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48
Latin American Immigration
to the United States
Marta Tienda & Susana M. Sánchez
MARTA TIENDA, a Fellow of the
American Academy since 1993, is
the Maurice P. During ’22 Professor
in Demographic Studies, Professor
of Sociology and Public Affairs,
and Director of the Latino Studies
Program at Princeton University.
SUSANA M. SÁNCHEZ is a grad-
uate student in the Sociology De-
partment and the Population Re-
search Institute at Pennsylvania
State University.
(*See endnotes for complete contributor
biographies.)
Both the size and composition of the U.S. foreign-
born population have grown since 1960, rising
from 9.7 million to nearly 40 million in 2010. Latin
Americans have been a major driver of this trend,
as their numbers soared from less than 1 million in
1960 to nearly 19 million in 2010.1The source coun-
tries have also become more diverse, especially after
1970, when flows from Central America, Cuba, and
the Dominican Republic surged. However, these
census-based stock measures, which combine recent
and prior immigration as well as temporary and
unauthorized residents, reveal little about the path-
ways to U.S. residence, the ebb and flow of migrants
from speci½c countries, or the forces that produce
and sustain those flows.
In this essay, we provide an overview of immigra-
tion from Latin America since 1960, focusing on
changes in both the size and composition of the
major flows as well as the entry pathways to lawful
permanent residence in the United States, with due
attention to policy shifts. We describe the deep his-
torical roots of current migration streams and
explain how these flows are related both to changes
© 2013 by Marta Tienda & Susana M. Sánchez
doi:10.1162/DAED_a_00218
Abstract: This essay provides an overview of immigration from Latin America since 1960, focusing on
changes in both the size and composition of the dominant streams and their cumulative impact on the
U.S. foreign-born population. We briefly describe the deep historical roots of current migration streams
and the policy backdrop against which migration from the region surged. Distinguishing among the three
major pathways to U.S. residence–family sponsorship, asylum, and unauthorized entry–we explain how
contemporary flows are related both to economic crises, political conflicts, and humanitarian incidents
in sending countries, but especially to idiosyncratic application of existing laws over time. The concluding
section highlights the importance of investing in the children of immigrants to meet the future labor needs
of an aging nation.
49
142 (3) Summer 2013
in U.S. immigration policy and to un-
equal and inconsistent enforcement of
existing laws in order to spotlight the
myriad unintended consequences for
sending and receiving communities. The
concluding section reflects on the impli-
cations of Latin American immigration
for the future of the nation, highlighting
the growing importance of the children of
immigrants for the future labor needs of
an aging nation. We also note the thwarted
integration prospects of recent and future
immigrants in localities where anti-
immigrant hostility is on the rise.
Nearly a century before the English
founded Jamestown in 1607, Spanish set-
tlements peppered the Americas. Even as
they forged indelible Hispanic imprints
in large swaths of the American Southwest,
Spanish settlers Hispanicized the South
American continent, later joined by the
Portuguese in creating an “Iberian enter-
prise.” Rubén D. Rumbaut, poet and pub-
lic intellectual, describes that process as
“one of the greatest and deepest convul-
sions in history . . . [an] epochal movement
. . . that poured the occidental nations of
Europe over . . . the New World.”2As such,
Spain began the ½rst wave of migration to
what would become the United States of
America, and also populated one of its
future sources of immigrants.
The long-standing power struggle be-
tween Spain and England, which carried
over to the Americas, is also relevant for
understanding Latin American immigra-
tion to the United States. Although most
Spanish colonies had achieved indepen-
dence by the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury, the newly independent republics were
weak politically and militarily, vulnerable
to external aggression. Given its proximity,
Mexico proved an easy target for the ex-
pansionist aspirations of the United States.
Under the terms of the Treaty of Guada-
lupe Hidalgo, which ended the U.S.-Mex-
ican War (1846–1848), combined with
the Gadsden Purchase, the United States
acquired almost half of Mexico’s land.
The signi½cance of the annexation for
contemporary immigration from Mexico
cannot be overstated. Not only were social
ties impervious to the newly drawn polit-
ical boundary, but economic ties also were
deepened as Mexican workers were re-
cruited to satisfy chronic and temporary
labor shortages during the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries–an asymmetrical
exchange that was enabled by the main-
tenance of a porous border. The Bracero
Program, a guest worker program in force
between 1942 and 1964, is a poignant
example of U.S. growers’ dependence on
Mexican labor facilitated by legal con-
tracts combined with growing reliance
on unauthorized workers.
Fifty years after the Treaty of Guada-
lupe Hidalgo, the United States intervened
in Cuba’s struggle for independence
against the Spanish crown, which lost its
last colonies in the Americas and the
Paci½c region. As part of the settlement,
the United States acquired Puerto Rico,
Guam, and the Philippines, and was ceded
temporary control of Cuba. Both the U.S.-
Mexican War and the Spanish-American
War established foundations for U.S.-
bound migration. Mexico and Cuba have
been top sending countries for most of
the twentieth century and into the twenty-
½rst, with the Philippines ranking second
since 1980.3Notwithstanding intermittent
travel barriers imposed by the Castro
regime, Cuba was a top source of U.S.
immigrants during the last half of the
twentieth century, consistently ranking
among the top three Latin American
source countries and among the top ten
worldwide.
The underpinnings of contemporary
migration from Latin America are also
rooted in policy changes designed to reg-
ulate permanent and temporary admis-
Marta
Tienda &
Susana M.
Sánchez
50 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences
sions, beginning with the Immigration
Act of 1924. Although widely criticized for
establishing a racist quota system designed
to restrict migration from Southern and
Eastern Europe, the 1924 Act is relevant
for contemporary Latin American immi-
gration because it explicitly exempted from
the quotas the independent countries of
Central and South America, including
Mexico and the Dominican Republic. Both
countries currently are major sources of
undocumented migration; however, the
circumstances fostering each of these
undocumented streams differ.
Table 1 summarizes key legislation that
influences Latin American immigration
today, beginning with the most recent com-
prehensive immigration law, the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act of 1952 (ina).
