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© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2012 DOI: 10.1163/187119112X628454
e Hague Journal of Diplomacy 7 (2012) 135-160 brill.nl/hjd
Small States in the UN Security Council:
Means of Influence?
Baldur orhallsson*
Institute of International Affairs/Centre for Small State Studies, and Faculty of Political Science,
University of Iceland, Reykjavik, Iceland
baldurt@hi.is
Received: 8 February 2011; revised: 7 October 2011; accepted; 8 December 2011
Summary
is article argues that there are two broad categories of qualitative factors that determine the ability of
small states to influence the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). e first is the internal compe-
tence of small states in areas such as knowledge, initiative, and diplomatic, coalition and leadership skills.
e second is the image of the state in the international system with specific regard to its perceived neu-
trality or reputation as a norm entrepreneur in particular policy fields. ese qualitative features need to
be combined with quantitative variables — such as population, territorial size, gross domestic product
(GDP) and military capacity — that are normally used in International Relations (IR) in order to under-
stand small states’ ability to become active participants in the UNSC.
Keywords
small states, United Nations Security Council (UNSC), knowledge, initiative, diplomacy, coalition, lead-
ership, image
Introduction
Power in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is often solely ascribed to
the institutional position of the five permanent members (P5). eir right to veto
places them in a much stronger position than other states to influence the UN
decision-making process and world affairs. In international relations, the power
of a state is often attributed to quantitative criteria, such as population and ter-
ritorial size, gross domestic product (GDP) and military capacity.1 In these terms,
*) e author would like to thank his research assistant, Selina Stenberg, for her valuable contribution to
this project; and former students Pia Hansson, Þröstur Freyr Gylfason and Þórhildur Hagalín for inspir-
ing work on small states in the UN.
1) Clive Archer and Neill Nugent, ‘Small States and the European Union’, Current Politics and Economics
of Europe, vol. 11, no. 1, 2002, pp. 1-10.
136 B. orhallsson / e Hague Journal of Diplomacy 7 (2012) 135-160
small states are held to be politically, economically and strategically vulnerable2
and, as such, incapable of exerting any real influence in world affairs.3
However, real problems exist in categorizing and classifying states according to
these matrices. In the literature, small states are often defined by population
thresholds of 10 to 15 million.4 ese figures coincide with European studies that
perceive all European Union (EU) member states as small, apart from Germany,
the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain and Poland. On the other hand, the
Commonwealth and the World Bank usually use a threshold of 1.5 million peo-
ple but, in some instances, larger states, such as Jamaica, Lesotho, Namibia and
Papua New Guinea, are included because of their lack of institutional capabilities.5
us, very often, the figures depend on context.
In 2010, there were 192 UN member states, as shown in Fig. 1; thirteen had
less than 100,000 inhabitants and fifteen states had population sizes that fell
between 100,000 and 500,000. Altogether there were 39 states with less than one
million inhabitants and 71 states with a population between one and ten million.
If we draw the line between small and large states at ten million inhabitants, there
were 110 states in the UN that can be classified as small — that is, the majority
of member states.6
Other attempts at categorizing states focus on economic variables such as GDP.
Although economic factors are important markers of capabilities and power, the
nature of the decision-making process in the UNSC makes them less prominent
than in other intergovernmental organizations such as the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) and World Trade Organization (WTO). States elected to the
UNSC are not necessarily elected on the basis of their economic strength (or
military power) and in the Council their vote — excluding the P5 — weighs the
same. In fact, from 1991 to 2010 42 states in the UNSC had ten million or less
inhabitants, and 25 of these had a population of less than five million (see Fig. 2
and Table 1). However, the lack of consensus and agreement in categorizing states
within and between international organizations and IR theories make it even
more difficult to determine a state’s ability to influence decisions on the basis of
these quantitative criteria alone.
2) David Vital, e Inequality of States: A Study of Small Power in International Relations (Oxford: Claren-
don Press, 1967).
3) Robert O Keohane, ‘Lilliputians’ Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics’, International Orga-
nization, vol. 23, no. 2, 1969, pp. 291-310.
4) Harvey W. Armstrong and Robert Read, ‘e Phantom of Liberty? Economic Growth and the Vulner-
ability of Small States’, Journal of International Development, vol. 14, no. 4, 2002, pp. 435-458.
5) World Bank, ‘Small States: Meeting Challenges in the Global Economy’, Report of the Commonwealth
Secretariat/World Bank Joint Taskforce, April 2000, available online at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
PROJECTS/Resources/meetingchallengeinglobaleconomyl.pdf; and World Bank, ‘Defining a Small Econ-
omy’, Projects and Operations, 2007, available online at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTER-
NAL/PROJECTS/0,,contentMDK:21512464~pagePK:41367~piPK:51533~theSitePK :40941,00.html.
6) United Nations, Member States of the United Nations, 2006, available online at http://www.un.org/en/
members/index.shtml; and United States Census Bureau, International Data Base (IDB): Countries and
Areas Ranked by Population, 2010, available online at http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/broker.
B. orhallsson / e Hague Journal of Diplomacy 7 (2012) 135-160 137
Fig. 1. Number of UN states (192) according to population in millions, 2010.
Fig. 2. Number of states with a population of 10 million and fewer that were
elected to the UNSC, 1991-2010.
50
40
30
20
Number of states
10
>0.09 0.1-0.49 0.5-0.99 1.0-4.99 5.0-9.99 10.0-14.9 15.0-19.9 <20
13 15
11
41
30
25
18
39
0
>0.09 0.1-0.49 0.5-0.99 1.0-4.99 5.0-10.9
25
20
15
Number of states
10
5
0
4
21
17
138 B. orhallsson / e Hague Journal of Diplomacy 7 (2012) 135-160
Table 1: States with a Population of 10 Million and Fewer that Were Elected
to the UNSC, 1991-2010
States Population
(2010) Period No. of countries’
UN mission staff
(2010)
Belgium 10.4 1991-1992/ 2007-2008 47
Sweden 9.1 1997-1998 42
Portugal 10.7 1997-1998 39
Norway 4.7 2001-2002 32
Denmark 5.5 2005-2006 21
Hungary 9.9 1992-1993 18
Greece** 10.7 2005-2006 18
Libya 6.5 2008-2009 17
Slovakia 5.4 2006-2007 16
New Zealand 4.3 1993-1994 15
Czech Republic 10.2 1994-1995 14
Guinea 10.3 2002-2003 13
Benin 9.1 2004-2005 11
Slovenia 2 1998-1999 10
Panama 3.4 2007-2008 10
Bosnia Herzegovina 4.6 2010-2011 10
Ireland 4.6 2001-2002 10
Bulgaria 7.1 2002-2003 10
Tunisia 10.6 2000-2001 9
Lebanon 4.1 2010-2011 9
Costa Rica 4.5 1997-1999/2008-2009 9
Croatia 4.5 2008-2009 9
Botswana 2.1 1995-1996 8
Singapore 4.7 2001-2002 8
Djibouti 0.7 1993-1994 7
Oman 2.9 1994-1995 7
Cape Verde 0.5 1992-1993 7
Gabon 1.5 1998-1999/2010-2011 6
Qatar** 0.8 2006-2007 6
Gambia 1.8 1998-1999 6
Bahrain 0.7 1998-1999 4
Mauritius 1.3 2001-2002 4
Jamaica 2.8 2000-2001 2
Guinea Bissau 1.6 1996-1997 *
B. orhallsson / e Hague Journal of Diplomacy 7 (2012) 135-160 139
In the literature on small states, qualitative variables have received considerable
attention in explaining states’ international influence. ese variables include
small states as norm entrepreneurs,7 the image and perception of domestic and
international actors,8 the aims and priorities of state leaders,9 and the administra-
tive competence associated with small states’ central bureaucracy.10 ese factors
contradict traditional IR theories, which have a tendency to reduce explanations
of power and action to economic or military variables only.
Furthermore, the relational definition of small states shifts the focus from the
power that states possess to the power that they exercise. A small state is seen as
tied to a specific spatio-temporal context that is not a general characteristic of the
state — that is, a state may be weak in one relation but powerful in another.11
Accordingly, it is not useful to categorize states generally according to quantita-
tive criteria or to come up with a definite category of small states, since their
power potential varies according to the subject area. On the other hand, the
7) Christine Ingebritsen, ‘Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia’s Role in International Relations’, in Small
States in International Relations (Seattle WA: University of Washington Press / Reykjavik: University of
Iceland Press, 2006).
