Chapter 6.Costs and Benefits of Migration ..................................................................................... 49
A. Economic costs and benefits .................................................................................................... 49
1. Impact on the local labour market ....................................................................................... 49
2. Cost and benefits of labour mobility for development ...................................................... 52
B. Social costs and benefits ........................................................................................................... 54
1. Cost of migration for family members left behind and impact on migrants’ households
....................................................................................................................................................... 54
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
Country Study: Belarus
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2. The impact on education and the health sector ................................................................. 55
3. Social security of migrants .................................................................................................... 56
C. Demographic costs and consequences .................................................................................... 58
Chapter 7.Current Migration Policies .............................................................................................. 58
A. Institutional set-up for migration ............................................................................................ 58
B. Selected international agreements in the field of migration and people-to-people
contacts ............................................................................................................................................ 61
C. Barriers for and mechanisms to labour migration: Focus Group results .......................... 63
Chapter 8.Forecasts/Projections of Migration and Labour Markets Trends ............................. 65
A. Analysis of possible responses to changes in migration policies in the EU ....................... 65
B. Projections of potential increases in the labour force as a result of natural causes and
migration ......................................................................................................................................... 66
Conclusions ......................................................................................................................................... 67
References ............................................................................................................................................ 69
List of tables
Table 1 Belarus: Selected economic indicators, 2011 ................................................................12
Table 2: Trade with Russia and EU in 2011: selected indicators ..............................................12
Table 3: Employment structure (industries), % ........................................................................19
Table 4: Public expenditure on education in EaP countries, % of GDP ................................... 20
Table 5: Motivations for emigration in Belarus: pull factors ................................................... 28
Table 6: Comparison of the situation in Belarus with the situation in selected countries with a
Belarusian population .............................................................................................................. 29
Table 7: Destination of external labour emigration, % of total number of labour emigrants . 36
Table 8: Labour emigrants by occupation and skills (shares) ..................................................41
Table 9: Labour emigrants by economic sector (shares) ......................................................... 43
Table 10: Problems that have been resolved thanks to labour migration ............................... 47
Table 11: Structure of monetary expenditures of Belarusian households, % ........................... 48
Table 12: Shares of labour migrants in selected categories of employed population, % ......... 51
Table 13: The effect of remittances on poverty ........................................................................ 54
Table 14: Institutional set-up for migration ............................................................................. 59
List of figures
Figure 1: Employment, unemployment and inactivity .............................................................16
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
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Figure 2: Employment status .................................................................................................... 17
Figure 3: Employment structure (sectors) ............................................................................... 18
Figure 4: Employment structure (industries), % ......................................................................19
Figure 5:Wage dynamics (real and measured in US$) ............................................................ 20
Figure 6: Education sector wages compared to the average wage, % ...................................... 22
Figure 7: The effect of education on wages (measured in US$ per month) ............................. 23
Figure 8: Number of emigrants and their share of the Belarusian population ....................... 25
Figure 9: Net migration ............................................................................................................ 26
Figure 10: Migrants stock: destinations (in thousands) .......................................................... 27
Figure 11: Ratios of per capita GDP in Belarus to per capita GDP in the EU and Russia ........ 30
Figure 12: Sectoral wage* disparities: Belarus vs. EU and Russia ............................................ 31
Figure 13: Reasons and obstacles for migration: Focus group results..................................... 33
Figure 14: Labour emigrants by age and destination (shares) ................................................. 38
Figure 15: Labour emigrants by gender and nationality (shares) ............................................ 38
Figure 16: Labour emigrants by region and residence (shares) ............................................... 39
Figure 17: Labour emigrants by education level and foreign language* .................................. 40
Figure 18: Remittances size in Belarus: BoP data and alternative estimates .......................... 45
Figure 19: Remittances size: Belarus and EaP countries ......................................................... 46
Figure 20: Labour migrants as a share of the employed population, % .................................. 50
Figure 21: Business constraints to firms in Belarus and Eastern Europe & Central Asia
region, % of firms that mentioned a constraint ....................................................................... 53
Figure 22: Main areas of managing migration by IOM ............................................................61
Figure 23: Labour force and working age population projections for Belarus ........................ 66
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
Country Study: Belarus
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Executive summary
Labour migration does not appear to have the same magnitude and socio-economic
importance in Belarus as in other EaP countries. There is however much uncertainty
with regards to basic facts. First, unlike its neighbours, Belarus has not had a Labour
Force Survey until recently: it was launched in 2012 and results are not yet available.
Official data significantly underestimates the size of labour migration, as it accounts
only for those migrants who work under officially signed contracts, while different
studies show that unofficial migration is far more widespread. Alternative estimates
vary within a broad range and do not provide a comprehensive picture of labour
migration. Almost the only available trustworthy source is Census-2009, but this data
also has its drawbacks (being a spot observation, undertaken in a year of crisis, no
information about incomes/expenditures, etc.).
Second, research on the topic is rather limited. Although there are a lot of studies of
different aspects of migration and labour migration, they have been undertaken by
government agencies or at the request of government bodies, and their results are
usually not available publically. Again, because of the data issue some of these studies
have relied on polling data, but the absence of any structurally defined methodology
for analysing these polls may generate interesting but somewhat biased results. Some
of the studies are based on official migration data, with at times quite comprehensive
but strongly biased results.
Data on remittances is also limited, although it takes into account most of the
incomes of labour migrants reasonably well. Alternative estimates have showed that
remittance inflows are generally underestimated, although these estimates are
irregular and their methodology is not always clear.
This study utilises publically available literature as background and relies where
possible on micro-data: Census-2009, Household Budget Survey (HBS), as well as
relevant official data and data from polls related to the topic. Additionally, some
sections of this report rely on information collected in the course of a focus group
meeting with labour migrants and a series of in-depth interviews with officials from
state, international, and non-governmental agencies dealing with migration. Lastly,
in some cases anecdotal evidence was collected to support some of the new trends
that have not yet been recorded in the statistics.
Another important specificity is that analysis of the phenomenon of labour migration
should be implemented against the background of the current economic situation.
The recent balance of payments crisis, followed by a dramatic depreciation of the
national currency, led to a drastic increase in the income gap between Belarus and its
neighbours – recipients of its labour migrants. The ratio of the Belarusian average
wage to the Russian one fell by 1/3, and in some sectors of the economy disparities
grew even more. Additionally, the crisis has reduced employment opportunities in
Belarus (employment fell in 2011 by more than 2%), especially in the construction
sector, which suffered the most. While the increased wage gap has pulled the labour
force to Russia and other more attractive (in terms of income) countries, lower
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
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economic activity in Belarus has at the same time also pushed the surplus workforce
in that direction.
The existing social welfare system can also create incentives for migration. Social
benefits for the unemployed are negligible and thus the risk of falling into poverty
among the unemployed is one of the highest in the region. However, low-paid jobs
that are usually available for the registered unemployed often do not allow people to
escape from poverty: poverty risk among households with low-paid workers is also
higher than average. With this in mind one might well chose labour migration as a
fast and quite effective coping strategy. Earlier studies of labour migration support
this finding.
Activity rates for the Belarusian work force are rather high and close to EU indicators
– although pension age in the EU is significantly higher than in Belarus. Thus, only a
small part of the economically inactive population can be considered as a reserve pool
for labour migration. Unemployment is also moderate – largely for the reasons
described in the previous paragraph.
During the last decade the average education level of the Belarusian work force has
increased. Although quality of Belarusian tertiary education is questionable, returns
on education in Belarus are generally positive and this finding is supported by earlier
studies. Thus, in order to maximize returns on their education the most qualified
specialists may tend to migrate, especially after the dramatic increase in the income
gap between Belarus and recipient countries.
According to Census-2009 data, the share of labour migrants with higher and
secondary specialised education was lower than the share of the workforce with the
same education level. However, this share differs significantly between migration
directions: labour migrants to Russia (90% of all labour migrants) have a lower
education level than the labour force on average, while migrants to other destinations
are much more educated than the average person of working age. This can be
explained by economic factors: the income gap between Belarus and Russia was
much lower than that between Belarus and the EU. So, the widening the gap with
Russia after the crisis of 2011 will most likely lead to a bigger outflow of qualified
labour to this country.
Overall, economic incentives dominate in making decisions about labour migration.
Apart from the macroeconomic data, this is shown by polls and focus groups results:
the desire to improve one’s material status (investing in real estate, renovating an
apartment, buying better durables/clothes/whatever...etc.) is the most popular factor
driving migration among respondents. Another important group of push factors is
related to the capital needed for realisation of respondents’ plans upon their
homeward return: increase education level, start a family, run a business, etc. As pull
factors, one can stress better quality of life (according to the respondents’
perception), better opportunities for professional self-realisation, or simply new
experiences and acquisition of the social status of a “mobile” person (more popular
among young people).
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Russia is a popular direction for migration not only for economic reasons, but also
because of the absence of a visa regime and passport control over the border, as well
as the absence of a language barrier. If a person speaks a foreign language he/she is
much more likely to become a labour migrant; however, the general level of language
skills (self-defined) is quite low: slightly more than 10% of Census-2009 respondents
speak foreign language(s) fluently. The figure among labour migrants to non-Russia
destinations was more than 75%, while the foreign language skills of labour migrants
to Russia were on average lower than among the whole labour force. That is why the
widening income gap between Belarus and Russia is an important determinant of
migration, while the persistently high gap between Belarus and (for instance) the EU
provides limited incentives for migration. The language barrier would most likely
prevent mass out-migration of the labour force in the case of softer regulation of
labour migration by the EU.
The absence of a language barrier is especially important for the labour force with
lower qualifications and this is another reason why migrants to Russia are less
educated than those to other destinations (mainly developed industrial economies).
In general, the share of high-skilled labour among migrants to Russia is only about
15%, while its share in total employment is about 25% and among migrants to other
destinations it is close to 30% (Census-2009 data). However, in absolute terms
Russia attracts more labour of all skill levels than all other destinations.
Due to its limited size, labour migration has had moderate effects on the domestic
labour market, although regional and sectoral impacts may differ significantly.
Construction and transport are the most heavily influenced sectors, while the
Viciebsk, Homiel and Mahiliou regions are the main donors of labour. However,
outflows of highly skilled professionals is limited (0.5% of their total number), while
migration of unskilled labour brings more benefits than costs, reducing
unemployment and poverty. Nevertheless, risks related to bigger income differences
could push more professionals to Russia: anecdotal evidence indicates increased
outflows of doctors, civil servants, etc.
Although the effects of labour migration are not so significant as to mark it as a
development problem, they do exist. Labour migration affects the health sector, but
would affect it more in the event of higher outflows of doctors. At the same time,
migrants and their families invest part of their remittances into their health, although
these investments go mainly to tourism (imports of services). The impact of labour
migration on education is more complex: on the one hand, it may postpone or cancel
further education, on the other it allows money to be saved for further investment in
education. In terms of the costs and benefits of labour migration for families, earlier
studies have showed that it brings more benefits than costs or is neutral for family
members who are left behind, as it tends to help resolve the material problems of
households; however, traditional demographic costs of labour migration such as
postponed marriage and births are still valid for Belarus.
Another set of labour migration’ effects is related to use of remittances. First,
according to the official balance of payments data, their inflow is important, but a
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
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rather small part of total inflows on the current account, comparable to 10% of gross
reserve assets. But increased labour migration leads to higher dependence of the
economy on remittances inflows and this makes the country more vulnerable to
external shocks such as a probable “second wave” in the global economic crisis.
Second, remittances affect household consumption patterns: according to indirect
estimates based on the HBS data, households with remittances spend a significantly
higher share of their incomes on real estate (buying, renovation, etc.). This is proved
by polling data from earlier studies: the most widespread economic incentive for
labour migration is to earn money that allows solving the “housing problem”. As a
result, remittances could be considered as an important source of household fixed
capital investment.
There are around 7-8 governmental bodies responsible for regulating and monitoring
migration processes, although no single body embraces all the activities and issues
associated with migration within a unified conceptual framework. Local NGOs and
the ILO have limited impact on migration policies: locals concentrate their efforts at
combating human trafficking, supporting students and young people in finding the
possibilities to continue studying abroad, and other issues, while only one of the four
main areas of the IOM’s activities is functional in Belarus. Diaspora organisations
have negligible influence on local policies (largely due to the limited willingness of the
government to cooperate), although they do play an important role in the cultural life
of migrants and support people-to-people contacts. All in all, there are a lot of
difficulties in the sphere of state regulation of labour migration, as migration
problems are understood narrowly (mainly from the point of view of protection of the
domestic labour market and combating human trafficking), while recent trends show
that labour migration issues should be addressed by the government and non-state
actors.
Recent studies show some alarming results via simulated different scenarios of the
impact of migration flows on the economy (GDP growth rate). Their findings
demonstrate the strongly negative impact of high-skilled labour outflows (inflows of
unskilled labour reduces these costs, but only slightly), while inflows of skilled labour
generate significant benefits in the form of additional real GDP growth. Current
policies in the field of labour migration are not aimed at attracting professionals (or
even keeping domestic professionals at home), and in order not to undermine
medium- and long-term growth potential the government should address the issue.
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
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Introduction and Literature Review
Belarus is one of the few post-socialist economies that have preserved the dominance
of the state sector and built complicated systems of subsidisation and economic
support for the population designed to manage the political-business cycle (see
Chubrik, Shymanovich, Zaretsky (2012)). This model has allowed the economy to
grow quite steadily until recently. However, the distorted system of incentives that
was created for enterprises and households has resulted in the need for a
“correction”, which happened in the form of a balance of payments crisis in 2011. The
impact of this factor on migration has not been fully visible yet. At the same time the
relatively long period of stability and gradual, but steady, increase in welfare
payments has played a role as a migration-restraining factor.
Until the beginning of the transition period, migration in Belarus behaved similarly to
other countries of the Former Soviet Union (FSU). External migration in Belarus
changed enormously after 1991 with the collapse of the USSR for ethnic, social,
economic and political reasons. Many of the large number of people who had lived
outside their home country in the Former Soviet Union decided to return home. Since
the 2000s these factors have mostly been replaced by economic factors such as
deterioration of living standards and increased poverty. Industrial restructuring of the
former centrally planned economy, coupled with low incomes and the absence of
decent jobs in post-Soviet Belarus, have driven people abroad in search of better lives.
Migration in Belarus is considered as a strategy to avoid poverty rather than to find a
new job (Kazlou (2008)). Shakhotska (2003) showed that willingness to improve one’s
financial status is the main reason for labour migration from Belarus. Artyuhin and
Pushkevich (2011, 117), based on opinion poll results, identified the following reasons
for emigration: a desire to increase income (46.5%), people’s desire to create a better
future for their children (31%) and to avoid instability in the home country (16.9%).
According to a study conducted in 2009 by the Belarusian Institute for Strategic
Studies, almost 20% of its respondents would like to leave the country (Haiduk, Rakova,
Silitski (2009)). The last opinion poll made by the Institute of Sociology in 2010 in
Belarus showed that external migration potential is lower – at 5.9% (Artyuhin and
Pushkevich (2011, 115–118)) – because respondents preferred short-term labour
migration than long-term or permanent migration. The study showed that Minsk is the
main migrant-donor region in Belarus: emigration potential here is 8.8%. The main
preferable destination countries are Russia (16.4% of respondents would like to
emigrate there) followed by Germany (15%), the USA (12.7%), Italy (7.3%), and Poland
(6.5%).
Typical characteristics of labour emigration include relatively high level of education,
a significant share of females, diversified age groups (Bardak (2010)). Artyuhin and
Pushkevich (2011, 116) showed that almost 15% of potential emigrants have higher
and around 60% secondary and upper-secondary education. Young people prefer
permanent labour emigration and elder people tend to prefer short-term emigration.
Moreover, emigration potential for permanent emigration consists of young people
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living in Minsk (72.6% of all those who plan permanent emigration) and in Mahiliou
(91.1%).
Emigration influences the domestic labour market in Belarus, contributing to a
population decrease (see Shakhotska (2009)). The adverse economic consequences of
net emigration appear to be severe for Belarus. It is already, for example, advanced in
the ageing process (and suffers from a declining population). This problem is even
more urgent if one takes into account low fertility and high male mortality rates.
Because the industrial sector was not restructured in Belarus significant hidden
unemployment is absorbed at state enterprises (which are subsidised by the state).
This fact distorts information about actual demand for labour in Belarus and creates
false signals for migration policy – attracting low skilled workers while it is the high
skilled that are really needed (Kazlou (2008)).
Chubrik and Shymanovich (2008) showed that elimination of the shadow economy,
including non-registered labour migration, would significantly improve the state of
the Belarusian pension system. It is important to create a social security net for
labour migrants in a way that guarantees them pensions and avoids additional
pressure on the state budget. Some steps have already been made for mutual pension
recognition with other countries.
Various authors (e.g. Katz (2001), Shakhotska and Bobrova (2009), Bardak (2010))
have mentioned the poor quality of migration data in all FSU countries, including
Belarus. The problem is aggravated by the absence of a formal state border with
Russia, which makes statistical accounting of migrants to that country an uneasy
exercise. Belarus has just launched a labour force survey (LFS), as its household
budget survey (HBS) does not capture enough of the total of labour migrants to arrive
at any strong conclusions based on these data.
A number of studies (ETF (2010), Alquézar et al. (2010)) highlight the need for a
comprehensive cooperation mechanism to develop a ‘win-win-win’ strategy in
migration management. The process of ‘skill matching’ between migrant workers and
jobs abroad is crucial for efficient labour mobility.
