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Constructing Life The World of Synthetic Biology

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November 2007
Constructing Life
The World of Synthetic Biology
Rinie van Est, Huib de Vriend, Bart Walhout
Constructing Life: the World of Synthetic Biology
Rathenau Instituut
2
© Rathenau Instituut, 2007
Rathenau Instituut
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The Rathenau Institute focuses on the influence of science and technology on our daily
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and Science. The institute’s administration falls under the Royal Academy of Arts and
Sciences (KNAW).
Preferred citation:
R. van Est, H. de Vriend and B. Walhout, Constructing life: the world of synthetic
biology, The Hague, Rathenau Instituut, 2007
No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint,
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Rathenau Instituut – Technology Assessment
Rathenau Instituut
1 Preface
In the summer of 2007 a group of seventeen international top researchers hailed
synthetic biology as a ‘new technology revolution’ which could provide solutions
to major problems. Synthetic biologists don't just want to create new biological
systems, they want to improve them. Clean bio fuels and cheap malaria drugs are
just some of the visions synthetic biologists cherish. But social and ethical
questions about the impact on health and the environment and abuse through
biological warfare, arise. And what of the commercial implications? Can you
patent life itself?
The construction of a completely artificial cell is still many years away. Yet with the
current knowledge of hereditary information (genomics) and the developments in
nanotechnology and IT, synthetic biology is a discipline that is developing extremely
fast. Molecular biologists, physicists, chemists and technicians are working together,
and influencing each other.
In 2006 the Rathenau Institute published the book Constructing Life, the world's first
review of the societal aspects of synthetic biology. Recently the Dutch edition, Leven
Maken appeared. In September 2007 the Rathenau Institute informed the Dutch
Parliament with a Letter to Parliament called: ‘Synthetic Biology: New Life in the Bio
Debate.’ The Dutch Labour Party (Partij van den Arbeid) responded by demanding
answers from seven departments of state. This document is the English translation of
the Letter to Parliament.
For more information, please visit our website: www.rathenau.nl or send an e-mail to
info@rathenau.nl
Constructing Life: the World of Synthetic Biology
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Genetic modification Synthetic biology
Technology
Reading / analysing DNA
Trial and error
Writing / synthesisis of DNA
Software programming
Application
Adaption / modification of
existing biological systems
Design and construction / modulation
of new biological systems
2 Synthetic biology:
constructing life
If we view life as a machine, then we can also make it: this is the revolutionary
nature of synthetic biology. Until recently, biotechnologists focused on
modifying the DNA of existing organisms (genetic modification). Synthetic
biologists go one step further. They want to design new life and construct this
from scratch.
Craig Venter, famed for his contribution to unravelling the human genome, sees it as
the step everyone has always talked about: “Now that we have learned how to read the
genome, we are also in a position to write it”.
The transition from reading to writing DNA, entails a paradigm shift whereby the
process of construction takes centre stage. Synthetic biologists view things through the
eyes of engineers and regard a cell as a collection of cooperating nano machines.
According to Drew Endy of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) biology
has, until now, always been ‘nature at work’. “Yet”, he says, ”if you consider nature to
be a machine, you can see that it is not perfect and that it can be revised and
improved.”
The paradigm shift of synthetic biology
The Revolutionary Power of Converging Technologies
Synthetic biology has been hailed as the ‘third technological revolution’ that could
eventually provide solutions to climate change, energy - and water shortages, and even
our health. In June 2007 seventeen top researchers, including Cees Dekker, a Dutch
professor of molecular biophysics, drew a parallel with two other revolutionary
technologies that have had fundamental impact: the integrated circuit, the basis for
modern electronics, and the discovery of DNA, the basis for molecular biology. In
synthetic biology these technologies converge as molecular biologists, physicists,
chemists and technologists work together and influence and strengthen each other.
[see box 1: Converging Technologies].
Rathenau Instituut – Technology Assessment
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Box 1 Synthetic Biology: converging technologies
Three scientific and technological developments converge in synthetic biology:
Molecular biology
Modern electronics and information technology
Nanotechnology, the construction of machines and structures at a
molecular level
Constructing Life: the World of Synthetic Biology
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Information technology
Information technology (IT) is a vital tool for reading and
interpreting the genetic code. Determining the DNA sequence
of viruses, bacteria, plants, animals and humans yields vast
quantities of data. Researchers use increasingly powerful
computers and specialised software to simulate, design and
test biological systems. In 2007, IBM launched BLUE
GENE/P, the fastest computer in the world. One second of its
processing power is equivalent to that of the processing power
of a pile of laptops of two-and-a-half kilometres high.
In genomics research, bioinformatics is used to further analyse
these data, with the result that we know increasingly more
about genes. Their role in metabolic processes in cells and
their significance for a whole host of biological processes is
becoming increasingly clearer.
