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Prying Eyes: Inside the NSA's War on Internet Security

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Prying Eyes: Inside the NSA's War on
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December 28, 2014 08:01 PM
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When Christmas approaches, the spies of the Five Eyes
intelligence services can look forward to a break from the arduous
daily work of spying. In addition to their usual job -- attempting to
crack encryption all around the world -- they play a game called
the "Kryptos Kristmas Kwiz," which involves solving challenging
numerical and alphabetical puzzles. The proud winners of the
competition are awarded "Kryptos" mugs.
Encryption -- the use of mathematics to protect communications
from spying -- is used for electronic transactions of all types, by
governments, firms and private users alike. But a look into the
archive of whistleblower Edward Snowden shows that not all
encryption technologies live up to what they promise.
One example is the encryption featured in Skype, a program used
by some 300 million users to conduct Internet video chat that is
touted as secure. It isn't really. "Sustained Skype collection began
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in Feb 2011," reads a National Security Agency (NSA) training
document from the archive of whistleblower Edward Snowden.
Less than half a year later, in the fall, the code crackers declared
their mission accomplished. Since then, data from Skype has
been accessible to the NSA's snoops. Software giant Microsoft,
which acquired Skype in 2011, said in a statement: "We will not
provide governments with direct or unfettered access to customer
data or encryption keys." The NSA had been monitoring Skype
even before that, but since February 2011, the service has been
under order from the secret US Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court (FISC), to not only supply information to the NSA but also
to make itself accessible as a source of data for the agency.
The "sustained Skype collection" is a further step taken by the
authority in the arms race between intelligence agencies seeking
to deny users of their privacy and those wanting to ensure they
are protected. There have also been some victories for privacy,
with certain encryption systems proving to be so robust they have
been tried and true standards for more than 20 years.
For the NSA, encrypted communication -- or what all other
Internet users would call secure communication -- is "a threat". In
one internal training document viewed by SPIEGEL, an NSA
employee asks: "Did you know that ubiquitous encryption on the
Internet is a major threat to NSA's ability to prosecute digital-
network intelligence (DNI) traffic or defeat adversary malware?"
The Snowden documents reveal the encryption programs the
NSA has succeeded in cracking, but, importantly, also the ones
that are still likely to be secure. Although the documents are
around two years old, experts consider it unlikely the agency's
digital spies have made much progress in cracking these
technologies. "Properly implemented strong crypto systems are
one of the few things that you can rely on," Snowden said in June
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2013, after fleeing to Hong Kong.
The digitization of society in the past several decades has been
accompanied by the broad deployment of cryptography, which is
no longer the exclusive realm of secret agents. Whether a person
is conducting online banking, Internet shopping or making a
phone call, almost every Internet connection today is encrypted in
some way. The entire realm of cloud computing -- that is of
outsourcing computing tasks to data centers somewhere else,
possibly even on the other side of the globe -- relies heavily on
cryptographic security systems. Internet activists even hold crypto
parties where they teach people who are interested in
communicating securely and privately how to encrypt their data.
German officials suggest "consistent encryption"
In Germany, concern about the need for strong encryption goes
right up to the highest levels of the government. Chancellor
Angela Merkel and her cabinet now communicate using phones
incorporating strong encryption. The government has also
encouraged members of the German public to take steps to
protect their own communication. Michael Hange, the president of
the Federal Office for Information Security, has stated: "We
suggest cryptography -- that is, consistent encryption."
It's a suggestion unlikely to please some intelligence agencies.
After all, the Five Eyes alliance -- the secret services of Britain,
Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United States -- pursue
a clear goal: removing the encryption of others on the Internet
wherever possible. In 2013, the NSA had a budget of more than
$10 billion. According to the US intelligence budget for 2013, the
money allocated for the NSA department called Cryptanalysis
and Exploitation Services (CES) alone was $34.3 million.
Last year, the Guardian, New York Times and ProPublica
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reported on the contents of a 2010 presentation on the NSA's
BULLRUN decryption program, but left out many specific
vulnerabilities. The presentation states that, "for the past decade,
NSA has led an aggressive, multipronged effort to break widely
used Internet encryption technologies," and "vast amounts of
encrypted Internet data which have up till now been discarded are
now exploitable." Decryption, it turns out, works retroactively -
once a system is broken, the agencies can look back in time in
their databases and read stuff they could not read before.
