Developmental Local Government in South Africa: Institutional Fault Lines

Abstract

This paper provides a brief introduction to the recent history of, as well as the legal and policy framework for, local government in South Africa. It discusses the transformation of local government from a racially configured, illegitimate arm of the apartheid government into a system designed to produce developmentally oriented municipalities. The progress made by South African municipalities towards realising the vision of developmental local government is remarkable and unprecedented. Over the last 13 years, municipalities have embarked on the extension of infrastructure and development, whilst absorbing fundamental changes to their internal governance and management arrangements, financial management systems and intergovernmental responsibilities. The new local government system offers great potential for the realisation of a better life for all citizens, facilitated by a new generation of municipalities. However, the challenges remain huge and some of these can be attributed to institutional fault lines. These include challenges that come with large, inclusive municipalities, new executive systems and the political appointment of senior officials. The paper also identifies the downside of overzealous institutionalisation of community participation. With regard to intergovernmental relations, the paper highlights the need for a clearer definition of local government mandates and a greater recognition of the role of big cities. The current insistence on comprehensive intergovernmental alignment of policies and budgets is questioned, and suggestions are made to substitute this with an approach of selective alignment around key national priorities.

Full text

RESEARCH AND EVALUATION
CJLG January 2009 7
Developmental Local Government in South
Africa: Institutional Fault Lines
Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance
Issue 2: January 2009
http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/ojs/index.php/cjlg
Jaap de Visser
University of the Western Cape,
South Africa
Abstract
This paper provides a brief introduction to the recent history of, as well as the
legal and policy framework for, local government in South Africa. It discusses the
transformation of local government from a racially configured, illegitimate arm of
the apartheid government into a system designed to produce developmentally
oriented municipalities. The progress made by South African municipalities
towards realising the vision of developmental local government is remarkable and
unprecedented. Over the last 13 years, municipalities have embarked on the
extension of infrastructure and development, whilst absorbing fundamental
changes to their internal governance and management arrangements, financial
management systems and intergovernmental responsibilities. The new local
government system offers great potential for the realisation of a better life for all
citizens, facilitated by a new generation of municipalities. However, the challenges
remain huge and some of these can be attributed to institutional fault lines. These
include challenges that come with large, inclusive municipalities, new executive
systems and the political appointment of senior officials. The paper also identifies
the downside of overzealous institutionalisation of community participation. With
regard to intergovernmental relations, the paper highlights the need for a clearer
definition of local government mandates and a greater recognition of the role of
big cities. The current insistence on comprehensive intergovernmental alignment of
policies and budgets is questioned, and suggestions are made to substitute this with
an approach of selective alignment around key national priorities.

DE VISSER: Developmental Local Government in
South Africa: Institutional Fault Lines
CJLG January 2009 8
1. Introduction
Thirteen years since the advent of democracy and seven years into the operation of
an entirely new local government dispensation, local government in South Africa is
in a critical phase. On the one hand, local government has not only survived a
fundamental restructuring but has also made great strides towards extending
service delivery and development to marginalised communities. In thirteen years,
local government has emerged from being an institution that was subservient, racist
and illegitimate to an institution with democratically elected leadership,
constitutional status and a developmental agenda. On the other hand, as
expectations of local government service delivery, quite correctly, have risen, it has
become evident that the broader transformation of local government is by no means
complete.
The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly, it provides a brief introduction to the
recent history of, as well as the legal and policy framework for, local government
in South Africa. Secondly, it examines some fault lines in the design and
functioning of the system of local government, focusing on the national
institutional and policy framework. Where possible, suggestions are made for a
change of direction. It is hoped that this discussion of the local government
framework, as well as some of its major challenges, may make a positive
contribution to the search for avenues of improvement.
The areas of concern highlighted in this paper are located in the practice of internal
municipal governance, the functionality of current intergovernmental arrangements
with regards to big cities, and the feasibility of the intergovernmental planning
framework. However, before these areas of concern are traversed, a brief history
and introduction into the main tenets of the local government framework follows.
2. History of Local Government
Local Government Pre-1994
Before 1994, no single, uniform system of local government existed across the
country: each province had its own configuration of local government institutions.
Local government as an institution of governance was subservient, racist and
illegitimate. The subservience of local government was manifest in that local
authorities existed in terms of provincial laws, and in that their powers and
functions were dependent on and curtailed by those laws. The development of
separate local authorities for separated racial groups, under the leading theme of
‘own management for own areas’, produced a clever scheme of naked exploitation
on the basis of race. Without exception, the well-resourced and viable commercial
centres with their strong revenue bases were reserved as white areas. The outlying
and poor areas without meaningful formal economies were reserved for black
people. In the homeland areas, traditional authorities were tasked with performing
local government functions. Transformation of local government into a fully-
fledged and non-racial institution of governance was thus impelled by a legacy of