Synthetic biology = construction
of biological circuits
“We want to do for biology what Intel
does for electronics. We want to
design and manufacture complex
biological circuits”, says George
Church, professor of genetics at
Harvard Medical School. IT is no
longer just a tool to design and test
biological circuits. For synthetic
biologists it is also a major source of
inspiration. The comparison with
micro electronics is particularly apt.
A printed circuit board is necessary
for the design and construction of
micro electronics. Electronic circuits
are built on this board, using
resistors, transistors and
condensers.
In the construction of a biological
system, a cell with a minimal
genome fulfils the function of a
printed circuit board. The electronic
components are replaced by DNA
sequences whose exact biological
functions are known. With this
approach, biological circuits with a
wide range of functions can be
constructed. An example of this is
the metabolic pathway that allows a
specific protein to be synthesised.
Synthetic biologists are therefore
focusing on both the development of
a suitable cell with a minimal
genome and the development of
relevant biological building blocks.
(see also Box 2)
Nanotechnology
Synthetic biologists want to use this knowledge to build their
own genetic structures, so that plant fibres or sugars, for
example, can efficiently be converted into ethanol, raw
materials for bio plastics, or drugs. By applying the design and
construction principles from nanotechnology, it is possible to
write the genetic code (synthesis). Companies have already
developed techniques with which the four nucleotides, (from
which DNA is constructed, indicated with the letters A, C, T
and G), can be attached to each other in any desired order.
Using this technology, researchers have successfully
reconstructed the poliovirus and, in 2002, the Spanish
influenza virus; the genome of both is known. DNA synthesis
provides the genetic building blocks with which the design can
be realised. Synthetic biologists use these to make
standardised biological components. The Biobricks initiative of
MIT is an electronic catalogue containing such parts.
Molecular biology
Genetically transferable information for biological processes is
encoded in the structure of DNA (the letters of the genetic
alphabet). By recombining (cutting and pasting) pieces of
DNA, the characteristics of natural organisms can be altered
artificially, currently a common practice in biotechnology.
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Box 2 Two approaches: deconstruction and construction
Two research approaches lie at the heart of synthetic biology: deconstruction
and construction. These two approaches converge in the development of
artificial genetic networks with tightly defined and predictable functions.
Deconstruction
In this approach, existing biological life is unravelled. Functioning living cells are
deconstructed step by step until the minimal set of genes a cell needs to live, is
determined, - the idea behind the minimal genome. The idea is, that if you can limit the
complexity of biological processes by switching off as many genetic characteristics as
possiblek, such processes become more predictable and manageable.
These minimal cells can then serve as a living chassis into which standardised
biological building blocks can be plugged in. Researchers believe that in this way, they
can make viruses, micro organisms and other biological systems that function 'better'
than natural life forms, or even fulfil entirely new functions. The Craig Venter Institute is
one of the research laboratories that follows this method. In 2005, researchers from this
institute established that the minimum required number of genes for Mycoplasma
Genitalium is 387.
Construction
Another research line, the constructionist approach, focuses on the creation of new
material using bio molecular assembly. Researchers use detailed knowledge of the
functioning and structure of DNA and other bio molecules, to artificially reconstruct
biological components, such as genes and cell membranes, in the laboratory. An
example of this is the reconstruction of the Spanish influenza virus in 2002. To achieve
this, the entire genetic material of this virus was synthesised. The Biobricks initiative of
MIT is another example. Biobricks is an open source Internet catalogue containing a
range of standard genetic building blocks: Lego blocks of DNA.
Constructing Life: the World of Synthetic Biology
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3 Application areas
Promising potential applications
Many researchers are enthusiastic about the possibilities of synthetic biology.
There are three key application areas, and the most important of these is the use
of microbial platforms to produce drugs, bio energy and fine chemicals.
Drugs
For some time now, genetically modified organisms have been used to produce drugs.
With the application of principles from synthetic biology, new possibilities arise. For
example, American researchers have developed a synthetic metabolic pathway that
causes yeast cells to produce artemisinic acid. This is a raw material for an anti
malarial drug that is currently extracted from plants. Thanks to this approach, the drug
can now be produced for a tenth of the current cost price. A similar approach can be
used for the production of taxol, which is used for the treatment of cancer, and
prostratin, which is being clinically tested for the treatment of HIV infections. Various
research institutes and companies (including oil company British Petrol) are currently
working on the development of micro organisms with optimised, synthetic metabolic
pathways for the production of bio fuels and fine chemicals.
Measuring instruments based on biosensors
A second application area is that of advanced measuring instruments based on
biosensors. These are cells that respond to specific signals from the environment. They
can be deployed to recognise (pathogenic) bacteria such as Salmonella or Legionella,
or to detect pollutants in the soil, air or water, and to measure bio molecules in the
human body, such as the sugar level in diabetic patients.