Although the ina retained the quota sys-
tem that limited immigration from East-
ern Europe (and that virtually precluded
immigration from Asia and Africa), the
legislation established the ½rst preference
system specifying skill criteria and imposed
a worldwide ceiling. But in the wake of
the civil rights movement, the 1965 amend-
ments to ina dismantled the overtly racist
quota system.
Two aspects of the new visa preference
system are key for understanding contem-
porary Latin American immigration: the
high priority accorded to family uni½ca-
tion relative to labor quali½cations; and
the exemption of spouses, children, and
parents of U.S. citizens from the country
caps, which in effect favored groups
exempted by the 1924 Immigration Act.
This included Mexican Americans whose
ancestors became citizens by treaty and
the relatives of braceros who had settled
throughout the Southwest during the
heyday of the guest worker program; but
over time, it came to include the relatives
of newcomers who sponsored their rela-
tives after naturalization. The termination
of the Bracero Program coupled with the
extension of uniform country quotas for
the Western Hemisphere in 1978 was par-
ticularly consequential for Mexico, with
the predictable outcome that unauthorized
migration climbed.
When an exodus from Cuba began in the
aftermath of the Cuban revolution, the
United States had not yet established a
comprehensive refugee policy. Although
not a signatory to the un Refugee Con-
vention or Protocol, and despite a highly
unbalanced economic and political rela-
tionship with the United States, Cuba has
influenced the development and execu-
tion of U.S. refugee policy in myriad ways.
Cuban émigrés instantiated the ideologi-
cal war between the United States and
Castro’s socialist regime, not only forcing
the U.S. government to de½ne its refugee
policy, but also beginning a period of
exceptions to of½cial guidelines. The
1966 Cuban Adjustment Act (caa) allows
Cuban exiles to apply for permanent resi-
dence after residing in the United States
for only one year. Unlike Haitians, Domini-
cans, or other Latin Americans, very few
Cubans are repatriated if they land on
U.S. soil, even if they enter through land
borders.4
Cubans seeking asylum in the United
States are the main Latin American bene-
½ciaries of the 1980 Refugee Act, and they
have enjoyed preferential admissions and
generous resettlement assistance both
before and since the 1980 Act.5In response
to a third major Cuban exodus during the
mid-1990s, the U.S. government negotiated
the Cuban Migration Agreement, which
revised the caa by establishing what be-
came known as the “wet foot/dry foot”
policy. By agreement, Cubans apprehended
at sea (that is, with “wet feet”) would be
returned to Cuba (or a third country in
cases of legitimate fears of persecution);
those who successfully avoided the U.S.
Coast Guard and landed on U.S. shores
(with “dry feet”) would be allowed to re-
Latin
American
Immigration
to the
United
States
51
142 (3) Summer 2013
Table 1
Major U.S. Legislation Concerning Latin American Immigration, 1952–2001
Source: Michael E. Fix and Jeffrey S. Passel, Immigration and Immigrants: Setting the Record Straight (Washington,
D.C.: Urban Institute, 1994); Guillermina Jasso and Mark R. Rosenzweig, The New Chosen People: Immigrants in
the United States (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1990); Ruth E. Wasem, Cuban Migration to the United States:
Policy and Trends (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2009); Ruth E. Wasem, U.S. Immigration
Policy on Permanent Admissions (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2010); and U.S. Department
of Homeland Security, http://www.dhs.gov/.
Legislation Date Key Provisions
Immigration and 1952 Establishes the ½rst preference system
Nationality Act Retains national-origin quotas favoring Western Europe
(ina) Imposes ceiling of 154Kplus 2Kfrom Asia-Paci½c Triangle
Immigration Act 1965 Repeals national-origin quotas
(Amendments to ina) Sets a maximum limit on immigration from the Western
(120K) and Eastern (170K) Hemispheres
Revises visa preference system to favor family reuni½cation
Establishes uniform per-country limit of 20Kvisas for the
Eastern Hemisphere
Cuba Adjustment Act 1966 Allows undocumented Cubans who have lived in the United
(caa) States for at least one year to apply for permanent residence
Refugee Act 1980 Adopts un protocol de½nition of refugee
Creates systematic procedures for refugee admission
Establishes resettlement procedures
Eliminates refugees from the preference system
Institutes the ½rst asylum provision
Immigration Reform 1986 Institutes employer sanctions for hiring undocumented
and Control Act immigrants
(irca) Legalizes undocumented immigrants
Increases border enforcement
Establishes “wet foot/dry foot” policy
Cuban Migration 1994– Sets up a minimum of 20Kvisas annually
Agreement (cma) 1995 Conducts in-country refugee processing
Illegal Immigration 1996 Strengthens border enforcement and raises penalties for
Reform and Immigrant unauthorized entry and smuggling
Responsibility Act Expands criteria for exclusion and deportation
(iirira) Initiates the employment veri½cation pilot programs
Nicaraguan Adjustment 1997 Legalizes Nicaraguans and Cubans; later legalizes abc class
and Central American members (Salvadorans and Guatemalans)
Relief Act (nacara )
Temporary Protected Grants temporary legal status to nationals of countries that
Status (tps) experienced an armed conflict or a major natural disaster
1990 Granted to Salvadorans due to civil war (lasted 18 months)
1998 Granted to Hondurans and Nicaraguans due to damages
caused by Hurricane Mitch (expires 2015)
2001 Granted to Salvadorans following an earthquake (expires 2013)
Marta
Tienda &
Susana M.
Sánchez
52 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences
main and, in accordance with the provi-
sions of the 1966 caa, would qualify for
expedited legal permanent residence.6
A third major amendment to the ina,
the 1986 Immigration Reform and Con-
trol Act (irca), in principle marks a shift
in the focus of U.S. immigration policy
toward a growing emphasis on enforce-
ment. irca granted legal status to approx-
imately 2.7 million persons residing un-
lawfully in the United States, including the
special agricultural workers who only were
required to prove part-year residence.
