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The (Soft) Power of Commitment: The
EU and Conflict Resolution in Northern
Ireland
Katy Hayward a & Mary C. Murphy b
a Queen's University Belfast, UK
b University College Cork, Ireland
Version of record first published: 03 Oct 2012.
To cite this article: Katy Hayward & Mary C. Murphy (2012): The (Soft) Power of Commitment:
The EU and Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland, Ethnopolitics: Formerly Global Review of
Ethnopolitics, 11:4, 439-452
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The (Soft) Power of Commitment:
The EU and Conflict Resolution in
Northern Ireland
KATY HAYWARD∗& MARY C. MURPHY∗∗
∗Queen’s University Belfast, UK, ∗∗University College Cork, Ireland
ABSTRACT This paper examines the potential of international actors to contribute to conflict
resolution by analysing the evolving role of the European Union (EU) in embedding Northern
Ireland’s peace process. Scrutiny of the EU’s approach to conflict resolution in Northern Ireland
offers useful insights into the scope and potential of soft power for facilitating behavioural
change from governmental to grass-roots levels. This paper traces the development of the EU’s
approach to conflict resolution in Northern Ireland from one concentrated on encouraging state-
level agreement, to nurturing peace through multilevel funding, through now to consolidating the
peace by facilitating regional-level empowerment. The core argument is that, in sum, the most
critical element of the EU’s contribution to peace in Northern Ireland has been, quite simply, that
of enduring commitment.
Introduction
Northern Ireland’s prolonged teetering on the brink of post-conflict status has seen differ-
ent players in the peace process come to differing conclusions as to its success. Although,
as Tannam (this issue) notes, the appropriateness of ‘coercive consociationalism’ remains
contested, the simple fact of power-sharing between two extremes of unionism and nation-
alism gave rise to much self-congratulatory promulgation of the Northern Ireland ‘model’
of conflict resolution from the British and (to a lesser extent) Irish governments (O’Kane,
2010; Wilson, 2010). The US government has come, post-9/11, to approach Northern
Ireland as a problem of economic underperformance rather than intractable political con-
flict (Guelke, this issue; see also Clancy, 2007; Schmitt, 2008). The other major inter-
national actor in this peace process, the European Union (EU), is the one that interests
us here. The EU has held up its role in peacebuilding in Northern Ireland as an opportunity
for lesson-learning and modelling as it seeks to expand its capacity for conflict interven-
tion and prevention (Tonra, 2011). What makes this role particularly interesting is the fact
that it has clearly evolved with the peace process in Northern Ireland. We argue that the
most critical feature of the EU’s intervention in Northern Ireland is precisely the fact
Ethnopolitics, Vol. 11, No. 4, 439 – 452, November 2012
Correspondence Address: Katy Hayward, School of Sociology, Social Policy and Social Work, Queen’s Univer-
sity Belfast, 6 College Park, Belfast BT7 1LP, UK. Email: k.hayward@qub.ac.uk
Ethnopolitics, Vol. 11, No. 4, 439 – 452, November 2012
1744-9057 Print/1744-9065 Online/12/040439– 14 #2012 The Editor of Ethnopolitics
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2012.697655
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that it, like the peace process, is a long-term project; sustained commitment is the trump
card in the soft power of the EU.
We should acknowledge at this early stage that the question of whether the EU’s con-
tribution to peace in Northern Ireland can be properly defined as ‘international interven-
tion’ is an open one. It is certain that membership of the EU for both the UK and
Ireland enabled it to have a type of multilevel intervention that would not otherwise
have been possible: from the informal talks between British and Irish ministers on the side-
lines of EU Council meetings to the conditions of cross-border partnership set for local
authorities’ receipt of certain structural funds (Hayward, 2007; McCall & O’Dowd,
2008). Less distinctive but even more significant has been the Europeanization of domestic
politics within Northern Ireland. Murphy (2010, p. 190) notes in particular that, despite the
predominance of Eurosceptism among Northern Ireland’s political parties, they have
proved capable of consensus decision-making in a range of EU-related policy areas.
Nevertheless, the contribution that the EU has made to peacebuilding in Northern
Ireland that has generated the most publicity and comment is specifically its financial
one; this is also a tactic already employed liberally as part of the EU’s development of
a conflict prevention/intervention role in other parts of the world (see Hughes, 2010).
However, throwing money at the problem is no longer going to be the easy option for
the EU in Northern Ireland or elsewhere as budgets tighten. With financial constraints
and local political and economic needs (and potential) in mind, the EU has developed a
new innovation in support of peace in Northern Ireland.