In 2005, students from the University of Texas hit the headlines in the international
scientific press with an imaginative experiment: with a smart combination of genetic
components from cells (so-called Biobricks, see Box 2) they successfully designed a
bacterium that responds to red light. Applied to a dish, these bacteria functioned as a
photographic film on which a print could be made if the film was illuminated. They are
now refining this system in the laboratory, with a view to developing new biosensors.
Living drugs and stem cells
A third promising application area is that of living therapeutics (drugs). With the help of
modified bacteria and viruses, researchers think it will eventually be possible to combat
cancer cells and inhibit HIV infections. There are also researchers who think that it will
be possible to use synthetic biology to guide the differentiation of stem cells in a
controlled manner to produce, for example, skin, nerve or muscle cells. This would
enable damaged tissues or organs to be replaced.
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4 Current Research
At this stage, synthetic biology research is mainly focused on the exploration of
fundamental principles of artificial biological systems which might give the
impression that all of the promising applications are still a long way off. However,
there are reasons to assume that synthetic biology will make considerable
advances over the next few years. Major steps in the creation of artificial life are
being made by research institutes, the technology of DNA synthesis is
developing at a phenomenal rate with parallels to the microelectronics industry,
and synthetic biology is attracting significant industrial investment.
The Craig J. Venter Institute recently made world headlines with a successful attempt
to equip a bacterium with an entire DNA from another bacterium. This involved
introducing a large number of genes at the same time into an organism; it is seen as an
essential step towards the creation of artificial life.
In 2007 it is already possible to synthesise the complete genome of a virus, for which
the DNA sequence is known, and the use of synthetic genes in molecular biology
research is commonplace. Some researchers think that within ten years it will be
possible to synthesise entire yeast genomes. Yet in contrast, there are many
researchers who believe that living systems are so complex that it is doubtful whether
these expectation will be realised.
The speed of the development of DNA synthesis,
exhibits strong similarities with the dynamics in
micro electronics, where the calculating capacity
has increased exponentially for many years
(Moore's law, see below). Parallel to this, it is
expected that the speed and accuracy with which
DNA can be synthesised will exponentially
increase in the coming years. Specialised DNA
synthesis companies will produce more genes for
ever-lower prices and this will provide an
important impulse for research.
Synthetic biology is attracting considerable
interest from industry. In 2006, the American firm
Amyris Biotechnologies acquired twenty million
dollars of venture capital for the development of
synthetic biology applications in drugs and bio
energy. In the spring of 2007, the oil company BP
invested five hundred million dollars in a program
for developing efficient production systems for bio
fuels. During the last seven years, the German
gene synthesis company Geneart has become
one of the fastest growing companies in Bavaria
with over a hundred employees.
For synthetic biology developments in the
Netherlands, see Box 3.
Moore's law (exponential increase in the speed)
also applies to the analysis and synthesis of DNA
Constructing Life: the World of Synthetic Biology
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Box 3 Synthetic biology in the Netherlands
Thanks to companies such as Genencor-Danisco, DSM and the Kluyver Centre for
Genomics of Industrial Fermentation in Delft, the Netherlands has a strong position with
regards to applications in the production of fine chemicals. The University of Groningen
envisages possibilities for the synthesis of large numbers of new proteins that will
subsequently be tested for their (biomedical) functionality. The use of biosensors can
be interesting for companies such as Philips, who are focusing on the development of
equipment for medical diagnostics. The Kavli Institute for Nanosciences in Delft plans
to initiate a large research program on bio-nano-synthetic biology in the future.
The developments in synthetic biology have caught the attention of several advisory
bodies and institutes. In 2006 the Netherlands Commission on Genetic Modification
(COGEM) published a monitoring report discussing the significance of synthetic biology
for the analysis of bio safety risks and current legislation.
At the end of 2006, the Rathenau Institute published the world’s first detailed study of
societal implications of synthetic biology: Constructing Life, followed by the Dutch
edition Leven maken. In the same year, the Minister of Education, Culture and Science
approached the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW) to
investigate, together with the Health Council of the Netherlands and the Advisory
Council on Health Research (RGO), whether a scientific foresight study in this area was
worthwhile. These advisory bodies have appointed a work group to ascertain what else
needs to happen following the monitoring report from COGEM and the publications
from the Rathenau Institute.
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5 New life in the biodebate
For the past thirty years, developments in biotechnology have led to public
debate and disquiet; the marketing of genetically modified maize, for example,
and Dolly the sheep, and Herman, the bull. Synthetic biology raises important
ethical and social questions about the possible impact on human health and the
environment and possible abuses for biological warfare or terrorist attacks. A
number of themes need to be reconsidered.
Bio safety
In August 2007, British livestock was infected with the viral Foot and Mouth disease
(FMD), which was traced to a research laboratory in nearby Pirbright, raising again the
issue of bio safety. Synthetic organisms can also escape. At present, experiments with
synthetic biology follow the safety principles of genetic modification to which existing
legislation applies. There are three types of risk in genetic modification:
Infection of laboratory staff. Despite all precautionary measures, laboratory
staff can become infected with synthetic viruses or micro organisms from the
lab with pathogenic characteristics.