The number of Internet users concerned about privacy online has
risen dramatically since the first Snowden revelations. But people
who consciously use strong end-to-end encryption to protect their
data still represent a minority of the Internet-using population.
There are a number of reasons for this: Some believe encryption
is too complicated to use. Or they think the intelligence agency
experts are already so many steps ahead of them that they can
crack any encryption program.
Still Safe from the NSA
This isn't true. As one document from the Snowden archive
shows, the NSA had been unsuccessful in attempts to decrypt
several communications protocols, at least as of 2012. An NSA
presentation for a conference that took place that year lists the
encryption programs the
Americans failed to crack. In the process, the NSA cryptologists
divided their targets into five levels corresponding to the degree
of the difficulty of the attack and the outcome, ranging from
"trivial" to "catastrophic."
Monitoring a document's path through the Internet is classified as
"trivial." Recording Facebook chats is considered a "minor" task,
while the level of difficulty involved in decrypting emails sent
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through Moscow-based Internet service provider "mail.ru" is
considered "moderate." Still, all three of those classifications don't
appear to pose any significant problems for the NSA.
Things first become troublesome at the fourth level. The
presentation states that the NSA encounters "major" problems in
its attempts to decrypt messages sent through heavily encrypted
email service providers like Zoho or in monitoring users of the Tor
network*, which was developed for surfing the web anonymously.
Tor, otherwise known as The Onion Router, is free and open
source software that allows users to surf the web through a
network of more than 6,000 linked volunteer computers. The
software automatically encrypts data in a way that ensures that
no single computer in the network has all of a user's information.
For surveillance experts, it becomes very difficult to trace the
whereabouts of a person who visits a particular website or to
attack a specific person while they are using Tor to surf the Web.
The NSA also has "major" problems with Truecrypt, a program for
encrypting files on computers. Truecrypt's developers stopped
their work on the program last May, prompting speculation about
pressures from government agencies. A protocol called Off-the-
Record (OTR) for encrypting instant messaging in an end-to-end
encryption process also seems to cause the NSA major
problems. Both are programs whose source code can be viewed,
modified, shared and used by anyone. Experts agree it is far
more difficult for intelligence agencies to manipulate open source
software programs than many of the closed systems developed
by companies like Apple and Microsoft. Since anyone can view
free and open source software, it becomes difficult to insert secret
back doors without it being noticed. Transcripts of intercepted
chats using OTR encryption handed over to the intelligence
agency by a partner in Prism -- an NSA program that accesses
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data from at least nine American internet companies such as
Google, Facebook and Apple -- show that the NSA's efforts
appear to have been thwarted in these cases: "No decrypt
available for this OTR message." This shows that OTR at least
sometimes makes communications impossible to read for the
NSA.
Things become "catastrophic" for the NSA at level five - when, for
example, a subject uses a combination of Tor, another
anonymization service, the instant messaging system CSpace
and a system for Internet telephony (voice over IP) called ZRTP.
This type of combination results in a "near-total loss/lack of
insight to target communications, presence," the NSA document
states.
ZRTP, which is used to securely encrypt conversations and text
chats on mobile phones, is used in free and open source
programs like RedPhone and Signal. "It's satisfying to know that
the NSA considers encrypted communication from our apps to be
truly opaque," says RedPhone developer Moxie Marlinspike.
Too Robust for Fort Meade
Also, the "Z" in ZRTP stands for one of its developers, Phil
Zimmermann, the same man who created Pretty Good Privacy,
which is still the most common encryption program for emails and
documents in use today. PGP is more than 20 years old, but
apparently it remains too robust for the NSA spies to crack. "No
decrypt available for this PGP encrypted message," a further
document viewed by SPIEGEL states of emails the NSA obtained
from Yahoo.