The Northern Ireland Task Force (NITF) is the most significant development in the
EU’s contribution to conflict resolution since the 1998 Agreement and it constitutes
the focus of this paper. Our analysis is informed by a series of interviews with Northern
Ireland politicians, officials from the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Min-
ister in Northern Ireland (OFMDFM) and European Commission officials contemporary
to, and with a focus upon, the creation of the NITF. Just as the Special Support Pro-
gramme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties of
Ireland (or PEACE programme) was intended to support the paramilitary ceasefires in
the mid-1990s, the timing of the Task Force’s creation in 2007 is crucial; it was con-
ceived not only as a means to support the ongoing peace process but also to consolidate
the operation of the devolved system of power. Interestingly, however, and in contrast to
previous EU interventions in Northern Ireland, Barroso’s initiative did not include a
financial commitment. This signalled a step-change in the European Commission’s
engagement with Northern Ireland and involved a mobilization of new forces in response
to the particular needs of the region. It also indicated recognition on the part of the Euro-
pean Commission that it has an enduring role, responsibility and contribution to make to
Northern Ireland’s future.
The EU’s relationship with Northern Ireland has thus reached a critical point. It has
made a decision to stay involved in peacebuilding, but it has also chosen to change the
nature of its relationship to the province. The EU thus appears here to have begun to
employ the ‘self-reflexivity’ seen by Diez (2004, 2005) as necessary for the effective util-
ization of its ‘normative power’. The attempt to activate non-financial initiatives to support
the peace process in Northern Ireland may reflect straitened economic circumstances, but
it also demonstrates an evolving approach to conflict resolution that may be replicated
elsewhere: one based on enabling and empowering the region to adapt economically
and politically to the demands and rigours of the post-conflict period. In this way, the
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EU hopes to make as much of a contribution to what post-conflict Northern Ireland society
might become as well as to ensuring it remains just that, i.e. post-conflict.
Soft Power and the EU
The lines of division between peace studies and political science scholarship (as identified
by Tannam, this issue) are perhaps most blurred when considering the realm of ‘soft
power’ (Nye, 2004). For instance, the EU’s soft power works at various levels—from
heads of government, to local officials, to grass-roots activists—and is thus able to
address each of the layers of leadership identified as essential by Lederach (1997), even
across contested borders (Diez et al., 2008). Soft power thus bridges any gap between
‘grass-roots’ focused peace studies and ‘elitist’ political science (Tannam, this issue). Fur-
thermore, as Pace (2007, p. 1042) notes, the tendency to view the EU’s ‘normative’ soft
power as ‘necessarily a good thing’ implies that the EU ‘superpower’, as foreseen by
the father of peace studies, could take a benign form (Galtung, 1973). The fact that the
EU is viewed as such adds to its likely success as a mediator in conflict intervention,
which depends on it being seen by local parties as having the power to produce an attrac-
tive outcome (Zartman & Touval, 1985). Thus, Byrne (2006) describes the EU as a
‘primary mediator’ in Northern Ireland, providing resources and incentives as well as
mediation; it thus constitutes a model of soft power. Soft power ‘co-opts rather than
coerces people’ (Smith, 2005, p. 67), using the attractiveness of its example, the persua-
siveness of its arguments, the appeal of its values, the influence of its advocates and (as
is evident in Northern Ireland) the colour of its money. Northern Ireland has been a
useful testing ground for such power, and for its limits, in relation to conflict resolution
(Tannam, 2007).
The debate about the meaning and nature of the EU’s ‘normative power’ (Manners,
2002, 2008; Diez, 2005; Hyde-Price, 2006) is beyond the scope of this paper, but the
concept itself undoubtedly illuminates our understanding of the EU’s approach to North-
ern Ireland. Indeed, the EU’s self-conception as an example of conflict resolution has
helped sustain its commitment to negotiation and peace in Northern Ireland. For
example, officials whom we interviewed who are engaged directly in the EU’s role in
Northern Ireland readily referred to the EU’s ‘origins’ as a model for conflict resolution
and described Northern Ireland conflict as a ‘microcosm’ of Europe after the 1939 –
1945 war. One official interviewed described the ‘European principles’ of ‘peace, prosper-
ity and stability’ as being a motivating force in the EU’s approach to Northern Ireland. For
such reasons, although Tocci (2007, p. 178) concludes from her study of the EU’s role in
conflict resolution in the European ‘neighbourhood’ that ‘the pursuit of narrow and short-
term interests has often obstructed the EU’s potential to advance those long-term goals’ of
democracy, human rights and development, it is clear that those very values remain essen-
tial to legitimizing and motivating the expanding role of the EU in conflict resolution
(Tonra, 2011). But what does this normative power mean in practice?