Synthetic viruses or micro organisms can escape via clothing, instruments or
laboratory animals and thereby cause harm to the environment or contribute to
the spread of new diseases for humans and animals. In the worst scenario, an
infection of laboratory personnel is discovered too late, leading to an epidemic.
A disruption of the ecological balance. If synthetic biological systems are used
outside of the laboratory for a specific task and time period under specific
circumstances, for example to clean up an environmental contamination, such
organisms might have a disruptive effect on the ecological balance. In the
worst possible scenario, the situation gets out of control and there is a
presence of ‘Green goo’ (unidentifiable material), comparable with the ‘Grey
goo’ from nanotechnology. Also new organisms, which have escaped or have
been deliberately introduced to the environment, can lead to a contamination
Theme Genetic modification Synthetic biology Significance for the
biodebate
Biosafety
Original host organism as
reference
No more natural
reference
New questions and
uncertainties about risk
analysis
Misuse /
bioterrorism
Known, risky viruses and
bacteria
Difficult to establish what
short DNA fragments will
be used for
Monitoring misuse of
potentially risky
organisms and research
becomes more difficult
Intellectual
property
Limited number of genes Number of genes virtually
unlimited
Research & innovation
impeded
Ethics
The alteration of existing
organisms
The creation of (partially)
artificial life
Boundary between life
and machine blurs
Constructing Life: the World of Synthetic Biology
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of natural genetic sources. The exchange of genetic material between
synthetic and natural biological systems leads, in principle, to the
contamination of the natural genetic pool.
The question is whether the current risk assessment system for genetically modified
organisms is prepared for the future developments in synthetic biology. The
Netherlands Commission on Genetic Modification (COGEM) published its first
monitoring report concerning this in 2006. This report made it clear that there are many
outstanding uncertainties and questions at policy level.
Can the current risk assessment system be adjusted if it proves to be
unsatisfactory? And if so, how?
What needs to be known about the characteristics of an organism for a good
risk assessment?
Does a distinction need to be drawn between completely synthetic organisms
and existing organisms with new synthetic parts?
How can the risks of synthetic genes and organisms be assessed if there is no
longer a natural reference?
Some researchers state that synthetic life will be so weak that it will never survive
outside of the lab. Others propose constructing artificial biological systems in such a
manner that they can only survive and reproduce under strictly controlled conditions (in
the laboratory or a fermentation vessel). For both propositions there is insufficient
scientific evidence and further research is needed.
Misuse and bioterrorism: monitoring is becoming more complex
The five deaths from Anthrax through letters sent shortly after the attack on the World
Trade Centre in New York in 2001, placed bioterrorism high on the agenda. The
international treaty on biological weapons (Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
BTWC), signed in 1972, is focused on combating the misuse of natural pathogenic
viruses, bacteria and toxins. It lists many different pathogenic organisms that can be
used to develop biological weapons. On the blacklist are Anthrax, the smallpox virus,
and the BSE virus; other examples include the Asian flu virus and the Ebola virus. Strict
controls on the trade and use of these viruses and bacteria can limit, but does not
completely exclude, misuse.
Supervision is more difficult
With the emergence of synthetic biology, supervision will be more complex still. The
reconstruction of the polio virus and the Spanish Influenza virus make it clear that it is
technologically possible (although still highly complex) to reconstruct pathogens on the
basis of existing DNA building blocks . A number of American and European gene
synthesis companies screen orders for potential misuse. This is already difficult for long
DNA chains at a gene or genome level, but for short DNA fragments, it is virtually
impossible and therefore scarcely effective.
Dual use research
In the United States in particular, the authorities fear misuse through ‘dual use’
research. This is research into pathogenic organisms for medical, biological or
agricultural applications which can also be used for biological weapons. In 2004 the
American National Scientific Advisory Board for Biosafety (NSABB) was founded,
whose task is to improve the safety measures involving research into the life sciences.
Synthetic biology is one of their priorities.
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Bio security code of conduct
The awareness among biologists about bioterrorism is low. That is apparent from the
reaction of the sixteen hundred biologists who recently participated in bio security
workshops organised by the universities of Exeter and Bradford. Efforts are, however,
being made to change this, as, for example, various countries are working on ethical
codes of conduct. The Interacademy Panel (IAP), a worldwide network of scientific
academies, drew up the IAP Statement on Biosecurity at the end of 2005.
This document can serve as a guideline for the compilation of such a code of conduct.
Five items are crucial: making researchers aware, following safety requirements,
education and information, the responsibility of researchers to signal abuse, and
supervision. In the Netherlands, the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science asked
the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences to make a contribution to the
national Biosafety Code of Conduct. This code has now been compiled and will be
presented to the Minister of Education, Culture and Science in the autumn of 2007.
