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Marushiakova, Elena and Vesselin Popov. 2014. Migrations and Identities of Central Asian
‘Gypsies’. – In: Asia Pacific Sociological Association (APSA) Conference “Transforming
Societies: Conestations and Convergences in Asia and the Pacific”, 15-16.02.2014, Chiang-Mai,
Thailand. http://rcsd.soc.cmu.ac.th/web/APSA2014/docmedia.php?type=1&page=2.
Different communities, living in the new, independent states of Central Asia, (former Soviet
republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) are often called with
the umbrella appellation ‘Central-Asian Gypsies’. However, uniting all these groups, which mostly
have nothing in common both in their origin and in their language, under one cover term can not be
justified. Generally speaking, the thing that unites all these communities into one category is their
distinction (according to their lifestyle, main occupation, appearance, ethno-social structure, certain
ethno-cultural characteristics, etc.) and the generally marginal position compared with the majority
of their surrounding populations throughout the region of Central Asia.
What are the ‘Central-Asian Gypsies’
Most often as ‘Central-Asian Gypsies’ is called Lyuli, also known as Jughi (in Tajikistan), Multoni
(in some regions of Uzbekistan) and sporadically also Gurbath (or Gurvath). They been present in
the land of a contemporary Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan for
centuries, since their ancestors migrated from India. (Snesarev 1960: 24-29; Snesarev & Troitskaya
1963: 597-609; Nazarov 1968a: 43-45; Nazarov 1968b: 53-55; Nazarov 1975: 3-23; Nazarov 1980:
165-185; Nazarow 1983: 3-38; Demeter 1980: 143-149; Abashin 2004; Bessonov 2008: 27-39;
Gabbasov 2008a; Gabbasov & Cherenkov 2008; Khakimov 2010: 32-53)
A Lyuli are not the only ‘Central Asian Gypsies’. There are other, relatively small, groups, mainly in
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, that can be identified as “intermediate communities”; they often
differentiate themselves from Lyuli (and Lyuli likewise differentiate themselves from them) though
their surrounding populations perceive them all as a single minority of Lyuli or Central Asian
Gypsies. These are the Tavoktarosh (or Kosatarosh, or Sogutarosh in Tajikistan), Mazang1 and Agha
(called also Kashgarskie Lyuli); all these groups are relatively close to Lyuli and perhaps in the past
were even part of them. (Snesarev 1960: 24-29; Snesarev & Troitskaya 1963: 597-609; Nazarov
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1 The designation “Mazang” (literally “dark, dark-faced”) often leads to confusion, as it can refer to "real"
Mazang, i.e. those who use this term to describe themselves (Oransky 1971b: 202-207) as well as to Mug’at,
Tavoktarosh, and other “Gypsy-like communities”.
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1968a: 43-45; Nazarov 1975: 3-23; Nazarov 1980: 165-185; Nazarow 1983: 3-38; Demeter 1980:
143-149; Bessonov 2008: 27-39; Gabbasov 2008b; Khakimov 2010: 32-53)
The region is also home to a number of other groups usually defined by scholars as ‘Gypsy-like
communities’ such as the Chistoni, Kavol, Baluj and Parya. Relative newcomers to the region (their
ancestors migrated here from Afghanistan and India in 18th-19th centuries), they are more obviously
distinct from the Lyuli. All of these groups maintain their differentiation (including by the practice of
endogamy) and may even strongly oppose being classed under the Lyuli heading. (Oransky 1961: 62-
77; Oransky 1964a: 62-75; Oransky 1964b: 3-16; Nazarov 1968: 43-45; Oransky 1971a: 66-99;
Nazarov 1975: 3-23; Oransky 1977; Demeter 1980: 143-149; Oransky1983; Nazarow 1983: 3-38;
Abashin 2004; Bessonov 2008: 27-39; Gabbasov & Cherenkov 2008; Khakimov 2010: 32-53)
The division of the so-called Lyuli and other ‘Gypsy-like communities’ in Central Asia can be
presented schematically as follows:
Central Asian “Gypsies”
“Gypsies”
Lyuli / Jughi / Multoni / Ghorbat
Intermediate
Communities
Tavoktarosh / Kosatarosh /
Sogutarosh / Koshuktarosh
Mazang
Agha
“Gypsy”-like
Communities
Chistoni
Kavol
Baluj
Parya
The Lyuli call themselves Mug’at, from an Arabic term meaning “fire cult followers” or “heathen”
applied in the past to Zoroastrians; it has persisted despite they fact that they have been Sunni
Muslims for centuries. They are subdivided by the geographical regions with which they are
historically associated, e.g. Samarkandikho, Karshigikho, Mug’atoi bukhorgi, etc., and into
patronymic clans (tupar) which are in turn comprised of separate extended families (avdol).
(Nazarov 1968a: 43-45; Nazarov 1975: 3-23; Nazarow 1983: 3-38; Abashin 2004; Bessonov 2008:
27-39; Gabbasov & Cherenkov 2008)
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Beyond the borders of the former USSR, small groups descended from Mug’at who migrated in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth century from what was then Russian Turkestan are to be found in
Afghanistan, where they are called Ghorbat. They continue to use self-apellations such as Kulobi,
Bukhori, Samarkandi, etc. (Günther 2007: 103-120; 2011: 86-98). The latter two obviously derive
from Bukhara and Samarkand, suggesting that these regional names persist even after moving away.
