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Fudan Journal of the Humanities and
Social Sciences
ISSN 1674-0750
Fudan J. Hum. Soc. Sci.
DOI 10.1007/s40647-013-0001-z
The Growth of Intra-party Democracy and
Its Implications for China’s Democratic
Future
Dingping Guo
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RESEARCH ARTICLE
The Growth of Intra-party Democracy
and Its Implications for China’s Democratic Future
Dingping Guo
Received: 20 May 2013 / Accepted: 27 October 2013
ÓFudan University and Springer-Verlag GmbH Berlin Heidelberg 2014
Abstract During the past decades, while the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has
continued to consolidate its political leadership and refused to tolerate any oppo-
sition parties, intra-party democracy has been emphasized repeatedly and expanded
vigorously by Chinese Communist leaders as an alternative to electoral democracy
or liberal democracy characterized by multiparty competition. Various democratic
experiments have been conducted and many democratic elements introduced at all
levels in the CCP. Although the growth of intra-party democracy is limited, these
great efforts and achievements have profound implications for China’s democratic
future. The growth of intra-party democracy not only reflects the CCP’s continuous
efforts to institutionalize the rules of elite politics and fight against widespread
corruption, but might also provide a good approach for political transition to
democracy with Chinese characteristics in the future.
Keywords Intra-party democracy Political development Democratization
Party-state CCP
1 Introduction
During the past three decades, while the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) continues
to consolidate its political leadership and refuse to tolerate any opposition parties,
intra-party democracy has been emphasized repeatedly and expanded vigorously by
Chinese Communist leaders as an alternative to electoral democracy or liberal
democracy characterized by multiparty competition. This paper is designed to
explore and explain the gradual growth of intra-party democracy in the CCP and its
D. Guo (&)
School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University, 220 Handan Road,
Shanghai 200433, China
e-mail: guodp@fudan.edu.cn
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Fudan J. Hum. Soc. Sci.
DOI 10.1007/s40647-013-0001-z
Author's personal copy
implications for China’s democratization in the future. The whole paper consists of
the five sections: (1) introduction. (2) A new approach to democratization in China
will be introduced by reviewing many different kinds of discussions and disputes
about China’s democratic developments during the past several decades. (3) The
development of intra-party democracy in the CCP will be analyzed based on
Communist theory and practice. The major experiments with intra-party democracy
during the recent years will be introduced and explained. (4) The limitations of
intra-party democracy will be discussed. (5) The implications for China’s
democratic future will be analyzed. This article argues that the growth of intra-
party democracy not only reflects the CCP’s continuous efforts to institutionalize
the rules of elite politics and fight against widespread corruption, but might also
provide a good approach for political transition to democracy with Chinese
characteristics in the future.
2 Chinese Approach to Democratization
Democratization has been experiencing a global wave since the mid 1970s and has
been a central theme of comparative political studies since the early 1980s.
Similarly, democratization has been established as an important goal of political
development and political reform in China since the reform and opening policy was
adopted during the late 1970s. As Deng (1994b, p. 144) points out, ‘‘special
emphasis should be placed on democratization nowadays, because the democratic
centralism has not really been implemented for a long time and as a result,
centralization has been emphasized too much and democracy ignored’’. Therefore,
Deng (1994b, p. 322) expatiated on his blueprint for political reforms in 1980,
which aimed at fully developing a people’s democracy and finally creating a higher
and truer democracy in China than exists in western capitalist countries. While CCP
leaders pledged to develop intra-party democracy, some experiments had been
conducted from the late 1980s when the Central Organization Department
promulgated ‘‘Provisional Methods regarding Multi-Candidate Elections of the
Provincial, City and County Congress’’ in March 1988. In the 1990s, CCP leaders
focused on market-oriented reforms and initiated few efforts to promote intra-party
democracy at the national level, but several innovative and bold attempts to
introduce elements of democracy at the grass-root levels in the Party surfaced in
some areas and were tolerated by the central authority of the CCP (Lai 2008,
pp. 209–213). Since Hu Jintao ascended to power as the supreme leader in late
2002, CCP leaders have attached more importance to the development of intra-party
democracy. In his report delivered to the 18th Party Congress, Hu Jintao promised
to vigorously promote intra-Party democracy and enhance the Party’s creative
vitality. As he points out, ‘‘Intra-Party democracy is the life of the Party’’, and we
should insure that Party members have the right to know, participate in and oversee
Party affairs, as well as the right to vote by improving institutions for intra-Party
democracy (Hu 2012).
At the same time, there have been comprehensive discussions about, and intense
debates over, the nature and path of political democratization among Chinese
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scholars. While many people suggest that the goals of political development should
be electoral democracy based on strengthening and empowering of the People’s
Congress system, and deliberative democracy based on reinventing and rebuilding
of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) system, some
other scholars argue that the only feasible plan for political reform should be to
expand intra-party democracy within the ruling CCP (He et al. 2004, pp. 23–26). Hu
(1999,2010), a political scientist based in Shanghai, argues that political
development should focus on the expansion of intra-party democracy, which could
combine the two seemingly conflicting goals of democratization and CCP
leadership and consequently lead to a new Chinese model of democracy. Another
scholar from Beijing, He (2004), insists that democratization should be the goal of
political development in China and intra-party democracy within the CCP should be
given priority over people’s democracy. Since studies of intra-party democracy have
become a hot topic, many different understandings of intra-party democracy can be
found and various proposals have been put forward, among which some scholars
insist on a top-down initiative and others on down-top ones; also, some support
competitive elections within the CCP and others favor non-competitive deliberation
(He 2011).