Pace (2007, p. 1051) argues that the construction of the EU as a normative power:
enables EU actors to create a broad range of measures aiming at—on the one hand—
eliminating socio-economic inequalities and—on the other hand—building up pol-
itical and social institutions and capacities that will enable those involved in conflict
areas to cope with (ethnic) plurality.
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This capacity-building potential of the EU’s soft power fits comfortably with the priorities
identified by mainstream peace studies (Ramsbotham et al., 2009, p. 25). As policymakers
and academics alike have come to recognize, ‘winning the peace’ depends on targeting
exogenous support correctly so that it can promote self-sustaining indigenous capabilities
(Orr, 2004). As Loizides & Kovras (this issue) deduce from the case of Cyprus, successful
settlements depend on the empowerment of local leadership and their ownership of the
process. Such ‘ownership’ depends on the external mediator’s nurturing, rather than over-
riding, of local consensus and culture (Richmond, this issue). This may happen, of course,
regardless of the will of the external player; as Tocci (2007, p. 178) notes of the EU’s role
in conflict resolution: its impact is always constrained by local political determinants. This
phenomenon has been described as the mediating role of the EU being ‘mediated’ (and
restrained) by local actors (Hayward 2007).
To be effective, therefore, external intervention should be directed to facilitating
endogenous dynamics towards integrative social development, a reduction in asymmetric
economic and political power, and enhanced local political legitimacy (Jeong, 2005,
pp. 34– 35). Such goals are not readily achieved; no wonder Jeong (2005, p. 34) notes that:
Successful peacebuilding cases are characterized by a sufficient level of commit-
ment of time and resources as well as political will both on the part of external
and internal actors.
In placing our hypothesis within the spectrum of ‘soft power’ we are seeking to propose a
new element to common understanding of the EU’s capacity in this regard, specifically the
capacity for sustained commitment to resolving conflict in any particular case. How this
commitment is made manifest can vary according to both the nature of the conflict con-
cerned and the relationship of the actors involved to the EU itself. One of the most impor-
tant dividends of this enduring commitment from the EU in the case of Northern Ireland is
that it has enabled the EU’s contribution to building peace to evolve over time, as the
nature of the conflict has changed. The next section of this paper considers the role of
the EU in conflict resolution in Northern Ireland as it evolved from enabling intergovern-
mental agreement, to nurturing peace through funding, to facilitating regional empower-
ment, to encouraging necessary local reform in administrative practices vis-a
`-vis the
EU. All four trends exemplify the ‘co-opting’, centripetal forces of soft power, and
their effectiveness depends on a lasting commitment to engagement from the EU.
Enabling: The EU and Intergovernmental Agreement in Northern Ireland
Cochrane (2007) has shown that the use of soft power by Irish America, particularly its
political embodiment, helped to change the internal dynamics of the conflict. The soft
power of the EU has worked in a different way, i.e. not through the appeal of a shared iden-
tity or through a common political ideal. Indeed, it is quite evident that a common ‘Euro-
pean’ identity is not emerging as a consequence of the EU’s input to Northern Ireland, and
it is certainly not likely to become a contributing factor to any conflict resolution
(McGarry, 2006). However, the EU has clearly helped to nudge elite actors to negotiations,
by providing both a context and a rationale for cross-border, intergovernmental discussion
and compromise. The UK’s membership of the EU broadened the context within which
possible resolutions of the Northern Ireland conflict might be framed and implemented.
442 K. Hayward & M. C. Murphy
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Nevertheless, British and unionist politicians in particular have been reluctant to present
the EU as an ‘external player’ in the game of peace (Murphy, 2009).
This discrepancy between the actual and the publicly acknowledged impact of the EU in
Northern Ireland political circles helps to explain why, in contrast to the role of the US, the
EU is rarely credited with any significant role in the peace process. For example, in his
survey of the Northern Ireland situation and 25 years of membership of the EU,
Kennedy (2000, pp. 163– 167) points to the ‘limited ability, or inability, of the European
Union to act in any significant way to help resolve the problem’. Teague (1996, p. 550)
concurs, claiming that while the European context was beginning to figure more promi-
nently, the exact nature of any EU intervention remained ambiguous. He suggests that
the EU should have an important and long-term role in Northern Ireland, but realistically,
for both political and practical reasons, this role is only likely to be successful and accep-
table to the communities in Northern Ireland if confined to the economic and social arena.