Chapter 1.Background and recent economic trends
A. Economy of Belarus: a snapshot
Belarus is upper-middle income country: according to World Bank Atlas
methodology, GNI per capita in 2010 was equal to US$ 5,950, while the lowest
upper-middle income threshold was US$ 5,886. The World Bank data show that
Belarus is free of absolute poverty (4 US$/day, PPP), while the official poverty rate is
also moderate (see Table 1).According to the last Census (2009), the majority of the
population lives in urban areas (3/4), and there is a clear urbanisation trend (according
to Census-1999, Belarus has 2/3 of the urban population
1
). Another important
1
See http://belstat.gov.by/homep/ru/perepic/p3.php.
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demographic trend is the gradual decrease in the population, due to natural decreases
or net out-migration
2
.
Table 1 Belarus: Selected economic indicators, 2011
Indicator
Value
Population, mln eop:
9.47
Rural
24.2%
Urban
75.8%
GDP:
US$, bn*
47.3
US$ per capita
4,998
US$ per capita, PPP
15,028
Real growth rate, % yoy
5.3
Absolute poverty (official poverty line), % of population
7.3
Average wage, US$/month
347
Average pension, US$/month
130
* At market exchange rate.
Sources: Belstat
3
, WEO database (April 2012), National Bank of Belarus, IPM Research Centre.
Belarus is a small open economy: in 2011, its merchandise trade turnover exceeded
GDP in current prices by 80% and amounted to 60% of PPP-based GDP. Russia and
the EU are the main destinations of Belarusian exports and main importers to
Belarus (see Table 2). However, the big share of exports to the EU is oil-related
(refined oil products), as well as imports from Russia (crude oil, natural gas and oil
products). After exclusion of the main exported/imported goods from exports and
imports respectively it appeared that Russia takes almost half of Belarusian exports,
while the EU takes slightly more than 1/5 of them. In terms of imports, Russia and
the EU are equally important partners (after exclusion of the above-mentioned
merchandise groups, see Table 2).
2
Official data based on current population records noted positive net migration between 2000 and
2009, but Census-2009 revealed that the gap between current and census data is about 175,000, which
makes net migration negative, see figure 2 below for details.
3
Belstat (2012). Statistical Yearbook, see
http://belstat.gov.by/homep/ru/publications/yearbook/2012/about.php.
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Table 2: Trade with Russia and EU in 2011: selected indicators
Total
Main commodities*
Other goods
Exports (CIF), US$ bn
40.3
17.2
23.1
Share of Russia
34.0%
0.4%
49.4%
Share of the EU
39.0%
55.2%
22.6%
Imports (FOB), US$ bn
45.7
18.2
27.6
Share of Russia
54.5%
88.8%
31.9%
Share of the EU
19.0%
0.3%
31.3%
* For exports: crude oil, oil products and natural gas; for imports: crude oil, oil products and potash
fertilizers.
Source: own estimates based on Belstat data
4
.
Belarus is among the fastest-growing countries of the region. Although before the
crisis of 2009, Azerbaijan, Armenia and at some point Georgia grew faster (growth
measured as 5-year moving averages of real GDP growth rates), after the crisis
Belarus appeared as the second among the EaP countries after Azerbaijan that was
able to reap the fruits of the 2005–2009 oil boom. Belarus has been demonstrating
positive rates of real GDP growth since 1996; this trend was not broken by the three
major crises (1998–1999, 2009 and 2011). However, the sources of this growth are
not sustainable: as has been shown in a number of works (Chubrik, Shymanovich,
Zaretsky (2012), Kruk, Tochitskaya, Shymanovich (2009), IMF (2010), etc.),
economic growth was fuelled by domestic demand-enhancing policies (income policy
and quasi-fiscal financing of state investment programmes via state-owned banks),
which led to growing external imbalances financed mainly via external debt
accumulation. As a result, in 2011 Belarus faced a balance of payments crisis (see
Chubrik (2012)).
B. Recent trends and medium-term prospects
The consequences of the latest crisis caused by accumulated external imbalances on
the labour market and migration are much more severe than those of previous ones.
This crisis has manifested itself in the form of a huge devaluation (the national
currency lost 64% of its value in 2011
5
)), 3-digit inflation (108.7%), and an increase in
absolute poverty (10.1% in 2011Q4, 5% in 2010Q4). As a result, the wage gap between
Belarus and neighbouring countries increased significantly, creating additional
economic incentives for migration. Macroeconomic policies have been improved, but
risks of further crises are still in place. The main scenarios for medium-term economic
development and related challenges are summarised in Chubrik, Shymanovich,
Zaretsky (2012) and are as follows (cited in this paper):
First, long-term growth potential has decreased because of limited sources of capital
accumulation financing and demographic challenges – a decreasing working-age
population. According to various estimates, the potential GDP growth rate is between
4
Belstat (2012). Foreign Trade of the Republic of Belarus, see
http://belstat.gov.by/homep/ru/publications/ftrade/2012/about.php.
5
End of period.
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
Country Study: Belarus
______________________________________________________________________
14
4 and 5% a year, while a few years ago it was about 8% thanks to the very favourable
external environment. Second, the short-term growth potential is also limited, as
Belarus needs to pay off and service significant external debt. Hence, medium-term
growth prospects will be determined by potential GDP growth almost entirely.
The macroeconomic forecast presented in Chubrik, Shymanovich, Zaretsky (2012)
demonstrated that external imbalances cannot be removed simply via macroeconomic
policies (such as devaluation and/or fiscal restriction). The IMF (2011) has showed
that for the next 5 years Belarus will face a lack of sources for external imbalances
financing. Thus one can expect that in the medium-term the government will try to
implement debt restructuring or even default.
Major long-term challenges for the country are aging companies with a reduction in
the working-age population, increasing the potential for structural unemployment and
coinciding with a deficit of a high-skilled labour force and growing migration
pressures. Postponed resolutions for these problems will cause growing income
disparities between Belarus and its neighbours, undermining the economic potential
of the country.
Chapter 2.Labour Market Trends and Characteristics
A. Employment and unemployment
One of the key issues in analysing the Belarusian labour market is lack of data: as the
LFS was launched in 2012, almost no strongly reliable data is available. One of the
few sources prior to the LFS was the Household Budget Survey, which contains a set
of labour-market related questions (since 1995) and serves as the only source of
micro-data on employment and unemployment
6
. Another data source is Census-
2009, but the data there is as of the second week of October 2009. Finally, official
data is collected from enterprises (“enterprise data”).
According to both HBS and Census data, Belarus has high activity rates: around 70%
of the population aged 15–64 are working or searching for a job and ready to start
working within two weeks (see Figure 1, a and b). The inactivity rate (31.4%, according
to the Census-2009) is slightly more than in the EU (28.8% in 2011
7
). HBS gives lower
figures of inactivity (27.2% at the end of 2009 and 25.5% at the end of 2010). These
relatively low rates of inactivity are due to the vulnerability of the inactive working
population to poverty, see e.g. IPM Research Centre (2011). Naturally, inactivity rates
among men are lower than among women (see Figure 1b); however, they are 3.3
percentage points higher than in the EU, while the inactivity rate for women is only 1.5
percentage points higher. Higher inactivity rates in Belarus can be explained by (i) the
6
However, figures on the labour market obtained from HBS should be treated with caution, as its
sample and questionnaire are designed for incomes and expenditure analysis, not for analysis of
economic activities.
7
See http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Labour_market_
participation_by_sex_and_age#cite_note-0.
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
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15
higher share of rural population (about 25%, according to the Census-2009), and
more important by (ii) the much lower retirement age.
8
The unemployment rate is relatively low: at 6.1% in late 2009 (according to the
Census) – the year in which Belarus first faced the fall-out from the global economic
crisis, and labour migration opportunities were limited due to the recession in Russia
– a major recipient of Belarusian labour. The following key factors help explain this
phenomenon. First, unemployment tends to increase the risk of poverty dramatically
(see IPM Research Centre (2011), Chubrik and Shymanovich (2010), and Chubrik et
al. (2009)), because social protection for the unemployed is (i) negligible
(unemployment benefit is about 20% of the official poverty line), (ii) hard to obtain (in
order to get unemployment benefit one must participate in public works) and (iii)
short-term (it is provided for no longer than 6 months
9
). As a result, the “incentives”
to be unemployed are low. Second, ensuring as high employment as possible is one of
the “pillars” of the government’s economic policy (see Haiduk et al. (2006)), which is
why the state sector seeks to maintain such high levels of surplus employment
10
.
Third, the absence of a visa regime and passport control over the border with Russia,
as well as absence of a language barrier, allows part of those who cannot find a job in
Belarus to migrate to the Russian labour market.
8
Higher alcohol consumption can also play an important role in explaining this phenomenon: in 2011,
per capita (adult) alcohol consumption in Belarus, according to expert estimates that measure
unrecorded alcohol vary from 15–16 (see http://naviny.by/rubrics/society/2012/01/24/
ic_articles_116_176604/) to 18 (see http://nn.by/?c=ar&i=41837) litres of pure alcohol a year, while
in the EU this indicator is equal to 12.5 litres (see Anderson, Møller and Galea (2012)).
9
As a result, less than 15% of the unemployed are registered by employment offices; see comparison of
unemployment rates in figure 12d.
10
According to the monitoring of more than 2,000 Belarusian enterprises organised by the National
Bank, around 7% of respondents indicate surplus employment.
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
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16
Figure 1: Employment, unemployment and inactivity
(a) Structure of working age population (15+),
%, eop
(b) Activity rates in 2009, % of age cohort, eop
(c) Employment, enterprise (p.a.) vs. HBS
(eop) data
(d) Unemployment, % of economically active,
eop
* As HBS micro-files contain only information about self-identification of non-working persons, this
estimate includes only those who define themselves as unemployed.
Sources: Structure of the working age population, employment rates (HBS) and unemployment (HBS)
– own estimates based on HBS micro-files (Belstat); unemployment (Census-2009) and registered
unemployment – Belstat
11
, employment rates (Census-2009) – own estimates based on Census-2009
micro-sample (Belstat).
Data quality is one of the key issues when discussing employment analysis. Figure 1c
demonstrates the differences between estimates of employment based on enterprise
data and estimates obtained on the basis of the HBS. In general, profiles of the two
lines are similar, but HBS-based data is more volatile, reflecting for instance the
effects of the crisis of 2009. At the same time, Census data for the end of 2009 gives
almost the same employment figure as Belstat official estimates based on enterprise
data. The LFS lunched in 2012 may serve as a more reliable source of labour market
information, but historical analysis can be implemented only on the basis of the
abovementioned sources.
11
Belstat (2012). Labour and Employment in the Republic of Belarus, see
http://belstat.gov.by/homep/ru/publications/labour/2012/about.php; Belstat (2011). Population
Census 2009: Socio-Econonmic Characteristics of Population of the Republic of Belarus, see
http://belstat.gov.by/homep/en/census/2009/volume6.zip.
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
employed unemployed inactive
0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
HBS
Census-2009
HBS
Census-2009
15+ 15-64
Total Female Male
4300
4400
4500
4600
4700
4800
4900
1995
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
HBS Enterprise
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
1995
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
HBS* Census-2009 Registered
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
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17
Figure 2: Employment status
(a) Employment structure: employees*, %, p.a.
(b) Employment status, Census-2009 data, %,
as of October 7–13, 2009
* Enterprise data: Employees are defined based on monthly reporting.
** Calculated as those who defined their employment status as “employee” and the official figure of
employees.
Source: (a) Belstat; (b) Belstat and own estimates based on Belstat data
12
.
Employees constitute the largest share of the employed population: 94% according to
the Census data. However, monthly statistics from Belstat provide a different figure:
in 2011, only about 70% of the employed population was reported by enterprises as
employees, their share falling from 82% in 2000 (see Figure 2a). This difference is
partially explained by the fact that some enterprises (SMEs, sole proprietors and some
others) report to Belstat only once a year and their employees are not taken into
account in the monthly statistics. However, this difference is less than the number of
“other” employees from Figure 2b: for instance, in 2008 the difference between data
on employees based on monthly and annual reporting was 612,000, while the
difference between Census-2009 and Belstat data (monthly reporting) was 1,053,000.
Hence, this discrepancy (about 400,000) may indicate the size of informal
employment, excluding various kinds of self-employment. One should also take into
account that only employees (more precisely, their employers) pay social security
contributions, and that average wages in the economy is calculated not for all
employed but for employees only
13
.
Taking together the facts that (i) the working-age population in Belarus has low
incentives to be unemployed due to high risk of poverty among the unemployed and
that (ii) inactivity means a significant increase in poverty, one can conclude that in
general employment in Belarus is close to some “potential” level. On the other hand,
these facts push the work force that cannot find a (good) job in Belarus to look for
employment opportunities abroad.
12
Same souce as in the footnote 11.
13
According to the HBS-2011, the average wage in the economy (calculated for those who received a
wage for 12 months in the year – 72.2% of those who indicated wage as an income source) was only
71% of the official estimates for the average wage (76.5% in 2010).
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
other employed
employees (based on monthly reporting)
71%
23%
1% 2%
3%
employees
(official)
employees
(other)**
employers
other self-
employed
other employed
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
Country Study: Belarus
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18
B. Sectors and industries
Structural changes in employment have been very gradual. For the last decade (2000–
2010), the share of services has increased by 5 percentage points, those in
construction (the most affected sector during the recent crisis) by 2 percentage points,
while industry and agriculture lost 2 and 5 p.p. respectively (Figure 3a). At the same
time, the GDP structure changed in a different way: agriculture “lost” 5 percentage
points, industry and construction together added the same share,
14
while the share of
services value added remained unchanged (Figure 3a). Hence, related productivity in
services fell, in agriculture it remained unchanged, while in industry and construction
it went up.
Figure 3: Employment structure (sectors)
(a) Employment structure, % of total
(b) GDP structure, % of total
Sources: (a) Belstat
15
; (b) World Bank (WDI database, updated on April 2012).
A more detailed breakdown
16
also demonstrates gradual changes in employment
structure. The biggest changes happened in agriculture, industry, trade and catering
and construction (the last one lost its share in the first years of transition, but almost
regained it later, especially between 2005 and 2010). In “other sectors” an important
role is played by public administration and the defence sector, which increased
employment noticeably.
14
According to Belstat data, the share of value added in construction increased in this period by 5
percentage points (consequently, those for industry remained unchanged).
15
Belstat. Labour and Employment in the Republic of Belarus, various issues.
16
This information is based on enterprise data, while more reliable census data is provided in Section
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1990
1995
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Services Construction Industry Agriculture
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1990
1995
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Agriculture Industry and construction Services, etc.
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
Country Study: Belarus
______________________________________________________________________
19
Figure 4: Employment structure (industries), %
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
1990-
1995
1995-
2000
2000-
2005
2005-
2010
Industry
30.9
27.6
27.6
26.9
25.3
-3.3
0.0
-0.7
-1.6
Trade and catering
6.4
9.8
11.0
12.7
14.3
3.4
1.2
1.7
1.6
Agriculture, hunting and
forestry
19.6
19.7
14.9
11.5
10.3
0.2
-4.9
-3.3
-1.2
Education
8.4
9.5
10.4
10.4
9.5
1.0
1.0
0.0
-0.9
Construction
11.1
6.9
7.0
7.8
9.4
-4.2
0.2
0.7
1.7
Health and social work
5.2
6.5
7.3
7.4
7.2
1.3
0.8
0.1
-0.2
Transport and storage
6.0
5.7
5.8
6.0
6.2
-0.3
0.1
0.2
0.2
Housing and utilities
2.5
3.4
4.2
4.6
4.6
0.9
0.8
0.4
0.0
Culture and arts
1.4
1.6
1.8
1.9
2.0
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.1
Communication
1.1
1.4
1.4
1.5
1.4
0.2
0.1
0.1
-0.1
Paid consumer services
0.5
0.6
0.5
0.8
1.0
0.1
-0.1
0.3
0.1
Science and science services
2.0
1.0
1.0
0.9
0.8
-1.0
-0.1
-0.1
-0.1
Material supply and sales
0.8
0.6
0.8
0.7
0.4
-0.1
0.2
-0.1
-0.3
Other sectors
4.2
5.8
6.3
6.9
7.7
1.6
0.5
0.6
0.8
Source: Belstat
17
.
C. Wages
Wages in Belarus have grown steadily since 1996 (in real terms) and in particular
between 2000 and 2008 (in US$ terms): see Figure 4a. Their dynamics were on one
hand influenced by labour productivity rates, see Chubrik, Kruk (2007), and on the
other by electoral dynamics – major political events, see Chubrik, Shymanovich and
Zaretsky (2012), Haiduk et al. (2009), etc. The cyclicality of wage dynamics impacted
in the recent volatility of dollar-denominated wages, which fell in 2009 and 2011 after
significant increases in the preceding years (see Figure 4b). As Chubrik (2012) shows,
pre-election wage increases (above labour productivity growth) were one of the
factors that provoked the balance of payments crisis of 2011, which in turn caused the
reduction of dollar-denominated wages to the level of 2009 or even lower. However,
real wages did not fall, although over the year their dynamics vary (growth at the
beginning of the year, contraction later).
Another important note about wage dynamics is the existence of a gap between
dollar-denominated and real wage growth. Before 2000, real wages grew faster than
the US$ denominated one. But before the presidential elections of 2001 the
authorities started to target dollar-denominated wages, and from 2001 dollar wages
started to catch up. In 2005–2006 the dollar wage index caught up with the real wage
one, and prior to the crisis of 2009 dollar wages grew faster than real wages (see
Figure 4a). This fact led, on the one hand, to fast growth in demand for imports, and,
on the other, a narrowing of the gap between incomes in Belarus and neighbouring
17
Belstat. Labour and Employment in the Republic of Belarus, various issues.
