Content uploaded by Alfonso Montuori
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Alfonso Montuori on Nov 20, 2014
Content may be subject to copyright.
1
Social Creativity: The Challenge of Complexity
Alfonso Montuori Ronald E. Purser
California Institute of Integral Studies Loyola University Chicago
A. Montuori & R. Purser, (1997). Le dimensioni sociali della creatività. Pluriverso, 1, 2, 78-88.
Our understanding of creativity has been shaped by cultural,
methodological, and epistemological factors. There already exist a multiplicity of
methodological perspectives on the phenomenon of creativity (Rosner & Abt, 1974;
Runco & Albert, 1990). A brief overview of the wealth of important work going on
in psychology is enough to point to the use of numerous approaches ranging from
psychometrics to psychohistory, from social constructionism to cognitive
psychology, from systems theory to phenomenology.1 Numerous anthropological
(e.g., G. Bateson, 1972; M. Bateson, 1990; Geertz, 1973; Kroeber, 1944), sociological
(e.g., Becker, 1982; Wolff, 1984; Zolberg, 1990) and historical (e.g., Boorstein, 1993;
Mokyr, 1990; Simonton, 1988) studies also deserve attention.
All these efforts bring numerous, often contrasting and at times seemingly
incompatible, perspectives to bear on a complex question. This proliferation of
perspectives is a potentially very valuable source of new understandings and new
conceptualizations of creativity. Every methodological slant inevitably leaves
something out of its inquiry, something which it considers ‘noise’. But this very
noise can be the source of new learnings as it opens up new avenues of inquiry
1 Kearney’s (1991) work provides an excellent introduction to philosophical approaches to the
imagination and creativity, from Husserl to Lyotard. Conrad (1990) develops a critique of creativity
research from a phenomenological perspective.
2
which create not just more questions but different kinds of questions, questions
which may well not have been addressed previously (Ceruti, 1986).
The existence of alternative approaches and questions can provide an
extremely useful form of self-knowledge, as we see ourselves and our assumptions
questioned by the existence of different approaches. New positions and methods
often arise as reactions to existing ones, and in so doing often define themselves in
opposition to what they are criticizing.
Despite the not insubstantial attention placed on the social dimensions of
creativity in the literature, it does not, until recently, seem to have spawned a
larger stream of ongoing substantive creativity research and debate, and no
investigation of why creativity should be seen largely as an individual and not a
social phenomenon. Likewise, there has been little work done addressing the very
notion of such a split, and its philosophical, social, and methodological implications
(Montuori, 1989; Montuori & Purser, 1995).
This is perhaps not surprising given the fact that the majority of the
literature surveyed originates in the United States, a culture which orients strongly
to individualism, and whose method of study has largely been reductionistic
(Sampson, 1983, 1993). The focus of both social recognition and research has
therefore been on creative individuals at the expense of the social environment and
interaction. In this essay we explore how the highly influential North-American
understanding of creativity has been socially constructed, as a way of both
broadening our understanding of the phenomenon we call creativity, of
understanding the larger systems of thought which has produced this
understanding, and as a way of opening up further inquiry into the theory,
practice, and popular understanding of creativity.
1. Individualism
3
On the basis of cross-cultural comparisons, Stewart and Bennett (1991) made
some broad generalizations about North-American cultural patterns (cf. Hampden-
Turner & Trompenaars, 1993; Marsella, DeVos & Hsu, 1985). They argued a) that
North-Americans view the self as the “cultural quantum in society” (p.134); b) that
“in the American self, there is a remarkable absence of community, tradition, and
shared meaning which impinge upon perception and give shape to behavior” (p.
130); c) that North-Americans reject “sociological and philosophical principles”
(p.135) and replace them with psychological theories; d) that the nature of North-
Americans’ self-concept prevents them from understanding the enormous cross-
cultural variations in self-concepts; and e) that despite the emphasis on freedom of
choice and autonomy, North-Americans are subject to subtle but pervasive
pressures to conform, to be free like everybody else (cf. Slater, 1991).
We believe these cultural factors have played a considerable role in shaping
the North-American understanding of, and research into, creativity (cf. Stein 1992,
on the sociohistorical context of creativity programs). From points a) and b) it
would follow that since North-Americans view the self as the cultural quantum of
society, and mostly do not view themselves in a historical and social context to the
extent that, for instance, the Germans and the Japanese do, historical and social
considerations have generally been omitted from discussions of creativity, with
greater emphasis placed on synchronic studies of the individual (Barron &
Harrington, 1981; Csikszentmihalyi, 1988, 1990).
Consequently, as point c) suggests, psychological theories of creativity have
until recently been preeminent over sociological or philosophical approaches
(Montuori and Purser, 1995; Stein, 1963). Following from point d), little emphasis
has been placed on cultural differences in the study of creativity (Lubart, 1990), and
differences in self-concept have been left out of considerations of the creative
person, process, and product.
4
Finally, point e) suggests that despite the emphasis on the individual, little
attention has been paid on the societal pressures on creative individuals, and on
creativity researchers themselves, to conform to certain socially sanctioned
historical attitudes, behaviors, and research programs. In other words, we have
generally been unwilling to explore the extent to which we are shaped by our
culture, and in the case of the encouragement and promotion of creativity, we have
focused on individual factors rather than attempts to change social circumstances.