The Lyuli of Central Asia: Background Data
The Mug’at, a hierarchically structured community most commonly known as Lyuli by neighboring
populations, have for centuries been an integral part of Central Asian life. They live primarily in
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, with smaller populations in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (mainly in the
Fergana Valley) as well as a small presence in Turkmenistan. They inhabit both major urban centers
such as Samarkand, Bukhara and Tashkent, and rural areas. (Snesarev 1960: 24-29; Snesarev &
Troitskaya 1963: 597-609; Nazarov 1968a: 43-45; Nazarov 1975: 3-23; Nazarov 1980: 165-185;
Nazarow 1983: 3-38; Bessonov 2008: 27-39; Gabbasov & Cherenkov 2008; Khakimov 2010: 32-53)
They are generally multilingual, commonly having a mastery of both Uzbek (even outside of
Uzbekistan proper) and often also Russian, which retains a legal status of “language of transnational
communication” throughout most countries of Central Asia. 2
Their mother tongue, however, is Tajik. They often also possess Tajik preferred identity, and
especially outside of Tajikistan tend to publicly identify as Tajiks in addition to or in place of their
own ethnic identity. (Snesarev 1960: 24-29; Oransky 1961: 62-77; Snesarev & Troitskaya 1963:
597-609; Oransky 1964a: 62-75; Oransky 1964b: 3-16; Oransky 1971a: 66-99; Oransky 1977;
Oransky 1983; Khakimov 2010: 54-60)
Due both to the complex nature of their identity and because it is often perceived negatively by
others, many Lyuli self-declare their “nationality”3 as Tajik rather than Tsygane (‘Gypsies’) on
census forms during the Soviet period. As a result, official data are not a reliable indicator of the true
size of the population. Bearing this in mind, official figures are as follows:
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2 All our communication with Lyuli men, women and even children was conducted in Russian, and none of
them had any significant difficulties operating in it.
3 Term used in Soviet times and in use also in post-Soviet space for ethnic belonging and self-identification.
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• In 1926 3,710 persons in the Uzbek SSR (which then included today’s Tajikistan) declared
themselves as Tsygane;
• In 1939 the figures were 5,487 in the Uzbek SSR, 1,193 in the Tajik SSR, 4,257 in the Kazakh
SSR, 644 in the Kyrgyz SSR and 190 in the Turkmen SSR;
• The 1959 figures were 7,860 in the Uzbek SSR, 1,556 in the Tajik SSR, 7,265 in the Kazakh SSR,
776 in the Kyrgyz SSR and 103 in the Turkmen SSR;
• In 1970 the number of self-declared Tsygane was 11,371 in the Uzbek SSR, 1,171 in the Tajik
SSR, 7,766 in the Kazakh SSR, 863 in the Kyrgyz SSR and 218 in the Turkmen SSR;
• The 1979 figures for the Uzbek SSR were 12,581; in the Tajik SSR 1,139; in the Kazakh SSR
8,626; in the Kyrgyz SSR 1,927 and in the Turkmen SSR 357 persons;
• In 1989 in the Uzbek SSR 16,397 persons declared themselves Tsygane; in the Tajik SSR 1,791
persons; in the Kazakh SSR 7,165 persons; in the Kyrgyz SSR 990 persons, and in the Turkmen SSR
119 persons. (Perepisi naselenia ... 2012)
The Newly Independent States that have emerged in the region since the collapse of the USSR have
not conducted censuses on a regular basis, so available data are incomplete, fragmented and in many
cases approximate. To put these figures in context, there was significant emigration, particularly of
ethnic Russians and Roma, from Central Asia during this period. The comparison of data shows that
some States (Uzbekistan in particular) experienced a dramatic decrease in the Lyuli population, while
others, like Tajikistan, experienced significant increases.
Both trends are associated with changes in public attitudes towards this population: the more
negative and stigmatizing the public perception of Tsygane or “Gypsies”, the more likely Lyuli are to
hide their identity. In any case, the actual number of Lyuli currently living in the countries of Central
Asia is significantly higher than the official figures, just as it was in previous historical periods.
The Lyuli traditionally lived a nomadic or semi-nomadic life style, stopping for the winter months in
rented houses or agricultural outbuildings in the kishlaks.4 Men’s characteristic occupations, some of
which are reflected in the self-appellations of some subgroups5, included trading horses and donkeys,
producing various objects from horsehair, making wooden utensils and costume jewelry, itinerant
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4 kishlak – from the Turkic, a rural settlement in Central Asia.
5 Some self-appellations derive from producing different wooden utensils, e.g. Tavoktarosh from tavok
(wooden dish), Sogutarosh from sugu (wooden bowl), Kosatarosh from kosa (wooden cup), Koshuktarosh
from koshuk (spoon), etc. (Khakimov 2010: 39)
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trading, providing cures for the ailments of humans and/or animals, seasonal agricultural labor and
providing music for various family and village celebrations. Women helped their husbands in these
activities, but their main occupation was simply begging, combined in many cases with
fortunetelling and other magical and folk-healing practices. (Nazarov 1975: 3-23; Nazarov 1980:
165-185; Nazarow 1983: 3-38; Abashin 2004; Bessonov 2008: 27-39; Gabbasov & Cherenkov 2008;
Khakimov 2010: 69-78)
After the October Revolution of 1917, the new Soviet government implemented policies designed to
transform the socio-economic situation of so-called Tsygane Sredneaziatskie (“Central Asian
Gypsies”), the main objectives of which were forced settlement and inclusion in the State-run labor
force (a policy pursued by other communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe as well). Because
the Lyuli were classed as Tsygane Sredneaziatskie (“Central Asian Gypsies”) i.e. a part of the
Tsygane minority, they were subject to all measures undertaken by the Soviet State with regard to
Tsygane. In the 1920s a number of Tsyganskie kolkhozy (“Gypsy collective farms”) and Tsyganskie
arteli (“Gypsy cooperatives”) were set up throughout the Soviet Union. Tsyganskie kolkhozy in
Central Asia engaged mainly in the cultivation of cotton (by 1937 there were thirteen such in
Uzbekistan alone) while the region’s Tsyganskie arteli were mainly involved in the collection of
scrap metal and other secondary raw materials, wood processing, basket making, etc. Tsyganskie
shkoly (“Gypsy schools”) and, in the case of Central Asia, separate Tsyganskie klassy (“Gypsy
classes”) were established as well.