8) Gunnhildur Lily Magnúsdóttir, Small States’ Power Resources in EU Negotiations: e Case of Sweden,
Denmark and Finland in the Environmental Policy of the EU, Ph.D. thesis, University of Iceland, 2009;
and Staale Ulriksen, Deployments for Development? Nordic Peacekeeping Efforts in Africa (Oslo: Norwegian
Institute of International Affairs, 2006), available online at http://www.nupi.no/Publikasjoner/
Notater/2006/Deployments-for-Development-Nordic-Peacekeeping-Efforts-in-Africa.
9) Keohane, ‘Lilliputians’ Dilemmas’; and Baldur orhallsson, ‘e Size of States in the European Union:
eoretical and Conceptual Perspectives’, Journal of European integration, vol. 28, no. 1, 2006, pp. 7-31.
10) Baldur orhallsson, e Role of Small States in the European Union (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2000).
11) Hans Mouritzen and Anders Wivel (eds), e Geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic Integration (London: Rout-
ledge, 2005).
States Population
(2010) Period No. of countries’
UN mission staff
(2010)
Namibia 2.1 1999-2000 *
Congo Brazzaville 4.1 2006-2007 *
Honduras 7.9 1995-1996 *
Austria 8.2 1991-1992/2009-2010 *
Sources: United Nations, Member States of the United Nations; United Nations, ‘Permanent Mission
of Cape Verde to the UN: Letter from the Division of Advancement of Women’, 2006, available
online at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw36/CPV_ delegation.pdf; United
States Census Bureau, International Data Base (IDB); and United Nations Security Council, UN
Security Council Memberships, 1991-2010.
* Numbers not available.
** Only Geneva numbers available.
Table 1 (cont.)
140 B. orhallsson / e Hague Journal of Diplomacy 7 (2012) 135-160
literature cannot escape the reality that states in the UN are often perceived
according to the traditional quantitative criteria. Hence, in order to analyse the
smaller members’ means of influence within the UN and to compare it with the
larger states, it is necessary to draw a line between the two groups, as in Figure 2,
although such a distinction has its limitations, as discussed above and indicated
by the article’s findings on the importance of qualitative variables.
e purpose of this article is thus to assess what factors are best suited to explain-
ing a small state’s ability to participate in, and influence, the UNSC decision-
making process. is is, of course, a difficult task, as traditional IR literature is
dominated by the capabilities of the P5. However, this article seeks to demonstrate
that the nature of power in the UNSC is more nuanced than is often claimed. e
article argues that the ‘traditional’ quantitative variables that are normally used to
define state sizes and to predict state behaviours in the international system do not
completely grasp the role that small states can play in the decision-making process
of the UNSC. e article suggests that the administrative competences of small
states — based on quality not quantity, diplomatic skills, knowledge and initia-
tives — are important factors to explain their accomplishments within the UNSC.
In addition, states’ image and their reputation as norm entrepreneurs and their
perceived neutrality are important sources for success. Moreover, to become active
and successful, small states need to demonstrate strong leadership, excellent coali-
tion-building skills and an ability to prioritize heavy workloads.
e article begins by addressing some of the deficits of current IR theories in
order to grasp and account for the role that small states play in the international
system. is is combined with a discussion on previous ideas and perceptions of
small states in the UN system and its predecessor, the League of Nations. e
article will then examine the role of small states as non-permanent members of
the Security Council. It identifies small states that often participate in the Coun-
cil’s proceedings and those that can be deemed particularly active within it and
the UN in general. is leads to an examination of the factors that determine the
ability of small states to be influential in the UNSC. e article concludes by
combining the theories with the article’s main findings and suggests that these
factors can be used in a prescriptive manner by small states aiming to be active
and successful participants in the UNSC proceedings.
eoretical Considerations and Opportunities for Small States within
the UN
Traditional IR theories commonly maintain that a state’s size is closely associated
with the concept of capabilities. According to Neumann and Gstöhl,12 IR is
12) Iver B. Neumann and Sieglinde Gstöhl, ‘Lilliputians in Gulliver’s World’, in: Small States in International
Relations (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press / Reykjavik: University of Iceland Press, 2006).
B. orhallsson / e Hague Journal of Diplomacy 7 (2012) 135-160 141
preoccupied with measuring state capabilities on the assumption that having
them implies pending action. For realist thinkers, international relations are
guided by military strength, power politics, warfare and survival under anarchy,
limiting capabilities to larger and more powerful states.13 Within this framework,
the United States will act differently to the EU because of its superior capabili-
ties.14 is is closely akin to neo-realism, in which anarchy and state capabilities
are seen as structural preconditions that can explain and predict state behaviours
in the international system.15 ese approaches fail to account for small states as
international actors, in part because of their neglect of international norms and
rules in determining state behaviour. ey also ignore, for example, the existence
of links — such as common values, histories, trade and regions — that tie states
together. In order to overcome the deficits of assuming that all actors have the
same IR starting point of ‘great power capabilities’ and interests, the field of small
state studies focuses on the role that ideas and global governance play in deter-
mining different states’ behaviour.16
Within this framework, neo-liberal institutionalism provides a better under-
standing of the role that small states play in the international system.17 From this
perspective, the five permanent members of the UNSC have to work and cooper-
ate with the elected members, the UN Secretary-General, non-permanent mem-
bers and other international organizations to gather information and draft
resolutions effectively. us, in order to be seen as legitimate actors, the proce-
dural aspects of discussing — including information-gathering, drafting and pre-
senting resolutions — are as important as the outcome of resolutions for the P5
and the UNSC. In addition, although the P5 have the right to veto, according to
Rule 35 of the Charter any member can bring matters to the attention of the
Council. For Hurd, this represents an important source of power for them, which
in effect gives them a say in the UNSC’s agenda: ‘Technically, the UNSC cannot
veto their introduction nor take it off the agenda’.18
e power of institutions, then, also lies in the structure, consisting of laws and
treaties, which states create and by which they have to abide. Liberal institutional-
ists often argue that states seek order and stability in anarchy, illustrated by their
13) John Mearsheimer, ‘Correspondence: Back to the Future. Part II: International Relations eory and
Post-Cold War Europe’, International Security, vol. 15, no. 2, 1990, pp. 194-199; Hans J. Morgenthau,
Politics among Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 5th edition 1972); Kenneth Walz, ‘Political Struc-
tures’, in: Robert Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and it Critics (New York: Colombia University Press, 1986);
and Martin Wight, ‘e ree Traditions’, in: Brian Porter and Gabriele Wight (eds), International e-
ory: e ree Traditions (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1991).
14) Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Knopf,
2003).
15) Walz, ‘Political Structures’.
16) Neumann and Gstöhl, ‘Lilliputians in Gulliver’s World’.
17) Neumann and Gstöhl, ‘Lilliputians in Gulliver’s World’.
18) Ian Hurd, ‘Legitimacy, Power, and the Symbolic Life of the UN Security Council’, Global Governance,
vol. 8, no. 1, 2002, pp. 35-51 at p. 40.
142 B. orhallsson / e Hague Journal of Diplomacy 7 (2012) 135-160
willingness to invest resources in expanding international institutions.19 If process
also determines states’ behaviour, then the interactions among them are equally
important.20 is is illustrated by the actions of larger states that are engaged in
multilateral diplomacy. Refusal to follow international laws, norms and treaties
means that they will face several difficulties despite their ‘traditional’ political and
economical powers. However, (neo-)liberal institutionalism — like other domi-
nant IR theories — falls into the trap of focusing excessively on ‘differences in
capabilities’ between states.21 e argument is often posed that institutions are
formed by, and for, the powerful states, giving rise to claims that, for example, the
Bretton Woods institutions have been operated more like ‘clubs’.22 While small
states can lobby for favourable outcomes in international institutions, differences
in capabilities between small and large states have a tendency to exclude the pos-
sibility of small states’ ability to influence.
eoretical approaches would benefit greatly by redirecting their attention
towards the qualitative means that are available to small states to influence the
UNSC, such as good image/perception, administrative competence — based on
the characteristics of a small bureaucracy — and favourable diplomatic multilat-
eral arrangements. is is partly because states have both similar and different
reasons, interests and motivations for participating and becoming members of
international organizations. Small states, like other states, aspire to, and achieve,
UN membership in order to receive official approval and international recogni-
tion of their independence and sovereignty, particularly in instances of decoloni-
zation. e UN provides small states, which often have limited resources available
to defend their borders, with a framework of multilateralism through interna-
tional treaties and laws, by which to receive endorsement. By protecting small
states, this same framework inhibits larger and more aggressive states. Hence, the
founding premises of the UN — to ensure peace and security — as a supplement
to bilateral relations are perceived to be crucial to the interests and relations of
small states. is position is epitomized by Mahbubani, the former Permanent
Representative to Singapore, who argued that ‘small states have a greater vested
interest in international peace and stability than larger states’.23
19) Robert O. Keohane and Lisa Martin, ‘e Promise of an Institutional eory’, International Security,
vol. 20, no. 1, 1995, pp. 39-51.