Over 85 percent of the legalized popula-
tion originated in Latin America, with
about 70 percent from Mexico alone.7
The rapid growth of unauthorized immi-
gration post-irca also led to increased
enforcement efforts.
The 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (iirira),
which intensi½ed forti½cation of the bor-
der, expanded criteria for deportation and
made a half-hearted effort to strengthen
interior enforcement through the employ-
ment veri½cation pilot programs. More
than a decade after irca, Congress ap-
proved another legalization program, the
Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central Amer-
ican Relief Act (nacara ), which conferred
legal permanent resident (lpr) status to
registered asylees (and their dependents)
from Nicaragua, Cuba, El Salvador, Gua-
temala, and nationals of former Soviet
bloc countries (and their dependents) who
had resided in the United States for at
least ½ve consecutive years before Decem-
ber 1, 1995. According to Donald Kerwin,
executive director of the Center for Migra-
tion Studies, fewer than 70,000 asylees
were legalized under nacara through
2009; but in typical fashion, a patchwork
of solutions for speci½c groups have been
enacted since irca was passed in 1986.8
Finally, as part of its humanitarian goals,
Congress also enacted legislation offering
Temporary Protected Status (tps) for
Central Americans displaced by civil wars
or natural disasters. tps is time-limited;
does not offer a pathway to permanent
resident status; and requires acts of Con-
gress for extension.9Once the period of
protection expires, its bene½ciaries are ex-
pected to return to their country of origin.
Among those displaced by civil conflict,
some claim political asylum while others
lapse into unauthorized status along with
the thousands denied asylum.
Collectively, the legislation summarized
in Table 1 represents the major pathways
to attain lpr status: namely, family uni½-
cation, employer sponsorship, and human-
itarian protections. Family reuni½cation
gives preference to prospective migrants
from countries with longer immigration
traditions, like Mexico, because they are
more likely to have citizen relatives in the
United States who can serve as sponsors;
but over time this pathway has become
more prominent as earlier arrivals natu-
ralize in order to sponsor their relatives.
With the exception of Argentineans dur-
ing the 1960s and Colombians during the
early 1970s, relatively few Latin American
immigrants receive lpr status through
employment preferences. Rather, the
majority of Latin Americans recruited for
employment enter as temporary workers
or through clandestine channels. Neither
unauthorized entry nor tps provides a
direct pathway to legal permanent resi-
dence, but they can evolve into indirect
pathways via comprehensive (for example,
irca) or targeted (for example, nacara)
amnesty programs. In the following sec-
tion, we use the three pathways to illus-
trate how each differs for speci½c countries,
and to identify the economic and politi-
cal forces undergirding changes over time.
Figure 1 uses data from the decennial
census to portray changes in the U.S. Latin
American-born population from 1960 to
2010 by region of origin. The graphic rep-
Latin
American
Immigration
to the
United
States
53
142 (3) Summer 2013
resentation reveals the regional-origin
diversi½cation that accompanied the
twelvefold increase in the Latin American-
born population since 1970. Despite the
continuing Mexican dominance among
Latin American-born U.S. residents, flow
diversi½cation resulted in a more balanced
subregional pro½le in 2010 compared with
prior decades. The Caribbean share of
Latin American immigrants peaked at 31
percent in 1970, fell to 20 percent in 1980,
and has remained at 10 percent since 2000.
Over the last ½fty years, the Central Amer-
ican share of all Latin American immi-
grants rose from about 6 percent in 1960 to
around 16 percent since 1990, when about
12 percent of Latin American immigrants
originated from South America.
Table 2 reports the major source coun-
tries that drove the changes reported in
Figure 1. Only countries comprising at least
2 percent of the decade total Latin Amer-
Figure 1
U.S. Foreign-Born Population (in millions) from Latin America, 1960–2010
“Caribbean” includes Cuba and the Dominican Republic; “Central America” includes Guatemala, Honduras, El
Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama; and “South America” includes Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador,
Peru, Chile, Brazil, Bolivia, and Paraguay. Source: Campbell Gibson and Kay Jung, “Historical Census Statistics
on the Foreign-Born Population of the United States: 1850–2000,” Population Division Working Paper No. 81
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, 2006); and American Community Survey, One-Year Estimates for 2010.
Marta
Tienda &
Susana M.
Sánchez
54 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences
Table 2
Largest Latin American-Born Populations (by percentage) in the United States, by Country of Origin, 1960–2010
Countries are presented in descending order for each year. Source: Campbell Gibson and Kay Jung, “Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-Born Population of the United States:
1850–2000,” Population Division Working Paper No. 81 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, 2006); and American Community Survey, One-Year Estimates for 2010.
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Mexico Mexico Mexico Mexico Mexico Mexico
(73.1) (47.6) (57.8) (58.2) (63.6) (61.3)
Cuba Cuba Cuba Cuba Cuba El Salvador
(10.0) (27.5) (16.0) (10.0) (6.1) (6.3)
Argentina Colombia Dominican Republic El Salvador El Salvador Cuba
(2.1) (4.0) (4.4) (6.3) (5.7) (5.8)
Dominican Republic Colombia Dominican Republic Dominican Republic Dominican Republic
(3.8) (3.8) (4.7) (4.8) (4.6)
Argentina El Salvador Colombia Colombia Guatemala
(2.8) (2.5) (3.9) (3.5) (4.3)
Ecuador Guatemala Guatemala Colombia
(2.3) (3.1) (3.3) (3.3)
Other Countries Other Countries Other Countries Other Countries Other Countries Other Countries
(14.8) (14.3) (13.2) (13.8) (13.0) (14.4)
N788,068 1,597,481 3,801,351 7,385,479 14,418,576 19,115,077
55
142 (3) Summer 2013
ican-born population are separately re-
ported, which quali½es a maximum of six
countries after 1970, but only three in 1960.
Not surprisingly, Mexicans remain the
dominant group throughout the period,
but owing to large swings in immigrant
flows from the Caribbean and Central
America, the Mexican share fluctuated
from a high of 73 percent in 1960 to a low
of 48 percent in 1970. Cubans were the
second largest group among the Latin
American-born population through 2000,
but their share varied from a high of 27
percent in 1970 to less than 6 percent in
2010, when Salvadorans edged out Cubans
for second place.
