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Evangelicals in the Post-Reagan Era: An Analysis of Evangelical Voters in the 1988 Presidential Election

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The 1980s was an important period of time in the political life of American evangelicals. While evangelicals entered the decade as relatively apolitical citizens (Wuthnow 1983) with predominantly Democratic partisan orientations (Hunter 1983), both of these political traits appeared to be changing during Reagan's tenure in office. Since these changes were closely tied to the presidential candidacies of Ronald Reagan, it was unclear what would happen once he was absent from the ticket. This research note examines evangelical involvement in the 1988 general election in comparison to the 1980 and 1984 presidential elections. In so doing, it seeks to ascertain whether the recent changes among evangelicals are likely to become permanent features of the political landscape.
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Evangelicals in the Post-Reagan Era: An Analysis of Evangelical Voters in the 1988
Presidential Election
Author(s): Corwin Smidt and Paul Kellstedt
Source:
Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion,
Vol. 31, No. 3 (Sep., 1992), pp. 330-
338
Published by: Wiley on behalf of Society for the Scientific Study of Religion
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Research Note
Evangelicals in the Post-Reagan Era:
An Analysis of Evangelical Voters in
the 1988 Presidential Election
CORWIN SMIDT*
PAUL KELLSTEDT*
The 1980s was an important period of time in the political life of American evangelicals. While
evangelicals entered the decade as relatively apolitical citizens (Wuthnow 1983) with predominantly
Democratic partisan orientations (Hunter 1983), both of these political traits appeared to be changing
during Reagan's tenure in office. Since these changes were closely tied to the presidential candidacies
of Ronald Reagan, it was unclear what would happen once he was absent from the ticket. This research
note examines evangelical involvement in the 1988 general election in comparison to the 1980 and
1984 presidential elections. In so doing, it seeks to ascertain whether the recent changes among
evangelicals are likely to become permanent features of the political landscape.
EVANGELICALS AND THE 1988 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
Prior to the 1988 presidential election, a variety of different factors cast doubt upon
what was likely to be the level of political activism and partisanship evident among
evangelicals in that election. Some developments suggested that evangelical political
activity in the late 1980s might be waning from the levels evident at the turn of the
decade. Not only had voter turnout among evangelicals dropped between the 1980 and
1984 presidential elections (Smidt 1987), but the Religious Right had also enjoyed little,
if any, success in the 1986 congressional campaigns. Moreover, the PTL and Swaggert
scandals which erupted during 1987 and the early months of 1988 had undermined the
credibility and financial stability of many televangelists who had championed evangelical
political involvement.
Stirl other developments suggested that there might be greater evangelical involve-
ment in 1988 than earlier in the decade. While Falwell's move into the political arena
had mobilized fundamentalist segments of American evangelicalism, pentecostal and
charismatic evangelicals had remained largely apolitical.' Pat Robertson, however, had
*Corwin Smidt is a professor of political science at Calvin CoUege in Grand Rapids, MI 49546. Paul Kellstedt
is a graduate student in the Department of Political Science at the University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242.
1. For a discussion of some differences between fundamentalist and nonfundamentalist evangelicals, see Wilcox
(1986) and Smidt (1988b); for differences between evangelicals and charismatics, as well as their overlapping
tendencies, see Smidt (1989a).
C Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 1992, 31 (3): 330-338 330
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EVANGELICALS IN THE 1988 ELECTION 331
considerable appeal among these traditionally apolitical pentecostal and charismatic
Christians (Smidt and Penning 1990), and his candidacy seemingly had the potential
to mobilize these segments of American evangelicals.
There was also uncertainty regarding which party evangelicals would choose once
Reagan was absent from the ticket. First, many evangelicals, particularly those residing
in the South, had cast ballots for Reagan in the 1980 and 1984 elections despite their
Democratic partisan identifications, and it was unclear whether such "Reagan
Democrats" would also support the Republican nominee in 1988. Moreover, the
Democratic Party was making serious efforts to regain the electoral support of these
"Reagan Democrats" (Galston 1988; Quirk 1989). Second, early indications also sug-
gested that evangelicals were not strongly attracted to any of the announced Republican
candidates. Robertson's charismatic leanings were likely to draw opposition from more
fundamentalistic segments within the theologically diverse evangelical wing of American
Christianity.2 In addition, a majority of evangelicals claimed in 1986 that knowing a
particular candidate was an evangelical would make no difference in their voting decisions
(Smidt 1988a). Evangelicals also had considerable doubts about George Bush,
particularly early in the campaign. For example, a national poll conducted in 1986
revealed that "born again" Christians were less likely than other voters to prefer Bush
as the Republican nominee in 1988, with just over one-third of such "born again" Chris-
tians supporting the Bush candidacy (Shribman 1986).