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
Country Study: Belarus
______________________________________________________________________
20
countries (see Figure 10). However, this gap widened after the crisis of 2011 (see
Section 4.2), creating additional economic incentives for labour migration.
Figure 5:Wage dynamics (real and measured in US$)
(a) Wages
(b) Cyclical component of real wages and
major electoral events* (logarithmic scale)
* Yellow markers: constitutional referendums of 1995 (May), 1996 (November) and 2004 (October) and
presidential elections of 2001 (September), 2006 (March) and 2010 (December). Green markers:
parliamentary elections of 1995 (November-December), 2000 (October), 2004 (October), 2008
(September), and transformation of the Supreme Soviet
18
to the National Assembly
19
(since December of
1996).
Sources: (a) own estimates based on Belstat (nominal wages, CPI), NBB (official exchange rate) and
IPM Research Centre (black market exchange rate for 1996–2000 and 2011) data; (b) Chubrik,
Shymanovich, Zaretsky (2012).
D. Education
1. Education system of Belarus: A snapshot
Public expenditures on education in Belarus as a share of GDP are close to the EU
level (5.1% in 2010
20
). However, during the last decade this share fell quite noticeably
(see Table 4), leaving Belarus behind EaP countries such as Moldova and Ukraine.
Table 3: Public expenditure on education in EaP countries, % of GDP
2000
2007
2009
Belarus
6.2
Moldova
8.3
Moldova
9.5
Moldova
4.5
Ukraine
5.3
Ukraine
7.3
Ukraine
4.2
Belarus
5.2
Belarus
4.5
Azerbaijan
3.9
Armenia
3
Armenia
3.8
Armenia
2.8
Georgia
2.7
Azerbaijan
3.2
Georgia
2.2
Azerbaijan
2.5
Georgia
3.2
Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics Custom Tables.
18
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supreme_Soviet_of_Belarus.
19
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Assembly_of_Belarus.
20
Chubrik et al. (2011).
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
1995
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Average monthly wage, US$
Real wage, 2000=100
1995Q1
1996Q1
1997Q1
1998Q1
1999Q1
2000Q1
2001Q1
2002Q1
2003Q1
2004Q1
2005Q1
2006Q1
2007Q1
2008Q1
2009Q1
2010Q1
2011Q1
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
Country Study: Belarus
______________________________________________________________________
21
The constitution guarantees free and equal access to secondary education and
provision of vocational and tertiary education on a competitive basis. Thus, local
authorities are delegated the responsibility of ensuring equal access to quality
secondary education. Budgetary funding of vocational and higher education is limited
to scholarship students who score above a designated threshold in the entrance
examination. These students get free studies and access to libraries, computers and
other university/college facilities, receive a grant and also have the right to subsidised
on-campus accommodation. The number of places for scholarship students in higher
education is determined by administrative demand, which is shown from graduates’
redistribution in previous years.
The share of the private sector in education is small but increasing. The expansion rate
of the private sector in education accelerated after 2000. The share of pupils receiving
general secondary education in private schools is negligible. In the 2007–2008
academic year the share of private general secondary schools was just over 1% and the
share of students in private general secondary schools was less than 1%.
The private resources spent on education in Belarus are sizeable. Funding education
using private funds is becoming widespread. As in many countries, Belarus has
introduced a dual system, whereby fees are set for those who fail to gain admission to
funded higher education, although this dual system does not apply to secondary and
primary education. In primary education, parents pay for catering; in secondary
education, parents may make charitable donations and pay for extra classes. A
substantial proportion of private expenditure on higher education in Belarus is
represented by the recently developed network of fee-based predominantly state-
owned educational institutions. The contract system (referring to fee-paying students)
is education provided by state-owned higher educational institutions to those who fail
to enter university on academic merit. In Belarus, the share of students in public
higher educational institutions who pay fees is substantial. Private fees for education
set by individual educational institutions ranged from USD 500 to USD 1,500 per year
in 2010 excluding living expenses (sometimes exceeding the amount of money paid
per student from public funds). Not surprisingly, fee-paying students are heavily
concentrated in fields of study such as management, economics and the humanities.
The quality of the educational system in Belarus is generally agreed to be
questionable, although difficult to measure. Different sources of information provide
different assessments. The government assessment of education quality is high. The
Belarus State Statistics Committee indicates a high degree of relevance between the
skills obtained in education and the corresponding occupations. However,
international comparisons raise questions about the quality of education.
Unfortunately, Belarus has not yet received the results of the Programme for
International Student Assessment (PISA), which compares the quality of education
between different economies.
There are also indirect signs of the low quality of education. Low wages in education
do not attract highly skilled specialists. After a considerable decline in the 1990s,
wages in the educational sector started to increase in 2001 due to gradual increases in
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
Country Study: Belarus
______________________________________________________________________
22
the statutory minimum wage against which public sector wages is indexed,
implementation of a unified wage grid for public sector employees and also due to the
overall increase in public spending on education. However, educational sector wages
are still low in comparison with other sectors, and the gap between average wages and
those for the rest of the economy is substantial, varying from 15 to 30%, Figure 5.
Figure 6: Education sector wages compared to the average wage, %
Source: own estimates based on Belstat
21
data.
Other signs of the relatively low quality of education in Belarus include the following.
First, a skills mismatch exists. The quantity of graduates with higher education is too
high in comparison with the real needs of the economy for highly educated persons,
whereas demand for skilled blue-collar workers is unmet. The Belarusian educational
system is biased towards humanities and so is unable to satisfy the increasing needs of
the labour market in terms of engineers and other technical specialists. Second, the
educational system does not develop the practical skills of graduates. Third, private
higher education institutions are often focused not on filling the gaps in the system,
but on the provision of poor quality education for those who failed to enter state-
owned institutions. There are some indicators that show the relatively poor quality of
private higher educational institutions:
1. Infrastructure is far from perfect, as many establishments provide private
higher education on premises formerly used for kindergartens, enterprises, etc.
rather than in buildings specifically designed for higher education;
2. Salaries are relatively low, with average pay in private educational institutions
lower than in the public education sector (and also long-service bonuses,
scientific degree and academic rank bonuses, etc.);
3. Poor quality makes it difficult for private educational institutions to attract
high-quality teachers and professors;
4. Fees in private educational institutions may be lower than in higher-ranked
public universities.
21
Belstat, Labour and Employment in Belarus, various issues.
70%
75%
80%
85%
90%
95%
100%
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
Country Study: Belarus
______________________________________________________________________
23
At the same time, reasonable fees for students in Poland and other EU countries and
various private and public scholarship possibilities attract Belarusian young people for
study there as well as a higher quality of education in EU countries.
2. Effects of education on wages and employment
The structure of employment by education (in comparison with labour migrants’
education) is discussed in section 5.1.2. In trend terms, over the decade 2000–2010
the share of employees with higher education increased by 6.6 percentage points to
25.4%, while the share of employees with primary or lower education fell by 5.4
percentage points to 2.9%.
This shift toward an increased education level of the labour force can be explained by
the existing wage differences between workers with different educational levels.
According to HBS-2011, the average wage of workers with higher education was 62%
higher than among those with education defined as “general basic and below” (see
Figure 6). However, it seems that the 2011 crisis lowered differences between wages
paid to workers with higher vs. secondary specialised education (from 40% in 2010 to
34% in 2011), reducing incentives to obtain a higher education. Taking into account
existing demand for a well-educated work force abroad this will likely create
additional pressure on highly-educated labour, pushing part of it abroad.
Figure 7: The effect of education on wages (measured in US$ per month)
Note. Average wages calculated for those who received wages for 12 month a year.
Source: own estimates based on Belstat (HBS micro data), NBB (official exchange rate, 2010) and IPM
Research Centre (black market exchange rate, 2011) data.
E. Social inclusion issues
Social inclusion in Belarus is the subject of the government “Programme of
Employment Promotion” adapted annually. The most recent programme of this kind
stresses that the labour market of Belarus in 2012 will be influenced by the “reduction
of the labour force, the existence of surplus labour, accompanied by a deficit of
professionals, imbalances between professions and demand for qualifications and the
low competitiveness of vulnerable groups – people with disabilities, young people,
-31%
-30%
-29%
-28%
-27%
-26%
-25%
-24%
-23%
-22%
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
Higher and post-
graduate Secondary
specialized Vocational school General secondary General basic and
below
2010 2011 change, %
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
Country Study: Belarus
______________________________________________________________________
24
females, released prisoners and the long-term unemployed”.
22
Programme-2012 puts
a special emphasis on the social inclusion of vulnerable groups, stabilising
employment, improvement of the re-training system, and informational support on
employment issues, particularly the new system of labour market monitoring
(launched LFS). All these measures are financed from the Social Protection Fund, but
the volume of financing is low compared to the pension expenses of the Fund (77.9%)
or different types of allowances and benefits (19.4%), while expenditures on
“employment promotion amounted to only 0.4% of the fund’s spending
23
. This
amount of financing can hardly be considered efficient.
Chapter 3.Trends in Labour Migration
A. History and trends in migration
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Republic of Belarus has been
reintegrating into the world economy, with several factors influencing migration
processes in this period. The early years of the transition witnessed high levels of
cross-border migration. Flows of population relocated to Belarus from other
countries. Various hot-spots spurred a movement of refugees to Belarus, for example
the eruption of civil and trans-border conflicts among the newly emerged countries in
the region. The socio-economic hardships and environmental adversities at the
beginning of the transition led to rising external emigration, which grew particularly
fast in 1986–1990, when exit procedures were simplified. The top three emigration
destinations were Israel, the United States and Germany at the beginning of the
transition. The volume of migration with non-CIS countries decreased from 46,500
in 1990 to 6,200 in 2002.
International migration in Belarus has its own history. During the late 1980s huge
migration flows occurred for ecological reasons. Mass migration from the Chernobyl
polluted area was directed to the relatively ‘clear’ northern areas of Belarus, mainly to
Minsk, and to other regions of the former USSR, mainly to Moscow. Ecological
factors dominated during that period and once they had been opened up some people
became more mobile, creating migration opportunities to other regions.
This outflow was partly compensated by the return of military forces from the former
GDR, Poland, the Czech Republic and other former CMEA countries after 1988.
Special districts were built in Belarusian towns (like Slonim and others) to allocate
people who had come from ‘military missions’ in Central and Eastern Europe.
Political transformation factors dominated during this stage.
When Belarus regained independence in 1991 it immediately liberalised its migration
law. As a result, migration size and flow were largely determined by ethnic factors
(Russians, Ukrainians, and other FSU nationalities went back to their home countries
(especially military servants); emigration of Belarusian Jews to Israel and Western
countries was also significant at the time. At the same time, Belarus remained a
22
See http://www.government.by/upload/docs/filee74d48c7ca1baf26.PDF.
23
See http://www.ssf.gov.by/priside/about/cerrent_fond/budget/.
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
Country Study: Belarus
______________________________________________________________________
25
relatively stable state in the territory of the Former Soviet Union at the beginning of
the transition when local ethnic conflicts started almost everywhere else. Economic
recession and rising unemployment were not as sharp as other post-soviet republics.
These factors attracted immigrants from the new Baltic States, especially those from
the military sector, as well Belarusians and Russian-speaking people from many
conflict areas, including Moldova, Ukraine, the Caucuses, etc.
Negative net migration occurred among highly educated labour, although total net
migration was positive. Figure 7 shows small positive labour migration, which
continued throughout the period of transformation.
Figure 8: Number of emigrants and their share of the Belarusian
population
*Defined as 16-59 male, 16-54 female (official definition).
Sources: Belstat (number of migrants); own estimates based on Belstat data
24
.
Evidence from the official data shows that migration outflows decreased significantly
compared to the beginning of transformation. The decreasing migration trend to
Russia can largely be explained by the current “integration” process with Russia.
Simplified migration procedures may push a new wave of migrants (and not
necessary covered by official statistics).
Labour emigration from Belarus is – to a significant extent - an unofficial and hidden
phenomenon, with the largest part of illegal labour migration going to Russia, many
of whom working illegally in Moscow and other Russian cities are vulnerable to
exploitation. Hidden migration tends to be directed to the building sector, hence
having a seasonal character, although in unofficial migration this has decreased
significantly.
Between 1991 and 1992, Belarus experienced high immigration flows, with the vast
majority of migrants coming from former Soviet republics. After repatriation
processes slowed down the trend turned negative, with the unfavourable economic
situation provoking migratory outflows (mainly to Russia) and very small inflows to
24
Belstat, Statistical Yearbook, various issues.
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.1%
0.1%
0.1%
0.1%
0.1%
0.2%
0.2%
0.2%
1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
thousand
Number of migrants (right axis) Share of population Share of working-age population*
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
Country Study: Belarus
______________________________________________________________________
26
Belarus. The reasons for immigration to Belarus, both economic and political, are
diverse. Migration pressures are increasing in Belarus; consequently, migration
policies and the challenge of migration management are coming to the forefront of
the political agenda of the Belarusian government.
During the last decade economic motivation has become the key driver of migratory
flows. Belarusians are leaving to countries with a higher standard of living in search
of a better future and greater material prosperity. Immigrants to Belarus also seek
better living conditions and stability. According to current official statistics, net
migration in Belarus was positive during the whole period of the transition; however,
Census results (1999 and 2009) indicated negative net migration for almost all years
after 1990, see Figure 8.
Figure 9: Net migration
* corrected after publication of Censuses results (difference between population growth and natural
increase of population).
Source: Belstat, own estimates based on Belstat and Censuses data
25
.
However, emigrants are in general more educated, better skilled and more
economically active compared to immigrants. The majority of emigrants are young
people at the start of their professional careers (ages 20–24) or mid-career
professionals aged 30–49. Over 90% of emigrants have tertiary and secondary
education, according to official statistical data. People with tertiary education have
the highest emigration rate. In Belarus, the share of persons with tertiary education is
14.0% of the total population, while the share of emigrants with tertiary education is
over 25%. The emigration of professionals and intellectuals from Belarus greatly
affects the country’s future. This brain drain contributes 2.5% of total staff outflow
from research, universities and colleges (Bardak (2010)). Sixty-three per cent of all
academic and teaching staff who emigrated from 2001 to 2003 settled in Russia,
Germany and the United States. Another 17% are residing in Canada, Poland and the
United Kingdom. One visible and stable trend in intellectual emigration has been the
prevalence of researchers over tertiary-level teaching staff. Most of the brain drain
takes the form of internships and temporary employment under contracts and grants.
25
Ibid
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
thsd persons
net migration, current data net migration, actual data*
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
Country Study: Belarus
______________________________________________________________________
27
The direction and composition of emigration was changing during the transition
period. In 1989-1990, almost 95% of all flows of emigrants went to Israel, in 1992 only
32.5% emigrated to this country, and in 1996 it was 37.3%. In 1989 only 1% of all
emigrants from Belarus left to the United States, in 1992 the share reached 57.5%, and
in 1996 had decreased to 13.6%. The proportion of emigration flows steadily increased
to Germany – initially the main destination country in Europe for emigrants from
Belarus. In 1989 only 0.3% of all emigrants from Belarus left to Germany, but in 1996
the share was already 5.8% of total. The flow of emigrants to other countries, especially
Asian ones, rose sharply in 1994–1997, see Mansoor, (2007).
The Belarusian authorities often used illegal migration as a form of leverage in
dialogue with the EU. Many migrants from the other poorer CIS countries travel to
Belarus and many of them subsequently seek to move further west in search of higher
earnings. Hence a number of CIS migrants may spend short or long periods in
Belarus in the hope of moving to Western Europe.
According to World Bank data, emigrant stock (cumulative since 1970) amounted to
1,765.9 thousand, or 18.6% of Belarus’ population in 2010. The size of the Belarusian
Diaspora may also serve as a proxy for emigrants stock; according to estimates by
Hardzienka (2007), its size may vary from 2.1 to 2.4 mln (including those who were
born abroad), or between 22 and 25% of the population (as of 2005).
The main destination of permanent emigration was Russia (54.3% of the emigrant
stock) and other CIS countries (18.9%); the EU came next with 12.4% of emigrants. In
terms of Diaspora size, official Belarusian communities exist in more than 25
countries; the biggest Belarusian minorities are in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and
Russia (Hardzienka (2007)).
Figure 10: Migrants stock: destinations (in thousands)
(a) Migrants stock, total
(b) Migrants stock, EU
Source: Bilateral Estimates of Migrant Stocks in 2010, UN population division (2011 update).
According to expert opinions, the migration direction for Belarusians – given specific
barriers and circumstances – can be divided into several groups: (i) Russia and CIS
countries; (ii) neighbour countries – EU members; (iii) other EU members; other
countries.
49,204 55,623
958,719
276,070
32,007
218,911
175,473
Israel
Kazakhstan
Russian
Federation
Ukraine
United States
EU
Other countries
112,197
35,502
29,134
11,488
10,765
5,546 13,970 Poland
Lithuania
Germany
Latvia
Estonia
Italy
Other EU
countries
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
Country Study: Belarus
______________________________________________________________________
28
B. Reasons and causes of migration (push and pull factors)
According to a study conducted in 2009 by the Belarusian Institute for Strategic
Studies
26
and its partners, almost 20% of Belarusian citizens would like to leave the
country (Haiduk, Rakova, Silitski (2009)). This study relied on national opinion poll
data, which revealed, among other things, the pull factors of migration (i.e.
attractiveness of emigration comparing to life in Belarus). This poll showed that the
main factors behind respondents’ willingness to leave were economic (the opportunity
to increase welfare or improve skills) and social (higher social guaranties, better social
protection, higher quality of health care), see Table 5.
Table 4: Motivations for emigration in Belarus: pull factors
Would you like to leave Belarus?