The decade-speci½c pro½le of main
source countries also reveals the ascen-
dance of Colombians and Dominicans
during the 1960s and 1970s, with Central
Americans following during the 1980s.
Although Argentina ranked among the
top source countries during the 1960s and
1970s, when the United States bene½ted
from the exodus of highly skilled profes-
sionals from that country, the “brain drain”
was not sustained. Political repression and
economic crises rekindled Argentinean
emigration during the late 1970s, early
1980s, and again at the beginning of the
twenty-½rst century, but Spain, Italy, and
Israel were then the preferred destina-
tions. Today, unlike Colombia, Argentina
is not a major contributor to U.S. immi-
gration.
The stock measures reported in Table 2
and Figure 1 portray the cumulative impact
of immigration, but reflect immigration
trends imperfectly because they conflate
three components of change: new addi-
tions; temporary residents, including the
bene½ciaries of protection from deporta-
tion; and unauthorized residents. Thus, the
foreign-born population based on census
data overstates the immigrant population,
which consists of persons granted lpr
status in any given period, including ref-
ugees and asylees. Therefore, to explain the
ebb and flow of Latin American immigra-
tion over the last half-century, we orga-
nize the remainder of this section around
the three sources of immigrants: lprs;
refugees and asylees; and unauthorized
migrants granted legal status.
Legal Permanent Residents. Table 3 reports
the number of new lprs from Latin Amer-
ica over the last ½ve decades, with details
for the major sending countries from the
Caribbean, Mesoamerica, and South Amer-
ica. Since the 1960s, Latin Americans have
made up about one-third of new lprs, with
the period share fluctuating between 31
percent during the 1970s to 41 percent
during the 1990s. For each period there is
high correspondence between the domi-
nant foreign-stock population countries
(Table 2) and the number of new lprs
admitted from those countries (Table 3);
therefore, we use these nations to orga-
nize our discussion of speci½c streams.
Mexicans comprise the largest share of
legal immigrants from Latin America, typ-
ically 40 to 45 percent per cohort except
for the 1980s and 1990s, when the irca
legalization was under way. The vast major-
ity of Mexicans granted lpr status–88
percent in ½scal year 2010, for example–
are sponsored by U.S. relatives; less than
10 percent quali½ed under the employment
preferences.10 Mexicans comprised nearly
60 percent of all new lprs from Latin
America during the 1980s and 1990s, in part
due to the large number of status adjusters
under irca. Moreover, Mexican immigra-
tion would have been higher in each decade
if the family-sponsored preferences were
not numerically capped. Along with Fili-
pinos, Chinese, and Indians, Mexicans are
greatly oversubscribed in the family-
sponsored preference categories, and thus
thousands of Mexican family members
wait for years for their visa priority date.
For example, in 2010 unmarried Mexican
adult children sponsored by U.S. residents
Marta
Tienda &
Susana M.
Sánchez
56 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences
had waited eighteen years to receive their
entry visa.11
Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru are the
major immigrant-sending nations from
South America. Although their initial lev-
els of immigration differ, all three countries
witnessed gradual increases during the
1970s, but thereafter their immigration
flows diverged. Colombia was the largest
single source of immigrants from South
America throughout the period. Stimu-
lated by prolonged political instability,
armed conflict, and drug violence amid
sporadic economic downturns, Colombian
emigration gained momentum over the
latter half of the twentieth century. The
early waves largely involved upper-class
professionals with the resources to flee,
but as the internal armed conflict escalated,
members of the working classes joined
the exodus.12 Legal immigration rose 60
percent between the 1970s and 1980s, and
nearly doubled after 2000.
Ecuadorian immigration has trebled
since 1961, rising from 37,000 during the
1960s to more than 110,000 during the
most recent decade. Demand for Panama
hats produced in the provinces of Azuay
and Cañar triggered the early waves of
Ecuadoran immigrants during the late
1950s, but deteriorating economic condi-
tions augmented subsequent flows from
these regions, which were facilitated by
dense social networks established by ear-
Table 3
Number of Latin Americans (in thousands) Granted Legal Permanent Resident Status, 1961–2010
Source: For decades 1961–1970 and 1971–1980, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1984; for decades 1981–
1990, 1991–2000, and 2001–2010, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics from the years 1990, 1995, 2002, and 2010.
1961– 1971– 1981– 1991– 2001–
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Total 3,321.7 4,493.3 7,338.1 9,095.4 10,501.0
(all countries)
Latin America 1,077.0 1,395.3 2,863.6 3,759.8 3,746.1
(all countries)
Mexico 443.3 637.2 1,653.2 2,251.4 1,693.2
Caribbean
Cuba 256.8 276.8 159.3 180.9 318.4
Dominican Republic 94.1 148.0 251.8 340.9 329.1
Central America
El Salvador 15.0 34.4 214.6 217.4 252.8
Guatemala 15.4 25.6 87.9 103.1 160.7
Honduras 15.4 17.2 49.5 66.8 65.4
South America
Colombia 70.3 77.6 124.4 131.0 251.3
Ecuador 37.0 50.2 56.0 76.4 112.5
Peru 18.6 29.1 64.4 105.7 145.7
Rest of Latin America 111.1 99.2 202.5 286.2 417.0
Latin
American
Immigration
to the
United
States
57
142 (3) Summer 2013
lier waves.13 The collapse of oil prices in
the 1980s combined with spiraling unem-
ployment, wage erosion, and inflation re-
kindled emigration, which averaged 17,000
annually.