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an “urban economic logic that systematically favoured white urban areas at the cost
of black urban and peri-urban areas,” with “tragic and absurd” results.
1
Negotiations on local government between the apartheid government and the
liberation movements commenced in earnest in the beginning of the 1990s. They
produced a foundation for local government transformation. Essential to the
outcome was the adoption of the principle of ‘one city one tax base’, the slogan
with which the grossly inequitable distribution of resources was opposed by the
liberation movement. Furthermore, a chapter on local government for the Interim
Constitution was agreed upon, as well as a transition Act (the Local Government
Transition Act of 1993) to guide the transformation towards democratic local
government.
Local Government Transformation
The Interim Constitution (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1993) paved
the way for the first democratic elections in 1994 and for the formulation of a final
Constitution by the newly elected Parliament. It ushered in constitutional
recognition for local government by recognising its autonomy and guaranteeing it
revenue generating powers, as well as a right to a share of nationally generated
revenue. The Interim Constitution set the scene for the amalgamation of over 1000
racially defined and disparate local government structures into 842 transitional
local authorities (Steytler 2006:187).
The final Constitution of 1996 then contained a definitive statement on local
government, in the form of a progressive chapter in which local government is
firmly established as a mature sphere of government. Furthermore, the Constitution
posited local government as a critical development agent by listing the
‘constitutional objects’ and ‘developmental duties’ of local government. These
centre around democracy, sustainable service delivery, social and economic
development, environmental protection, community participation, poverty
alleviation and intergovernmental cooperation (Constitution of the Republic of
South Africa 1993, ss 152 and 152).
The 1998 White Paper on Local Government (Department of Constitutional
Development 1998) preceded the implementation of the constitutional provisions.
It proved to be a policy that rallied friend and foe around new concepts. It
introduced a discourse that would reverberate until long afterwards. It translated
the constitutional objects and duties into the concept of ‘developmental local
government’, and defined the new mandate as “local government committed to
working with citizens and groups within the community to find sustainable ways to
meet their social, economic and material needs and improve the quality of their
lives.” Developmental local government would be characterised by four features.
1
Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council
and Others 1998 (2) BLCR 1458 (CC), para 122.

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• Maximising economic growth and social development: local government is
instructed to exercise its powers and functions in a way that has a
maximum impact on economic growth and social development of
communities.
• Integrating and coordinating: local government integrates and coordinates
developmental activities of other state and non-state agents in the
municipal area.
• Democratic development and public participation: local government
becomes the vehicle through which citizens work to achieve their vision of
the kind of place in which they wish to live.
• Leading and learning: municipalities must build social capital, stimulate
the finding of local solutions for increased sustainability, and stimulate
local political leadership.
The transformation of local government institutions began in earnest with the
adoption in 1998 of the Local Government: Municipal Demarcation Act, providing
for the demarcation of municipal boundaries by an independent Municipal
Demarcation Board (MDB). The Constitution contains the imperative of creating a
‘wall-to-wall’ system of inclusive and viable municipalities (Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa 1993, s. 151(1)). This represented a break with the past
where not all areas, particularly traditional rural areas, were governed by a local
authority. The Local Government: Municipal Structures Act of 1998 provided a
legal framework for the establishment of local government institutions. It
established two modes of local government: single-tiered metropolitan
municipalities in large urban areas, and a two-tiered system of district and local
municipalities throughout the rest of the country. It further provided a framework
for the internal functioning of municipalities. Critical new aspects were the
introduction of firstly, an ‘executive mayor’ system of municipal governance
alongside the classic ‘collective executive committee’ system; secondly, a separate
municipal speaker; and thirdly, ward committees as vehicles for community
participation. The impact and success of these changes is discussed below.
On 5 December 2000, municipal councils were elected into this new system of
local government. A new generation of municipalities thus commenced their
journey towards realising the constitutional vision of developmental local
government.
In the meantime, transformation work had continued with the adoption in 2000 of
the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act. This Act represents a detailed
definition of developmental local government as espoused in the White Paper on
Local Government. It engages the developmental vision of municipalities working
together with citizens by establishing a framework that instructs municipalities to
involve citizens in decision making, particularly through the regulation of a
framework for participative development planning.

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In 2003, the institutional and developmental chapters of local government
transformation were complemented by a financial chapter. The Local Government:
Municipal Finance Management Act of 2003 establishes a robust framework for
local government finance, dealing with financial management and accounting,
revenue, expenditure and debt management, responsibilities of accounting officers
and mayors, and financial supervision by national and provincial governments. The
Act was widely welcomed as a long awaited and necessary framework and
financial management tool for municipalities.
3. Local Government’s Record of Delivery
Before venturing into a critical analysis of the progress achieved to date with
regard to local government transformation, it is important to recall some of the key
benefits to be had from engaging local government in development and service
delivery (De Visser 2005:19). Firstly, local government is the level of government
that is closest to the citizens. At least in theory, municipalities are best able to
obtain and understand people’s wishes and aspirations for the locality. They should
also be best placed to identify and unlock local potential, and mobilise resources
present in the locality. These characteristics do not automatically lead to a higher
quality and legitimacy of decisions but certainly have the potential to do so. This
depends on whether local governments are indeed configured and behave
responsively, and to what extent local governments are able to pursue their
communities’ wishes for the locality through broader government structures and
partnerships.
Secondly, there is the promise that local government holds for deepening
democracy: having many sites of democratic practice is fertile ground for the
growth of new leadership and the consolidation of multi-party democracy. Thirdly,
the allocation of responsibility to municipalities creates room for local creativity
and avoids the phenomenon where the entire country needs to experience the same
experiment before it can be evaluated. Fourthly, municipalities are key players in
multi-sectoral coordination as they are the witnesses of the actual delivery by all
development actors on the ground.
Against this background, a broad assessment of progress to date indicates an
impressive record of expansion of service delivery. Through the leadership of
municipalities, basic service delivery has been extended to the marginalised to a
degree that is unprecedented in South Africa’s history, and at a pace that is noted
and commended internationally. Access to water supply increased from 59% of
total households in 1994 to 86% by April 2007. Access to sanitation increased from
48% to 73% over the same period. In 1994, 30% of houses in South Africa had
access to electricity, but by 2006/07 this figure had increased to 73%. From 1994 to
2006 a total of 2,243 million houses were delivered at an average of 249,290 units
per annum (Department of Provincial and Local Government 2007:5).
However, the incomplete and, in certain respects, imperfect nature of local
government transformation is evidenced by social protests that emerged most