% of respondents
Rather yes
18.8
Rather no
73.1
NA/undecided
8.1
If you would like to leave Belarus, what are the reasons?*
% of respective respondents
This would improve my material status
81.8
I would have more social guarantees, better social protection
35.5
This would give me a possibility to improve my skills, advance in career
22.3
This would give me a possibility to have high-quality treatment, medical
services
18.6
This would give me a chance to have good education
12.5
Other
10.0
NA/undecided
1.0
If you have no wish to leave Belarus, what are the main reasons
for this?*
% of respective respondents
My relatives – family, children – and close friends live in this country, and
I do not want to leave them
60.3
Everything suits me in my country
29.4
Uncertainty scares me
22.9
I am proud of my country, this is why I live here
16.0
No money to leave
12.0
I would not be able to find a job in another country
6.4
Other
3.3
NA/undecided
1.9
* A few answers were possible.
Source: Haiduk, Rakova, Silitski (2009), own estimates.
Additionally, the majority of respondents stated that compared to Belarus, economic
perspectives are better not only in developed countries, but even in Russia (see Table
6). At the same time, political motivations – seeking more safety, attempts to avoid
26
An independent think-tank registered in Lithuania but operating in Belarus with a focus on cross-
disciplinary studies, see http://belinstitute.eu/.
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
Country Study: Belarus
______________________________________________________________________
29
corruption, etc. – tend to underpin emigration to the EU and other developed
countries, as respondents tend to assess the situation in this sphere in Russia as worse
than in Belarus (Table 6).
Table 5: Comparison of the situation in Belarus with the situation in
selected countries with a Belarusian population
Comparing to Belarus, the situation in that country is:
Better minus
worse
Worse
the same
better
NA/undecided
1. Living standards:
Russia
20.9
35.0
30.8
13.3
10.0
Lithuania
11.8
22.7
31.5
33.9
19.7
Poland
3.8
16.0
50.9
29.4
47.1
Germany
1.3
4.6
71.2
22.8
69.9
Sweden
1.3
3.9
67.1
27.6
65.8
United States
2.9
5.4
64.0
27.8
61.1
2. Stability:
Russia
22.6
44.5
16.5
16.4
-6.2
Lithuania
17.1
28.2
18.4
36.3
1.3
Poland
6.2
23.7
36.8
33.3
30.6
Germany
1.6
11.7
58.8
27.8
57.2
Sweden
1.2
9.9
57.6
31.3
56.4
United States
8.1
13.0
44.6
34.2
36.5
3. Possibility to make money:
Russia
7.7
22.3
58.3
11.7
50.6
Lithuania
10.8
23.7
30.2
35.4
19.5
Poland
3.1
16.7
50.5
29.7
47.4
Germany
1.0
6.4
68.8
23.8
67.8
Sweden
0.9
6.1
62.7
30.4
61.8
United States
1.8
6.3
63.0
28.8
61.2
4. Corruption:
Russia
34.9
31.8
8.3
25.0
-26.6
Lithuania
11.6
28.6
10.6
49.2
-1.0
Poland
6.3
24.9
19.5
49.3
13.1
Germany
3.7
15.0
36.6
44.7
32.8
Sweden
3.7
13.4
35.4
47.5
31.8
United States
9.1
15.0
27.5
48.4
18.4
Source: Haiduk, Rakova, Silitski (2009), own estimates.
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
Country Study: Belarus
______________________________________________________________________
30
One should take into account that the abovementioned study was implemented at the
time of the global economic crisis of 2009, which impacted hard also in Belarus
27
and
neighbouring countries. The recent balance of payments crisis in Belarus in 2011
affected employment opportunities and wages in the country even more severely,
further sharpening economic reasons behind labour migration.
Another illustration of economic incentives is provided in Figure 10. Although
according to the IMF estimates, PPP-based per capita GDP in Belarus in 2011
increased slightly compared to Russia and the EU (see Figure 10a), another measure
of income – per capita GDP at current US$ - demonstrates the drastic fall in relative
incomes in Belarus. Its ratio to Russian per capita GDP fell to the lowest figure since
1996 (Figure 10b). In terms of wage disparities, the average wage in Belarus fell from
about 60% of the average wage in Russia in 2010 to about 40% in 2011 (compared to
the average wage in Moscow, Belarusian salary amounted to a tiny 22%). Taking into
account the fact that labour migrants spend money at home / send money back home,
current dollars appear to be a better measure for income disparities than the PPP-
based one.
Figure 11: Ratios of per capita GDP in Belarus to per capita GDP in the EU
and Russia
(a) Per capita GDP, US$ PPP
(b) Per capita GDP, current US$
Note. Data for Belarus and Russia for 1990–1991 is not available (most likely because of the absence of
reliable data for exchange rates).
Source: own estimates based on WEO database, October 2010.
27
At that time, according to monitoring of Belarusians’ perceptions of the economic crisis undertaken
by the Axiometrical Laboratory “NOVAK” (an iindependent Belarusian think-tank specializing in
social studies, see http://novak.by/), between November 2008 and March 2010, more than a quarter
of respondents thought that as a result of the global financial crisis they may lose their job, while more
than half (from 45.7 to 58.8%) expected a decrease or freeze in their wages. About 40% of respondents
(from 33.9 to 44.4%) faced reduction or freeze of wages, another 15% (between 10.2 and 15.9%) lost
their jobs. The crisis also influenced those who kept their jobs: according to Belstat data for large and
medium-sized enterprises, in 2009 working time losses caused by incomplete working weeks and
unpaid leave increased 5.4-fold compared to 2008 and amounted to the equivalent of 13,100 workers
absent from work on an daily basis (2,400 in 2008), which is approximately equal to the level of
2003–2004 (Haiduk et al. (2006)).
0
20
40
60
80
100
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Russia EU
0
20
40
60
80
100
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Russia EU
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
Country Study: Belarus
______________________________________________________________________
31
Figure 11 provides additional evidence of economic incentives for migration due to
wage disparities between the same sectors of the economy in Belarus and some of the
possible recipients of its labour force.
Figure 12: Sectoral wage* disparities: Belarus vs. EU and Russia
(a) NMS-2**
(b) NMS-10***
(c) EU-15****
(d) Russia
* Average wage for Belarus and Russia, gross earnings for the EU (both include wage, income tax and
social security contributions payable by employees).
** Bulgaria and Romania.
*** Latvia, Hungary, Malta, Slovakia.
**** Denmark, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, United Kingdom.
Note. Gross earnings data (EU) is as of 2010; average wages in Belarus are as of 2011; average wages in
Russia are as of 2010 multiplied by growth rate of average dollar-denominated wages in the economy
in 2011.
Source: own estimates based on Eurostat, Belstat and Rosstat data.
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Industry
Mining and quarrying
Manufacturing
Electricity, gas, steam…
Water supply;…
Construction
Wholesale and retail…
Transportation and…
Accommodation and…
Information and…
Financial and…
Real estate activities
Professional, scientific…
Administrative and…
Public administration…
Education
Human health and…
Arts, entertainment…
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Industry
Mining and quarrying
Manufacturing
Electricity, gas, steam…
Water supply;…
Construction
Wholesale and retail…
Transportation and…
Accommodation and…
Information and…
Financial and…
Real estate activities
Professional, scientific…
Administrative and…
Public administration…
Education
Human health and…
Arts, entertainment…
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Industry
Mining and quarrying
Manufacturing
Electricity, gas, steam…
Water supply;…
Construction
Wholesale and retail…
Transportation and…
Accommodation and…
Information and…
Financial and…
Real estate activities
Professional, scientific…
Administrative and…
Public administration…
Education
Human health and…
Arts, entertainment…
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Industry
Mining and quarrying
Manufacturing
Electricity, gas, steam…
Water supply;…
Construction
Wholesale and retail…
Transportation and…
Accommodation and…
Information and…
Financial and…
Real estate activities
Professional, scientific…
Administrative and…
Public administration…
Education
Human health and…
Arts, entertainment…
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
Country Study: Belarus
______________________________________________________________________
32
It is clear that the gap between Belarus and the EU-15 countries could create strong
incentive for Belarusian workers – but this gap is caused by labour productivity
differences and entry barriers such as the visa regime and language exist, so only a
small share of the labour force can really choose this direction for migration. The gap
between Belarus and Russia is not so wide but higher than with some of the NMSs,
while the level of qualifications is similar in these two countries. Only a few sectors of
the economy in Belarus can afford wages equal to half of the Russian wage in the
same sectors, while the ratio of Belarusian to Russian wages in 2011 varied from 24.9
to 51.1%. At the same time, in 2010 this ratio varied between 39.3 and 76.3% and fell
from 3.7 percentage points (public administration and defence) to 30.8 percentage
points (construction). Taking into account the low barriers to entry, this makes
Russia potentially attractive for labour migrants from Belarus, and recently this
attractiveness has increased.
Economic motives play an important role as push factors: the poverty rate in rural
areas, regardless of how it is measured (absolute or relative poverty) is almost 2-fold
higher than in urban localities and massively higher than in Minsk (see Chubrik et al.
(2009)). In terms of poverty risk, agricultural workers are on a par with the
unemployed: in 2008, the absolute poverty rate among them was equal to 10.2%,
while among the unemployed was 12% (Chubrik, Shymanovich (2010)). Evidently,
the geographical roots of poverty are an important factor driving internal migration
from rural to urban areas.
However, poverty or low incomes could hardly be considered as push factors for
emigration of Belarusian citizens, because people with low incomes are much less
certain about their chances of finding a job or arranging their affairs abroad
compared to people with higher incomes
28
. The abovementioned survey by the
Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies showed that 12% of those who do not want
to leave the country explained their unwillingness to leave by the lack of sufficient
money needed for emigration, while another 6.4% feared they would not be able to
find a job and 22.9% mentioned that uncertainty related to emigration scared them
(see Table 5). Additionally, a large portion of the poor in Belarus are unemployed or
economically inactive, (Chubrik et al. (2009)), i.e. those who can hardly find a job
even in Belarus.
There are differences in motivations between those who have or do not have a family,
as the focus group organised within the project showed
29
(see Figure 12). Most people
28
At the same time, poverty together with this uncertainty creates potential for trafficking. Ministry of
Internal Affairs representatives stated that between 2002 and 2009 more than 4,000 persons were
registered as victims of trafficking. Polling of female victims of trafficking showed that 68% of them
were not employed and had not finished studies; only 3% of them had higher education, while 19% had
an education level less than general secondary, see
http://naviny.by/rubrics/society/2008/11/29/ic_articles_116_160127/,
http://www.interfax.by/article/65207.
29
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner
Countries project included sociological research consisting of two parts: (i) focus-group discussions
with former labour migrants or people planning to migrate in the nearest future and (ii) expert in-
depth interviews with representatives of governmental and non-governmental organisations working
on migration issues. Focus group research was appended by representatives of academic migration,
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
Country Study: Belarus
______________________________________________________________________
33
who start migration processes think of returning to Belarus one day. Those who have
no family state the following as reasons to migrate:
To have a new experience of communication, everyday life in a new place;
To increase social status as ‘mobile’ people (they take in account that when
they move to another country they lose their status, but increase it significantly
when they come back);
To have professional growth (new international experience and possibilities
for career growth in the spheres where career possibilities in Belarus are
limited);
To earn money to start a family life after returning home or starting their own
business.
Figure 13: Reasons and obstacles for migration: Focus group results
They encounter problems such as difficulties in integrating into local society
and a lower quality of life (very often they have better accommodation in
Belarus). In such cases Internet-communities become a very important source
of socialisation abroad.
Those who have families tend to need to have bigger incentives to move, such
as lack of money or problems with accommodation in Belarus. Often they
could change their occupation to earn more money in Belarus, but they choose
emigration to continue to work in their own profession. Communication with
potential migrants to EU countries (Czech Republic, Latvia), as well as people with the experience of
labour migration to CIS countries (Russia, Ukraine). In-depth interviews were carried out with
representatives of the IOM, La Strada and the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection (Department
of Managing of Occupation Policy).
MIGRANTS WITH FAMILIES
1) Lack of money
2) Problems with accommodation in Belarus
SINGLE MIGRANTS
1) New experience
2) Social status
3) Professional growth
DRIVERS AND MOTIVES
DIFFICULTIES
MIGRANTS WITH FAMILIES
1) Vulnerable status of migrants’ families
or
2) Damaging of family relations
SINGLE MIGRANTS
1) Communication with the local community
2) Decreasing of the level of life quality
3) Decreasing of social position
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
Country Study: Belarus
______________________________________________________________________
34
the local community is not such a serious problem for them, but may be a very
serious challenge to take care of the family.
There are difficulties with transmitting money from abroad especially when
attempting to avoid taxes. It is common also that separation can lead to family
breakdown. At the same time there are several labour migration programmes
which assist in the moving of specialists and their families, although semi-legal
or illegal employment in some such cases may put them in an even more
vulnerable position.
C. Number of migrants
Official statistics in Belarus doesn’t capture all migrants
30
. The official data on the
number of international migrants drastically differs from the experts’ estimations.
Belarusian official statistical data are based on the rules of population registration by
place of residence
31
and place of stay divided into temporary migrants, who are
registered by place of stay, and permanent migrants. According to the International
Labour Organisation (ILO) database, the number of migrants from Belarus was 12–
14 thousands per year in 2000–2005.
According to official data, only 4,200 Belarusians were working abroad with signed
contracts or agreements in 2009 (2,600 of them in Russia). However, a quantitative
assessment of the number of labour migrants from Belarus is rather complicated.
First, there is no border between Belarus and Russia – the main recipient of its labour
force. Second, labour migrants often work unofficially and do not provide any
information to any statistical office. Third, there was no Labour Force Survey
(hereafter – LFS) in Belarus until 2012
32
. The only available regular source of
information was Household Budget Survey (hereafter – HBS), but the information
about labour migrants obtained from this survey was not published, as the HBS was
not designed to cover labour market issues properly and labour migration estimates
were not valid.
One of the most reliable sources of information about the number of labour migrants is
the census undertaken in Belarus in 2009. According to this census, the number of
30
According to the experts interviewed within the project, collecting of statistical data is sporadic and
has many limitations; hence the international and governmental bodies have no relevant official
information of the level of migration. Information on international migration is incomplete and
unreliable. The main obstacles to obtaining information on international migration are poor
methodical background and uncertain definitions of the main categories of migrants and their
characteristics. There is no clear understanding in the literature and in official documents regarding
permanent residence, temporary workers, students/ professionals abroad, family members and the
like. As for official migration data, statistics on international migration are not full and reliable as they
only reflect only movements from/to Belarus accompanied by registration of a permanent residence.
31
Official data on labour migration covers officially registered labour migration as monitored by the
Belarus Public Employment Service. The high proportion of males compared to females according to
official statistics may be explained by high levels of illegal female migration. Many Belarusian women
working abroad are employed in nurseries and other low-skilled jobs that do not require a contract,
and so they are not registered by the Public Employment Service.
32
Although two pilot surveys were conducted: one by the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection in
2006 and another by Belstat in late 2011, their data was not published. However, some figures from
the first survey were announced by the Minister of Labour: according to that survey, the number of
temporary labour migrants amounted to 117 thousand of which 98 thousand worked in Russia, see
http://naviny.by/rubrics/economic/2006/11/17/ic_articles_113_148705/.
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
Country Study: Belarus
______________________________________________________________________
35
people working abroad was 41.9 thousand, including 37.7 thousand employed in
Russia. However, census data might underestimate labour migration, given that (i) it
was implemented in mid-autumn when a significant share of seasonal workers are not
working; (ii) some labour migrants might be working during the census and not take
part in it; (iii) some temporary migrants might not be working not because they did not
have a job but because they were waiting for an answer from their employers or were
preparing to start work. Census data show that another 6.3 thousand of working-aged
Belarusians were about to start working, 31.2 thousand awaited an answer from their
employer, and 46.9 were waiting for the start of the working season. This gives us
additional labour migration capacity of about 85 thousand in working age. One should
take into account the fact that the census was taken in 2009 when Russia was suffering
from the global economic crisis and its labour market was stagnant. For instance, the
World Bank estimated the number of labour migrants from Belarus in 2005 at
400,000 (World Bank (2011)), and the Ministry of Interior at 300,000
33
. Later on in
the text we will use census data (41,900 labour migrants), but keeping in mind all the
imperfections of this figure.
Compared to domestic labour migration, external migration is significantly lower:
according to Census-2009, only 0.9% of the employed population works abroad,
while internal labour migration (some more distant than others) amounts to 8.9% of
total employment. No important regional differences in the number of external
labour migrants exist: workers from Minsk oblast and Minsk city prefer to work in
Minsk (the share of external labour migrants there is about 0.5%), while in the
Viciebsk, Homiel and Mahiliou regions the share of external migration is above the
country average, but hardly exceeding 1.5% (and only in the case of the Viciebsk
oblast).
The duration of labour migration was included in official questionnaires only in 2012
(as a part of the LFS questionnaire
34
), so reliable information on this topic is not
available and it is not covered in this study.
D. Directions (countries)
The main recipient of the labour force from Belarus is Russia: it absorbs 90.2% of
labour migrants. However, there are strong regional differences: while eastern
regions (Homiel, Mahiliou and Viciebsk) send more than 95% of their labour
migrants to Russia, Minsk city and Hrodna oblast send 2/3 and 3/4 of their labour
migrants there, respectively (see Table 7). Other CIS countries were not popular
directions in 2009 (only in the case of Minsk city is their share significant), while
non-CIS absorbed about 9.5% of all labour migrants. The same territorial differences
exist: Hrodna oblast and Minsk city take the lead, while Viciebsk, Homiel and
Mahiliou are not very active in this respect.