It is possible to argue, however, that the crucial point in the EU’s reflexivity regarding its
contribution to Northern Ireland was its realization that even a role restricted to these
arenas can have absolutely critical influence when it comes to embedding a peace
begun at the elite level (Tannam, this issue).
The origins of the EU’s ‘intervention’ in Northern Ireland lie in the direct actions of pol-
itical actors working within or around Brussels. John Hume used his profile as a newly
elected Member of the European Parliament for the nationalist Social Democratic and
Labour Party (SDLP) to campaign for the then-European Economic Community (EEC)
to take a stance in relation to the conflict in Northern Ireland. The Political Affairs Com-
mittee of the European Parliament was subsequently tasked with this responsibility and,
under the chairmanship of Nils Haagerup (1984), produced a report drawn up on behalf
of the Political Affairs Committee on the Situation in Northern Ireland. The European Par-
liament’s intervention was ‘a clear departure from the convention that the Parliament did
not interfere in the internal affairs of a member-state’, and was, because of this, ‘strongly
resisted by London’ (Kennedy, 1994, p. 179). An essentially cautious document, the report
was less threatening than unionists had anticipated. As Guelke (1988, p. 160) notes, the
document was in fact ‘studiously moderate in its analysis of the conflict and in its political
prescriptions’. The report endorsed a coordinated British– Irish approach to the Northern
Ireland problem (Haagerup, 1984, pp. 72– 73; Hayward, 2006). In stressing the importance
of the ‘Irish dimension’, it afforded international recognition to an aspect of the conflict
that the unionist community largely disputed (as seen in the collapse of the Sunningdale
Agreement in 1974) but which came to be essential to the peace process as it developed
from the Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985) onwards.
Indeed, the Anglo-Irish Agreement demonstrated growing recognition of the impor-
tance of a ‘European’ dimension in approaching the problem. The 1985 Agreement
noted the then-EEC in its preamble and drew heavily on the findings, recommendations,
language and spirit of the Haagerup Report (Guelke, 1988, p. 161; Moxon-Browne, 1992,
p. 51). Both the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament formally
welcomed the Anglo-Irish Agreement and in 1989 paid 15 million ECUs (European cur-
rency unit, precursor to the euro) into the International Fund for Ireland established by the
Agreement. The EEC’s support for the Anglo-Irish Agreement legitimized British policy
in an unprecedented way, made it extremely difficult for either Britain or Ireland to
renounce the pact unilaterally, and helped to maintain the Agreement in the face of
fierce unionist opposition (Moxon-Browne, 1992, p. 52). By the 1990s there were more
The (Soft) Power of Commitment 443
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substantive attempts to place the Northern Ireland situation within a wider international
context. References to Europe are more plentiful and more substantive in the 1995 Frame-
work for Agreement (or ‘Framework Documents’) than in any of their predecessors.
Indeed, Kennedy (2000, p. 160) has suggested that the proposals contained within the Fra-
meworks Documents ‘were radical in terms of how Northern Ireland as a region would
relate to the European Union’. Teague (1996, p. 550) interprets these provisions as indi-
cating that:
both the Irish and British governments have signalled ... that EU programmes and
activities could be a key way to deepen political and economic ties between the
North and South of the island.
Thus, providing an ‘enabling’ context for Northern Ireland’s development, and supporting
communication and agreement between the two governments, allowed the European Com-
mission to have a role in supporting peace in Northern Ireland without interfering in
British domestic policy on the matter. However, this did not preclude the European Com-
mission from playing an important and direct role in conflict resolution in Northern
Ireland. We now consider this role in relation to three further dynamics: funding, empow-
erment and reform.
Funding: Nurturing Peace with PEACE
Jacques Delors, then President of the European Commission, drew the line for EU invol-
vement in Northern Ireland thus:
The European Commission will follow with friendship and enormous interest the
evolution of events in the province and we are ready to help but not to be a substitute
for those responsible for the province. (Quoted in Irish News, 4 November 1992)
What this ‘friendship and enormous interest’ meant for Northern Ireland was balanced
with the principle of ‘non-interference’ in domestic politics by utilizing a means of
direct effect common to all its member states: EU funding. The EU’s explicit concern
to improve Northern Ireland’s socio-economic situation was implicitly accompanied by
the belief that the resulting political and social benefits would help to support the devel-
oping peace process. The 1994 – 1999 Structural Funds Plan (Northern Ireland Office,
1993, p. 73) stated:
Positive action is ...needed to overcome community alienation by promoting recon-
ciliation between communities in Northern Ireland and by tackling sources of disad-
vantage, which sustain community divisions.