Slater (1991) argued that the “Individual-versus-society myth” is deeply
embedded in North-American culture. This myth is closely related to the “lone
genius myth” (Montuori & Purser, 1995), which also sees culture and society--other
people, in other words--as an obstacle to the self-realization and self-expression of
individuals. But Slater (1991, p.154), like Stewart and Bennett, pointed out that “the
very wish to escape our culture is itself a product of cultural conditioning,” and
therefore manifests itself in clearly preestablished roles which have taken on
mythical status in North-American culture, from the Lone Ranger to James Dean to
Einstein (cf. Bellah et al., 1985).
Stewart and Bennett (p. 132) wrote that “when confronted with people who
do not locate the self within the individual, most Americans are bewildered. That
the self can be centered in a role or in a group is to them a culturally preposterous
idea.” It should also be pointed out that conversely, according to North-American
anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1972), the North-American concept of the self
strikes most of the world’s population as very peculiar. The first part of Stewart
and Bennett’s statement points to the tendency for ‘projective similarity’ found in
North-American laypersons and intellectuals, or the assumption that people are
everywhere the same, and therefore that they can be categorized and judged by
North-American standards (cf. Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars, 1993). The
second part of the statement is indicative of the strong resistance found in North-
5
Americans for collaborative or group enterprises, which they view as inevitably
leading to dependence and a subsequent loss of autonomy (Slater, 1991).
The enormous recent interest in ‘teamwork’ in the management literature
attests to the urgent need to redress this problem in industry. Efforts to import
team-based Japanese management methods without taking cultural differences into
account are bound to fail, particularly since for the Japanese dependence is a virtue
and for Americans it is considered a fate almost worse than death (Slater, 1991).
Viewing management practices of other cultures as ‘tools’ that can be borrowed in
a decontextualized manner is highly problematic and reflects the North-American
tendency to discount culture and historicity (Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars,
1993).
With this individualist focus, in North America collaborative creative
processes are not valued as highly as individual efforts. But this is not to say that
there are no cooperative creative enterprises in the U.S.A.: a country that is known
for its movie industry and has spawned such higly interactive, collaborative art
forms as jazz, must surely know something about collaboration (Becker, 1982), but it
certainly does not seem to be a subject of major academic interest, as, for instance,
the lives of individuals of great genius (Gardner, 1993). Again we have to ask to
what extent disciplinary categories and cultural biases have obscured our
understanding and appreciation of creative processes.
It is also interesting to note that the focus in research on group creativity has
been on brainstorming, an artificial procedure, rather than on natural everyday
interaction, as if brainstorming sessions where the only time people grudgingly get
together to ‘generate ideas.’ The assumption is that time has to be set aside to
collaborate creatively in a structured manner, since apparently this does not
happen spontaneously. From a North-American individualist perspective
6
interactions are viewed as either neutral or a hindrance to the individual (Sampson,
1993) and hence to creativity, but rarely as ‘creativogenic’.
The individualist view described above is diametrically opposed to the
systems-theoretical view that “the whole is more than the sum of its parts.” In fact
it emphasizes the equally valid corollary, that a system is also less than the sum of
its parts, because any system imposes certain constraints on its parts (Morin, 1983;
Wilden, 1980). These constraints inhibit the part, and allow it only limited
expression of its full capacities. Societies impose constraints on individuals, as do
groups and any form of social organization, including marriage and family.
Individuals also impose constraints on their own “parts” in choosing careers,
spouses, and in making other decisions which may inhibit some of their potentials,
while opening up others (cf. Ceruti, 1986; Morin, 1992).
Thinking about creativity has stressed these constraints imposed on
creative individuals and the creative process by society and relationships in general
rather than the potential of cooperation and collaboration. North-Americans speak
derisively of decisions made by committees, and stress the need creative
individuals have for isolation and freedom from distractions, of the independence
of creative individuals from their environment. But according to systems theory, a
system is both more and less than the sum of its parts (Morin, 1983). Focusing on one
half of that statement (i.e. either less or more), does violence to the complexity of the
system.
Along with imposing certain constraints, interactions among individuals in
a larger system can also trigger emergent properties which could not be predicted
through knowledge of the single individuals. The whole is more than just the sum
of its parts, it is more than the global unity, because of the appearance of emergent
properties. Systems can open up possibilities for parts which the parts in and of
themselves might not be able to have. Being part of a research group, a musical or
7
theater group, or a community, opens up possibilities while at the same time
creating constraints.
In contrast to North-America, Tatsuno’s (1990) research on creativity in
Japan showed that building teamwork and a sense of harmony are quite as integral
to Japanese creativity as the individual struggling against the environment is in the
West. In Japan, Tatsuno argued, one might almost say that all creativity is group
creativity. North-Americans can undoubtedly be creative in groups: as we already
pointed out, perhaps the most interactively group-oriented creative art form, jazz,
is a product of North-American soil, at its best reconciling both great individuality
and great cooperation and team membership.2 Jazz may in fact provide a powerful
metaphor for organization and collaboration (Purser & Montuori, 1994). But the
concept of creative interaction still seems largely alien, and will continue to do so if
the individualist myth of the lone hero versus the many remains the only
formulation between self and other.3
Clearly, North-American discourse and practices of creativity are shaped
by cultural factors. An awareness of these social and historical factors affecting
creativity researchers may lead us to study--and indeed celebrate--the social
creativity of creativity research and discourse, and the social creativity of the
peculiar practices which fall under the heading of creativity in our society. The
above is clearly not intended as an attack on North-American values, or on North-
American creativity researchers, but we do hope that it will point to the existence of
2 It should be noted that jazz is the product of a minority, and may therefore represent different cultural
values from mainstream North-American culture.