DATA AND METHODS
The data utilized to analyze the changing levels of politicization and partisanship
among evangelicals were drawn from the 1980,1984, and 1988 National Election Studies
conducted by the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan. Three criteria
were used to identify potential evangelical respondents. First, respondents had to state
that religion played an important part in their lives.3 Second, only those respondents
who stated that they had had a "born again" experience, or who called themselves "born
2. Dispensational theology, espoused by many fundamentalists, holds that the dispensation of gifts given to
the church at Pentecost are not given to the contemporary church; pentecostalists and charismatics hold that
the gifts given at Pentecost are gifts freely available to the church today. Thus, while pentecostalists and
charismatics argue that such gifts as speaking in tongues and healing are available to the church today, dispen-
sationalists would argue that any manifestations of these "gifts" are given by the deceiver Satan rather than
by God. For a more detailed discussion of dispensationalism and its empirical consequences, see Turner and
Guth (1989).
3. This first requirement need not be a definitional criterion by which to identify evangelicals, but this ques-
tion served as a filter for the second, more conventional, measure used to identify evangelical respondents, i.e.,
whether the respondent had had a "born again" experience. Only those respondents who stated that religion
played an important part in their lives were asked the "born again" question in 1980 and 1984. Consequently,
the fact that religion must play an important role in the respondent's life automatically becomes part of the
resulting operational definition of an evangelical. In 1988, respondents did not have to state that religion played
an important role in their lives to be asked the "born again" question. However, to ensure comparability across
the three surveys, the operational measure for identifying evangelical respondents in 1988 also required that
respondents state that religion played an important role in their lives. Whether religious salience or church
attendance should be crucial to the evangelical label is a matter of some debate and is related to the particular
analytical framework with which one approaches the study of American evangelicals (see, for example, Kellstedt
1989b and Smidt 1988a).
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332 JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION
again" Christians, were classified as potential evangelicals.4 Third, respondents had to
acknowledge that they viewed the Bible as "God's word and all it says is true." Finally,
because evangelicals are conceptualized in this paper as a socio-religious group, only
Protestants who met the three criteria specified above were classified as evangelicals,5
and analysis was restricted to white respondents.6
Partisan Self-Images
In 1980, pluralities of both evangelicals and nonevangelicals identified themselves
as Democrats (Hunter 1983; Smidt 1987). However, an important shift in partisan iden-
tification took place between the 1980 and 1984 presidential elections, when a plurality
of evangelicals began to classify themselves as Republicans (Smidt 1987; Kellstedt 1989a;
Kiecolt and Nelson 1991). No similar increase occurred between 1984 and 1988, but the
earlier gains appear to have been solidified: The percentage of white evangelicals who
willingly classified themselves as strong Republicans was even greater in 1988 than in
1984 (data not shown).
Changes in mean partisan identification among white evangelicals and
nonevangelicals from 1980 to 1988 are presented in Table 1. Partisan identification was
measured so that scores ranged from 0 (strong Democrat) to 6 (strong Republican).
Several patterns are evident. First, evangelicals were more Republican in 1988 than were
nonevangelicals. Both groups had begun the decade with marginally Democratic mean
scores (less than 3.0), but both moved consistently toward the GOP after that. The mean
score for all evangelicals became more Republican than Democratic in 1984, and in 1988
nonevangelicals also had mean scores leaning slightly toward the GOP.
Second, striking regional differences in partisan identification continue to exist
among both white evangelicals and nonevangelicals. As of 1988, nonsoutherners,
regardless of religious standing, were more Republican than were southerners. Outside
the South, evangelicals were significantly more Republican than their nonevangelical
4. In 1988, the born-again question simply asked whether or not the respondent would classify himself/herself
as a born-again Christian.