In this context, the European Commission’s incipient role in conflict resolution appeared
to centre on a link between prosperity and stability and saw economic aid as being a tool by
which to lever community relations. The manner of programme delivery thus advocated
and supported by the Commission involved an array of actors in Northern Ireland. A
strong emphasis on modes of partnership—cross-border, cross-sector, cross-commu-
nity—saw unlikely figures seated around the same table. In this way, EU financial
444 K. Hayward & M. C. Murphy
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support was an economic means of promoting novel forms of governance capable of deli-
vering economic and political benefits. The EU deliberately ties economic growth together
with the challenge of embedding peace; it thus sought, as one interviewee put it, ‘to lock
people in Northern Ireland together, so that they can’t go back, whilst giving their children
a future’. The most direct manifestation of this logic was the PEACE programme.
The original PEACE programme was initiated by the then President of the European
Commission, Jacques Delors, in 1994. It, and subsequent PEACE programmes, were dis-
tinct from other structural fund programmes in Northern Ireland (and elsewhere), given
that its strategic aim has been ‘to reinforce progress towards a peaceful and stable
society and to promote reconciliation’ (see, for example, European Union, 2009, p. 2).
At the launch of the initiative, Delors (European Union, 1994, p. 1) stated:
We should seize the new opportunities for action in Northern Ireland and address the
additional needs arising out of the peace process. This must be done now, to con-
vince those on the ground that the peace process can yield real dividends to their
lives.
The programme has largely focused on addressing specific problems, of an economic and
social nature, that are linked to the legacy of the conflict. Thus, the programme has
financed a range of measures, including economic regeneration, social inclusion and
reconciliation (Buchanan, 2008; Byrne et al., 2008). The PEACE money was intended
to raise important yet ‘missed’ areas of Northern Ireland society to a point of ‘normaliza-
tion’ in which society is raised out of the vicious cycle of conflict in order to develop itself.
All three rounds of the PEACE programme to date were conceived as being means to
‘complement the mainstream (political) efforts at peace-building but also were a specifi-
cally designed conflict transformation tool’ (Buchanan, 2008, p. 387); they have involved
support for civil society initiatives and local and regional partnership arrangements.
However, the programme has been a victim of its own success in many ways. As the pro-
spect of a fourth PEACE programme was proffered, interviewees in the public and civil
sector, to our surprise, expressed some dismay and concern as to the purpose and conse-
quences of such funding. The risk carried by this programme is that it has come to be
heavily depended upon, not only by the third sector but also by the public sector (and
perhaps even the private, in some areas). The EU does not want to be an unofficial prop
for government direction and funding, but nor does it want to financically abandon
Northern Ireland only to risk seeing it fall further behind in regional development.
Empowering: Facilitating Local Capacity Building
In 2007, and in anticipation of the devolution of powers to Northern Ireland in May of that
same year (following a prolonged suspension of almost 5 years), European Commission
President Jose
´Manuel Barroso visited the province and announced the creation of the
Northern Ireland Task Force (NITF). The move was seen as an attempt by the EU to
publicly endorse and support the return to devolution in Northern Ireland. Announcing
the creation of the NITF in Belfast, President Barroso said:
I believe there is a lot of symbolism in this because the message I want to bring to the
citizens of Northern Ireland is that precisely we are following with great admiration,
The (Soft) Power of Commitment 445
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great respect, very important political transformations here. This message I bring on
behalf of the European Commission and I can say on behalf of the European Union.
(BBC News, 1 May 2007)
Interviewees for the research behind this paper have claimed that immense credit is due
to Barroso and the Commission (particularly Directorate General (DG) Regio) for this
initiative, with Barroso being personally committed to demonstrating support for the
Northern Ireland peace process. The support of Catherine Day, Secretary General of
the European Commission and Irish economist, has also been indicated to have been
instrumental in the creation of the Task Force. The then Commissioner for Regional
Policy, Danuta Hu
¨bner, was delegated responsibility for pioneering and practically facil-
itating the work of the Task Force. What made this initiative different, however, was that
it was intended to enable Northern Ireland, as one interviewee described it, ‘to stand on
its own two feet’. The NITF was intended to consolidate the peace, the (grass)roots of
which the PEACE programme had helped (perhaps in ways of less significance than
the EU hoped) to nurture.