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intensively during 2005 and 2006 and continued in 2007. Protests revolved around
poor records of service delivery, real and perceived instances of corruption, and a
lack of developmental impact by municipalities (Atkinson 2007:58).
It is also relevant to note that whilst municipal political leadership in South Africa
is democratically elected under a national electoral system, voter turnout over the
last three local government elections has not been impressive, averaging around
48% (Independent Electoral Commission 2006; Human Sciences Research Council
2006:3). Negative sentiments that contribute to a lower turnout for local than for
national and provincial elections relate mainly to a lack of interest and trust in local
government (Good Governance Learning Network 2008:34)
It is argued here that certain fault lines in the design of the local government
system may have contributed to this negative sentiment and the groundswell of
protest against municipalities. These fault lines relate to some of the key elements
of the legal and policy framework for local government.
4. Central Tenets of the System
The Constitution terms each sphere of government ‘distinctive, interrelated and
interdependent’ (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1993, s. 40(1)). These
three labels define the values underlying South Africa’s system of
intergovernmental relations. The status of local government in the South African
system of government can be explained by making use of this constitutional
terminology.
Local government’s ‘distinctiveness’ as a sphere of government manifests itself in
a number of ways. Firstly, municipalities are headed by democratically elected
councils (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1993, s. 157(1)). The
electoral framework, laid down in the Constitution, the Municipal Structures Act
and the Local Government: Municipal Electoral Act of 2000, provides that
municipal councils generally comprise 50% ward councillors, elected on a ‘winner
takes all’ constituency system, and 50% councillors elected via a party list
(Municipal Structures Act 1998, s. 20).
The second manifestation of the ‘distinctiveness’ of local government is the fact
that the Constitution itself allocates ‘original’ powers and functions to
municipalities. It does this by providing a list of ‘local government matters’ over
which local government has authority (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa
1993, s. 156).
2
Additional powers and functions can be transferred by national and
provincial governments to local government as a sphere, or to individual
municipalities (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1993, s. 156(2)).
Furthermore, a significant part of local government’s financial authority is
guaranteed through constitutional provisions that secure local government’s power
2
Read with Schedules 4A and 5B of the Constitution.

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to levy property rates and surcharges on fees (Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa 1993, s. 229). Finally, the Constitution provides that local government is
entitled to an ‘equitable share’ of nationally generated revenue, providing
municipalities with a legal claim to unconditional revenue streams (Constitution of
the Republic of South Africa 1993, s. 227(1)(a)). It also instructs national and
provincial governments to respect local government’s distinctiveness (Constitution
of the Republic of South Africa 1993, s. 151(4)).
The emphasis on the distinctiveness of local government is balanced by the two
other constitutional labels, namely the ‘interdependence’ and ‘interrelatedness’ of
the three spheres.
Local government’s interdependence in relation to other spheres of government
connotes a relationship of supervision. National and provincial governments are
constitutionally entitled and mandated to supervise the performance of
municipalities. The constitutional division of functions between national
government and provincial governments determines the extent to which either of
them may supervise municipalities with respect to a particular functional area. A
detailed exposition of this division goes beyond the scope of this paper. However,
it is safe to say that both spheres of government exercise significant supervisory
powers with regard to municipalities. National government establishes an
institutional framework for local government that is largely uniform across the nine
provinces. National and provincial governments must monitor the performance of
municipalities so as to ensure that they discharge their developmental and service
delivery responsibilities (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1993, s.
155(6) and (7)). National and provincial governments must support local
government (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1993, s. 154). Finally,
provincial governments have the right to intervene in the event of serious problems
in a municipality (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1993, s. 139).
The ‘interrelatedness’ of local government with other spheres of government
connotes cooperation: organs of state in the three spheres of government are
instructed to cooperate with one another in a relationship of equality (Constitution
of the Republic of South Africa 1993, s. 41). This constitutional instruction to
cooperate is particularly relevant in the South African context where the
constitutional division of functions between the three spheres is not neatly defined.
Many overlaps between national, provincial and local functions exist (Steytler and
De Visser 2007:5-16; Steytler and Fessha 2007:325). For example, when the
Constitution makes national and provincial governments responsible for ‘Public
Transport’ and municipalities for ‘Municipal Public Transport’,
3
it is clear that the
‘fuzzy edges’ between municipal and provincial functions require intensive
cooperation between the two spheres to avoid and address role confusion.
A key instrument of cooperation is integrated development planning. An important
premise of South Africa’s planning framework is that the municipality coordinates
3
See Schedule 4 of the Constitution.