Some researchers are concerned that under the banner of national security, restrictions
will be imposed on the publication of research results. To date, there would seem to be
little basis for this concern. Science academies in particular, are well aware of the
importance of an undisturbed progress of science.
Intellectual property: the patent mountain
At the end of May 2007, the American patent Office announced that Craig Venter had
requested a patent for the minimal genome of a synthetic bacterium called Mycoplasma
Genitalium. British magazine The Economist commented: ”This time he is proposing
not just the patenting of a few genes, but of life itself”. The awarding of intellectual
property rights is thought to facilitate innovation. In exchange for publishing his
invention, the inventor receives a temporary monopoly on its commercial exploitation.
Recombinant DNA technologies and the results of this, are considered to be inventions
under patent law and therefore patentable.
DNA Patents
Genes that have been isolated from an organism, even if they are almost identical in
terms of structure (base sequence) as genes from nature (or the human body) are
considered patentable. These types of patents can be compared with substance
patents for new chemical products. Such a substance patent covers all – including
future – use of the new compound so also those that are unknown at the time of the
patent application. What applies for isolated genes, also applies for synthesised DNA
sequences and cells with a minimal genome, and these are also, in principle,
patentable.
Researchers, particularly in the United States, fear that the large number of patents on
biological building blocks will hinder the progress of their research. For new
applications in particular, where many different gene patents play a role, the bringing
together of widely spread and fragmentary rights can cause problems. This is already
playing a role in drug research into complex diseases such as Alzheimer's and cancer
that involve a large number of genes. Synthetic biology could exacerbate these
problems. What sort of bureaucratic nightmare will a company end up in when it tries to
construct a complete chromosome on the basis of these genes?
Constructing Life: the World of Synthetic Biology
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Research exemption
In Europe, researchers make use of patented discoveries without patent infringement,
thanks to the right of research exemption, arranged at the national and European level.
Yet this research exemption applies to ‘research of the patented’, and is invalid as soon
as the research is focused on a commercial innovation. For public-private research in
particular, the boundary between academic and commercial research is often not clear.
When it comes to innovation programmes, such as the Dutch National Genomics
Programme, there is a strong emphasis on validating the research results via patents.
Patents can therefore have an inhibitory effect. In the Netherlands, this discussion
about this, is scarcely getting off the ground.
Emerging open source movement
In the United States the situation is more dire. There, research exemption does not
even exist since university research is considered to be a commercial activity.
Researchers therefore fear that the growing mountain of patents will increasingly
impede them. Alternatives are being sought to safeguard freer access to technological
knowledge. For example, the geneticist Richard Jefferson has set up the Biological
Innovation for Open Society (BIOS). This organisation promotes the free use of patents
in the area of agro biotechnology. In cooperation with the International Rice Institute,
researchers in Korea, China and Kenya have started to set up a freely accessible
database of rice-related patents. The American synthetic biology research community
recognises the importance of freely accessible knowledge in the public domain for
sustainable research. That is why the Biobricks initiative was developed in 2004 , which
is an open source system in which everyone has free access to well-defined DNA
sequences.
The need for ethical reflection and societal involvement
Should the patenting of genes be possible at all? We attribute different values to living
than to non-living material. We mostly regard life as being worth protecting, with the
level of protection being dependent on the life form concerned. In similar discussions,
such as therapeutic cloning and stem cell research, human gene therapy and the
permissibility of genetically modifying animals, it is the moral questions that colour the
debate.
The discussion about the patenting of genes and genetically modified organisms clearly
has an ethical aspect. The breast cancer related gene BRCA-1,was largely mapped
with public funding yet the company Myriad Genetics has obtained three European
patents on this. In 2002 this led to Dutch MPs asking whether such patents would lead
to a monopoly of Myriad Genetics on the diagnosis and treatment of that type of breast
cancer.
In the discussions about gene technology, key values such as autonomy, justice and
naturalness play an increasingly important role. There was strong reaction by the
Canadian ETC Group due to the awarding of a patent on a synthetic organism with a
minimal genome to Craig Venter. “Will Craig Venter's company become the
‘MicrobeSoft’ of synthetic biology?” There is considerable concern that patenting the
building blocks of life will favour rich countries and hinder free access to knowledge and
technology.
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What is life?
Since synthetic biology is no longer based on existing life forms, but is focused on the
creation of biological systems that are entirely or partially synthesised, other ethical
questions also arise. May we intervene in life? What is our definition of life? To what
extent do we still view artificial biological systems as 'living material'? How does a
completely artificial cell differ from a machine? What criteria do we use to determine to
designate life? Do we restrict the principle of 'worthy of protection' to natural organisms,
to (evolved) creation, or do we consider artificial forms of life also worthy of protection?