In 1938, however, State policy towards nationalities, including Tsygane, underwent radical reform,
shifting from the “special policy” of supporting ethnic development towards what would today be
termed “mainstreaming”: “Gypsy” schools and classes were closed and the pupils moved into
mainstream education; “Gypsy”-specific collective farms and cooperatives were dissolved, and those
engaged in them redirected towards existing collective farms in rural areas and towards factories and
enterprises in the towns. (Nazarov 1968c: 67-73; Nazarov 1969b: 73-77; Nazarov 1970; Bessonov
2008: 27-39; Gabbasov & Cherenkov 2008)
On the fifth of October 1956 this policy was given increased impetus by Decree No. 1373 of the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR “On the Admission to Labor of the Gypsy Vagrants”6,
followed by Ordinance No. 685 of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the twentieth of October
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6 In original: Ukaz Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR “O priobshchenii k trudu tsygan
zanimayushchikhsya brodyazhnichestvom”, Moscow, Kremlin, 5 Oct. 1956.
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the same year. The latter prohibited the nomadic way of life and criminalized those who would try to
avoid sedentarization, simultaneously obliging local authorities to assist those affected by offering
them housing, employment and schooling. (Polnoe sobranie …)7 As a result, Tsygane (including
Lyuli) gradually adopted an almost entirely sedentary lifestyle and became an integral part of the
social structures of Soviet society, though generally at its periphery. Nominally they became part of
the ‘new historical, social and international unity of people’, the ‘Soviet people’, and member of
ruling class of agricultural proletariat, became most often part of the so-called “agricultural
proletariat”8. Some individuals went on to higher education, including university degrees, and
achieved decent social positions.9 (Demeter et al. 2000: 240-242; Marushiakova & Popov 2003: 293-
294: Marushiakova & Popov 2008)
The relatively high degree of social integration achieved by Tsygane in Central Asia during the
Soviet era proved unstable and superficial in its aftermath. From 1991, as the USSR fragmented, the
situation in the region changed radically. Severe economic crisis deprived the vast majority of Lyuli
of their jobs, leaving them with literally no means of subsistence, while the ensuing social climate
exacerbated ethnic tensions, reviving and intensifying negative attitudes formulated over the
centuries transformed them to declassed community (phenomena also experienced by the Roma
populations in the former communist block of Central and Eastern Europe). Simultaneously, as
newly independent Central Asian countries have engaged in intensive “nation building”, the Lyuli
find themselves pushed from the so-called “titular nation”10 and in most countries of the region are
once again being perceived as “aliens”.
A bad economic situation, armed conflicts, negative attitudes towards them and worsening
interethnic relations are, in combination with the generally low level of education among the Lyuli,
the main factors behind the rapid deterioration in their overall circumstances. The situation continues
unabated and, to date, there have been no significant efforts to improve it, whether through domestic
mechanisms or foreign aid. The Lyuli have not been included in any of the national or international
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7 http://www.ussrdoc.com/ussrdoc_communizm/ussr_5137.htm.
8 Soviet people as political concept adopted at 60s of 20th century was determined as: a “new historical,
social, and international community of people having a common territory, economy, and socialist content; a
culture that reflected the particularities of multiple nationalities; a federal state; and a common ultimate goal:
the construction of communism.” –Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya.
9 The most famous representative of this new Lyuli elite is Professor Khol Nazarov. A list of Nazarov’s
publications see Bibliography.
10 titul’naya natsia – a Russian term used in the region to designate a given country’s dominant population.
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action and support programs directed towards Europe’s Roma and Sinti, nor has their case been
espoused by any social movement or NGO.
Lyuli in the Russian Federation
Lyuli migration (especially from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan) increased significantly in the aftermath
of the collapse of the USSR. Most of the region’s Newly Independent States have, since their
emergence, been in severe social and economic crisis, which became a major push factor for the first
Lyuli migration. The breakdown of public and municipal services and the collapse of many
enterprises, particularly collective farms, coupled with deteriorating public attitudes towards them,
left a huge proportion of Lyuli permanently unemployed with no means of subsistence and no
prospect of regular work. As an additional “push” factor, from 1992-1997 Tajikistan was in a state of
outright civil war.
Changes in the legislation of the Russian Federation facilitated migration. In 1991 Chapter 209 of the
Criminal Code, under which so-called tuneyadstvo (social parasitism or the maintenance of a
parasitic lifestyle - in a word, begging)11 was subject to prosecution, was repealed.
Large scale Lyuli migration directed towards the Russian Federation and other independent countries
forming on the ruins of the former USSR began in the early 1990s and continues to the present day.
It remains a major source of their livelihood.
Lyuli migrate as whole families, men, women and children, including infants. The women’s main
occupation is begging (usually with small children)12 on the streets of big cities (particularly
Moscow and St. Petersburg), a highly visible activity that attracts negative attention from Russian
society and media.