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the planning of development and service delivery by all three spheres of
government in its municipal area.
4
Another key manifestation of the inclusion of
local government into the broader cooperative venture is that local government is a
partner in intergovernmental relations: through organised local government
structures (local government associations), it is represented on most relevant
intergovernmental structures and institutions (Intergovernmental Relations
Framework Act 2005).
Municipal Governance
Effectiveness of municipal governance institutions is a precondition in order for
any country to reap the benefits of decentralisation. Olowu and Wunsch (2004:9)
remark that:
[w]eak authority and defective institutional and operational rules can make it
difficult to reach decisions, and thereby lead to policy failure and weakened local
governance.
As mentioned earlier, the transformation of local government governance systems
introduced new systems of executive leadership in municipalities. These new
systems have drastically changed the profile of a municipality and the desired
relationship between its political and administrative components.
Before 2000, the average municipality was governed by a small council with a
weak, collective executive structure. The council was chaired by a mayor whose
task was largely ceremonial. The municipal administration was led by a strong
‘town clerk’ who initiated and drove much of the council agenda (Olowu and
Wunsch 2004:89). This fitted the context of the municipality as a largely
administrative, rather than policy making, authority.
The new generation of municipalities is governed by a large council; it has a strong
executive authority, in many cases concentrated in an executive mayor. The council
meeting is chaired by a separately elected speaker (Municipal Structures Act 1998,
ss. 36 and 37) and the administration is headed by a municipal manager (Municipal
Structures Act 1998, s. 55). The municipal manager is appointed by the council
(Municipal Structures Act 1998, s. 82) and is expected to work very closely
together with the municipal executive
5
. The new legal framework expects
municipalities to extend their activities beyond administering national and
provincial laws. Municipalities must adopt policies and by-laws, actively engage
municipal communities, plan strategically and partner with external institutions.
This requires strong political and administrative leadership. A critical difference
from the system that prevailed before 2000 relates to the role of the municipal
4
See Chapter 5 of the Municipal Systems Act; see also below.
5
Municipal managers enter into a performance agreement with the mayor. See the Municipal
Performance Regulations for Municipal Manager and Managers Directly Accountable to Municipal
Managers, 2006, GN R805, Government Gazette 29089, 1 August 2006.

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executive. The municipal executive is expected to initiate policy, oversee the
administration and take regular executive and administrative decisions.
At an administrative level, the transformation has been fundamental. The new legal
framework has resulted in an improved and rational system for municipal
administration. The Municipal Systems Act and the Municipal Finance
Management Act have laid down a framework for the municipal administration that
is based on modern public management principles. Concepts such as strategic
planning, performance measurement, modern accounting principles, transparency,
and separation of politics from administration, resonate throughout the legal
framework. Community participation in municipal affairs has been firmly placed
on the municipal agenda by the adoption of a progressive framework that instructs
municipalities to involve communities in decision-making. Best practices on how
best to implement these directives are emerging, albeit slowly.
5. Current Challenges
Despite significant progress in the rationalisation and modernisation of municipal
governance, there are specific challenges inherent in the new system which are
possibly hampering the successful transformation of local government. What
follows is a examination of some of the most pertinent institutional difficulties that
have arisen in the first decade of democratic local government in South Africa.
Size
A significant challenge is the size of the average South Africa municipality. The
country has 283 municipalities that serve a population of close to 48 million and
cover a landmass of 1,220,813 square kilometres (Statistics South Africa 2007:1.1
and 2.1). Quick comparisons with Spain (50 provinces and 8,108 municipalities),
and Germany (323 districts and 12,477 municipalities), show that South Africa’s
municipalities are vast in size and population. In fact, municipalities are actually
charged with a regional mandate. Not only are municipalities slowly emerging
from the painfully difficult amalgamation of varied previous municipal
administrations, but the management of often very diverse communities is itself a
difficult task. There are many examples of contestation between communities in
single municipalities. For example, when one group of communities succeeded,
after a protracted and sometimes violent battle, to have their municipality (called
Merafong) incorporated into the Gauteng province, another group of communities
in the same municipality vehemently questioned that decision.
Furthermore, it is suggested that the size of the South African municipality is a
considerable challenge for that municipality when it wants to realise effective
community participation. This challenge relates specifically to rural areas. In the
quest for economically viable municipal units with redistributive potential, the
norm is that a number of towns are demarcated into one municipality together with
their rural hinterlands, which are thus very extensive and, again, often diverse in
character.