Public involvement and the government
In May 2006, a group of 35 societal organisations sent a letter to the organisers of the
second International Synthetic Biology Conference in Berkeley. In this letter they stated
that synthetic biology is not just an issue for scientists: this development requires a
broader public involvement and dialogue.
Including all interested parties at an early stage in important policy questions regarding
potentially significant and controversial technologies is wise, but engaging public
involvement in a worthwhile and effective manner is far from easy, however. On the
one hand governments must take regulatory responsibility with respect to biosafety,
bioterrorism and intellectual property. But it is also important that an open discussion
can take place in society about the ethical questions associated with synthetic biology.
The debate about synthetic biology demands a facilitating, rather than an organisational
role from the government.
Constructing Life: the World of Synthetic Biology
14
6 Recommendations
Synthetic biology can challenge existing concepts and the resulting policy in
various ways. The challenge demands immediate action from the government.
The Rathenau Institute makes six reccomendations:
Biosafety
1. Initiate research
It is expected that synthetic biology will develop rapidly over the coming years. As
legislative changes are usually a lengthy process, we advise the Ministry of Housing,
Spatial Planning and the Environment, to develop a strategy in the short term.
Research into new biosafety-related uncertainties, associated with synthetic biology
must be quickly deployed. Here, the questions from the COGEM monitoring report form
a good starting point.
2. Feature on the European Agenda
Biosafety is regulated at European Union level. That is why the Ministry of Housing,
Spatial Planning and the Environment must place the question on the EU agenda as to
whether synthetic biology demands amendments to the European protocols and
directives for the introduction of genetically modified organisms into the environment
(2001/18/EC) or their contained use (98/81/EC).
Misuse and bioterrorism
3. Arrange national and international harmonisation
The current package of measures to counteract bioterrorism is focused on the products
(what), in this case the DNA sequences, those who place the order (who) and the
location from where the order is made (where). Developments in the area of synthetic
biology demand an expansion of the current approach. To counteract bioterrorism
where results of synthetic biology research are used, international harmonisation is
needed between safety experts, the universities and companies involved, and the
biosafety officers from research institutes. The Dutch National Coordinator for
Counterterrorism should take the initiative towards this.
4. Increase awareness of researchers
Researchers must report the misuse of biological agents and their possible
unintentional wrong use. Therefore the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science
should increase the safety awareness of researchers. One way of doing this is actively
disseminating (for example via information campaigns and workshops) the Biosecurity
Code of Conduct compiled by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences.
Feedback from the research community must be arranged to increase the feasibility of
this code of conduct.
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Patenting
5. Reconsider valorisation strategy
The patenting of genes does not always facilitate innovation. Particularly with new
applications, where a large number of patents play a role, the current patenting system
reaches its limits. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Education,
Culture and Science should therefore consider using the options of open source
approaches in the case of publicly funded gene technology research.
Ethics and society
6. Encourage ethical reflection and societal involvement
Synthetic biology will fuel the public and ethical debate about biotechnology. The
government must create space for public involvement and reflection on fundamental
ethical questions about biosafety, bioterrorism, patenting and the definition of 'life'. This
requires facilitation as opposed to regulation. This could mean informing citizens to
enable them to form their own opinion.
Constructing Life: the World of Synthetic Biology
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References
Vriend, H. de (2006) Constructing Life: Early Social Reflections on the Emerging Field
of Synthetic Biology. The Hague: Rathenau Institute.
Vriend, H. de, R. van Est en B. Walhout (2007) Leven maken: Maatschappelijke
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... Besides critical aspects and risks, one can also figure out an innovative, creative, pragmatically useful and even revolutionary function [41,72] and epistemic normativity of metaphors as conditions and driving forces of scientific inquiry, technological progress and societal discourses. Metaphors (and models) in this perspective appear as constitutive moments of paradigm shifts in the research process on all levels of theory building; practical norms of science; technological development; and the accompanying political, social and ethical discourses. ...
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In this paper, we examine the use of the term ‘life’ in the debates within and about synthetic biology. We review different positions within these debates, focusing on the historical background, the constructive epistemology of laboratory research and the pros and cons of metaphorical speech. We argue that ‘life’ is used as buzzword, as folk concept, and as theoretical concept in inhomogeneous ways. Extending beyond the review of the significant literature, we also argue that ‘life’ can be understood as a Burstword in two concrete senses. Firstly, terms such as life easily turn into fuzzy, foggy and buzzy clouds of nonsense, if their use is not appropriately reflected. In these cases, the semantic orientation is detonated. This is the Burstword I characteristic of the concept of ‘life’ that we reveal for its unclear terminological use. Secondly, and in contrast to Burstword I, we show that the concept of ‘life’ can be used in a methodologically controlled way. We call this kind of use Burstword II. Here the concept of ‘life’ fulfils the function of expanding an inadequately narrow disciplinary or conceptual focus in different discursive contexts. In this second sense, ‘life’ receives an important operational function, for instance as a transdisciplinary research principle. It turns out that the innovative function and paradigm-changing power of metaphorical speech belong here as well. Finally, we illustrate three ethically relevant examples that show how ‘life’ can be applied as Burstword II in the context of synthetic biology.