According to the interviews with experts undertaken in the course of the project, the
main push and pull factors differ with regard directions of emigration. Russian and
33
See http://naviny.by/rubrics/economic/2006/11/17/ic_articles_113_148705/.
34
See http://belstat.gov.by/homep/ru/households/4-t.pdf.
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
Country Study: Belarus
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36
CIS countries are the most attractive for labour migrants because of 1) the slight or
absent language barrier – Russian is used in most places in the region, 2) no visa
system, 3) ease of registration at work (no discrimination for Belarusians, no special
rules protecting the local labour market). According to different estimations, the
share of migrants to the Russian Federation is about 75–85%. Furthermore, the
integration processes in the region are ongoing. Ease of interaction on labour markets
is provided by the creation of the Union State, as well as the Customs Union and
Common Economic space. At the same time there is a higher personal income level
and higher quality of life in centres such as Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kiev, Astana and
other Russian cities. In the case of migration to this region it is easier to maintain
relations with families (the absence of a visa system and low travel costs make it
possible to keep in touch and transfer money) and even move the families to the
target countries. The negative features of such migration for the country are the
following. There is no border (in the case of the Russian Federation) or border control
is weak (in the case of Ukraine: the border is relatively new and part of it goes
through marshland or territories polluted with radiation after Chernobyl nuclear
power plant disaster), which makes migration flows uncontrolled and uncounted.
Another disadvantage is the high probability of assimilation with the local population
and permanent residence in the target country.
Table 6: Destination of external labour emigration, % of total number of
labour emigrants
Belarus
Brest
Viciebsk
Homiel
Hrodna
Minsk
city
Minsk
Mahiliou
Russia
90.2
90.1
95.4
96.3
77.3
67.3
90.5
95.4
Other
directions
9.8
9.9
4.6
3.7
22.7
32.7
9.5
4.6
Other CIS
1.1
1.4
0.4
0.9
0.7
4.3
1.3
0.4
Lithuania
1.7
0.4
0.9
0.3
8.9
2.3
2.5
1.5
Poland
1.5
3.9
0.8
0.2
5.6
2.3
0.8
0.3
USA
0.7
0.2
0.1
0.2
0.8
4.3
0.6
0.3
Germany
0.7
0.7
0.3
0.3
0.6
3.3
0.6
0.2
Other non-CIS
3.6
2.8
1.9
1.5
5.5
14.5
3.4
1.6
Not defined
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.3
0.5
1.8
0.2
0.3
Source: Belstat
35
.
Neighbouring countries – EU members. This type of target country for labour
migration has an intermediate status. Often there is a low language barrier (a lot of
citizens from the country’s western regions can use Polish and it is possible to use
Russian in Latvia and Lithuania). The movement of labour is supported by the border
visa programmes of those countries (the possibility of getting a visa for inhabitants
living within 50 km of the border zone). Such programmes make migration and
35
Belstat (2011). Population Census 2009: Socio-Econonmic Characteristics of Population of the
Republic of Belarus, see http://belstat.gov.by/homep/en/census/2009/volume6.zip.
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
Country Study: Belarus
______________________________________________________________________
37
returning home easier and one can see the growth of seasonal migration in the
region.
Other countries – EU members. Often there is a language barrier for migrants. This is
often not just about problems in searching for work, but reduces the possibilities of
migrants in their everyday life and in some cases also their rights. Most often they do
not try to be included in the local community but find some migrant community – or
socialise via online networks. Problems returning home and communication with
families because of travel costs and visa difficulties can in many cases be embarrassing.
There are various key points in the growth of labour migration in those different
directions. Remarkable is the fact that the proportion of qualified and non-qualified
migrants stays the same in spite of the different role played by the language barrier.
90% of labour migrants seek non-qualified occupations. At the same time a key
feature of Belarusian society is the very high level of education, which could be useful
for the recipient countries, but is rarely used by them.
Chapter 4.Labour Migration Profile
A. Characteristics of the migrant profile
1. Demographic characteristics
The age structure of labour migrants
36
is different from those of the economically active
population: the youngest group (15–19 years old) are practically not represented among
migrants, but amount to 7.7% of the work force. Next 5-year strata is the biggest of the
work force, while being one of the smallest age groups among labour migrants (see
Figure 13). Those aged between 25 and 49 make up 75% of migrants to Russia and 80%
of migrants to other destinations, but less than 60% of the work force. The most
important differences in age structure between destinations (Russia vs. others) are for
age groups of 25–34 (7.1 percentage point lower labour migration to Russia than to
other destinations), 15–24 (3.6 percentage point higher labour migration to Russia than
to other destinations) and 35–44 (3.3 percentage points higher labour migration to
Russia than to other destinations). However, in absolute figures labour migration to
Russia is higher than those to other destinations for all age groups.
36
In this report we treat as “labour migrants” only as those who work outside Belarus; the
phenomenon of internal labour migration is beyond the main scope of this report.
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
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38
Figure 14: Labour emigrants by age and destination (shares)
Note. Hereafter work force = employment + unemployment.
Source: own estimates based on Census-2009 micro-sample (Belstat).
In terms of gender, labour migration on average is an option for males; however, the
share of women who work in “other destinations” is almost the same as those in the
work force (Figure 14a). This can be explained by occupations taken by labour
migrants in both directions (see section 5.1.3).
Figure 15: Labour emigrants by gender and nationality (shares)
(a) Gender
(b) Nationality
Source: own estimates based on Census-2009 micro-sample (Belstat).
Ethnic composition demonstrates that Belarusians are the most ‘migration-averse’
nationality (especially those going in non-Russian directions), while Russians, Poles,
Ukrainians and representatives of other nationalities are more active here, especially in
non-Russian directions (see Figure 14b). However, this can be explained by ethnic
factors only in the case of Poles (for instance, they can get the so-called Polish Card – a
special tool that eases migration into Poland, see Section 9 for details) and some other
nationalities. In the case of Russians, Jews and even Ukrainians, differences between
their shares in labour migration and in the work force can be explained by their
residence: the share of Belarusians who live in rural localities is higher than those of the
0.8%
1.1% 0.8%
2.1%
1.6% 2.2%
1.4%
1.6% 1.8%
1.2%
1.5% 1.3% 1.0%
1.4% 1.3% 1.0%
1.3% 1.4% 1.1%
0.9% 0.8% 0.8%
0.4% 0.3% 0.4%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Russia Other destinations Work force
60+
55-59
50-54
45-49
40-44
35-39
30-34
25-29
20-24
15-19
9.1% 6.7% 6.2%
0.9% 3.3% 3.8%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Russia Other
destinations Work force
Male Female
8.2% 7.0% 8.5%
1.3% 1.4%
0.9%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Russia Other
destinations Work force
Other
Jew
Ukrainian
Pole
Russian
Belarusian
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
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39
above-mentioned nationalities, and external labour migrations are more an urban than
a rural phenomenon.
Figure 16: Labour emigrants by region and residence (shares)
(a) Region (by oblasts)
(b) Residence
Source: own estimates based on Census-2009 micro-sample (Belstat).
Ethnic factors may appear if one takes into consideration a regional breakdown of
labour migrants: the Hrodna region, for example, which borders Poland and
Lithuania, has more Poles and Lithuanians than other regions, and as a result is the
second biggest (after Minsk city) donor of labour migrants to non-Russia destinations.
On the other hand, the Viciebsk and Homiel regions are quite distant from Minsk and
have borders with Russia and serve as the main donors for labour migration to Russia
(see Figure 15a).
The fact of migration being an urban phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 15b: rural
localities’ share in labour migrants is lower than that in the total work force.
Additionally, bigger cities are more likely recipients for non-Russia destinations (see
Figure 15b). This can be explained by the fact that wage differences between bigger
(100,000+) cities and Russia are less than those between smaller towns / rural
localities and Russia, so labour migrants from bigger cities more often choose non-
Russia destinations to get a higher salary than they can get in Russia.
2. Education
One of the biggest differences between labour migrants to Russia and non-Russia
destinations is their educational level (and their language skills): labour migrants to
Russia are on average less educated than the work force on average and much less
educated than labour migrants to non-Russia destinations. In terms of language
skills, these differences are even more dramatic: while among labour migrants to
non-Russia destinations about 75% speak languages other than Belarusian and
Russian fluently, while among labour migrants to Russia this share is only 10% (14%
for the work force), see Figure 17. Language differences are quite natural: most labour
1.3% 1.4% 1.4%
2.5% 1.1% 1.3%
2.4%
0.7% 1.5%
0.7%
1.9% 1.1%
0.7% 3.4% 2.2%
0.7% 0.9% 1.5%
1.6% 0.6% 1.1%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Russia Other
destinations Work force
Brest Viciebsk Homiel Hrodna
Minsk city Minsk Mahiliou
0.7% 3.4% 2.2%
3.7%
3.5% 3.1%
3.7% 2.0% 2.2%
1.8% 1.1% 2.6%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Russia Other
destinations Work force
Minsk city Urban, other 100,000+
Urban,small Rural
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
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______________________________________________________________________
40
migrants to non-Russia destinations go to countries with a language barrier (non-
CIS
37
), while educational differences are largely determined by demand structure.
Figure 17: Labour emigrants by education level and foreign language*
(a) Education
(b) Foreign language
* Language other than Belarusian and Russian fluently spoken by respondent.
Source: own estimates based on Census-2009 micro-sample (Belstat).
3. Occupation and economic activities
The structure of demand for labour (defined in terms of the occupations of the
migrants) is largely determined by the economic incentives that migration offers:
Russia is closer, but wage opportunities there are on average lower than in the EU or
USA or other developed industrial economies. As a result, the share of high-skilled
labour is 2-fold higher among labour migrants to non-Russia destinations than among
those who work in Russia, see Table 8 (again, in absolute terms Russia prevails here).
However, skilled labour is dominant in both directions (about half of labour migrants
to non-Russia destinations and 2/3 of labour migrants to Russia). Unskilled labour is
also in higher demand in Russia than in other destinations, see Table 8.
37
Excluding Lithuania as a country where knowledge of Russian is usually enough for socialisation.
1.6%
4.2% 2.2%
3.2%
2.8%
3.2%
2.3%
1.0%
1.3%
2.5% 1.9% 2.7%
0.4% 0.2% 0.6%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Russia Other
destinations Work force
General
basic and
below
General
secondary
Vocational
school
Secondary
specialized
Higher
9.1%
4.3%
8.8%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
Russia
Other destinations
Work force
Only
native
Other
French
English
German
Polish
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
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41
Table 7: Labour emigrants by occupation and skills (shares)
Occupation (according to ISCO 08)
Russia
Other
destinations
Employed,
total
Administrative and commercial managers
8.8
10.7
11.4
Other managers
1.0
1.9
1.5
Science and engineering professionals
2.8
4.1
3.5
Physical and engineering science technicians
1.6
0.5
2.2
Health professionals
0.2
1.2
1.1
Health associate professionals
0.1
1.7
3.2
Teaching professionals
0.2
4.6
4.0
Teaching associate professionals
0.1
0.5
1.2
Business and administration professionals
1.0
6.1
3.4
Business and administration associate professionals; Legal,
social, cultural and related associate professionals; General
and keyboard clerks; Customer services clerks
2.3
7.3
9.0
Personal service workers
2.2
5.8
7.1
Cleaners and helpers
0.3
1.0
3.7
Sales workers
2.5
2.4
4.1
Market-oriented skilled agricultural workers
0.2
0.2
3.4
Agricultural, forestry and fishery labourers
0.2
0.7
0.7
Building and related trades workers, excluding electricians
30.1
3.6
5.5
Mining and construction labourers
7.3
1.0
0.7
Metal, machinery and related trades workers
7.9
1.7
9.2
Handicraft and printing workers
0.2
0.2
0.3
Electrical and electronic trades workers
1.1
0.0
3.0
Stationary plant and machine operators
2.5
0.5
2.1
Assemblers
1.0
0.5
2.8
Manufacturing labourers
0.2
0.5
0.8
Drivers and mobile plant operators
15.1
23.8
8.3
Transport and storage labourers
0.4
0.0
1.0
Commissioned armed forces officers
0.1
0.0
0.7
Not defined (ND)
0.1
0.0
0.1
No answer (NA)
10.6
19.4
5.8
TOTAL
100.0
100.0
100.0
By skills:
High-skilled
14.1
28.6
25.7
Skilled
66.9
48.8
61.7
Unskilled
8.3
3.2
6.8
NA/ND
10.7
19.4
5.8
Note. Shares greater or equal to 3% are marked by bold.
Source: own estimates based on Census-2009 micro-sample (Belstat).
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
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______________________________________________________________________
42
The highest demand in terms of types of occupation for non-Russia destinations is in
“drivers and mobile plant operators” (skilled labour) and “administrative and
commercial managers” (high-skilled labour; probably managers of foreign affiliates of
Belarusian businesses), followed by professionals and associate professionals in
business administration and related spheres (high-skilled and skilled labour). About
1/3 of labour migrants working in Russia have occupations in the category “Building
and related trades workers, excluding electricians” (unskilled labourers of similar
occupations are also in high demand there); the next popular type of occupation is
“drivers and mobile plant operators” followed by “administrative and commercial
managers” (Table 8). The occupational structure of non-Russia labour migrants is
much closer to that of the total work force, i.e. Russian demand is more focused on
specific occupations, while demand for other destinations is more diversified.
Another view concerning foreign demand for labour is based on the distribution of
labour migrants between economic sectors (economic activities). Here leading roles
are played by construction (in the case of Russia) and transportation (in the case of
other destinations) and this is even more evident than in case of occupations (see
Table 9). Trade is a popular sector across all labour migrants regardless of
destination, as well as “Other community, social and personal services activities” and
various sub-sectors of manufacturing. Education and health care have also attracted
mainly labour emigrants to non-Russia destinations
38
– according to Census-2009,
this sector in countries other than Russia has attracted more labour migrants than
Russia even in absolute terms.
38
However, the recent balance of payments crisis, according to anecdotal evidence, induced significant
migration of medical doctors to Russia.
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
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43
Table 8: Labour emigrants by economic sector (shares)
Economic sector (NACE Rev. 1.1 and Rev. 2)
Russia
Other
destinations
Employed,
total
Agriculture, forestry and fishing
0.7
1.2
10.6
Manufacturing
6.4
4.9
21.6
Electricity, gas and water supply
0.6
0.5
2.7
Construction
47.2
6.3
8.5
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and
motorcycles
8.8
9.5
11.9
Accommodation and food service activities
1.0
4.1
1.2
Transportation and storage
11.1
22.8
5.5
Information and communication
0.2
0.2
1.3
Financial and insurance activities
0.1
0.5
1.2
Real estate, renting and business activities
2.7
7.0
5.2
Public administration and defence; compulsory social
security
0.2
0.5
3.1
Education
0.5
7.3
9.5
Human health and social work activities
0.4
3.9
6.7
Other community, social and personal services activities, etc.
8.9
11.2
5.1
NA
11.2
20.1
5.8
Note. Shares greater or equal to 3% are marked by bold.
Source: own estimates based on Census-2009 micro-sample (Belstat).
B. Migrants’ intentions and future migration trends
To our knowledge, no special studies of labour migrants’ intentions have been
undertaken. Some information has been gathered via focus groups with labour
migrants in the course of this project: those participants who went abroad to earn
money or to gain experience and intended to come back and work at home
39
. Similar
evidence was collected in the course of sociological surveys in Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia: most (illegal) labour migrants are working abroad on
an irregular/seasonal basis and did not plan to settle in those countries
(Söderköping/Cross-Border Cooperation Process (2009)).
In terms of future migration trends, important observations were presented during an
in-depth interview with a Belarusian IOM office representative. According to him, no
significant changes would take place in Belarusian labour migration trends even if the
EU opened up its borders to labour migrants from Belarus, because – he believed –
the Russian market offers incomes high enough for the level of qualification of most
Belarusian migrants
40
. This statement is supported by the above-mentioned
information that most labour migrants are just earning money or gathering experience
39
According to anecdotal evidence, this is especially true for illegal migrants working in Russia – they
tend to choose work in Belarus if they can find an employment opportunity with more or less
acceptable salary which is significantly less than their incomes in Russia.
40
The language barrier is another important obstacle for labour migration to the EU (at least legal
migration), see (Figure 9b)
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
Country Study: Belarus
______________________________________________________________________
44
and prefer to live in Belarus. However, bearing in mind that about 20% of adult
Belarusians would like to leave the country (see Section 4.2), such significant “shocks”
(crises similar to the 2011 crisis are another type of such shock) can lead to increased
labour and permanent emigration.
Chapter 5.Remittances
A. Individuals’ transfer flow trends
Discussing the role of remittances in Belarus, one should take into account the
specifics of the data available in Belarus, which do not include workers’ remittances -
usually constituting an important part of total remittances inflow - while the
estimation methodology of two other components (migrants’ transfers and
compensations of employees) is quite well-developed
41
. As a result, official figures for
remittance inflows are most likely underestimated
42
; however, only a handful of
alternative estimates are available. One of them is dated 2006 and was implemented
by International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD (2008)), while another
was in 2010 (Luchenok, Kolesnikova (2011)). The former estimated the size of
workers’ remittances, the latter the total size of remittances, based on Ratha and
Shaw’s (2007) approach. The results are presented in Figure 17: while according to
official data, remittances amount to up 1.5% of GDP, alternative estimates give higher
figures.
41
The only important problem is reliable data on the number of short- and long-term labour migrants,
but to our knowledge the National Bank of Belarus uses estimations based on mirror data and other
approaches.