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Executive Mayors
As stated above, strong municipal executive leadership is a characteristic of the
new generation of municipalities. Many municipalities have ‘executive mayors’.
This means that municipal executive powers are concentrated in one councillor
who is elected by the council as its executive mayor (Municipal Structures Act
1998, ss. 55 and 56).
6
The executive mayor, in turn, ‘hand picks’ a mayoral
committee (Municipal Structures Act 1998, s. 60).
7
This system stands in contrast
to the conventional collective executive system that obtained in all municipalities
prior to 2000, and which is still practiced in those municipalities that do not have
an executive mayor. The collective executive system entails the election by the
council of an executive committee that broadly ‘mirrors’ the composition of the
municipal council (Municipal Structures Act 1998, ss. 43 and 44).
It is suggested that the introduction of the indirectly elected executive mayor has
been particularly successful in large cities, where it has contributed to visible
executive leadership. In general, stakeholders appear to be “relatively satisfied with
the system”.
8
There are, however, concerns around potential exclusionary effects.
The executive mayor system appears to have created a wide gap between executive
councillors (i.e. councillors on the mayoral committee) and ‘ordinary’ councillors
who are not part of the mayoral committee. These councillors feel increasingly
disadvantaged due to the lack of access to documentation and information flows. A
report on the functioning of the mayoral executive system remarked that: “[i]t is
clear that the relationships between the mayoral executive committee and non-
executive councillors are not based on democratic values, but display a lack of
transparency; autocratic decision-making; and accountability. This is expressed by
stakeholders as a lack of respect for one another, a culture of secrecy, and
perceptions of marginalisation.”
9
Role Definitions
The issue of the division of responsibilities and powers among political office-
bearers in a municipality has proved to be a persistent source of tension and
contestation. As stated above, the speaker’s office was a novelty when it was
introduced in 2000. Generally, municipalities have not found it easy to adapt to this
new political office-bearer. A persistent source of tension and conflict can be found
in the role definition of the speaker vis-à-vis the municipal executive, or more
specifically, the mayor. An earlier study found the relationship between speakers
and executive mayors to be poor: “Self-defeating patterns of behaviour characterise
interaction between the executive mayor and the speaker. Both act in a way that is
detrimental to themselves and the municipality and there is little understanding and
6
See further Steytler and De Visser 3-29ff.
7
See DA v Masondo 2003 (2) BCLR 128 (CC) for a Constitutional Court judgment on the
composition of mayoral committees. See also Wooldridge 2008:478.
8
See Idasa, paragraph 9.
9
See Idasa, section 3; See also Atkinson 2007:64.

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concern about the consequences of the poor relationship between them and the
negative impact this has on the municipality.”
10
The constitutional reality that the municipal council possesses both legislative and
executive authority (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1993, s. 151(2))
sets the scene for a possibly uneasy relationship between the speaker and the
municipal executive. South Africa’s national and provincial parliaments are
configured in a Westminster style. Their speakers are responsible for managing the
affairs of the legislature: they generally have no authority over the affairs of the
executive save for the occasion when its members participate in the legislature. In
contrast, the speaker in a municipality occupies a different role, simply because the
municipal council is not a body that is exclusively tasked with passing laws and
overseeing the executive. It is also tasked with discussing and disposing of a range
of executive and administrative issues. The mere fact that the municipal speaker
presides over and participates in meetings where administrative and executive
issues are debated and discussed, calls for a more nuanced role definition.
In terms of statutory law, the municipal speaker is at a minimum responsible for
chairing council meetings and enforcing the Code of Conduct for Councillors
(Municipal Structures Act 1998, s. 37). However, additional powers may be
delegated to the speaker (Municipal Structures Act 1998, s. 37(b)). It is common
practice for the council to delegate to the speaker responsibilities related to
community participation and councillor support. However, both these functional
areas attract a great deal of politics. The engagement of municipal office-bearers
with the municipal community is an intensely political activity where the municipal
executive is involved. At times, speakers do not limit themselves to organising and
guarding the quality of the community engagement. They then become active
participants, often to the chagrin of the municipal executive. Similarly, councillor
support may become an arena for ‘petty politics’ in the council. Unfortunately, the
power to decide who is entitled to training, conference visits and other types of
councillor support often represents political leverage. The mayor may seek to
preserve control over this.
Mostly, tensions arise from an unclear definition of roles. By law, municipalities
must define the roles and responsibilities in written ‘terms of reference’ for each
political office-bearer, and provide for internal conflict resolution mechanisms.
Research indicates that most municipalities have not adopted such ‘job
descriptions’ for their speakers and do not have standing procedures for resolving
these possibly debilitating conflicts (De Visser, Baatjies and Akintan 2008).
Council Appointees
As stated earlier, the role of the most senior municipal official, now called the
municipal manager, has changed significantly. Since 2000, the municipal council
has had the authority to appoint the municipal manager as well as those managers
10
See Idasa , section 2.