However, from a comparative perspective, intra-party democracy has not been
taken seriously as an approach to modern democracy because almost all scholars
tend to define modern democracy as a system of multiparty competition and pay
much less attention to intra-party democracy. Indeed, during the past three decades,
the multiparty competition system has been introduced and institutionalized in most
countries worldwide. By defining democracy as a multiparty competition system,
Larry Diamond said: ‘‘as democracy spread within each continent, it grew into a
global phenomenon; today, about three-fifths of all the world’s states are
democracies’’ (Diamond 2008, p. 54). In this sense, the global wave of
democratization depends on whether there is multiparty competition, not whether
there is intra-party democracy. And furthermore, intra-party democracy per se has
been doubted and even discarded as a goal of political development from the early
time of party politics. By studying the German Social Democratic Party, Michels
(1949, p. 365) proclaimed in 1911 to have discovered the ‘‘iron law of oligarchy’’
which states: ‘‘It is organization which gives birth to the domination of the elected
over the electors, of the mandataries over the mandators, of the delegates over the
delegators. Who say organization, say oligarchy’’. According to this iron law,
political parties as modern organizations would be inevitably governed by party
leaders who would control the decision-making process and the channels of
information based on their advantages in leadership positions and skills; they would
manipulate the uninformed and unprofessional party members, making empty
rituals of formal democratic policy-making processes (Heidar 2006, pp. 309–310).
Four decades later, Duverger (1954, p. 133) confirms such oligarchical tendencies
and says: ‘‘The leadership of political parties presents dual characteristics: it is
democratic in appearance and oligarchic in reality’’. If this iron law could be applied
to all political parties, it is obvious that intra-party democracy would be impossible.
Although Michels’ law has been tested and contested repeatedly, and intra-party
democracy has been promoted to a certain extent in some political parties, the
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oligarchical tendencies of party organization remain the same as 100 years ago.
Even after great progress toward democracy was made during the 1980s in East
Asia, the development of truly democratic procedures within the parties is obviously
not being encouraged (Sachsenroder 1998, pp. 18–19).
While more emphasis has been placed on multiparty competition and less to
intra-party democracy in many foreign countries all around the world (Mair 1990,
pp. 20–22), intra-party democracy has been sought and emphasized as an important
strategy of political democratization in China for the following reasons:
First, intra-party democracy has been developed as an experiment alongside
single-party democracy. The CCP is the sole ruling party and has zero tolerance for
organized opposition outside the party, although there are eight so-called
‘‘democratic parties’’ as satellite parties in China. Therefore, western style
democracy as characterized by multiparty competition has been strongly rejected
by Chinese communist leaders. After the adoption of multiparty democracy was
ruled out, the possibility of single-party democracy has been explained and explored
in China. For example, Wang Huning, former professor of political science and now
a top Communist leader, discussed the relations between the Communist leadership
and democratic politics in the early 1990s and argued that single-party democracy
would be totally different from western style democracy, as its basic principles,
procedures and norms must be studied and developed by ourselves, it would include
many aspects such as social democracy, intra-party democracy, political democracy,
party-state relations, party-society relations, and so on (Wang 1993). Obviously,
intra-party democracy is indispensable to single-party democracy.
Second, intra-party democracy has been sought as an integral part of global
democratization. As democracy has spread, more and more people in most countries
have come to accept democracy as the only legitimate form of government. Just as
Samuel Huntington puts it, ‘‘A world democratic ethos came into being; even those
whose actions were clearly antidemocratic often justified their actions by
democratic values’’ (Huntington 1991, p. 47). Since the open-door policy was
implemented from the late 1970s, there have been increasing exchanges with the
outside world. As a result, it is much more difficult for the CCP to resist the global
wave of democratization. Moreover, as a so-called representative of the most
advanced culture, the CCP has to keep up with the contemporary wave of global
democratization. Ouyang (2011, p. 65), the master mouthpiece of the party-building
project, analyzed the importance of intra-party democratic development and argued
that it was imperative to consciously study the general trend of global democra-
tization, review intra-party democratic situations, raise high the flag of democracy,
and promote the theoretical, practical, and institutional innovations of intra-party
democratic development with great effort. While the CCP has improved its
legitimacy based on its economic performance during the past decades, it has sought
to gain the support of the masses by introducing democratic procedures and
responding to public preferences.
Third, intra-party democracy has been emphasized as an effective way to govern
the mammoth organization of the CCP. According to official statistics, at the end of
2012, the CCP is a political body with a huge membership of more than 85 million,
with 4.2 million cells at the grassroots level, and party organizations have been
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established at 7,245 urban streets, in 33 thousand townships, 87,000 urban
communities (neighborhood) and 588,000 administrative villages (Xinhua 2013).
The whole body of the CCP is organized under the constitutional principle of
democratic centralism. Considering the over-concentration of power in party leaders
and its negative influences on public policy and political life during the Maoist
years, intra-party democracy has been repeatedly emphasized after Mao’s death in
order to encourage party members’ participation in party affairs and overcome
problems such as personality cults and dictatorship.
Fourth, intra-party democracy has been utilized as a means of alleviating public
discontent, strengthening intra-party supervision, fighting against corruption, and
maintaining social order and political stability. Since the CCP is the sole ruling
party and many party leaders assume important government positions at all levels,
the CCP and its leaders have great power to intervene in economic and social
affairs. If there is no intra-party democracy and intra-party supervision, political
power will easily be abused for personal gain and social justice will necessarily be
distorted so as to cause public discontent. Intra-party democracy has usually been
promoted as the mechanism of checks and balances, the fundamental measure to
contain widespread corruption and an instrument to protect the human rights of
party members within the CCP.