The NITF is not a financial package, nor does it involve an explicit financial incentive. It
is an attempt to facilitate regional strategic empowerment by serving as a conduit between
Northern Ireland and the EU. In effect, it represents:
a new and closer partnership between Northern Ireland and the Commission services
as the region’s long period as [a] major recipient of European regional aid is gradu-
ally phased out, and where it will increasingly rely on its own resources. (European
Commission, 2008a)
The Task Force was charged with advising the administration, business, research institutes
and other interests in Northern Ireland about how best to increase and optimize their invol-
vement in key EU initiatives, not least in terms of accessing extra funds by providing
Northern Ireland with the means and capacity to bid successfully for competitive EU
funding. In this context, the work of the Task Force is heavily focused on the growth
and jobs agenda but not limited to it, i.e. the EU still sees itself as a financial support to
the province.
The Northern Ireland Task Force sought to redress the fact that so few in Northern
Ireland were applying for the one-third of the EU budget that is dedicated to competitive
bidding. The EU recognized that this was because the incentives for doing so were dimin-
ished by the fact that monies acquired through such successful bidding were then deducted
from Northern Ireland’s block grant from the British Treasury. In 2007, the Treasury
changed the rules to remove the limits on the acquisition of additional monies by Northern
Ireland. The timing for this initiative was crucial in that it directly facilitated the work of
the proposed Northern Ireland Task Force, which was intended in part to increase substan-
tially the number of successful competitive bids within Northern Ireland for EU money.
This is done through the NITF by, according to one interviewee, ‘embedding Northern
Ireland in a dense maze of networking’ across the EU, to include a broad range of
policy concerns and actors. Northern Ireland, this interviewee noted, has ‘traditionally
been bad at this type of activity’. This is a fascinating example of soft power at work—
it is not just offering an opportunity for financial support, it is also increasing the
chances of winning this support by connecting individuals to ‘Europe’.
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Reforming: Helping Northern Ireland to Consolidate Peace
The Northern Ireland Report of the Task Force (European Commission, 2008b) was pub-
lished in April 2008 having drawn on the work of the Task Force in the period from May
2007 to April 2008. The report was welcomed by the Northern Ireland Executive (2008). It
is targeted and tailored to respond directly to Northern Ireland interests and to provide a
solid basis for the conduct of EU – Northern Ireland relations. The emphasis on regional
strategic empowerment as distinct from financial assistance is purposeful and resolute.
According to a senior European Commission official we interviewed, the NITF report
was ‘a unique experiment which was implicitly about self-sustainability’. In other
words, the NITF aimed to facilitate Northern Ireland’s adaptation to the rigours,
demands and challenges of their newly devolved status within the EU, which in turn, it
was anticipated, would strengthen and consolidate the peace process. Does the work of
the Task Force itself justify this ambition?
The Task Force itself represents an innovative approach on the part of the European
Commission to supporting a European region in transition, not only from conflict to
peace, but also from centralized to decentralized status. The Task Force undertook two
separate exercises to help Northern Ireland to boost its involvement in Community policies
and programmes as part of efforts to modernize its economy. First, it conducted a detailed
stocktaking of the achievements of Northern Ireland in different EU policies during the
period 2000– 2006 (and where appropriate with reference to other parts of the EU). The
comparative exercise demonstrated that Northern Ireland had performed reasonably
well relative to other European regions (Meehan, 2009). Second, the Task Force formu-
lated ‘recommendations on how the [Northern Ireland] administration, the private
sector, universities and research institutes, and other economic actors can contribute to,
and benefit more from, Europe’ (European Commission, 2008a, p. 2). To that end, the
work of the Task Force included the fast-tracking of decisions on new socio-economic
development programmes for the period 2007 –2013 (European Commission, 2008a, p. 4).