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that report directly to him or her (Municipal Structures Act 1998, s. 82; Municipal
Systems Act 2000, s. 56). This configuration was designed to produce a senior
management team in the municipality that understands, and operates in sync with
its political principals in the municipal executive. Whilst this objective is
supported, there appear to be a number of important side-effects. Firstly, political
instability in a municipal council now has an immediate ‘knock-on’ effect on
senior management. A change in local political leadership, shifts in a ruling
coalition, or even a reform within a ruling party, often leads to the dismissal of the
municipal manager and sometimes even to the dismissal of managers reporting to
the municipal manager (Wooldridge 2008:475). This is evidenced by the large
number of unfilled vacancies in the top two echelons of municipal administration.
In 2006 and 2007, 15% of the posts in senior municipal management stood vacant
(National Treasury 2008:184). Municipal administrations are thus suffering from a
lack of continuity at senior management level (Municipal Demarcation Board
2007:89).
Secondly, the highly charged political profile of these positions has contributed to a
shift in control over appointments from the municipal council to the internal
workings of political parties. There is widespread concern that the need for
‘political suitability’ is starting to eclipse the need for qualified and skilled senior
managers in the municipality (Atkinson 2007:67). The fact that 30% or more of
senior municipal management has five years or less local government experience
reveals a disconcerting trend towards the appointment of inadequately skilled
senior managers.
11
It is suggested that this is partly the result of excessive political
involvement in what should be appointments on the basis of merit. In order for
local government to further improve its performance, a new balance needs to be
struck between the need for political alignment of top management with the
municipal executive on the one hand, and an insistence on quality on the other.
Serious consideration should be given to removing the appointment of the second
layer of management from the realm of the municipal council and leaving this to
the municipal manager. It is suggested that this will assist in reducing political
involvement in the administration, whilst leaving the political alignment between
the municipal manager and the municipal executive intact.
Improving Community Participation
The involvement of communities in municipal affairs is not only a key objective of
local government but also one of the main reasons for South Africa’s choice of
developmental local government. Success is this area is thus of paramount
importance. Government’s recognition of this importance is evidenced by an
elaborate and progressive legal framework for participatory governance at
municipal level.
Municipalities are tasked to involve communities in the drafting of their integrated
development plan, their budget, and in the taking of decisions regarding service
11
See Municipal Demarcation Board 2007:88; SALGA 2007:59; National Treasury 2008:185.

DE VISSER: Developmental Local Government in
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delivery and development. Furthermore, the law contains a legal framework for
ward committees. These committees generally comprise ten representatives of
various sectors or geographical areas in the ward. They are elected by the voters in
the ward. The committee is chaired by the ward councillor. Its role is to advance
participation of the community in the affairs of the municipality, particularly in
relation to development planning. The concept of a ward committee follows similar
practices elsewhere, such as the village development committees in Botswana
(Serema 2002:1).
However, an apparent contradiction exists between the progressive legal
framework for community participation and persistent incidences of protest
targeting councillors and municipal administrations.
12
Although government has
created ample spaces, platforms and procedures for community engagement with
local government, it is clear that communities still elect to take their grievances to
the streets. These protests expose not only the current shortcomings in service
delivery but also the presence of untapped local energy and involvement with
municipal governance. Atkinson suggests that the frustrations of communities are
threefold. They relate to poor service delivery, unresponsive decision-making and
conspicuous consumption by councillors and officials (Atkinson 2007:58).
There are many underlying reasons for the protests that are not always within the
realm of what municipalities are responsible for, and an extended discussion of
these tensions falls outside of the scope of this paper. However, a general
observation relates to the wisdom of institutionalising community participation.
The legal framework impacting on municipal governance is awash with
institutions, procedures and platforms that are used to capture diverse interests and
channel them into a discourse to which a municipal bureaucracy can relate. The
danger that lurks in the creation and nurturing of institutionalised forms of public
participation such as ward committees, is that it removes the imperative to
continuously look for innovative ways to engage communities. There may be good
reason to revisit this approach and seek more insights into how communities really
wish to relate to municipal administrations. This observation does not detract from
the potential that local government has for deepening community participation or
from the noble intentions behind the current legal framework. It rather emphasises
the need for adequate strategies at municipal level for translating this potential and
the enabling framework into genuine engagement.
6. Intergovernmental Framework: A New Role for Cities?
Central to many of the problems besetting local government is the lack of clarity
with regards to the intergovernmental framework. The Constitution combines a
strong expression of autonomy for municipalities with a weak definition of the
areas that they are responsible for. The precise demarcation of the functional
responsibility of a municipality is dependent on a variety of processes and
12
For an overview of the scale of protests, see Atkinson 2007:54; SALGA 2007:139; Mathekga and
Buccus 2006.