3 Developments of Intra-party Democracy
The CCP was founded in 1921 as a revolutionary and progressive force struggling
for democracy and against autocracy. At its 2nd Congress in 1922, the CCP
established the goal of China’s revolution as follows: ‘‘unifying China proper
(including Manchuria) into a real democratic republic’’ and ‘‘Mongolia, Tibet and
Xinjiang can exercise the power of ethnic autonomy and become democratic
autonomous regions’’ (Chen 1991, pp. 55–56). It would be a democratic revolution
against imperialism and feudalism. During the following revolutionary period,
while the CCP carried out its political and military struggle against all dictatorships
and suppressions, the Party experimented with all kinds of democratic government
and democratic life under its leadership. For example, the CCP carried the banner
for democracy, established democratic government in Yan’an and attracted much
attention at home and abroad. The democratic government was based on a special
institutional arrangement in which any administrative organs or legislative organs
consisted of three different political forces, the Communist members, the
progressive forces, and the moderate forces, with each occupying one-thirds
positions, and sometimes with the Communists occupying less than one-thirds. This
was the famous three–three-structural (San San Zhi) democratic government under
Communist leadership during the Anti-Japanese War period. It was totally different
from the Nationalist Party dictatorship at that time (Deng 1994a, pp. 8–9).
However, after the CCP defeated the Nationalist Party government in the civil
war and ascended to power in 1949, it revised its democratic program and began to
emphasize proletariat dictatorship under Communist leadership. For example, Liu
Shaoqi, one of the PRC founding fathers, emphasized democracy only as a
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revolutionary slogan for political mobilization and then pointed out bluntly in 1951:
‘‘When talking about elections, some people often recall the old slogan ‘general,
equal, direct, and secret voting’. No doubt, under the past counterrevolutionary
dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek, it is progressive and significant for us to raise this
propaganda slogan against Chiang Kai-shek’s despotic rule. However, under the
new democratic leadership, if this slogan is put into practice immediately, it is not
suitable to the present conditions of Chinese people, and consequentially it is not
acceptable’’ (Liu 1985, pp. 54–55). Thereafter, the CCP made great efforts to
consolidate its ruling power and established a party-state, which gradually
degenerated into Mao Zedong’s personal dictatorship during the Cultural Revolution
(1966–1976). Mao as the founding father of Communist China took advantage of his
prestige and power to rise above the Communist party and state. After he launched
the Cultural Revolution, many of his revolutionary comrades and colleagues were
compelled to submit to self-criticism and were even put into prison without trial,
while most Communist committees and governmental agencies had been disman-
tled. As Harry Harding said, ‘‘No one in China, save Mao Zedong himself, was to be
exempt from criticism, and the methods of criticism could be harsh indeed’’
(Harding 1997, p. 189). During the Cultural Revolution, many communist leaders
were subjected to criticism, sent to labor camps and put into prison just because they
allegedly opposed Mao Zedong. The most famous case was Liu Shaoqi, the former
President of China who was criticized and abused to death in 1969.
After the death of Mao Zedong and the end of the Cultural Revolution, the
second communist leadership group with Deng Xiaoping as its core sought to
drastically reform China’s economic and political systems, because Chinese were
ashamed and chagrined by the fact that Maoist socialism had produced only meager
results in the preceding 30 years in comparison with the other nations of East Asia.
Deng Xiaoping, who was criticized twice during the early and late Cultural
Revolution, and took over as China’s supreme leader in 1978, publicly declared his
commitment to accelerating the long-delayed process of political institutionalization
and democratization in China. In a landmark speech entitled ‘‘On the Reform of the
System of Party and State Leadership’’ (Deng 1994b, pp. 320–343), Deng called for
political reforms which aimed at the democratization of political and social lives
and the establishment of a system governed by rules, clear lines of authority, and
collective decision-making institutions to replace the over-concentration of power
and patriarchal rule that had characterized China under the personal dictatorship of
Mao Zedong. By drawing lessons from the tragic and disastrous Cultural
Revolution, the CCP under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping began to promote
unswerving political reforms, implement fully the principles of democratic
centralism and collective leadership, and oppose firmly all forms of personality
cult and personal dictatorship in order to avoid the resurgence of Maoist
dictatorship. Furthermore, CCP leaders resolved to abandon the Maoist practices
of ‘‘class struggle’’, ‘‘rightful rebellion’’, and so-called ‘‘grand democracy’’, and
promote the institutionalization of socialist democracy and legality (Zhonggong
Zhongyang Dangshi Yanjiushi 2011, pp. 979–980).
Since the late 1970s when reform and opening policies were adopted, the CCP
have attached great importance and paid much attention to its party-building,
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emphasized repeatedly the expansion of intra-party democracy and explored many
new forms of intra-party democracy during the past several decades. As early as in
February 1980, ‘‘Some Rules on Intra-Party Political Life’’ was discussed and
adopted at the Fifth Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP.
According to the Rules, the collective decision-making system must be upheld and
any personal dictatorship prohibited; intra-party democracy must be developed and
different opinions correctly and fairly treated; the human and political rights of
party members must be protected and cannot be violated; intra-party elections must
be free, and fully reflect the will of voters. As an obvious reaction to the
undemocratic practices and activities during the Cultural Revolution, the Rules
aimed at restoring intra-party democratic life and providing an institutional
guarantee for it (Lin 2010, p. 99). From then on, almost every Central Committee
has held its plenary session on party-building and adopted some kind of special
resolution based on the current situations of the CCP. For instance, after Jiang
Zemin was suddenly designated as General Secretary and his power was
consolidated step by step, the Fourth Plenum of the Fourteenth Central Committee
convened in Beijing on September 25–28, 1994, focusing on the issue of party-
building. The plenum adopted the ‘‘Decision on Some Major Issues on Strength-
ening Party Building’’, which on the one hand excoriated negative trends such as
corruption and weakness of grassroots party organizations and, on the other hand,
urged renewed attention to democratic centralism. While the plenum stressed
central authority, as the decision put it, ‘‘there must be a firm central leading body,
and there must be a leading core in this leading group’’, the CCP declared that
democratic centralism and ‘‘system construction’’ were necessary so that the Party’s
policies ‘‘will not change with a change in leaders or with a change in their ideas
and their focus of attention.’’ Moreover, the plenum decision called for intra-party
democracy, declaring that ‘‘if there is no democracy, there will be no socialism, nor
socialist modernization’’ (Fewsmith 2008, pp. 169–171). In his political report to the
15th CCP National Congress, Jiang Zemin devoted considerable space to political
and legal reforms, and used the word ‘‘democracy’’ some 32 times; more
importantly, he used for the first time the term ‘‘rule of law’’ instead of the standard
formula ‘‘rule by law’’ in the CCP official documents.