3
A more critical and political question might address the possibility that the lack of emphasis on social creativity in
organizations might be part of a policy of ‘divide and rule’, designed to prevent creative collaborations among
workers.
8
certain ‘blind spots’ in the broader discourse and practices, which become all the
more clear when viewed from a cross-cultural perspective.
A considerable expansion of our scope occurs when we see creativity as a
phenomenon in time and space, occurring in different eras and different cultures,
and taking on quite different forms from the ones we are accustomed to in our 20th
century, Western discourse. There are substantial historical and cultural differences
in the way people have thought about creativity, and consequently in their creative
processes and products (Kearney, 1988; Ludwig, 1992; Lubart, 1990).
2. Reductionism
Methodological reductionism is another factor in the lack of attention paid to
creativity as a social phenomenon (Sampson, 1977, 1978, 1981, 1983, 1993). In
explicit imitation of the scientific method, this methodological slant may have led to
a focus on what was perceived to be the smallest identifiable variable, e.g. the
individual (methodological individualism), at the exclusion of ‘external’ factors
such as the social environment.
Whatever creativity is--and Torrance (1988, p.43), a leading researcher,
argues that “it defies precise definition”--it seems to be a complex, multifaceted
phenomenon. Yet the main focus of traditional scientific methods has been on
simplicity, on reducing phenomena to their single elementary units and on finding
the general laws which govern these units. Emerging mainly through the successes
of physics in controlling systems through the manipulation of their elements,
traditional reductionist approaches where eagerly embraced by social scientists in
an effort to put their own disciplines on the same level of scientific status as the
natural sciences. Although reductionist approaches have historically been very
successful, there are some problematic aspects to it. Morin (1983) argues that
9
Simplification isolates and therefore hides the relational nature
consubstantial to the system (relations not only with the environment, but
with other systems, with time, with the observer and conceptualizer). (p.
186, translation by AM)
Recent developments in science have led to what has been called the
challenge of complexity (Bocchi & Ceruti, 1985). We are becoming aware of the
irreducible complexity of phenomena ranging from atoms to star systems, from
cognitive systems to human societies, and this complexity is not amenable to
reductionistic approaches. Science is beginning to view complexity as a basic fact of
existence and not as an exogenous, chaotic element interfering with the
“purification” of a single variable to be manipulated. The term complexity is
generally defined as the length of the minimal program required to compute a
number (Pagels, 1988). But as Pagels points out, this is an algorithmic definition,
and another definition might be “a measure of how hard it is to put something
together starting from elementary parts” (p.67). Morin (1992) describes complexity
as a recognition of complex causality, or “more specifically an eco-auto-causality,
where auto causality means recursive causality in which the organizing process
elaborates the products, actions, and effects necessary for its creation or
regeneration, and where autocausality needs causality from outside” (pp.130-131).
In other words, complexity entails a shift in our description of phenomena, which
at minimum recognizes mutual, recursive, and circular causality. Our
understanding of complexity emerges out of the inclusion of relationships as a constitutive
part of the phenomena we want to understand.4
4 For excellent and accessible discussions of complexity and chaos theory applied to the social sciences,
see Goerner (1994) and Laszlo (1991). Maruyama (1963) is the classic original reference for mutual
causality.
10
As Morin (1983) notes, recently scientific inquiry has begun to move away
from thinking about objects and essences to systems and relationships. The atom
itself, the synecdoche of reductionist thought because of what was thought to be its
indivisible, irreducible nature as an elementary unit, is now seen as a system of
reciprocally interacting particles. And even particles themselves are not the
irreducible, indivisible elementary unit to which everything can “ultimately” be
reduced, since, as Morin points out, they seem to suffer from an identity crisis,
being at times waves and at others particles. By analogy, this same ‘identity crisis’
may be said to afflict our understanding of human beings, viewed both as single
actors, and as parts of larger social entities, depending on the perspective and
methodology of the investigator (Valle, 1981).
Angyal (1941) argued that what is needed is a shift from elementary single
units to systems viewed as a unitas multiplex, or complex unity. The Latin root of
the word complex, complexus, means different elements interlaced together to form
a single fabric. In fact, one of the characteristics of complexity is its unity in
diversity.
Complexity emerges at the center of the One as, at the same time, relativity,
relationality, diversity, alterity, duplicity, ambiguity, uncertainty,
antagonism, and the union of these notions which are complementary,
competitive, antagonistic. (Morin, 1983, p.190, translation by AM)
Whatever we choose to call the One (the observing system’s process of
system definition), Morin argues, whether atom, brain, self, group, or society, we will
always find ambiguity, and diversity in the complexity that is inherent in any
11
unity. A system is an interrelation of elements and a global unit constituted by
those elements in interrelation (Morin, 1983). A system is both unity and diversity,
in fact, it is a unity in diversity.