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CJLG January 2009 20
interventions, such as functional definitions in statutes, the outcome of judicial
proceedings solving disputes over who does what, or the conclusion of
intergovernmental agreements and protocols (Steytler and Fessha 2007:325). The
uncertainty over functional areas renders it difficult for municipalities to plan and
budget for current and capital expenditure (National Treasury 2008:152). There is a
perception that the goal posts are changing continuously (Atkinson 2007:71). The
challenges pertaining to the mismatch between the constitutional allocation of
powers and the realities of the developmental mandate are traversed in another
contribution to this journal (Christmas and De Visser 2009).
It may be argued that an insistence on a clear demarcation of functional local
government responsibilities is naïve, that the complexities of governance cannot be
confined to legal definitions, and that flexible governance arrangements are more
important. However, three reasons are proffered for greater clarity. Firstly, the
constitutional context in South Africa gives rise to an expectation surrounding
clarity of responsibilities. If the Constitution itself puts forward a list of functional
areas and seeks to protect municipal discretion with regard to these areas, there is
an expectation that these constitutional prescripts should be given a reasonably
precise meaning. It would not be in keeping with the constitutional promise of
autonomy if the Constitution contains a list of functional areas but then the content
of these areas is actually immaterial, and that flexible governance arrangements are
considered more pressing than giving effect to constitutional provisions.
Secondly, flexible governance arrangements are likely to work better in countries
with strong municipal governments and a long history of decentralisation. In such a
context, municipalities will enter these governance partnerships as equal partners.
But in countries such as South Africa, where decentralisation is a new
phenomenon, municipalities (with the exception of strong metropolitan
municipalities) are underdogs in negotiations with strong provincial or national
government departments. A reasonably clear understanding of the content of the
functional areas equips municipalities to enter negotiations surrounding the fuzzy
edges as equal partners.
Lastly, the uncertainty surrounding functional responsibilities is undermining the
legitimacy of intergovernmental fiscal arrangements. In South Africa, fiscal
arrangements and calculations are premised on an understanding of constitutional
mandates. If this understanding is contested at a fundamental level, the integrity of
the intergovernmental fiscal system is endangered.
Role of Big Cities
An example of incoherence in the intergovernmental framework that should impel
law and policy makers to reflect on the adequacy of the institutional and policy
environment for local government, relates to the role of big cities. A concern for
more coherence in the institutions of local government and the powers it possesses
should not be misunderstood as a drive for uniformity. In fact, the imposition of
uniformity on an unequal environment produces a lack of coherence. It is argued

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that this type of incoherence may be emerging in the system of local government.
Despite having a dedicated institutional arrangement for metropolitan areas in the
form of single tiered metropolitan municipalities, the local government system pays
too little regard to the variations in challenges, capacity and progress between areas
(Cities Network 2006:2-28; Van Ryneveld 2007). There are two bases for this
concern. The first relates to the fundamental economic importance of large cities.
• The majority of South Africans now live in cities and large towns and this
figure is generally on the rise. In 2006, 42 percent of the national
population lived in the 21 biggest cities and towns that cover just 2 per cent
of the South African land surface.
• The majority of wealth is created in urban areas. The 21 biggest cities and
towns together contribute 70 per cent of the national General Value Added
(GVA).
• The 21 biggest cities and towns are also home to 25 per cent of persons
living below the breadline (Cities Network 2006:2-12).
The second basis for concern relates to the fact that this concentration of both
economic activity and poverty in urban areas requires specific, specialised
approaches to issues such as:
• Dealing with the informal economic activity and settlements; and
• Planning and implementing in an integrated manner around typical urban
governance issues, such as housing, transport and infrastructure.
South Africa’s biggest cities are consistently appealing to provincial and national
governments, with varying success, to consider the devolution of certain critical
functions. The Constitution itself permits and envisages an ‘asymmetrical’
approach to municipal powers by providing for individual assignments, that is the
transfer of authority to individual municipalities (Steytler and De Visser 2007:5-
39). To date, this instrument has not been used to empower big cities with authority
that goes beyond their ‘original’ functions. In reality, however, big cities perform a
myriad of additional functions, on behalf of or in partnership with organs of state in
other spheres of government. These are often based on fluid, informal or
contractual arrangements.
Critical areas that have been consistently identified as being in need of a
differentiated approach include housing and transport (SALGA 2007:103,108).
Authority over housing, and the entitlement to the intergovernmental finances for
housing development, is with the provincial governments. However, the
eradication of slums and inadequate shelter through the provision of low cost
housing is without doubt a key priority of cities such as Johannesburg, Cape Town
and eThekwini (Durban). Similarly, the redesign and upgrade of South Africa’s
appalling public transport system, historically designed to accommodate the
transfer of the black labour force into city centres and white suburbs, is a top