20) Hedley Bull, ‘International Relations as an Academic Pursuit’, Australian Outlook, vol. 26, no. 3,
1972, pp. 251-265.
21) Neumann and Gstöhl, ‘Lilliputians in Gulliver’s World’.
22) Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye, ‘Introduction: Governance in a Globalizing World’, in: J. Dona-
hue and Joseph Nye (eds), Governance in a Globalizing World (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution
Press, 2000).
23) Kishore Mahbubani, ‘Message from Permanent Representative: Welcome Note by Ambassador Extraor-
dinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative Permanent Mission of the Republic of Singapore to
the United Nations, 2002, available online at http://www.mfa.gov.sg/unsc/unsc_message.html.
B. orhallsson / e Hague Journal of Diplomacy 7 (2012) 135-160 143
In addition to recognition of sovereignty, UN membership amounts to accep-
tance into the international community by other states and actors, providing
small states with access to a variety of international, transnational and multina-
tional bodies, such as the IMF and World Bank, which can facilitate widespread
development assistance. In essence, the UN provides states with a venue in which
to pursue and promote their interests through engagement with other states. is
important facilitative role is highlighted by the fact that all UN member states —
except for Kiribati, which has only a handful of diplomatic officers abroad —
have a permanent mission at the UN.24 It is important to point out that these
interests are neither homogeneous nor bound solely to realist interests with regard
to survival or military strength. On the other hand, interest among states cannot
be reduced to the liberal institutionalist assertion that small states seek member-
ship in international institutions solely on the grounds that laws, norms and trea-
ties constrain larger states.
Although the foreign policy of the Nordic states (Sweden, Norway, Denmark
and Finland) is directly linked to different international and intergovernmental
institutions, Ulriksen claims that the relationship is far more complicated, with
the Nordic states actively seeking to influence world affairs through image and
perception-building.25 e Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs directly links
reputation to influence, and the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has bluntly
stated that ‘Creating a strong image of Sweden abroad is another means of pro-
moting Sweden’.26 us, in the UN, the Nordic states try to influence by active
participation and contribution towards humanitarianism, world peace and burden-
sharing. Ingebritsen argues that the Nordic states pursue ‘social power’ by acting
to promote a particular view of the ‘good society’.27 ey hence act as norm
entrepreneurs, persuading states to adopt new norms, and are successful if states
conform to their norms in the absence of domestic pressure. Moreover, norms
may become internationalized if states adopt them almost automatically.28 Accord-
ingly, Nordic strategies are grounded in a commitment to pursue interests through
‘soft power’. For Nye, soft power is influence derived from a state’s qualitative
features — such as diplomatic skills, culture and reputation — as opposed to real-
ist military and political hard power.29 According to Nye, soft power is the ability
to get others to want what you want; hard power is the ability to get others to do
what they would not otherwise do. Small states can use their soft-power resources
24) United Nations, Member States of the United Nations.
25) Ulriksen, Deployments for Development?, p. 1.
26) Cited in Ulriksen, Deployments for Development?, p. 10.
27) Ingebritsen, ‘Norm Entrepreneurs’.
28) Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’,
International Organization, vol. 52, no. 4, 1998, pp. 887-917.
29) Joseph S. Nye, ‘Soft Power’, Foreign Policy, vol. 80, 1990, pp. 153-171.
144 B. orhallsson / e Hague Journal of Diplomacy 7 (2012) 135-160
to shape outcomes, such as at the UNSC, and do not need to have great hard-
power resources.30
Small states have not always been welcomed to the UN platform on an equal
footing with the larger states. Liechtenstein, San Marino and Monaco unsuccess-
fully sought international recognition from the UN predecessor, the League of
Nations, in 1919 and 1920. ey were regarded as being too small and therefore
incapable of conducting a foreign policy that was independent of their larger
neighbouring states.31 In 1920, a Committee on Amendments to the Covenant
by the League of Nations concluded that smaller states should be admitted to the
League, but on different grounds. ree types of membership were suggested:
associated membership; limited participation membership; and represented
membership.32 e recognition of small states as politically equal to larger states
has thus historically been a contentious issue. Understandably, no small state
chose to apply for membership based on these alternatives, and the League hence
did not amend them to the Charter.
In a similar fashion, during the decolonization processes of the late 1960s and
early 1970s, there were considerable debates within the UN as to whether to offer
new members, particularly small states, alternative forms of membership. Mem-
ber states — particularly the large ones — and the UN Secretary-General were
concerned about the prospects of providing equal voting powers to small states in
the UN Assembly. In addition, the overriding perception was that small states
were not able to fulfil the UN’s Charter criteria because of their small size and
limited resources. e opponents of small-state membership cited Article 4 of the
Charter, which stated that only states that in the judgement of the Organization
are able and willing to carry out its obligations, such as to take effective collective
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, could join the
UN.33 Several membership alternatives were put forward: observer status; mem-
bership that was exempt from the right to vote and hold office; different forms of
associated membership; and a distinction between the right to independence and
full UN membership.34
30) Joseph S. Nye, e Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011).
31) Stephen Schwebel, ‘Mini-States and a More Effective United Nations’, e American Journal of Inter-
national Law, vol. 67, no. 1, 1973, pp. 108-116; and Jorri Duursma, Fragmentation and the International
Relations of Micro-States: Self Determination and Statehood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996).
32) Duursma, Fragmentation and the International Relations of Micro-States.
33) United Nations, e Charter of the United Nations and Statue of the International Court of Justice (New
York: UN Department of Public Information, 1985), available online at http://www.un.org/en/docu-
ments/charter/index.shtml.
34) Duursma, Fragmentation and the International Relations of Micro-States; Michael M. Gunter, ‘What
Happened to the United Nations Mini-state Problem?’, American Journal of International Law, vol. 71,
1977, pp. 110-124; David Rapoport, ‘e Corrupt State: e Case of Rome Reconsidered’, Political
Studies, vol. 16, no. 3, 1968, pp. 411-432; and Schwebel, ‘Mini-States and a More Effective United
Nations’.
B. orhallsson / e Hague Journal of Diplomacy 7 (2012) 135-160 145
e UN, however, did not carry out these suggestions. e UN Legal Council
came to the conclusion that none of the amendments could be carried out with-
out fundamentally altering the UN Charter. e notion of fundamentally alter-
ing the Charter was extremely unpopular, as this would have questioned the core
principle of sovereignty and the equal sovereignty of all states.35 e result is that
all UN member states have one vote each in the UN General Assembly, despite
enormous differences in sizes and capabilities. In addition, in the early 1990s,
Liechtenstein, San Marino and Monaco were finally granted full membership of
the UN.
However, real concerns about the independence and capacity of some of the
smallest UN member states to participate in the UNSC have remained. For
instance, e Marshall Islands, Micronesia and Palau are committed to having to
consult the United States on their foreign affairs; Monaco is obliged to consider
the political, economic and military interests of France; and Andorra is bound by
a trilateral treaty with both France and Spain, in which it commits itself to French
and Spanish foreign policy interests.36
Ten countries are elected by the General Assembly to serve as non-permanent
members for two-year terms and are not eligible for immediate re-election: two
from Africa; two from Latin America and the Caribbean; two from Asia; two
from Eastern Europe; and two from Western European and other states. From
1991 to 2010, 100 countries were elected to participate in the UNSC.37 Of these,
four had a population of between 500,000 and one million (Cape Verde, Dji-
bouti, Bahrain and Qatar), 21 had a population of between one and five million,
and seventeen had a population of between five and ten million (see Table 1 and
Fig. 2). It is noticeable that none of the 28 states with a population of less than
500,000 (see Fig. 1) has been elected to the UNSC, as Fig. 2 demonstrates.