3. Epistemological considerations
A system does not exist as an ontological entity out there, ready-made, in the
world. Von Bertalanffy’s systems view of the world was what he called a
“philosophy of positions,” influenced by the philosopher Hans Vaihinger.
Discussing the latter’s philosophy of “As-If,” he wrote that
Each interpretation of reality is an audacious adventure of reason, to use
Kant’s expression. There is only the alternative: Either we renounce any
interpretation of the “essence” of things--which is the well-founded opinion
of science--or, if we venture upon such an interpretation which is only
possible if patterned after ourselves, we must remain conscious of its merely
metaphorical character. For we have not the faintest proof that the “real”
world is of the same nature as the minute corner given to us in our own
internal experience. Such an interpretation, therefore, can have no other
value than that of an analogy, an As-If according to Vaihinger. (1975, pp. 70-
71)5
Any observed system is always described by an observing system. The
observing system makes certain choices about what to define as system and
5 Of considerable interest here is also Pepper’s (1942) groundbreaking work on ‘world-hypotheses’.
12
environment. It is almost as if a circle were drawn around our subject of inquiry
which defines what Montuori (1989, 1992) has referred to as the scope of inquiry.
When studying human behavior, do we draw the circle around the human brain, or
our genes, or the immediate space around our bodies, or our families? What is left
outside of this circle is generally considered an epiphenomenon by reductionist
researchers. The argument is that ultimately what lies outside the circle is of no
significance--which leads to statements that describe A as nothing but a function B.
But Ceruti (1986) writes that
The observer's operations and decisions intervene on several levels in the
process of system construction. They trace, first of all, the boundary between
system and environment, and establish the relationship between system and
subsystem, between global dynamics and components. A system is always,
at the same time, a subsystem and a suprasystem, and its dynamic is
regulated by the constraints of the dynamics in which it participates, and in
turn imposes constraints on the dynamics of the various components. (p.107,
translation by AM)
A systemic approach sees this proliferation of scopes as a reflection of the
plurality of perspectives generated in the study of a phenomenon, and the
polysystemic nature of systems. A systems approach therefore problematizes our
understanding of phenomena by emphasizing their complexity, which becomes
apparent when we observe the variety of relationships and interrelationships any
system entails.
Complexity is understood, according to Morin (1983), as difficulty and
uncertainty, as a challenge. As Ceruti (1986, 1989) has shown so clearly, this
awareness of complexity is tied to a shift from a representational epistemology to
13
an epistemology of construction. We create categories and ‘oppositions’ in our
process of system definition (the scope of our research), through the
methodological slants we apply in studying phenomena.6 These boundaries
delineate what, in a reductionistic perspective, we believe is necessary or
unnecessary. What lies outside of our boundaries of inquiry is generally considered
unnecessary--it is an epiphenomenon, noise which must be eliminated.
Ceruti (1986) points to a shift from a concept of necessary/unnecessary to
one of possible/not possible, where a certain methodological slant makes it
possible for us to see certain aspects of a phenomenon but not others, and what
remains is not noise or residual, but potentially the source of new possibilities,
categories, and inquiries. In much of the existing creativity research, boundaries
have been drawn tightly around the self, with the self as privileged locus of inquiry
(Barron & Harrington, 1981). It is possible to extend those boundaries to include
other phenomena which give us new and important perspectives on creativity.
Csikszentmihalyi’s (1988) question “where creativity” is useful here, because it
points our attention, among others, to the struggles of creative individuals and
groups in their social, economic, political contexts, and on a more abstract level, to
creativity as a phenomenon occurring in space and time.
Following Ceruti, we would argue that extending these boundaries of
inquiry to include social phenomena should be seen in the context of the pair
possible/not possible rather than necessary/unnecessary. The reductionist
formulation would argue that social or personality phenomena are unnecessary for
our understanding of creativity, depending on whether we are dealing with
6 Wilden (1980) has explored the political dimensions of these methodological slants, and the use (and
misuse) of oppositions, arguing that they perpetuate structures of domination in society.
14
sociological reductionism (e.g. Kroeber, 1944), or the more familiar form of
psychological reductionism. All methodological slants and boundaries of system
definition open up certain possibilities and create constraints which limit other
avenues of inquiry.
Our belief is that by studying the creative process at various ‘focal settings’,
which include all the concentric circles, from genetics to group processes to the
historical ‘zeitgeist’, we can obtain a richer picture of the process which can be of
great relevance in ‘putting creativity to work’. Our purpose is not to downplay any
of the research focal settings, but to encourage further research and discussion into
and between focal settings, particularly the ones which have thus far been given less
attention. At present these seem to be the circles moving outward from the
individual, namely group processes, social, political, and economic forces, and the
larger historical and geographic context of our discussions of creativity.