... The European TA Group (ETAG) (2006) states that ' [a]nother benefit of these extreme future visions is that they expose the most sensitive issues in the debate and clarify the normative deep core issues at stake' (ETAG 2006, p. iv). As a worst possible scenario, van Est et al. (2007) refer to the presence of 'Green goo', comparable with the 'Grey goo' from nanotechnology (van Est et al. 2007, p. 9). EGE (2009) recommend responsible documentation of potential risks and 'hyped' benefits in the public debate, 'where the public is confronted, with the assistance of media and science fiction writers, with unrealistic scenarios on synthetic biology products' (EGE 2009, p. 86). ...
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Policymakers and scholars have employed technology assessment to formulate and deliberate policy and social agendas by anticipating plausible futures for the last half century. Proposing a reflexive hermeneutics approach and taking a case of synthetic biology, this study illustrates how TA discourses are socioculturally and institutionally bounded. The case study leads to the conclusion that future-oriented conceptions of the ‘precautionary’ and ‘proactionary’ intertwine with general concepts including biosafety, biosecurity, bioeconomy, and biodiversity. These general concepts together with the advent of disruptive innovation in synthetic biology have already affected perception of possible futures.
... In the United States the publication of the result of Venter's group made the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues initiate a series of hearings on the ethics of synthetic biology, and various councils and agencies in the European Union and individual European countries such as the United Kingdom, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Denmark have started to outline the ethical agenda of synthetic biology (see e.g. Balmer and Martin 2008, van Est, R. de Vriend, H. and Walhout, B. 2007, and EHKA 2010. Also, a number of articles point out that synthetic biology gives rise to questions about dual use, risks to human health and the environment, and other ethical and societal problems associated with biotechnology (e.g. ...
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With the ever rapid development of scientific and technological research in the 19th century, the power growth of scientific institutions and their specific influence have expanded incredibly due to the results they have achieved in several research areas.
... On the basis of these principles, many descriptions of synthetic biology divide it into three related, partially overlapping classes (Balmer & Martin, 2008) (Lentzos, Bennett, Boeke, Endy, & Rabinow, 2008) (Rinie van Est, 2007) and (O'Malley, Powell, Davies, & Calvert, 2008): ...
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Abstract Claims concerning the role of design figure heavily in the recent emergence,of synthetic biology. This paper argues that there can be no straightforward application of engineering design principles to biotechnological problems. The design practices appearing in synthetic biology embody,wide-ranging and heterogeneous re-organisation of techniques of working with biological substances in networked assemblages. This paper analyses the function of design in synthetic biology via the concepts of 'meta-technique' and 'meta-material.'These two terms suggest how existing biological techniques and materials are being intensively re- organised. The notion of design as a meta-technique shows how synthetic biology draws highly reflexively from digital cultures for practices of collaboration, standardisation and a sense of ongoing change. The notion of biological substance as meta-materialsuggests a way of thinking about the dynamism of living things infused by models, constructs and work-processes. Design in synthetic biology has important implications for how we think about biotechnology and biomedicine more generally. Synthetic biology design software, as well as the several hundred scientific papers and patents published between 2004-2009, indicate an alteration of biological substance in train. Existing critical accounts of biotechnology and genomic,medicine contend that species differences and evolutionary histories undergo a flattening or lateralization in molecular biology and genomics. By contrast, analysis of design practices appearing in synthetic biology suggests a different set of topological operations are taking shape in synthetic biology. Effects of depth and verticality appear at critical design conjunctions in synthetic biology, and these meta-stable effects intensify public, economic and lived responses. Keywords: synthetic biology, design, technique, materiality, emergence, new media What is design in synthetic biology? From techniques to
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The assessment of the impacts of sociotechnical futures on processes of innovation is a continuing challenge for technology assessment (TA). Imaginations of the future shape communications and actions in the present. They do not deliver any information about the outcome of these processes. This seems to contradict the task of TA to provide future-oriented knowledge. But vision assessment can provide knowledge concerning ongoing changes in sociotechnical arrangements and options for intervention. Our approach presents a heuristic for analyzing visions as socio-epistemic practices, which rearrange actors in innovation processes. In our cases—Big Data, Smart Grid and FabLabs—we identify dynamics in power constellations which might enable or restrain future innovations.
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This article discusses the contingencies and complexities of CRISPR. It outlines key problems regarding off-target effects and replication of experimental work that are important to consider in light of CRISPR’s touted ease of use and diffusion. In light of literature on the sociotechnical dimensions of the life sciences and biotechnology and literature on former bioweapons programs, this article argues that we need more detailed empirical case studies of the social and technical factors shaping CRISPR and related gene-editing techniques in order to better understand how they may be different from other advances in biotechnology — or whether similar features remain. This information will be critical to better inform intelligence practitioners and policymakers about the security implications of new gene-editing techniques.