At the 16th CCP National Congress in early November 2002, Hu Jintao
succeeded Jiang as head of the CCP and the highest power transfer was the most
peaceful in CCP history. The Fourth Plenum of the 16th Central Committee met
from September 16–19, 2004, and endorsed a resolution on strengthening the
Party’s ability to govern. The resolution discussed party-building in its final section
and stated that it was important to ‘‘deepen reform of the cadre and personnel
systems’’ by promoting such mechanisms as ‘‘democratic recommendation,
democratic assessment, multi-candidate examination, public announcement before
appointment, open selection, and competition for posts, and voting by the entire
Party committee.’’ ‘‘Developing intra-party democracy is an important part of
political structural reform and political civilization construction’’ (Benshubianxiezu
2004, pp. 31–37). 5 years later, when the CCP celebrated its sixtieth anniversary as
the ruling party in China, the Fourth Plenum of the 17th Central Committee
convened in Beijing from September 15–18, 2009, and adopted the ‘‘Resolution on
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Some Major Issues on Strengthening and Improving Party Building under the New
Circumstances.’’ Although the Resolution reemphasized the importance of demo-
cratic centralism, it paid special attention to actively developing intra-party
democracy. While intra-party democracy was sought just like the Party’s continued
life, many institutions were designed and arranged in order to protect the basic
rights of party members and strengthen the grassroots democracy of the CCP (Liu
2010, pp. 71–72).
In the time since intra-party democracy was actively sought from the late 1970s,
many experiments have been conducted at all levels and great achievements have
been made. The progress toward intra-party democracy can be outlined as follows:
First, experiments with a permanent system of party congresses were conducted.
According to the Party constitution, the National Congress and the Central
Committee produced by the Party Congress are the highest leadership organs within
the CCP. Party Congresses were established in various party organizations above
the county level. The Congress is held once every 5 years. When the Congress is in
session, it usually performs its function as the leading organ; during recess, the party
committee at all levels performs this function. Therefore, the representatives of
party congresses at all levels can play their roles only when the Congresses are in
session. When the Congresses are closed, the duty of Party representatives is
finished. This is to say, during recess, the Party Congress cannot exercise its
influence and the Party representatives cannot play their roles. It can even be said
that they do not exist at all. In order to perform the functions of the Party Congresses
and their representatives, it was obvious that a permanent system (Changrenzhi,
standing system or tenure system) of the party congresses must be established so as
to develop intra-party democracy. Through long-term discussions and debates, the
16th CCP National Congress finally endorsed the proposal that local party
congresses should be in session more regularly, instead of meeting only once every
5 years, on an experimental basis. The 17th National Congress decided to expand
the experiment with the permanent system of party congress. As Hu Jintao said in
the political report to the 17th National Congress, we must concentrate on
‘‘perfecting the system of party congress, implement the tenure system of party
representative, and choose some counties (cities and districts) to conduct
experiment with the permanent system of party congress.’’ During the past decades,
many experiments have been conducted all over the country.
For example, Jiaojiang District of Taizhou Municipality in Zhejiang Province has
made great achievements and shown typical significance in conducting experiments
with the permanent system of its party congress. In December 1988, the Jiaojiang
Third Congress of the CCP started the experiment with a permanent system of party
congress with the approval of the Provincial Communist Party Committee and the
consent of the Organization Department of the CCP. In January 1993, Jiaojiang
expanded the experiment with the permanent system of party congress in towns and
neighborhoods. Since 2003, the permanent system of party congress has introduced
into some Communist party organization in urban communities and non-public
enterprises. Jiaojiang District has played a leading role for about 20 years in the
experiment with the permanent system of party congress and attracted much
attention from all around China. The experiment with a permanent system of party
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congress consists of four parts: the tenure system of party representatives, the annual
session of party congresses, the member system of the local party committee, and
the decision-making system of appointing and removing cadres by a vote of the
party committee. According to one study, the Jiaojiang experiment with the
permanent system of party congress is an important institutional innovation toward
developing intra-party democracy. It has further improved the system of party
congress, and made the party congress (annual session) the true highest leading
organ, decision-making organ, and supervisory organ of the party organization at
the same level, and provided the institutional platform to guarantee and realize the
democratic rights of party members (Liu 2011a, pp. 92–99).
Second, democratization of candidate and leadership selection has been
promoted. The process of recruitment to elected and appointed offices is widely
regarded as one classic function of political parties, with potential consequences due
to the degree of intra-party conflict and democracy (Norris 2006, p. 89). In most
modern representative democracies, there have been obvious trends during the last
decades in the direction of greater democratization of candidate and leadership
selection. The controlling role of an exclusive selectorate diminishes so that more
people—i.e. a more inclusive selectorate—have a direct say in who is selected and,
hence, how they are represented. American political parties have been among the
most innovative in inventing new ways to democratize party nominations.