One of the more significant trends in creativity research over the past 10
years has been the use of systems approaches along with a renewed interest in the
social dimensions of creativity. As Runco (1996) states, the systems approach has
come to be associated with a focus on the social dimensions of creativity. But there
is nothing intrinsic to systems approaches that requires they be concerned with
‘social’ systems or society as opposed to individuals. A systems approach is equally
amenable to personality approaches. In fact, Schwartz (1987, p.218) has stated that
“the concept of personality and the concept of a system are one and the same,” and
several other personality-oriented psychologists influenced by systems theories
have chosen to view the person as a system embedded in a larger social system
(Allport, 1968; Gray, Fidler, & Battista, 1982; Gruber, 1988; Guidano, 1987;
Krippner, Ruttenber, Engelman, & Granger, 1985; Macy, 1991; Stein, 1996; Wilden,
1980). Systems theories challenge the traditional distinction between ‘social’ and
15
‘individual’ (Emery, 1982; Laszlo, 1972; Morin, 1994), and draw our attention to
mutually causal, recursive processes (Maruyama, 1963, 1976).7
Systems theory argues that we must understand any system in the context
of its environment, in its relation with time, and finally in its relationship with the
observer (Emery, 1969; Morin, 1983). The methodological problem, from the
perspective of systems theory, would not be studying creativity by focusing on
individual intrapsychic processes, or cerebral lateralization, or, for that matter,
groups (every discipline to some extent having its own ‘elementary unit’). The
problem is not even attempting to focus the level of explanation on smaller and
smaller units, which may indeed produce useful and valid information (e.g., the
individual, the brain, cerebral hemispheres, etc.), but rather to reduce the explanation
to just one level.
Our argument is not that personality or cognitive approaches to creativity
are reductionistic per se. But if creativity is viewed as nothing but a factor of
personality, or nothing but a factor of cognitive or genetic forces, or, for that matter,
nothing but the product of historical forces, then we are falling victims to a kind of
reductionism (whether genetic, psychological, or sociological) that severely restricts
and impoverishes our understanding of creativity. A systemic or contextual
approach stresses the importance of considering the relationships between ‘focal
settings’, and the process of ‘system definition’ whereby we outline our subject of
inquiry.
7 Early systems theories have been criticized for being a new form of totalizing, coercive sociological
determinism (e.g. Lyotard, 1979), but recent work, particularly that of Laszlo (1972, 1991), Maruyama
(1976, 1992; Caley & Sawada, 1994), French sociologist Edgar Morin (1983), and the German philosopher
Niklas Luhmann (1990), have developed extremely sophisticated philosophical and methodological
contributions.
16
Systems theory, and specifically the so-called ‘second cybernetics’ (Von
Foerster, 1983), has argued for the re-integration of the observer into scientific
inquiry. Ceruti (1986) explains the historical nature of this shift in our conception of
knowledge and knowing from a systems/cybernetic perspective by pointing out
that it involves a rejection of the ideal of a fundamental, objective vantage point, the
result of science's neutralization of the observer’s values and perspectives (with the
inquirer as objective ‘bystander’). He argues that no neutral language is possible or
even desirable, and the observer cannot be considered as somehow standing
outside of the events which are observed.
The challenge to the ‘bystander’ perspective is addressed very clearly by
Ceruti. As he stated, in our century we have moved from a view of knowledge as a
cumulatively built edifice to one of context. This eliminates the possibility of the
knower as outsider, or ‘bystander’, and reflects an awareness of how knowledge
stands not outside our world, but is in it, and in us, and all knowledge passes
through problem formulations, categories, and disciplines.
Ceruti writes that consequently knowledge is now beginning to study its
own origins. Drawing on Von Foerster’s (1983) development of the cybernetics of
cybernetics, we are studying not just observed systems, but the observing system, a
shift from acquired knowledge to the roots and matrices of that knowledge in
history, biology, anthropology, politics, and so forth.
In other words, every statement is made by somebody, and nobody has a
‘God’s eye view from nowhere’ that is completely purified of historical, social,
political, economic, and methodological context (cf. Code, 1991; Sampson, 1993).
This suggests the need to explore the discourse of creativity. Not just what we are
finding out about creativity, but the whole process in which we find out about it,
define creativity, study it, and talk about it. Investigations of ‘folk psychology’ or
popular discourse about creativity and creative persons would also be very useful
17
here. We need to understand the history and evolution of the concept of creativity
and of creativity research and practices as we know them today. This is particularly
relevant in an age when we speak of both creative genius and creative accounting,
when the word creativity is used in discussions of advertising, finance, art, science,
and, as Stein (1983) suggests, its meaning in everyday use is becoming far from
clear.
As we begin to address the discourse of creativity and its history, we
inevitably come across such issues as methodological choices and their history in
social science as it is practiced in the United States, Europe, Asia, and the rest of the
world. How do intellectual and cultural traditions affect not just the discourse but
the practice of creativity? These questions have been addressed by Kroeber (1944),
Kearney (1988), and Simonton’s (1996) extensive research. As we explore these
historical and social issues we also find ourselves inevitably confronted with issues
of power and domination: Who, if anyone, sets the agenda for creativity, shaping
trends in the arts and sciences, determining who shall be considered creative or not
in the public mind (Zolberg, 1990)? And who, if anyone, sets the agenda in
creativity research?
These kinds of broader questions of intellectual history are addressed far
more often in other countries, where they are considered eminently relevant to our
understanding of creativity--in Europe, for instance, where historical and
sociological traditions and the German tradition of Frankfurt school critical theory
are much more strongly embedded in the culture, and consequently in the
discourse of creativity (Adorno, 1976; Attali, 1985; Melucci, 1994; Trombetta, 1989;
Vattimo, 1988). These questions and more need to be addressed from a plurality of
perspectives. They presently fall somewhat awkwardly between a number of
different disciplines, sometimes being generally ignored for lack of an appropriate
18
category or methodology, or with discussions in one discipline often appearing
without any reference to the work done in other disciplines.