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concern of the cities. Yet, cities have little authority over public transport matters
(National Treasury 2008:153).
It is suggested that this lack of authority compromises cities’ ability to ensure an
integrated approach to the provision of housing and the upgrading of public
transport facilities in an environmentally sustainable manner. There is no doubt
that, through innovative and cooperative arrangements at a regional and provincial
level, much can be achieved without resorting to changing the formal division of
powers
(National Treasury 2008:153). However, it is submitted that the devolution
of housing and public transport authority to South Africa’s cities would contribute
to the acceleration of delivery in these areas. The same does not apply to smaller
towns and rural municipalities: in that case, different public transport needs,
economies of scale and capacity constraints render it necessary for housing and
public transport authority to be exercised at a higher level than the municipality.
7. Integrated Development Planning: Towards Selective Alignment?
The legal and policy framework for development planning in South Africa
envisages that municipalities will play an absolutely essential role in realising
coherent planning across the three spheres of government. Each municipality is
required by law to adopt an integrated development plan (IDP). The IDP must be
adopted shortly after the beginning of a municipal council’s term. Furthermore, it
must be reviewed annually. It is the municipality’s strategic plan that is based on an
intensive community participation process to gauge and prioritise the municipal
community’s needs. The IDP is expected to integrate the planning of all municipal
departments under the umbrella of a united strategy for the municipal area.
Importantly, the IDP must go beyond planning rhetoric and be the basis for the
municipality’s annual budgets and its spatial planning. Furthermore, the
municipality’s senior managers must be held accountable regularly, through a
system of performance management, for the realisation of the IDP. As if this
configuration is not sufficiently ambitious, the IDP is expected to integrate not only
the municipality’s plans but also the plans of all national and provincial
departments and parastatals (such as electricity-generating and telecommunication
utilities) in that municipal area (Department of Constitutional Development
1998:19)
There is no doubt that the introduction of integrated development planning has
forced municipalities to engage communities and gauge and prioritise their needs.
It has also propelled municipalities into a thinking that goes beyond the municipal
council’s term, and into a concerted effort at integrating service delivery and
development across spheres, sectors and actors.
In this framework, the municipality is expected to be the pivot that skilfully
mediates the tremendous and varied needs of a municipal community with the
requirements of departments and parastatals in two other spheres of government
(Patel and Powell 2008:353). All of this is to be done within the parameters of a
tight municipal budget. When the municipal capacity is set off against these

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expectations, however, the picture looks bleak for many municipal areas. Capacity
for integrated development planning at municipal level is low. The dependency on
consultants to realise an IDP is staggering. A recent report suggests that 28% of
local municipalities lack the most basic capacity to prepare an IDP and will
struggle even with additional support. Only one in three (37%) municipalities has
independent capacity to prepare an IDP, whilst another 35% have some basic
capacity and can prepare an IDP with additional support (Good Governance
Learning Network 2008:51). Against the backdrop of these figures, the assignment
to municipalities to be the coordinator of all of government’s development efforts
in the municipal area may be a tall order for some time to come. Thus when they
reflect on the municipality’s role in intergovernmental planning, Pieterse and Van
Donk remark that: “it is unlikely that municipalities will have the political clout (let
alone the institutional capabilities) to persuade a national department to delay or
redefine its particular programmes.” (Pieterse and Van Donk 2008:62)
The intergovernmental aspiration, embedded in the planning framework, which
envisages the IDP to be a reflection of the entire government’s vision for the
municipal area, may be an ambitious attempt at cooperative planning across the
three spheres. However, the insistence on this wholesale alignment of municipal
budgets and plans with national and provincial budgets and plans may also just be
an offshoot of the distrust of municipalities as the custodians of local development.
There is no doubt that pervasive trends of corruption, mismanagement, immature
politics and a skills deficit in many municipalities do little to dispel this distrust.
However, the solution that is now imposed through legislation is, by all accounts,
extremely difficult to achieve and harbours significant dangers for the achievement
of bottom-up development.
The IDP has become a tightly regulated process that must absorb the input of a
multitude of development actors towards the adoption of a document within tight
deadlines. This process has thus become a ‘pressure cooker’, which is incompatible
with unwieldy community input which tends to disrupt intergovernmental cohesion
and adherence to the intergovernmental deadlines (Good Governance Learning
Network 2008:52). There is then a real danger that communities and community
organisations will become disgruntled with the IDP, as they perceive the process to
be inadequate in responding to their needs. A more realistic approach to
intergovernmental planning and alignment may be apposite. It may be worthwhile
to consider the identification of a limited number of national key priorities and
insist on their alignment, whilst relaxing the effort towards synchronisation on
other, less important policy areas. This may provide the necessary room for
municipalities to develop their planning capabilities, devise mechanisms for
genuine interaction with communities, and display creativity.
8. Conclusion
The progress made by South African municipalities towards realising the vision of
developmental local government is remarkable and unprecedented. Over the last 13
years, municipalities have embarked on the extension of infrastructure and

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development, whilst absorbing changes to their internal governance and
management arrangements, financial management systems and intergovernmental
responsibilities. The new local government system thus offers great potential for
the realisation of a better life for all citizens, facilitated by a new generation of
developmentally oriented municipalities.
However, this paper has identified several areas of contestation and conflict that
impede service delivery and development. It has argued that an improvement in
municipal governance is essential, and has identified key questions around
governance arrangements and community participation. It has also proposed that
municipal service delivery would benefit from more institutional coherence and
predictability. An example given relates to the need for institutional
accommodation of different spatial and economic realities that obtain in big cities.
The paper also looked at the ambitious and progressive framework for integrated
development planning and asked whether the insistence on comprehensive policy
alignment should not be substituted with a policy of selective alignment around
national key priority areas.
Thus it cannot be assumed that communities will start reaping more benefits from
the developmental system of local government. Municipalities operate in a
complex system of intergovernmental relations, which places a high premium on
both local discretion and intergovernmental integration. Capacity constraints in
critical areas of municipal governance and administration are hampering service
delivery. There is also a lack of connectivity between communities and
municipalities, which flies in the face of the policy intent of ‘developmental local
government’. The search for the right balance is far from over.
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