The Lyuli travel mainly by train. Their principal point of entry into the Russian Federation is the
town of Astrakhan due to its direct rail connections with Uzbekistan (Bukhara and Samarkand) and
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11 Chapter 209 was inherited from the time of the USSR and reflected Soviet thinking, in which
unemployment was ideologically unacceptable and incompatible with a “socialist way of life”. It was
therefore officially eliminated and those who were not engaged in either work or study were subject to
prosecution. Begging, considered a form of “social parasitism”, was a criminal offence.
12 The number of children in Lyuli families is high; according to some estimates they comprise some 70% of
the community both in the Central Asian countries and among Lyuli migrants in the Russian Federation. See:
Skakirov D. A chto naidut - tem i zhivut. - Media Zavod, 21.04.2010. http://mediazavod.ru/articles/86519.
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Tajikistan (Dushanbe), and also because, as most of our Moscow-based informants emphasized, “the
people there are better towards us”. Their second major entry point is Novosibirsk, with rail links to
the Fergana Valley and Tashkent regions of Uzbekistan. Other entrance points are cities such as
Saratov, Samara, Chelyabinsk, Yekaterinburg and Omsk: the rail network enables Lyuli to move not
only to the European part of the Russian Federation, but to Siberia and the Far East as well.
Lyuli migration is impressive in both scale and scope. Although primarily directed towards the
largest cities, Moscow and St. Petersburg, Lyuli are to be found on the streets of almost all of the
Russian Federation’s major urban centers, including Arkhangelsk and Murmansk on the shores of
the Arctic Ocean in the extreme northwest and Vladivostok on the Pacific coast in the Far East.
Generally they prefer larger and more developed economic centers, but have also made their way to
more remote and less developed regions. Thus, for example, the first Lyuli appeared in Syktikvar (in
the Komi Republic) as early as in 1993; their arrivals and departures, and the legality of their
remaining, are still periodically reported and discussed in local media.13 In 2002 some 315 Uzbek
Lyuli were expelled from Surgut (Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Region).14 In 2008 the local
authorities and residents of Yuzhno Sakhalinsk (on Sakhalin Island) held public discussions15 to
consider the (still unresolved16) issue of how to expel Central Asian Lyuli.
Tightening border controls have curtailed and gradually redirected Lyuli migration, which is now by
and large confined to the States of Central Asia and the Russian Federation. In recent years
Kazakhstan has attracted more and more migrant workers, among them Lyuli, from neighboring
countries, especially Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Lyuli migrants in Kazakhstan typically combine
begging with seasonal agricultural labor, those from Uzbekistan mainly involved in the harvesting of
cotton while Lyuli from Kyrgyzstan generally work with tobacco.
In their migrations Lyuli have for years used their old Soviet passports for entering the Russian
Federation, and the adoption of the Federal Law on Citizenship of the Russian Federation in 2002
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13 Vremya lyuli. Tadzhikskie tsygane izvlekayut pol’zu iz nesovershenstva rossiiskikh zakonov. – Molodezh
Severa. Ezhenedel’naya obshchestveno-politicheskaya gazeta Respubliki Komi. 21/2003, 22.05.2003.
http://www.mskomi.ru/arhiv/new055.htm.
14 Surgut "zachistili" ot uzbekskikh tsigan. – Informatsionnoe agentstvo “Tyumenskaya liniya”. http://www.t-
l.ru/22063.html.
15 Na Sakhalin na zarobotki vpervye pribyla gruppa tsygan iz blizhnego zarubezh’ya. – Sakhalin - Kuryli.
Informatsionnoe agentstvo. http://www.skr.su/?div=skr&id=15622; Muzhchiny iz tsyganskogo tabora
pytayutsya naiti rabotu v Yuzhno-Sakhalinske. – Nashi ostrova. Obshchestvenno-politicheskaya gazeta.
http://www.tia-ostrova.ru/?div=news&id=107403.
16 K nam priekhal tabor. http://zemliaki.info/publ/2010_god/5_2010_god/k_nam_priekhal_tabor/12-1-0-110.
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did not change the situation. As citizens of their countries of origin (primarily Uzbekistan and
Tajikistan) which are part of the Commonwealth of Independent States, Lyuli are entitled to visa-free
entry to the Russian Federation and to remain there for a period of up to three months. They are,
however, required to register domicile within three days of arriving in the country. Few do so,
preferring to set up temporary camps or shantytowns on the outskirts of population centers.
Lyuli in the Russian Federation face both old and new problems and difficulties arising from their
migrant status. The most common of these has always been the threat of deportation on grounds of
failure to register or overstaying the three-month deadline. It should be noted that although these
legal requirements are violated by the majority of migrant workers deportations are rare, except in
the case of Lyuli - a real possibility if they fail to pay the blackmail often demanded by the police.
They also have frequent dealings with inspectors from the migration services. Eviction and/or
deportation may be carried out on grounds of lack of proper residence or work permits, illegal
accommodation, suspicion of spreading infectious disease, complaints from citizens, public nuisance
(usually a euphemism for begging, especially with small children) etc. Local mafia types, attracted
by myths of hereditary gold and high earnings from begging and supposed drug dealing, are yet
another threat.17
In April 2012 employees of the Federal Migration Service in the Novosibirsk area discovered an
illegal tent settlement in the forest not far from the city of Berdsk. It was home to Lyuli from
Uzbekistan who worked the city’s litter bins and dumps, collecting cans, plastic bags, bottles, etc.
which they sold on to scrap merchants, earning on average 100-150 rubles (between €2.50 and €4)
per family per day. Law enforcement agents detained thirty citizens of Uzbekistan. First offenders
without migrant registration were fined, while repeat violators were deported by court order.18
In July that year, in the same region, people with holiday homes in the countryside near Novosibirsk
notified local agents of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation and of the Office of
the Federal Migration Service about the existence of an illegal tent settlement. Forty-six Uzbek Lyuli
were found to be living there. They had arrived the previous month and their main occupation was
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17 But we also heard stories from colleagues working with Lyuli communities in Russia about mafia members
who went to Lyuli camps with the intention of extorting money from them but, shocked by their extreme
poverty, gave them small donations instead.