Creativity research ought to address the recent critiques of individualism
(e.g. Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler & Tipton, 1985; Sampson, 1993) and
reductionism (e.g. Laszlo, 1972, Morin, 1994), arising in a variety of disciplines, and
that the subject of creativity may in fact be a very fertile area in which to study the
implications of these critiques. Bellah and his associates have suggested that these
North-American individualistic cultural patterns may be changing towards a
greater awareness of interdependence. If this is indeed so, then we should see this
reflected in creative persons, processes, and products (Bateson, 1972; Gablik, 1991;
Montuori & Purser, 1995; Sampson, 1989), and, as the emergence of a social focus
on creativity already attests, in creativity research.
The emphasis on the social dimensions of creativity represents an important
trend which touches on many crucial issues in psychology, the social sciences, and
philosophy. The study of creativity in its social and historical context addresses
many existing conceptual polarizations between self and society, sociology and
psychology, individualism and collectivism, isolation and community,
reductionism and holistic or systemic approaches (cf. Wilden, 1980; Hampden-
Turner & Trompenaars, 1993). It suggests the need for an approach which is
interdisciplinary, historical, ecological, systemic, critical, and aware of cultural and
gender differences (Barron, 1972; Helson, 1990; Montuori, 1989; Runco & Albert,
1990).
REFERENCES
Adorno, T. W. (1976). Introduction to the sociology of music. New York:
Continuum.
Allport, G. (1968). The open system in personality theory. In W. Buckley
(Ed.), Modern systems research for the behavioral sciences (pp. 343-350). Chicago:
Aldine.
Amabile, T. (1983). The social psychology of creativity. New York: Springer.
19
Angyal, A. (1941). Foundations for a science of personality. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Attali, J. (1985). Noise: The political economy of music. Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press.
Barron, F. (1963). The needs for order and disorder as motives in creative
action. In Taylor, C.W., & Barron, F. (Eds.) pp. 139-152. Scientific creativity: its
recognition and development. New York: Wiley.
Barron, F. (1968). Creativity and personal freedom. New York: Van Nostrand.
Barron, F. (1969). Creative person and creative process. New York: Holt,
Rinehart & Winston.
Barron, F. (1972). Towards an ecology of consciousness. Inquiry, 15, 95-113.
Barron, F. (1975). The solitariness of self and its mitigation through creative
imagination. In I. Taylor & J. Getzels (Eds.), Perspectives in creativity. pp.146-156.
New York: Aldine.
Barron, F. (1979). The shaping of personality. New York: Harper & Row.
Barron, F. (1988). Putting creativity to work. In R. Sternberg (Ed.), The nature
of creativity. pp. 76-98 Cambridge: University Press.
Barron, F. (1990). Creativity and psychological health. Buffalo, NY: Creative
Education Foundation.
Barron, F. (1995). No rootless flower: Thoughts on an ecology of creativity.
Creskill, NJ: Hampton Press.
Barron F. & Harrington, D. (1981). Creativity, intelligence, and personality.
In M. Rosenzweig & L. Porter (Eds.), Annual review of psychology (Vol.32, pp.439-
476). Palo Alto, CA: Annual Reviews.
Barth, J. (1984). The friday book. New York: Putnam.
Barthes, R. (1977). Image-music-text. London: Fontana.
Bateson, G. (1972). Steps to an ecology of mind. New York: Ballantine.
Bateson, M.C. (1990). Composing a life. New York: Plume.
Becker, H.S. (1982). Art worlds. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Bellah, R., Madsen, R., Sullivan, W., Swidler, A., & Tipton, S. (1985). Habits of
the heart. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Bocchi, G., & Ceruti, M. (Eds.) (1985). La sfida della complessita` [The challenge
of complexity]. Milano: Feltrinelli.
Boorstein, D. (1993). The creators. New York: Vintage.
Caley, M.T. & Sawada, D. (Eds.) (1994). Mindscapes. The epistemology of
Magoroh Maruyama. New York: Gordon & Breach.
Ceruti, M. (1986). Il vincolo e la possibilita`. [Constraint and possibility]
Milano: Feltrinelli. [Eng. trans. 1994, Constraints and possibilities. The evolution of
knowledge and knowledge of evolution. New York: Gordon & Breach.]
Ceruti, M. (1989). La danza che crea. [The creative dance] Milano: Feltrinelli.
Code, L. (1991). What can she know? Feminist theory and the construction of
knowledge. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Conrad, S. D. Toward a phenomenological analysis of artistic creativity.
Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 21, 103-120.
Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1988). Society, culture and person: a systems view of
creativity. In R. Sternberg (Ed.), The nature of creativity. (pp.325-339). Cambridge:
University Press.
Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1990). The domain of creativity. In M. Runco, & R.
Albert (Eds.), Theories of creativity. (pp. 190-212). Newbury Park: Sage.
20
Emery, F. E. (Ed.). (1969). Systems thinking: Selected readings. London: Penguin
Books.Emery, M. (1982). Searching: In new ways, for new directions, in new times.