Following the collapse of the banking
system in the late 1990s, emigration rose
from approximately 30,000 annually be-
tween 1990 and 1997 to over 100,000
annually thereafter.14 However, Spain
replaced the United States as a preferred
destination during the 1990s, hosting
nearly half of all Ecuadorian emigrants be-
tween 1996 and 2001 compared with about
27 percent destined for the United States.15
Hyperinflation and massive underemploy-
ment resulting from the 1987 structural
adjustment measures also accelerated
Peruvian out-migration during the 1990s,
more than doubling the number of new
Peruvian lprs; but the Peruvian share of
the Latin American-born population never
reached 2 percent. Except for the modest
dip between the 1960s and 1970s, immi-
gration from the rest of Latin America
mirrors the Peruvian trend: doubling be-
tween the 1970s and 1980s and then con-
tinuing on an upward spiral that has
exceeded 400,000 since 2001 (Table 3).
Civil wars and political instability trig-
gered the formidable influx of Salvadorans,
Hondurans, and Guatemalans to the Unit-
ed States. Emigration from El Salvador,
the smallest but most densely populated
of the Central American republics, is par-
ticularly noteworthy because of the sheer
numbers that received lpr status: more
than 215,000 during the 1980s and an ad-
ditional half-million over the next two
decades. That thousands of Salvadorans
arrived seeking asylum largely explains why
their lpr numbers exceed the annual caps
for several decades. Hundreds of thousands
lapsed into undocumented status when
they were denied asylee status, but a large
majority of Salvadoran asylees successfully
adjusted to lpr status under nacara .
Like El Salvador, Guatemala witnessed
prolonged civil conflict, which escalated
after 1978 and initiated a mass exodus of
asylum seekers during the 1980s and 1990s.
Those who arrived before 1982 quali½ed for
status adjustment under irca, but later
arrivals did not. Although political insta-
bility is credited for the surge in Guate-
malan immigration, sociologists Steven
Alvarado and Douglas Massey claim that
neither violence nor economic factors
predicted the likelihood of out-migration;
rather, they portray Guatemalan emigra-
tion as a household decision to diversify
income streams by sending young, skilled
members to join U.S. relatives. Their inter-
pretation is consistent with sociologist
Jacqueline Hagan’s ethnographic account
that chronicles how establishment of sister
communities in U.S. cities enabled fur-
ther migration via family uni½cation.16
By 2010, Guatemalans became the fourth
largest Latin American-born group in the
United States. The increase in Guatemalan
legal resident admissions since 2001 also
reflects the status adjustments authorized
by nacar a.
In contrast to Guatemala and El Salvador,
the rise in Honduran immigration has been
more gradual, except for the 1980s, when
it nearly trebled compared to the prior
decade. Unlike Nicaraguans, Salvadorans,
and Guatemalans, Hondurans could not
claim asylee status. Rather, skyrocketing
poverty and unemployment during the
1980s and 1990s is responsible for the surge
in emigration. In 1998, Hurricane Mitch
aggravated the country’s economic woes,
leaving hundreds of thousands homeless.
An estimated 66,000 Hondurans sought
refuge in the United States and were grant-
ed tps, which does not confer a path to
legal permanent residence. Unless renewed
in 2015, Hondurans granted tps will join
the unauthorized population, which, ac-
cording to the Of½ce of Immigration Sta-
tistics, rose from 160,000 to 330,000 be-
Marta
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Susana M.
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58 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences
tween 2000 and 2010.17 Currently, family
sponsorship is the main pathway to legal
permanent residence for Hondurans, ac-
counting for 85 percent of the recent lprs.
The last major lpr flow since 1960 is
from the Dominican Republic. This out-
migration began in the wake of the polit-
ical upheaval following dictator Trujillo’s
assassination in 1961; but even after the
political scene stabilized, failed economic
policies continued to fuel the flow. Since
1961, the number of new lprs more than
trebled, exceeding 330,000 during each of
the last two decades. Despite modest eco-
nomic growth during the 1990s and the
revival of tourism, persistently high un-
employment buttressed by deep social net-
works has maintained a steady exodus.18
Dominicans have been taking full advan-
tage of the family uni½cation provisions
of the ina by sponsoring relatives; virtu-
ally all Dominicans granted lpr status in
2010 bene½ted from the family sponsor-
ship provisions of the ina.19
Refugees and Asylees. By de½nition, refugee
and asylee flows precipitated by political
upheavals and natural disasters are un-
predictable in both timing and size, but
the impact they have on immigrant admis-
sions also depends on the idiosyncratic
application of U.S. immigration and ref-
ugee policy. Since 1960, Cubans have
dominated the refugee flow from Latin
America, but armed conflicts in Central
America and Colombia as well as natural
disasters have also contributed to the
growth of humanitarian admissions in
recent decades. The Cuban exodus has
been highly unpredictable owing to bar-
riers imposed by the Cuban government
and the level of acrimony between Havana
and Washington.
Cuban emigration began shortly after
Fidel Castro took up the reins of the island
nation. By 1974, 650,000 Cubans had left
for the United States.20 Dubbed the
“golden exile” because the vast majority
of the ½rst-wave migrants were profes-
sionals, entrepreneurs, and landowners,
Cuban émigrés were granted visa waivers
and parolee status, and were offered a
range of services to facilitate their labor
market integration, including certi½cation
of professional credentials, a college loan
program, and bilingual education.21 Partly
because they were fleeing a socialist state
and partly because they did not ½t the un
de½nitions of refugee, Cubans enjoyed a
privileged position among the U.S. foreign-
born population. Indeed, the 1966 caa
put Cubans on a fast track to citizenship.
A second major exodus occurred in April
1980, when the Cuban government opened
the port of Mariel to anyone who wanted
to leave, including prisoners and lunatics.
About 125,000 “Marielitos” arrived on U.S.
shores in a few short months, joined by
35,000 Haitians.22 Although Marielitos did
not formally qualify as refugees accord-
ing to the guidelines of the newly enacted
Refugee Act and were technically ineligi-
ble for federal funds, they were accorded
refugee status by congressional decree,
illustrating yet again the idiosyncratic
application of U.S. immigration law.