5. Roman Catholics who met the three criteria above were excluded from the ranks of evangelicals because
their heritage is historically outside the evangelical movement and because their patterns of primary relation-
ships are likely to be part of another religious subcommunity. Various scholars have argued, either implicitly
or explicitly, that Catholics do not belong under the evangelical umbrella (e.g., Webber 1978:26-30; Hunter
1982:139-140). On the other hand, other scholars have treated certain Catholics who exhibit particular behavioral
patterns as evangelical Catholics (Welch and Leege 1989). Whether or not Catholics fall under the evangelical
umbrella depends heavily upon one's theoretical framework. If one wishes to treat evangelicals as a category
exhibiting certain types of behavior or professing certain religious beliefs or experiences, then certain Catholics
could be properly viewed as evangelicals. On the other hand, if one wishes to treat evangelicals as a social group,
and emphasize patterns of social interaction among primary groups, then it is likely that most, if not all, Catholics
would have to be excluded from the ranks of evangelicals.
6. Because the religious subcultures of white and black evangelicals are likely to be different, and because the
patterns of social interaction between white and black evangelicals are likely to be less frequent than those
between black evangelicals and black nonevangelicals, white and black evangelicals were separated. However,
given the relatively small numbers within the resultant black categories, meaningful comparisons could not
be made between the two black groups. Therefore, analysis was restricted to a comparison and contrast to white
evangelicals and nonevangelicals. Blacks who subscribe to evangelical tenets of the Christian faith are less likely
to call themselves evangelicals than are whites who do so (see Sidey 1990 and Jelen et al. 1990).
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EVANGELICALS IN THE 1988 ELECTION 333
TABLE 1
PARTISAN SELF-IMAGES AMONG WHITE EVANGELICALS AND NONEVANGELICALS
1980 1984 1988
Nonevan. Evan. Nonevan. Evan. Nonevan. Evan.
All Respondents 2.77 2.82 2.92 3.29** 3.02 3.36**
(1017) (180) (1392) (285) (1356) (312)
Non-South 2.91 3.27 2.96 3.73*** 3.07 3.81***
(776) (95) (1104) (128) (1042) (173)
South 2.61 2.41 2.78 2.73 2.84 2.79
(241) (85) (288) (127) (314) (139)
Non-South
Young 2.85 3.17 3.02 3.84** 3.18 4.11**
(294) (35) (403) (51) (336) (44)
Middle-Aged 2.90 2.84 2.87 3.73** 3.01 3.93***
(252) (31) (381) (48) (382) (68)
Old 2.73 3.76* 2.98 3.64** 3.05 3.46
(230) (29) (320) (59) (322) (61)
South
Young 2.71 2.39 2.94 3.06 3.17 3.31
(93) (28) (114) (49) (108) (48)
Middle-Aged 2.77 2.88 3.04 2.41 2.72 2.80
(74) (24) (100) (39) (127) (45)
Old 2.27 1.91 2.19 2.64 2.60 2.24
(74) (33) (74) (39) (79) (46)
Source: CPS Election Studies
Note: Figures represent mean scores ranging from 0 (strongly Democrat) to 6 (strong Republicans).
*t = .05, **t = .01, ***t = .001
counterparts, whereas southern evangelicals were slightly more Democratic than their
nonevangelical counterparts. Yet, regardless of region, both groups moved consistently
toward the GOP after 1980. Future elections will shed additional light on whether these
changes reflect primarily a process of realignment or dealignment, but it is undeniable
that a significant movement toward the Republican Party occurred after the initial
election of Ronald Reagan.
Nevertheless, a "permanent" realignment, especially among white evangelicals,
seems a possibility. The youngest evangelical groups are the most Republican in their
respective regions, while the oldest voters (with the exception of nonsouthern
evangelicals) have been the most Democratic. A generational changing of the guard
appears to be taking place, to the benefit of the Republican Party.