Canberra: Australian National University Press.
Gablik, S. (1984). Has Modernism failed? New York: Thames and Hudson.
Gablik, S. (1991). The reenchantment of art. New York: Thames and Hudson.
Galton, F. (1869). Hereditary genius: An inquiry into its laws and consequences.
London: Macmillan and co.
Gardner, H. (1993). Seven creators of the modern era. In J. Brockman, (Ed.) ,
Creativity. (pp. 28-47). New York: Simon & Schuster.
Geertz, C. (1973). The interpretation of cultures. New York: Basic Books.
Gergen, K. (1985). The social constructionist movement in modern
psychology. American Psychologist, 40, 266-275.
Gergen, K. (1991). The saturated self. Dilemmas of identity in contemporary life.
NY: Basic Books.
Gioia, T. (1988). The imperfect art. Reflections on jazz and modern culture. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Goerner, S. M. (1994). Chaos and the evolving ecological universe. New York:
Gordon & Breach.
Gray, E. G. (1961). An epicyclical model for Western civilization. American
Anthropologist, 63, 1014-1037.
Gray,W., Fidler,J., & Battista,J. (Eds.) (1982). General systems theory and the
psychological sciences. An edited compendium on the state of the art organized around the
human knowledge process. (Vols. 1&2). Salinas: Intersystems Publications.
Gruber, H. (1988). Inching our way up Mount Olympus: The evolving
systems approach to creative thinking. In R. Sternberg (Ed.), The nature of creativity.
(pp.243-270). Cambridge: University Press.
Guidano, V. (1987). Complexity of the self: A developmental approach to
psychopathology and therapy. New York: Guilford.
Hales, S. (1986). Rethinking the business of psychology. Journal for the Theory
of Social Behaviour, 16,1, 57-76.
Hampden-Turner, C. & Trompenaars, A. (1993). The seven cultures of
capitalism. New York: Doubleday.
Harrington, D. (1990). The ecology of human creativity: A psychological
perspective. In M. Runco, & R. Albert (Eds.), Theories of creativity. (pp. 143-169).
Newbury Park: Sage.
Hebdige, D. (1979). Subculture. The meaning of style. New York: Methuen.
Helson, R. (1990). Creativity in women: Inner and outer views over time. In
M. Runco, & R. Albert (Eds.), Theories of creativity. (pp. 46-58) Newbury Park: Sage.
Hennessey, B., & Amabile, T. (1989). The conditions of creativity. In R.
Sternberg (Ed.), The nature of creativity. (pp.11-38). Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
James, W. (1927). The will to believe and other essays in popular philosophy. New
York: Longmans, Green and Co.
Jencks, C. (1989). What is Post-Modernism? New York: Academy Editions/St.
Martin’s Press.
Kearney, R. (1991). Poetics of imagining. From Husserl to Lyotard. London:
Harper Collins.
21
Kearney, R. (1988). The wake of imagination: Toward a postmodern culture.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Krippner, S. Ruttenber, A.J. Engelman, S.R. & Granger, D.L. (1985). Towards
the application of General Systems Theory in humanistic psychology. Systems
Research, 2, 105-115.
Kroeber, A. (1944). Configurations of culture growth. Berkeley, CA: University
of California Press.
Kuhn,T. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Kundera, M. (1988). The art of the novel. New York: Perennial.
Laszlo, E. (1993). The creative cosmos. A unified science of matter, life, and mind.
Edinburgh: Floris Books.
Laszlo, E. (1991). The age of bifurcation. Understanding our changing world. New
York: Gordon & Breach.
Laszlo, E. (1996). Introduction to systems philosophy. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton
Press. Leonard, N. (1987). Jazz. Myth and religion. New York: Oxford University
Press. Lubart, T. (1990). Creativity and cross-cultural variation. International Journal
of Psychology, 25, 39-59.
Ludwig, A. M. (1992). Culture and creativity. American Journal of
Psychotherapy, Vol. XLVI, No. 3, July, 455-469.
Luhmann, N. (1990). Sistemi sociali. Fondamenti di una teoria generale. [Social
systems. Foundations of a general theory.] Il Mulino, Bologna.
Lyotard, J-F. (1979). The postmodern condition: A report on knowledge.
Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
Macy, J. (1991). Mutual causality in Buddhism and general systems theory.
Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
Marsella, A.J.,DeVos, G. & Hsu, F.L.K. (Eds.), (1985). Culture and self. New
York: Tavistock.
Maruyama, M. (1963). The second cybernetics: Deviation amplifying mutual
causal processes. American Scientist, 51(2).
Maruyama, M. (1974). Paradigmatology and its applications to cross-
disciplinary, cross-professional and cross-cultural-communication. Dialectica, 28,
135-196.
Maruyama, M. (1976). Toward cultural symbiosis. In E. Jantsch & C.H.
Waddington, Evolution and consciousness: Human systems in transition. (pp.198-213).
Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Melucci, A. (1994). Creativita`: miti, discorsi, processi. Milano: Feltrinelli.
Mokyr, J. (1990). The lever of riches. Technological creativity and economic
progress. New York: Oxford University Press.