A third migration wave occurred in the
mid-1990s, when the Cuban government
lifted the ban on departures. Rather than
extend the welcome gangplank as in prior
years, the U.S. government interdicted
Cuban fugitives attempting to circumvent
legal immigration channels and returned
them to Guantánamo. Within a year,
33,000 Cubans were encamped at Guan-
tánamo, but in yet another predictable
exception to immigration law, the majority
were paroled and granted lpr status.23
Although accompanied with less media
fanfare than the 1980 Mariel boatlift, the
largest number of Cubans to arrive in a
single decade came after 2001; since that
date, nearly 320,000 Cubans have been
granted lpr status. Under the provisions
of the wet foot/dry foot agreement,
Latin
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142 (3) Summer 2013
Cubans interdicted at sea or apprehended
on land are deportable; but in practice very
few are returned because they are enti-
tled to request asylum, and most do so.
Central Americans and Colombians also
have used the humanitarian pathway to
acquire legal permanent residence, albeit
with far less success than Cubans. Salva-
doran and Guatemalan asylee approval
rates were less than 3 percent between
1983 and 1990 compared with 25 percent
for Nicaraguans.24 Alleging discrimination
against Central Americans, religious orga-
nizations and immigrant rights advocates
½led a class action lawsuit on their behalf,
American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh. As
part of the 1991 settlement, Congress
allowed Central Americans who had been
denied asylum to reapply for review, and
they achieved much higher success rates.
However, the 1996 iirira made the asy-
lum rules even more dif½cult by adding
provisions to resettle asylum seekers to
third countries; by requiring asylees to
½le applications within a year of arrival in
the United States; by precluding appeals
to denied applications; and by imposing
high processing fees. After 1997, the class
members in American Baptist Churches v.
Thornburgh were allowed to adjust their
status through nacara ; as a result, ap-
proval rates grew to over 95 percent.25
Two major natural disasters rekindled
asylees from Central America at the turn
of the twenty-½rst century, when Hurricane
Mitch (1998) displaced thousands of Nica-
raguans and Hondurans, and a massive
earthquake (2001) left more than a million
Salvadorans homeless. Drawn by a sizable
expatriate community, thousands of dis-
placed Salvadorans made their way to the
United States. In a humanitarian gesture,
Congress granted tps to Salvadorans re-
siding in the United States as of 2001, and
it has renewed the protection several times.
As of 2010, more than 300,000 individuals
–70,000 Hondurans, 3,500 Nicaraguans,
and 229,000 Salvadorans–had bene½ted
from tps.26 The status protections accord-
ed to the victims of Hurricane Mitch and
the Salvadoran earthquake are set to expire
in 2015 and 2013, respectively. In the current
political climate, it is uncertain whether
these temporary protections will be extend-
ed; if they are not, many will probably join
millions of others as undocumented resi-
dents.
Unauthorized Migration. The growth of
undocumented immigration since 1960 is
not only a distinctive feature of the current
wave of mass migration, but also a direct
consequence of selective enforcement of
U.S. immigration laws. As of March 2010,
an estimated 11 million undocumented
immigrants resided in the United States,
down from a peak of nearly 12 million in
2007, but 29 percent higher than the 2000
estimate of 8.5 million.27 Latin Americans
make up over three-fourths of undocu-
mented residents, with 60 percent from
Mexico alone. The collapse of the housing
and construction industries during the
great recession fostered the ½rst signi½cant
decline in the size of the undocumented
population, reversing two decades of con-
tinuous growth. Removals from Latin
America since 2001 more than quadrupled
relative to the prior decade, which partly
explains the shrinking unauthorized pop-
ulation, albeit less than changes in labor
demand.
Several factors have fueled the growth
of unauthorized migration from Latin
America, beginning with the abrupt ter-
mination of the Bracero Program in 1964,
following a 22-year period during which
U.S. growers became dependent on pliable
Mexican labor. In some ways, the 1965
amendments to the ina constructed an
illegal immigration system by default be-
cause the disproportionate focus on fam-
ily visas gave short shrift to labor needs;
because the Texas proviso protected em-
ployers who willfully hired undocumented
Marta
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Susana M.
Sánchez
60 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences
workers until irca imposed employer
sanctions; and because the cap on family
visas (except for immediate family mem-
bers of U.S. citizens) produced long wait
lists for countries with established immi-
gration traditions. Furthermore, the inte-
gration of separate hemispheric ceilings
into a single worldwide total in 1978 dra-
matically curtailed the number of visas
available to Mexico, the largest single send-
ing nation. As occurred when the Bracero
Program ended, unauthorized entry pro-
vided an alternative pathway to the United
States, one greatly facilitated by the exis-
tence of strong social networks that were
forti½ed over decades of relatively unre-
stricted migration.
Finally, decades of lax and inconsistent
enforcement enabled millions of persons
to enter without inspection, while shoddy
monitoring of temporary visitors permit-
ted hundreds of thousands of legal entrants
to overstay their visas. Since 1986, how-
ever, U.S. immigration policy has been
dominated by a growing emphasis on
border enforcement, with heightened
penalties for persons who enter without
authorization as well as for non-immi-
grants who remain in the country after their
visas expire. Because irca’s employer
sanctions provisions were never seriously
enforced, unauthorized immigration rose
during the 1990s, when the housing and
construction industries–both dominated
by unskilled workers–expanded. Weak
interior enforcement basically left in place
the lynchpin of unauthorized migration,
namely, employers’ ability to hire unau-
thorized foreign workers essentially with-
out reprisal.
Even as irca’s comprehensive amnesty
program was winding down, unauthorized
migration was on the rise. In fact, during
the 1990s, between 70 and 80 percent of
all new migrants from Mexico were un-
documented, and this share rose to 85 per-
cent between 2000 and 2004.28 In a feeble
attempt to reduce employment of unau-
thorized workers, the 1996 iirira autho-
rized three pilot programs to verify em-
ployment eligibility, but it protected
employers from ½nes for declared “good
faith” efforts to comply with veri½cation
requirements. Not surprisingly, iirira did
little to restrict the unauthorized flow from
Latin America because interior enforce-
ment remained weak; because the social
networks sustaining the flows were already
very deeply entrenched; and because the
people-smuggling networks and fraudu-
lent-document industries developed new
avenues to circumvent the laws.