18 V Berdske obnarushili lyuli. http://nazaccent.ru/content/4353-v-berdske-obnaruzhili-lyuli.html.
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collecting scrap metal from landfills.19 Fourteen of them were found to be in the territory of the
Russian Federation in violation of legal requirements, and were deported.
Some of our Lyuli informants claim that such actions are often more a case of forcing people out of a
given region than of bona fide deportation. One such case occurred in the Siberian city of Tyumen in
2010. Lyuli living there were found to be carrying a number of infectious diseases such as scarlet
fever and polio. The local authorities gathered them, gave them two train carloads to load their
belongings, and drove them outside the borders of the Tyumen administrative region.
In other cases, Lyuli have learned to exploit the authorities’ willingness to get rid of them. For
example in April 2012, in the Chelyabinsk region, ten Lyuli adults, including a mother with five
children, voluntarily presented themselves at the local bailiff’s office, from which they were taken
directly to Balandino airport and repatriated. They had been living in a tabor (temporary camp) on
the outskirts of Chelyabinsk, between the Meridian Highway and the railroad tracks. Their incomes,
mostly from begging on the streets, were low, so they chose to return home at public expense. After
a few months back in Tajikistan, one of the families headed back to Russia, this time to Moscow.
Years of constant migration have enabled the Lyuli to gather significant amounts of practical
information about conditions in different regions of Russia, which in turn allows them to plan and
direct their migrations. For example during major Orthodox holidays, when believers are inclined to
give alms, they head to the most visited churches and monasteries, while during Muslim holidays
they turn to regions with a predominantly Muslim population. In Dagestan, for example, the Lyuli
are mostly known as “Tajiks”, i.e. they are not generally regarded as “Gypsies”. They arrive annually
in the capital Makhachkala around the time of the Bairam festival and can be found begging at all
road intersections. Typically, they rent cheap houses in the suburbs, with large numbers of people
sharing dwellings, for the duration of their stay. When the holidays are over, they leave the country.
In some places a gradual transition from illegal camps and temporary shantytowns to permanent
residence in the towns has been made. In downtown Kazan, for example, a whole Central Asian
quarter has taken shape since the 1990s. Its old, sometimes formerly abandoned, houses are mostly
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19 Nelegal’nyi tsiganskii tabor byl obnaruzhen pod Novosibirskom. http://nazaccent.ru/content/5026-eshe-
odin-cyganskij-tabor-byl-obnaruzhen.html.
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inhabited by Lyuli, who make a living by begging in the major markets and sometimes selling dried
fruit.20
Lyuli migrants have relatively limited possibilities for economic activity. In the early 1990s, when
large scale Lyuli migration was a new phenomenon, they usually traveled to the Russian Federation
in spring and stayed there until returning to their homelands for the autumn harvests. From very early
on, however, some were already overwintering abroad, in camps (e.g. in the forests near Moscow) or
abandoned buildings, surviving mainly by begging. In the early years, these families relied almost
exclusively on the earnings of women and children, whose main occupation is begging on the streets
of big cities and in front of churches and/or mosques. It is only within the past four to five years that
men have also become significant contributors to the family economy. Typically, they are employed
(sometimes legally, but more often illegally) in temporary construction jobs or other unskilled labor,
or involved in collecting scrap and other secondary raw materials.
In recent years more and more Lyuli (especially men) are seeking to regularize both their residential
and their employment status. In some rare cases Lyuli women - for example those working at a fruit
and vegetable warehouses near Moscow - have also found employment in the mainstream economy.
The general trend is towards long-term stays in the Russian Federation, with an accompanying
increase in efforts towards legalizing residence and employment, and some even seeking Russian
citizenship. Naturally, the longer Lyuli have been in Russia, the more experience they gain, and the
easier it becomes for them. They cease to dress in ways that distinguish them from the surrounding
population, declare themselves to be Tajiks, and find legal or semi-legal low-skill jobs in
construction, scrap collection, sanitation, trade and communal services, and so on.
Although they are to be found throughout the vast territories of the Russian Federation, Moscow
remains the preferred destination for Lyuli migrants (especially from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) as
well as for other migrants from Central Asia. They live in camps, rented buildings, abandoned
houses, barns and sheds as well as basements and residential buildings, a dozen people together, and
even on building sites (so they don’t need to travel to work). They are mainly employed in
construction and as janitors (the preferred job, as it includes accommodation). During our field
research in Moscow in the autumn of 2012 the only Lyuli remaining in the city were those with jobs
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20 Ekspert: V tsentre Kazani Lyuli zakhvatili tselyi kvartal. – Natsional’nyi aktsent. Media-proekt Gil’dii
mezhetnicheskoi zhurnalistike. http://nazaccent.ru/content/4771-ekspert-v-centre-kazani-lyuli.html.
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in construction or as janitors, while those who lived in camps had journeyed back to their homelands
because of cold weather.
Throughout the Russian Federation, all schools are required to accept the children of migrants
whether they are legal or not, but in practice only a limited number of schools in Moscow do so.
However not one of the Lyuli we interviewed in Moscow had enrolled their children in school there.