Montuori, A. (In press). Frank Barron’s ecological vision. In A. Montuori
(Ed.), Unusual associates: Essays in honor of Frank Barron. Creskill, NJ: Hampton
Press. Montuori, A., & Purser, R. (1996). Social creativity. Prospects and possibilities.
Volume 1. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.
Montuori, A., & Purser, R. (In press). Deconstructing the lone genius myth:
A contextual view of creativity. Journal of Humanistic Psychology.
22
Morin, E. (1992). The concept of system and the paradigm of complexity. In
M. Maruyama (Ed.), Context and Complexity. Cultivating contextual understanding.
(pp.125-136) New York: Springer-Verlag.
Morin, E. (1983). Il Metodo. Ordine disordine organizzazione. [Method. Order
disorder organization.] Milano, Feltrinelli.[Eng. trans. 1992, Method. The nature of
nature. New York: Peter Lang.]
Pagels, H. (1988). Drems of reason. The computer and the rise of the sciences of
complexity. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Purser, R. & Montuori, A. (forthcoming). Knowledge Development and
Epistemologies of Practice: A Systems Theoretic Analysis. In M. Beyerlein (Ed.),
Advances in Interdisciplinary Studies of Work Teams. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Purser, R. & Montuori, A. (1994). Miles Davis in the Classroom: Using the
jazz ensemble metaphor for enhancing team learning. Journal of Management
Education. Vol. 18, 1, 21-31.
Rosenau, P. M. (1992). Post-modernism and the social sciences. Insights, inroads,
and intrusions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Rosner, S., & Abt, L. E. (Eds.), (1974). Essays in creativity. Croton-on-Hudson,
NY: North River Press.
Rubenson, D.L., & Runco, M.A. (1992). The psychoeconomic approach to
creativity. New Ideas in Psychology, 10, 2, 131-147.
Runco, M. & Albert, R. (Eds.), (1990). Theories of creativity. Newbury Park:
Sage. Sampson, E. (1977). Psychology and the American ideal. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 35, 767-782.
Sampson, E. (1978). Scientific paradigms and social values: Wanted - A new
scientific revolution. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36, 1332-1343.
Sampson, E. (1981). Cognitive psychology as ideology. American Psychologist,
36, 730-743.
Sampson, E. (1983). Justice and the critique of pure psychology. New York:
Plenum Press.
Sampson, E. (1988). The debate on individualism: Indigenous psychologies
of the individual and their role in personal and societal functioning. American
Psychologist, 43(1), 15-22.
Sampson, E. (1989). The challenge of social change for psychology:
Globalization and psychology's theory of the person. American Psychologist, 44 (6),
914-921.
Sampson, E. (1993). Celebrating the Other. A dialogic account of human nature.
Boulder: Westview Press.
Schwartz, G. E. (1987). Personality and the unification of psychology and
modern physics: A systems approach. In J. Aronoff, A.I. Rubin, & R.A. Zucker,
(Eds.), The emergence of personality. New York: Springer.
Simonton, D. K. (1984). Genius, creativity and leadership. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
Simonton, D. K. (1988). Creativity, leadership and chance. In R. Sternberg
(Ed.), The nature of creativity. (pp.43-75). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Slater, P. (1991). A dream deferred. America’s discontent and the search for a new
democratic ideal. Boston: Beacon.
Spiro, M. (1951). Culture and personality. The natural history of a false
dichotomy. Psychiatry, 14 19-46.
23
Stein, M. (1992). Creativity programs in sociohistorical context. In S. Parnes,
(Ed.), Source book for creative problem solving. Buffalo, (pp. 85-88). NY: Creative
Education Foundation Press.
Stein, M. (1983). Creativity in Genesis. Journal of Creative Behavior, 17, 1-8.
Stein, M. (1963). A transactional approach to creativity. In C.W. Taylor and F.
Barron (Eds.), Scientific creativity. Its recognition and development. New York: John
Wiley.Stein, M. (1953). Creativity and culture. Journal of Psychology, 36, 311-322.
Stewart, E.C. & Bennett, M. J. (1991). American cultural patterns: A cross-
cultural perspective. Revised Edition. Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural Press.
Tatsuno, S. (1990). Created in Japan. From imitators to world-class innovators.
New York: Harper Business.
Torrance, E. P. (1988). The nature of creativity as manifest in its testing. In R.
Sternberg (Ed.), The nature of creativity. (pp.43-75). Cambridge: University Press.
Trombetta, C. (1989). La creativita. Un’ utopia contemporanea. [Creativity. A
contemporary utopia] Milano: Bompiani.
Valle, R. (1981). Relativistic quantum psychology: A reconceptualization of
what we knew. In R.S. Valle & R. von Eckartsberg (Eds.), The metaphors of
consciousness (pp.419-436). New York: Plenum Press.
Vattimo, G. (1985). La fine della modernita. Nichilismo ed ermeneutica nella
cultura post-moderna. [The end of modernity. Nihilism and hermeneutics in post-
modern culture.] Milano: Garzanti.
Von Bertalanffy, L. (1975). Perspectives on General Systems Theory. New York:
Braziller.
Von Foerster, H. (1983). Observing systems. Seaside, CA: Intersystems
Publications.
Wilden, A. (1980). System and structure: Essays in communication and exchange.
London: Tavistock.
Zolberg, V.L. (1990). Constructing a sociology of the arts. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