Although great contrasts exist outside the South, no statistically significant
differences in partisan identification exist between southern evangelicals and southern
nonevangelicals (see also Kiecolt and Nelson 1991). The unique nature of the political
culture in the South seems to have a greater effect on a respondent's partisan identifica-
tion than does his or her religious grouping. The South is becoming more Republican,
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334 JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION
but so is the North, and often at a rate equal to or more rapid than that found in the
South. Little support, then, can be found in Table 1 for the idea of southern and non-
southern convergence, at least in terms of partisan self-images (Little 1989).
Voting Turnout
Historically, evangelicals have been less likely than nonevangelicals to vote in
presidential elections (Wuthnow 1983; Kellstedt and Noll 1990:371). While evangelicals
flocked to the polls in 1980 (Brundy and Copeland 1984; Bruce 1988), they were less
likely than nonevangelicals in 1984 to have gone to the polls (Smidt 1987). Was
evangelical involvement in the 1980 election unique, or did it herald a new level of
politicization muted only by the anticipated Reagan landslide in 1984?
Table 2 reveals that when the levels of voter turnout over the last two presidential
elections are compared, there was a marginal increase among white evangelicals and
a modest decrease among white nonevangelicals. This slight increase in evangelical
turnout is better depicted as a modest increase outside the South, coupled with a slight
TABLE 2
VOTING TURNOUT AMONG WHITE EVANGELICALS AND NONEVANGELICALS
1980 1984 1988
Nonevan. Evan. Nonevan. Evan. Nonevan. Evan.
All Respondents .715 .771 .763 .695* .721 .712
(1039) (183) (1427) (292) (852) (222)
Non-South .731 .750 .783 .753 .753 .797
(792) (96) (1132) (162) (688) (137)
South .664 .793* .688 .623 .614 .607
(247) (87) (295) (130) (164) (85)
Non-South
Young .623 .722 .684 .635 .608 .682
(302) (36) (414) (52) (169) (30)
Middle-Aged .799 .774 .839 .824 .807 .838
(254) (31) (385) (51) (280) (57)
Old .795 .759 .843 .797 .830 .833
(234) (29) (322) (59) (239) (50)
South
Young .516 .767** .576 .620 .457 563
(97) (30) (118) (50) (42) (27)
Middle-Aged .750 .792 .777 .634 .708 .622
(76) (24) (103) (41) (75) (28)
Old .770 .818 .743 .615 .681 .638
(74) (33) (74) (39) (47) (30)
Source: CPS Election Studies
Note: Figures represent proportion reporting they had cast a ballot.
*p = .05, **p = .01, ***p= .001
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EVANGELICALS IN THE 1988 ELECTION 335
drop in turnout within the South. Actually, the gap in turnout rates between southern
and nonsouthern evangelicals widened during the 1980s, with a 30% difference in 1988.
Regional differences among nonevangelicals, while obvious, are less dramatic.
Although turnout rates of nonevangelicals were also higher outside the South than within
the South, regional differences in participation rates were smaller for nonevangelicals
than for evangelicals.
However, a new generation of relatively politicized evangelicals might be enmerging,
as younger white evangelicals appear to be more active politically than their
nonevangelical counterparts. Since 1980, young southern evangelicals have consistently
voted at higher rates than have young southern nonevangelicals. Likewise, outside the
South, young evangelicals have also been somewhat more politicized, the exception being
the 1984 election. In 1988, young evangelicals once again voted at higher rates than
did young nonevangelicals (68.2% versus 60.8%, respectively), as they had in 1980. If
this level of politicization among young evangelicals continues as they grow older, then
the overall evangelical turnout rates might, over the course of the next several elections,
exceed the nonevangelical rates.
Voting Behavior
Prior to the 1988 election, it was unclear whether evangelical support for the
Republican presidential candidate was simply tied to the candidacy of Ronald Reagan
or represented a more fundamental shift toward the Republican Party. The 1988 election
constituted the first real test of evangelical loyalty to the GOP in the post-Reagan era.
It might be too early to assess the permanence of any such shift, but it is at least possi-
ble to analyze what hints, if any, the election offered about the future behavior of
evangelicals.
As can be seen from the top portion of Table 3, the voting patterns among
evangelicals and nonevangelicals became significantly different during the 1980s. While
white nonevangelicals voted consistently for Republican presidental candidates during
that period, the percentage of white nonevangelicals voting Republican monotonically
declined. On the other hand, the percentage of white evangelicals voting Republican
was greater in 1988 than it was in 1980, although not as high as it had been in 1984
when Reagan sought reelection.