Nowadays the primaries play the major role in the nomination process of
presidential candidates. For example, when Bill Clinton won the democratic
presidential nomination, no fewer than 35 states held primaries. British political
parties have also promoted democratization of leadership selection by introducing
new rules during the past years. For example, when British Conservatives chose
William Hague as their new leader in 1997, the selectorate which made that decision
consisted solely of the 165 Conservative Members of Parliament. However, a new
constitution adopted by the party provides that the final two leadership candidates
are submitted to mass party membership in a postal ballot. In 1980, the Labor Party,
which like the Conservatives had long allowed the party caucus to select their
leader, adopted an ‘‘electoral college’’ formula in which the parliamentary caucus,
the constituency associations and the affiliated trade unions would each hold one-
third of the votes required to elect the party leader (LeDuc 2001, pp. 324–325).
Since the CCP is the sole ruling party which controls most important official and
public positions in the Communist Party-State, the democratization of candidate and
leadership selection is of vital political significance. The reform of cadre selection
and appointment has been placed on the political agenda and many specific
measures have been taken in order to promote the democratization of candidate and
leadership selection.
For a long time, the leadership selection of the CCP has been criticized as ‘‘one
has a final say (Yiyantang)’’ by many people at home and abroad. As Susan Shirk
put it, comparing Communist China with Western democracies, ‘‘the leadership
selection process is less transparent, and the formal rules for selection are not
always followed’’ (Shirk 1993, p. 70). In order to develop intra-party democracy,
CCP leaders have called for more political reforms and more competitive intra-party
elections to select party leaders and government officials. For example, the
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Resolution on Party-building adopted at the Fourth Plenum of the 17th Central
Committee provides that the Party should ‘‘improve intra-party electoral methods,
regulate electoral procedures, and voting formats, cultivate new ways to introduce
candidates, and gradually expand the scope of direct elections.’’ In fact, since the
early 1980s, the CCP has adopted a method of multi-candidate election known as a
‘‘more candidates for seats election (Cha’e Xuanju)’’ instead of the equal-candidate
election (Deng’e Xuanju). From then on, the multi-candidate elections have been
expanded and implemented at all levels of party organizations. At the 16th Party
Congress in 2002, there were 208 candidates for the 198 full membership seats and
167 candidates for the 158 alternate membership seats in the Central Committee, 5.1
and 5.7 % more than the fixed seats, respectively (Chen and Shu 2003, p. 623). At
the 17th Party Congress in 2007, the representatives voted to elect 204 full members
from the total number of 221 candidates (8.3 % more), and 167 alternate members
from the total number of 183 candidates (9.6 % more) to the 17th Central
Committee (Xinhua 2007; Bergsten et al. 2009, p. 63). At the 18th Party Congress in
2012, 205 full members of the CCP Central Committee were elected from the total
224 candidates (9.3 % more), and 171 alternate members from 190 candidates
(11.1 %) (Xinhua 2012).
While the scope of multi-candidate elections are being expanded and the direct
election of party secretaries and members of township party committees is
introduced in many places, Jiangsu and Sichuan provinces have conducted
successful experiments and attracted much attention from top leaders and mass
media. A new method of ‘‘publicly recommending and directly electing (Gongtui
Zhixuan)’’ has been adopted widely and highly lauded in China. Jiangsu province,
particularly its capital, Nanjing, was an experimental area for multi-candidate and
direct elections in 2002–2007 under the leadership of then Jiangsu Party secretary Li
Yuanchao. Therefore, Jiangsu province has taken a lead in the experiment with
direct election of township party secretaries and members of party organizations, the
Provincial Party Committee has chosen each county from North Jiangsu, Middle
Jiangsu, and South Jiangsu to conduct this experiment, and the direct elections have
been implemented in more than one hundred township party organizations (Ouyang
2011, p. 275). In Pingchang County, Sichuan Province, the first experiment with
direct election of township party leaders was conducted in Lingshan Township in
2001. On this experimental basis, direct elections were expanded and implemented
in 2004 in 9 Townships of Pingchang County, with 9 party secretaries, 28 deputy-
party secretaries and 81 members of township party committees directly elected
based on public recommendation and open nomination. From late 2004 to early
2005, direct elections were carried out in 490 rural village and urban neighborhood
party organizations. China’s official Xinhua News Agency called it ‘‘the first large-
scale experiment with direct election in the CCP history, and also most advanced
and broadest experiment with direct election in Sichuan Province’’ (Wang 2007,
p. 17).
Third, participation in decision-making processes has been increased. One of the
ways to assess the degree of intra-party democracy in a political party is to ask who
dominates the decision-making process. In the most inclusive of parties, individual
party members may be asked to vote on specific policy positions. More usually,
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parties tend to choose less inclusive options in their policy deliberation process. In
the CCP history, only a few party leaders have dominated the decision-making
process for a long time and even personal dictatorship prevailed over collective
leadership during the Cultural Revolution. As Deng Xiaoping pointed out frankly,
‘‘The over-concentration of power is that all powers have been concentrated in the
party committee, and more usually the powers of party committee concentrated in
the hands of several party secretaries, especially the first secretary with the slogan
‘‘strengthening Party’s unified leadership’’; everything must be decided by the first
secretary himself; Party’s unified leadership tends to degenerate into personal
dictatorship’’ (Deng 1994b, pp. 328–329). Since the early 1980s, much emphasis
has been placed on collective leadership and public participation in decision-making
processes. While the experiments with the permanent system of party congresses
have been expanded and the central role of the party committee has been
emphasized in the decision-making process, the rule of ‘‘decision by votes (piaojue
zhi)’’ has been adopted widely at all levels in order to strengthen collective
leadership. According to the Resolution adopted at the Fourth Plenum of the 17th
Central Committee, all major decisions regarding socioeconomic policies, large
construction projects, financial expenditures, and important personnel appointments
should be made via a ‘‘decision by votes’’ during a meeting of the Party committee
(quanwei hui) or executive committee (changwei hui) rather than at the whim of the
party secretary, so as to perfect the intra-party democratic decision-making
mechanism. As the forerunner of intra-party democracy, Jiaojiang District Party
Committee in Zhejiang Province has carried out the rule of ‘‘decision by votes’’
since 1988, which stipulates that two-thirds of a party committee’s members should
be present at the meeting and decisions should be made by votes based on thorough
deliberation; one member has one vote which must be cast secretly; and a candidate
for appointment must receive at least half of the votes in order to be confirmed.