A significant obstacle to Lyuli children’s school enrolment is the practice of giving birth outside
hospital, as a result of which they have no birth certificate or other ID. In 2006 the St. Petersburg
Center for the Prevention of Child Neglect and Drug Addiction investigating an illegal Lyuli camp
near the city discovered fifty children without any personal documents. (ADTs MEMORIAL 2010:
43)
The narratives of our Lyuli informants in Moscow and nearby satellite towns focused primarily on
issues of migration and their life in the Russian capital. Most had accumulated relatively long
experience of this type of labor migration, and many recalled the 90s when they first set up camps in
local woodlands. The following story describes the situation:
“We would choose a camping place that couldn’t easily be seen, but was relatively close to an
elektrichka [electric train] station so we could get in to Moscow. We made tents, kept the camp
clean, and we had an aksakal21 with us for solving problems. But it was a hard time - the women and
children went begging every day and sometimes people came and collected money in return for
letting us stay there. Some people still live like that, but now we have shelter and work, and we’re
earning more money, so life is much better. As for how it will be in future ...who knows?” 22
Most of the Lyuli we interviewed indicated gradual but steady improvement in their situation. Ten to
fifteen years ago camp dwellers lived under double pressure from both criminal elements and the
police, both of which had to be bribed, and under constant threat of deportation or expulsion from the
Moscow region. Their main income came from the not particularly profitable occupation of begging,
carried out by women and children. Work for men (usually illegal, in construction) was hard to find.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 The Turkic term aksakal (literally “white beard”) is used throughout Central Asia to designate male elders,
the wise old men of the community.
22 Conversation with G. A. and Z. N., Lyuli women from Tajikistan, in front of the Tretyakovskaya Gallery,
Moscow, autumn 2012.
13
In the last five to ten years the Russian State, and particularly the greater Moscow region, has
experienced rapid economic growth and achieved greater stability. These developments have
dramatically transformed the lives of Lyuli migrants. Our informants highlighted this in every
conversation, emphasizing positive changes in relation to accommodation - from forest camps to
urban or village conditions23 - and in the nature of basic work activities within their large families,
from subsistence on the begging of women and children to more or less regular employment for men
as janitors, drivers, or construction workers.
Increased income, improved living conditions and partial legalization have made possible the gradual
formation of stable networks among Lyuli migrants based on kinship/clan and region of origin. These
are intertwined with, but separate from, the general networks of migrant workers from Central Asia,
and community life takes place largely within these frameworks. There is no trend towards a return
to their homelands, at least among those we interviewed, who almost unanimously expressed the
opinion that “Things are not getting better at home, and there is no hope that this will change soon”.
Attitudes within Russian society towards Lyuli migrants are ambivalent. In the early years of their
migrations, Lyuli were not clearly identifiable as such. The media usually referred to them as Tajiks
or as Roma (local European “Gypsies”). In this context they were often accused of drug trafficking
and other criminal activities popularly associated with these groups. As a result they became victims
of cruel racist and nationalistic attacks, including the burning out of some temporary camps, e.g. in
the woods near the St. Petersburg suburb of Gorelovo in 2009.24 In human rights circles the pogrom
of a Lyuli camp near St. Petersburg in 2003, in which skinheads killed six-year-old Nilufar
Sangoeva, was a particularly well known case.25 After lengthy court proceedings the perpetrators
received heavy penalties.
Lyuli migration in the Russian Federation has revealed new dimensions of their identity. As with the
Roma worldwide, the identity of Lyuli is multidimensional, hierarchically structured, and – crucially
– always contextual, i.e. depending on the social environment, different aspects of identity emerge.
In the conditions of Central Asia, the situation is clear and simple: Lyuli are a separate community
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 A Lyuli man from Tajikistan: “Don’t believe in the romance of the nomadic life. Of course it is much better
to live in house than a tent in the forest!” (interview in Moscow, autumn 2011).
24 Shkurenok N. Doma tadzhikskikh tsigan sozhgli v Gorelovo. – Byulleten’ ADTs Memorial, Nr. 27, Sept.
2009. http://www.memorial.spb.ru/.
25 ADTs Memorial. 2005. Violation of the rights of Roma children, 132-133.
http://www.memorial.spb.ru/www/506.html?lang=en.
14
with their own identity, clearly distinguished from the surrounding population, but sharing a regional
consciousness and identification as citizens. On a broader level their Tajik mother tongue determines
their preferred Tajik identity in Central Asian countries outside Tajikistan, as well as in Russia.
Developments in preferred ethnic identity for Lyuli outside the Central Asian region can be
confirmed by data from censuses of the Russian Federation (which take into account only those who
have acquired Russian citizenship). The 2002 census was the first to include, alongside the existing
Tsygane (“Gypsies”) heading, the separate category of Tsygane Sredneaziatskie (“Central Asian
Gypsies”), with other designations (Gurbath, Jughi, Lyuli, Mug’at, Multon, and Tavoktarosh)
included as clarification. Significantly, while the 2002 census recorded 486 persons identifying
themselves as “Central Asian Gypsies”, the next, in 2010, recorded only forty-nine of them.
(Vserossiiskaya perepis’ naseleniya 2002 goda; Vserossiiskaya perepis’ naseleniya 2002 goda) It
seems highly unlikely that in the period between the two censuses several hundred “Central Asian
Gypsies” who had succeeded in obtaining Russian citizenship (no easy procedure) decided to leave
Russia. Much higher is the probability that they declared another identity in the second census.