Regional differences also continue to be noteworthy in the voting behavior of white
evangelicals and nonevangelicals. Outside the South, evangelicals supported Bush at
a much higher level than did nonevangelicals (71% versus 55%), although they did so
at a lower level than they had supported Reagan in 1984. Within the South, however,
evangelical support for the Republican ticket continued its monotonic growth upward,
while southern nonevangelicals supported Bush at a slightly lower rate than they had
given Reagan in 1980, and at much lower rate than in 1984. Previously, southern
evangelicals and nonevangelicals tended to mirror each other in their political behavior
(Smidt 1989b), but the patterns found here suggest that there might be a growing
divergence.
The major portion of growth in white evangelical support for the Republican ticket
appears to have been largely limited to the South. Evangelicals outside the South have
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336 JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION
TABLE 3
PRESIDENTIAL VOTING BEHAVIOR AMONG WHITE EVANGELICALS AND NONEVANGELICALS
1980 1984 1988
Nonevan. Evan. Nonevan. Evan. Nonevan. Evan.
All Respondents .623 .669 .610 .763*** .560 .703***
(626) (139) (1022) (198) (822) (219)
Non-South .623 .700 .596 .828*** .552 .713***
(477) (70) (831) (117) (661) (136)
South .624 .638 .670 .667 .590 .687
(149) (69) (191) (81) (161) (83)
Non-South
Young .624 .840* .595 .906*** .559 .733
(141) (25) (269) (32) (161) (30)
Middle-Aged .661 .565 .597 .875*** .548 .750**
(165) (23) (308) (40) (272) (56)
Old .580 .682 .595 .727 .553 .660
(169) (22) (246) (45) (228) (50)
South
Young .636 .696 .694 .774 .537 .769
(44) (23) (62) (31) (41) (26)
Middle-Aged .673 .895 .722 .654 .573 .679
(52) (19) (79) (26) (75) (28)
Old .566 .407 .560 .542 .667 .621
(53) (27) (50) (24) (45) (29)
Source: CPS Election Studies
Note: Figures represent proportion reporting they had cast a Republican ballot among those casting ballots
for the two major parties.
*p = .05, **p = .01, ***p= .001
always been heavily Republican in their partisan preferences, and no major growth in
support for the Republican candidates occurred during the decade. Within the South,
however, there was a steady, though modest, growth in support for the Republican ticket
among evangelicals across the three elections. As a result, by 1988, support for the
Republican candidate among evangelicals living within the South approximated that
among evangelicals living outside the South (68.7% versus 71.3%, respectively).
When age differences were analyzed in conjunction with regional differences, several
patterns became noteworthy. Outside the South, evangelicals were more likely than
nonevangelicals, regardless of age, to vote for the Republican presidential candidate,
and young evangelicals, generally speaking, were the most Republican of any of the
groups analyzed. Within the South, young evangelicals were also the most consistently
Republican of any of the groups analyzed, and the differences in voting patterns between
young southern evangelicals and young southern nonevangelicals grew over the last
three elections. By 1988, young southern evangelicals were substantially more Republican
in their voting choice than were young nonevangelicals. Yet, even among the most
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EVANGELICALS IN THE 1988 ELECTION 337
Democratic of southern groups, the winds of change are apparent as older evangelicals
and nonevangelicals have both grown more Republican in their voting.
CONCLUSIONS
Several conclusions can be drawn from this study. First, there has been an important
shift in the partisan identification of white evangelical voters during the past decade.
A shift toward Republican identification took place during the early 1980s, and this
shift appears to have solidified during Reagan's second term. Moreover, this shift is
most evident among younger evangelicals, and, as a result, its effects are likely to be
felt in elections to come.
Second, it would appear that white evangelicals have become more politicized during
the past decade. Whereas this segment was less likely to have been politically active
than their nonevangelical counterparts prior to the 1980s, it was just as likely, if not
more likely, to have been politically engaged during the past decade. This increased
activism was evident in the presidential elections of 1980 and 1988, as well as in the
1988 presidential selection process (Smidt 1989c). Previous conclusions concerning the
relatively apolitical nature of evangelicals need to be reassessed in light of these
new patterns.