The Task Force report also serves a particular function towards meeting the overall goal
of the NITF. It provides a unique wealth of information and data in relation to the extent
and manner of Northern Ireland’s engagement with the European Commission over recent
years. Each chapter presents an overview of a specific policy area in terms of achievements
to date, priorities for 2007– 2013, and suggestions/recommendations for the future. The
report reveals the level of contact between Northern Ireland government departments,
interests groups, civil society and the services of the European Commission; it also
suggests specific and detailed actions for the Northern Ireland administration in antici-
pation of areas of important policy change in the EU, such as the Common Agricultural
Policy, advocating that Northern Ireland authorities forge a ‘pro-active’ stance, participate
in dialogue at ‘national and European levels’ and maintain ‘close contact with the Com-
mission services’ (European Commission, 2008b, p. 31). Northern Ireland is thus seen as a
‘new kid on the block’ in European negotiations, needing friendly advice and support in
coming out from behind Britain’s shadow.
For similar reasons, the Task Force also promoted a series of actions facilitating closer
and improved relations between the European Commission, EU networks and the North-
ern Ireland administration. The core members of the Task Force are officials in the various
services of the Commission with a role to play in the region’s economic modernization.
They include officials from agriculture, education and culture, employment, regional
The (Soft) Power of Commitment 447
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policy, enterprise and industry, environment, maritime affairs and fisheries, research and
development, transport and energy, and also the European Investment Bank (EIB). In
addition, officials from various Directorates-General in the Commission have been desig-
nated to act as ‘handholders’ to their Northern Ireland counterparts wishing to develop
stronger communicative links with the Commission. The general perception from Brussels
was that a ‘culture change’ was needed in the Northern Ireland civil service to facilitate
greater engagement with the EU. To this end, a Task Force Working Group was estab-
lished in Northern Ireland, drawing officials from all its government departments. It
was the task of this Working Group to develop thematic priorities to, as one interviewee
put it, ‘rebrand us [NI] and get us into international networks’. The Task Force report
shared this aim. The chapter on education and learning, for example, urges Northern
Ireland to become engaged with one or more of the eight European Commission-coordi-
nated Peer Learning Clusters, which promote the implementation of effective reforms of
education and training systems. The NITF also offers secondments to Brussels for North-
ern Ireland civil servants (European Commission 2008b, p. 67). These types of reform are
deemed necessary in Northern Ireland, specifically in the context of developing the best
possible human resources—regarded as a key means by which to allow Northern
Ireland to play its part in meeting the Lisbon goals (see European Commission 2008b,
pp. 41– 42). However, some departments in the Northern Ireland administration remain
more engaged than others, typically those with pre-existing regular links to Brussels.
Future: What is the Scope of the EU’s Soft Power?
The Commission has become concerned to facilitate a move from a divided society (as
recognized by the PEACE programme) to a shared society (as facilitated by the NITF),
i.e. one in which, according to one interviewee, young people are employed and educated
rather than being exposed to the appeal of dissidents. The heavy emphasis that the EU has
placed, since the restoration of devolution in 2007, on consolidating the peace in Northern
Ireland has seen it, in effect, ‘normalize’ the needs of this small region. When asked how
Northern Ireland should ideally be ‘rebranded’ as a result of the type of initiatives sup-
ported by the EU NITF, one OFMDFM official responded, ‘a modern, dynamic, competi-
tive, open, European region’.
It is worth noting that this approach has seen Northern Ireland transferred as a cause of
concern fully towards DG Regio, rather than DG Justice or DG Home Affairs, which share
responsibility for the task of conflict resolution in the Community. For such reasons,
participants in the NITF are approaching their role as being shaped specifically to the
needs of Northern Ireland as a region rather than becoming a model for use in other
parts of the EU. The wider significance or ‘legacy’ of the NITF has not, as one interviewee
put it, been ‘given any serious consideration’.
The circumstances that have enabled the EU to have such a deep level of engagement in
Northern Ireland—UK membership of the EU—have also been those that define the
boundaries to it. As Tannam (2007) notes, the evolution of the EU’s role in conflict res-
olution in Northern Ireland has always centred on the critical role of the British and
Irish governments. With regards to the new initiative of the NITF, the UK Permanent
Representative (UKRep) in Brussels is kept informed of key developments in the Northern
Ireland/EU relationship, but the Northern Ireland government and departments have
effectively been given ‘free reign’ to pursue the NITF interests and agenda. This is
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partly because the President of the European Commission himself has sponsored and
facilitated the work of the NITF. This unusual openness of UKRep to direct engagement
between the Commission and the Northern Ireland administration is seen to be a concrete
gesture on the part of the UK government to support Northern Ireland’s regional ‘empow-
erment’ rather than as a bypassing of the UK state. It remains the case that the UK position
regarding future developments in European integration, specifically the wide host of
changes anticipated with the EU2020 strategy, will, as one interviewee stated, ‘dictate
Northern Ireland’s fortunes’.