Afterward, the rule of ‘‘decision by votes’’ has been emulated by many other areas
and become a common practice (Zheng 2005, pp. 291–294).
At the same time, the CCP leadership has constantly sought consultations from
research institutes, think tanks, other democratic political parties, social groups, and
public hearings so as to enhance scientific, democratic, and legal decision-making.
In February 2005, the CCP Central Committee issued the important document
‘‘Opinions of the CCP Central Committee on Further Strengthening the Building of
the System of Multi-Party Cooperation and Consultation under the Leadership of
the CCP,’’ encouraging more active participation in policy deliberation and decision
making processes by the members of the eight non-Communist ‘‘democratic
parties’’ and the CPPCC. As a result of this new initiative, CCP leaders have
consulted more closely with these noncommunist parties and submitted major
policy programs to the CPPCC for feedback before adoption. The members of the
CPPCC are more involved in the public policy-making process by being shown
drafts of various policy initiatives, party, and government documents, and being
asked for various feedback on them. At the local level, CCP leaders have decided to
expose party committees to input and criticism from local citizens and encourage
intra-party criticism of policies (Shambaugh 2008, pp. 137–139).
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Fourth, transparency in Party affairs has been improved. CCP politics has been
described as a ‘‘black box’’ operation and ‘‘back door’’ dealing and decision-making
in the CCP has remained shrouded in secrecy for a long time. However, along with
the opening up of Chinese society and rise of internet politics, the CCP leaders are
confronted with the increasing expectations of party members for transparency of
party affairs. In order to respond to these new situations and guarantee the basic right
to know about party affairs, various concrete measures have been implemented so as
to improve transparency in party affairs during the past several years. After the
Tiananmen demonstration for democratization in 1989, and especially the SARS
incidents in 2003, the demand for transparency in politics has been made repeatedly
by the public and has been met piecemeal by the Communist party and government.
For instance, ‘‘Regulations on Opening Government Information (draft)’’ had been
prepared from 2002 by The Office of Information Affairs of the Central Government
and submitted for deliberation. The ‘‘Regulations’’ passed at the 165th meeting of the
State Council went into effect from May 1, 2008 (Cheng 2009, p. 156). Since the
CCP dominates the policy-making process and controls most crucial information, it
is naturally imperative to open party organization and party affairs to its members
and general public. The Resolutions on party building adopted at the Fourth Plenum
of the 17th Central Committee in 2009 provide that the Party should improve
transparency in party affairs, perfect the system of intra-party communication, open
intra-party information, and foster the smooth flow of information within the party
organization at all levels. In September 2010, ‘‘Regulations on Opening Party Affairs
at the Grassroots Organizations of the CCP’’ was issued as an important step to
develop intra-party democracy (Renmin Ribao 2010). The Regulations stipulate that
all grassroots organizations of the CCP should open the information on the party
organization’s decision and its implementation, ideological building, organizational
management, leadership building, cadre selection and appointment, party member’s
right protection, and discipline enforcement. These works have been carried out all
over the country smoothly and successfully. All townships and 95 % of villages in
Anhui Province have opened the party affairs as required by the Regulations. 97 % of
villages in Sichuan Province have finished the same job. Many specific ways and
methods to improve transparency in party affairs of grassroots organizations have
been created in Shanxi, Guangdong, Ningxia, Jiangxi, and other provinces/
prefectures (Ouyang 2011, p. 273).
Among many new ways to improve transparency in party affairs, the news
spokesperson system is the latest bright spot in China. The Resolution on party
building adopted at the Fourth Plenum of the 17th Central Committee provides that
the news spokesperson system should be established in party committees at all
levels. Since then, the news spokesperson system has been set up one after another
at local party committees. On December 29, 2009, 117 spokespersons from the party
committees at Nanjing and its districts, counties, departments, and commissions
appeared before the public and held the first press conference, marking the formal
start of the news spokesperson system in Nanjing. On June 30, 2010, 11
spokespersons from the party committees at the CCP central departments and
commissions held a vivid meeting with Chinese and foreign journalists. Now, the
news spokesperson system has already been established in 11 central party
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organizations, such as the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, Organi-
zation Department, Publicity Department, United Front Department, Foreign
Liaison Department, Office for Taiwan Affairs, Office for Foreign Publicity,
Central Party School, Research Institute for the CCP Documents, Research Institute
for the CCP History, and Center for the CCP Archives (Liu 2011b, pp. 69–71). This
system is expected to contribute to greater transparency in party affairs.
4 Limitations of Intra-party Democracy
As analyzed above, several documents on party building have been made and issued
as the guiding principles for developing intra-party democracy and many concrete
measures taken as specific steps to improve intra-party governance. All these efforts
have produced some positive results and promoted intra-party democratic devel-
opment to a certain extent. However, these achievements are limited and
unbalanced, and more new problems may be brought about if current political
reforms for intra-party democracy continue in the special political context of the
Communist party-state. The major limitations of intra-party democracy can be
analyzed as follows:
First, the institutionalization of leadership transition is limited. In order to
prevent any possible recurrence of Maoist dictatorship especially during the period
of the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping and his colleagues have made great
efforts to promote the institutionalization of elite politics and leadership transition
within the CCP. As a rule, party congresses and the Central Committee Plenum
should convene as stipulated in the party’s constitution. Under Mao’s leadership,
these bodies met only sporadically after 1959, in spite of that the party constitution
adopted in 1956 stipulates that party congresses convene every 5 years and plenums
convene twice a year. In contrast with the irregularities of Mao’s period, under
Deng’s leadership, these bodies have met regularly on the schedule prescribed by
the 1982 party constitution which calls for party congresses every 5 years and
Central Committee Plenums at least once every year. Following this rule of game,
party congresses have convened in 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, and 2012,
and Central Committee Plenums every year. At the same pace, the central
leadership has shifted from Deng to Jiang and to Hu and to Xi. According to Jing
Huang, the Jiang-Hu transition reflects a new norm in China’s political processes:
the ‘‘hierarchical game’’ of life and death struggles dominated by Mao Zedong, and
Deng Xiaoping has been transformed into a more formal ‘‘game of competitive
coexistence,’’ with the emphasis on compromise making and consensus building.