Migration is part of a multiphase demo-
graphic response to unequally distributed
social and economic opportunities that is
simultaneously determined by micro- and
macro-level forces. Many of these forces
cannot be predicted, such as sudden flows
triggered by civil wars or natural disas-
ters, nor can they be rigorously managed
through policy measures, as demonstrated
by the failure to seal the U.S.-Mexico bor-
der. Like most nations with long immi-
gration traditions, the United States strives
to balance economic, social, and human-
itarian goals through its admission pref-
erences while also ensuring compliance
with the laws. But an appraisal of Latin
American immigration exposes numer-
ous instances where extant laws have
been systematically disregarded or ap-
plied in a capricious or discriminatory
manner. Striking examples include the
preferential treatment accorded to Cuban
émigrés compared with Haitians who
arrive on U.S. shores in similar situations;
the explicit protection of employers who
hire unauthorized workers by not holding
them accountable for violating the law; and
differential treatment of asylum applicants
according to national origin. Fairness is
not a de½ning feature of U.S. immigration
policy toward Latin Americans.
Latin
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Immigration
to the
United
States
61
142 (3) Summer 2013
Historically and in the present, Latin
American immigration has afforded the
United States myriad economic bene½ts,
including lower prices for goods pro-
duced in industries that employ immi-
grant workers, increased demand for U.S.
products, and higher wages and employ-
ment for domestic workers. That new im-
migrants accounted for half of the growth
in the labor force during the 1990s added
signi½cantly to the economic prosperity
enjoyed by average Americans. Neverthe-
less, it is doubtful that the current admis-
sion criteria that favor family uni½cation
over employment needs are well aligned
with future economic needs of an aging
nation. Suggestions to adjust employment
visas with fluctuations in labor needs,
while intuitively compelling, ignore that
two-thirds of U.S. immigrants enter under
family preferences and that the momen-
tum for future flows is already baked into
the system in the form of visa backlogs
for Mexicans and others. Beyond imme-
diate family relatives of U.S. citizens, how-
ever, it is worth reconsidering the social
and economic value of maintaining the
extended family preferences, which have
become a key driver of Dominican and
Salvadoran immigration in recent years.
Notwithstanding the visa backlogs for
family-sponsored relatives of Mexicans,
there is some evidence that net migration
from Mexico has slowed and may have
even reversed.29 Bleak job prospects fol-
lowing the great recession are a key rea-
son for the slowdown, but record high
deportations under the Obama adminis-
tration, a militarized border, and stepped
up interior enforcement are contributing
factors. Whether this slowdown in Mex-
ican migration is a temporary blip or the
beginning of a long-term reversal is yet
unclear, and likely will depend on both
the future pace of the U.S. recovery from
the recession as well as the Mexican gov-
ernment’s success in sustaining economic
growth and dealing with its plague of
drug-related violence. Lower fertility
throughout Latin America also portends
less surplus labor in the years to come.
Equally uncertain are the integration
prospects of Latin American immigrants
and their offspring. The rise of anti-
immigrant sentiment in response to an
unprecedented geographic dispersal of
Latin American immigrants highlights the
formidable integration challenges facing
the nation–challenges that can thwart eco-
nomic prospects in the years ahead while
also fomenting ethnic conflict. Several
worrisome trends warrant consideration.
The recent Supreme Court decision up-
holding a state’s right to empower local
police to check the immigration status of
anyone suspected of being in the country
illegally bodes ill for the integration of
Latin American immigrants, particularly
those with indigenous roots who pose
ready targets for racial pro½ling.
Another concern is the persistent
achievement gap between the offspring
of Latin American immigrants and their
American-born counterparts. After the
year 2000, births outpaced immigration
as a component of Hispanic population
growth in the United States; this fact un-
derscores the urgency of closing the edu-
cation gap so that the children of Latin
American immigrants can become pro-
ductive replacement workers for the aging
white majority. Recent trends are not en-
couraging, however. State and local gov-
ernments have gouged education budgets
in the interest of ½scal restraint, which not
only reduces educational investments in
future workers–large majorities of them
children of immigrants–but also compro-
mises the nation’s competitive advantage
over the medium and long term.
Finally, the unresolved status of 11 mil-
lion unauthorized immigrants–of which
three-quarters are from Latin America–
remains a thorny social, political, and
Marta
Tienda &
Susana M.
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62 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences
moral issue. Legal status profoundly affects
prospects for economic and social mobility.
Economists Sherrie Kossoudji and Debo-
rah Cobb-Clark estimated wage penalties
for unauthorized status at 14 to 24 percent,
and they ½nd a bene½t of legalization of
6 percent.30 This represents a formidable
economic stimulus that can generate sub-
stantial multiplier effects via consumption.
Our review of Latin American immigra-
tion reveals that thousands have bene½ted
from status adjustments through several
group-speci½c congressional acts. In the
interest of transparency and uniformity
in the application of immigration laws, a
blanket amnesty will advance U.S. eco-
nomic interests while promoting social
cohesion. Another blanket amnesty will
go a long way toward aligning our liberal
democracy with the realities of Latin
American immigration.
endnotes
* Contributor Biographies: MARTA TIENDA, a Fellow of the American Academy since 1993, is
the Maurice P. During ’22 Professor in Demographic Studies, Professor of Sociology and
Public Affairs, and Director of the Latino Studies Program at Princeton University. Her pub-
lications include Hispanics and the Future of America (edited with Faith Mitchell, 2006), Eth-
nicity and Causal Mechanisms (edited with Michael Rutter, 2005), and The Hispanic Population
of the United States (coauthored with Frank D. Bean, 1987).
SUSANA M. SÁNCHEZ is a graduate student in the Sociology Department and the Popula-
tion Research Institute at Pennsylvania State University. Her research focuses on the children
of Mexican immigrants and health disparities by social class and ethnicity.
1Campbell Gibson and Kay Jung, “Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-Born Population
of the United States: 1850–2000,” Population Division Working Paper No. 81 (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, 2006). The 2010 estimate is our calculation based on the American
Community Survey.