Phil Zimmermann wrote PGP in 1991. The American nuclear
weapons freeze activist wanted to create an encryption program
that would enable him to securely exchange information with
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other like-minded individuals. His system quickly became very
popular among dissidents around the world. Given its use outside
the United States, the US government launched an investigation
into Zimmermann during the 1990s for allegedly violating the
Arms Export Control Act. Prosecutors argued that making
encryption software of such complexity available abroad was
illegal. Zimmermann responded by publishing the source code as
a book, an act that was constitutionally protected as free speech.
PGP continues to be developed and various versions are
available today. The most widely used is GNU Privacy Guard
(GnuPG), a program developed by German programmer Werner
Koch. One document shows that the Five Eyes intelligence
services sometimes use PGP themselves. The fact is that
hackers obsessed with privacy and the US authorities have a lot
more in common than one might initially believe. The Tor Project*,
was originally developed with the support of the US Naval
Research Laboratory.
Today, NSA spies and their allies do their best to subvert the
system their own military helped conceive, as a number of
documents show. Tor deanonymization is obviously high on the
list of NSA priorities, but the success achieved here seems
limited. One GCHQ document from 2011 even mentions trying to
decrypt the agencies' own use of Tor -- as a test case.
To a certain extent, the Snowden documents should provide
some level of relief to people who thought nothing could stop the
NSA in its unquenchable thirst to collect data. It appears secure
channels still exist for communication. Nevertheless, the
documents also underscore just how far the intelligence agencies
already go in their digital surveillance activities.
Internet security comes at various levels -- and the NSA and its
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allies obviously are able to "exploit" -- i.e. crack -- several of the
most widely used ones on a scale that was previously
unimaginable.
VPN Security only Virtual
One example is virtual private networks (VPN), which are often
used by companies and institutions operating from multiple
offices and locations. A VPN theoretically creates a secure tunnel
between two points on the Internet. All data is channeled through
that tunnel, protected by cryptography. When it comes to the level
of privacy offered here, virtual is the right word, too. This is
because the NSA operates a large-scale VPN exploitation project
to crack large numbers of connections, allowing it to intercept the
data exchanged inside the VPN -- including, for example, the
Greek government's use of VPNs. The team responsible for the
exploitation of those Greek VPN communications consisted of 12
people, according to an NSA document SPIEGEL has seen.
The NSA also targeted SecurityKiss, a VPN service in Ireland.
The following fingerprint for Xkeyscore, the agency's powerful
spying tool, was reported to be tested and working against the
service:
fingerprint('encryption/securitykiss/x509') = $pkcs and ( ($tcp and
from_port(443)) or ($udp and (from_port(123) or from_por (5000)
or from_port(5353)) ) ) and (not (ip_subnet('10.0.0.0/8' or
'172.16.0.0/12' or '192.168.0.0/16' )) ) and 'RSA Generated
Server Certificate'c and 'Dublin1'c and 'GL CA'c;
According to an NSA document dating from late 2009, the agency
was processing 1,000 requests an hour to decrypt VPN
connections. This number was expected to increase to 100,000
per hour by the end of 2011. The aim was for the system to be
able to completely process "at least 20 percent" of these
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requests, meaning the data traffic would have to be decrypted
and reinjected. In other words, by the end of 2011, the NSA's
plans called for simultaneously surveilling 20,000 supposedly
secure VPN communications per hour.
VPN connections can be based on a number of different
protocols. The most widely used ones are called Point-to-Point
Tunneling Protocol (PPTP) and Internet Protocol Security (Ipsec).
Both seem to pose few problems for the NSA spies if they really
want to crack a connection. Experts have considered PPTP
insecure for some time now, but it is still in use in many
commercial systems. The authors of one NSA presentation boast
of a project called FOURSCORE that stores information including
decrypted PPTP VPN metadata.
Using a number of different programs, they claim to have
succeeded in penetrating numerous networks. Among those
surveilled were the Russian carrier Transaero Airlines, Royal
Jordanian Airlines as well as Moscow-based telecommunications
firm Mir Telematiki. Another success touted is the NSA's
surveillance of the internal communications of diplomats and
government officials from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Turkey.
Ipsec as a protocol seems to create slightly more trouble for the
spies. But the NSA has the resources to actively attack routers
involved in the communication process to get to the keys to
unlock the encryption rather than trying to break it, courtesy of the
unit called Tailored Access Operations: "TAO got on the router
through which banking traffic of interest flows," it says in one
presentation.