In the course of their migrations within the Russian Federation, Lyuli come into increased contact
with European Roma and with local preconceptions concerning them. They are therefore compelled
to seek ways of differentiating themselves from these other Tsygane. When the researchers asked
Lyuli in Moscow about their ethnicity, they all insisted at first that they were Tajik (regardless of
country of origin). Only in response to repeated requests for clarification did they say, “We are
Mug’at”, in conjunction with which many emphasized repeatedly “Mug’at, that’s a kind of Tajik”,
i.e. they tried to present Mug’at as an internal division of Tajiks. When asked if they could be
considered Tsygane, the answer was “We are not like them”. The Lyuli label was rejected too, out of
fear that it could be seen as coming under the Tsygane or “Gypsies” heading. Yet at home in Central
Asia, where they are not being compared with Tsygane in the Russian Federation, they describe
themselves as Tsygane when speaking Russian. Only in some places in Central Asia, in rare cases of
outright conflict with European Tsygane, do Lyuli refuse to apply the Russian term to themselves. As
for the appellation “Roma”, which has in recent decades been adopted throughout Europe as the
politically correct umbrella term for various communities, it is generally completely unknown, and
incomprehensible, to Lyuli.
The attitudes of local Roma in Russia towards migrating Lyuli are negative, and they strongly
distinguish themselves from them, as well as from Hungarian-speaking Madyari (from
15
Transcarpathia). To the Roma way of thinking, Lyuli cannot be considered to be nastoyashchie
Tsygane (“real Gypsies”) partly because they are poor and live by begging and, even more crucially,
do not speak Romanes and are Muslims.
International institutions and NGOs (mostly those acting in the field of human rights), by contrast,
have not generally distinguished between Lyuli and Roma. In recent years, however, there is usually
some recognition that these are different kinds of communities. (ERRC 2005; Bessonov 2000, 2003;
ADTs Memorial 2010)
Over the last few years the public visibility of Central Asian Lyuli in Moscow has decreased
somewhat, with less women and children begging on the streets and in front of churches. Begging
continues, but has shifted both in where it is done and when. Nowadays it is concentrated in
monasteries and mosques on religious holidays and in markets (especially food markets). It is
accompanied with magical services. Early in the morning Lyuli women burn incense on the market
stalls of their compatriots from Central Asia, using special herbs (called isryk or adraspan) which
according to Central Asian beliefs serve as ritual purification and dispel evil forces.
Over the course of time Muscovites have become more and more aware of “Tajiks” (the term used
nowadays to describe all migrant workers from Central Asia, regardless of ethnic background and
country of origin). Ethnic tensions are steadily growing and fear of criminal activities by “persons of
Caucasian nationality” is gradually being replaced by fear of a mass invasion by “Tajiks” who “have
already occupied Moscow”, which “no longer looks like a Russian city”.
The exact number of migrants from Central Asia, be it in Moscow in particular or the Russian
Federation as a whole, is extremely difficult to determine. Lack of precision around the concepts of
legal or illegal “migrant workers” is compounded by their constant movement between Russia and
their homelands.26
The Russian State is trying to control migration, although it lacks experience in so doing because so
much of what was “internal migration” two decades ago is today “transnational migration”.
Migration within Russia is monitored and regulated by the Federal Migration Service, created in
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 According to Professor Osim Karimov from Tajikistan State University, illegal migrants outnumber legal
ones by a ratio of approximately 7:1.
16
2004 by Decree No 314 (point 13) of the President of the Russian Federation, “On the System and
Structure of Federal Bodies of Executive Power”. The FMS is a federal executive body responsible
for implementing State policy in relation to migration, including law enforcement, control,
supervision, and the provision of public services. It is currently subordinated to the Government of
the Russian Federation (Decree of the President of Russia, May 21 2012 No 636). On the first of
January 2006 the FMS set up regional branches bringing together passport and visa services and the
migration-related subdivisions at the Ministry of the Interior.
One way for migrants from Central Asia to regularize their legal status is by obtaining a so-called
“migrant’s patent”, introduced in 2010. This is a special document confirming the right of foreign
nationals who do not require a visa to enter Russia, to remain in the country as employees of a
private individual. In this way migrants are legalized in terms of work and taxes, but not in terms of a
residence permit. The procedure for obtaining a patent is very simple. They are issued out of the
annual quotas for work permits, and are available only to so-called extended visa-free foreigners
(i.e., citizens of post-Soviet space). To qualify, the individual must specify the purpose of their travel
as employment when filling in migration forms on arrival in Russia. A patent may be extended for a
total period of not more than twelve months, after which the individual is expected to leave Russia.
In practice, this sometimes means crossing the border and returning after a couple of minutes. It is
also theoretically possible, but much more difficult, to obtain a new patent without leaving the
country.
Yet virtually no Lyuli take advantage of this relatively liberal system. In most cases they do not have
the minimum necessary knowledge or social literacy skills to do so. In practice migrant Lyuli
continue to rely primarily on established community and regional networks27 for assistance in
employment, housing, obtaining medical services, and - rarely - the education of their children.
The Russian authorities are making efforts to improve Central Asian migrant workers’ conditions for
adaptation and integration. Some pilot schemes offering practical courses such as Russian language,
introduction to labor law in the Russian Federation, the availability of job opportunities etc. to
potential migrants have been set up. They are funded by the “Russian World” foundation, which
enjoys special government support and is used to implement various State policies. Some Lyuli
living in Tajikistan have heard about these opportunities, and that there are migrants who have
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 When talking about such networks informants usually used expressions like “our friends help us”, “we have
our people”, “I get advice from my neighbor”, etc.
17
obtained employment in Moscow and other Russian cities thanks to special bilateral agreements, but
do not benefit from them because they believe that, as Tsygane, these options do not apply to them.