From a traditional realist perspective, small states faced by the anarchical sys-
tem do not have many alternatives other than to bandwagon with, or balance
against, larger states to ensure their survival.38 As such, they are presumed to have
limited influence within the decision-making process. However, the current
UNSC operates in a different environment than during the era of Cold War real-
politik. From the 1990s onwards, the majority of conflicts and UNSC resolutions
have involved intra-state and civil conflicts rather than traditional wars between
states. Since 1990, the UNSC has been responsible for 56 peace missions,
35) Duursma, Fragmentation and the International Relations of Micro-States; and Gunter, ‘What Happened
to the United Nations Mini-state Problem?’.
36) Þórhildur Ósk Hagalin, Real Independence of Micro-states in International Organizations and State Rela-
tions, BA thesis, University of Iceland, 2005.
37) United Nations Security Council, UN Security Council Memberships, 1991-2010 (New York: UNSC,
2010), available online at http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp.
38) Stephen M. Walt, e Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).
146 B. orhallsson / e Hague Journal of Diplomacy 7 (2012) 135-160
including peacekeeping, observations, stabilization, support, transition, police
and other operations.39 According to Hulton,
[. . .] peacekeeping operations in such contexts have evolved into a more complex and multidimen-
sional mechanism; in addition to military components, they may have a humanitarian relief compo-
nent, as well as elements aimed at bringing about national reconciliation and re-establishing effective
government.40
Furthermore, Hulton emphasizes the way in which the P5 recognized their limi-
tations in these new conflicts.41 e P5 acknowledged that good decisions are
dependent on the inputs that, because of different capacities and areas of focus in
their information-gathering, had to be gleaned from wider sources than the fif-
teen members. Reforms have also increased transparency and openness, and made
the decision-making procedure more efficient,42 leading to claims that the UNSC
has turned into a problem-solving institution.43
As old Cold War power relations have been transformed or have diminished in
prominence, the UNSC opened itself up to face a new era beset by different types
of conflicts. is, in turn, opened up space for smaller states to step up and con-
tribute in certain policy areas. Despite unequal voting rights between the Elected
10 (E10) and P5, the majority of countries still aspire to membership of the
UNSC.
From a Beneficiary to a Contributor and an Active Member
To understand when and how a state considers that it can contribute to, rather
than merely receiving benefits from, the UN, one has to look at its domestic and
external competencies. Motivation among political leaders to contribute to the
UN is essential. A government has to have the ambition to play an active role in
the UN’s work, set an aim of involvement and prioritize the UN cause. Ideology
may also play a significant part in such a mission. For example, the value of equal-
ity for the long-serving Social Democratic Parties in the Nordic states may pro-
vide an ideological basis for supporting humanitarian and peacekeeping missions.
In addition, politicians need to regard their state as able to make a difference
39) United Nations, ‘List of Operations, 1948-2010’, Peacekeeping Department, 2010, available online
at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/list.shtml.
40) Susan C. Hulton, ‘Council Working Methods and Procedures’, in: David Malone and David M.
Boulder (eds), e UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century (London: Lynne Rienner,
2004), pp. 240-241.
41) Hulton, ‘Council Working Methods and Procedures’, p. 241.
42) Hulton, ‘Council Working Methods and Procedures’, p. 337.
43) Kishore Mahbubandi, ‘Permanent and Elected Council Members’, in: David Malone and David M.
Boulder (eds), e UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century (London: Lynne Rienner,
2004), p. 254.
B. orhallsson / e Hague Journal of Diplomacy 7 (2012) 135-160 147
within the UN apparatus. Moreover, the cohesion and national unity that are
evident in the Nordic states’ foreign policy objectives towards the UN (that is, in
the case of Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland) contributed greatly to their
commitment to the UN’s cause.44
is is illustrated by the Nordic financial support for UN organizations such
as the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Norway and Sweden were the
second and fourth largest donors to OCHA in 2004, with contributions of US$
12 and US$ 9 million respectively, while Denmark and Finland were ranked
as twelfth and fourteenth, with contributions of between one and two million
dollars — far more than Japan and Germany.45 In general, the Nordic states have
an astonishing track record of supporting the UN, providing, for example, 25 per
cent of all the military personnel deployed in UN peacekeeping operations dur-
ing the Cold War.46 In addition, Norway, Sweden and Denmark have, for a num-
ber of years, been some of the few countries, along with Luxembourg and the
Netherlands, to reach the UN’s target of 0.7 per cent of GDP in Overseas Devel-
opment Aid (ODA). e high ODA score and its associated ‘good international
practice’ is an asset that is quite effectively utilized by the Nordic states on the
international scene.47
is is important, as international institutional expectations rise in accordance
with perceived changes in states’ wealth and competence. In accordance with
good international practice, states may feel pressurized by the international com-
munity — both by individual states and the UN — to contribute both financial
and human resources to UN activities. Both Iceland and Ireland experienced
considerable pressure during the late 1990s from the international community to
increase development funding and aid, and to create peacekeeping units as they
became more affluent and developed more comprehensive foreign policies.48
A government that does not regard the UN apparatus favourably in its attempt
to be influential and to gain benefits from its activeness is unlikely to pool
resources towards the UN cause. is was the case of the Icelandic government,
which was divided in its bid for UNSC membership. Iceland’s Prime Minister
Davíð Oddsson (1991-2004), who later become Foreign Minister (2004-2005),
44) Baldur orhallsson, ‘Iceland’s Involvement in Global Affairs since the Mid-1990s: What Features
Determine the Size of a State’, Stjórnmál og Stjórnsýsla Veftímarit [Politics and Administration Web Jour-
nal], 2006, available online at http://stjornmalogstjornsysla.is/images/stories/fg2006h/baldur.pdf.
45) OCHA cited in Ulriksen, Deployments for Development?, pp. 14-15.
46) Danish Institute for International Studies, ‘Nordic Peace Diplomacy: Looking Back, Moving For-
ward’, background note for conference part of Norway’s Centennial Anniversary 1905-2005 programme,
Copenhagen, 24 February 2005, available online at http://www.diis.dk/sw9099.asp.
47) Ulriksen, Deployments for Development?, p. 14.
48) Christophe Gillissen, ‘e Back to the Future? Ireland at the UN Security Council, 2001-2002’,
Nordic Irish Studies, vol. 5, 2006, pp. 23-40; Katsumi Ishizuka, Ireland and International Peacekeeping
Operations, 1960-2000 (London: Frank Cass, 2004); and orhallsson, ‘Iceland’s Involvement in Global
Affairs Since the Mid-1990s’.
148 B. orhallsson / e Hague Journal of Diplomacy 7 (2012) 135-160
argued that Iceland, as a small state, would not be able to exercise any influence
within the Security Council or to receive any benefits from membership. Odds-
son and some other Conservative MPs hence saw no reason to continue the cam-
paign and considered withdrawing from it. When they failed to get the government
to withdraw from the bid, they limited the resources available for it. Iceland’s
challengers, Turkey and Austria, then openly questioned Iceland’s seriousness
about its application, and this seriously undermined Iceland’s campaign.49
e importance of small states’ administrative competences and their activity
in the UN work is demonstrated by the number of times that countries have been
invited as outsiders to the UNSC meetings on the basis of Rule 37, as indicated
in Table 2. According to the rule, states that either have a particular interest in
issues being discussed in the UNSC or have brought the matter to the Security
Council’s attention may be invited, or request an invitation, to the UNSC with-
out the right to vote.50 e ability of non-members to exert influence on specific
issues has increased with the publishing of the Security Council’s monthly pro-
gramme of work and a provisional agenda in advance of its meetings,51 making it
possible for states to be informed and prepare for proceedings. Importantly, coun-
tries that score high on the Human Development Index (HDI)52 are more likely
to be proactive within the UN (see Table 2). A state’s high ranking on the HDI is
seen as a significant source of prestige and adds to the country’s international
image (as demonstrated in newspaper coverage around the globe — for example,
the Nordic states are often hailed for their high HDI ranking).