Anything But Secure
Even more vulnerable than VPN systems are the supposedly
secure connections ordinary Internet users must rely on all the
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time for Web applications like financial services, e-commerce or
accessing webmail accounts. A lay user can recognize these
allegedly secure connections by looking at the address bar in his
or her Web browser: With these connections, the first letters of
the address there are not just http -- for Hypertext Transfer
Protocol -- but https. The "s" stands for "secure". The problem is
that there isn't really anything secure about them.
The NSA and its allies routinely intercept such connections -- by
the millions. According to an NSA document, the agency intended
to crack 10 million intercepted https connections a day by late
2012. The intelligence services are particularly interested in the
moment when a user types his or her password. By the end of
2012, the system was supposed to be able to "detect the
presence of at least 100 password based encryption applications"
in each instance some 20,000 times a month.
For its part, Britain's GCHQ collects information about encryption
using the TLS and SSL protocols -- the protocols https
connections are encrypted with -- in a database called "FLYING
PIG." The British spies produce weekly "trends reports" to catalog
which services use the most SSL connections and save details
about those connections. Sites like Facebook, Twitter, Hotmail,
Yahoo and Apple's iCloud service top the charts, and the number
of catalogued SSL connections for one week is in the many
billions -- for the top 40 sites alone.
Hockey sites monitored
Canada's Communications Security Establishment (CSEC) even
monitors sites devoted to the country's national pastime: "We
have noticed a large increase in chat activity on the hockeytalk
sites. This is likely due to the beginning of playoff season," it says
in one presentation.
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The NSA also has a program with which it claims it can
sometimes decrypt the Secure Shell protocol (SSH). This is
typically used by systems administrators to log into employees'
computers remotely, largely for use in the infrastructure of
businesses, core Internet routers and other similarly important
systems. The NSA combines the data collected in this manner
with other information to leverage access to important systems of
interest.
Weakening Cryptographic Standards
But how do the Five-Eyes agencies manage to break all these
encryption standards and systems? The short answer is: They
use every means available.
One method is consciously weakening the cryptographic
standards that are used to implement the respective systems.
Documents seen by SPIEGEL show that NSA agents travel to the
meetings of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), an
organization that develops such standards, to gather information
but presumably also to influence the discussions there. "New
session policy extensions may improve our ability to passively
target two sided communications," says a brief write-up of an
IETF meeting in San Diego on an NSA-internal Wiki.
This process of weakening encryption standards has been going
on for some time. A classification guide, a document that explains
how to classify certain types of secret information, labels "the fact
that NSA/CSS makes cryptographic modifications to commercial
or indigenous cryptographic information security devices or
systems in order to make them exploitable" as Top Secret.
Cryptographic systems actively weakened this way or faulty to
begin with are then exploited using supercomputers. The NSA
maintains a system called Longhaul, an "end-to-end attack
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orchestration and key recovery service for Data Network Cipher
and Data Network Session Cipher traffic." Basically, Longhaul is
the place where the NSA looks for ways to break encryption.
According to an NSA document, it uses facilities at the Tordella
Supercomputer Building at Fort Meade, Maryland, and Oak Ridge
Data Center in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. It can pass decrypted data
to systems such as Turmoil -- a part of the secret network the
NSA operates throughout the world, used to siphon off data. The
cover term for the development of these capabilities is Valientsurf.
A similar program called Gallantwave is meant to "break tunnel
and session ciphers."
In other cases, the spies use their infrastructure to steal
cryptographic keys from the configuration files found on Internet
routers. A repository called Discoroute contains "router
configuration data from passive and active collection" one
document states. Active here means hacking or otherwise
infiltrating computers, passive refers to collecting data flowing
through the Internet with secret NSA-operated computers.
An important part of the Five Eyes' efforts to break encryption on
the Internet is the gathering of vast amounts of data. For
example, they collect so-called SSL handshakes -- that is, the
first exchanges between two computers beginning an SSL
connection. A combination of metadata about the connections
and metadata from the encryption protocols then help to break
the keys which in turn allow reading or recording the now
decrypted traffic.