Critique: The Need for Reciprocation
The years following the restoration of devolution and the launch of the NITF have seen the
First Minister and Deputy First Minister publically engage with the EU via visits to Brus-
sels and hosting visits by European Commissioners to Northern Ireland. Much of the
context for this type of recent high-profile engagement has focused on the work of the
Northern Ireland Task Force. There is, however, a strong sense that the possibilities
offered by the NITF have not been fully exploited, and that much of the blame for this
can be levelled at the Northern Ireland Executive. On the face of it, outward signs of a will-
ingness to engage with the EU on the part of the most senior political level within the
Executive signals some enthusiasm for building EU networks and for developing a stra-
tegic engagement with Europe. However, on closer inspection this seeming eagerness to
nurture an EU agenda in Northern Ireland is rather shallow in nature. In practice, the
pursuit of a Northern Ireland EU agenda post-2007 has not been approached with any
degree of vigour or urgency by key Northern Ireland political figures. There is some
degree of disappointment with the perceived inadequacy of the Northern Ireland adminis-
tration’s response to the work of the NITF, such as the Executive’s failure to produce
annual action plans in response to the work of the NITF and the limited time devoted to
discussion of the NITF on the floor of the Northern Ireland Assembly (apart, for
example, from a Ministerial Statement in April 2009 by the Deputy First Minister on
the Executive’s Action Plan in response to the Barroso Task Force Report) (Northern
Ireland Assembly, 2009b). As the most pro-European party, and one with best knowledge
of the workings of the EU, the SDLP has criticized the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)
and Sinn Fe
´in for ‘squandering’ the influence and opportunity in Brussels offered by the
NITF. This is just one issue among many that the SDLP, with Ulster Unionist Party
backing, has criticized the administration of the DUP and Sinn Fe
´in power-holders.
These features of Northern Ireland’s limited engagement with the EU agenda, and the
NITF in particular, are symptomatic of broader political difficulties related to both the
nature of the devolved political system and strained relations between political parties.
This leads to the critical point in relation to the EU’s exercise of soft power for conflict
resolution in Northern Ireland: unlike hard power, the effectiveness of soft power depends
entirely on the response of the target. The muted response of the Northern Ireland admin-
istration to the privileged access they have been granted in the Commission demonstrates
the lack of reciprocity in its relationship with the EU. The EU is more committed to North-
ern Ireland’s future than Northern Ireland is to the EU. This says, arguably, as much about
the capacity of the Northern Ireland administrative and societal set-up to allow for agree-
ment as regards Northern Ireland’s future per se, let alone its relationship to Europe. The
EU’s attempt to move towards less direct and more mainstream means of consolidating
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peace appears to be no less vulnerable to internal whims and external pressures than its
funding programmes.
Conclusion
Despite some positive policy and financial outcomes from the interactions between the
European Commission and the Northern Ireland administration, the potential implicit in
the work of the Task Force has not been fully realized. The European Commission’s
ability to empower the Northern Ireland European region has been only partially success-
ful. The incapacity, and perhaps unwillingness, of the Northern Ireland administration to
engage fully with the EU is a consequence of party political wrangling, the low priority
afforded to the EU and the delicate political dynamics of the local devolved institutions.
The innovative nature of the work of the NITF is clear. The overriding emphasis on
regional strategic empowerment is not rooted in a financial aid package. The key objective
of the Task Force was to improve strategic capacity in Northern Ireland and thus allow key
actors to bid successfully for competitive EU funding. The report of the Task Force expli-
citly identified opportunities, networks and possibilities that Northern Ireland might
exploit. This more targeted and direct form of support for a region may, if proved success-
ful, have the potential to alter the ways in which the EU and regions cooperate in the
future. Indeed, Commissioner Hu
¨bner referred specifically to this possibility during her
visit to Northern Ireland in June 2007:
This work is important not only for Northern Ireland, but also for other parts of
Europe which can learn valuable lessons from what has been achieved here.
(European Commission, 2007)
Perhaps, for the time being, the most important lesson is that the challenge of consolidating
peace is, as Barroso himself is wont to say, ‘a marathon, not a sprint’ (Northern Ireland
Assembly, 2009a). This is a task most suitable for the nature of the EU’s soft power, as
it seeks to enable, fund, empower and reform. Sustaining all of these trends, and crucial
to their success, remains its enduring commitment to the task.
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