Norway was invited to the UNSC 78 times during the period from 2000 to
2007, despite not being part of any conflict, as Table 2 indicates. Only Israel was
invited more often. However, Norway’s total number of invitations might actu-
ally have been higher had it not been an elected member of the Security Council
from 2001-2002. During the same period, Bangladesh, which is the biggest troop
contributor to UN peacekeeping missions with nearly 11,000 police, experts and
troops in 2010 and a population of 156 million,53 was only invited 30 times to
the Security Council.
49) Utanríkisráðuneytið [Iceland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs], Skýrsla um framboð Íslands og kosning-
abaráttu til sætis í öryggisráði Sameinuðu þjóðanna, 2009-1010 [Report on Iceland’s bid for a seat in the
UN Security Council], 2009, available online at http://captainfigolu.appspot.com/www.utanrikisra-
duneyti.is/media/PDF/Lokaskyrsla_um_oryggisradsframbodid_2008PDF.
50) United Nations, ‘Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council’, S/96/Rev.7, 1983, available
online at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/scrules.htm.
51) Hulton, ‘Council Working Methods and Procedures’, p. 245.
52) e purpose of HDI is to assess the quality of life based on: 1) a long and healthy life/life expectancy
at birth; 2) access to knowledge/mean years of schooling and expected years of schooling; and 3) a decent
standard of living/GDP per capita (in purchasing power parity, or PPP).
53) United Nations, ‘Contributors to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’ (New York: Peacekeeping
Department, 2010), available online at http://www.un.org/peacekeeing/contributors/2010/aug10_1.pdf.
B. orhallsson / e Hague Journal of Diplomacy 7 (2012) 135-160 149
Table 2: States with a Population of 10 Million and Fewer that were Invited 25
Times or More to the UNSC under Rule 37, 2000-2007
States Population
(2010) HDI (ranking) Number of
invitations
2000-03
Number of
invitations
2004-07
Total number of
invitations
2000-07
Israel 7.4 0.932 (23) 33 47 80
Norway 4.7 0.968 (2) 26 52 78
New Zealand 4.3 0.943 (19) 44 30 74
Lebanon 4.1 0.772 (88) 14 53 67
Portugal 10.7 0.897 (29) 39 22 61
Sierra Leone 5.2 0.336 (177) 22 25 47
Liechtenstein (2009) 0.035 0.951 (19) 16 31 47
Austria 8.2 0.948 (15) 15 28 43
Bosnia and
Herzegovina 4.6 0.803 (66) 17 23 40
Switzerland 7.6 0.955 (7) 11 28 39
Jordan 6.4 0.773 (86) 25 12 37
Serbia 8 0.826 (67) 7 30 37
Sweden 9.1 0.956 (6) 29 8 37
Albania 3 0.801 (68) 19 17 36
Burundi 9.8 0.413 (167) 19 24 35
Finland 5.2 0.952 (11) 6 28 34
Croatia 4.5 0.850 (47) 22 12 34
Libya 6.4 0.818 (56) 25 9 34
Belgium 10.4 0.946 (17) 31 3 34
Tunisia 10.6 0.766 (91) 19 10 29
Costa Rica 4.5 0.846 (48) 17 12 29
Somalia 10.1 * 4 24 28
Singapore 4.7 0.922 (25) 11 17 28
Namibia 2.1 0.650(125) 16 9 27
Liberia 3.7 * 6 21 27
Georgia 4.6 0.754 (96) 11 16 27
Ireland 4.6 0.959 (5) 4 23 27
150 B. orhallsson / e Hague Journal of Diplomacy 7 (2012) 135-160
Of the larger states, Japan was invited a total of 155 times over the same period;
India, 79 times; and Germany, 61.54 Comparing the small states in Table 2, it is
possible to detect a trend. ose countries, such as Israel, that have a stake in the
proceedings by being parties to a conflict, and/or neighbouring states, are invited
often (as demonstrated by the white background). Many of these often score low
on the HDI, which is consistent with the argument that fragile states which suffer
from poverty, exclusion, weak institutions and low levels of human development
are more prone to internal conflicts.55 On the other hand, countries that are not
a party to conflicts and enjoy relatively high levels of development — such as
Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, Finland, Bel-
gium, Ireland and Denmark (as demonstrated by the grey background) — are
equally invited many times, suggesting that these states’ activities are related to
particular knowledge and expertise in certain policy fields.
Smaller states, particularly those without a colonial legacy, are perceived to be
more neutral when mediating in the affairs of other, often developing, states.
Perceived historical neutrality has benefited the Nordic states in their interna-
tional work, in particular in Africa, distinguishing them from other active small
states, such as the Netherlands, Portugal and Belgium, whose intentions will
54) United Nations Security Council, ‘Chapter III: Participation in the Proceedings of the Security Coun-
cil’, Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 2000-2003 (New York: UNSC, 2003), available
online at http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/; and United Nations Security Council, ‘Chapter III: Par-
ticipation in the Proceedings of the Security Council’, Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council,
2004-2007 (New York: UNSC, 2007), available online at http://ww.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/.
55) Ravi Kanbur, ‘Poverty and Conflict: e Inequality Link’, Coping with Crisis Working Paper (New
York: International Peace Academy, 2007), available online at http://www.ipinst.org/media/pdf/publica-
tions/mgs_povr.pdf.
States Population
(2010) HDI (ranking) Number of
invitations
2000-03
Number of
invitations
2004-07
Total number of
invitations
2000-07
Bahrain 0.7 0.866 (41) 21 5 26
Denmark 5.5 0.949 (14) 22 3 25
Sources: Human Development Report (HDR), ‘Human Development Index 2005: Monitoring Human
Development, Enlarging People’s Choices’, Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World,
2007/2008, available online at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_20072008_EN_Indicator_tables.pdf;
HDR, ‘Human Development Index 2007 and its Components’, Overcoming Barriers, 2009, available online
at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2009_EN_Complete.pdf; United States Census Bureau, Interna-
tional Data Base (IDB); United Nations Security Council, ‘Chapter III: Participation in the Proceedings of
the Security Council’, Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 2000-2003; and United Nations
Security Council, ‘Chapter III: Participation in the Proceedings of the Security Council’, Repertoire
of the Practice of the Security Council, 2004-2007.
* Numbers not available.
Table 2 (cont.)
B. orhallsson / e Hague Journal of Diplomacy 7 (2012) 135-160 151
always be tainted by the colonial legacy.56 However, a state’s perceived neutrality
is not automatically transformed into an asset for international influence. In order
to become an asset, it must be combined with image-building and factors such as
experience and skills, which take time, leadership and initiative to develop. Nor-
way’s reputation and engagement with the UN’s conflict resolution work expanded
with the Oslo process in the Middle East in the early 1990s. Since then, Norway’s
experience includes facilitating talks between the government of Sri Lanka and
guerrillas of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, and between the government
of the Philippines and the communist National Democratic Front. According to
Whitfield,57 Switzerland, the Netherlands and Sweden have followed Norway’s
footsteps by also establishing themselves as international peacemakers. Each of
these small states has frequently attended UNSC meetings under Rule 37, as
Table 2 indicates. Another small state that is often present at the UNSC meetings
is New Zealand, because of the conflict in East Timor. Despite regional proxim-
ity, Whitfield argues that New Zealand took part in the process because of its
status as a small, neutral state in addition to its regional expertise and diplomatic
skills.58 Also, Costa Rica’s activeness in the UNSC, despite its generally lower
HDI score compared to other states that are also not part of any conflict (as indi-
cated by Table 2), is a result of its perceived neutral position and its role as ‘the
spokesperson’ on behalf of the Rio Group.59 Interestingly, states with a popula-
tion of less than 500,000 seem not to have competence to take an active part in
the UNSC’s work, except for Liechtenstein, which is the only state with less than
500,000 inhibitions to have been invited 25 times or more to the Security Coun-
cil under Rule 37 during the period 2000 to 2007 (see discussion below and
Table 2).
ese examples highlight a central feature of a small state’s ability to contribute
to the UN: it needs to have administrative competence and knowledge in a par-
ticular policy area. is is not to say that economic and military resources are
unimportant. Given that the UN’s peacekeeping missions, peace-support opera-
tions and peace-building initiatives are dependent on the military and the finan-
cial contributions of UN member states, the countries contributing troops and
finances are essential to the functioning of specific aspects of the UNSC organiza-
tion. However, increased contributions of troops and money do not necessarily
translate into increased influence in the UNSC.