Third, there is a growing divergence between the voting patterns of white
evangelicals and white nonevangelicals, with evangelicals being more likely to cast their
ballots for the GOP presidential candidate. These differences in voting patterns were
not statistically significant in 1980, but they had become so by 1984 and remained so
in 1988. However, of the various categories of voters analyzed, a monotonic increase
in support for the Republican ticket occurred only among white southern evangelicals.
Finally, there might be a growing divergence between the political behavior of white
evangelicals and nonevangelicals within the South. In the past, the political attitudes
and behavior of southern evangelicals and nonevangelicals were somewhat similar in
nature. By 1988 there were some notable differences between the two groups. These
differences were evident not only in voter turnout and candidate choice in the Super
Tuesday primaries (Smidt 1989c), but also in candidate choice in the general election.
As a result of this growing divergence, southern evangelicals seemingly have begun
to reflect more closely the patterns evident among nonsouthern evangelicals than among
southern nonevangelicals. While there might not be a growing convergence between the
South and the rest of the country, there could be a growing convergence in the political
attitudes and behavior of southern and nonsouthern white evangelicals.
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... Woodrum concluded that the influence of moral conservatism "will remain obscured unless it is presented by a party or candidate not otherwise unattractive to the very segments of the electorate most receptive to conservative moral appeals" (Woodrum, 1988). Reagan's name on the November ballot left considerable doubt surrounding which party evangelicals would support in the election, with a substantial portion of Reagan's victory coming from Southerners who had previously identified with Democrats (the so-called "Reagan Democrats"), most observers began to wonder whether or not these voters would return to the Democratic Party or remain Republican voters (Smidt & Kellstedt, 1992). ...
... In order to study this topic, Smidt and Kellstedt drew on National Election Studies data from 1980, 1984, and 1988 to see if there had been any changes in politicalization and partisanship throughout the 1980s. They also developed a three-pronged criteria for determining which participants were eligible for their study: To qualify, respondents first had to say that religion played a significant role in their lives, second they had to define themselves as "born again" Christians, and finally they had to identify with the statement "God's word and all it says is true" (Smidt & Kellstedt, 1992). ...
... First, there had indeed been a substantial ideological shift over the course of the 1980s for white evangelicals. Smidt and Kellstedt argued that this shift solidified in Reagan's second terms, and was most prevalent in young voters; a conclusion they argued would be felt in future elections (Smidt & Kellstedt, 1992). A second finding was that throughout the decade evangelicals had become substantially more politically active. ...
... In 1980, the plurality of conservative evangelicals self-identified as Democrats. 22 By 1984, conservative evangelicals self-identified as Republicans due to their support of the Reagan administration and Reagan's conservative social policies. 23 The partisan shift for evangelicals was greater than that for the population as a whole, which suggests that evangelicals became politically activated during the Reagan administration. ...
Article
This article examines the divide within the Republican Party between business interests and conservative evangelicals during the debate over the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). Business interests were able to build compromises by raising their concerns over practical matters such as costs. Conservative evangelicals advocated for changes due to their moral and ideological positions on homosexuality and HIV. Conservative evangelicals did not receive their desired changes because they constructed their concerns with public safety themes. This led to conservative evangelicals and their opponents talking past each other instead of addressing their concerns. The dynamics shown from the opposition of conservative evangelicals in the ADA debate demonstrate that their influence in elections did not lead to dominance within the Republican Party in shaping policy.
... An additional explanatory variable included in the analyses is the percentage of a state's population identified as adherents of evangelical Protestant churches. 36 Despite the fact that a number of studies including Smidt and Kellstedt (1992), Manza and Brooks (1997), Brooks and Manza (2004), and Guth, Kellstedt, Smidt, and Green (2006) have found evidence that evangelical Protestants for more than two decades have been significantly more likely to vote for Republican candidates in presidential elections, none of the previous studies testing rational political theory appears to have controlled for this factor. 37 Results Table 2 presents the results for the regression of state percentage vote for Obama in the 2008 election on Iraq War state military fatality rates from the start of the war through the day before the election and other variables. ...