42
Another obstacle for efficient accounting of remittances inflows was created by changes in legal
control over financial inflows from abroad introduced in Belarus after 2003. Procedures for receiving
money from abroad are regulated by Decree #24, November 28, 2003 of President of the Republic of
Belarus. According to the Decree #24, all money transfers received from abroad (regardless of the
amount) must be allocated to special bank accounts as humanitarian aid within five days upon
receiving, after that special permission and an approved plan how to spend received money is issued
by the Presidential Administration (see
http://www.pravo.by/main.aspx?guid=3871&p0=pd0300024&p2={NRPA}).
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
Country Study: Belarus
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45
Figure 18: Remittances size in Belarus: BoP data and alternative estimates
Note. Alternative estimates are based on IFAD (2008) – 2006 data – and on Luchenok, Kolesnikova
(2011) – 2010 data.
Source: BoPS database (IMF), National Bank of Belarus, IFAD (2008), Luchenok, Kolesnikova (2011).
With this data problem in mind one can start to compare remittance inflows to
Belarus with other EaP countries. While in the early 1990s per capita remittances in
Belarus were similar to other EaP countries, today these inflows - measured either via
official data (Figure 18) or alternative estimates (Figure 17) – are the lowest. This fact
can be explained by income level (Belarus has the highest per capita GDP among
these countries), better employment opportunities and lower inequality
43
: while
workers from other EaP countries have tended to use labour migration as a coping
strategy, a larger share of Belarusians have a job that enables their households to not
fall into poverty (both absolute and relative (see for instance Chubrik et al. (2009)).
43
Maintaining almost full employment is one of the important policy priorities in Belarus due to the
existence of the political-business cycle; see Haiduk et al. (2006).
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
BoP data, % of GDP Alternative estimates, % of GDP BOP data, US$ mln (right axis)
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
Country Study: Belarus
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46
Figure 19: Remittances size: Belarus and EaP countries
(a) Remittances inflows, US$ per capita
(b) Remittances inflow in 2010, % of GDP
Source: own estimates based on World Bank data on remittances inflow, April 2012
44
, and WEO
database, April 2012 (a); World Bank data on remittances inflow, April 2012 (b).
According to balance of payments data for 2011, the main source of remittances was
Russia (82.6% of inflows from migrants’ transfers and compensation of employees).
This share is lower than the share of labour migrants to Russia (90.2%), which means
a higher amount of average transfers from non-Russia destinations
45
. Taking into
account the fact that Russia is also the main destination of permanent migration (see
Section 4.1), workers’ remittances inflow should also originate mainly from this
country.
B. Remittances consumption patterns, effect on income,
consumption, investment
As in many other cases, data availability is a problem here. Although the HBS in
Belarus asks a question about the place of the respondent’s work (in Belarus or
outside the country), its sample is not designed to be representative for the working
age population. As a result, only about 40 respondents from the sample (of about
15,000 respondents) indicated another country as their place of work and this fact
serves as a key reason for the non-provision of this data by Belstat.
To our knowledge, one special survey was undertaken on this topic (based on a
“snowball approach”, i.e. not fully representative); its results were published in
Shakhotska (2003). According to this study, labour migrants were able to resolve the
following main problems: improvement of housing conditions and facilities (the vast
majority of respondents mentioned housing-related problems), purchasing durables,
good clothes and good quality food, as well as finding funds for investing in education
and recreation/paid health care services. Help to relatives and subsistence were
mentioned as resolved problems only by 1/3 of respondents.
44
http://go.worldbank.org/SSW3DDNLQ0.
45
Actually this happens due to the methodology that links average transfer size to the income level in a
recipient country (average wages in the case of compensation of employees).
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011(e)
Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus
Georgia Moldova Ukraine
8,755.8
2,536.5
1,039.3
6,380.0
23,194.7
3,918.1
0 5 10 15 20 25
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Georgia
Moldova
Ukraine
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
Country Study: Belarus
______________________________________________________________________
47
Table 9: Problems that have been resolved thanks to labour migration
Problems that have been resolved
% of responses
Improving of housing conditions and facilities
86.3
Purchase of durables
70.9
Purchase of good clothes
58.5
Education-related issues
52.1
Health care and recreation
52.1
Allow good quality food
48.7
Car purchase
33.3
Help to relatives
22.2
Business-related issues
21.4
Subsistence
15.0
Other reasons
2.1
Note. Multiple choice was possible.
Source: based on Shakhotska (2003).
Shakhotska, Shymanovich, Bobrova (2012) proposed using data on transfers from
relatives and friends who do not live with other household members (“material aid
from family members and friends”) as a proxy for remittances obtained by a
household. However, if a household includes a labour migrant, his or her incomes are
most likely counted as wage incomes. That is why in this study we propose an
alternative approach: to consider households where the share of “material aid from
family members and friends” in disposable resources
46
exceeds 20%as households
with labour migrants. For these households, we treat the sum of all wage income and
material aid from family members and friends as remittances. Evidently, this is a very
rough proxy, but it gives an annual figure for remittances obtained by all households
of US$ 686 mln
47
in 2011 (the official figure is US$ 692 mln). This approach gives the
total number of households with migrants (defined as described above) at
189,000.Taking the average number of labour migrants per household from Census-
2009 (1.065 individuals), this number of households gives the number of labour
migrants (individuals) equal to 201,000.
This approach allows one to distinguish between the consumption structure of
households with labour migrants and other households. First, although in terms of
income differences households with “remittances” (as defined above) have slightly
higher income per capita than those without remittances
48
, this difference was not
big enough to cause significant differences in basic types of expenditures such as food
(see Table 11). However, two expenditure lines differ drastically: spending on real
estate (construction and purchase) – families with remittances spend on this 3.3%
more of their revenues than those without remittances. Additionally, they spend more
46
Total household expenditures plus in kind income benefits plus net in kind income.
47
Based on unweighted data.
48
It is natural that they spend less on material aid to relatives and friends – actually, to the same
amount (table 9).
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
Country Study: Belarus
______________________________________________________________________
48
on housing (renovation, etc.). This finding is in line with the results of Shakhotska’s
(2003) study: one of the main reasons for labour migration is improvement of
housing conditions and facilities
49
.
Table 10: Structure of monetary expenditures of Belarusian households, %
Households with
remittances
Households
without
remittances
Difference, percentage
points
Food
29.6
29.9
-0.3
Catering
2.2
1.6
0.6
Clothes
6.1
5.6
0.5
Footwear
2.9
3.1
-0.2
Durables
5.9
6.2
-0.2
Housing (without utilities and
fuel)
3.1
2.0
1.0
Private plot
0.6
1.4
-0.7
Real estate
7.1
3.8
3.3
Car service
3.4
4.0
-0.5
Cars
2.2
2.2
0.0
Communications
3.7
3.1
0.6
Education
1.7
1.1
0.6
Health care and hygiene
5.3
4.5
0.9
Material aid to relatives and
friends
2.7
5.9
-3.3
Savings
5.1
6.6
-1.5
Paying off debts
2.8
3.9
-1.0
Other goods and services
15.5
15.2
0.3
Memorandum items
US$/month
%
Per capita disposable resources
194.4
214.9
10.6
Note. Based on unweighted data.
Source: own estimates based on Belstat (HBS-2011 micro-data) and IPM Research Centre (black
market exchange rate in 2011) data.
Other important differences are also consistent with the findings of Shakhotska’s
study. First, households with remittances spend more on education (all types) and
health care. Second, they have higher spending on clothes, communications and
catering. At the same time, they save less and spend on paying off their debts less –
which is natural, taking into account higher expenditures on real estate.
In 2011, households financed 6.2% of total fixed capital investment, or US$ 0.94 bn
calculated at the market exchange rate. Bearing in mind that improving housing
49
Purchases of durables is hardly an important issue now, as “thanks” to the devaluations of 2009 and
2011 and the pre-crisis credit boom the majority of households had purchased durables up to HBS-
2011 – but in the early 2000s it was one of the most urgent problems that was resolved via labour
migration, see Table 8
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
Country Study: Belarus
______________________________________________________________________
49
conditions are a main channel of remittances spending, it is not surprising that size of
remittance inflows (US$ 0.7 bn) is comparable to the size of investment financed by
households.
50
C. Effects of large remittance flows on macroeconomic management
The impact on remittances of macroeconomic growth and development is
conditioned by the quality of the recipient country’s political and economic policies
and institutions. The quality of institutions might play an important role in
determining the exact effect of remittances on economic growth, because institutions
exert substantial influence on the volume and efficiency of investment (Mansoor
(2007)).
Remittances are important, but a rather small share of inflows of funds on the current
account (1.4% in 2011), which is comparable to ½ of FDI inflows (revenues from the
sale of 50% of Beltransgaz’s shares), or 10% of gross reserve assets. However, if one
takes into account alternative estimates of remittance inflows (which are not
systematic and vary significantly), they appear to be a more important source of
external imbalance financing. For instance, for the last three years the “errors and
omissions” account on the balance of payments has been positive and growing.
Between 1993 and 2007, average inflows on errors and omissions amounted to US$
8.4 mln a year, in 2009 it was equal to US$ 319 mln, in 2010 US$ 558 mln and in
2011 1,551 mln. This may indirectly indicate the increased inflow of remittances and
show their higher importance for the balance of payments.
But the more important the role of remittances becomes for the balance of payments,
the more vulnerable the country becomes to external shocks, something evidenced
during the 2008/2009 crisis. Even official data on remittances in Belarus registered a
reduction in 2009, although this decline had only a minor impact on the current
account and overall macroeconomic stability due to its relatively small size. Belarus’
higher reliance on remittance inflows that could follow increases in the positive
balance on the “errors and omissions” account could in turn lead to a more serious
recession in Russia following the second phase of the global economic and financial
crisis.
Chapter 6.Costs and Benefits of Migration
A. Economic costs and benefits
1. Impact on the local labour market
The most straightforward effect of labour migration on the domestic labour market is
the deficit in specialist areas that are most in demand. Due to data problems (the only
available source is a spot observation in Census-2009), it is hard to check this
empirically. However, Census-2009 provides at least some data on this issue. Overall,
50
However, as is shown in Błąd! Nie można odnaleźć źródła odwołania., “households with remittances”
spend 7.1% of their expenditures on real estate; if so, household finance from remittances is only
slightly more than 5% of their fixed capital investment.
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
Country Study: Belarus
______________________________________________________________________
50
a breakdown of the employed population by skill level (see Table 8 for details) shows
that all levels of qualification – high-skilled, skilled and unskilled – choose labour
migration as a form of employment with a similar likelihood, 0.6%, for high-skilled
and by 1% for skilled and unskilled.
Figure 19a show that labour migrants have the highest share in the construction and
transportation sectors with 4.6 and 2%, respectively, which would appear to be a
rather moderate outflow. Moreover, this may indicate the positive impact of labour
migration as a way of absorbing excess labour from the local market.
However, looking at the same data from a different angle (at occupations) one can see
that labour migrants’ share among non-qualified “mining and construction labourers”
reaches almost 10%, while among qualified workers of the same speciality it is close to
that in construction (see Figure 19b). One of the possible explanations for this is that
labour migration does not absorb surplus labour (at least from this sector) but allows
those who do not have a speciality to work in low-paid positions in construction
abroad. Thus, the outflow of labour migrants helps Belarus reduce its domestic
unemployment and poverty.
Figure 20: Labour migrants as a share of the employed population, %
(a) By economic activity*
(b) By occupation**
* see Table 9 for the list of economic sectors. ** see Table 8 for the list of occupations.
Source: own estimates based on Census-2009 micro-sample (Belstat).
This fact has an important implication for possible labour market changes in Belarus.
First, the recent balance of payments crisis forced the government to scale down its
“investment” programmes (most of them in construction), which led to a drastic fall in
wages in construction and a reduction in employment. According to Belstat data
51
, in
2011 the number of employees in this sector fell by more than 38,000, and in January-
April 2012 by about 12,400, while the total number of employees in this sector as of
the end of 2011 was about 250,000. At least part of the released labour found new jobs
in Russia. But in the event of any serious turbulence (such as oil price decreases or
more general global economic and financial crises) affecting the Russian economy
many of the labour migrants working in the Russian construction sector may lose their
51
Enterprise (except private companies of small business and sole proprietors) data on employees.
0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5%
NA
Other sectors
Real estate, renting and…
Wholesale and retail…
Accommodation and…
Other community,…
Transportation and…
Construction
0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10%
NA/ND
Other occupations
Administrative and…
Metal, machinery and…
Science and…
Stationary plant and…
Drivers and mobile…
Building and related…
Mining and…
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
Country Study: Belarus
______________________________________________________________________
51
jobs. Taken together with the “systemic” crisis in the Belarusian construction sector
this may lead to structural unemployment, with respective challenges for the social
security system and social inclusion policies.
Next, labour migration affects the local labour market in different regions differently.
First, in three regions that border Russia (Viciebsk, Homiel and Mahiliou) the share of
labour migrants is higher than in others, while in Minsk city it is the lowest (which is
natural, taking into account the income gap between Minsk and the regions). Second,
these differences are largely explicable with reference to the construction sector: in all
these oblasts the share of labour migrants working in construction is higher than the
country average, and significantly (14–19 times) higher than in Minsk city, see Table
12. At the same time, differences in outflows of high-skilled labour are small and vary
between 0.3 and 0.8% of the high-skilled employed population.
Table 11: Shares of labour migrants in selected categories of employed
population, %
Total
Construction
Mining and
construction
labourers
High-skilled
Belarus
0.9
4.4
8.4
0.5
Brest
0.8
4.2
8.1
0.4
Viciebsk
1.7
8.9
14.5
0.8
Homiel
1.4
6.8
10.4
0.8
Hrodna
0.7
2.8
2.3
0.3
Minsk city
0.4
0.5
0.8
0.5
Minsk
0.5
1.7
1.8
0.4
Mahiliou
1.2
7.1
14.1
0.6
Source: own estimates based on Census-2009 micro-sample (Belstat).
In the case of labour emigration becoming a challenge for the domestic labour market
in terms of labour supply, attracting immigrants may help meet the demand. At the
moment the most evident experience is of a migration policy aimed at attracting
immigrants to agricultural areas. The State Programme of Support and Development
for Rural Areas for 2005–2010 and the State Programme for the Development of the
Regions and Small/Medium Cities for 2007–2010 created new work places under the
state’s order for building new houses and infrastructure, as well as possibilities for
obtaining “better living conditions” in rural areas for immigrants. According to the
State Programme for Demographic Security for 2010–2015, immigrants from abroad
will receive a house in rural areas and financial support equivalent to about US$
1,000 (at pre-crisis prices
52
). Agriculture offers many low-paid vacancies. According
to the “National bank of vacancies”, the number of unfilled vacancies as of May 1,
2012 was about 59,000, or 1.9 vacancy per each officially unemployed person
53
.
During the last decade and especially after abolishing licensees for attracting
52
See http://www.rg.ru/2011/02/24/migranti.html.
53
See http://www.rabota.by/news/?p=10404.
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
Country Study: Belarus
______________________________________________________________________
52
immigrants for work and simplifying the procedure for receiving work permissions
after January 1, 2011, seasonal regional labour migration from the neighbouring
Ukraine and Moldova into agricultural sector, both private and state owned, has been
on the rise.
54
In terms of the migration impact on wages, evidence is very limited. Although
economic theory would indicate that labour immigration in a substituting sector (the
low skilled sector in Belarus) should lower wages (Borjas, Freeman and Katz 2001)),
immigrants to Belarus are as yet no threat to local wages. At the same time, anecdotal
evidence stresses the impact of the recent crisis on labour migration: for instance,
there is an outflow of professionals from government bodies to the supranational
government bodies of the Eurasian Union (Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan
55
). In
turn, this outflow forces the government to increase wages for these occupations: for
the first five months of 2012 the government increased the base wage rate for
budgetary organisations by 19.4%
56
. But all these impacts are focused on very specific
sectors or occupations and almost invisible at the level of the overall economy.
Similar results were obtained by Luchenok and Kolesnikova (2011), who did not find
any statistically significant impact of migration on wages, explaining this by wage
rigidities / regulations in Belarus and the relatively small size of labour migration.
57
2. Cost and benefits of labour mobility for development
The impact of labour mobility on development is twofold. First, internal migration in
Belarus, especially rural-urban migration caused by weaker employment opportunities
and lower incomes in rural areas, has undermined the economic and demographic
potential of rural areas. Moreover, it is easier to get housing in rural areas than in
urban ones, as well as possibilities to run subsistence agriculture. This creates
incentives for households/individuals with relatively low human capital to stay in rural
areas or to migrate there, widening the gap between urban and rural areas.
54
See footnote 52.
55
See http://naviny.by/rubrics/opinion/2012/05/30/ic_articles_410_178005/.
56
See http://telegraf.by/2012/05/v-belarusi-povishayutsya-zarplati-byudjetnikam.
57
They estimated labour emigration at 150,000 a year and labour immigration at 6,000 a year.
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
Country Study: Belarus
______________________________________________________________________
53
Figure 21: Business constraints to firms in Belarus and Eastern Europe &
Central Asia region, % of firms that mentioned a constraint
Source: IFC/World Bank Enterprise Surveys Database.
58
Second, external labour migration is an important factor influencing development,
but its impact is limited by its size. Whether one uses Census-2009 data (about 1% of
the work force) or alternative estimates (at least 3% of the work force, see Luchenok,
Kolesnikova (2011)), the overall scale of labour migration in Belarus is moderate.
However, Belarusian business has already noticed the problem. The results of the
World Bank ‘Doing business’ report showed that an “inadequately educated
workforce” is one of the main factors restraining business development in Belarus
(see Figure 20). An unstable legal framework, complex tax system and high tax
burden, overbearing and frequent state interventions have pushed business out of the
country. Labour is just following business and emigrating from the country, which at
the same time constrains new business entrants.