56) Ulriksen, Deployments for Development?, pp. 11-12.
57) Teresa Whitfield, Friends Indeed? e United Nations, Groups of Friends, and the Resolution of Conflict
(Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 2007), p. 42.
58) Whitfield, Friends Indeed?, p. 202.
59) United Nations Security Council, ‘Chapter III: Participation in the Proceedings of the Security Council’.
152 B. orhallsson / e Hague Journal of Diplomacy 7 (2012) 135-160
How Small States Can Influence the UNSC
In order for a country to be elected to the UN Security Council, it has to have the
support of a large part of the international community. e other UN members
have to regard the state in question as capable of participating in the Council’s
work, presenting its positions and views, and/or representing other states’ or
actors’ interests. States that wish to be elected to the UNSC hence have to set up
a programme of work for their period in the Council, lobby their case and
demonstrate their commitment to the other UN member states. Hansson
identified three factors that are of key importance in determining whether small
states become active, influential participants in the UNSC: knowledge; diplo-
matic skills; and initiatives.60 In addition to these, there appear to be four other
important factors: the ability to prioritize; leadership; coalition; and image-/
perception-building.
Knowledge and Prioritizing
e importance of the P5 lies in their permanent status and right to veto, which
give them in-depth knowledge of the Security Council’s affairs, missions, and
operating procedures, and enable close collaboration with other permanent
and elected members. Small states, with less administrative capacity for collecting
and analysing information,61 have to rely on the UN Secretariat and other Secu-
rity Council members to inform their decision-making. Knowledge — with its
preparation and prioritization — thus remains one of the most important and
demanding aspects of UNSC membership. From Table 2, it is possible to discern
that it is not necessarily economic growth or military strength per se that deter-
mines attendance of the UNSC meetings, but the human factors behind knowl-
edge, expertise and diplomatic skills. Acquiring and building the necessary
knowledge is thus important for a small state to become an active and influential
participant in the UNSC as a member. To deal with the structural disadvantage
and to maximize influence, small states have to prioritize, delegate and decide
upon which issues are manageable, and which can be dealt with more effectively
by others in the Security Council.62
Ireland’s period in the Security Council was considered a success because of its
pragmatic approach to prioritizing workloads. Ireland knew that it could not
change the procedural functioning of UNSC operations and, as such, prioritized
60) Pia Hansson, Against All Odds: Small State Candidature and Membership of the United Nations Security
Council, MA thesis, University of Iceland, 2007.
61) Þröstur Freyr Gylfason, e Distinctive Characteristics and Behaviour of Small States which have been
Elected Members to the United Nations Security Council, BA thesis, University of Iceland, 2004.
62) See United Nations Security Council, draft report of the workshop ‘Hitting the Ground Running’, a
workshop for newly elected members of the Security Council (held at the Harrison Conference Center at
Glen Cove, Long Island, New York, 13 and 14 November 2003), S/2004/135, 2004, available online at
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/248/41/PDF/N0424841.pdf ?OpenElement.
B. orhallsson / e Hague Journal of Diplomacy 7 (2012) 135-160 153
those tasks that lay in areas over which it believed that it could influence.63 One
of Ireland’s successes included its robust stance against the proposition to lift the
arms’ embargo when combatants in the Ethiopia/Eritrea conflict had reached an
agreement, with this position eventually winning the support of the other mem-
ber states.64
Success is also highly dependent on a state’s preparation in building up the
necessary knowledge base for its foreign service to be able to deal with the demands
of the Security Council. Sweden’s preparatory work included the construction of
a database of the issues on the agenda corresponding to the positions of different
members. Subsequently, the knowledge compiled in the database was used to
construct mini-seminars for the Swedish delegation leading up to its term on the
Security Council.65 Although unsuccessful, by 2008, Iceland’s preparation for
UNSC membership comprised the making of a catalogue of issues and analyses
of principal subjects of discussion in the Security Council.66 Another successful
strategy is evident in Norway’s preparation for membership, which included close
cooperation with its knowledge institutions, such as universities, research insti-
tutes and non-governmental organizations.67 Also Liechtenstein, despite being
one of the smallest UN members in terms of inhabitants, has built up a reputa-
tion regarding knowledge and expertise through initiatives such as the Princeton
University-based Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination — with direct
links to the Permanent Mission of Liechtenstein at the UN.68 e long-serving
officials at the Liechtenstein’s Permanent Mission have built up capacity to take
an active part in discussion on issues such as ‘Civilians in armed Conflict’,69
‘Women, Peace and Security’70 and ‘Post-conflict Peace-building’.71 As Table 2
shows, Liechtenstein has participated many times in the Security Council’s
63) Gillissen, ‘e Back to the Future?’, p. 37.
64) Ryan cited in Gillissen, ‘e Back to the Future?’, p. 34.
65) Robert Rydberg, ‘Sverige i säkerhetsrådet: arbete och organisation i Stockholm’ [Sweden in the Security
Council: Work and Organization in Stockholm], in: Promemoria 1998-12-28 (Stockholm: Regerings-
kansliet Utenriksdepartementet [Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs], 1998).
66) Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, ‘Address on Foreign Affairs by Minister for Foreign Affairs and External
Trade, Delivered at the Althing on 8 April 2008’, 2008, available online at http://www.iceland.org/
media/jp/Address_on_Foreign_Affairs_8_April_2008.doc.
67) Halvard Buhaug and Eva Terese Voldhagen, ‘Norge i Sikkerhetsraadet’, report by Utenriksdepartemen-
tet [Norwegian Foreign Department] in collaboration with NTNU, Trondheim, 19 April 2001, available
online at http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/dok/rapporter_planer/rapporter/2001/norge-i-sikker-
hetsradet-utvidet-sikkerhe.html?id=105680.
68) See Liechtenstein Institute on Self Determination, Links, 2006, available online at http://www
.princeton.edu/~lisd/archived/links.html.
69) United Nations, ‘Effective Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Requires Stronger Partnerships’,
Security Council SC/8575, 9 December 2005, available online at http://www.un.org/News/Press/
docs/2005/sc8575.doc.htm.
70) United Nations, ‘Security Council Stresses Urgency of Full, Effective Implementation of Landmark
Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security’, Security Council SC/8538, 27 October 2005,
available online at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc8538.doc.htm.
71) United Nations, ‘Security Council Hears 60 Speakers, Asks Secretary-General to Advise Organization
154 B. orhallsson / e Hague Journal of Diplomacy 7 (2012) 135-160
proceedings under Rule 37. ese cases highlight a general feature of UNSC
membership: states have to commit to serious competence-building and training
of officials to respond to possible scenarios.
On the other hand, this can be a difficult task. For instance, this was demon-
strated by the events of 9/11, as few states were adequately prepared to deal with
such an attack within the UN framework. In addition, to be able to handle excess
workloads, states need to increase staff capacity.72 e high number of Belgian
UN mission staff, compared with other small states, is a result of Belgium being
elected to UNSC membership twice since 1991 (see Table 1).
Diplomatic Skills and Image/Perception
Diplomatic skills are a crucial factor for the ability of states to become active and
influential within the UNSC. As already emphasized, a small state needs to have
the administrative capacity to tackle a wide range of complex issues and duties.
e more competence that a state’s diplomatic service has, the more influence it
can yield. e combination of Norway’s experience and skills as a mediator in the
Middle East and Sri Lanka has given it more international credibility. is enabled
Norway to play a constructive role in negotiations between Eritrea and Ethiopia,
and to take leadership in the Eritrea-Ethiopia Committee during its term in the
Security Council. Norway prepared suggestions and led the way in drafting the
resolution, the presidential statement and media talking points for the Security
Council president.73
Norway’s ability to assume that position and role was assisted by its long dip-
lomatic experience and the perception of Norway as an international norm-setter.
In fact, all the Nordic states are seen as norm entrepreneurs in the fields of human
rights, development assistance, women’s rights, participation in peace operations,
humanitarian efforts and environmental protection.74 is perception is related
to the Nordic states’ long history of military, police and civilian support for UN
peace operations such as ONUC (1960-1964), UNAVEM I-III (1988-1999),
UNTAG (1989-1990), ONUMOZ (1992-1994), UNSOM I-II (1992-1995)
and UNOMSIL (1998-1999),75 to mention but a few. More recently, Norway,
within One Year of Best Ways to Support National Peace-building Efforts’, Security Council SC/9333,
20 May 2008, available online at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9333.doc.htm.
72) Osvald cited in Hansson, Against All Odds; Colin Keating, ‘e United Nations Security Council:
Options for Small States’, speech by the Executive Director, Security Council Report, Reykjavik, 16 June
2008, available online at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-
8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Media%20Small%20States%20Reykjavik.pdf; and Rydberg, ‘Sverige i
Säkerhetsrådet: arbete och organisation i Stockholm’.