Chapter
Metaphors play a constitutive and mostly underestimated role in science in general, in the modern life sciences and bio-technologies in particular, and also in the accompanying ethical debates. The current discussion on synthetic biology can be seen as a prime example for the different ways metaphors enter into an area of conflict between science, technology, society and ethics. There seems to be a connection between the paradigm shift in the epistemological approach, the technological development, the societal discourse and the metaphors that have been used to describe, explain and argue the new field of synthetic biology and its revolutionary nature. The goal of my paper is to outline an analytical frame to determine and decipher the specific role and functions of metaphors in the intersection of science, technology and society. I aim to analyze and criticize the innovative, critical, and argumentative functions of metaphors of “life” in synthetic biology. This analytical frame will then be applied to the example of the metaphor of the genetic code which is the common reference point and driving force in a reconstructed story from Erwin Schrödinger to Craig Venter. This leads to a reassessment of synthetic biology between science and art and focusses on the obscuring and ideological dimension of metaphorical speech about the revolutionary nature of synthetic biology.
Article
Synthetic biology enthusiasts often tout the emerging field for its present and future potential to revolutionize the life sciences. In the biosecurity arena, which has received considerable government and non-government attention, many are concerned that synthetic biology may prove to be an easier and cheaper way to conduct bioterrorism. To evaluate these claims, this article will focus on contrasting two different frameworks that have been used for understanding the development, diffusion and adoption of synthetic biology. In contrasting these frameworks, I will draw on examples from biotechnology and information technology because they are often used as analogies in synthetic biology discussions. I conclude that the critical elements for successful development, transfer, and use of synthetic biology methodologies and tools for harm are not purely material or technical, but involve important social dimensions that underpin technical work, requiring time, teams of experts, appropriate political, legal, and funding structures, and the development of new (still unknown) techno-organizational processes. To date, there have been few studies that have explored these socio-technical mechanisms of synthetic biology diffusion through in-depth examination at a micro and macro level. However, by having a more nuanced understanding of various synthetic biology approaches and how they are (or are not) able to travel easily to new settings, one can create a more refined spectrum of factors shaping threats from state and non-state actors related to synthetic biology. This article ends by outlining new research agendas important to support and pursue in order to improve biosecurity policymaking.
Article
The Millennium Declaration committed the 193 member states of the United Nations to end poverty by 2015. Despite the efforts of the UN and World Health Organisation, and the G8 commitment to spend a fixed proportion of gross national income on overseas aid, more than 2.6 billion people still lack access to proper sanitation. The absence of effective public health strategies in developing countries results in significant health burdens following gastrointestinal infections. Diarrhoea associated with infections resulting from oral-faecal contamination is the second leading cause of death in children under 5 years of age, primarily in Africa and South Asia. Currently there are no appropriate vaccines that could be easily administered on a global scale to prevent these infections. Synthetic biology has the potential to contribute to development of such vaccines. Our work is directed at developing a range of multivalent oral vaccines against the most common diarrhoea-causing bacteria, e.g., Escherichia coli, Shigella and Salmonella. If synthetic biology is to avoid the suspicion and possible revulsion of the public, scientists need to demonstrate that this new field has something real to offer.
In: Wired Magazine, Issue 13.01
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Life, Reinvented. In: Wired Magazine, Issue 13.01, January 2005.
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Synthesizing the Future: a vision for the convergence of synthetic biology and nanotechnology ( " The Ilulissat Statement " ), KAVLI Foundation, 25 June, 2007, http://www.kavlifoundation.org/assets/docs/ilulissat_statement.pdf Toepassing van genetica in de gezondheidszorg. Letter from the State Secretary for Health, Welfare and Sport to the Minister of Economic Affairs and the Minister of Education, Culture and Science, Parliamentary paper 27 424, no. 43, 28 November 2003.
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Leven maken: Maatschappelijke reflectie op de opkomst van synthetische biologie
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Vriend, H. de, R. van Est en B. Walhout (2007) Leven maken: Maatschappelijke reflectie op de opkomst van synthetische biologie. The Hague: Rathenau Institute.
Advisory Report from the Gene Patents Committee of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences
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De gevolgen van het octrooieren van humane genen voor het wetenschappelijk onderzoek in Nederland, Advisory Report from the Gene Patents Committee of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, Amsterdam, August 2003, http://www.knaw.nl/publicaties/pdf/20031057.pdf
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Synthetische biologie; een onderzoeksveld met voortschrijdende gevolgen Bilthoven: Netherlands Commission on Genetic Modification
Synthetische biologie; een onderzoeksveld met voortschrijdende gevolgen. Bilthoven: Netherlands Commission on Genetic Modification, 2006. Monitoring Report CGM/060228-03.
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