If all else fails, the NSA and its allies resort to brute force: They
hack their target's computers or Internet routers to get to the
secret encryption -- or they intercept computers on the way to
their targets, open them and insert spy gear before they even
reach their destination, a process they call interdiction.
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A Grave Threat to Security
For the NSA, the breaking of encryption methods represents a
constant conflict of interest. The agency and its allies do have
their own secret encryption methods for internal use. But the NSA
is also tasked with providing the US National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) with "technical guidelines in
trusted technology" that may be "used in cost-effective systems
for protecting sensitive computer data." In other words: Checking
cryptographic systems for their value is part of the NSA's job. One
encryption standard the NIST explicitly recommends is the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). The standard is used for a
large variety of tasks, from encrypting the PIN numbers of
banking cards to hard disk encryption for computers.
One NSA document shows that the agency is actively looking for
ways to break the very standard it recommends - this section is
marked as "Top Secret" (TS): "Electronic codebooks, such as the
Advanced Encryption Standard, are both widely used and difficult
to attack cryptanalytically. The NSA has only a handful of in-
house techniques. The TUNDRA project investigated a potentially
new technique -- the Tau statistic -- to determine its usefulness in
codebook analysis."
The fact that large amounts of the cryptographic systems that
underpin the entire Internet have been intentionally weakened or
broken by the NSA and its allies poses a grave threat to the
security of everyone who relies on the Internet -- from individuals
looking for privacy to institutions and companies relying on cloud
computing. Many of these weaknesses can be exploited by
anyone who knows about them -- not just the NSA.
Inside the intelligence community, this danger is widely known:
According to a 2011 document, 832 individuals at GCHQ alone
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were briefed into the BULLRUN project, whose goal is a large-
scale assault on Internet security.
By Jacob Appelbaum, Aaron Gibson, Christian Grothoff,
Andy Müller-Maguhn, Laura Poitras, Michael Sontheimer and
Christian Stöcker
* Two co-authors of this article, Jacob Appelbaum and Aaron
Gibson, work on the Tor-Project. Appelbaum also works on the
OTR project, as well as contributing to other encryption programs.
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... The dynamics of cat and mouse, or poacher and gamekeeper, are evident in revelations published in Spiegel (Appelbaum et al., 2014) that the NSA is having a difficult time decrypting some of the platforms that are used by activists to communicate with one another. Tor provides a level of anonymity that is difficult (although apparently not impossible) to surmount, whereas when Tor is used in conjunction with other encryption technologies (Appelbaum et al., 2014) it becomes 'catastrophic' to the NSA's ability to decrypt them. ...
... The dynamics of cat and mouse, or poacher and gamekeeper, are evident in revelations published in Spiegel (Appelbaum et al., 2014) that the NSA is having a difficult time decrypting some of the platforms that are used by activists to communicate with one another. Tor provides a level of anonymity that is difficult (although apparently not impossible) to surmount, whereas when Tor is used in conjunction with other encryption technologies (Appelbaum et al., 2014) it becomes 'catastrophic' to the NSA's ability to decrypt them. The use of end-to-end encrypted communication is still very much a hinderance to regimes who would ideally like to monitor all communications, usually under the auspices of fighting terrorism. ...
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Social network sites (SNSs) such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube are often claimed to be central in their role as a facilitating medium for contemporary protest movements. Protestors are able to coalesce around particular keywords such as found in the use of ‘hashtags’ on the SNS Twitter, while sympathetic audiences across the globe are able to follow events in real time. While the role of Twitter use in protests has been celebrated as a means of reducing the information asymmetry between protestors and police, this article problematises this view by exploring the ways in which social media data are beneficial to law enforcement agencies and the state. The article examines the extent to which intelligence agencies are able to monitor activists, drawing on the Edward Snowden revelations of widespread SNS surveillance, and the ways in which internet users are altering their online activities as a result of the revelations. Far from challenging the state, social media use and the data it provides offer the state a multitude of resources to extend its reach and to ensure political order.
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Why corporate crypto won't save you. Or even a typewriter.
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any references for this publication.