73) Ole Petter Kolby, ‘Norge i FNs Sikkerhetsrad, 2001-2002’, Internasjonal Politikk, vol. 61, no. 2, 2003,
pp. 277-287.
74) See Ingebritsen, ‘Norm Entrepreneurs’.
75) See Ulriksen, Deployments for Development?
B. orhallsson / e Hague Journal of Diplomacy 7 (2012) 135-160 155
Sweden, Denmark and Finland — in collaboration with Austria, Canada, the
Netherlands and Poland — established the UN Standby High Readiness Brigade
(SHIRBRIG) with headquarters situated in Copenhagen,76 in effect bringing UN
operations and decisions closer to home. is also illustrates the importance of
initiative for attempts to become important actors within the UN system, while
strengthening the Nordic position and image.
As already mentioned, this image has been of enormous value for the Nordic
countries in international affairs, and they have used it actively to build coalitions
and have issues placed on the agenda of the UNSC.77 e Nordic countries have,
over the years, jointly initiated a number of UN reform projects. e Nordic UN
Project’s aim was to transform the UN Development Programme (UNDP) from
a funding mechanism into a stronger development institution.78 e latest reform
attempt can be found in the high-level panel entitled Deliver as One, from 2006,
which tried to provide some critical answers as to why the UN has become frag-
mented and weak.79
It is important to remember that the influence and support that the Nordic
countries enjoy within the UN are the result of years of experience, investment in
the UN’s work and, not least, image-building. Iceland’s campaign for UNSC
membership in 2010 tried to build on these Nordic ideals of promoting human
rights, development assistance and women’s rights. However, the failure of the
Icelandic campaign was partly because of free-riding on the Nordic image with-
out previously having the experience and history of being an active promoter of
the UN’s ideals. us, image/perception and skills/experience go hand in hand,
and for a state to be successful and influential it needs a combination of each.
In addition, small states have to maximize their diplomatic skills and small
bureaucracy, exemplified by informality, flexibility, prioritization and room for
manoeuvre. e Irish delegation, during its term in the Security Council, proved
that these traits can make a huge difference. In the aftermath of 9/11, when the
United States showed signs of uncertainty about taking the attack to the UNSC,
the Irish delegation — informally — managed to persuade the United States to
take the issue of the attack to the UNSC,80 thus strengthening the institution.
e Irish case also shows that skilful negotiation tactics, competence and auton-
omy of officials are crucial in the Security Council. States need excellent negotia-
tors in the Security Council to be able to influence.81 Despite the permanent
76) See Ulriksen, Deployments for Development?, p. 14.
77) See Hansson, Against All Odds.
78) Nordic UN Project, cited in Bertil Oden, ‘Review Essay’, Forum for Development Studies, vol. 37,
no. 2, 2010, pp. 269-279 at p. 273.
79) See Oden, ‘Review Essay’, pp. 273-274.
80) See Gillissen, ‘e Back to the Future?’, p. 36.
81) See Kolby, ‘Norge i FNs Sikkerhetsrad, 2001-2002’.
156 B. orhallsson / e Hague Journal of Diplomacy 7 (2012) 135-160
members’ right to veto, the Security Council’s proceedings normally follow the
protocol that issues should be negotiated until consensus is reached and the
elected members can use this to their advantage.
Initiatives and Leadership
e high quality and long experience of the Nordic countries in the UN’s work
are also represented in UN leadership positions. Finland’s former president,
Martti Ahtisaari, assumed the lead in the effort to determine the future status of
Kosovo — as UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s special envoy in 2005 — and
also served as a mediator in Aceh, Indonesia.82 Kai Aage Eide, a Norwegian dip-
lomat, was appointed the UN Special Representative to Afghanistan and Head of
the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan from 2008-2010,83 only to be suc-
ceeded by Swedish diplomat Staffan de Mistura in March 2010.84 Other well-
known Nordic persons involved in the UN’s work include Hans Blix, of the
United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, and Jan
Egeland, the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs
and Emergency Relief Coordinator. Although these examples are not directly
linked to UNSC membership, they highlight the importance of leadership and
initiative to small states seeking to influence the Security Council.
e best opportunity for influence by small states is when holding the UNSC
Presidency.85 Small states can use the Presidency to present a theme that is not
formally on the agenda or, as in the Irish case, to keep things on the agenda.
While the Security Council was caught up in 9/11, Ireland managed to maintain
focus, attention and support for the peace processes in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (DRC), Burundi, and Somalia.86 In addition, during the Irish Pres-
idency — in a context of rising violence in the Middle East following the collapse
of the Oslo peace agreement — ‘Ireland managed to obtain unanimous agree-
ment on a call “for immediate withdrawal of all Israeli forces” from Palestinian-
ruled areas’.87 Furthermore, Doyle argued that, despite the lack of progress, the
Irish position was maintained, affirmed and decisive in shaping the overall policy
of the Security Council.
Another small state whose time in the Security Council is remembered for
its strong leadership skills and initiative is New Zealand (1993-1994). New
Zealand was mainly concerned with the lack of transparency in the UNSC
82) See Whitfield, Friends Indeed?, pp. 35 and 268.
83) United Nations, ‘Secretary-General Appoints Kai Eide of Norway as Special Representative for
Afghanistan’, 2008, available online at http//:www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sga1123.doc.htm).
84) United Nations, ‘Secretary-General Appoints Staffan de Mistura of Sweden as Special Representative
for Afghanistan’, 2010, available online at http//:www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sga1217.doc.htm.
85) See United Nations Security Council, draft report of the workshop ‘Hitting the Ground Running’.
86) Gillissen, ‘e Back to the Future?’, p. 34.
87) Doyle cited in Gillissen, ‘e Back to the Future?’, p. 36.
B. orhallsson / e Hague Journal of Diplomacy 7 (2012) 135-160 157
decision-making procedure and suggested that the Security Council’s secret delib-
erations should be transmitted through closed-circuit televisions for the other
UN members to be kept informed of, and updated on, the Council’s activities.
is decision did not win the hearts and minds of the permanent members.88
However, the problem of secret consultations became apparent a few months
later, at a time when New Zealand held the Presidency of the Security Council,
in quite dire circumstances. Renewed violence in Bosnia and a humiliating defeat
and departure for US forces in Somalia made the conflict in Rwanda seem quite
quiet in comparison. It became apparent, however, for New Zealand’s Permanent
Representative that the E10 were not adequately informed about what was going
on in Rwanda, with the Representative claiming that the E10 should be able to
access information gathered by the intelligence services of the P5. When com-
plaints were not heard, and even the Secretariat withheld information, New Zea-
land’s Permanent Representative submitted, on his second to last day of holding
the Security Council Presidency, a draft statement to the Security Council that
included the word ‘genocide’. Rwanda — an elected member on the Security
Council during that period — heavily objected to the statement and spread dis-
information about the severity of the situation. e debate was headed towards a
stalemate, so, in a last desperate attempt, New Zealand called for a draft resolu-
tion that would require a vote. A compromise was reached, with a watered-down
statement excluding the word ‘genocide’.89 Although Rwanda represents a huge
failure of the UNSC to act, without New Zealand’s initiative and decisive leader-
ship skills, no statement at all would have been released. e case thus represents
a good example of a way in which a small state can be in a pivotal position at a
critical moment and make an impact.90
Coalition-Building
e last important factor is the development of allies or, in other words, coali-
tion-building. Having support is crucial for a small state to be able to influence
the UNSC. e Nordic countries always support each other by opting for one
Nordic country in the Security Council every other two-year term. ere is also
the CANZ group of countries, consisting of Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
ese three countries, according to Malone, ‘work to ensure that their candida-
cies prove mutually reinforcing and do not clash’. 91 ere is also the Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM), consisting of 118 members.92 According to Hurd, it has been
88) Linda Melvern, ‘Behind Closed Doors’, e World Today, vol. 56, nos. 8/9, 2000, p. 9.