Another dimension of the problem of domestic human capital quality is brain drain
and brain waste caused by labour migration of skilled persons. Table 8 clearly
indicates that labour migration is accompanied by brain drain problems, as the vast
majority of migrants (including permanent emigrants) are part of the high-skilled or
skilled labour force. According to Census-2009, only 23.2% of immigrants have
higher education, while according to Belstat data the share of people with higher
education among emigrants between 2000 and 2010 varied from 29.6 to 37.2%, and
during the last five years has stayed around 36%. A study by Shakhotska mentioned
in Section 5.2 also concluded that “labour migrants are active, highly educated and
the most entrepreneurial and mobile part of the population” (Shakhotska (2003)).
According to the study, 44.5% of labour emigrants had higher education, another
14.1% so-called “incomplete” higher education (Census-2009 revealed that 21.8% of
labour migrants have higher education, see Figure 16a).
Another problem is brain waste: according to census data, 39.1% of female labour
migrants have higher education, while only 15.5% of male ones have it. The
58
http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/Data.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Courts
Access to land
Electricity
Tax administration
Transportation
Labor regulations
Political instability
Corruption
Crime, theft and disorder
Access to finance
Practices of the informal sector
Customs and trade regulations
Inadequately educated workforce
Business licensing and permits
Tax rates
Belarus
(2008)
Eastern
Europe &
Central Asia
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
Country Study: Belarus
______________________________________________________________________
54
prevalence of well-educated women among emigrants (Belstat data) is not so drastic
– 33.4% of female and 28.9% of male emigrants have higher education. This
phenomenon has been termed “highly educated brides” (Shakhotska (2009)),
referring to the fact that (according to Census-2009) the average age of female labour
migrants with higher education is 35 years. A part of these women work as “personal
service workers”, in effect wasting their investment in education. Bardak (2010) also
noted the brain waste problem, noticing that a large share of migrants work at low
skilled jobs abroad irrespective of their education.
Luchenok, Kolesnikova (2011) analysed the economic effects of migration on
development, noting not only that Belarus is a net exporter of labour
59
, but also a
degradation of labour migrants’ skill levels. The results of their simulation are
presented in Chapter 8, section A, the main message being that if Belarus exports
high-skilled labour and imports low-skilled labour, this leads to significant efficiency
losses, measured in terms of slower GDP growth.
B. Social costs and benefits
1. Cost of migration for family members left behind and impact on migrants’
households
Earlier studies (Shakhotska, Shymanovich, Bobrova (2012)) stressed higher poverty
risk among those left behind (for all categories – men, women, elderly and children).
They also showed that labour migration often serves as a coping strategy – which
clearly complements Shakhotska’s (2003) findings on labour migration as a source of
improving standards of living (see section 6.2).
Our estimates based on HBS-2011 data support these findings. Absolute poverty
among households with remittances (as defined in section 5.2) is higher, i.e. (taking
into account higher average per capita incomes, see Table 11) inequality is higher
among these households than among households without remittances. But the
absolute poverty rate increases dramatically after exclusion of material aid from
relatives and friends from per capita income of households with remittances (Table
13
60
); hence, migration is a clear coping strategy for many of these households.
Table 12: The effect of remittances on poverty
% of households
with remittances
% of households
without
remittances
Difference, percentage
points
Poverty (official poverty line)
7.2
5.7
1.5
Poverty if material aid from
relatives and friends is excluded
21.3
6.8
14.5
Note. Based on unweighted data.
Source: own estimates based on Belstat (HBS-2011 micro-data) and IPM Research Centre (black
market exchange rate in 2011) data.
59
See footnote 57.
60
This is an expected result, as according to the proposed approach households with remittances are
those with a share of material aid from relatives and friends significantly higher than average.
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
Country Study: Belarus
______________________________________________________________________
55
2. The impact on education and the health sector
The topic of migration’s impact on education has several dimensions. First, the
effects of education are related to remittances: as shown in Section 5.2, higher
investment in education is one of the causes and outcomes of labour migration.
According to Census-2009 data, 70% of households with migrants that have
members aged 6–24 years have members that attend educational institutions, while
among families without migrants that have members in the same age group only 63%
have educated members
61
. However, the share of families with a member in that age
group who did not attend educational institution during the census is also higher (63
vs. 56%). Thus, on the one hand, labour migration and remittances help the higher
investment in education, but on the other hand young people from households with
labour migrants tend to enter the labour market earlier than average. But this can be
explained not as an effect of labour migration per se, but as an effect of poverty: the
poorer the household, the more often its members prefer education to employment.
Second, labour migration (and emigration) influence the quality of education in
Belarus: as Table 9 shows, a significant share of labour migrants to non-Russia
destinations (7.3%) work in the field of education, and most of them (see Table 8) are
high-skilled professionals. Although this outflow was not very visible (0.11% of those
employed in education and 0.14% of professionals employed there), but for some
specialities this outflow is visible.
Additionally, a young person who has to choose between labour migration and
continuing education, has to consider a trade-off: on the one hand, he or she can earn
more now, but on the other higher education means better employment opportunities
(in terms of wages, see Figure 6). Positive returns on education are revealed in the
work of Pastore and Verashchagina (2005), who analysed HBS data and showed that
an additional year of schooling adds 10% to wages (at the main work place), while
further work experience adds approximately 5% a year to wages. Thus, long-term
labour migration may lower chances of finding a well-paid job in Belarus, creating a
sort of “vicious circle”.
The health sector is experiencing outflows of specialists for the following reasons.
First, the average wage in this sector is 10% lower than average wages in the economy
and significantly lower than in recipient countries, see Figure 11). According to the
“National bank of vacancies”, unfilled vacancies in the health sector exceed the
number of unemployed specialists in this sector five-fold (this gap is especially high
in small and medium towns). Second, the health care structure has been inherited
from the former USSR; the legacy of this approach is still present in many respects.
In many cases, the available - limited - resources are dispersed among a great number
of providers and facilities, rather than being targeted towards the most important
priorities, such as raising staff salaries, adjusting staff numbers and purchasing
modern equipment and medical technologies (UNDP 2005). Additionally, getting
61
Average number of members of this age is approximately the same in both types of households: 1.38
in families with labour migrants compared to 1.34 in families without them.
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
Country Study: Belarus
______________________________________________________________________
56
medical education requires significant effort, at least in terms of time, while average
returns from this effort are quite low.
However, private medicine is a relatively well developed sector in Belarus, which
allows professionals to find a job there (often additional to work in the state health
care sector). That is why Bhargava, Docquier and Moullan’s dataset
62
showed a
moderate outflow of physicians, one of the lowest in EaP countries: as of 2004,
migrant doctors amounted to 0.5% of their total number in Belarus, or 2.46 doctors
per 100,000 of population (only Azerbaijan has a lower outflow) compared to 1.2%
and 3.74 doctors per 100,000 inhabitants in other EaP countries on average.
But these data are rather outdated, given the limited information on the recent (post
crisis-2011) outflow of doctors from Belarus – the available data are combined with
anecdotal evidence. For instance, the media portal Zautra tvajoj krainy (The other
day of your country) refers to an interview with Belarusian Health Ministry
representatives that estimated the number of doctors leaving the health care system
in search of a better job abroad at up to 200 persons a year, or 10% of the annual exits
from the state medicine sector. Moreover, according to the interviewed ministry
employees, the share of young specialists in the sector’s staff is falling. In spite of the
increased enrolment in medical educational institutions, some regions lack medical
staff: for instance, the Brest oblast has only 75% of vacancies in the health sector
filled, while the Mahiliou oblast has only 67%
63
. On top of this, neighbouring Russia
is investing in the creation of modern medical centres that attract foreign
professionals, including Belarusian ones.
64
3. Social security of migrants
A comprehensive overview of the social security of labour migrants with a special
focus on international agreements in this field was made by Shakhotska, Shymanovich
and Bobrova (2012). They counted more than 10 international agreements
65
covering
62
See http://perso.uclouvain.be/frederic.docquier/filePDF/MBDDataSet.xls, described in Bhargava,
Docquier and Moullan (2010).
63
See http://www.zautra.by/art.php?sn_nid=10508&sn_cat=20.
64
http://www.zautra.by/art.php?&sn_nid=2758&sn_cat=20.
65
The Social Protection Fund provides a list of international agreements related to the issue of paying
pensions and allowances, http://www.ssf.gov.by/priside/payment_pension/. It includes:
Agreement on Guarantees of the CIS Citizens’ Rights (came into force on 1992/03/13);
Agreement on Guarantees of the CIS Citizens’ Pension Rights between the governments of
Belarus and Moldova (1996/10/15);
Agreement on Guarantees of the CIS Citizens’ Pension Rights between the governments of
Belarus and Ukraine (1997/02/11);
Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Pension Provision between the Ministries of Social
Protection of Belarus and Tajikistan (1998/08/28);
Agreement on Social Security between Belarus and Lithuania (1999/12/15);
Agreement on Social Security between Belarus and Latvia (2008/02/29) followed by Agreement
between Belarusian Social Protection Fund, Belarusian Republican Unitary Insurance
Enterprise “Belgosstrakh” and State Social Insurance Agency of Latvia on Procedures of
Pensions and Allowances Payment and Transfers (2010);
Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Pension Provision between Belarus and Russia
(2007/03/29) followed by Agreement between Ministry of Labour and Social Protection of
Belarus, Ministry of Health of Belarus, Ministry of Finance of Belarus, and Ministry of Health
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
Country Study: Belarus
______________________________________________________________________
57
issues of pension payments, taxation, legal status, rights and social security of
migrants, as well as 8 domestic legislative acts that “regulate the rights of Belarusians
working abroad from the Belarus side, and demand the right for equal treatment of
Belarusians working abroad with the local labour force under local legislation”.
However, this study stresses the limited efficiency of most of these agreements and
regulations. First, some of the international agreements have not been ratified yet.
The Convention “On Legal Status of Labour Migrants and Their Family Members
within CIS” was signed in 2008 and came into force for Belarus in 2010, but some
other countries, including Russia, have not yet adopted it. The Convention implies
that labour migrants have access to social services (except pension system) in
accordance with local legislation. These agreements cover only those migrants who are
in the territory of receiving country legally, and consequently do not capture a
significant share or even the majority of migrants (especially in case of Russia). The
agreement between the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation on
cooperation in the field of social security (signed at Saint Petersburg on 24 January
2006)
66
contains provisions on maternity benefits, unemployment benefits, old age,
disability and survivors benefits, benefits in the event of occupational disease or
accident, and family benefits in both countries. It was fully ratified by Belarus but only
partly by Russia
67
. In practice, Belarusians were refused equal rights. Absence of the
pension insurance number for Belarusian workers is one of the obstacles to
employment in Russia
68
. Ambassador of Russia in Belarus Mr. Surikov explained the
reasons of not ratifying the agreement as the longest procedure for Russia
69
. Second,
and more importantly, they cover only legal migrants that (depending on the
estimated number of labour migrants) constitute from 20 to 25% of all labour
migrants. Additionally, the authors noted that “registration [as a legal migrant] per se
may be a problem, as there are quotas for labour migrants and need for special
licenses for employers to hire labour migrants and permission for migrants to be
hired”.
An important aspect of labour migrants’ social security is related to their contributions
to the Social Protection Fund. First, in the case of the absence of a legal place of work
in Belarus they cannot count on reimbursement of their wages during a serious illness
by their employer. Second, a household can count on one-off maternity benefit
70
only
if such leave is taken by officially employed family member. Third, pension size is
linked to wages received during 18 years of work, which is not a problem in the case of
the only limited labour migration but can become a problem if labour migration is
informal and serves as the main place of work.
and Social Security of Russia on Adoption of the abovementioned agreement.
66
Natsional'nyi Reestr Pravovykh Aktov, 2006-07-04, No. 103, pp. 39-46
67
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n=23&p_origin=SUBJECT
68
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paid upon maternity leave to the amount of four monthly salaries but within cumulative
contributions to the Social Protection Fund.
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Next, labour migration serves as a coping strategy for many households, thus reducing
pressures on the social security system (the government shouldn’t provide targeted
social assistance). However, as labour migrants do not pay contributions to the Social
Protection Fund, higher labour migration means lower incomes to the fund. Chubrik
and Shymanovich (2008) showed that elimination of informal employment would
shift the problems of the pension fund by approximately 15 years forward.
C. Demographic costs and consequences
As labour migration in Belarus is relatively moderate, its demographic consequences
are quite limited. However, some general effects can be noted. First, as about ¼ of
labour migrants are young people aged up to 30, labour migration may lead to
postponed marriages
71
. According to Census-2009 data, 56.6% of labour migrants
were married (officially registered marriages), while among other categories of
employed people this share was 6.7 percentage points higher. Second, labour
migration of women leads to postponed births
72
: Census-2009 shows that 38.5% of
women labour migrants don’t bear a single child, while among women employed in
Belarus this share is only 17.3%. Furthermore, labour migration may increase the risk
of divorce. Although this phenomenon has not been studied and census data provides
little evidence of this effect (the share of divorced people among labour migrants is
just 0.6 percentage points higher than among internal workers), the general trend is
towards higher ratio divorces per one marriage: between 1990 and 2010 this ratio
increased from 0.35 to 0.48.
However, according to polling results presented in Shakhotska (2003), the majority of
labour migrants evaluate the benefits from migration higher than its costs. Only 12.3%
of respondents stated that migration had influenced their family negatively, leading to
more quarrels and leaving less time for child-rearing. At the same time, 60% of
respondents mentioned that labour migration had improved the situation in their
families, linking this to resolving the problems outlined in Table 10. Others evaluated
the impact of migration on family neutrally.
Chapter 7.Current Migration Policies
A. Institutional set-up for migration
Although migration policy plays an important role in migration management, its
impact is often limited to regulatory mechanisms and a steering of flows, with limited
possibilities to influence the drivers of migration. Key determinants of immigration
and emigration processes include the economic policy of the country, its economic
performance, the efficiency of legal and taxation systems, quality of life, access to
social security systems, as well as other similar factors.
71
Overall, the average age of marriage increased between 1990 and 2010 from 24.4 to 26.5 years for
men and from 22.4 to 24.4 years for women – however, due to the relatively small size of labour
migration’s role here this shouldn’t be overestimated.
72
Again, the general trend is towards later childbirth: between 1990 and 2010 the average wage of
bearing a first child increased by 2 years.
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The institutional set-up that shapes policies in the field of migrations is briefly
summarised in Table 14.
Table 13: Institutional set-up for migration
Issue
Responsible
institution(s)
Tasks performed
A. Government
Migration planning
Department on citizenship
and migration, Ministry of
Interior Affairs
Guarantee implementation of the actions of the National
Programme of Demographic Security for 2011-2015, which
assume granting financial support to immigrants and
returnees in the form of covering costs of moving and
adapting to new living conditions. Monitoring of migration
and legal status, granting of citizenship. Altering migration
law.
Protection of labour
Ministry of Labour and
Social Affairs
The Belarusian social economic development programme
for 2011-2015 implies introduction of filters
Migration control
State Border Committee of
Belarus
Protection from illegal migration, information support on
human rights
Research and
analysis
Migration Monitoring
Centre of Scientific and
Pedagogical Staff, National
Academy of Sciences
Official data-based monitoring of scientific staff migration
B. In-Country Non-Government Organizations
Emigrants
information support
La Strada, www.lastrada.by
Pre-emigrating consultancy for Belarusian citizens
C. Diaspora Organizations
Emigrants support
abroad
Diaspora organisation of
Belarusians of the world
"Baćkauščyna"
Maintaining Belarusian self-identity of emigrants and their
children, help in developing Belarusian schools, organising
cultural events and information support for Belarusian
emigrants abroad.
D. International Organization and governments of recipient countries
Technical support
and institutional
building
International Organisation
for Migration (IOM)
Awareness-raising among potential migrants and capacity-
building for governmental institutions in counter-
trafficking. Financial support for local project on
Trafficking
Source: own compilation based on the official websites of the agencies mentioned in the table.
The main government body responsible for migration matters is the Department of
Citizenship and Migration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Ministry of Labour
and Social Protection, which used to deal with migration issues before 2004, is
currently engaged in legal advising to Belarusian companies willing to employ
professional immigrants.
Government regulations overseeing migration are provided by legal documents such
as the Act on External Labour Migration and the Act on Combating Human
Trafficking (developed with the help of NGOs). There was a National Migration
Programme for 2006-2010. Since 2011 operations on international migration
regulations were included in "The National program of demographic security of
Belarus for 2011-2015", which sets funding in amount of BYR 2.8 billion annually
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($330 thousands) . The program aims at increasing quality of migrants and attract
around 60 thousand people for five years
73
.
Government regulations of migration come from (i) the Act on External Labour
Migration, (ii) the Act on Combating Human Trafficking. The main government
programmes in this field are as follows:
1. Sub-programme “Optimisation of Migration Processes” of the “National
Programme of Demographic Security of the Republic of Belarus 2011–2015” –
Attracting low skilled labour to rural areas;
2. “The comprehensive state programme for developing small and medium-sized
urban localities” – promoting migration and further urbanisation (the
disappearance of small villages - “land without people”);
3. Mandatory job assignments post-graduation – allocating qualified workers to
state-owned enterprises;
4. Other measures/legislative acts regulating/responding to migration;
5. The National Migration Programme 2006–2010; wasn’t renewed.
There are around 7-8 governmental bodies responsible for regulating and monitoring
migration processes, as follows: the Cabinet of Ministers, which coordinates the work
of ministries; the Belarus Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which protects Belarusian
citizens abroad and regulates visas; the State Committee for State Border Protection,
which controls passports; the Belarus Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, which
regulates labour migration and social protection for Belarusians abroad and
foreigners in Belarus; the Belarus Ministry of Internal Affairs, which records
migration and prevents illegal migration and trafficking; the Public Employment
Service, which enters into consultations on employment abroad and cooperates with
international organisations; and finally, the State Committee for Nationalities and
Migration, which develops migration policy.