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Opposition to the Iraq War is thought to have contributed to the election of Barack Obama in 2008. The present study shows that controlling for other factors, including the percentage of the vote going to the prewar Democratic presidential candidate, states with relatively high levels of Iraq War military fatalities had a higher percentage vote for Obama. This result is consistent with a prediction derived from rational political theory and the results of several studies examining the impacts of war fatality rates in other military conflicts in previous elections. However, in the current study, we find that the effect of Iraq War fatalities on the percentage vote for Obama is conditioned by state military enlistment rates. Military fatalities have a strong effect in states with historically low military enlistment rates. But the effect disappears in states with very high levels of military enlistment.
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İnsan, toplumla iletişim kuran, sosyal ilişkilere giren ve o toplumun kurumları ile var olan siyasal bir varlıktır. Bu anlamda toplumda yaşayan herkes, insanların ortak yaşam alanını ve geleceğini etkileyen siyasetten bir şekilde etkilenmektedir. Fakat toplumdaki her bireyin siyaset hakkında bilgi düzeyi ve siyasetle ilgi düzeyi birbirinden farklıdır. Bireyleri siyasi davranışta bulunmaya iten pek çok nedenin yanında onların siyasi tercihlerini etkileyen pek çok faktör bulunmaktadır. Bu faktörler seçmenin yaşadığı bölgeye, yaşına, cinsiyetine, arkadaş grubuna, eğitim ve gelir düzeyine göre farklılaşabildiği gibi, seçmenin dindarlık düzeyi, laiklik tutumu ve seçime giren partinin liderinin kişisel özelliklerine göre de farklılaşabilmektedir. Bunun yanında ülkenin içinde bulunduğu ekonomik durum, uluslararası politika vs. gibi pek çok etken bireylerin siyasi tercihlerini etkilemektedir. Çalışmanın amacı Tokat ilinde yaşayan katılımcıların dindarlık düzeylerinin partilere yönelik tutumu üzerindeki etkisinde lider imajının aracılık rolünün incelenmesidir. Çalışmada anket aracılığıyla toplanan verilerin analizi yapılmıştır. Çalışmada katılımcıların (N= 420) dindarlık düzeylerinin çalışma kapsamındaki partilere yönelik tutumları üzerindeki etkisinde parti liderlerinin imajının aracılık rolü bulunduğu sonucuna ulaşılmıştır. Ayrıca dindarlığın partiye yönelik tutum üzerindeki etkisi partilere göre de farklılık göstermektedir. Çalışma değişkenler arası ilişkileri araştırmasından dolayı literatüre katkı sunacağı değerlendirilmektedir.
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The activities of political parties, and particularly local party organizations, are geared toward cultivating the relationship between the electorate and those who govern. This paper adds to the theoretical and empirical literature on party activities by focusing on one of the primary mechanisms by which parties attempt to stimulate political participation on behalf of their candidates: the party canvass. Using the 1952-90 National Election Studies, I examine the contacting patterns of the two major U.S. parties, and argue that political parties contact individuals in the electorate not randomly, but strategically, targeting their canvassing efforts to specific individuals and groups within the electorate. This can only be done imperfectly, but with technological increases over the last 40 years, the parties have become somewhat more efficient in their contacting activities and in their ability to target such contacts.
Chapter
The u.s. constitution prohibits government from establishing or promoting a particular religion or intruding on citizens' religious beliefs or activities. Although the constitutional wall separating church and state was designed to keep religious conflicts and influences at bay, the American political and legal landscape is not free from religious strife and influences. Politicians frequently appeal to voters' religious sentiments through symbolic gestures or by supporting policies particular to religiously oriented persons. Religious leaders are increasingly active in the political arena through voter mobilization efforts and endorsements of particular candidates. Perhaps none has had the longevity or been as influential as the Christian Right. The election of a Republican majority to Congress in the mid-1990s and the presidential victories of George W. Bush, a deeply religious Christian, both with strong backing from conservative Christians and their organizations, have renewed interest among scholars in examining the role of religion in American politics.1. © 2008 by The Georgetown University Press. All rights reserved.