There must be broader participation in the process of leadership selection because of
prolonged consultations and compromises among the ruling elites at both the center
and at the ministerial and provincial levels. This would help promote elite
democracy, or intra-party democracy (Huang 2008, pp. 80–93).
However, a close examination into the details of leadership transition has
indicated that there are always irregularities and exceptions to the communist rule of
game. For example, Deng Xiaoping had made the final decisions on many major
issues even after he retired and did not hold formal position in the supreme decision-
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making body, the Standing Committee of the Central Committee of the CCP. This
allowed him to remove Zhao Ziyang, the then General Secretary of the CCP from
his post, and hand-pick Jiang Zemin from Shanghai as his successor. As Zhao
Ziyang himself reported later, the First Plenum of the 13th Central Committee had
made a decision that the Standing Committee should seek Deng’s advice and Deng
could convene a meeting at home and made final decisions on all major issues (Zhao
2009, p. 66). Although the Jiang-Hu transition was hailed as a great success in terms
of peaceful transfer of power, there were two important institutional changes which
were widely regarded as violations of rules. One was that the members of the
Standing Committee of the CCP had been increased from 7 to 9, allowing two more
of Jiang’s prote
´ge
´s into the supreme body. Another was that Jiang continued to
serve as the Chairman of the Central Military Commission until 2004–2005,
following the precedents established by Deng Xiaoping. Moreover, several
surprising downfalls of politburo members have been discussed as the results of
factional politics within the CCP obviously because there are not clear and formal
rules of game for candidate and leadership selection. For instance, there were the
Chen Xitong case under Jiang’s leadership before the 15th Party Congress and the
Chen Liangyu case under Hu’s leadership before the 17th Party Congress. Both of
them were strong competitors for being members in the supreme Standing
Committee, but toppled down in the race to the highest position.
Second, the experiment with the permanent system of party congress is limited.
The party congress is the highest leading body at the same level as stipulated in the
party’s constitution and the experiment with the permanent system of party congress
is widely regarded as a progress toward intra-party democracy. However, the
permanent system of party congress failed to work well and was finally abandoned
in CCP history. Indeed, during the early period after the founding of the CCP, the
party congress convened almost every year and contributed very much to policy
making and leadership changes. But during the long history of military struggle,
severe conditions and serious pressures did not allow the CCP to hold its party
congresses regularly. After Soviet Communist leaders criticized Stalin at the 20th
Party Congress for his dictatorship and his failure to convene party congresses
regularly according to the party’s constitution, CCP leaders decided to restore and
reestablish the permanent system of party congress in 1956. As Deng Xiaoping
reported at the 8th Party Congress, ‘‘The biggest merit of the permanent system of
party congress is that party congress can become the fully effective highest
decision-making and supervision body in the CCP, those results cannot be produced
by the old party congress which only convenes once several years and whose
representatives are reelected every time. According to this new system, all the most
important decisions can be discussed by party congress.’’ Therefore, ‘‘we believe
that this reform can make a major contribution to intra-party democracy’’ (Deng
1994b, p. 233). Unfortunately, this reform could not be implemented because of the
class struggle and mass movement in which many party representatives were
criticized and even sent to labor camps and prison. As a result, the 8th Party
Congresses convened only twice in 1956 and 1958 according to the 1956 Party’s
constitution, and the 9th Party Congress was held in 1969, 13 years after the 8th
Party Congress.
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Considering the irregularities and serious violations of rules in the party’s
political life, the permanent system of party congress was discussed again before the
12th Party Congress where a new version of the Party Constitution would be
deliberated and adopted. Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang, a
deliberation council on Party’s constitutional amendments was created and Hu
Qiaomu was in charge of its works. From late 1979 to the middle of 1982, many
conferences had been organized and researches conducted in order to solicit advice
and ideas from party organizations at all levels and party members of different
backgrounds. As the result of discussions and deliberations over the Party’s
constitutional revision, the proposal for restoring a permanent system of party
congress was not adopted by the 1982 Party Constitution. Hu Qiaomu explained the
reasons for this decision as follows: The permanent system of party congress
stipulated in the 1956 Party Constitution is very difficult to implement in practice
and there had been only First and Second Sessions of the 8th Party Congress during
the past years; the party congress is different to a great extent from the People’s
Congress, because the latter must convene and discuss many major issues every
year, but the former’s main task is to make basic policies and guidelines and
produce stable leadership for the party during a certain period in the future, and so it
is unnecessary and impossible to convene the party congress every year; if the
permanent system of party congress and tenure system of party representatives are
adopted, it is very difficult to define the rights and obligations, power, and
responsibilities of party representatives and their relations to party committees at the
same level, if not, this system would make the works of party committee
unnecessarily more complex. Afterward, the debates continued and Hu Qiaomu’s
points of view have been challenged and confuted by some scholars as intra-party
democracy has been emphasized by the CCP leaders (Guo 1998, p. 166; Gao 2006,
pp. 189–190). The fundamental dilemma for the experiment with the permanent
system of party congress and tenure system of party representatives lies in the
political structure of the Communist party-state.