No single body embraces all the activities and issues associated with migration within
a unified conceptual framework. There is also a lack of migration methodology,
relevant data collection and monitoring of migratory movements – this was a
problem prior to 2012, when Belstat launched the Labour Force Survey.
Cooperation between non-governmental organisations, international organisations
and government bodies in Belarus has its own tradition: there are enough platforms
for contacts and collaboration, although these contacts are concentrated on just a
handful of issues such as trafficking or migration control and regulation.
There are several international and non-governmental organisations working on
migration issues in Belarus: the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the
Red Cross, the international programme La Strada, etc. Local organisations
concentrate their efforts at combating human trafficking, while youth organisations
support students and young people in finding opportunities to continue studying
abroad. Due to the specific approach of Belarusian authorities to the migration issue,
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the mission of the IOM in Belarus is limited: in-depth interviews with IOM officials
undertaken within the project showed that only one of the four main areas of the
IOM’s activities is functional in Belarus, see Figure 21.
Figure 22: Main areas of managing migration by IOM
Source: based on the in-depth interview with the IOM office in Belarus representatives.
Diaspora organisations have a negligible influence on local policies (largely due to the
limited willingness of the government to cooperate), although play an important role
in the cultural life of migrants and support people-to-people contacts.
The experts who participated in the project’s in-depth interviews agreed that there
are a lot of difficulties in the sphere of state regulation of labour migration processes.
Migration policy is not well developed in the country. However, the issue is
understood narrowly and only from the point of view of protection of the internal
labour market and combating human trafficking.
B. Selected international agreements in the field of migration and
people-to-people contacts
Institutional support for migrant workers from Belarus is still limited in
neighbouring countries. The relative lack of organisational/institutional links and
activities can be explained by status insecurity as well as by the economic strategies of
the majority of the migrants. NGOs play a minor role mainly due to the novelty of the
phenomenon of labour immigration and lack of funding. Migrants who are in an
Main areas of managing migration by IOM
MIGRATION AND
DEVELOPMENT
Return of qualified
nationals
Exchange of expertise
Remittances/Money
transfers
Overseas
communities
Microcredit schemes
Targeted assistance
FACILITATING
MIGRATION
Workers and
professionals
Students and trainers
Family reunification
Recruitment and
placement
Documentation
Language training
Cultural orientation
REGULATING
MIGRATION
System for visa, entry
and stay
Border management
Technology
applications
Assisted return and
reintegration
Counter-trafficking
Counter-smuggling
FORCED MIGRATION
Asylum and refugees
Resettlement
Repatriation
Internally displaced
persons
Transitions and
recovery
Former combatants
Claims and
compensations
The only part of the mission realized in Belarus
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insecure position in their host country tend to rely on informal networks
(Söderköping/Cross-Border Cooperation Process (2009)).
While special visa agreements have been adopted between the EU and Ukraine as
well as between Moldova and the EU, no visa facilitation agreement has been
concluded between the EU and Belarus. This means that entry into EU Member
States incurs higher costs for citizens of Belarus and that none of the facilitating
measures of the agreements with Moldova or Ukraine apply. The EU is committed to
eventual “easier travel of citizens of Belarus to EU countries”, subject to the
ratification of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (which is dependent on an
improvement of the democracy and human rights record in Belarus).
Belarus has officially participated in the circular migration forums organised by the
European Commission, as well educational visits to Sweden and Finland for
representatives of Belarusian authorities aimed at sharing legal and illegal migration
regulations. Some instruments concerning migration policy have been implemented
in Belarus.
Belarus has concluded many agreements with Russia in different spheres, such as
equal rights of citizens of Belarus and Russia in social affairs, education and
employment since 2006.
An agreement between Belarus and Latvia on cooperation in the field of social
security was concluded on February 29, 2008 and the Agreement between the
Republic of Belarus and Lithuania on Social Security was enforced on December 15,
1999. With other countries of the EU such agreements have not yet been concluded.
Since late 2007 negotiations have been ongoing concerning a special regime for
border crossing for the residents of border regions of Lithuania and Belarus. A
dedicated regime would cover those living within a 50-kilometre belt on both sides of
the Lithuanian-Belarus border. The application of such special rules would have an
impact on migration flows as it would allow only the residents of the border region to
easily reach the Lithuanian capital Vilnius. By the end of January 2008 the
Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had prepared a draft agreement on travel
across the state border with Belarus and opened talks on the contents of this
agreement with the European Commission (whose approval will be necessary) and
sent it to the authorities of Belarus. In mid-November 2008 it was announced that a
bilateral agreement on border cooperation introducing eased conditions for border
crossing for the residents of the 50-kilometre zone on both sides of the frontier would
be signed “within the next few weeks”, but has not yet been signed. Among three
bilateral agreements on border movement with Poland, Lithuania and Latvia one
with Latvia became effective since 2012. Poland and Lithuania are still awaiting
notification from the Belarusian side of the completion of the necessary procedures.
It seems that political reasons explain the prolongation of the agreements ratification
process in Belarus. Experts believe that the implementation of the agreements will
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start up after improving relations between Belarus and the European Union
74
.
Migrants from Belarus could benefit from bilateral agreements with Poland, which
guarantees relevant working conditions and access to the social security net in
Poland. Belarus did sign agreements on mutual employment with Poland in 1994, but
these documents never came into force due to the lack of relevant executive protocols.
Unfortunately, Polish-Belarus agreements have never been ratified. The reasons were
both economic (the surplus of labour was not large enough in Belarus) and political
(lack of will from some politicians, as well as administrative chaos driven by frequent
changes of governments).
An agreement on the simplified cross-border movement of residents of frontier
regions is also to be signed between Poland and Belarus. The agreement would
include the issue of Polish visas at a reduced fee of €20 to several categories of
travellers. The reduction in the Polish national visa fee came into effect on November
1, 2008 in response to the Belarus decision to lower its visa fees for Polish nationals
in December 2007 (EaP Panel on Migration and asylum (2008)).
C. Barriers for and mechanisms to labour migration: Focus Group
results
The focus group implemented as part of the project revealed three main mechanisms
of finding a job abroad, their advantages and disadvantages:
1. Looking for a job with the help of intermediate recruit organisations. The
advantages are legal status and state protection because of the strong
regulations of such organisations, help with the main procedures and
documents. The disadvantages are spending of financial and time resources;
2. Looking for a job with the help of acquaintances. Advantages are that it tends
to be easier and faster. Disadvantages are that work status is often semi-legal;
migration becomes unsafe because of a low level of legal culture;
3. Moving from one country to another within a corporation. This type concerns
qualified professionals and cannot be connected with loss of status or quality
of life.
Additionally, the focus group provided information about respondents’ perception of
barriers to migration within the existing institutional framework (external and
internal). All barriers for labour migration can be divided into two groups: barriers to
moving from Belarus and barriers to coming for work to other countries. Barriers
from the Belarusian side include:
1. Absence of double citizenship;
2. Obligatory 1-3 years of employment in Belarus (so called “job distribution”) for
those who have obtained tertiary education without paying tuition fees, i.e. at
the cost of Belarusian government. In case of refusal of such obligatory
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employment due to economic - and even academic - migration, a person must
reimburse the costs of his/her graduate education process;
3. Lack of intermediary recruitment firms for a job abroad (such organisations
should have a license from Ministry of Internal Affairs).
External barriers include:
4. Language barriers;
5. Lack of knowledge of laws and other regulations (medical care, for example);
6. Difficulties of confirmation of qualifications (Belarus isn’t included in the
Bologna Process etc.).
Representatives of NGOs and international organisation name among the most
common problems concerning labour migration the following:
7. Lack of a common state migration policy in Belarus. Attention tends to be paid
to controlling criminalised migration and protecting the domestic labour
market. These directions in state bodies’ activities deal mainly with limitation
of migration;
8. This context creates restrictions on the activities of the IOM in Belarus. If there
are four main areas of their work for other countries (Migration and
Development, Facilitating Migration), Regulating Migration and Forced
Migration), they undertake activities in Belarus only in the area of Regulating
Migration;
9. There are many ways to restrict the rights of migrants abroad. This is common
for semi-legal employment, domestic labour and in countries where the
residence of migrants strongly depends on their contract with a particular
employer (when losing a contract migrants have to leave the country and tend
to be unable to defend their rights);
10. Collection of information on labour migration is defective. The main source of
information is registered job contracts. Job contracts are registered obviously
when they are provided by a licensed intermediary recruitment firm, but when
migrants organise their own employment or with the help of intermediary
recruitment firms from other countries, they very rarely register their
contracts. Also there is no Boundary Committee information on migration
between Belarus and the Russian Federation because of the openness of the
borders. Thus neither state nor do international and non-governmental
organisations have a sufficiently complete picture of labour migration to be
able to manage it.
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Chapter 8.Forecasts/Projections of Migration and Labour
Markets Trends
A. Analysis of possible responses to changes in migration policies in
the EU
Improvements in the overall quality of life in Belarus may help to reduce the
emigration rate, induce migrants in the Diaspora to return home and provide
incentives for migrants to use the existing human and financial capital, including
remittances, accumulated abroad at home.
Circular migration may have the potential to facilitate development in Belarus and
neighbouring countries by increasing migrants’ human and financial capital,
facilitating international skill transfers, building cross-border trade and investment
and preventing the long-term separation of families. Circular migration is for
example organised by state-owned firms in the building sector to Venezuela.
As the Polish Card (introduced by the Polish government in 2008), the Belarusian
authorities have made some political appeals to put a halt to the migration stream of
qualified and active workers to Poland. Among Belarusian official responses to Polish
migration policy are restrictions for officials to obtain the Polish Card, hidden barriers
from governmental authorities in receiving documents, as well as rational appeals to
improve living conditions in the country and to increase labour demand at national and
local levels.
Belarusian society has had a largely positive response to the Polish Card, with many
people having sought to obtain the right to freedom of movement and to enter the
broader labour market, as well as receive access to welfare benefits in Poland. The
total quantity of received cards in Belarus has been about 30,000 (3 per 1,000
inhabitants) since the introduction of the policy, while in Ukraine it is about 1 per
1,000
75
. This means that there is a high willingness among Belarusians to migrate
legally to the EU. A similar reaction from both the authorities and from citizens is
expected in response to the unified EU migration policy.
The institutional framework – or lack thereof – for recognising foreign diplomas
received by Belarusians abroad is an obstacle for returning of emigrants, i.e. an
obstacle to knowledge and experience inflows into Belarus. At the same time, Belarus
needs to attract more highly qualified immigrants as they are complementarily to the
local labour force. The role of the government is to create incentives for absorbing
highly qualified specialists into the domestic labour market. Benchmarking with
other countries (e.g. Philippines and Morocco) shows, that migrant-sending countries
can receive more benefits from migration when government protects domestic labour
rights abroad and supports remittances.
Experts surveyed during in-depth interviews organised within the project pointed out
that Belarus has great potential for collaboration with EU countries in the sphere of
labour migration. According to the experts’ opinions, Belarusians have one of the
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highest levels of education among countries of the region; they are more law-abiding
and close to European cultural values. They suggested that liberalisation of migration
regulations would not lead to a total shift of labour out of the country, as we can see
in the example of migration flows to the Russian Federation in the context of an
opening of that labour market.
B. Projections of potential increases in the labour force as a result
of natural causes and migration
The UN population division provides long-term projections for population dynamics
by age group (2010 revision). Based on this data, the following estimates were
implemented (Figure 22). The labour force was estimated based on activity rates for
men and women, while the working-age population was calculated on the basis of 5-
year age cohorts (UN forecasts). It is quite clear that natural causes push labour
supply down, creating challenges not only for the labour market, but also
undermining migration potential and harming pension system sustainability.
Figure 23: Labour force and working age population projections for
Belarus
Source: own estimates based on the UN Population Projections (2010 revision).
In terms of migration’s impact on the labour force, Luchenok and Kolesnikova (2011)
estimated long-term migration trends (up to 2020) by simulations on the basis of a
general equilibrium model. Three scenarios were estimated:
1. Baseline scenario: high-skilled workers’ outflow (6% a year) and increasing
inflows of low-skilled labour (3% a year). The annual per capita GDP growth
rate decrease by 0.8 percentage points;
2. Optimistic scenario: reverse changing trends – an increasing inflow of
qualified workers (3% per year), zero inflow of low-skilled labour, and positive
net migration. This adds to GDP growth by 2.5 percentage points a year;
3. Pessimistic scenario: Increasing outflows of qualified workers (8% per
annum), increasing inflows of low-skilled labour (5% per year). A general
decrease in the effectiveness of labour use and a decrease in per capita GDP
growth rate by 2.2 percentage points a year.
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
2022
2024
2026
2028
2030
2032
2034
2036
2038
2040
2042
2044
2046
2048
2050
15-64 labour force
Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries
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Unfortunately, Belarus’ migration strategy has been directed towards attracting low-
skilled labour, while the country is losing its skilled workforce. Belarus clearly needs
to attract migrants to sustain economic growth. In the process of so doing, local
labour tends not to be used efficiently and labour productivity is still very low. The
Belarusian authorities have to double labour supply simply to sustain economic
growth at the same level and then to double GDP over the next ten years, as planned.
Currently, the Belarusian economy possesses 4.3 mln employed people and 1.8 mln
reserve labour (300 thousand officially unemployed and 1.5 million economically
inactive). A simple calculation shows that to sustain the same rate of economic
growth and productivity Belarus needs to attract at least 2.5 million people (without
family members) over the next 10 years, or 250 thousands per year. This scenario is
technically unrealistic and economically unreasonable because the negative socio-
political effects of mass immigration could outweigh the economic effects. Kazlou
(2008) has suggested an intensification of the economic use of domestic human
resources in Belarus to increase labour supply.
As Belarus has an aging and declining population it faces a number of policy
dilemmas, including appropriate retirement ages, pension system reform and
healthcare for the elderly; support levels and ratios between working and pension-age
populations; labour force participation; possible replacement migration as well as
integration of immigrant population. In contrast to other possibilities, replacement
migration refers to the principle of using international migration to offset declines in
total population, working-age population or population aging. For Belarus to
maintain the size of its total and working age populations, allowing migration seems
to be one of the few policy options.
Conclusions
According to the most reliable data source – Census-2009 – the scale of labour
migration in Belarus has been rather limited: less than 1% of the work force worked
abroad. However, this estimate is questionable and sits between official data and
expert estimates of varying quality; but what is more important is that the balance of
payments crisis that occurred in 2011 seems to have reversed the most important
factor that militated against labour migration from Belarus, namely the rapid
convergence between incomes in Belarus and the main recipients of its labour force
before the crisis. In addition, medium-term prospects for economic growth in Belarus
are clouded, at least if it does not undergo comprehensive market reforms that would
deal with the foundations of the existing imbalances. Hence, in the nearest future the
scale of labour migration could increase and anecdotal evidence shows that it is
already doing so.
However, Belarus’ migration is highly concentrated: 90% of migrants go to Russia.
Education and skill barriers prevent more active labour migration to other
destinations, particularly EU countries. Although a higher income gap with these
countries than with Russia creates incentives for labour migration, these are not
strong enough for the majority of potential migrants to overcome the existing
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barriers. Most labour migrants are concentrated in the construction and transport
sectors and have low or “average” skills, and for them more open borders with the EU
would probably not mean a change of destination.
Nevertheless, easier movement to the EU may serve as an additional attraction for
high-skilled professionals. Currently, some of them are attracted by the increased
wage differential with Russia, although the gap between Russia and the EU is still
high enough, while the gap in life quality between these destinations is even higher,
thus providing strong incentives for professionals to migrate there.
Thus, if the EU becomes more open for labour migrants from Belarus, it might induce
higher migration of professionals but most likely a lesser amount of low-skilled
migration.
Specific recommendations for the EU could include the following:
A. To reduce illegal labour migration to the EU. Among potential instruments could
be: (i) facilitation for EU work permits, especially for low-skill jobs, (ii) institution of
a free-of-charge visa regime to allow more frequent travel and rational choice of
travel reasons.
B. To review higher education programs for Belarusians supported by the EU in
terms of their effectiveness and develop instruments that would stimulate graduates
to return to Belarus and utilize the knowledge received back in the country of their
origin (for instance, through support of centres of excellence, cooperation with
Belarusian companies – potential employers or alike).
C. To negotiate with Belarusian authorities on bilateral migration agreements in the
field of retirement benefits (one of the expected effects is higher incentives for legal
employment for Belarusian migrants).
D. To cooperate with Belarusian statistical authorities in the field of the bilateral
system of migrant registration development and migrant information exchange,
including working migrants.
Challenges related to the global crisis and local instability are aggravated by
demographic developments: Belarus has started to see a fall in its working-age
population, while the number of aged people is still increasing. Hence, any additional
losses in the labour force mean slower potential GDP growth, while loss of high-
skilled labour means faster growth deceleration. But fast growth is important for
narrowing the income gap between Belarus and recipient countries. As such the
country may find itself in a vicious circle: the more skilled labour it loses, the slower
GDP growth becomes and the bigger the income gap grows – and so it begins again.
This is one of the reasons why the country not only needs comprehensive market
reforms for sustainable growth, but also a migration strategy that will be aimed at
making the country attractive for skilled labour.
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