Some of these initiatives were reflected in two documents signed by President of the Russian
Federation Vladimir Putin on December 3, 2012: “Ordinance on the Order of Stay in the Country”
and “On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation”, the latter regulating the
conditions of migrant workers and incorporating changes in the law. An important aspect of these
new legislative norms is the official legalization of long-standing practice, as the decree allows
employers to take on foreigners temporarily residing in Russia without a work permit. The system
for notifying the Federal Migration Service about foreign employees has also been streamlined, and
can now be done electronically.
President Putin has also approved changes in existing laws, ensuring migrants’ social security and
establishing administrative responsibility with regard to their material, health and housing status.
This new legislation also tightens responsibility for regularizing illegal migrants. The general trend
in policy towards migrant workers (who mostly originate in the Central Asian countries, and whose
labor is needed by the Russian economy) is that migration be promoted, legalized, regulated and
controlled. Of particular interest in the region is the official public announcement made by President
Putin in December 2012, in which he clearly stated that from 2015 citizens of the Newly
Independent States will be required to show international passports (instead of national ID cards, as
has been the case since the breakup of the USSR) to cross into the Russian Federation.
The main problems of migrant workers from Central Asia in general, and local Lyuli in particular,
are associated not so much with the opportunities for labor migration in Russia, but with the situation
in their home countries (especially Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan). Most migrate in order to
survive and to support their relatives at home. Those who are able to save some money use it to buy
(secondhand) cars, repair their homes, or, in some cases, even to build new ones. The difficult
economic situation and lack of prospects in Central Asia dooms them to heavy reliance on income
earned abroad, i.e. they are bound to migrate to find work, and there are no indications of significant
change in this situation, at least for the foreseeable future.
Lyuli, like many people in Central Asia, migrate to escape severe social and economic conditions,
and in this sense are part of the region’s general migration trends. Lyuli from Uzbekistan and
18
Tajikistan migrate mainly to Russia, but Kazakhstan has recently become a more popular destination,
with small numbers even migrating to Kyrgyzstan.
Lyuli face, to some extent, the same problems as other migrants, due to gaps in or even
contradictions between local laws concerning migrant workers, and how these are actually
implemented by the authorities (e.g. the widespread practice of blackmail by police and migration
officers). (Marushiakova and Popov 2011) In addition, however, Lyuli experience particular
difficulties in integrating into the labor market and social realities of their host countries due to
generally low levels of education and poor social literacy coupled with the social stigma associated
with their ascribed identity as Tsygane. All these factors contribute to their dependence on informal
(often illegal) networks, involvement in begging and other marginal activities, living in unregulated
or illegal settlements, and facing increasing hostility and rejection.
Migrant workers from Central Asia are generally labeled “Tajiks”, and Lyuli often define themselves
as such. The public image of “Tajiks” is deteriorating, and transborder migration is currently one of
the most hotly debated issues in the Russian media. Lyuli are also often subject to negative attitudes
and stereotypes towards Roma, such as the assumption that they are all involved in drug dealing, or
have strong hypnotic powers which they misuse to steal from the majority.
On a positive note, migrant Lyuli in the Russian Federation (and recently also in Kazakhstan) are
taking steps towards stabilization, as illustrated by their efforts to gradually legalize their status.
Such attempts may, however, be periodically hindered by fluctuations in relations between their
countries of origin and of residence. The most dramatic instance of this phenomenon, repeatedly
mentioned by our informants in Tajikistan and the subject of blanket media coverage at the time,
occurred in autumn 2011 when two Russian pilots found guilty of smuggling were given lengthy
prison sentences by a Tajik court, and Russia retaliated by expelling large numbers of migrants.28
Conclusions
The Lyuli and other similar Central Asian groups continue to face social exclusion and
discrimination, and in this their experience is similar to that of European Roma: their status and
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 See numerous articles on the issue, e.g.: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-15835483;
http://globalvoicesonline.org/2011/11/21/russia-and-tajikistan-pilots-sentenced-and-migrants-deported/;
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/tajikistan-says-it-may-release-russian-pilot-6264624.html.
19
position have deteriorated since independence. In the USSR they were just one, very small entity
among hundreds of different “nationalities” in a multinational State. In the newly independent
nation-states they have become more visible, and more easily singled out. Deteriorating provision in
health and education, high unemployment, corruption, administrative arbitrariness, lack of social
security etc., endemic in most of the region’s countries, impact with particular severity on local
“Gypsies”. Under these circumstances manifestations of intolerance and discrimination against Lyuli
and other similar groups encounter no serious resistance from the relevant institutions of new and
fragile nation-states.
The condition of Central Asian Lyuli in the individual countries of their home region displays
common social and economic problems, but different levels of social disengagement of their
communities from their respective ethnic majorities. In Kyrgyzstan, they are perceived as alien, not
belonging to the “land of the Kyrgyz”, whereas in Tajikistan they are considered to be part of the
nation. The difficult social and economic situation of Lyuli in their countries of origin, and the
absence of prospects for development at home, compels them to rely primarily on income earned
abroad. Thus they are doomed to be migrant workers, and there are no indications of significant
improvement for the foreseeable future. On the contrary, all available data show a trend of increasing
migration combined with continuing integration difficulties in host countries, where their needs and
rights are ignored or neglected by the relevant institutions. Nowadays the problems of the so-called
Central Asian ‘Gypsies’, including the Lyuli, can not (and should not) be considered only in the
context of particular countries in Central Asia whose citizens they are. It is more revealing to analyze
them in the context of current realities in post-Soviet space as a whole, both the Russian Federation
and the Newly Independent States which remain linked to it in myriad ways.
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