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This article examines the relationship between conservative Protestant doctrine and economic policy attitudes. Building upon Weber's (1930) classic (and controversial) thesis that Calvinist thought inspired the “capitalist spirit,” we posit that the individualistic theology of fundamentalists, evangelicals, and charismatics often engenders political preferences for individualistic economic policies. We test this hypothesis by (1) performing a series of cross-sectional ordered probit analyses to understand the independent degree of association between doctrinal belief and economic attitudes toward taxing, spending, and the role of government, (2) creating and testing a structural equation model to assess various hypothesized paths of influence, and finally, (3) using 1994–96 NES panel data to assess the degree to which changes in an individual's doctrinal beliefs produce changes in his or her economic attitudes. Results lend substantial support to the efficacy of Weber's thesis, and point to religious belief as one exogenous agent of core political values.
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States of the United States differ significantly in terms of politically salient religious culture. But prior to the 2008 presidential election several studies inspired by rational political theory that found that during war time voting districts with high rates of military fatalities were more likely to vote against incumbent candidates and for anti-war candidates failed to control for variation in religious culture. In the present study, multivariate analyses that controlled for local differences in religious culture found that Iraq War military fatalities had an overall positive effect on the difference in the percent of the vote received in the 50 states and the District of Columbia by the anti-war Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama in the 2008 election and the pre-war Democratic presidential candidate Al Gore in the 2000 election. Tests for interaction, however, also found that the magnitude and ultimately the direction of this effect were conditioned by religious culture. In states with very high percentages of evangelical Protestants, the military fatality rate actually appeared to have a negative effect.
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The results of a methodological experiment are reported, in which black, urban respondents are presented with a new question dealing with beliefs about the Bible. The new item contains alternatives connoting both biblical literalism and inerrancy. Contrary to some previous research, it was found that the difference between literalism and inerrancy is meaningful to most doctrinally conservative respondents.
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Most research on fundamentalist and evangelical Christians has used these labels interchangeably, despite differences between the two groups. This paper compares and contrasts the political attitudes and behaviors of the fundamentalists and evangelicals within the Ohio Moral Majority. The fundamentalists are consistently more conservative, and the difference is significant after controls for denomination and demographics. The fundamentalists are more likely than the evangelicals to perceive a strong connection between their religious and political beliefs. The strength of this connection is associated with domestic conservatism among the fundamentalists, and with domestic liberalism among the evangelicals. Evangelicals are more politically active and sophisticated, and are more likely to be active in other political groups. The study suggests the utility of differentiating between fundamentalists and evangelicals in future research.
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As interest in the cultural bases of American political behavior increases, scholars are paying closer attention to the measurement of religiosity and to the mechanisms by which religious values become politically relevant. This research, based on a parish-connected sample of 2,667 Roman Catholics, enjoins the measurement issue by developing a behavioral scale of evangelically oriented Catholicism and shows the distinctive political orientations of those who score high on it. A striking disjuncture between liberal and conservative positions on different sets of issues is discussed in terms of dual reference groups--Catholics and evangelicals--and the clarity of the message offered by Catholic religious leaders.
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This article analyzes the change and continuity evident in the political attitudes and behavior of American evangelicals over the past two presidential elections. Viewed in terms of a socioreligious group, evangelicals remained a relatively large bloc of voters with distinctive political attitudes. However, important changes were evident in their level of voter turnout, their level of voting cohesion, and their pattern of partisan identification. Regional and age differences among evangelicals are also analyzed. The data suggest that a new "generation" of evangelicals may be emerging. Young evangelicals, regardless of region, appear to be relatively politicized and distinctively Republican in their partisanship.
Evangelicals as a political force: Reagan and the 1980 religious vote
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  • Gary Copeland
Brundy, Jeffrey, and Gary Copeland 1984 Evangelicals as a political force: Reagan and the 1980 religious vote. Social Science Quarterly 65:1072-1079 (December).
Did Super Tuesday work?
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Galston, William 1988 Did Super Tuesday work? Election Politics 5:2-5 (Summer).
Evangelicals and party realignment
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Kiecolt, K. Jill, and Hart M. Nelson 1991 Evangelicals and party realignment, 1976-1988. Social Science Quarterly: forthcoming.