Third, the competitive election is limited. The competitive multi-party elections
following legal procedures are universally regarded as an essential institution of any
democratic state, necessary but not in themselves sufficient for citizens to exercise
power over their leaders. This is usually called the minimal definition of democracy
(LeDuc et al. 2010, p. 6). Since Communist leadership is upheld as a cardinal
principle, competitive multi-candidate elections have been emphasized and
implemented from the early 1980s in order to develop intra-party democracy. As
Wei Hu argues, ‘‘the only possible model of democratic development in China is to
promote intra-party democracy within the CCP; and strengthen intra-party
competition instead of inter-party or multi-party competition’’ (Hu 2011, p. 11).
Although multi-candidate elections and direct elections are adopted on the
experimental basis, it is not clear whether these experiments will be expanded to
party organizations at all levels, and whether the electoral competition will be
permitted at the higher level, such as in the provincial and central party
organizations.
Furthermore, there are different and even opposite understandings of intra-party
democracy in China. For example, by strictly defining intra-party democracy as a
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system in which every party member and party organization has the basic right and
obligation to participate in, decide, and manage party affairs as stipulated in the
Party’s constitution, Yicheng Wang denounced and dismissed a lot of wrong ideas
and opinions on intra-party democracy, for example, the proposal for establishing an
intra-party mechanism and system to allow lawful competition between different
factions within the CCP (Wang 2010, pp. 129–130). Comparative studies of intra-
party democracy have indicated that moderate forms of democratization can have
beneficial effects on party organizations, such as higher levels of membership
participation, but radical forms are more likely to distort party cohesiveness, and
consequently weaken the quality of democracy (Pennings and Hazan 2001, p. 267).
For the CCP, if real competitive multi-candidate elections are widely implemented
in party organizations at all levels and especially if direct elections are expanded to
more areas and higher levels, many factions must emerge and finally split the party.
But this horrible prospect will not be tolerated by CCP leaders. Therefore, in the
near future, electoral procedures may be improved and more multi-candidate
elections conducted, but direct elections will be limited to the grassroots level and
electoral competition controlled to a low level.
5 Implications for China’s Democratic Future
Since CCP leaders emphasize intra-party democracy first as a effective way to
prevent the recurrence of the Cultural Revolution and then sought it as a new
method to govern party organizations and fight against rampant corruption, many
important measures have been taken and great progress achieved during the past
three decades, especially during the 21st century after Hu Jintao ascended to
supreme power. Although the growth of intra-party democracy is limited, great
efforts and achievements have profound implications for China’s democratic future.
First, the growth of intra-party democracy has contributed to better governance
within the CCP and helped protect the basic rights of party members, especially in
comparison with the 1950–1970s. Since the CCP has been playing a dominant role
in the political structure of the party-state in China and its membership is larger than
the general population of most foreign countries, governing the Party is not only a
crucial and central work for CCP leaders, but also a tough task and great challenge
for them. Therefore, party-building has always been on the agenda for every Central
Committee of the CCP from the early 1980s. After intra-party democracy was
established as an important goal and integral part of party-building, many concrete
measures have been taken in order to prevent personal dictatorship, and protect the
basic rights of common Communist members. The developments of intra-party
democracy are expected to play an important role in the CCP’s efforts against abuse
of power and political corruption.
Second, the growth of intra-party democracy has made contributions to a more
democratic and scientific decision-making process within the CCP, which has led
directly to China’s rapid development and emergence as a big power. In stark
contrast to the disastrous consequences of the Great Leap Forward and Cultural
Revolution under Mao’s personal dictatorship, many far-reaching strategies and
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policies have been made during the reform period under the collective leadership
based on more participation by all different kind of actors such as scholars,
entrepreneurs, journalists, and even ordinary citizens. This democratic and scientific
policy-making process has laid solid foundations for China’s peaceful rise.
Third, the developments of intra-party democracy have provided many experi-
ences and lessons for expanding people’s democracy. Since the CCP is the sole
ruling party with a huge organizational network at all levels in China, the expansion
of intra-party democracy will play a leading role and exercise a demonstrative effect
on people’s democracy. Democracy is the fundamental goal of political reform and
political development in China. Considering the low level of development and
complex nature of Chinese society, we must develop democracy in China
piecemeal, in a gradual way under the leadership of the CCP. The experiments
with intra-party democracy will give some clues on how to develop Chinese-style
democracy.
Fourth, the intra-party democratic life helps foster democratic political cultures
within the CCP and among Chinese people. China is a country with a long history of
civilization but without a democratic cultural tradition. It is important and
imperative for China to introduce some democratic practices in order to nurture
democratic culture both at the grass-root level and the elite level. Political
experience with democracy has a sizable independent effect on political attitudes
and values, often overpowering the national level of socioeconomic development,
individual socioeconomic status, and the regime’s economic performance (Diamond
1999, p. 162). The expansion of intra-party democracy can provide CCP members
and leaders with such kind of political experience with democracy.
Fifth, the developments of intra-party democracy will help improve the image of
the CCP and China as a whole. Since democratization became a global wave, China
under one-party rule has consistently been criticized by foreign political leaders and
mass media as standing at the opposite side of history. The substantial progress
toward intra-party democracy will not only effectively respond to foreign pressure,
but also greatly improve the image of the CCP as a ruling party and democratic
organization. At the same time, it will help China acquire a new status as an
important member in the international community and lift China’s soft power to an
unprecedented level.
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Dingping Guo is a Professor of Political Science in the School of International Relations and Public
Affairs, Fudan University, now concurrently serving as Chinese Director of the Confucius Institute at the
University of Nottingham, UK. He holds one PhD from Fudan University (1999) and another PhD from
Tokyo University (2002). His research focuses on comparative politics in East Asia.
The Growth of Intra-party Democracy and Its Implications
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Author's personal copy