2Rubén D. Rumbaut, “The Hispanic Prologue,” in A Hispanic Look at the Bicentennial, ed. David
Cardús (Houston: Institute of Hispanic Culture of Houston, 1978), 5–22.
3Ruth E. Wasem, U.S. Immigration Policy on Permanent Admissions (Washington, D.C.: Con-
gressional Research Service, 2010), Figure 4.
4Ruth E. Wasem, Cuban Migration to the United States: Policy and Trends (Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Research Service, 2009). The difference between asylees and refugees is their
physical location when requesting protection: asylees apply after arriving in the United States
whereas refugees apply from abroad, often a third country, and request resettlement in the
United States.
5The current annual ceiling for refugee admissions is 80,000 per year, with 5,500 allocated for
Latin America and the Caribbean. See Daniel C. Martin and James E. Yankay, Refugees and
Asylees: 2011 (Washington, D.C.: Of½ce of Immigration Statistics, U.S. Department of Home -
land Security, 2012).
6Furthermore, in an effort to discourage random surges in Cuban migration, the U.S. govern-
ment set aside a minimum of 20,000 visas (excluding the immediate relatives of U.S. citizens)
for Cubans seeking to immigrate and instituted a “visa lottery” to allocate the visas.
7Marta Tienda, George J. Borjas, Hector Cordero-Guzman, Kristin Neuman, and Manuela
Romero, “The Demography of Legalization: Insights from Administrative Records of Legalized
Aliens,” Final Report to the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation of the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services (Chicago: Population Research Center, University of
Chicago, September 1991).
Latin
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8See Donald M. Kerwin, More than IRCA: U.S. Legalization Programs and the Current Policy Debate
(Washington, D.C.: Migration Policy Institute, December 2010). Unlike irca, which was a
comprehensive program, nacara and other population-speci½c programs receive less media
attention.
9Ruth E. Wasem and Karma Ester, Temporary Protected Status: Current Immigration Policy and
Issues (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2010).
10 Of½ce of Immigration Statistics, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2010 (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011), Table 10.
11 Wasem, U.S. Immigration Policy on Permanent Admissions, Table 4.
12 Alexandria Murnan, “Colombian Immigrants,” in Encyclopedia of Immigration, 2011; available
at http://immigration-online.org/441-colombian-immigrants.html (accessed July 6, 2011).
13 Brad Jokisch and David Kyle, “Las transformaciones de la migración transnacional del
Ecuador, 1993–2003,” in La Migración Ecuatoriana Transnacionalismo, Redes e Identidades, ed.
Gioconda Herrera, Maria Cristina Carillo, and Alicia Torres (Quito, Ecuador: flacso, Plan
Migración, Comunicación y Desarrollo, 2005), 57–70; Brad Jokisch, “Ecuador: Diversity in
Migration,” in Migration Information Source (Washington, D.C.: Migration Policy Institute,
2007), http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=575 (accessed May 1,
2012).
14 Franklin Ramírez Gallegos and Jacques Paul Ramírez, La Estampida Migratoria Ecuatoriana:
Crisis, Redes Transnacionales y Repertorios de Acción Migratoria (Quito, Ecuador: unesco,
ciudad: Centro de Investigaciones, 2005), 41–42.
15 Brian Gratton, “Ecuadorians in the United States and Spain: History, Gender and Niche For-
mation,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 33 (4) (2007): 581–599.
16 Steven E. Alvarado and Douglas S. Massey, “In Search of Peace: Structural Adjustment, Vio-
lence, and International Migration,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sci-
ence 630 (1) (2010): 137–161; Jacqueline M. Hagan, Deciding to be Legal: A Maya Community in
Houston (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994).
17 Michael Hoefer, Nancy Rytina, and Bryan C. Baker, Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant
Population Residing in the United States: January 2010 (Washington, D.C.: Of½ce of Immigra-
tion Statistics, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011).
18 Ramona Hernández, The Mobility of Workers under Advanced Capitalism: Dominican Migration
to the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Peggy Levitt, “Dominican
Republic,” in The New Americans: A Guide to Immigration since 1965, ed. Mary C. Waters and
Reed Ueda (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007), 399–411.
19 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2010, Table 10.
20 Alejandro Portes and Robert L. Bach, Latin Journey: Cuban and Mexican Immigrants in the United
States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Rubén D. Rumbaut and Rubén G.
Rumbaut, “The Family in Exile: Cuban Expatriates in the United States,” American Journal of
Psychiatry 133 (4) (1976): 395–399.
21 Portes and Bach, Latin Journey, 86.
22 Lisandro Perez, “Cuba,” in The New Americans, ed. Waters and Ueda, 386–398.
23 Ibid.; and Wasem, Cuban Migration to the United States.
24 Sarah J. Mahler, American Dreaming: Immigrant Life on the Margins (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1995), 174.
25 Susan B. Coutin, “Falling Outside: Excavating the History of Central American Asylum
Seekers,” Law & Social Inquiry 36 (3) (2011): 585.
26 Wasem and Ester, Temporary Protected Status.
Marta
Tienda &
Susana M.
Sánchez
64 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences
27 Hoefer et al., Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States,
Table 3.
28 Jeffrey Passel, “Estimates of the Size and Characteristics of the Undocumented Population”
(Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Hispanic Center, 2005), http://www.pewhispanic.org/
2005/03/21/estimates-of-the-size-and-characteristics-of-the-undocumented-population/
(accessed July 10, 2012).
29 Jeffrey Passel, D’Vera Cohn, and Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, “Net Migration from Mexico Falls
to Zero–and Perhaps Less” (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Hispanic Center, 2012),
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/04/23/net-migration-from-mexico-falls-to-zero-and
-perhaps-less/ (accessed July 5, 2012).
30 Sherrie Kossoudji and Deborah A. Cobb-Clark, “Coming Out of the Shadows: Learning about
Legal Status and Wages from the Legalized Population,” Journal of Labor Economics 20 (3)
(2002): 598–628.
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American
Immigration
to the
United
States