89) See Melvern, ‘Behind Closed Doors’.
90) See Ken Ross, ‘Power in Numbers’, e World Today, vol. 57, no. 5, 2001, p. 23.
91) David Malone, ‘Eyes On the Prize’, Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International
Organizations, vol. 6, no. 1, 2000, pp. 1-21.
92) See BBC, ‘Profile: Non-Aligned Movement’, 7 August 2009, available online at http://news.bbc.co
.uk/2/hi/2798187.stm.
158 B. orhallsson / e Hague Journal of Diplomacy 7 (2012) 135-160
quite common practice for certain groups of states, such as the NAM, to have
extensive consultations between those members that have a Security Council seat
and the other members in the General Assembly.93 ere is also the Forum for
Small States (FOSS), which is a loose coalition of small countries that meets
regularly to exchange views and coordinate positions.94 In addition to forging
alliances, Malone argues that the trading of votes is not a rare occurrence either.95
Also, during Iceland’s bid for a UNSC seat, Iceland established diplomatic rela-
tions with 75 countries.96
Coalitions can make a huge difference in the ability of small states to become
influential and/or UNSC members. However, they can also be a source of pres-
sure for states to become members. Iceland experienced strong pressure from the
other Nordic states to continue to strengthen its bid for a seat at the UNSC when
it was considering withdrawal of its candidacy.97 Financial pressures are also real,
and the process of campaigning for UNSC membership can be costly.
Furthermore, coalitions, collaborations and networks with other important
international actors have become crucial factors in determining whether a small
state is able to influence the UNSC. e elected members have increasingly pre-
sented a thematic issue or two during the month of their Presidency on topics
such as disarmament, armed conflict and women’s rights. If successful in bringing
other actors on board, small states have a better chance of succeeding in the Secu-
rity Council and in promoting their thematic issues. However, in order to suc-
ceed, the issue has to be well prepared, non-controversial and highly relevant.98
ere is no doubt that this networking and coalition-building takes enormous
time and effort and, with limited resources, small states may have to choose
between presenting thematic issues within the Security Council and focusing on
efficient participation in the daily work of the Council.99
93) See Hurd, ‘Legitimacy, Power, and the Symbolic Life of the UN Security Council’, p. 42.
94) See Keating, ‘e United Nations Security Council’.
95) See Malone, ‘Eyes On the Prize’.
96) See Gísladóttir, ‘Address on Foreign Affairs by Minister for Foreign Affairs and External Trade, Deliv-
ered at the Althing on 8 April 2008’.
97) Árni Helgason, ‘Fullur stuðningur við framboð Íslands til Öryggisráðsins’ [Full Support for Iceland’s
Candidacy to the Security Council], Morgunblaðið, 29 June 2005, available online at http://www.mbl
.is/mm/gagnasafn/grein.html?grein_id=1025465; Morgunblaðið, ‘Öryggisráðið og aðrar leiðir’ [Other
Options to Security], 27 January 2005, available online at http://www.mbl.is/mm/gagnasafn/grein
.html?grein_id=841523; and Morgunblaðið, ‘Mörg fordæmi fyrir því að ríki hætti við’ [e Many Precedents
for State Direction], 14 July 2005, available online at http://www.mbl.is/mm/gagnasafn/grein.html?grein_
id=1028007.
98) See Hansson, Against All Odds.
99) See Malone, ‘Eyes On the Prize’.
B. orhallsson / e Hague Journal of Diplomacy 7 (2012) 135-160 159
Conclusion
Current IR theories are preoccupied with the concept of the capabilities of big
states,100 despite the fact that small states comprise a large proportion of the
world’s states. e theories rightly point to several disadvantages and structural
constraints in small states’ efforts to take on active international roles. In the UN,
although all member states enjoy one vote each in the General Assembly and the
E10 enjoy one vote each in the UNSC, small states have had to fight for their
equal membership, and real inequalities in states’ abilities to influence UN
decision-making prevail. us, prima facie, realpolitik — with its focus on power
relations — seems to be the underlying premise of international relations and
states’ activities within the UNSC.101 Opposing this view, neo-liberal institution-
alists argue that a small state’s interest in international organizations such as the
UN lies in the protection that they receive from international laws, norms and
treaties.102 e UN is also seen to provide small states with an opportunity to
forge alliances, cooperate on a range of issues, and lobby for particular, favourable
solutions, but without much power directly to influence outcomes.103
Contrary to these theoretical approaches, this article has sought to demon-
strate ways for small states to be active and successful participants within the UN
and the Security Council. A number of small states have utilized activities related
to good international practice and favourable image, particularly with regard to
being norm entrepreneurs, as means of garnering international influence, merg-
ing realism with idealism through soft power. e article argues that there are two
broad categories of qualitative factors that determine the ability of small states to
influence the UNSC: the first is administrative competence in areas such as
knowledge, initiative, and diplomatic, coalition and leadership skills; the second
is the image of the state in the international system, with specific regard to its per-
ceived neutrality or reputation as a norm entrepreneur in particular policy fields.
On the basis of these categories, small states can move beyond being merely a
beneficiary of UN membership to become an active participant in international
affairs. Accordingly, we need to look at both qualitative and quantitative resources
to explain states’ ability to have a say within the UN. In addition, small states in
the EU are not equal. Larger material capabilities, such as in terms of wealth and
alliance formation, in addition to soft power resources, make a difference among
small states. According to Nye, ‘when ideals are an important source of power, the
classic distinction between realpolitik and liberalism becomes blurred’.104 Moreover,
100) See Neumann and Gstöhl, ‘Lilliputians in Gulliver’s World’.
101) See Walz, ‘Political Structures’.
102) Keohane, ‘Lilliputians’ Dilemmas’.
103) Keohane and Nye, ‘Introduction’.
104) See Nye, ‘Soft Power’, p. 170.
160 B. orhallsson / e Hague Journal of Diplomacy 7 (2012) 135-160
this article confirms Keohane’s assessment that multilateral institutions — in this
case the UN — provide disproportionate access to the materially weak.
To conclude, the article has identified several factors that determine the active-
ness and influence of small states. First, countries have to have political incentives
and ambition to adopt an active role in the UN. Some states may simply lack
ambition in this respect. e state in question needs to be prepared to spend time,
effort and money on working within the UN. Moreover, the governing elite in
the state in question has to consider it possible to have a say within the UN. If the
political elite does not consider that it can have a say, it may not even try to con-
tribute to, or influence, decision-making within the UN. Second, governments
interested in taking on the role of an elected member of the UNSC have to con-
vince others that they can take on the duties that are associated with membership.
e state’s image is important in this respect, as it must be perceived as having the
competence to carry out the Security Council’s obligations. ird, countries need
to be able to prioritize their work within the UNSC in order to be able to influ-
ence the Security Council’s decisions. Small states hence need to find their niches.
Fourth, small states must have particularly good knowledge of their chosen issues.
Fifth, they must have the ability to take initiatives and the necessary diplomatic
skills to pursue their initiatives and fulfil their responsibilities. Sixth, leadership
and coalition-building are of fundamental importance with regard to power rela-
tions in the Security Council. Seventh, a small state must be able to present itself
as more neutral than others, while the ability to develop a reputation as a norm
entrepreneur or norm-setter in its chosen policy field is of enormous help in get-
ting its policy objectives though the Security Council. Hence, the way in which
international actors regard the state in question is of fundamental importance
when considering the state’s power potential within the UNSC.
e failure of IR theories to take seriously these factors undermines their abil-
ity to understand and explain the role of small states in the UNSC. e IR theo-
ries need to consider the administrative competence and perception of states,
along with the traditional variables, in order to produce a fuller picture of the
power potential of small states in the international system.
Baldur orhallsson is Professor of Political Science and Jean Monnet Chair in European Studies at the
Faculty of Political Science at the University of Iceland. He founded the Centre of Small State Studies within
the Icelandic Institute of International Affairs in 2002, and was Chair of the Board of both until 2011, and
remains on the Board. His research focus is primarily on small state studies, European integration and Iceland’s
domestic and foreign policy. He has published extensively in international journals, and has contributed to
several academic books. He has written two books on small states in Europe: Iceland and European integra-
tion: On the Edge and e Role of Small States in the European Union. He holds a PhD and MA in
Political Science from the University of Essex in the United Kingdom.
